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Година 3, Број 2, 2012.

# БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ ДИЈАЛОЗИ

СПИСАНИЕ ОД ОБЛАСТА НА БЕЗБЕДНОСТА, ОДБРАНАТА И МИРОВНИТЕ НАУКИ



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Уредувачки одбор/Editorial board: тел. (+389) 2 3066 232, email: sd@fzf.ukim.edu.mk

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## ПРЕДГОВОР НА УРЕДНИКОТ

Почитувани читатели,

Во периодот помеѓу двата броја за 2012 година, списанието „Безбедносни дијалози“ успешно ја заврши регистрацијата во престижната база на списанија со отворен пристап (DOAJ – Directory of Open Access Journal). Оваа база на списанија е насочена кон зголемување на видливоста и поедноставување на користењето на научни и академски списанија со отворен пристап. Вклучувањето во базата е уште една потврда дека списанието „Безбедносни дијалози“ ги задоволува потребните критериуми кои меѓу другото налагаат имплементиран систем за контрола на квалитетот на објавените содржини.

Вториот број за 2012 година на читателите ќе им понуди различни содржини со интересни методолошки пристапи кон истражуваните проблеми. Овој број е збогатен со пригодното обраќање и предавање на министерката за внатрешни работи м-р Гордана Јакнулоска на тема „Тероризмот на почетокот на XXI век“. Поводот за средба со министерката беше потпишувањето на Меморандумот за соработка помеѓу Филозофскиот факултет – Институт за безбедност, одрбана и мир и Министерството за внатрешни работи. Понатаму, следуваат позитивно рецензираните научни трудови кои нудат различни содржини и во голема мерка го збогатуваат научниот опус во безбедносната, одбранбената и мировната сфера. Како оригинален научен труд е детерминиран трудот на проф. д-р Кристијан Валар, декан на факултетот за право и политички науки при Универзитетот во Ница, Франција. Авторот е гостин предавач на Вториот циклус студии на Институтот за безбедност, одбрана и мир. Во оваа прилика пишува за НАТО и Арапската пролет – средствата за една комплексна ситуација. Следуваат седум научни трудови кои се однесуваат на следните истражувачки проблеми: НАТО и животната средина, идентификувачките обележја на тероризмот и организираниот криминал, лиците на нелегална и присилна миграција во Република Македонија, одговорот на дилемата: воена или невоена безбедност, улогата на дипломатијата во зачленувањето на Република Македонија во Европската унија, влијанието на социјалната политика на одрживото градење мир – случајот на Косово и бунтовништвото и неговата мутирачка природа во XXI век. На самиот крај се поместени приказите за традиционалните и современи концепти на безбедноста и институционалните капацитети за спроведување на политиката кон дијаспората на Република Македонија.

Со почит,

Проф. д-р Тони Милески

Главен и одговорен уредник



**EDITOR'S NOTE**

Dear readers,

In the period between the two issues of 2012, the Journal "Security Dialogues" successfully finalized the registration process for the prestige Directory of Open Access Journals. This directory of journals is directed towards increasing the visibility and simplifying the use of open access scientific and academic journals. Inclusion in the directory confirms yet again that the Journal "Security Dialogues" fulfils the needed criteria, which among other things impose an implemented system for quality control of the published content.

The second issue for 2012 will offer its readers a variety of content with interesting methodological approaches towards the issues being researched. This issue is also enriched with the occasional speech and lecture of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Gordana Jankuloska, M.A., on the topic of "Terrorism at the Beginning of the XXI century". The reason for a meeting with the Minister was the signing of the Memorandum for Collaboration between the Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Security, Defence and Peace Studies, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition, one can find reviewed scientific articles that offer different content and largely enrich the scientific opus in the field of security, defence and peace. The article by Christian Vallar, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Studies at the University of Nice, France, is considered to be an original scientific article. The abovementioned author is a guest lecturer for the second cycle of studies at the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace Studies. In this work he specifically writes about NATO and the Arab Spring - the means for a complex situation. The Journal contains seven scientific works, which pertain to the following research issues: NATO and the environment, the identifying characteristics of terrorism and organized crime, the forms of illegal and forced migration in R. Macedonia, the answer to the dilemma of war and non-war security, the role of diplomacy in Macedonia's EU membership, the influence of social politics in the persistent building of peace - the case with Kosovo and rebelliousness and its mutating nature in the XXI century. The final part concludes with the stories of the traditional and contemporary concepts of security, and the institutional capacities for conducting the politics towards the diaspora of R. Macedonia.

Sincerely,  
Prof. Toni Mileski, PhD  
Editor in chief



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## ТЕРОРИЗМОТ НА ПОЧЕТОКОТ НА XXI ВЕК

М-р Гордана Јанкулоска

Министер за внатрешни работи на Република Македонија

Почитувани,

Дозволете ми на самиот почеток од ова предавање, најпрво, да ја искажам благодарноста за поканата, но и честа што ми е укажана - да говорам пред овој, за мене лично, значаен аудиториум на идни академски граѓани. Темата заради која денес сме тука, бездруго, претставува една од, во глобални рамки, прилично експлоатираниите предмети на јавна и институционална дебата, на теоретско и практично опсервирање, особено последниве две децении.

Имено, феноменот на тероризмот се наметна во фокусот на интересирање како на пошироката јавност, така и на самите општества и општествени системи првенствено поради неколку битни причини:

- на прво место тука е своевидното глобално етаблирање на тероризмот како „средство“ во намерите за остварување на наводните - најчесто политички, етнички, или религиозни права;

- второ, поради неспорниот факт дека насилството како ексклузивен инструмент на тероризмот, со своите уништувачки капацитети воспостави далеку пошироки граници на дејствување и следствено на тоа станаа далеку позастрашувачки ефектите од неговата употреба;

- трето, и не помалку важно – таргетот кон кој се насочува тероризмот за да стигне до своите вистински цели е проширен, односно, така да речам, бива „дефокусиран“ од порано вообичаените мети – институции, политички личности и слично. Сега, тероризмот првенствено е насочен кон граѓанството, односно тие не се веќе само колатерална штета туку и директна жртва;

- и конечно, четврто - самото терористичко организирање на оперативно, тактичко и стратешко рамниште евидентно се надгради, па денес општествата, односно меѓународната заедница немаат работа со, ајде така да ги наречеме - идеолошки десперадоси, туку со одлично организационо, финансиски и технолошки подготвени групи во чијашто мрежа, како дополнителна компликација, се испреплетуваат и интереси на други групи, организации, па ако сакате и на држави, коишто неретко можат тероризмот да го користат како параван зад кој тие ги туркаат своите интереси.

Се разбира, овие неколку компоненти не мора да бидат третираны по поставениот редослед, ниту пак грубо дефинирани на нотирааниот начин, особено што се

презентирани од аспект на практичното, а не теоретското согледување на феноменот на тероризмот, сега на почетокот на 21-от век. Впрочем, денес во науката, постојат мноштво дефиниции на тероризмот, но како за ниедна друга област тие без оглед на разликите сепак се и подеднакво теоретски коректни во својата суштина, а тоа е: насилиството како акт и средство, а жртвите и штетите како ефект на притисок за остварување на посакуваните цели.

Значи, кога говориме за феноменот на тероризмот, во оваа ера на глобализација и силни општествено-интегративни процеси, мораме да ги имаме предвид базичните премиси што предмалку ги посочив.

На историската сцена во општествениот и цивилизациски развој на човештвото, биполарниот свет и „студената војна“ кои ги дефинираа глобалните, па и регионалните односи во поголемиот дел од втората половина на минатиот век сега веќе неповратно се минато. Исто како што стана минато оној специфичен претежно „левичарски“ детерминиран облик на тероризам својствен за тој период. Притоа, сакам да напоменам дека глобализацијата никако не треба да се гледа како „замена“ за биполаризмот, туку пред сè како своевиден транзициски процес во рекомпонирањето на меѓународните односи и стандарди.

Во таквиот вакуум, и тероризмот како појава претрпе свое фундаментално реструктурирање прераснувајќи од реалтивно ограничен акт на дејствување во акт на закана насочен кон она што денес го нарекуваме колективна безбедност. Сакам да кажам дека глобализацијата напоредно со неспорните предности, донесе и закани, причинети првенствено од продлабочувањето на јазот помеѓу сиромашните и богатите, а проследено и со интернационализација на низа опасности, од кои најекстремни се меѓународниот тероризам и организираниот криминал. Покрај нив, во експанзија се и илегалната миграција и илегалната трговија со дрога, оружје, луѓе и со стратегиски материјали. Исто така, зголемена е и опасноста од употреба на оружје за масовно уништување кое го поседуваат и земји со недемократски режими. Сето ова, мора да биде вкалкулирано доколку се сака оспежно и суштинско опсервирање на денешното манифестирање на тероризмот.

Всушност, нема да биде претерување ако кажеме дека тероризмот во моментот претставува еден од најголемите антагонизми во процесот на глобалистичката општествено-цивилизациона транзиција. Погоре нотираните трендови дополнително му овозможуваат на тероризмот максимално да се интернационализира и практично да се инфилтрира како противник секаде и на секое место. Така што денес ниту една држава не може да биде имуна од заканите на терористичкото дејствување, вклучително и нашата.

Имено, напредно со фактичките последици – загрозување или уништување на човечки животи, тероризмот предизвикува објективни кризни состојби и во вистински смисол на зборот претставува опасност по мирот и територијалниот интегритет на државите кои се изложени на неговото дејствување.

Ова оттаму што актите на тероризам вперени против државите всушност честопати се експлицитен повод за засилување или продлабочување на внатрешните политички, верски или други поделби, со паралелни, исто такви рефлексии и во рамки на меѓународната заедница.

Во тој смисол сакам уште еднаш да потенцирам дека темпото на - условно кажано - развојот на тероризмот, е исклучително брзо како по формата така и по неговата содржина, типови или облици на организирање, опременост и дејствување. Говорејќи од безбедносен аспект, согледувањата и анализите покажуваат дека терористичките групи денес сè повеќе ги карактеризира факторот на изненадување, особено по примарната цел – државата или системот на истата. Дополнителниот елемент што ја усложнува состојбата во контекст на безбедноста е што предмалку споменатата интернационализација на тероризмот овозможува и негова соодветна динамичност и прилагодливост не само кон и во различните држави и околности, туку и во поглед на самото спроведување на терористичките акти.

Ова, пак, нè доведува до новиот детектиран атрибут на денешниот тероризам – а тоа е масовноста на целите на напад пред сè меѓу цивилното население, што ги мултиплицира, како ефект, чувствата на несигурност, загрозеност, страв, деморализираност, колебливост и слично.

Изложени на ваквите сериозни предизвици кои ги наметнува феноменот на тероризмот сведоци сме дека државите, на национално, но и на меѓународно рамниште, во изминатите години беа соочени со потребата за адекватен одговор кон тие закани. Морам да забележам, всушност, дека меѓународната заедница по падот на Берлинскиот ѕид, со што беше окончана ерата на „студената војна“ и „биполарниот свет“, интензивно отпочна со редифинирање и конципирање на едни поинакви стандарди, како во нормативен, така и во секој друг општествен поглед, а во функција на што поуспешно спротивставување на тероризмот. Тие напори по познатите настани од 11 септември 2001-та година, сосема разбирливо, добија уште поголем интензитет. Притоа, во основата на сите меѓународно промовирани и верификувани документи јасно е зацртано дека е невозможно спротивставување и борба против тероризмот без истовремено почитување на меѓународните принципи на заштита на човековите права. Односно, дека борбата против тероризмот не смее да биде на сметка на намалување или укинување на тие вредности и слободи кон коишто реално се насочени

терористичките акти. Врз основа на таквиот фундамент се креираат и националните и меѓународните безбедносни стратегии.

Мора да се признае дека димензијата на глобалната безбедност како никогаш порано, во актуелниот момент, со право е високо позиционирана во рамките на меѓународните односи.

Република Македонија, пак, зазема свое значајно место, не само поради тоа што ние ги имаме ратификувано сите битни меѓународно донесени норми од посочената проблематика, туку и поради ноторниот факт што ние со години наназад сме активни и ефективни партиципиенти во сите важни меѓународни активности на тој план. Почнувајќи од нашето конкретно учество во мисиите во Ирак и Авганистан, па преку мноштвото активности во сите релевантни меѓународни организации и институции во сферата на безбедноста.

Ова не случајно го споменувам, пред конкретно да се осврнам на прашањето околу третманот на тероризмот од внатрешен аспект, затоа што унапредувањето на формите и методите на соработка меѓу државите независно дали на билатерално, мултилатерално, или меѓународно институционално рамниште, прерасна во императив, а сè со цел навремено спротивставување и уништување на какви било појавни облици на тероризмот.

Република Македонија тој тренд го препозна, и тоа стана една од клучните карактеристики во нашето надворешнополитичко дејствување. Дотолку повеќе што реалноста јасно покажа дека денес ниту една земја не може да се чувствува безбедна или заобиколена од потенцијалните ризици на терористичкото дејствување. Токму затоа е важен меѓународниот, особено превентивен настап во системот на колективна безбедност во којшто, како што реков, Република Македонија, иако мала земја, има свое бележито место.

Иако безбедноста во термилошки и практичен смисол денес опфаќа прилично широк корпус на сегменти, како што е на пример, економската безбедност или безбедноста на животната средина и слично, кои се составни ставки на генералните концепти за национална или меѓународна безбедност, сепак и натаму главен чинител во борбата против тероризмот како една од најопасните закани врз безбедноста, остануваат, така да ги наречам, класичните безбедносни институции, како што впрочем е ресорот за внатрешни работи. Исто како што, без оглед на сè подинамичното меѓународно организирање и настапување, националната безбедност останува сè уште главната константа во борбата против сите закани, вклучително и тероризмот.

Во таа насока, а тргнувајќи од позицијата на министер за внатрешни работи, дозволете ми да акцентирам некои важни елементи во контекст на нашата национална

безбедност. Имено, Република Македонија од поодамна, не само во рамки на нашето активно учеството во меѓународните односи, како и нормативното верификување и имплементирање на меѓународните легислативни стандарди од оваа област на безбедноста, туку и на внатрешен план презеде низа структурни реформи заради наше системско и институционално прилагодување кон потребите, капацитетите и интересите за зачувување и заштита на националната безбедност од предизвиците на тероризмот.

Врз основа на Националната концепција за одбрана и безбедност, Владата на Република Македонија изготви и Национална стратегија на Република Македонија за борба против тероризмот 2011-2015 година, како документ во којшто се дадени јасни насоки за натамошно институционално организирање и дејствување, при што прецизно се дефинирани, како целите, така и облиците на терористички закани, мерките за сузбивање на тероризмот, материјалните ресурси, носителите на стратегијата и динамиката за нејзино имплементирање.

Притоа, во Националната стратегија недвосмислено се акцентира дека Република Македонија ја демонстрира својата цврста определба за борба против тероризмот на национално, регионално и глобално ниво за заштита на демократските вредности утврдени со Уставот на РМ, овозможувајќи им на своите граѓани да живеат во слободна, безбедна и правна држава. Се разбира, фокусот на севкупното делување треба да биде свртен кон превентивните активности за елиминирање на сите потенцијални опасности од појава на тероризмот и натамошна ескалација на последиците од истиот. Впрочем, не попусто е назначено во Стратегијата дека дејствијата на тероризмот се казниви и не се оправдани под никакви околности, или како што предвидува и нашиот Кривичен законик, делата поврзани со тероризмот се дела против државата, односно против граѓаните како конституенти на таа држава.

Националната стратегија, тргнувајќи од факторите клучни за севкупното општествено функционирање, ги идентификува облиците, но и можностите на манифестирање на терористичките закани. Притоа, таксативно посочувајќи ги: радикализацијата, регрутирањето и поттикнувањето на активностите кои се во функција на тероризмот; идеолошката и воената обука; потоа финансирањето на тероризмот, и реализацијата на терористичките закани – како облици на терористичка закана.

Стратегијата го нотира и нивното манифестирање како: напад на објекти и лица од национален интерес; напад со предизвикување голем број жртви; напад на институции и објекти од значење за одбраната, безбедноста, политичките и економски интереси на државата, со што би се предизвикало ширење страв и несигурност меѓу населението.

Практично, може да се забележи дека при детерминирањето на овој сегмент од Националната стратегија за борба против тероризмот водена е сметка како за опфатноста, така и за неговата комплементарност со актуелните меѓународни принципи. Ова дотолку повеќе што Република Македонија како земја кандидат за членство во ЕУ и НАТО, и уште поважно - суштински многу конкретен партнер во НАТО, дури повеќе и од многу земји членки на оваа евро-атланска организација, практично го сноси ризикот за потенцијален таргет на евентуални терористички акти.

Токму заради тоа, Националната стратегија многу подетално ги насочува активностите во делот посветен на „мерките за сузбивање на тероризмот“ делејќи ги на неколку нивоа: превенција; одбрана; заштита на граѓаните и имотот; процесуирање и координација.

1. Под превенција подразбираме создавање политички, општествени и економски услови кои ќе го попречат ширењето на тероризмот во сите негови појавни облици. Поконкретно, превенцијата опфаќа анализа на ризик со систем на ранопредупредување, оневозможување на пропаганда и поттикнување на тероризам, препознавање и сузбивање радикализам и екстремизам кои може да прераснат во тероризам, прекинување на изворите за финансирање на тероризмот, како и техничко-информатичка, но и професионална надградба на релевантните институции.
2. Одбраната од тероризмот подразбира преземање мерки и активности насочени против создавање, ширење и делување на терористички структури, мрежи и организации, а воедно навремено откривање на плановите, подготовките, организирањето или спроведувањето активности со карактеристики на тероризам на територијата на Република Македонија. Оттаму, во делот на одбраната спаѓа оневозможување на организациски и логистички активности со терористички цели, спречување терористичка идеолошка и воена обука, зголемена контрола на транзит на лица поврзани со тероризам, илегална трговија со оружје, експлозив и други средства наменети за потенцијални терористички активности, идентификување лица кои престојувале во кризни подрачја и се стекнале со терористичка обука, како и спречување на транзит и користење средства за масовно уништување и средства со двојна намена.
3. Заштитата на граѓаните и имотот подразбира намалување на опасноста од напад вклучувајќи го подобрувањето на безбедноста на границите, сообраќајната инфраструктура и објектите од витално значење. Стратегијата тоа го предвидува преку преземање засилени безбедносни мерки, соодветно информирање и зајакнување на контролата на сите чувствителни точки.



4. Што се однесува до процесуирањето, истото претставува спроведување казни мерки за прогон на лица и организации поврзани преку тероризмот. Покрај соодветните истраги и усогласувањето на регулативата, во овие мерки исклучително важно е замрзнувањето и одземањето финансии и имот на физички и правни лица поврзани со тероризам.

Од суштинско значење е што во тој дел од документот се инсистира на континуиран институционален ангажман притоа проследен со соодветно, исто така постојано и динамично надградување –техничко, кадровско, организационо, нормативно - на институциите задолжени за справување со тероризмот за да можат соодветно да одговорат на заканите што тероризмот ги носи.

Секако, што е и разбирливо, носечките институции во имплементацијата на Националната стратегија на чело со Министерството за внатрешни работи се: Управата за безбедност и контраразузнавање при МБР, Агенцијата за разузнавање и Секторот за воена безбедност и разузнавање при Министерството за одбрана коишто ја чинат сржта на заедничкото работно тело во координирање на активностите за доследно реализирање на овој стратешки документ.

Во Националната стратегија согласно најдобрите практики е опфатено и менаџирањето на последиците од терористички напад кое се дефинира како одговор и подготвеност на сите безбедносни и други институции во Република Македонија за навремено преземање на сите потребни мерки со цел намалување и санирање на последиците од терористички напад. Тоа подразбира идентификување на цивилните и воените ресурси за координиран одговор во случај на напад, механизми за заштита и спасување и зајакнување на регионалната и мултилатералната соработка за навремена реакција и помош при терористички напад.

Во изминативе години Владата на Република Македонија, и пред сè Министерството за внатрешни, силно и посветено ја демонстрираше својата решителност во бескомпромисната борба против тероризмот. Инвестирањето во квалитативното подобрување на организационите, законските и технички капацитети за справување со овој вид закани е само дел од напорите кои ги вложувавме во таа насока. Истовремено, ниту за малку не заостанувајќи во активното меѓународно партнерство и соработка во глобалната коалиција против тероризмот за што впрочем постојано добиваме признанија од нашите партнери од ЕУ и НАТО.

Таквиот светоглед дополнително аргументиран и со нашата јасно изразена политичка решителност и волја, останува еден од оние најважни национални, односно државни приоритети кои се и во интерес на македонски интеграциски аспирации, но уште поважно во интерес на сите граѓани на Република Македонија.

Вооружената група која се стационираше во Бродец, но и грозоморниот масакр кај Смилковското Езеро ни го презентираа одблиску грдото лице на теоризмот во нашиот двор. Со акциите „Планинска бура“ и „Монструм“ покажавме дека можеме соодветно да одговориме во ситуација кога сме нападнати.

Ние, ниту смееме, ниту сакаме да отстапиме од одбраната на демократските вредности утврдени со Уставот на Р. Македонија и затоа сметам дека ваквите расправи и анализите на тероризмот на академско ниво ќе ни обезбедат подобро разбирање на феноменот, поголема ефикасност во борбата со него, со што ќе им овозможиме на нашите граѓани да живеат во слободна, безбедна и правна држава.

## **TERRORISM AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY**

**MA Gordana Jankuloska**  
**Minister of Internal Affairs**

Dear,

At the very beginning of this lecture, let me first express my gratitude for the invitation and the honor that I was given - to speak in front of this, personally, for me, a significant audience of future academics. The subject, because of which we are here today, of course, is one of the globally exploited subjects of public and institutional debates, of theoretical and practical observation, especially in the last two decades.

The phenomenon of terrorism has emerged in the focus of interest of the broader public, societies and the social systems, mostly because of two main reasons:

In the first place, here is the global establishment of terrorism as a "tool" in the intentions for achieving the alleged mainly political, ethnic, or religious rights;

Secondly, due to the undeniable fact that violence as an exclusive instrument of terrorism, with its destructive capacities sets further limits of action and consequently the threatening effects became greater from its use;

Thirdly, and no less important - the target towards which terrorism moves to reach its true goals is extended, that is, so to say "defocused" from the previous targets-political figures and institutions etc. Now terrorism is primarily directed towards the citizenry, that they are no longer just collateral damage but a direct victim;

And finally, the fourth - the terrorist organization itself is evidently upgraded on operational, tactical and strategic level, so societies, or international communities now do not have to deal with the so called - ideological desperados, but with excellently organized, financially and technologically equipped groups in whose network, as a further complication, intertwine interests of other groups, organizations, and countries, and can often use terrorism as a curtain behind which they realize their goals.

Of course, these few components need not to be treated in the given order, or generally defined in the noted way, especially when they are presented in terms of practical but not in theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism, now, at the beginning of the 21st century. Anyway, today in science, there are many definitions of terrorism, but as for any other area, regardless of the diversity, they are equally theoretically correct in its essence, that is: violence as an act and instrument, and victims and damages as an effect of pressure for achieving the desired goals.

So, when we talk about the phenomenon of terrorism, in this era of globalization and strong social integration processes, we must keep in mind the basic premises I pointed above.

At the historical stage in the social and cultural development of mankind, the bipolar world and the "Cold War" that defined the global and regional relations in most of the second half of the last century are now an irretrievable past. Just as that characteristic, mainly the "leftist" determined shape of terrorism, specific for that period of time, has become a past. However, I want to mention that globalization must never be viewed as a "replacement" for bipolarism, but rather as a kind of transitional process in recomposing international relations and standards.

In such a vacuum, terrorism itself as a phenomenon went through its fundamental reconstruction, growing from relatively limited action into an act of menace directed towards what is now called collective security. I want to say that globalization along with the undeniable advantages brought threats, caused primarily by the deepened gap between rich and poor, and accompanied by the internationalization of dangers, the most extreme of which are international terrorism and organized crime. Moreover, illegal migration, drug, arms, human and strategic materials trafficking are in expansion. The danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction wielded by countries with undemocratic regimes is increased, too. All this must be calculated for the essential observation of today's manifestation of terrorism.

Actually, it will not be an exaggeration if we say that terrorism currently represents one of the largest antagonisms in the process of global sociocultural transition. The above mentioned trends additionally allowed the terrorism maximally to be internationalized and practically to be infiltrated as an opponent anywhere and at any place. So that today no country can be immune to the threat of terrorist activity, including our country, too.

Namely, along with the actual consequences - endangering or destroying human lives, terrorism causes objective critical conditions and in the true sense of the word it means a threat to the peace and the territorial integrity of the countries that are exposed to its action.

Acts of terrorism aimed against countries are actually often explicit occasion for reinforcement or enhancement of internal political, religious or other divisions, with parallel and the same reflections and within the international community.

In that sense, once again I would like to emphasize that, relatively speaking, the pace of development of terrorism is extremely fast both in form and in its content, types or forms of organizing, equipment and action. From a security point of view, the observations and analysis show that today's terrorist groups are more and more characterized by the factor of surprise, especially in the sense of its primary objective, the country or the system of the country. The additional element that complicates the situation in the context of security is that the above mentioned internationalization of terrorism allows its proper dynamism and adaptability not only to and from different countries and circumstances, but also in terms of actual implementation of terrorist acts.

This leads to the newly detected attribute of terrorism today - and that is the mass of targets of attacks among the civilian population, which multiplies as an effect, the feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, fear, demoralization, uncertainty and so on.

Exposed to such serious challenges imposed by the phenomenon of terrorism, we have seen that countries, on national and international level, in the past years, were faced with the need for an adequate response to these threats. I have to say that the international community after the fall of the "Berlin Wall", which ended the era of the "Cold War" and "bipolar world", started intensively to redefine and conceptualize different standards, both in normative and in any other social terms, and in order to successfully counter terrorism. Those efforts, after the famous events from 11 September 2001, quite understandably, received even greater intensity. Moreover, in the basis of all internationally promoted and verified documents, it is clearly set out that opposition and fight against terrorism are impossible without simultaneously respect of international principles of protection of human rights. The fight against terrorism must not be at the expense of reducing or abolishing these values and freedom, towards which terrorist acts actually target. Based on this foundation, national and international security strategies are created.

It must be agreed that the dimension of global security at the moment, like never before, is rightfully highly positioned within international relations.

Meanwhile, Republic of Macedonia occupies an important place, not only because we have ratified all the relevant internationally adopted norms of the given issue, but also because of the noted fact that in the past few years, we are active participants in all relevant international activities; since our concrete participation in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and through many activities in all relevant international organizations and institutions in the field of security.

I do not mention this accidentally, before I directly address the issue of treatment of terrorism from an internal aspect, because the improvement of the forms and methods of cooperation between countries, whether on bilateral, multilateral, or international institutional level, has grown into an imperative in order to oppose and destroy any manifestations of terrorism.

The Republic of Macedonia recognized that trend, and it has become one of the key features in our foreign policy action. Moreover, the reality today made it clear that no country can feel safe or surrounded by the potential risks of terrorist activities. For that reason, the international, especially the preventive action in the system of collective security is particularly important, in which, as I said the Republic of Macedonia, although a small country, has its noticeable place.

Although security today, terminologically and practically, covers quite a wide corps of segments such as economic security or environmental security etc., that are constituent parts of the general concepts of national or international security, however, the major player in the fight against terrorism as one of the most dangerous threats to security still remain, so to call them, the classic security institutions, as it is the department of the Interior. Regardless of the more dynamic international organization and action, the national security still remains the main constant in the fight against all threats, including terrorism.

In that direction, starting from the position of Minister of Internal Affairs, let me emphasize some important elements in the context of our national security. Namely, the Republic of Macedonia since long time, not only within the frames of our active participation in international relations, but the normative verification and implementation of international legislative standards in the field of security, as well as internally undertaken, I would say, series of structural reforms for systematical and institutional adaptation to the needs, capacities and interests for the preservation and protection of the national security from the challenges of terrorism.

Based on the National Concept for Security and Defense, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia prepared The National Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia on the fight against terrorism 2011-2015, as a document which provides clear guidelines for further institutional organization and activity, whereby the goals and the forms of terrorist threats, the measures to combat terrorism, material resources, the holders of the strategy and its implementation dynamics are precisely defined.

In addition, the National Strategy clearly emphasizes that Republic of Macedonia demonstrates its strong commitment to fight terrorism on national, regional and global levels in order to protect the democratic values determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, allowing its own citizens to live in a free, safe and legal country. Of

course, the focus of the whole operation should be faced towards the preventive activities for elimination of all the potential dangers of the appearance of terrorism and further escalation of the consequences of it. Anyway, not without a purpose, it is indicated in the Strategy that the acts of terrorism are criminal and are justified under no circumstances, or as provided by our Penal Code, acts related to terrorism are acts against the country, respectively against the citizens as constituents of that country.

The National Strategy, starting from the key factors for the overall social functioning, identifies the forms and possibilities of manifestation of terrorist threats and exhaustively points the radicalization, recruitment and stimulating activities that are in function of the terrorism; ideological and military training; then the financing of terrorism, and the realization of terrorist threats - as forms of terrorist threat.

The Strategy notes their manifestations such as: attack of objects and people of national interests; attack causing many casualties; attack of institutions and facilities of importance to the defense and security, the political and economic interests of the country, which would cause spread of fear and insecurity among the population.

Practically, it is obvious that in determining this segment of the National Strategy on the fight against terrorism, the danger and its volume and complementarity with the current international principles are heeded. The Republic of Macedonia as a candidate country for membership in EU and NATO, and more importantly - fundamentally very specific partner in NATO, even more than many countries of the Euro-Atlantic organization, practically bears the risk for a potential target of possible terrorist acts.

For that reason, the National Strategy directs the activities in the section devoted to "measures to combat terrorism" in details, dividing them in several levels: prevention; defense; protection of citizens and property; processing and coordination.

1. By prevention we mean creation of political, social and economic conditions that will inhibit the spread of terrorism in all its manifestations. More concretely, prevention includes analysis of risk with a system of early prevention, disabling propaganda and inciting terrorism, recognizing and combating radicalism and extremism that can grow into terrorism, interruption of the sources that finance the terrorism, as well as technical information and professional superstructure of relevant institutions.
2. Defense against terrorism means measures and activities directed against the creation, dissemination and action of terrorist networks, structures and organizations, as well as timely detecting plans, preparations, organization or conducting activities with characteristics of terrorism on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Hence, in the part of defense belongs disabling the

organizational and logistics activities with terrorist purposes, preventing terrorist ideological and military training, increased control of transit of people associated with terrorism, illegal arms, explosives and other resources for potential terrorist activities trafficking, identifying people who stayed in crisis areas and acquired a terrorist training, as well as preventing transit and use of weapons of mass destruction and dual-use assets.

3. Protection of citizens and property means reducing the danger of attack, including improvement of borders safety, transport infrastructure and facilities of vital importance .The Strategy provides that by taking tight security measures, appropriate information and strengthening the control of all sensitive points.
4. The Proceeding itself is the application of sanctions to prosecute people and organizations connected by terrorism. Despite the appropriate investigations and regulatory compliance, the freezing and seizing of assets of natural and legal persons associated with terrorism is vitally important.

Of vital importance is the fact that in this part of the document it is insisted on continuous institutional engagement accompanied by a proper continuously and dynamically updating -technical, personnel, organizational, normative-of institutions responsible for dealing with terrorism to be able to respond appropriately to threats that terrorism brings.

Certainly, what is also understandable, the leading institutions in implementation of the National Strategy led by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs are: Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate in the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, The Intelligent Agency and the Military Security and Intelligence Sector in the Ministry of Defense that constitute the core of the mutual working body to coordinate activities for consistent implementation of this strategic document.

The National Strategy, in accordance with the best practices, covers managing of consequences of a terrorist attack which is defined as a response and preparedness of all security and other institutions in the Republic of Macedonia to timely take all the necessary measures in order to reduce and sanify the consequences of a terrorist attack. It involves identification of civilian and military resources for a coordinated response in the event of an attack, mechanisms for protection and rescue and strengthening of the regional and multilateral cooperation for timely response and assistance in a terrorist attack.

In the past few years, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, and mostly the Ministry of Internal Affairs, strongly and dedicatedly demonstrated its determination in the uncompromising fight against terrorism. Investing in qualitative improvement of the

organizational, legal and technical capacities to deal with this kind of threat is only a part of the efforts invested in this direction. In the same time, keeping pace with the active international partnership and cooperation in the global coalition against terrorism for what we consistently receive accolades from our partners in the EU and NATO.

The worldview of that kind being further argued, with our clearly expressed political will and determination, remains one of those most important national or state priorities, being in the interests of the Macedonian integration aspirations, but more importantly, in the interests of all the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

The armed group that was stationed in Brodec and horrifying massacre at Smilkovci Lake presented us closely the ugly face of terrorism in our yard. We showed that we can respond appropriately in a situation when we are attacked with the actions "Mountain Storm" and "Monster"

We neither dare, nor want to withdraw from the defense of the democratic values determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and I think that these discussions and analyzes of terrorism on academic level will provide us a better understanding of the phenomenon, greater efficiency in the fight against it, which will enable our citizens to live in a free, safe and legal state.



## NATO AND THE ARAB SPRING-THE MEANS FOR A COMPLEX SITUATION

### НАТО И АРАПСКАТА ПРОЛЕТ-СРЕДСТВАТА ЗА ЕДНА СЛОЖЕНА СИТУАЦИЈА

Christian VALLAR, PhD in public law, Professor of the Law Colleges, Director of the Public Law Department, Director of the Centre for studies and researches in administrative, constitutional, and financial law, EA 7267, Dean of the Law and Political science Faculty of the University of Nice Sophia Antipolis (France)  
vallar@unice.fr

**Abstract:** NATO hasn't disappeared with the end of the cold war. The new strategic concept of the Lisbon summit in 2010 and the military intervention in Libya in 2011 which implied it at the heart of the "Arab spring" are good evidences for this. This spring was first a source of hope, but quickly became a topic about eventual threats. Islamist victories and salafist violence's need NATO care.

The organization have means to face them, with security cooperation such Mediterranean dialogue and Istanbul cooperation initiative, and targeted operations, like Active Endeavour and Ocean shield.

**Key words:** NATO-Arab spring-Islamism-salafism-security cooperation

**Апстракт:** НАТО не исчезна со завршувањето на „Студената војна“. Самитот од Лисабон и новиот стратегиски концепт од 2010 година како и воената интервенција во Либија од 2011 година која беше носител на „Арапската пролет“ претставуваат евидентни докази за тоа. Таа пролет, на самиот почеток беше извор на надеж, но многу брзо премина во тема за евентуални закани. Исламистичките победи и салафистичкото насилство побаруваа заштита од НАТО. НАТО има начини за соочување со нив, првенствено преку безбедносната соработка како што е Медитеранскиот договор и Истанбулската иницијатива за соработка, како и операциите како што се „активни напори“ и „океански штит“.

**Клучни зборови:** НАТО, арапска пролет, исламизам, салафизам, безбедносна соработка.

## INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War and the conflicts between the East and the West might have spelt the end for NATO, which was created to answer the threat of the Soviet Union. It is common knowledge that no such thing happened and that NATO not only survived but was also reinforced afterwards. At the Lisbon Summit of November 19 and 20, 2010, NATO voted its new strategic concept, renewing its commitment to mutual defense: the threat of nuclear proliferation and weapons of mass destruction with the anti-missile shield, the emphasis put on cyberdefence, energy safety, cooperative safety, smart defense, and the fight against terrorism are essential concerns, requiring action and structuring its approach (Mongrenier, 2012).

The MAY 20, 2012 Chicago Summit of the Atlantic Council reaffirmed the main three tasks of NATO, i.e. collective defense, the management of crises and cooperative security, and mentions UN-mandated operation Unified Protector, that is to say the military intervention in Libya in 2011.

The intervention is at the heart of what is referred to in Europe and the Western world as «the Arab Spring», which is presented as the uprising of the oppressed people fighting for Freedom and Democracy, more particularly the surge of young people, using the resources of internet and social networks against well-established dictatorships.

Even if the revolt started in January 2011, i.e. in Winter and not in Spring, with the immolation of a young man in Tunisia on December 17 2010, the word «Spring» is here used in reference of the European Revolutions of 1848 called «the Springtime of the Peoples», and more generally in reference to all the insurrections of oppressed people, like the «Prague Spring» of 1968.

NATO could not but feel concerned with the events that directly hit some of its member states- France, Turkey and Italy among others.

However, if the upheaval raises hopes, isn't it as well a cause for concern and potential threats? Does the Alliance have the means to face them?

## IS THE ARAB SPRING A HOPE OR A THREAT?

It took less than a month for the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia to collapse (December 17, 2010- January 14 2011); in Egypt, less than three weeks for Hosni Mubarak to resign after the huge demonstrations on the Tahrir Square in Cairo ( January 25-February 2 2010). In Libya (February 17- October 20 2010), the uprising of the people in Benghazi ended with the brutal death of Mouammar Kaddafi. In Syria, in March 2011, the initial peaceful demonstrations in Deraa were brutally repressed and triggered the ongoing civil war (see declaration of June 2012 of UN Chief of military peacekeeping forces). In Yemen, in 2011,

the early stages of protest against President Ali Abdallah Saleh occurred in February 2011 and ended with the resignation of the President and the election of Abd Mansour Ali on February 21 2012. Bahrain and Morocco may add up to the list but there was no violence used in the latter.

"Arab Spring, The Recovery of Arab Dignity" is the book published by the great writer Tahar ben Jelloun, which is echoed by Bernard Guetta, a former journalist at Le Monde (French daily newspaper) in AN 1 des Révolutions arabes (Year One of the Arab revolutions) and according to whom «nothing can stop the Arab people, especially the Arab youth». Bernard-Henri Lévy, France's most famous proponent of the military intervention in Libya, hence a supporter of NATO's intervention, is convinced that the democratic emancipation of the Arab countries is under way. This idea is widespread among journalists, intellectuals and politicians- it is a remote reminder of the American neo-conservative Democratic and Liberal plan for a «great Middle East» which, along with other factors, was at the origin of the Iraqi war in March 2003- with the major difference that the people act by and for themselves.

However, can't «a slight scent of ethnocentrism- or western-centrism» be noted in that approach that refers to American and European history? Professor Mathieu Guidère points that in Arabic the words «revolt» and «revolution» are synonymous (*thawra*), with negative connotation because generating *fitna* (sedition) among the *oumma*, the group of believers. It's why Arabs use the word NAHDA (awake) (Guidère, 2012). The main claim of the insurgents was dignity, i.e. social justice, and the end of corruption- not Democracy per say.

The Arab Spring is characterized by the absence of leaders and thinkers, and by the impossibility to identify specific ideologies and programmes- consequently the Islamist and Salafist groups, the only forces that are both organizationally and ideologically well-structured, is coming to the fore.

Should the renewal of political Islam in a complicated and confusing context be a ground for concern?

**The hope that had risen when it was believed that the democratic -or even liberal-political forces came into power was seriously undermined by the result of the elections which were undeniably won by the islamist parties.**

In the current context, by «Islamism» is meant an ideology that aims at restoring the *Daoula*, or the Islamic State, as idealized by its supporters, thus involving the conquest of political power. Modernity is used by Islamists for whom «Revelation serves the purpose of revolution» (Olivier Roy, 2002). The movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in

1928 in Egypt by Hassan el Banna, an iconic figure, is the matrix of Islamist movements which has spread through the land of Islam. The Palestinian Hamas, the Libyan Party for Justice and Construction, the Egyptian party for Freedom and Justice, Tunisia Ennahda, the Moroccan party for Justice and Development are the offspring of the Brotherhood and have maintained ties to a greater or lesser extent with the Egyptian Movement. They agree to play by democratic rules even if they have sometimes resorted to violence in the past (Hamas). They have reacted the rewards of their work through their networks of operational solidarity, that go deep into Arab societies.

On November 14 2011, the Ennahda movement won 40% of the votes in the Constituent Assembly election in Tunisia and Ennahda's leader Jebali was appointed Prime Minister. In 2011 The Party for Justice and Development reached 27% of the votes in Morocco, and his leader also became Prime Minister after being appointed by King Mohamed VI. It is interesting to note that those two parties have formed a coalition with other political parties of different opinions (like the left-wing Ettakatol party in Tunisia).

Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood obtained a relative majority in the Constituent Assembly and at June 2012 her candidate for the Presidential campaign Mohammed Morsi won the election with 52% in the second round, against the army's unofficial candidate Ahmed Chafik.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood's landslide victory did not reach Libya, the Party for Justice and Construction obtaining 21.3% of the votes far behind the Alliance of National (so-called «liberal») Forces which won 48.8% of the votes, in the election for the National General Congress of July 7 2012. The events in Yemen have no link with the Arab Spring - it was a war between leaders, controlled by Saudi Arabia and the USA, forcing President Saleh to leave his seat thanks to an «election» prepared for his vice-president and friend Mansour Hadi (Picinin, 2012).

**Should the Islamist victory raise concern or even skepticism among Western countries?**

In Morocco, the Party for Justice and Development recognizes the power of the King and seems to coexist with the makhzen (the Royal control over the country). Its intentions have remained peaceful and conservative so far: after all, isn't the King a direct descendant of the Prophet and the Commander of the Believers?

In Tunisia, Ennahda claims to be a follower of the Turkish AKP Islamist Party which has been in power for years without questioning the fundamental principles of the secular State, while «Islamizing» the legislation whenever it has the opportunity to do so. In February 2012, however, the Ennahda Parliamentary leader suggested that the system of Islamic principles become one of the key references of the future constitution, which could

not include provisions conflicting with the Koran. A bill has been submitted to the Parliament to punish infringements upon «Sacred» values. Prime Minister Jebali himself went as far as bringing up the possibility of a sixth caliphate...

A similar ambiguity is to be noted with the Egyptian Party for Freedom and Justice. The younger members of the party claim that democracy is essential, that Coptic Christians should be considered as brothers and that woman should be equal to men. President Morsi stated that he would not put into question the peace treaty with Israel and reacted very firmly against the commando attacks in Sinai on August 5, 2012. However, a substantial number of «Brothers» do not identify with the modernism of young executives often educated in Western countries, but in the famous quote: «Allah is our objective, Prophet Muhammad is our leader, and the Koran is our constitution».

Similarly Western decision-makers worry about the key part played by the Syrian Brothers at the heart of the revolt, even when the leaders of the Syrian army affirm their determination that Syria respects all confessions.

**The problem comes mostly from the violent Salafist groups for which the Arab Spring is an unexpected opportunity to be back under the spotlight.**

Salafism advocates a return to the idealized Islam of pious ancestors or salafs that give priority to the Sunna and the practice of the Prophet (Rougier, 2008). Ibn Taimiyya in the Twelfth Century and Ibn Abd El Wahhab, the founder of Saudi Wahabism, in the Eighteenth Century are key references of Salafism, having promoted and in stored a rigorist if not puritan Islam.

Salafism often appears in a quietist, unpolitical way, mostly bent on having the believer follow the precepts of the Koran literally. But it is only a short step between the latter approach and Jihadism, or the use of violence in the name of Jihad, sometimes called «the Holy War» -a Christian word- be it local Jihad, as in Chechnya or Afghanistan, or global Jihad (Al Qaida). «All Jihadists are Salafists, by definition, but all Salafists may not necessarily be Jihadists» (Malek Chebel).

It's in Egypt that Salafists have achieved a significant political breakthrough with 25% of the votes in the Constituent Assembly election going to the Al Nour Party (the Light). This party advocates a society where Charia law would apply relentlessly, particularly to women's status, thus challenging the Muslim Brothers who look undeniably keen on modernism and reforms in comparison.

The situation is fairly similar in Tunisia where Salafists are quite powerful. The movement did not run for the 2011 election. A mere Tunisian Party for Prosperity was set up in 2012, a Salafist party, which called for the return of bigamy- Salafists prefer to use street demonstrations as a weapon, be it **sometimes violent**.

Such was the case in Tunisia where riots occurred recurrently. In June 2012 the pretext was an exhibition of paintings that were found anti-Islamic, In October 2011, the premises of a TV Channel were destroyed after a «blasphemous» film had been broadcasted. In April 2012, Salafist students caused violent incidents at the Department of Humanities in the Manouba to demand that female students wear the niqab, unsuccessfully. The pressure being put on Ennahda is quite obvious and some of the most conservative members of the party are quite convinced by it.

President Moncef Marzouki, who comes from the Secular Congress for the Republic, considers that «this is a loud and dangerous phenomenon....which eventually turns out to be not that threatening for society because it is massively rejected. The rejection is shared by the State authorities, including Ennahda» (Marzouki, 2012). Let's believe in his optimism...

If Egypt has become familiar with partisan Salafism in the elections, it also faces Jihadist Salafism. After all, isn't Ayman al Zawahiri, the new leader of Al Qaida, also from Egypt? E. In 2011, even if Jamma Islamaya, an important terrorist group, was dismantled after the frightful attack in Luxor in 1997, terrorist attacks have nevertheless carried on. Between 2004 and 2006, 130 persons died during a series of attacks on seaside resorts in Sinai, where eight Israelis were also killed in 2011. Al Tawhid wal Djihad claimed responsibility for that attack.

Last August 5, 16 Egyptian soldiers were shot by another commando unit who tried in vain to enter Israel, which triggered an immediate reaction from President Morsi, who ordered air strikes, with the agreement of his neighboring state. Sinai has for some time become a home for Jihadists, and Al Qaida has started operating there, fearing a union with Jund Ansar Allah, an important Palestinian group from the Gaza strip (Boltanski, 2012).

On Monday September 17, Imam Fouad Ashoush declared a fatwa sentencing to death the film crew of the Innocence of Muslims on Jihadist internet websites.

In post-Khaddafi Libya no significant Salafist victory has been registered in the polls. Salafists have shown their influence by using arms. Over the last few months, attacks have been committed against Foreigners and British and American- which climaxed with the commando attack on Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi. The Libyan authorities have blamed Ansar al Charia, a Salafist group, which has however denied the accusation (Zelin, 2012). A group named Shield of Jihad is also suspected.

Finally, Syria's armed opposition includes Jihadist fighters from a variety of movements, among which Abdallah Azzam's Brigades, the Al Nusrah Front or Martyr Al Baraa Ibn Malik's Brigade, and Al Qaida itself. However, the relationship between those groups and the Syrian Free Army, which has far more members, are tense and even hostile.

**NATO, along with the EU, has the authority to tackle this major issue. What means does it have to do so? Two types: security cooperation and targeted actions.**

**Security cooperation** is provided within the framework of the Mediterranean dialogue and the Istanbul cooperation initiative. They cover the strategic area of the «great Mediterranean region» (Mongrenier, 2012) which goes as far as the Atlantic border regions of the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East up to the Indus and the Black Sea.

**NATO's Mediterranean dialogue, instituted in 1994**, is based upon the principle that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean area (Mongrenier, 2011). Its general objective is:

- to contribute to security and stability in the area
- to instore better mutual understanding
- to do away with misconceptions about NATO in the countries that takes part in the Dialogue.

The work programme also includes military elements, with port visits by NATO's standing Naval Forces, on-site train-the-trainer sessions by mobile training teams and visits by NATO experts.

The Dialogue involves 7 non-NATO member States- Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

**The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative** which was launched at the summit organized in the Turkish capital in June 2004 aims at contributing to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East practical bilateral security. UAE, Bahrein, and Qatar are part of the agreement which covers number of security issues- terrorism, NBC weapons, trafficking.

The need for NATO to combine security cooperation and targeted actions with bilateral agreements with the countries of the broader Middle East was emphasized during the Marseille NATO Parliamentary Assembly summit on April 11-13, 2012, in front of Member States representatives.

These general frameworks are combined with targeted actions. In the first place, UN-sanctioned, NATO-led intervention (**UN Security Council Resolution 1973**) was the major intervention in the «Arab Spring». With the support of the US, France and Great Britain started a joined operation, similarly to the war in Afghanistan.

No intervention in Syria is planned, even if some NATO member states have become involved individually- France, Germany, Turkey and the USA.

**Active Endeavour**, a maritime initiative was launched right after 9/11, 2001, on October 26, 2001(Opération Active Endeavour, 2011). It was the only Article 5 NATO anti-

terrorist operation that was launched that early. Its target was to detect and dissuade terrorist activities in the Mediterranean region.

In March 2003, Active Endeavour was expanded to include providing escorts to non-military ships from Alliance member states requesting them.

Thus 10,000 merchant ships were hailed and 155 ships being identified as suspicious were subsequently inspected, thanks to a naval task force. The whole Mediterranean region therefore benefits from enhanced security- all the more so since members of the Mediterranean Dialogue also cooperate to Active Endeavour.

Another example is **Operation Ocean Shield**, launched in August 2009 and aiming at deterring piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (Opérations de lutte contre la piraterie, 2011). Yet that example is only distantly related to our topic. The common point is the NATO intervention off Yemen and Somalia, two countries that have been undermined by Jihadists movements- the Shebab in Somalia and Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. The purpose of the operation is not to watch Salafist activists though.

## CONCLUSION

Strategically, NATO goes well beyond a security coalition of its own members. The Alliance is also a community of Euro-Atlantic states and a hub for cooperation with other states, among which those who experienced the «Arab Spring». Such, NATO is a major security factor for all of these countries.

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## NATO AND THE ENVIRONMENT НАТО И ЖИВОТНАТА СРЕДИНА

Marina Malis Sazdovska, Associate Professor, Faculty of Security-Skopje  
mmalis@fb.uklo.edu.mk

**Abstract:** Military activities often have a variety of negative impacts on the environment in which they occur. Environmental breaches of military activities can be a threat to the welfare and habitats. NATO's responsibility is in the protection of the physical and natural environments, where they carry out operations and training. Military training can affect the biodiversity starting from the flora, birds and insects to marine life and marine mammals. Through researches and new technologies, together with the standardization of procedures and training, the Alliance is working to improve the protection of the environment and the nature where it operates. Measures taken are in the direction of protection from hazardous substances (including fuel and oil), waste water treatment, waste management, reduction of the consumption of fossil fuel energy, and application of environmental management systems during NATO's activities.

**Key words:** NATO, environment, operations.

**Апстракт:** Воените активности често имаат различни негативни влијанија врз животната средина во кои тие се случуваат. Нарушувањата на животната средина од воените активности може да биде закана за благосостојбата и живеалиштата. НАТО одговорноста е во делот на заштита на физички и природни средини, каде што се вршат операции и обуки. Воените обуки можат да влијаат врз биодиверзитетот, од растителниот свет, птици и инсекти до морскиот свет и морски цицачи. Преку истражувања и нови технологии, заедно со стандардизацијата на процедурите и обуките, Алијансата работи на подобрување на заштитата на животната средина и природата каде што оперира. Мерките кои се преземаат се во насока на заштита од опасни материи (вклучувајќи гориво и масло), третман на отпадни води, управување со отпад, намалување на потрошувачката на енергија од фосилни горива, како и примена на системи за управување со животна средина за време на НАТО активности.

**Клучни зборови:** НАТО, животна средина, операции.

## INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, the impact of war on the environment is evident worldwide. Modern civilization is constantly challenged how to mitigate the destructive impact of major military forces and operations that they undertake in the crisis, but also in other regions. In order organizing ways of warfare, the means used in the conflicts, and especially the issue of the refugees, victims, etc., number of international conventions as part of the international military and humanitarian law are passed and adopted. With these conventions attempt is made to define the conditions that the military force is applied to and the negative effects that it causes. Namely the international conventions establish a prohibition on the use of certain types of weapons, as well as to nuclear tests. But still there is the possibility of nonobservance to provisions of the conventions and in that case there are serious destructive consequences on the environment by leaders requiring military actions.

With the new achievements of military technology modern combat means with high deadly power are made, whose application enables quick solution of certain combat situations, but the application of such means drastically increases their destructive impact on the environment. Namely the use of the ammunition with depleted uranium, which is more frequently used in local and regional crisis areas, causing particular negative consequences (Mileski, 2011: 140).

The influence of modern military forces on the environment is a result from the application of military destructive power; consequences of the production of means of warfare and military equipment; consequences from the application of the means of warfare; tests that are made and so on.

Specific danger to human health, flora and fauna is coming from the weapons of mass destruction and their use for military purposes. This includes nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, owned by large military forces, and also by some terrorist organizations. The consequences that can arise from the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist attacks are serious and with unforeseeable effects (Malish Sazdovska, 2009: 157).

Eco-terrorism includes pollution threats to water supplies, destroying or disabling of power plants, and etc. The purpose of eco-terrorists is intimidation and causing fear and uncertainty among the population, especially due to the inability to limit the possible action of radioactive substances, poison gases, chemical toxins, biological compounds- viruses, bacteria and etc.

Special danger is represented by new ways of causing generally dangerous actions, the use of chemical warfare toxins (sarin) and chemical compounds (cyanide) which can cause serious consequences for human health and wheat, corn diseases, etc. Also eco-

terrorism can be used by agents as chemical weapons, bio-toxins and radiological materials.<sup>1</sup>

### NEGATIVE IMPACT OF MILITARY MEANS

In the overall arsenal of weapons used in military and other purposes, particularly negative impact on the environment comes from weapons or depleted uranium ammunition. This type of uranium is used because of its high strength, used for making bullets able to penetrate through metal armors and concrete slabs. Americans experimented with depleted uranium almost four decades, and began to use it in the late seventies of the twentieth century. It is assumed that at least 14 countries in the world possess depleted uranium weapons. Such weapons are used in military intervention in Kosovo and Afghanistan (Mileski, 2011: 145).

Negative impacts of depleted uranium weapons have been a subject of interest of several research studies. Such studies have been conducted by research centers in the United States after the first Gulf War. As a result of these researches it was found that depleted uranium affects the environment and the population. Negative influence arises through development of tumors, immune system damage, respiratory diseases, genetic mutations, malformations and infertility. Regarding the fact that uranium oxide is transferred in the atmosphere by aerosols, effects of radiation can be felt even after two decades. Many years after uranium oxide particles remain bound in water and air, which is confirmed by the suffering of the population of Iraq, or more specifically in Basra and Baghdad, and U.S. Gulf War veterans.

The affect of this type of weapon on the environment is realized as water and underground water pollution; contamination of plant roots and their fruits, milk and meat; air contamination; disruption of the ozone layer and the like.

Depleted uranium ammunition, unfortunately, becomes a part of the standard conventional weapon which finds its use in military conflicts and interventions of local and regional hot spots around the world. This ammunition was used in all 1991 interventions when the new military doctrine North-Atlantic Alliance with the official title "Air-land battle" was officially accepted. In order to protect its military forces, appropriate security measures are applied, so the members of the U.S. military wear protective clothing, protective mask,

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<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the best-known perpetrators of terrorist attacks are members of the Japanese cult Aum Shinrijo that in the period from 1994 to 2001 have realized 7 attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and other weapons.

and have special procedures for using depleted uranium weapons, and decontamination after the actions (Mileski, 2011: 151).

For certain military actions even the International Court of Justice was included, thus in 1999, the court received a complaint from Serbia and Montenegro (former FR Yugoslavia) against ten members of the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO alleged breach of the obligation not to resort to force. Among other things, these claims are based on breach of the obligation not to cause significant damage, and the case against the United States regarding the alleged violation of the obligation not to use prohibited weapons and not cause far-reaching and environmental damage. The case was completed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction (Mrlić, 2010).

### **NATO AND THE ENVIRONMENT**

In order to regulate the environmental impact, NATO takes certain measures and activities aiming at the prevention and overhaul of negative military consequences on the environment. Certain weapons and ammunition used by NATO forces, on the one hand, have serious environmental influence, such as depleted uranium weapons and ammunition. On the other hand, NATO forces carried out a number of measures and activities to protect the environment.

NATO has adopted and "NATO military principles and policies for environmental protection", in June 2003, which were revised in October 2011. With these the principles of environmental protection from the military point of view are set. It is the responsibility of military commanders to protect the environment during the preparation and execution of military actions.

The implementation of this policy is supported by various NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) and other publications. While some environmental damages may be an inevitable consequence of the operations, standards can be applied to reduce the effects without compromising operational or training requirements.<sup>2</sup>

Special emphasis is put on identifying environmental issues that need to be solved during the planning process, instead of after committing the damage. Early consideration of potential environmental impacts should lead commanders to a better understanding of the effects on the environment from the mission. Cleanup of any environmental impacts that result from the NATO-led military activities is also a key aspect of policies of STANAG.

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<sup>2</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_80802.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_80802.htm) accessed 15.11.2012

NATO has appointed officers to implement environmental protection, on strategic, operational and tactical level. In 2004, ACO has appointed environmental manager at the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers of Europe. This officer is responsible for providing environmental advice and expertise to commanders and headquarters officers involved in NATO's military activities, and counseling for policy development. In order to train personnel in this area, NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, provides training for environmental protection at the operational level, while the Military Engineering Centre of Excellence includes environmental protection in their courses at the tactical level.

Based on the broad definition of security that recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors, NATO is considering the security challenges arising from the environment. This includes extreme weather conditions, impoverishment of natural resources, pollution and others factors that can lead to disaster, regional tensions and violence.

Alliance seeks how best to respond to environmental threats to security in general, and also to those that directly affect military activities. For example, environmental factors can affect the energy supply of the population and military operations, that energy security is a major topic of concern. Thus NATO helps partner countries to clear dangerous stocks of weapons, ammunition and explosive remainders of wars posing a risk to humans and the environment.<sup>3</sup>

Since 1969, NATO Science and Security Programme supports activities dealing with environmental issues, including those related to the defense of NATO countries. In some certain workshops issues related to safety and the environment are worked out. For example, in April 2010 a NATO workshop in Moscow for environmental safety and eco-terrorism was organized, and the Cairo workshop on food safety and security against terrorist threats and natural disasters.

First international response to environmental security is in 2004, when NATO with five other international agencies formed the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC). The initiative included UNEP, OSCE, UNECE I REC (Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe).

Increased participation of the military as a "first response to natural disasters" is expected with the increase of the impact of the climate changes. This was underlined by the NATO Secretary General on the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. In order to resolve environmental issues and sustainability related to military activities, in October 2009 Expert Group on Defense and Environment was formed.

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49216.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49216.htm) accesses 15.11.2012

NATO pays particular attention to energy security, reducing the danger of environmental risks through disarmament and raising of the awareness and sharing information.<sup>4</sup> In this respect NATO forces in countries where they are present with their own missions, beside realization of military purposes they realize activities in the field of environmental management.<sup>5</sup> Among other things this includes environmental protection training. So according to Nate Whelan the Head of NATO special team training for environmental protection "awareness and training are key ways to protect the environment", and that includes training of troops and military units to protect the environment.<sup>6</sup> At least the military should behave in accordance with relevant laws and regulations for environmental protection.<sup>7</sup>

Among other areas of the environment that are of concern to NATO member states is also food insecurity.<sup>8</sup> It is also stated that the main problem is not the total amount of food but its proper distribution. Just changing this situation could save millions of lives and reduce conflict. NATO's comprehensive strategic approach is that Member States should focus more on security requirements of citizens and civil societies, rather than narrowly focusing on international diplomacy and military equipment for conventional conflicts. Food can be used for warfare, as for conventional wars with a frontline and for modern terrorist warfare. One example on how food has been used as weapons in a conventional war is the frontline in the Bosnian war in the 1990s. During the Bosnian war, the closure of the sieged cities or areas and limiting the food supply was effective as a weapon for political coercion and city or area bombing. In that war both means are frequently used in combination: limiting food supply and artillery bombing.

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<sup>4</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49216.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49216.htm) accesses 15.11.2012

<sup>5</sup> Example Butmir NATO camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina environmental management is one of the objectives, namely monitors the quality of water and soil in the territory of the camp and beyond to prove that there is no contamination by NATO forces and take and other activities.

[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_80802.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_80802.htm) accessed 16.11.2012

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_84609.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_84609.htm?selectedLocale=en) accessed 16.11.2012

<sup>7</sup> According to Lt. Siller,, I once read a good statement: if the world was a bank, we would have kept it long time ago. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_84609.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_84609.htm?selectedLocale=en) accessed 16.11.2012

<sup>8</sup> Food security and food safety is not the same thing. Food security is a matter of secure access to food for all people at all times, and under all circumstances. Food security is a strategic target because the food is so essential need of the people. On the other hand, food safety is more civilian subject and deals with the quality of food intended for human consumption, its nutritional value, food hygiene, long-term health effects, additives used in production and so on.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Food-Water-Energy/Food-security-importance/EN/index.htm> accessed 16.11.2012



As an example of food terrorism is mercury (quicksilver) poisoning of Israeli oranges from Palestinians three decades ago. Palestinian idea was to create fear of damage to the Israeli economy after Jaffa oranges become very well known Israeli trademark. When mercury poisoning was revealed, the created fear was significant especially the fact how did they poison the oranges. NATO in Macedonia has participated in environmental projects and conservation of clean drinking water and irrigation of River Vardar and sustainable management of the waters of Lake Prespa.

In regard to the use of weapons of mass destruction, according to NATO's strategic concept, "the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, threatens with immeasurable consequences on the global stability and prosperity. Over the next decade, proliferation will be the most critical in most crisis regions in the world".<sup>9</sup> Heads of States and Governments at the Summit in Chicago in May 2012 stated that, "our mutual vision is to create the necessary conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation". In order to achieve this goal, NATO will work actively to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by state and non-state actors through active political agenda for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as through the development and coordination of defense capabilities.

Despite abovementioned areas NATO undertakes specific measures and activities in the field of crisis management. For example, at NATO's School in Obermergau courses for Civil Emergency Planning and military cooperation in NATO are held. Thereby the main objective of the course is to familiarize the participants with the procedures in NATO from the aspect of terms of civil emergency planning in NATO military structures and its relationship to civil-military cooperation.<sup>10</sup> In the same center there are trainings for the role of the North Atlantic military alliance in providing assistance, through involvement of military forces, engineering units, professional units for protection and security of the population in certain areas.

Since 1990 NATO has been engaged in a number of operations in crisis areas, especially in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur region, and also during the forest fires in Greece and Portugal. Support was also provided for the consequences of the Hurricane Katrina, which destroyed the coast of the United States in 2005. Specific cooperation between NATO and Ukraine was initiated in 1995, following after heavy rains in the region Kharkov, and support was provided also during the subsequent flooding (Pedrazzini, 2010).

<sup>9</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50325.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50325.htm) accesses 16.11.2012

<sup>10</sup> This course was attended by a representative from the Republic of Macedonia Crisis Management Centre. <http://www.cuk.gov.mk/index.php?content=140> accesses 17.11.2012

NATO organizes numerous other workshops and seminars in the field of crisis management such as crisis management workshop (Zagreb, Croatia; Initial Planning Conference for exercise UUSIMA 08 (Helsinki, Finland) and others. Also Euro- Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre is established.

The functions of this center are: informing NATO Secretary-General for Disaster and requests for assistance; coordination of reactions of accidents at the request of the state that has been hit by the crisis; tool for exchange of information for the states in connection with disaster center regarding help in crisis situations.

In order to operationalize the goals and commitments of the "NATO Military Principles and Policies for Environmental Protection", a number of actions are taken in specific cases to prevent and overhaul environmental consequences from military actions. The following are examples of measures taken and rehabilitation activities for particular parts of the Balkan region, in order to improve the environmental situation in the region.

### **PROJECT "HARMONIZATION OF SEISMIC HAZARD MAPS OF THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES" - SUPPORTED BY NATO**

This project was implemented in the period 2007-2011, and participants were Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, under the guidance of experts from Turkey and Slovenia. The project was introduced and adopted by NATO SfP Environmental Panel (Glavatovic, 2011: 40). The aim of the project was to estimate the seismic danger, which is primary step in the application of preventive measures in order to protect human lives, the economy and society threatened by strong earthquakes. Also the project comes from the outdated maps of seismic danger as well as from the need to apply new seismic, seismotectonic, geophysical and other data involved in seismic dangers. Additional objectives are realized such as: harmonization of seismic hazard maps with EU standards (EUROCODE 8) and scientific cooperation and exchange of data in the region in this area.

For this purpose, numerous meetings and workshops are held, funded by NATO. Also during the cooperation is determined that NATO funds are easily available, the procedures of preparation are clear and simple, and technical support and assistance from SfP staff is very helpful throughout the realization of the project.

### **UNDERWATER DEMINING SUPPORTED BY NATO**

Underwater demining training was closely linked with professional and sport divers. Demining goal is to save lives and goods of the water, and in doing so underwater research and monitoring of underwater things. The trainings were realized in the U.S. military base

Fort Myers in Florida; Greece-NATO base "Disaster" in Athens; France - Antibes and Marseille; Italy-Venice and Rome; Croatia of Topusko and Montenegro-Bijela. The training was attended by representatives from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Russia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia and Montenegro (Mijajlovic, 2011: 48). The purpose of the demining program is to reduce the risk of mines and other explosive devices at a level that will ensure safe living of the people. Objective of the project is also reducing the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and other explosive devices.

During the action were demined 720 000 square meters of land, 2 million square meters under water and 100 tons of explosives were destroyed. Besides de-mining in Montenegro, also in Bulgaria was carried out and de-mined 220 000 squares and about 3 tons of various explosive devices were taken further actions of demining are planned in Libya - 300 000 squares undersea, in Serbia undersea demining of Dunav, the Albania-undersea, and also Iraq and Vietnam are covered. Beside these actions, natural disaster help activities, underwater search for persons and others have been taken. The role of Montenegro in NATO interventions is to help in delivering drinkable water in crisis areas during natural and other disasters, as well as training divers to rescue human lives and goods of water.

## CONCLUSION

Protection of the environment in contrast to the previous situation when it was a subject of interest only for non-governmental organizations and other secondary subjects, today serious environmental issues pose strategic interest of the overall international organizations and institutions, as their millennium interest. Thus environmental protection is an integral part of a number of international agreements that structure the substance of this important area.

Among other organizations and institutions that undertake certain actions in the direction of environmental disturbance, especially during military conflicts, is the NATO Alliance. Evident are the negative impacts on the environment and on the human health, the impact on flora and fauna and the negative consequences that they cause. Some theorists, on the basis of adequate analysis consider that the use of depleted uranium ammunition is a violation of fundamental principles of international humanitarian law (Mileski, 2010: 149).

On the other hand, NATO promotes a policy of protection of the environment through the establishment of certain principles for protection of the environment, but also creates specific policies. Thus it is evident, and their engagement in the prevention and

remediation of certain negative consequences on the environment in war and crisis regions. NATO in the future should give primacy of implementation of measures and activities for environmental protection, on account of the use of arms and ammunition used for destruction of the environment. Thus will operate in the direction of sustainable development-sustainable security, as the only way for securing healthy conditions for the development of human, plant and animal life, as well as to preserve the Earth, and the natural resources taking into account the needs of future generations Malish Sazdovska, 2010: 103).

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12. <http://www.cuk.gov.mk/index.php?content=140>

## IDENTIFYING POINTS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME

### ИДЕНТИФИКУВАЧКИ ОБЕЛЕЖЈА НА ИНТЕРАКЦИЈАТА ПОМЕЃУ ТЕРОРИЗМОТ И ОРГАНИЗИРАНИОТ КРИМИНАЛ

MA Tanja Milosevska

Faculty of Philosophy-Institute of Security, Defence and Peace.

tmilosevska@gmail.com

**ABSTRACT:** This article explores the nature of links and identifies the interface between terrorism and organized crime. Researching models discover major relationships that exist between the terrorist and criminal worlds, from strategic cooperation and alliance formations to the complete convergence of motivations. As a result, both criminal and terrorism groups operating in the world today, increasingly exhibit a similar structure, and are often simultaneously engaged in related criminal and political activities. Understanding nexus provide an explanation of the varying dynamics of the post-Cold War security environments as it relates to organized crime and terrorism.

The purpose of this paper is to identify points of interaction between terrorism and organized crime and also to explain the contemporary security threats of terrorism and organized crime.

The paper set out a way to explain the changing nature of security-specifically the threats of terrorism, organized crime and their convergence as non-traditional challenges that confronts humankind in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Key words:** security threats, terrorism, organized crime, points of interaction, non-traditional challenges.

**АПСТРАКТ:** Овој труд ја истражува природата на врските и идентификува интерфејс помеѓу тероризмот и организираниот криминал. Истражувачките модели ги откриваат главните односи што постојат помеѓу терористичкиот и криминалниот свет, од стратегиска соработка и создавање алијанси до комплетна конвергенција на мотивации. Како резултат на тоа, криминалните и терористичките групи кои денес дејствуваат во светот, забрзано покажуваат слична структура, и често се истовремено вклучени во поврзани криминални и политички активности. Разбирањето на поврзаноста обезбедува објаснување на различните динамики во пост-студеното безбедносно опкружување кое се однесува на организираниот криминал и тероризам.

Цел на овој труд е идентификација на обележјата на интеракција помеѓу тероризмот и организираниот криминал и исто така дава објаснување на современите безбедносни закани од тероризмот и организираниот криминал. Овој труд го изложува начинот да се објасни променливата природа на безбедноста - посебно заканите од тероризам, организиран криминал и нивна конвергенција како нетрадиционални предизвици со кои се соочува човештвото во 21 век.

**Клучни зборови:** безбедносни закани, тероризам, организиран криминал, обележја на интеракција, нетрадиционални закани.

## INTRODUCTION

The world of the twenty-first century is one in which transnational non-state actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks pose new threats to security. This paper shows that both transnational criminal organizations and global terrorist organizations are very rational in their behaviour and place great reliance on network structures. This article focuses not only on analyzing great changes of structure and dynamics of terrorism and organized crime, but also on examining how terrorism and organized crime intersect and converge that now become a national security threat. In particular, this analysis comments on reasons and opportunities that led the transnational terrorists undertaking the organized crime so as to raise revenue and the financial support. The article also examines numerous factors that enable terrorists and newer organized crime organizations to partner with each other in tactic and strategic ways.

The following sections explore the underlying rationale for criminal and terrorist group partnerships as well as the conditions that may facilitate the evolution or transformation of a criminal or terrorist group into the other.

## RECONCEPTUALISING OF TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME AS SECURITY THREATS

Neither organized crime nor terrorism is new. Links between terrorism and ordinary crime groups have been documented already in the 19th century with alliances between revolutionary-political movements and underworlds. Alliances can then be observed in the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the new terrorist movements in Germany as well as in North America. Recent years saw a growing interest in exploring the relationships between terrorist movements and organized crime, in particular on the basis of network approaches. Italy, Japan, China, and the United States are all countries in which organized crime flourished for much of the twentieth century.

Similarly, terrorism has long been a weapon of the weak against the strong and has been employed by anarchists, nationalists, anti-colonialists, and by political and religious extremists. During the Cold War, the problems of transnational organized crime and terrorism were relatively insignificant, and often considered separate phenomena. However, tremendous changes in the international environment at the end of the Cold War, and subsequently as a result of the loss of their main donor—the disintegration of the Soviet Union—created conditions that challenged the financing system of terrorism.

Current descriptions of financing terrorist movements point to the important role illicit markets play for generating terrorist funds, in particular drug markets (Shelley, 2002:305-318). However, the range of activities that can provide for terrorist funds is wide. The involvement of terrorist groups in bank robberies, extortion and blackmailing, kidnapping for ransom, drug trafficking and credit card fraud demonstrate that it is also conventional property crimes that serve to raise terrorist funds. The existence of substantial funds and illicit economic opportunities may then provide for an important condition for the survival of terrorist organizations beyond the cessation of terrorist activities if such organizations choose to continue to exploit illicit economic opportunities. Finally, economic motives may serve as a trigger for changing terrorist groups into criminal organizations active solely for financial gains.

If states or a Diaspora willing to finance insurgencies are not available then violent groups are dependent on acquisitioned crime activities. Participating in economic activities makes sense only in those areas where violent groups have a competitive advantage. The competitive advantage of violent/terrorist groups lies in their ability effectively to exert violence or to exploit a reputation of effective violence.

Links between organized crime and terrorist groups may also be established through the need for services that can be provided by organized crime groups or terrorist groups. Terrorist groups may be dependent on particular services or commodities available only through certain crime groups (for example money laundering or arms). Organized crime groups may be dependent on the protection that can be delivered by terrorist groups. It has been argued then that criminal groups and gangs may transform themselves into groups with a political agenda through politicization, internationalization and growing sophistication (in terms of organization and technology) (Sullivan, 2001:99-126). Both organized crime and major forms of terrorism operate today through networks (and not through hierarchical organizations with physical infrastructures and large investments).

Convergence between organized crime and terrorist groups has been claimed to be furthered by networks and networking with the peripheries of networks serving as

facilitators of cooperation and interactions. Through the peripheries of criminal and terrorist networks contacts are facilitated and common interests identified.

Terrorist and transnational criminal groups have long shared similar characteristics and borrowed tactics and techniques commonly ascribed to the other. Historical examples also indicate that such groups may drift, evolve, converge, transform, or otherwise alter their ideological motivations and organizational composition to appear to mimic each other. In general, there appears to be at least three primary ways in which crime and terrorism may overlap:

- (1) Through shared tactics and methods,
- (2) Through the process of transformation from one type of group to the other over time, and
- (3) Through short-term or long-term transaction-based service-for-hire activities between groups (Mullins, 2009).

In recent years, some analysts have identified a series of potentially disturbing trends that has hastened the expansion of relationships between terrorist and transnational crime groups.

First, criminal syndicates appear to be growing in size, scope, and ambition. Globalization has extended their transnational reach while major developments in technology, trade, and the financial industry have provided them with opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities in emerging criminal sectors, such as cybercrime, credit card fraud, and trade-based money laundering. The reason that criminal and terrorist organizations have been able to exploit these new resources and opportunities so effectively is that they are highly rational in their behaviour. Criminal groups have also adapted their structure and composition to a globalized future. Many now maintain a transnational footprint and a flexible and networked membership roster that can adapt more readily to new market niches and establish more fluid short-term alliances with external individuals and groups.

Second, the nature and activities of terrorist organizations appear to have also changed. Terrorist groups today are motivated more by a religious rather than a nationalist or ethnic separatist imperative that was predominant in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in extremist movements that can elicit sympathy well beyond a specific country or geographic region. Further, terrorist groups appear to have become more resilient to financial destruction, due to a combination of continued state sponsorship or support and entrepreneurial expansion into profitable criminal activities.<sup>11</sup> Combined, these trends may

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<sup>11</sup> For further discussion on the expansion of organized crime as a threat, see National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Global Trends 2025: a Transformed World*, November 2008.



suggest an increase in geographic overlap of operations where criminals and terrorists could interact. These trends may also suggest an increase in the opportunity for transformation from one type of group to the other.

### IDENTIFYING POINTS OF INTERACTION

The connection between crime and terrorism is identified and measured along two lines of interaction: the first is focused on *crime* and *terrorism* as concepts defined within specific definitional parameters; whereas the second concentrates on crime and terrorism as distinctly identifiable non-state actors which challenge security on all levels of analysis through their actions. Although these two lines of interaction can be separated to ease enquiry and provide explanatory clarity, the relationship between crime and terrorism exists along a dynamic continuum which plots the organizational and operational interaction between both phenomena. Thus crime and terrorism as concept and entities cross-over on several analytical planes: first, through the creation of alliances between distinct entities; second, through the operational use of terror tactics by a criminal group or criminal tactics by a terrorist group; and third, through the convergence of criminal and terrorist tactics within a single group, thus creating a hybrid entity. The notion that crime and terrorism exist along a continuum is used to illustrate the fact that, in addition to situations of cooperation between a criminal and terrorist group, a single group can slide across a definitional scale between what is traditionally referred to as *organized crime* and *terrorism* depending on the environment in which it operates (Makarenko, 2004).




Figure 1: The Crime-Terror Continuum

Key nodes, where interaction is most likely, include prisons; cyberspace, particularly online opportunities for social networking; and ungoverned or difficult-to-govern spaces, which include regions plagued by endemic corruption, conflict or post-conflict zones where legitimate governance has yet to take root, border regions, free trade zones, and urban mega cities where pockets of poverty, violence, criminality, and impunity from national law prevails. Overlap may also be facilitated by the involvement of hostile governments and

kleptocratic or criminal states that may consider sponsorship or support of criminal or terrorist activity of strategic value.

The nature of a relationship between a criminal and terrorist group varies in terms of longevity and depth. They range between the ad hoc (i.e. one point in time) to longer-term strategic alliances; and, are formed for a variety of reasons such as seeking expert knowledge (i.e. money-laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making) and/or operational support (i.e. access to smuggling routes and safe havens). In theory cooperation potentially provides significant benefits for both parties involved, including everything from access to previously unobtainable know-how and materials, to the destabilization of political structures (i.e. through corruption and violence) and international counter-terrorism or anti-crime policies through the undermining of trust between state actors. Regardless of the country which hosts a crime-terror connection, mapping the associated dynamics and resultant implications of such interaction often reveals a network that extends from an international to community context. Thus in a policy context, the existence of any crime-terror connection merely highlights the fact that law enforcement, homeland security and national security are intrinsically linked together.

### **FACTORS WHICH IDENTIFY CRIME-TERROR INTERACTION**

Factors which encouraging 'links'/cross-over/cooperation from the point of view of organized crime group are following:

- Drug traffickers benefit from terrorists' military skills and obtain protection for illicit drug cultivation or trafficking in areas under guerrilla/terrorist control.
- Terrorist destabilization of political and economic structures may create favourable environment for organized crime activities.
- Law enforcement preoccupation with countering terrorism may divert attention from organized crime activities.
- Political-terrorist label provides extra degree of 'intimidation' (Naylor, 2002:56).


Yet again, there are also a few, but decisive, arguments which speak against close links:

- Terrorist group may extort drug-trafficking organizations;
- Terrorist group might take over 'businesses from organized crime group.

Three major factors condition close interactions between terrorists and other criminals. A strongly disposing condition is the existence of trans-state nationalist, ethnic, and religious movements. Their trans-border identity networks – based on shared values and mutual trust – provide settings conducive to collaboration between terrorists and criminals. A second condition is the occurrence of armed trans-border conflict. Armed conflicts spawn criminal groups and provide incentives and opportunities for

interdependence between the political and the criminal. Third is the interaction of market opportunities and constraints. Drawing on criminology and organization theory we look at criminal enterprise as a 'profit-driven illegal collective behaviour', shaped by the interaction of the criminal market's opportunities and constraints, and performed by fluid criminal networks (Klerks, 2003:100-102). Constraints encourage political-criminal 'marriages of convenience'. Cooperative relations reduce constraints on criminal markets. Terrorists and criminals establish alliances to remove obstacles and expand the possibilities of both power-and profit seeking. Alternatively, factors that discourage cooperation are market opportunities available to terrorists. They present contemporary terrorists with the need increasingly to think as businessmen to whom profits will be available if they are pragmatic but lost if they remain doctrinaire.

Table 1. Illustrate this theoretical argument. It presents criminal enterprise as collective action and identifies the factors conditioning the interaction between terrorists and criminal networks. It also characterizes the motivations driving criminal enterprise and terrorist activities. More specifically, terrorists' motivations for undertaking illicit business activities vary. They may reflect ideological objectives. This was the case with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), whose militants and sympathizers engaged in illicit business activities aiming primarily at funding their political program. Not least, militants can be simultaneously terrorists and criminals, as is the case with some ethnic Albanian factions. This is a pattern of opportunistic interdependence, one that we have analysed as a political-criminal hybrid. Our study of the Albanian political criminal syndicates in the 1990s showed how the interaction of trans-border identity networks, ongoing armed conflict and illegal market opportunities gave birth to criminalized terrorist organizations.

<p><b>Constraints</b>                      (complex transnational exchange of commodities)                      (interdiction by security forces)                      Market opportunities                      Mobilization, control of resources                      Criminally exploitable ties                      Networks</p>		
<p><b>Motivation of criminal enterprise</b>                      profit maximization                      risk reduction</p>	<p><b>Motivation of terrorists' activities</b>                      insurgency funding                      profit making</p>	

<p><i>Patterns of terrorism – crime connections</i></p> <p>alliances of convenience</p> <p>direct involvement</p>
<p><i>Trends</i> in development of patterns of terrorist involvement in crime enterprise.</p> <p>Most European terrorist groups choose to engage directly in crime enterprise rather than seek cooperation</p>

Table 1. Criminal enterprise as collective action (Mincheva and Gurr, 2010:190-207).


Criminal and terrorist networks which have emerged from a state of perpetual conflict and instability blatantly reveal the ultimate danger of the crime-terror connection to international security. Operating within de facto 'safe havens' for illicit operations, weak and failed states foster nefarious collaboration, which subsequently seeks to perpetuate a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. In most of these situations conflict/war has provided "legitimizing for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources" (Kaldor, 1999:110).

Some newer transnational crime groups, often originating in ungovernable regions, are now establishing their links with terrorist groups; because the criminal groups do not possess long-term and efficient financial strategies and they want neither stability nor strong states that can control them. Another significant reason is that new transnational groups likely take advantages of the chaos of war and dysfunctional state functions and generate huge profits from cooperating with terrorists. Consequently, the new types of transnational crime groups share consistent interests with terrorist and they gradually form terrorist-transnational crime relationship. As Louise Shelley argues that "the terrorist-transnational crime relationship extends beyond a marriage of convenience that generates profits or provides logistics: it goes to the very heart of the relationship between crime groups and the state" (Shelley, 2005:105).

Meanwhile, terrorist groups tend to transform into criminal organizations who are interested in generating revenue in order to achieve political objectives. The situation would change only if these traditional groups were seriously crippled and compelled to combine with terrorists for combating their common enemies—the state authorities. On the other hand, the alliances of transnational criminal organizations (especially for new crime groups) and terrorist groups indeed exist and constantly occur depending on their consistent interests.

Phil Williams has taken this analysis further. Although he does not entirely disagree with Makarenko, he believes that the categories needed to be further disaggregated. In his proposition he differentiates between the essence of organizations, the activities that are coherent with such an essence, and the instrumental use of peripheral activities. In that sense, as it can be observed in figure 2, he separates criminal organizations and terrorist organizations drawing distinctions between organized crime as a method, as an entity, and terrorism as method and as entity. For criminal entities it is natural to use criminal methods, as for terrorist entities it is normal to use terrorist methods. But other dynamics also emerge: cooperation between entities of different type, the appropriation of criminal activities by terrorist entities and of terrorist activities by criminal entities, of which the latter is more common to be found.

But a more important contribution is Williams' idea of transformation. He believes that a process in which a terrorist entity becomes a criminal enterprise, and vice versa, is possible. As shown in the figure, this could happen in a direct form or through the creation of a hybrid organization. In the latter, the political and criminal dimensions are blended making it impossible to refer to the group entirely as a political or a criminal actor. But more importantly, Williams believes that although cooperation between terrorists/insurgents and criminal groups is not insignificant, transformation is more likely than the establishment of alliances (Williams, 2008:129-145).



**FIGURE 2**

This idea is shared by Christopher Dishman who argues that terrorist groups can be transformed into transnational criminal organizations when they become interested in profits, even when a political motivation exists. He is resistant to the idea of cooperation between different types of organizations (i.e. terrorists/criminals) due to the contrasting aims and motivations they display (Dishman, 2001:47-50).

**POINTS OF CONVERGENCE: ORGANIZATIONAL, OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL**

Transnational linkages between criminals and terrorists have occurred on some level for centuries, but have evolved during the past several decades because of the increasing international law enforcement pressure. The worldwide anti-terror campaign and an extremely broad approach of repressing terrorist funding make cooperation become a rational choice for both organized criminal groups and terrorists. Moreover, the crime-terror nexus could also take advantage of the communication technology and advanced equipment to minimize their risk getting caught.

There is, however, growing recognition that the intersection between organized crime and terror organizations is deepening and becoming more complex. The intersection of crime and terrorism raises three important issues that have bearing on considerations of counterfeiting: First, to what extent do terrorist organizations have an “in-house” criminal capacity? In the words of one observer, “Some of the most serious terrorism cases detected have not involved organized crime groups at all—the terrorists have acted alone using methods of organized crime” (Williams, 2005).

Second, to what extent have criminal and terrorist organizations allied with each other in either parasitical or symbiotic ways? And third, to what extent have terrorists benefited indirectly from the proceeds of organized criminal activity? A list of terrorist organizations with reputed in-house and/or sizable criminal operations or capabilities might include Hezbollah, FARC, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the PKK, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Provisional IRA, and the LTTE. These organizations engage in criminal enterprises across international borders, within their home countries, within Diaspora communities (especially in North America), and in their areas of operation.

There is also growing evidence of cooperation between terrorist organizations and organized crime, which again is most notable for the insurgent groups—Peru’s Shining Path, FARC, M19 in Colombia, the LTTE, and the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) are reported to have provided security for narcotics cartels in their respective countries or regions (Gorka, 2000).

In the Balkans and Central Asia, as well as Colombia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, markets dominated by organized crime require terrorist organizations desiring entry to forge alliances. Moreover, terrorists and criminals both operate “outside the law,” and they often use the same methods, such as false identification and shipping documents and counter surveillance techniques (Sanderson, 2004).

Since the two groups are interested in two different objectives, it seems reasonable to assume that similar to any other normal activity they will be tempted to get involved

with both. Specifically, we can broadly define the areas of collaboration and transformation between terrorist groups and organized crimes as follows:

- 1) A terrorist group engages in non - political criminal activities, such as bank robbery, gun running, human trafficking, drug dealing, etc. to sustain its political goals.
- 2) A terrorist group episodically collaborates with organized crime groups to purchase or transport weapons (including weapons of mass destruction) and/or operatives.
- 3) A terrorist group collaborates on a sustained basis with an organized crime gang(s) to engage in criminal activities to raise money to carry out its political agenda.
- 4) A criminal group collaborates on a sustained basis with terrorist groups to engage in acts of political violence and terrorism. In other words, criminal groups metamorphose into political groups.

In recent times, terrorism and organized crime also have organizational and functional similarities. Both have assumed networked structures resembling modern business enterprises organized into small cells without a central command. This has enabled them to become more amorphous and discreet. Both groups exploit modern technologies (computing, telecommunications, and the Internet) to plan and coordinate their activities from around the world. Both often use similar methods (underground financial networks, human couriers) to make, move, and launder money. Their support and recruitment bases now overlap. For example, the Chechen Diaspora in Russia, which had been the backbone of the Chechen criminal network, turned to terrorism by providing support to carry out attacks in Moscow. Ethnic Albanians in Europe running prostitution and drug rings had links with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) (Shanty, 2008:363-371).

The linkages between organized criminal groups and terrorists have occurred in a combination of ways, both tactical and strategic. A tactical relationship means one-spot or short timeframe cooperation without any complementary enduring goals. In contrast, strategic alliances between organized crime groups and terrorists base on their consistent interests and aim to achieve mutual expectations of long-term goals.

### ***TACTICAL ALLIANCES***

In much the same way, different aims and motivations of political and criminal groups lead organized crime groups and terrorists more likely to cooperate on a short-term basis. Most of the evidence of linkages between the two entities could prove that cooperation tend to be one-spot alliance or functional cooperation within shorter time.

Whether criminal organizations seek cooperation with terrorists or terror groups form alliances with criminal organizations, these linkages are based on a variety of reasons. Alliances are established in order to share “expert knowledge” (i.e. bomb-designing, money laundering, communication technologies) or “operational support” (i.e. access to trafficking routes) (Makarenko, 2004:131). Terrorists groups are just getting access to criminal activities and develop their own revenue through contacting with organized criminal organizations. While, cooperating with terrorists could help organized crime groups gain significant profits through the prolongation of conflict, corruption and undermining law enforcement (Shelley, 1999). But their alliances turn out to be superficial and short-time because both of them try to keep their groups secret.

### ***STRATEGIC ALLIANCES***

Since transnational criminal organizations and terror groups gain significant benefits (i.e. profit maximizing and risk reduction) from their one-spot cooperation, it is increasingly difficult to prevent them from alliances in strategic way. Sustaining cooperation between organized crime and terrorists seems to be a possible thing because they are running in the same circles— they already operate out of the law and they often create and take advantages of the same surrounding (i.e. little governmental control, open borders, chaos of national boundary and dysfunction of law enforcement) as well as they usually need the same resources, including “false identification, shipping documents, operators, transportation networks, and counter-surveillance techniques” (Sanderson, 2004:53). Moreover, the increasing tension of counter crime-terror policy is another growing problem for both organizations, strategic alliances make them possible combine together to combat their common enemy—the state authorities. In most cases, it is clearly that some of the alliance between criminal and political crime groups can be regarded as a rational way of risk reduction. Organized crime groups and terrorists often operate based on their networks, organized crime groups can seek protection from terror groups in order to guarantee their criminal profits, and terrorists can hide themselves through cooperating with organized crime groups. Furthermore, organized crime groups and terrorist usually share the similar money laundering measures and financing ways.

### ***CONVERGENCE***

Since the end of the Cold War, the increasing rise of transnational organized crime organizations and the changing nature of terrorist groups are creating new opportunities to resist their common enemies through collaboration. According to Tamara Makarenko and Chris Dishman, the final point of the crime-terror continuum is convergence. The



convergence of crime-terror nexus means these two groups arrive at one situation in which organized crime groups and terrorists gradually become the same or very similar organizations with a convergence of views or beliefs. Thus, as Makarenko presents that: "The criminal and terrorist organizations could converge into a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously; but has potential to transform itself into an entity situated at the opposite end of the continuum from which it began. Transformation thus occurs to such a degree that the ultimate aims and motivations of the organization have actually changed" (Makarenko, 2004:135).

Cooperation between these two groups in a tactical way has occurred frequently based their contemporary consistent interests, but strategic alliances have occasionally happened based on their long-time common goals. While different aims and ideological beliefs of these two entities are obvious and conflicts between them do exist, these realities make the two entities extremely difficult to maintain long-time cooperation or combine into one single entity. However, the criminal or terrorist group would transform itself into one entity with features of both groups. It seems that state authorities could not judge organized criminal group and terrorist by their cover (Dishman, 2001:43-58). Criminal groups may display political motivations, they would adopt terror tactics to obtain political leverage or initially use terrorism to control natural resources and financial institutions, and subsequently they would gain political power over the state. On the other hand, terrorist groups may increasingly focus their attention on criminal activities that they merely maintain a public façade, but underneath, they have transformed into another kind of groups with different end game.

The cultural, ideological, political, operational and practical differences between these criminal and political groups are obvious, thus it can be argued that these two groups are more likely to engage in self-transformation rather form alliances with other groups. Moreover, the tactic and strategic alliances between organized crime and terrorist organizations have frequently occurred depending on the changeable situation. It is inherently difficult for these two groups to maintain their harmonious relationship for a long time because of their separate aims and motivations. Furthermore, the cooperation between criminal and political groups remains in the tactical or strategic phase, there is not enough evidence to test and verify that these two groups have converged into one single entity displaying natures and characteristics of both groups at the same time. Makarenko points out that the nexus between organized crime and terrorism has occurred and developed because of their "common convergence of causes". (Makarenko, 2004: 129-145). Shelley also maintains that the regions in which transnational crime groups and terrorists interlink, particularly in a state of chaos and on-going conflict as well as regions with the

largest shadow economies have provided a safe haven for the nurturing of the crime-terror nexus (Shelley, 2005: 101-111). Moreover, Ridlay offers that the linkages are related to certain states, either in economic transition or failing states, because the criminal activities and the intersection of both groups are least risky in these regions (Ridley, 2008).

Transnational criminal organizations are similarly affected by changing circumstances, which has developed into influential hybrid criminal/terror entities with “in-house” capabilities of engaging in terrorism actions in order to get maximum illegal profit. In reality, transnational criminal groups and terrorist groups share many operational and organizational similarities and attributes. They regularly learn from one another and reproduce each other’s successes and failures and often associate with one another in their organizational structure and practical operation so as to keep one-step ahead of law enforcement. The nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism is increasingly multifaceted and sophisticated, which is directly challenging the security of states at a national and international level.

## CONCLUSION

There is no definite conclusion that how organized crime and terrorism intersect and converge. More recently formed crime actors thriving in uncontrollable regions and on-going conflict have a very diverse approach to the terrorists. The newer groups do not have long-established financial strategies or long-time ideological beliefs, thus they would seek to collaborate with terrorist groups for short-time endurance. The alliances among criminal and political groups in a combination of ways, both tactical and strategic, would always depend on their specific purposes and the particular changing surroundings.

The understanding that economic and political power enhance one-another, imply that more and more groups will become hybrid organizations by nature. This is enhanced by the reality that criminal and terrorist groups emerge to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other’s achievements and breakdowns. Researching models between organized crime and terrorism more specifically seeks to provide an rationalization of the varying dynamics of this environment as it relates to organized crime and terrorism. In doing so, its primary purpose is to highlight that security threats are not static phenomena, but are continually in a state of flux. It is therefore obvious that the nature of organized crime and terrorism, including their convergence, are dictated by the constantly evolving environment in which they are found, and by the connections in which they are engaged. Furthermore, the paper illustrates that security is no longer solely about the military objectives of state actors, but has been joined by economically driven interests. The mixture of political and economic motivations and a group practiced to attain them through the

exploit of terror tactics reveals the innate dangers of the crime-terrorist convergence as a contemporary security threats.

The crime-terror nexus is becoming increasingly intensive and requires efficient responses. In this case, it seems that a state cannot judge illegitimate transnational organizations by cover, and thus seek to formulate successful reactions through employing the significant overlapping strategies and policies between counter-terrorist and anti-crime. Counter-terrorism strategy cannot deal with the 21st century's problems by applying methods, strategies, principles and tactics embedded in the last century. Thereby, it may be argued that having a comprehensively understanding of the crime-terror nexus is the first step toward problem solving.

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**FORMS OF ILLEGAL AND FORCED MIGRATION  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**  
**ОБЛИЦИ НА НЕЛЕГАЛНА И ПРИСИЛНА МИГРАЦИЈА  
ВО РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА**

**Zoran B. JOVESKI, PhD. z.joveski@t-home.mk**

**ABSTRACT**

Long transition process as well as the long process of political stabilization of the country, had extremely worsen the situation in the country and created a "free" space for the development of new "modern" threats and challenges to peace and stability in the Republic of Macedonia. In the contemporary context, the safety of citizens is not just a matter of external threats to national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, but also implies building a society that effectively works. Forms presented below of illegal and forced migration, represent only part of a wider range of unconventional threats to international peace and stability that don't recognize limitations, that are transnational and increasingly operate without respect for national borders.

As a serious threat to peace and stability of the Republic of Macedonia, illegal and forced migrations represent a challenge of the first order and priority for both national and regional security. Accordingly, in the context of preserving, improving and promoting peace and stability in the Republic of Macedonia, of exceptionally importance is the presentation of their real and fair view.

This article is an attempt to present some of the forms of illegal and forced migration that are present today, and that seriously endanger the peace and stability of the Republic of Macedonia.

**Key words:** unconventional threats, illegal and forced migration, security, peace, stability.

**АПСТРАКТ**

Долготрајниот транзициски процес како и долготрајниот процес на политичка стабилизација на земјата, крајно ја влошија состојбата во државата и создадоа „слободен“ простор за развој на нови „современи“ закани и предизвици по мирот и стабилноста на Република Македонија. Во современ контекст, безбедноста на граѓаните не претставува само прашање на надворешни закани по националниот суверенитет и територијалниот интегритет на државата, туку подразбира и градење општество кое

ефикасно функционира. Подолу презентираниите облици на нелегална и присилна миграција претставуваат само еден дел од пошироката лепеза неконвенционални закани по мирот и стабилноста на Република Македонија кои не признаваат ограничувања, транснационални се, и функционираат без почитување на државните граници.

Како сериозна закана за мирот и стабилноста на Република Македонија, нелегалните и присилни миграции претставуваат предизвик како за националната, така и за регионалната безбедност од прв ред и приоритет. Оттука, во контекст на зачувување, подобрување и унапредување на мирот и стабилноста на Република Македонија, од исклучително голема важност претставува прикажувањето на една реална и објективна слика за нив.

Во трудот е направен обид да се презентираат дел од облиците на нелегална и присилна миграција кои денес се присутни, и кои сериозно го загрозуваат мирот и стабилноста на Република Македонија.

**Клучни зборови:** неконвенционални закани, нелегална и присилна миграција, безбедност, мир, стабилност

## INTRODUCTION

In last few decades, worldwide migration of people takes place with variable size and intensity which registered significant and continuous growth. Statistics show that today, more than 220 million people, meaning, more than three percent of the world's population lives outside the country in which they were born. Their scope is bigger than ever. And more importantly, the growth trend of migration is expected to continue in the coming decades. This conclusion applies also when it comes to only illegal and forced migrations.

In the Universal Declaration of Fundamental Rights clearly states that every citizen has the right to leave any country, including his own country, but to return again in the State in which he previously lived. Despite the declarative support, most of the countries of the world, especially economically more developed states, using different mechanisms, this "basic human right" successfully suspended. It essentially means that the legal process of migration of people becomes limited and conditional, which of course does not correspond to its postulates and indirectly forces citizens, in his absence, to "use" the illegal way of migrating.

Given the foreground sensitive socio-political situation in which today is the Republic of Macedonia, it is almost certain that the search for security, a better life and prosperity, initiated mainly by economic and political instability, but also from religious and

national intolerance citizens, constitute the basic reasons for the migration of its citizens. Considering the offered, in this paper is generated attempt to better understanding of the issues associated with those forms of illegal and forced migrations that at this point in the Republic of Macedonia can be found.


## MIGRATIONS

Migrations are complex demographic variables and they may manifest as a permanent process when people constantly, for a longer period move in one, or from one country to another, or as a mass exodus that is, when for a short period of time large populations move in within one or outside that country. About migrations, there are a number of definitions, but given their complexity, does not exist a single and generally accepted one that would have contained all their elements and features.

Term migration comes from the latin word - *migratio* meaning moving or relocation, and essentially represent any change in the place of residence of individuals or small and larger groups of people. In other words, the term migration means any geographical displacement of the population and the establishing of a new temporary or permanent residence. They even can be defined as permanently changing people's place of residence, its relocation due to realization and meet different kind of activities or interests (Talevski, 2004). On the other hand, if you take into consideration the normative aspect of this phenomenon (especially important for this paper), it is quite certain that the migration of people would be define as a movement of people in one or from one country to another, and this movement (migration) may be voluntary or involuntary, that is can be legal (lawful) or illegal (unlawfully).

Due to the impact of a number of different factors, migrations represent very complex multi-factorial social processes. In the literature there are a number of attempts to separate the most important factors. One of them, which define the influence of the factors for migration, is the "gravity model". Analogue to the natural gravitational field, migration as a process is affected by two types of factors (**factors that push** and **factors that attract**) that are closely connected with the place or country where population migrate in or out:


Figure no. 1 Schematic representation of the influence factors - "gravity model"



In addition to the factors on migration processes, appropriately influenced the reasons that have an impact to encourage the migration process. These causes are mainly located in the following three groups:

- o **Natural:** natural disasters, epidemics, uncontrolled population growth in certain areas and contrary-healthy and stable natural environment, controlled and healthy population, etc.;
- o **Social:** wars, political instability in certain country, religious and ethnic intolerance and contrary- peace, political, religious and national stability, etc.;
- o **Economic:** hunger, poverty, poor economic conditions and contrary - the desire and need for better and higher quality of life, economic stability and prosperity etc.

Figure no.2 Schematic representation of the causes of migration





Given the foreground the complexity of migration, as well as the causal factor on the migration process itself, we can almost certainly conclude that, migrations from pure type do not exist. Most often they are complex migrations that are a combination of several different types of migrations. Given the fact that the scientific literature lacks of precisely differentiated and appropriate classification of the types, below elaborated types of migrations, for the development of which used different sources, however, show a certain division (typology) of this complex phenomenon.

### **FORMS OF ILLEGAL AND FORCED MIGRATION IN MACEDONIA**

Illegal and forced migration in the Republic of Macedonia in the last two decades, are taking up one of the priority areas when it comes to maintaining peace and stability in the country. Reasons which led to it are the logical consequences of the conflict in the dissolution of the former SFR Yugoslavia in 1991, Kosovo's post-conflict situation and the refugee crisis of 1999, and the transition period that resulted as a conflict in Macedonia in the 2001. Even today, more than twenty years since the establishment of the independent Republic of Macedonia, illegal and forced migrations of all kinds and shapes represent one of bitter questions for overcoming, because basically they reduce trust in institutions, and encourage the corruption and crime, threatening with it even the whole process of stabilization of the country. When analyzing the forms of illegal and forced migration in the Republic of Macedonia, the basis would only represent the characteristics - illegally migrating, and the existence of a certain kind of enforcement in the process of migrating.

### **INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION**

As "**intellectual migration**" denote all the migrations of people who relate mainly on migration of highly educated staff, made under the influence of any reason and no matter what factor had caused them. Intellectual migration, or migration of highly educated personnel, mainly takes place due to economic reasons (long-term unemployment), but also influenced by the attractive factors of the country in which are migrating (getting a job in the field, certifications for professional skills, good conditions for scientific research work, etc..). Characteristic example of this type of migration is migration of medical staff (pharmacists and physicians). Although the health sector in the Republic of Macedonia had a shortage of about 500 physicians, and in particular the shortage of doctors specialists in certain areas, however these higher education profiles in the recent years massively decide to leave and look for jobs in another country. Their most common destination are Western European countries, and in particular the Republic of Germany, Austria, and often Slovenia and Croatia. Information show that in 2010, Drug chamber in Macedonia acquired the

documents they need to work abroad for 86 doctors, in 2011 the same thing did 121 physician and in the first half of 2012, 30 physicians. This situation is confirmed by the Embassy of the Republic of Germany in the Republic of Macedonia. According to official reports of the embassy, working visas for physicians in Germany since the beginning of 2010 to the first half of 2012 received 60 doctors (in 2010 issued 20 visas, in 2011 35, and in the first half of 2012 5 visas were issued).

Contemporary intellectual migration, gain on difficulty because of the increased potential of the intellectual migration. In efforts to identify potential intellectual emigration there are only two surveys of migration intentions of students in their final years and teaching academics of several faculties of the University "Ss. Cyril and Methodius "in Skopje<sup>12</sup>. They were conducted in 1994 and 2003 at the Faculty of Electrical Engineering (ETF), Mechanical (MF) and the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics (PMF) and they covered 120 or 305 students from the fourth year. At the same faculties in 2003 were interviewed 59 people, scientific workers. These faculties were chosen because they could produce staff that relatively easy find employment abroad. The results of these studies have shown that migration intentions of students of the mentioned faculties are highly expressed. In 1994 three-quarters of students ETF (76%), MF (77%) and Mathematics (75%) said they are considering or planning to leave the country. In 2003 the value of this indicator is even higher because 86.8% of the students of the ETF and MF and 79.2% of PMF said they are considering or planning to go abroad. The same indicator for all students surveyed in the two mentioned years is 75.8% and 84.9%. Research has shown that in the Republic of Macedonia also the situation regarding migration intentions of young academic-scientific staff is alarming. In fact, 55.9% of respondents said that they consider, and 10.2% said they plan to leave the country.

## MIGRATION OF REFUGEES

The term "**refugee migrations**" represents all migrating people (usually a group of people) in another country, which occur when the country of migration is affected by a crisis (war, weather, drought, starvation, etc.), and later, when conditions stabilize, they organized return to the country from where migrated.

Despite the fact that the Republic of Macedonia managed to avoid military actions of the 1999 military conflict that erupted with disintegration of former SFR Yugoslavia, however, from two million people that were displaced during the conflict, about 32,000

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<sup>12</sup> In 1994 by the department of Informatics at the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 2004 by the Institute of Economics in Skopje within the project "Migration of highly educated and professional staff - Causes and Consequences," funded by the Ministry of education and Science.

refugees entered the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. These refugees, mostly escaped from the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, received humanitarian protection by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of the Republic of Macedonia. By the end of the war in the former SFR Yugoslavia, thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their homes again. However, contrary to the goals of the Sarajevo Declaration of January 2005, which was supposed to immediately and as soon as possible find long-term solutions for all displaced persons, even today, there are still unresolved issues that represent obstacles to their return. The total number of evicted people during the Kosovo crisis, starting from March 24, 1999 (the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia) until the end of June 1999, when after the adoption of UN Resolution mediation of international forces in Kosovo, under the NATO command was signed Peace Agreement between General Jackson and part of Serbian generals, amounted to 379,523 persons. From this number, 92,100 people were transferred to third countries, 154,989 people were placed in Albanian families in the Republic of Macedonia, while, 112,434 refugees were placed in nine camps built specifically for them at the beginning of the Kosovo crisis.

As a result, tensions between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians living in Macedonia, which escalated into violent conflict in 2001 (Mitrevska and others, 2009), 76,046 people from areas affected by the conflict in the quest for personal safety and security had moved to other areas in the country. Of these, 72,134 people were placed in families, while 3912 entities found accommodation in 21 shelters. According to the new procedure for the population census in the Republic of Macedonia in 2006 there were 755 entities (256 families) which are still considered as internally displaced people. Of these, 331 were of Macedonian origin, 234 ethnic Serbs, 111 Roma, 62 Albanians and 17 Bosniaks. Of these people, 302 persons (83 families) were placed in families, and the other 452 people (173 families) in reception centers in Kumanovo, Tetovo and Skopje. Today, twelve years later, because of the large number of open questions, the process of reconstruction of houses in areas affected by conflict has not yet been fully completed.

Although a number of countries have already recognized Kosovo as a sovereign independent state, however, the uncertainty of the development of the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as unresolved until the end, the status of Kosovo, are a significant hotspot that can potentially lead to a "new" displacement of about 85,000 people who live in Kosovo's ethnically sensitive regions (especially in the northern part of Kosovo). It is indisputable that if it happens, most of them will enter the Republic of Macedonia.

## MIGRATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS

By the term **"migration of asylum seekers"** are represented all migration (legal or illegal) of individuals or groups of people that submit individual applications for asylum in the country where migrate in order to obtain identical rights as citizens of the country in which they migrate.

In terms of time distance, and given the fact that it is very difficult to follow and record the migration of asylum seekers is best to be considered before and after the facilitating visa regime of the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union. The characteristic period of time before visa facilitation, which recorded massive migration of entities, asylum seekers is connected to the 2001 conflict in Macedonia. According to UNHCR, which was then the only responsible authority for assistance in the process of return of refugees and displaced people from the "conflict in 2001", for the period from early 2001 to early 2006, 8599 citizens of Republic of Macedonia sought asylum in other countries (mostly in the European Union countries). As far as the migration of people - asylum seekers after visa facilitation, the European Commission's latest report on Republic of Macedonia note that there is an improvement in terms of the visa-free regime of the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union and there has been a decline in the number of asylum seekers from 7550 in 2010 to 5545 in 2011. However, given the increasing number of migrants - asylum seekers (false asylum seekers) in 2012 (according to official data from the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, in the last nine months of 2012, over 6,500 Macedonian citizens were stopped while trying to leave the country) can easily make certain countries, which recorded the largest number of this type of migrants (Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden<sup>13</sup> and the Netherlands) to seek review of the visa-free regime of the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union.

## MIGRATION RELATED TO SMUGGLING OF PEOPLE

**"Migration related to smuggling of people"** refer to all illegal and forced migration of people in particular (transit) country through its territory, often with the support of the people of that country, migrate to another (final) destination country.

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<sup>13</sup> In Sweden in 2011, a request for asylum lodged 890 Macedonian citizens, but only 0.4%, which is four people, obtained permission to stay in this country. For comparison, is worth pointing out the fact that in Sweden 75% of asylum seekers from Eritrea, as well as 43% of asylum seekers from Iraq were granted residence permits. According to the latest forecast of the Swedish Institute for Migration, next year the total number of asylum seekers in Sweden could be 50,000, which would be the highest level since the war in Bosnia 20 years ago.

Smuggling of persons is mainly characterized with including persons - immigrants who had previously agreed to be the subject of smuggling and ends with the arrival of migrants to their final destination. This means that smuggling is always transnational process and takes place between two or more states. Despite the fact that the Republic of Macedonia has signed the United Nations Refugee Convention of 1951 and its 1967 Protocol, adopted the Law on Asylum and harmonize its own criminal law in accordance with international standards and introduce the same or similar penalty measures for violators, however migrations related to the smuggling of people are very complex problem for the Republic of Macedonia because at the same time, represent social issue and a criminal act<sup>14</sup>.

Due to the drastic violation of human rights and freedoms, the United Nations Protocol relating to this type of migration, as the main aim has their reducing, preventing, or complete suppression.

**Table no. 1 Registered criminal acts related to smuggling of people for the period 2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**

Year:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Smuggling of people (Article 418-b)	-	-	-	21	35	23	32	36	26	27


**Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia**

In Table no. 1 are given recorded criminal acts related to smuggling of people in the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2001 - 2010. It is noticeable that the registered criminal offenses related to the smuggling of people ranging from 21 in 2004 to 36 in 2008. It is recorded a significant reduction (about 30%) of criminal acts related to people smuggling in 2009 (26) 2010 (27), which of course leads to the conclusion that is improving the operation of the relevant institutions of the Republic of Macedonia. Despite significant

<sup>14</sup> The Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia smuggling of people is defined as a criminal act. The punitive provisions against the participants in the smuggling of people are regulated in Article 418-b of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia.

improvement in the last two years, if we follow the trend of this phenomenon (Chart. 1), it can be concluded that has an upper line.

**Chart. 1 Trend of registered criminal acts related to smuggling of people for the period 2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

### MIGRATION RELATED WITH HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The term "**human trafficking**" represents all migrations of people (without their consent) in a particular country with the purpose of exploitation and abuse in the country where (without their consent - forced) have migrated (Article 418-a of the Criminal law of the Republic of Macedonia).

Human trafficking is a multidimensional problem that is high on the agenda of the Government of Macedonia. With the support of European programs of the European institutions (CARDS, Council of Europe, SECI Center, the Stability Pact, the OSCE, ODIHR and UN), the last ten years, the Republic of Macedonia pays particular attention to the fight against this type of crime. Today, in Republic of Macedonia operates a center for acceptance of human trafficking victims, introducing standard operating procedures for handling for all relevant institutions and the non-governmental organizations responsible for the reintegration of victims, fully implement the re-socialization of the victims. Also, in order to comply with European regulation, Macedonia several times changed the Criminal law for offenses related to human trafficking. Apart from the fact that human trafficking is defined as a crime, with recent amendments to the Criminal Law are provided huge penalties for offenders, particularly perpetrators of offenses related to trafficking of minors (minimum prison sentence of eight years).

Unlike smuggling of people, which is basically related to illegal border crossings, trafficking refers to the violation of fundamental human rights through human exploitation within organized crime. Today, this phenomenon is less concerned with issues related to illegal crossings in to and out of a country, and are more concerned with issues related to


the protection of victims of trafficking (Popovski and Naumovska, 2008) and their rights, and by taking stringent legal measures to punish participants in the trade.

**Table no. 2 Registered criminal acts related to human trafficking for the period 2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**

Year:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Human trafficking (Article 418-a)	-	18	42	19	12	3	3	1	1	-

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

**Chart. 2 Trend of the registered criminal acts related to human trafficking for the period 2001 – 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

In Table.2 are provided data on registered crimes related to human trafficking in the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2001 - 2010. It is noticeable that the registered crimes related to human trafficking range from 42 in 2003 to no registered criminal act in 2010. Recorded successively reduce crimes related to human trafficking every year, so the trend of this phenomenon (Chart. 2) has a downside.

### TRAFFICKING - RELATED MIGRATION OF MINORS

The term "**trafficking in minors**" refers to all the forced migrations from one country to another (Article 418-d of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia) by underage persons (under 18 years).

What kind of appearance it is, speaks human trafficking report released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United States which states that in the course of a year about 600,000 to 800,000 people are victims of human trafficking. Of these, about 70 percent are female and about 50 percent are minors. OSCE reports however, mentions a figure of 1.2 million children (under the age of 18 years, bought or sold to perform domestic work, farm work, work in the mines and in the commercial sex industry, as well as begging or performing minor offenses), that are victims of human trafficking around the world for a period of one year.

**Table no. 3 Registered crimes related to trafficking in minors for the period 2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**


Year:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
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Trafficking in under-age entities (Article 418-a))	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	7	3
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Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

**Chart. 3 Trend of registered criminal offenses related to the trafficking of minors for the period**

**2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**



Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

In Table.3 are given the data on registered crimes related to trafficking of minors in the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2001 - 2010. It is noticeable that registered trade-related crimes with minors only apply for three years, that is since 2008 when it is introduced a new and separate criminal act - trade with minors. It is recorded a significant reduction in offenses related to the trafficking of minors so the trend of this phenomenon (Chart. 3) has a downside, which of course leads to the conclusion that significantly improves the work of the competent authorities of the Republic of Macedonia related to the prevention of trafficking with minors.



## MIGRATION TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS

**"Migrations to commit criminal acts"** are a specific kind of migration so as to migrant during the illegal stay in the land in which temporary migrated, perform criminal acts and then return to the country that migrated from (Article 418-c of the Criminal Law of the Republic of Macedonia).

This type of migration mainly refers to the frequent cases (fraud, extortion, theft, murder, etc..) When the perpetrators of a crime in the Republic of Macedonia migrated (refuge) through border points in order to avoid being detected and detained, or in case when citizens of neighboring states (Kosovo, Serbia) "illegally" entering the Republic of Macedonia in order to commit a criminal act, and quickly return to the country where they came from to avoid being detected and caught.

Despite the fact that there are no precise data on the number of offenders and the number of this type of crime, we can conclude with certainty that are recorded a number of "serious crimes" (armed robbery Eurostandard Bank the center of Skopje, murder of five people near Lake Smilkovsko etc..) where the perpetrators of these crimes have migrated to neighboring countries.

## CONCLUSION

Starting from the constitutional provisions with whom basic human rights and freedom and respect for the generally accepted norms of international law are established as the fundamental principles of the constitutional order, and having regard to the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Government of the Republic of Macedonia, reacting decisively to fight illegal and forced migration and wanting to achieve higher levels of efficiency and joint action, in 2001 set up the National Commission for Fight against trafficking with human beings and illegal migration with one goal, to be actively engaged in the international community's efforts to prevent and fight against illegal and forced migration, people smuggling and trafficking, as one of the most severe forms of organized crime.

This committee manages the National Coordinator, and the content works an Office - a body that is responsible for accepting and implementing the decisions of the National Commission that includes representatives of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, embassies and government bodies. To give special emphasis on improving the protection of trafficking in minors, under the National Commission in 2003 was established subgroup for children - victims of trafficking.

In order to improve the fight against trafficking and forced migration in the period 2009 - 2012, by the proposal of the National Commission for Fight against human trafficking and illegal migration, the Macedonian government adopted:

- National Strategy for fight against human trafficking and illegal migration in the Republic of Macedonia;
- National Action Plan for fight against human trafficking and illegal migration in the Republic of Macedonia; and
- Action Plan to fight child trafficking in the Republic of Macedonia.

They are a result of the need for a different approach of society towards this type of organized crime. Along with the previously adopted documents whose implementation took place from 2006 - 2008, Republic of Macedonia continuously systematize the activities for prevention, protection and prosecution of participants in the illegal and forced migrations in a long time.


In accordance with the EU standards and decisions of the Council of Europe for the prevention of trafficking with people and fight against the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, the Republic of Macedonia developed national action plans for fight against people smuggling, human trafficking and trafficking in minors. Also, in terms of harmonization of criminal legislation with the European Union in 2002 in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia was introduced Article 418-a (human trafficking), and in 2004 the Criminal Code introduced two new Articles 418-b (smuggling) and a 418-c (organizing group and inciting to commit a criminal offense - trafficking in human beings and smuggling of people) and in 2008 the Criminal Code introduce a further Article 418-d criminal offense - trafficking in minors.

**Table no. 4 Registered crimes related to smuggling of people, human trafficking and trafficking of minors for the period 2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**

Year:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Smuggling of people (Article 418-b)	-	-	-	21	35	23	32	36	26	27
Human trafficking (Article 418-a)	-	18	42	19	12	3	3	1	1	-
Trafficking of minors (Article 418-d)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	7	3
Total:	-	18	42	40	47	26	35	46	34	30

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

**Chart. 4 Trend of registered criminal offenses related to people smuggling, human trafficking and trafficking in minors for the period 2001 - 2010 in the Republic of Macedonia**



**Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia**

Despite the progress in certain segments, however in front of the competent institutions of the Republic stand a number of open issues that need to be closed. That the situation is not such as we wish, speaks the fact that if we take only the registered crimes related to illegal migration (people smuggling, trafficking in human beings and trafficking in minors) in the period 2001 to 2010 (Table no. 4) we will see that their number does not decrease, but on the contrary, the trend of recorded offenses associated with this type of illegal and forced migrations in the period 2001 to 2010 has upper line (Chart. 4).

Seeing according to the data presented, the situation with the other forms of illegal and forced migrations (intellectual migrations, migrations associated with asylum seekers, refugee migrations and migrations associated with conducting criminal acts) is not yet at the required level. Hence, given the scope and dynamics of the presented forms of illegal and forced migration in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the complexity of the issues in terms of their causal association with socio-economic development of the individual, the state and the society, and in order to prevent and reduce them, the Republic of Macedonia (among others) have created a unique approach by taking a series of coordinated activities in advance through:

- Efficient and transparent management of legal migration;
- Respect for human rights, in accordance with national and international legislation;
- Adopting and implementing clear and effective procedures aimed at preventing illegal crossings of the border and cross-border crime (Integrated Border Management);

and perform

- Continuous adjustment and harmonization of legislation of the Republic of Macedonia to the procedures in the area of migration and migration policies in

accordance with changes in the laws of the countries of the European Union and international standards.

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## MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY SECURITY ВОЕНА ИЛИ НЕВОЕНА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ

Goran Vasilevski, PhD

Ministry of Defense, Republic of Macedonia

E-mail: gvasilevski@yahoo.com

**ABSTRACT:** There is no dilemma that military symbolizes the power and the capacity of the state to ensure the security of its boundaries, but also to influence the security in wider frameworks. Military potential itself was the grounds for the equilibrium of the world until the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, the following historic events have entailed a redefinition process of the military's place in the state. This has resulted in reforms of the military potential and the interconnection of the civil and the military relations at both the national and the international level. The current threats and risks against security additionally underline the necessity for such interconnection because the military culture significantly differs from the civilian culture in the approach to certain security related issues. The situation in the Republic of Macedonia since the period of gaining independence onwards is similar. This text aims to make a very brief analysis of the preference of the military security option over the civilian option, and, at the same time, of the situation in the Republic of Macedonia related to this issue in the past 20 years.

**Key words:** armed forces, defence interests, security environment, political influence, security threats.

**АПСТРАКТ:** Нема дилема дека армијата ја симболизира моќта и способноста на државата да ја осигура безбедноста во своите граници, но и да влијае врз безбедносните состојби во пошироки рамки. Токму на армискиот потенцијал се базираше и рамнотежата во светот до паѓањето на Белринскиот сид. Но подоцнежните историски настани, условија процес на редефинирање на местото на армијата во државата. Ова резултираше со реформски процеси на армискиот потенцијал и отпочнување интерконекција во цивилно-воените односи на национално и меѓународно ниво. Актуелните закани и ризици по безбедноста, дополнително ја нагласуваат потребата од ваква интерконекција, бидејќи армиската култура значително се разликува од цивилната култура во приодот кон одредени безбедносни прашања. Слични се состојбите и во Република Македонија од осамостојувањето наваму. Овој текст се обидува да изврши сосема кратка анализа за фаворизирањето на воената наспроти

цивилната безбедносна опција, а воедно и за состојбата во Република Македонија по ова прашање во изминатите 20 години.

**Клучни зборови:** вооружени сили, одбранбени интереси, безбедносно опкружување, политичко влијание, безбедносни закани

## WHY A DILEMMA

Security has been an imperative for all civilizations known in history. If the progress of the societies is followed, it is impossible to find evidence for shaping and structuring of any community, having existed in a certain period of time, without having an urging need to organize a protection system for its own values. In doing so, there has also been a tendency to build a security strategy as one of the basic functions that the stability of the society cannot be achieved without. This is one of the basic reasons why the security, as one of the fundamental prerequisites for the development of the society, is placed in the focus of the scientific discussions of the academic circles, but also of the wider public as well.

The analysis of the existing internal, bilateral and international relations of the states on the inhabited continents leads to the conclusion that any (positive or negative) influence on the security in one area produce triggers a series of security reactions in another area. The dynamic nature of the globalization brings about a change of the security management depending on the political, cultural or economic influences. The need for change was recognized immediately after the attacks against the USA on 11/09/2002.

Particularly interesting is the comparison of the individual with the national security, where by definition the freedom and the security of the individual are exploited in the interest of the state (the nation). The strongest argument for this is the existence of the armed forces which consist of its own citizens. This particularly stands for the states where compulsory military service is complied with.

The widely supported maxim that security has no cost has not prevented the restrictive interventions in the defense and military budgets in the last two decades. Such a trend has resulted in the endeavors to enhance the civilian power, with a belief that the decreasing of the military potential can be compensated with increased practice of diplomatic and economic activities. One of the first steps in this direction was made by the EU at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 by adopting the non-military crisis management Action Plan which has set in motion a series of other initiatives aimed at reinforcing the civilian component in the context of improved security.

However, the week (unsuccessful) states that continually threaten the stability, development and peace in certain geographical regions still leave the dilemma opened

whether practicing non-military security can successfully meet the security challenges of the new century. Additional dilemma is whether the non-military institutional segments of the state and the international community can successfully address the transnational arms smuggling, the surfacing of different terrorist, insurgent and paramilitary organizations in various geographical areas which influence the regional security ambiance. The impression is that the way in which these threats are addresses by trained and well equipped armed forces gives much better results so far.

### MILITARY SECURITY

The military, which has been instituted with the creation of the modern states at the end of the middle century, is tasked to demonstrate the power of the state. There is almost no sovereign state that does not have its own armed forces<sup>15</sup>, because they symbolize the coat and armor of the state. Most of the states base the efficient and stabile functioning of the security system, particularly in the defence area, on the capacity of the armed forces, i.e. the military, which as one of the most significant parts of the defense system plays a significant role in the ensuring of the security and defense interests.

By definition military is a well organized, political and socially aware entity, which together with the other social groups represents an actor in the social and the political arena. It is made capable for possible use of force when necessity occurs for the protection of the nation from external aggression or internal violence. The military is subordinated to the state institutions and it needs to be distanced from the sphere of the political decision making, though as a social subject it represents a tool of the politics. More precisely, the political subordination of the military does not mean its loyalty to a certain regime or to the policy and ideology of a certain political party, but its subordination to the constitution and the law (Vankovska, 2007).

Basically, the mission of the military is to defend the society from military risks and security threats and to prevent armed threats against the territory, the air and the aquatic space of the state. At the same time, military supports the civilian authorities in their fight against terrorism and organized crime, and participates in the management of natural and other types of emergencies. Military's participation in peace building, peace keeping and peace stabilization operations on bilateral and multilateral basis always has to be in line with the constitutional and the legal provisions of the state. Furthermore, the military also has a social function to participate in the building of the nation (Manual for Parliament

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<sup>15</sup> Vatican, as the smallest state in the world, also has a regular military, the so called Swiss Guard which has one hundred members.

Members no. 5, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices, IPU-DCAF, Geneva, 2003). The size of the military, its structure, functioning and the level of its capability to accomplish tasks depend on the defense policy and the economic capacity of the state.

Starting from 1990 onwards, most of the armed forces of the states in the world have passed through phases of drastic structural and personnel reforms. In the post-communist countries the first steps were aimed at reforms for democratization of the military in order to make it accountable in front of the democratically elected political leadership, as well as to harmonize the resources necessary for the military with the other resources in the society.

The changes in the international political and security arena have called for adaptation of the militaries to the new security environment. The new security challenges have contributed to the internationalization of the military activities. Thus, along with the national tasks, through the prism of the international cooperation, the military is also engaged outside of the boundaries of the state. The involvement in missions outside the state boundaries is due to at least two reasons. The first one is to manifest military power in order to prevent potential conflicts, i.e. to avoid the possible effects of the ones that have already been initiated, and the second is to contribute to the security of the people in the conflict areas. However, besides its contribution to security, due to its own purpose and the character of activities, the military also creates, directly and indirectly, negative security situations during each engagement. An example for this is the military intervention in Iraq where since March 2003 until the end of 2011 nearly 162 000 people have been killed, of which nearly 114 000 (79%) civilians. Of the total number of killed civilians nearly 3 900 have been children under 18 years of age<sup>16</sup>. This only confirms the brutality and the negative effects of one military intervention. The impression stands as a warning that military is engaged at times when the economic and political instruments used for managing the globalization fail.

The change of the nature of the security threats in the new century asks for an adapted approach and organization of the institutions to address unconventional intrastate wars (Knopf, 2007:374-375). (The military of the Republic of Macedonia was also engaged in such conditions in 2001.) Such reasons entail a revolutionary approach to the way of facing an adversary who does not have a formally structured military, an adversary without maneuvering forces and the one who has not been designed for conventional battle. The new security forces have also influenced the conventional defense approach which has led

<sup>16</sup> Source: [www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/](http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/) (January 2012 )



to changed military strategy. According to L. Panetta, the change of the defense strategy also means restructuring of the armed forces that should be smaller, leaner but agile and technologically capable force to confront and defeat any adversary. This asks for adaptation of the military forces which are required to respond to the unpredictable threats and challenges in the future (E.Panetta, 2012).

The new threats require engaging of military potential on one very different and, until now, less exploited battle field. Namely, in the cyber space which is developed as quickly as the technology itself, together with the war being led for domination over it. This war makes it possible to perform activities that would threaten the national security, and the ones that would be completely independent from the territory and the extensiveness of the physical security resources of the state. Security threats in the cyber space are considered as one of the biggest threats against the international peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Schneier and Fear, 2003). That forces the creators of the national defense and security policy to have in mind the immediate participation of the military and of the intelligence structures in the newly discovered cyber space. The reason is that both the military and the civilian structures use completely the same technical means. The basic difference lies in the context and the goal because the global electronic connection exposes the security of the overall civilian infrastructure to threats (Tafoya, 2011).

The unconventional conflicts, such as the NATO campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, require a significant military presence, though the military action is secondary to the political (civilian) decision. Such campaigns involve a significant number of civilian personnel, because in parallel to the combat activities, there is also an immediate contact of the military forces with the local civilian population (Leavenworth, 2006) whose basic human rights and requirements need to be provided for.

Though their shape and scope cannot be determined yet, security threats and challenges in the 21 century become evident. However, this is a space too short to include the advantages (creating positive sense of security, deterring the possible threats, participation in peace missions or conflict prevention missions ...) and the consequences (significant number of victims and demolishing caused by military actions, big financial expenditures, destruction of infrastructure and natural resources, socially misplaced military veterans ...) of the military engagement. Still the fact remains that in the future the military will continue to represent a key security factor in both national and international frameworks, reacting always when the state or the wider community will feel that the vital civilization values and interests have been threatened.

## NON-MILITARY SECURITY

The last decade of this century has been marked by significant changes in the security ambience. Security primarily from the military sphere has mostly expanded to areas such as the economy, the energy, the societal and the ecological security, with emphasis on the security of the individual. The formal vanishing of the block confrontation, the influence of democracy in the post-regime societies, the creating of a multi-polar world followed by intensive cultural and economic cooperation, together with the interconnection and the integrative processes in the security area, decrease the risks from conventional clashes among the states. At the same time it is considered that the risk of a global military conflict has been significantly diminished although the engagement of the militaries has been increased repeatedly in comparison to the time of the Cold War.

Of course, the globalization, which has made it easier for the security threats and challenges to cross the national borders, should not be forgotten either. The globalization has contributed to spreading prosperity by accelerating the transfer of trade, technology and ideas, but it can also propagate destabilizing influences. While globalization has brought prosperity to people around the world, its benefits are unequally distributed, creating "have" and "have not" conditions that can spawn conflict. In addition, the interdependence of the global economy amplifies the local impact of distant crises, as demonstrated by the food, energy and financial disruptions (Casey, 2009).

The globalization has also changed the conventional approach to security where the states were the object of security, and at the same time, the primary providers of security (Burgess, 2009). Nowadays, something can represent a security issue even if it does not threaten the state. It means that the state does no longer represent the only one and the exclusive reference object of security and that it is no longer possible to equalize security with the traditional military security and the use of force (Panic, 2009:35-37).

The new forms of nationalism, ethnic conflicts and civil wars, the organized crime in all its shapes, the information technology, the biological and chemical threats, the conflicts for energy and life resources, the pandemics, the massive migrations and the transnational terrorism become challenges for the conventional approach to the security threats. In such conditions, none of the states can solve the multitude of security threats alone. The globalized setup makes it very difficult to solve the security threats with the traditional running of the foreign and the defense politics. Hence, security and non-security are not based only on the military power, and at the same time the social, the economic, the cultural and the ecological aspects gain a more significant role (Tuchman, 1989:162-177). One of the non-military threats against security in the world today is also poverty, mainly caused by the development of the rich countries and the underdevelopment of the

countries of the so called Third World. Poverty produces massive migrations, crime at local, regional and international level, overpopulation, pollution, unemployment, corruption, terrorism, intolerance, xenophobia and etc (Muresan, 1998). Addressing these security threats means involvement of the civilian segments of the state and the international community, and primarily of the police and security subjects, the medical and the social capacities and of other institutional segments. The organized non-governmental subjects and their wide spectrum of activities play a major role and have a significant influence on the international stage.

Technology is another double-edged sword. Inexpensive access to information enables entrepreneurs and innovators to collaborate in developing new technologies and improving the existing ones. Yet, there is a possibility for exploring these same technologies to export terror around the globe (Casey, 2009).

According to the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, security can no longer be narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict, be it between or within states. Gross abuses of human rights, the large-scale displacement of civilian populations, international terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, drug and arms trafficking and environmental disasters present a direct threat to human security, forcing us to adopt a much more coordinated approach to a range of issues.<sup>17</sup>

The 2003 European Security Strategy is also concerned with the changed nature of the international relations in the world. This document challenges the traditional concept of security which understands engagement of military power for defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state, demonstrating the parting from the state and the military-centric security concept, and promoting a new approach which involves more the threats of non-military nature. This understands expanding of the military threats with the non-military ones, as well as deepening the security concept which, besides the state also acknowledges its citizens as the object for protection<sup>18</sup>. This also entails political and economic unification of an increasingly bigger number of states in the world which, by participating in unions, prefer minimizing the security risks and threats for their easier addressing.

However, one idea, its planning and shaping, and later its implementation, has caused a lot of controversial reactions, thus attracting major media attention and placing under the question mark the endeavors for reinforcing the civilian component and its

<sup>17</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, Official Records of the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 1 (A/55/1) of 30 August 2000

<sup>18</sup> "A secure Europe in a better world; European Security Strategy" International and Security Affairs Centre, Bruxelles, 2003 rođ.-[www.isac-fund.org](http://www.isac-fund.org)

influence on the security at the national, the regional and at the global level. The idea in question is the launching of the missile shield, i.e. the installing of a nuclear warhead ballistic missiles defense system and its promotion as the priority for the national security of one or a number of states. This project has significantly diminished the efforts for demilitarization of certain issues when security is in question. But this is a question that imposes a different approach to security at the global level.

### THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

Even when becoming independent in 1991 the Republic of Macedonia found itself in a specific security vacuum. In the moment of gaining independence on its territory Macedonia had the federal army which was under political influence, and therefore it was difficult to predict its reaction. On the other hand, the referendum which preceded the act of independence was characterized by the non-participation of the second in number ethnic group in the country, which produced distrust between the two most numerous ethnicums. Finally, in that period the Republic of Macedonia was also faced with a disagreeable political and economic position conditioned by the Greek veto for establishing the country on the wider international stage under the constitutional name. In such conditions, more or less successful were the many maneuvers of the then state authorities supported by the international diplomatic factors. However, in the Macedonian society, as in the many post-communist societies with different political, social and ethnic characteristics and with limited economic resources, the potentials for conflict were structurally incorporated (Mitrevska и соработници, 2009:92) and then in 2001 they escalated in an armed conflict.

Except the establishing and the structuring of its own military forces in 1992, the Republic of Macedonia has not yet found a permanent solution for the other two above mentioned problems which follow it since the independence onward and which represent factors of key importance to the security.

In the period from 14 February 1992 till the passing of the Defense Law in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, through overtaking the border checkpoint "Ramna Niva" at the Macedonian-Bulgarian border by the reserve military personnel in March and with the arrival of the first recruit in the middle of April the same year, began the establishing of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia - the ARM. Until 2006 the Republic of Macedonia practiced compulsory military service (except for the special unit comprised of professional soldiers), and since October the same year, it established a fully professional structure. In line with the legislation in force, voluntary military service is practiced in the Republic of Macedonia and it is made possible for the individuals who are assessed to be

capable for military service by a competent military medical committee<sup>19</sup>. The role of the ARM corresponds to the mission of each national military, but the strong political influence at the moment disturbs the hierarchy, the organization and the discipline as the basic principles that every military structure is based on.

Some of the basic security problems in the Republic of Macedonia are the influence of the political parties and the distrust among the different ethnic groups where the most dominating are the differences between the Macedonian and the Albanian citizens. In essence, the problem has a predominating political foundation. The emphasized differences led to open confrontations for the first time in 1994 with the establishing of the then illegal University of Tetovo and the subsequent intervention by the police. The next conflict with an ethnic indicator, which increased the division between the Macedonians and the Albanians, happened in 1997 in Gostivar. The police intervened in this case as well. The opened armed conflict of 2001 resulted in signing of the so called Ohrid Agreement. The different interpretation of the contents of the agreement has led to emerging of institutional parallelism which threatens to open a disintegration process. Objectively, the institutional parallelism itself and the ethnically motivated differences in political, cultural and social sense are the source of the unfavorable security climate and the crucial security problems for the citizens and the state. The parallelism, the derogation of the constitution, the laws and the unselective functioning of the institutions promote an impression of a bi-national state concept, thus endangering the position of the smaller ethnic communities. This problem does not only require a serious approach and a will for compromise by the political authorities in the state, but it also requires establishing of an applicative model for unselective functioning of all institutional subjects.

The position of the Republic of Greece with regards to the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia has not only led to intervention with amendments to the Constitution, but also, since the independence onwards, it has directly influenced the security of the state. Namely, the disability to accomplish the endeavors for Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of Macedonia produces conditions for additional security instability in the state, as well as a high risk of regional destabilization. Although indisputable, the international political engagement in this issue has not yet created conditions for overcoming such situation.

In sum, the strong political influence, and particularly the influence of the parties in the ARM goes at the expense of the professional attitude towards the obligations and

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<sup>19</sup> Article 3 of the consolidated text of the Defense Law, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia no. 185, dated 30.12.2011

the duties of its personnel. Furthermore, the frequent interventions in the dimensioning, structuring and the engagement of the army weaken its maneuvering operability. That reflects unfavorably to the level of combat readiness, i.e. the readiness and the training for addressing military threats and challenges<sup>20</sup>. Such a concept has, inter alia, contributed to developing a strong corruptive network in the defense system which in combination to the ethno-centrally divided civilian institutions has suspended the civilian control not only of the military, but of the other security structures<sup>21</sup> as well, and has placed them under immediate jurisdiction of the political (party) interests.

In the years since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia until today a major part of the energy and the capacities of the security structures have been spent on activities manifesting political revenge instead of aiming them to obtain positive security climate in the state and all the citizens living within. Such a trend of maintaining tensions and potentials for ethnic intolerance further impede the efforts for building a stabile society, threatening the security of the citizens, of the state and, depending on the conditions, of a wider area. Unless the state authorities take radical measures to change this course, the Republic of Macedonia will inevitably face with processes for changing the current governmental structure which by definition means unfavorable security climate for a longer period.

## CONCLUSION

Security in the world has never been dependable on the civilian factors than it is the case today. The globalization processes having led to interdependence of the states economically and financially, which is a reason for massive movements of the people in the world, have an innate security risk that may be transferred anytime and anywhere. Globalization and the new security threats have caused a complete redefinition of the role and function of the defence and security systems. Military has ceased to be a central institution with a classical defence mission as it used to be. On the other hand, even besides the changed nature of the security threats, the military forces remain the principal guarantor of security both at the national and the international level. Military needs to be shaped in the way that would (in coordination with the intelligence and security subjects and the other civilian institutions) effectively meet the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, because there is a war going on in the cyber space that is subjected to the general

<sup>20</sup> For an example, since 2007 the MoD does not have an updated document on the manning with military reserve, and consequently to that a functional reserve military contingent..

<sup>21</sup> Absence of accountability in front of the parliament, the allocating of resources, the concealment of documentation with a certain classification level, etc.

principles of the law during armed conflicts. Its defence role and function will further remain complementary to the economic, the internal and the foreign politics, and the scope and the intensity of such a process will unambiguously require a dynamic interaction of the civilian component.

The events since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia onwards indicate that our country is an active participant in the world processes. Of course, a specific, and even a unique security situation is characteristic for Macedonia in which equal importance in its creation is allocated to both the internal and the international factors. That requires an exceptionally cautious ratio, particularly in the interaction of the military and the civilian structures which are of key importance for successful management of security both internally and internationally. Hence, the rising of the security culture and, particularly, of the political culture in the country is of primary importance.

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**УЛОГАТА НА ДИПЛОМАТИЈАТА ВО ЗАЧЛЕНУВАЊЕТО НА  
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА ВО ЕВРОПСКАТА УНИЈА**  
**THE ROLE OF DIPLOMACY IN GETTING A MEMBERSHIP OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION**

**Тони ПЕТРЕСКИ, Д-р, Министерство за одбрана**

**e-mail: tonipetreski68@yahoo.com**

**Апстракт:** Една од стратегиските цели на нашата држава е полноправното членство во Европската унија. Полноправното членство на Република Македонија во Европската унија треба да продуцира стабилност, мир, економски просперитет и демократски развој. Цврстата определба за ЕУ, ја покажаа граѓаните, државните институции, политичките партии и невладините организации кои презедоа одредени практични чекори и ги преточија во неколку документи. Во таа насока, и македонската дипломатија даде голем придонес на патот кон интеграцијата на Република Македонија во Европската унија.

**Клучни зборови:** Дипломатија, евроинтеграции, Европска унија

**Abstract:** One of the strategic aims of our country is the full-legal membership in the European Union. The full-legal membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union should produce a stability, peace, economically prosperity and democratically development. The strong determination for the European Union, showed the citizens of our country, the state institutions, political parties and non-governmental organizations, which took several practical steps and create them in several documents. In that direction also the Macedonian diplomacy gave a big contribution on the way of its integration in European Union.

**Key words:** Diplomacy, European integrations, European Union

## **ВОВЕД**

Изразот дипломатија потекнува од грчкиот збор диплома (диплома) што во превод значи акт на суверен превиткан на две. Се претпоставува дека терминот дипломатија почнал да се користи во ситуации кога некој специјален пратеник на суверенот носел некој превиткан (скриен, недостапен за секого) документ со себе, овластен да му го предаде на друг суверен. Носителот на диплома започнал да се нарекува дипломат (Габер, 2002).

Дипломатијата како општествена дејност не е нова појава. Дипломатската комуникација постоела уште кај старите Асирци, во Египет, Стара Индија, Грција, Античка Македонија и Рим, и постојано била во центарот на надворешно - политичките случувања на државите. Таа тие случувања ги креирала, реализирала, следела и проучувала. Битно влијаела на развојот на билатералните и мултилатералните односи, на меѓународните односи, меѓународното право и комплетните општествени случувања во меѓународната заедница.

Дипломатијата се третира и како наука и како вештина. Наука е поради тоа што создала научни законитости и научни теории врз основа на кои се водат надворешните работи, а вештина е заради тоа што правилата на игра на дипломатскиот кадар се претвораат во систем кој има научна подлога.

Значи, дипломатијата изградила свој систем на учења, организација и структура. Елементи на тој систем се: Министерството за надворешни работи, дипломатија на врвот, *ad hoc* дипломатија и постојаните дипломатски мисии. Изучувањето на дипломатијата го опфаќа изучувањето на меѓународното право, меѓународните односи и меѓународната заедница.

Воспоставувањето меѓународни односи е условено од постоењето суверени држави и меѓународни организации кои го сочинуваат меѓународниот систем. Државите за да имаат меѓународно - правен субјективитет мора да исполнуваат определени услови: да поседуваат определена територија која е меѓународно утврдена, да имаат население кое живее на таа територија и суверена власт со определена супрематија во однос на другите власти на таа територија и народ. Таа треба да биде над сите атрибути на власта на таа територија.

Државата, како основен субјект на меѓународното право, ја развива дипломатијата поради остварување на своите национални интереси и надворешно-политичките цели. Значи, **целта** на дипломатијата е исполнување на националните интереси (заедно со надворешната политика), односно создавање што поповолни услови за нивно реализирање. Тоа подразбира зачувување на независноста, безбедноста и територијалниот, политичкиот и економскиот интегритет и развој на државата.

Исто така, дипломатијата треба да ѝ обезбеди на сопствената држава што поголема слобода на активност и на надворешен план. Таа има за задача, преку својот дипломатски апарат и пристап, да ја зајакне позицијата на државата во меѓународната заедница, создавајќи предности, и сојузници на земјава, а притоа потиснувајќи ги противничките настојувања.

Постојат редица **дефиниции** за дипломатијата. Па така, во нешто скратена суштина, се вели дека под дипломатија се подразбира употреба на акредитираните

претставници за одржување врски и контакти меѓу државите. Чарлс Тајер дипломатијата ја прикажува едноставно како средство за комуницирање меѓу владите, а самата амбасада како разводна табла за размена на пораки меѓу две влади. Поголемиот дел од научниците и теоретичарите тврдат дека дипломатијата е „вештина на водење на меѓународни преговори“ или „дејност на државите во меѓународните односи“ (Thayer, 1959: 114).

Русинот Ковалев во својата книга „Азбука на дипломатијата“ вели: „Во сложениот процес на дипломатијата, најважна е методологијата на преговарањето која ја применуваат дипломатите, а помеѓу акредитираните дипломати кои ги водат преговорите, се наоѓаат актерите на одлучување, кои судбоносно влијаат на исходот на преговорите“ (Ковалев, 1968: 85). Барстон, дипломатијата ја дефинира како управување на односите помеѓу државите и помеѓу државите и другите меѓународни актери (Барстон, 1996). Мајкл Ши вели дека дипломатијата има три степени, односно дека до првиот степен таа е рутина, на вториот степен е техника, а на својот највисок степен таа е уметност (Shea, 1996). Во Енциклопедијата „Британика“, дипломатијата е дефинирана како изграден метод на меѓународно општење или вештина за уредување на меѓународните односи, главно преку преговори.

Во поширок контекст Бојчев вели дека: (1) дипломатијата е средство за водење на државните работи од областа на надворешната политика по пат на официјални односи со други држави и меѓународни организации; (2) таа е облик и содржина на односите меѓу државите, низ службени контакти, за да се регулираат меѓусебните проблеми и интереси и склучат заемно прифатливите договори; (3) дипломатијата е практикувана дејност на органите за надворешно претставување на државата (шеф на државата, премиер, министер за надворешни работи, дипломатски мисии) за време на официјални посети, меѓународни конференции и сл; (4) способност, знаење и умевање да се водат преговори со други држави, но и во водење преговори и посредување при регулирање на меѓународни конфликти, изнаоѓање компромиси и прифатливи решенија, а исто така и за проширување и продлабочување на меѓународната соработка; (5) дипломатијата е често употребуван синоним за оперативен владин ресор - министерство за надворешни работи; (6) таа е професија и кариера, таа е припадност на кругот луѓе кои се занимаваат со надворешно-политичка дејност и ја претставуваат сопствената држава во односите со другите меѓународни субјекти“ (Бојчев, 1988: 84).

Обичајното дипломатско право се нормира и добива поопшти рамки на Виенскиот конгрес во 1815 година, а посебно во Виенската конвенција за дипломатски односи од април 1961 година, кога дефинитивно ќе се изврши кодификација. Покрај во оваа конвенција, преостанатите елементи во дипломатското општење денес се

нормирани во Конвенцијата за привилегии и за имунитет на ОН од 1946 година, во Виенската конвенција за конзуларни односи од 1963 година, во Конвенцијата за специјални мисии од 1969 година и во Виенската конвенција за претставување држави во меѓународни организации од универзален карактер од 1975 година.

Дипломатските односи и постојаните мисии се воспоставуваат врз основа на спогодби меѓу државите. Обично се воспоставуваат на база на реципроцитет. При поставувањето на шефот на дипломатската мисија претходи одобрение за отварање на постојана дипломатска мисија. Таа се дава кога државите првпат стапуваат во непосредни дипломатски односи или кога ги обновуваат. Одобрението обично се дава реципрочно во вид на меѓународен договор за воспоставување дипломатски односи. Промената на личноста на шефот на мисијата не влијае на важноста на тоа одобрение. За упатување на шефот на мисијата потребно е да се добие согласност т.н. агреман (agrement) на државата во која треба да е акредитиран, додека за воените, поморските и воздухопловните пратеници - аташеи (attache's), потребна е согласност од неформален карактер.

За извршување на дипломатската функција се даваат две неформални согласности: одобрување или скратување на влезната виза и воведување во дипломатската листа. За поставување на привремен претставник на работите, кој привремено го заменува шефот на дипломатското претставништво, доволно е да се извести Министерот за надворешни работи на државата на приемот.

По добивањето на агреманот, амбасадорот се поставува со внатрешен правен акт (декрет или указ) на шефот на државата или на друг надлежен орган. При стапувањето на должност, пратеникот ги предава акредитивите (lettres de creance). Со предавањето на акредитивите, новиот претставник добива легитимитет за вршење на своите пратенички должности. Со тој чин се смета дека го презел водењето на мисијата, а датумот на предавање го одредува неговиот ранг помеѓу другите пратеници од иста класа.

Шефовите на мисиите ја завршуваат својата мисија со предавање на писмата за отповик (lettres de rappel). Државите се должни да ги отповикаат своите пратеници и членовите на мисијата ако се прогласени од територијалната држава за непожелни лица (persona non grata). Ако тоа не го сторат, државите кои ги примаат имаат право да ги повикаат да ја напуштат земјата. Дипломатските претставници не треба да бидат државјани на земјата кај која се акредитирани (agents diplomatiques regnicoles), но во практика има и такви случаи. Не постојат ограничувања во поглед на бројот на членовите на мисиите, но се смета дека не треба да се преоѓа границата на разумните и нормалните потреби.

## ДИПЛОМАТИЈАТА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Низ вековите територијата и населението на Македонија биле предмет на интерес, расправа и конкретни зафати за влијание врз нив од страна на најзначајните меѓународни фактори. Значаен меѓународен третман се забележува при востанијата во неа и војните водени за ова парче земја, барањата на помош или притисоците за асимилација и за владеењето со македонскиот народ.

Од геостратешки и од дипломатски аспект, а гледајќи ја како значајна територија која лежи на патните правци од централна Европа кон Мала Азија и Блискиот Исток, освен блескавиот период на Античка Македонија и кулминацијата на моќта на македонската династија, чии најистакнати припадници биле Филип II и Александар Македонски, а подоцна и средновековното Самоилово царство, може да се каже дека поновата историја за Македонија и македонскиот народ била мошне тешка.

За и околу Македонија се водени посуштински надворешно-политички и дипломатски расправи и преговори на: Берлинскиот конгрес во 1878 г., за неа се донесени Мирцштегските реформи во 1903 /1904 г., а со Букурешкиот договор во 1913 г. оваа територија и нејзиното население се поделени меѓу три, односно четири држави. Мировните конференции по двете Светски војни во 20-от век (во Версај и во Париз), главно ја потврдиле меѓународната поделба на Македонија од 1913 г.

Во периодот помеѓу двете Светски војни дел од македонските млади интелектуалци, под влијание на големите пароли за еднаквост и самоопределување на народите, ја гледаа историската шанса за создавање држава - автономна и независна Македонија. Таквите активности особено се забележителни и за време на Втората светска војна. Тогаш македонските партизани на својата ослободена територија прифаќаат странски воени мисии (Габер, 2002) како дел од својата меѓународна афирмација. Учеството на тие мисии на официјалното македонско државотворно собрание- АСНОМ на 2 Август 1944 г., е само израз на *de facto* меѓународно признавање на Република Македонија. Конституирањето и развојот на македонската држава не може да ги заобиколи претходно поставените уставно-политички темели на Југославија, на Второто заседание на АВНОЈ од 29 ноември 1943 год. Ова заседание ги постави темелите на новата федерална држава. За Македонија, од посебно значење беше Декларацијата за создавање на Југославија на федеративен принцип во која експлицитно стоеше дека Македонија е една од шесте конститутивни елементи на федерацијата. Првите уредби на Президиумот на АВНОЈ се однесуваа на признавање на македонскиот јазик како еден од службените јазици на територијата на Југославија (Ванковска, 2007: 188).

Значи подоцна, под влијание на актуелните повоени ситуации на меѓународната сцена, Македонија и нејзиното раководство одлучува да влезе во Југо-Федерацијата заедно со другите југословенски народи. Тоа и го пишува во првиот устав на Македонија кој е донесен на 31 декември 1946 г. Во член 1 од Уставот пишува: „Народна Република Македонија е народна држава од републикански облик“, а во член 2 ... „изразувајќи се, врз основа на правото на секој народ на самоопределување вклучително правото на отцепување и на соединување со други народи по своја слободна воља македонскиот народ се соедини врз основа на начелото на рамноправноста ... во заедничка сојузна држава ФНРЈ“ (Група автори, 1981:648).

Значајно е да се напомене дека, првата мисија на македонски дипломат во странство е онаа на Кирил Миљовски во Софија во октомври 1944 г. (Габер, 2002). Така почнува калењето на македонските дипломати, како претставници на суверена држава. Во текот на наредните четириесет години тие први македонски државници и дипломати со сите свои знаења и интелектуални способности, ќе имаат одлучувачко влијание врз новите генерации Македонци кои ќе се определат за дипломатијата како своја животна професија.

Иако во периодот од 1945-1990 г. македонскиот кадар бил малку застапен во сојузната дипломатија (максимумот бил 6 % од сите вработени во Сојузниот секретаријат за надворешни работи, и бил достигнат во 1990 г.), сепак, според некои податоци од повоениот период до 1985 г. во рамките на меѓународната соработка во Р. Македонија престојувале 120 странски делегации и државници, од кои 32 шефови на држави и Влади (Габер, 2002: 59). Исто така во тој период, е постигнат висок степен во планот на меѓународната размена во културата (организирање на Струшките вечери на поезијата, Мајските оперски вечери, Охридско лето) и образованието (годишен собир на македонистите од целиот свет) итн.

По распаѓањето на поранешна Југославија, Република Македонија ги презема сите неопходни чекори за заокружување на својата државност. Донесена е Декларација за сувереноста на Македонија со која домашната и светска јавност е запознаена дека Република Македонија ја презема одговорноста за својата судбина во свои раце.

Потоа е донесена одлука за распишување Референдум на кој народот се произнесе за судбоносното прашање, дали е за самостојна и суверена држава. Резултатите од Референдумот се повеќе од импресивни. На 8 Септември 1991 г. излегле 71,85 % граѓани (од запишаните гласачи), а за самостојна суверена држава се изјасниле 95,32 %. Со ова се реализира идејата на илјадници Македонци кои со векови се бореле за создавање своја самостојна држава.

По донесувањето на Уставот и конституирањето на власта во Р. Македонија, почнува макотрпниот процес за меѓународно признавање кој беше доста сложен и тежок, испреплетен со низа интереси, уцени и закани како од политичка така и од економска и воена природа. Тоа значи дека проблемите на нашата дипломатија почнаа од почетокот, но се интензивираа по донесувањето на Декларацијата за условите под кои можат да се признаваат поранешните Југословенски републики, во Брисел на 16 Декември 1991 г. Со оваа Декларација, на инсистирање на соседна Грција, се внесени дополнителни услови за признавање како што се: да се обврзат дека немаат територијални претензии, дека нема да водат непријателска пропаганда и нема да користат имиња што би воделе кон територијални претензии кон соседите. Конечно, нашата држава стана 181-та членка на ООН, под референцата Поранешна Југословенска Република Македонија (FIROM). До денес има воспоставено дипломатски односи со 159 земји, а под Уставното име е призната од 132, меѓу кои три од постојаните членки на Советот за безбедност: Русија, Кина и САД. Исто така, Македонија стана членка и на голем број меѓународни организации: Советот на Европа, ОБСЕ, УНЕСКО, Програмата „Партнерство за мир“ итн.

Во изминатиот период нашата дипломатија е водена на сите нивоа, и тоа:

1. дипломатски активности од страна на највисоките државни раководители (Претседателот на Републиката, Претседателот на Собранието, Претседателот на Владата, и министрите на Владата);
2. Министерството за надворешни работи;
3. дипломатските и останатите претставници на Република Македонија;
4. собраниски, владини и невладини тела;
5. политички партии како субјекти на политичкиот систем на нашата земја .

Во текот на изминатите години, беа донесени и неколку систематизации, правилници и упатства на македонското МНР, се утврди мрежата на дипломатско конзуларни претставништва (ДКП) во странство и беа извршени првите кадровски селекции. Така, од сто и тројцата Македонци во југословенската дипломатија, за враќање во новосоздадената македонска дипломатија во 1992 г. се изјасниле педесет и тројца, а на двата регуларни конкурси во 1994 и 1995 г. биле примени уште 25 млади кандидати за дипломатската служба. Исто така бил преземен кадар и од другите министерства. На 1 Јануари 1996 г. МНР броело 193 извршители и уште 32 во странство, а веќе во 2001 г. бројот на вработените достигнал 310, од кои 119 извршители се деташирани во странство (Габер, 2002:79).

Според „Стратешкиот план за периодот 2009-2011“ од Министерство за надворешни работи на Република Македонија, од 2008, денес, дипломатската мрежа на Министерството за надворешни работи се состои од: **53 Дипломатско - конзуларни претставништва**, од кои **34 амбасади**,<sup>22</sup> **3 канцеларии за врски**,<sup>23</sup> **8 постојани мисии на Република Македонија**,<sup>24</sup> **7 генерални конзулати**,<sup>25</sup> (Торонто, Истанбул, Детроит, Минхен, Венеција, Мелбурн и Чикаго) и **1 канцеларија** за конзуларни економски, и трговски работи на Република Македонија во Солун.

Основни **задачи** на македонската дипломатија и дипломатите, би биле следните:

1. обезбедување меѓународно признавање на нашата држава;
2. зачленување во ЕУ;
3. зачленување во НАТО;
4. зачувување на историското и уставното име на државата;
5. воспоставување дипломатски односи и отворање ДКП-а во земјите кои ја признаваат нашата држава;
6. економско отварање кон светот;
7. потпишување билатерални спогодби со сите држави за нормализација и уредување на меѓусебните односи и др.

Амбасадорот Ружин Н. во овој контекст ги има следниве размислувања (Ружин, 2007):

1. македонската дипломатија треба да се адаптира кон правилата на современото демократско општество и да испраќа точни, критички, и конструктивни информации преку нашите дипломатски претставници од странство, дури и по цена да се во спротивност со очекувањата или интересите на Р.Македонија и на нејзините лидери;
2. Република Македонија не смее да погреша со приоритетите, а тоа се евроатлантските интеграции, кои се наша стратесиска цел;
3. Македонија не смее да заборави кои се нејзините стратесиски партнери како за влез во Алијансата и во ЕУ, така и за регионалната безбедност и стабилност. Така што, покрај САД, кои се нашиот најмоќен и најзначаен поддржувач за членство во Алијансата, не смеат да се запостават

<sup>22</sup> (Тирана, Виена, Канбера, Брисел, Сараево, Отава, Софија, Пекинг, Загреб, Копенхаген, Каиро, Париз, Берлин, Ватикан, Будимпешта, Рим, Тел Авив, Хаг, Варшава, Букурешт, Москва, Белград, Љубљана, Подгорица, Прага, Мадрид, Стокхолм, Берн, Анкара, Киев, Лондон, Вашингтон, Њу Делхи и Доха).

<sup>23</sup> (Атина, Приштина и Талин).

<sup>24</sup> (при меѓународните организации на Виена, при ЕЗ во Брисел, при НАТО во Брисел, при УНЕСКО во Париз, при Советот на Европа во Стразбур, при ФАО во Рим, при Обединетите нации во Женева и при Обединетите нации во Њујорк).

<sup>25</sup> (Торонто, Истанбул, Детроит, Минхен, Венеција, Мелбурн, и Чикаго).



Велика Британија, Германија, Франција, Италија, Холандија, Турција и Словенија. Секако важни се и другите членки на ЕУ;

4. Македонија треба да ја одржи интензивната Регионална иницијатива, која се должи на специфичната стратешка позиција на Балканот. Тука спаѓа и успешната соработка во рамките на Јадранската група;
5. македонската дипломатија треба да го промовира и мултиетничкиот карактер на Р.Македонија како позитивен пример за останатите земји на Балканот и во Европа;
6. надворешната политика не смее да ги заборава останатите политички и граѓански субјекти во државата, политичките партии, невладини организации, интелектуалци, новинари и др.

Според Законот за надворешни работи чл. 36, кој стапи на сила во јануари 2007 г. најмалку две третини од вкупниот број амбасадори треба да бидат професионалци, односно да произлегле од Министерството за надворешни работи. Во законот пишува дека тие треба да имаат стекнато високо дипломатско звање во случај кога кандидатот за амбасадор е од составот на дипломатско конзуларните службеници, односно да биде афирмирана личност во областа на надворешната политика и на меѓународните односи.

Но, битката за партиските амбасадори за жал сè уште не е завршена. Тоа го покажуваа и поранешните препукувањата помеѓу Претседателот и Премиерот на Владата кои доаѓаа од различни политички партии, но и денес кога неретко во дипломатијата се вдумуваат одредени партиски кадри. Иако од сите институции се согласуваат дека амбасадорите треба да бидат професионалци, сепак се изгуби премногу време и дел од амбасадите останаа празни што е недозволиво за една држава која е кандидат за членство во НАТО и која очекува да почнат преговорите со ЕУ, а според Д. Бојчев, тоа резултира со огромни и непроценливи штети. Тој уште го препорачува и т.н. Скандинавски модел на дипломатско претставување, односно дека Македонија може да акредитира свои амбасадори во бројни (подалечни) земји, но со нивно седиште во Скопје, односно во МНР. Со тоа, според него би се постигнале повеќекратни надворешни и внатрешни ефекти, а како најзначајни се помалите буџетски трошоци и можност за подобрување на кадровската политика (Бојчев, 2007).

Во овој дел, уште би укажале дека надворешната политика и дипломатија на Република Македонија треба да обрнат внимание и на следниве работи:

1. промоција на нашите економски интереси во странство и привлекување на директни странски инвестиции, каде што досега, не се остварени посакуваните резултати;

2. прашањето за односот и соработката со македонските национални и јазични малцинства, како во соседството така и во дијаспората (како на пример, проблемите кои ги имаат Македонците во Егејска Македонија - Грција и Македонците во Пиринска Македонија - Бугарија).

## ПАТОТ НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА КОН ЕВРОПСКАТА УНИЈА

Една од стратегиските цели на нашата држава е полноправното членство во ЕУ. Полноправното членство на Република Македонија во Европската унија треба да продуцира стабилност, мир, економски просперитет, демократски развој итн. Цврстата определба за ЕУ, граѓаните, државните институции итн., ја преточија во неколку документи, и во таа насока македонската дипломатија презеде неколку практични чекори:

1. во 1995 година Република Македонија воспостави дипломатски односи со ЕУ;
2. во 1996 година станавме членка на програмата ФАРЕ;
3. на почетокот на 1998 година Парламентот на РМ донесе Декларација за развој на односите со ЕУ, понатаму донесена е Декларација за Интегрирање во ЕУ од страна на сите политички партии во државата што е одраз на општиот консензус и цврстата определба за интегрирање во ЕУ;
4. на 29 Април 1997 година Владата на РМ потпиша спогодба за соработка со ЕУ која стапи во сила на 1 јануари 1998 година;
5. по барање на ЕУ на 10. 6.1999 година во Келн беше усвоен Пактот за Стабилност;<sup>26</sup>
6. на 9 април 2001 година Р. Македонија и официјално стана првата земја во регионот што ја потпиша Спогодбата со ЕУ во Луксембург, која во перспектива треба да овозможи полноправно членство во Унијата;
7. на 23 февруари 2004 г. Советот на министри во Брисел ја ратификува Спогодбата за стабилизација и асоцијација, откако 15 држави - членки на ЕУ го одобрија стапувањето во сила. Спогодбата за стабилизација и асоцијација е полноважна од 1 април 2004 г. со што Република Македонија стана придружна членка на ЕУ;

<sup>26</sup> Целта на Пактот за стабилност е да им овозможи на државите да постигнат траен мир во регионот, а со тоа и започнување на голем број структурни реформи почнувајќи од демократско-политичките процеси кои се базирани на повеќепартискиот систем и слободните и непосредни избори, потоа слободата на пазарот и претприемништвото како основа за економското уредување на земјата, почитување на основните права и слободи на човекот и граѓанинот, слободно изразување на националната припадност, подеднаков третман на сите видови сопственост, независно судство, независни медиуми, градење меѓусебна доверба на земјите во регионот итн.

8. во меѓувреме, Р. Македонија ја поднесе својата апликација за членство во ЕУ на 22 март 2004 г. во Ирска. Ова е повисоко ниво на односи за Македонија и поголема обврска кон европските партнери;
9. по поднесувањето на барањето на Република Македонија за полноправно членство во ЕУ, Министерскиот совет на ЕУ на 17 мај 2004 г. донесе одлука со која ја задолжи ЕК да подготви мислење за македонската апликација. Во согласност со вообичаената процедура, ЕК изготви прашалник кој на РМ ѝ беше доставен на 1 октомври 2004 г. РМ ги комплетира одговорите и на 14 февруари 2005 г. ги предаде одговорите од прашалникот од ЕК;
10. на 9 ноември 2005 г. ЕК даде препорака Република Македонија да се стекне со статус земја кандидат;
11. на Самитот на шефови и влади на ЕУ одржан од 15 до 17 декември 2005 г. Република Македонија го доби статусот земја - кандидат за членство во ЕУ. Со ова, е направен решавачки чекор напред во остварувањето на еден од стратешките приоритети на македонската надворешна политика и дипломатија - полноправно членство во најзначајната современа политичка и економска интеграција;
12. во октомври 2009 г. Европската комисија даде препорака за започнување на пристапните преговори помеѓу Република Македонија и ЕУ;
13. на 19 декември 2009 г. министрите за внатрешни работи и за правда на земјите-членки на Европската унија, со двотретинско мнозинство изгласаа одлука за укинување на визите за македонските граѓани;
14. во декември 2010 година, Советот на ЕУ ја потврди оценката на Европската комисија дека Република Македонија доволно ги исполнува политичките критериуми и забележа дека Европската комисија ја потврди својата препорака за почеток на преговори со Република Македонија;
15. во октомври 2011 г. Европската комисија по третпат ја потврди препораката за почеток на преговори со Република Македонија, но исто така имаше и сериозни забелешки за одделни области;
16. во октомври 2012 г. Европската комисија по четврти пат ја потврди препораката за почеток на преговори со Република Македонија.

Според амбасадорот Теговски Ј. добивањето на статусот земја-кандидат за полноправно членство во ЕУ за нас претставува сатисфакција, охрабрување и одговорност (Теговски, 2006:75):

1. сатисфакција - за сè што досега е направено;

2. охрабрување - со уште поголема посветеност, енергија и засилено темпо да продолжиме со имплементација на започнатите реформи; и
3. одговорност - да се движиме по зацртаната патна карта кон ЕУ и целосно да ги исполниме критериумите за полноправно членство.

За побрзо интегрирање во ЕУ од големо значење е да се изгради институционална рамка за управување и координирање на интеграциониот процес. А тоа значи да се координираат сите одлуки кои учествуваат во процесот на интеграција. Инаку, координацијата за членство во ЕУ се одвива преку реализирање на секторските приоритети и таа може да биде институционална и вонинституционална (Бакрески, 2005: 244):

1. институционална координација подразбира обука за носителите на политички одлуки за работа во синергични околности до институционално поставени механизми за координација. Механизмите за усогласување или координација се разните работни групи, комитети и пониски функционери кои учествуваат во подготовката на средби од повисок ранг и усогласување на документи и препораки од таквите средби;
2. вонинституционална координација се остварува преку билатерални средби на различни нивоа без однапред одредена институционална рамка.

Секако, за реализирање на конкретните активности покрај добрата координација, потребно е да се изготви оспособен кадар за зацртаните проектирани активности како и приближување на нашето законодавство кон европското, за да може да биде компатибилно со него, со што ќе се создадат сите предуслови да се следи институционалната надградба и да се обезбеди спроведување на законите.

Во моментот, координацијата на национално ниво со цел побрзо интегрирање на Република Македонија во ЕУ се одвива преку следните механизми:

1. Потпретседател на Владата на РМ задолжен за европски интеграции;
2. Комитет за евроатлантска интеграција;
3. Работен комитет за европска интеграција;
4. Поткомитет на работниот комитет за европска интеграција за апроксимација на законодавството;
5. Сектор за европска интеграција при Владата на Р.Македонија<sup>27</sup>;

<sup>27</sup> Секторот за европска интеграција се состои од:

- Одделение за апроксимација на домашното законодавство со тоа на ЕУ
- Одделение за превод на европски законски акти
- Одделение за институционална надградба
- Одделение за поддршка на работниот комитет за европска интеграција
- Одделение за координација на странска техничка помош и

6. Одделение за европска интеграција, и
7. Сектор за ЕУ при МНР.

Денес, непосредна, приоритетна надворешно-политичка цел е добивањето датум за отпочнување преговори за членство во ЕУ (и добивање покана за членство во НАТО, оти практично важат истите или слични „правила на игра“). За таа цел особено е важно остварување на што е можно поинтензивен политички дијалог со најзначајните чинители во меѓународните односи и на билатерален и на мултилатерален план. Притоа, посебно внимание треба да им се посветува на земјите кои претседаваат со ЕУ, преку зајакнување или обезбедување наше дипломатско присуство во главните градови на тие земји во периодот на нивното претседателство со ЕУ.

Унапредувањето и зацврстувањето на добрососедските односи и регионалната соработка спаѓаат во политичките критериуми од кои зависи напредокот на земјата во нејзината интеграција во ЕУ. Во тој дел Македонија во многу анализи е оценета како лидер во регионалната соработка. Тоа треба да продолжи и понатаму, а особено треба да се посвети внимание на инфраструктурното поврзување, односно изградбата на патната, железничката, енергетската и телекомуникациската мрежа во должина на двата паневропски коридора 8 и 10, кои поминуваат низ нашата земја.

Во контекст на добрососедските односи и регионалната соработка како приоритет на нашата надворешна политика и дипломатија од исклучително значење е прашањето за надминување на разликите со Република Грција околу користењето на Уставното име Република Македонија (иако како што претходно напоменав, до денес, Р. Македонија ја имаат признато 132 земји во светот). Потребата од дефинитивно затворање на ова прашање е посочена и во мислењето на ЕК во врска со нашата апликација за членство во ЕУ. Важноста на надминувањето на овој наметнат и ирационален проблем треба да се согледува во контекст на нашето пристапување во ЕУ, кое во одредени фази би можело да биде забавено или блокирано од страна на една или две земји-членки на ЕУ.

Република Македонија активно придонесува и во Заедничката надворешна и безбедносна политика (ЗНБП) и Европската безбедносна и одбранбена политика (ЕБОП), а тоа подразбира наше учество во цивилно-воените операции на ЕУ за управување со кризи. Се работи за подготвеноста на нашата земја, своите сегашни и идни капацитети (човечки и технички) да ги стави на располагање во акциите на ЕУ за превенција на конфликти, операции за зачувување на мирот, хуманитарни и спасувачки операции, употреба на борбени сили во управување со кризи и операции за градење на мирот итн. Градењето цивилни и воени капацитети и обуката на човечките ресурси

останува една од најважните цели не само во периодот до пристапувањето во ЕУ, туку уште повеќе, и по добивањето на полноправно членство. Република Македонија во одговорите на Прашалникот на ЕК ја декларираше својата определба активно да партиципира во ЕБОП и ги најави и своите расположиви капацитети. Најсвеж пример во оваа насока е учество на Р.Македонија во воената мисија на ЕУ во БиХ- „АЛТЕА“ со два хеликоптера и медицински персонал.

Република Македонија во рамките на ЕУ Каталогот на сили (Headline Goal 2010), во мај 2006 г. го декларираше конкретниот придонес кој како земја кандидат ќе го даде во правец на зајакнување на воените капацитети на Унијата. За таа цел беше упатено иницијално писмо до СР Германија за наше можно учество во **Концептот на борбените групи на ЕУ**, по што уследи покана за учество на вториот координативен состанок за ЕУ БГ II/2012, на 15 и 16 септември 2008 г. во Берлин, на кој беше презентирани можниот придонес на Република Македонија во истата, со веќе декларираните капацитети согласно Headline Goal 2010. Иницијативата на Република Македонија за учество во оваа БГ беше објавено во страна на СР Германија на Координативната конференција за борбените групи која се одржа на 17 октомври во Брисел. На 43 седница на Владата на Република Македонија одржана на 29.12.2008 беше усвоена Информацијата за потенцијално учество на Република Македонија во ЕУ БГ II/2012 на која водечка земја е Сојузна Република Германија, а во која учествуваат Австрија, Чешка, Ирска и Хрватска.

Јадрото на **борбената група** ќе претставува еден пешадиски баталјон составен од три пешадиски чети и елементи за борбена поддршка. Дополнително, една до две пешадиски чети ќе бидат одговорни за заштита на силите и обезбедување конвои, вклучувајќи и обезбедување на инфраструктурата. Хрватска, Македонија и Чешка Република го најавија своето учество со пешадиските чети. Република Македонија ќе учествува со штабни офицери, една механизирани пешадиска чета за обезбедување на командата и инфраструктурата, потоа со еден вод на воена полиција, тим за деминирање и тим за АБХО (со оглед дека и Чешка Република ќе понуди вод АБХО постои можност Република Македонија да биде водечка земја на командата на четата за воена полиција).

Значајно е да се напомене дека интегрирањето на Република Македонија во ЕУ ќе биде далеку покомплексно и потешко отколку што беше тоа случај во изминатите години. Критериумите за оценка на постигнатите резултати во реформските процеси на внатрешен план, и за исполнувањето на бараните стандарди се далеку поригорозни, а мониторингот е многу постриктен. Не би требало да се исклучат и евентуалните обиди за воведување нови услови, иако од страна на некои македонски политичари беше

побарано ЕУ да престане со дополнителни условувања кон Република Македонија (и Владата) за добивање датум за преговори.

Во тој контекст се и осумте услови познати како **"benchmarks"** што ѝ ги даде Европската комисија на Владата на Република Македонија за да добие датум за преговори, а кои ќе мора да бидат исполнети. Тие услови се:

- продолжување на конструктивниот политички дијалог;
- ефективна имплементација на Законот за полиција;
- запирање на вработувањето и напредувањето во администрацијата со политички влијанија, туку со почитување на Законот за државни службеници;
- јакнење на бизнис-климата во земјата;
- јакнење на независноста на регулаторните и супервизорските агенции и со регистрација на имотните права;
- судската реформа да биде одржлива, да се зајакне независноста на судскиот систем и да се пополни Судскиот совет;
- против корупцијата ќе се бара воспоставување одржлива законска регулатива со која пресметката со неа ќе биде системска и трајна;
- ЕУ бара да се создадат услови за решавање на невработеноста кај младата популација и тие кои долго чекаат за работа.

Во средината на март 2012 година се воспостави нова, уникатна фаза, во односите, а тоа е Дијалог на високо ниво меѓу ЕУ и Република Македонија. По тој повод еврокомесарот Штефан Филе ќе изјави: „Денес пополнуваме нова фаза во македонско-европското патување. Го пополнуваме мостот кој ќе нè одведе неизбежно до пристапни преговори. Тоа ќе биде сеопфатен процес, активна политика на меѓусебен дијалог и инклузивна рамка за реформите кои ќе бидат во корист за сите граѓани. Сакаме да работиме заедно со вас за вашето членство во ЕУ да стане реалност“ (Филе: 2012). Во таа насока, беа претставени и новите обврски за Република Македонија и тоа во следните области:

#### 1. Медиуми:

- да се измени и дополни законодавството за клеветата, да се подобри судската практика и да се зајакнат професионалните стандарди;
- советот за радиодифузија да ја подобри примената на прописите за сопствеништво на медиумите и изменување и дополнување на законодавството.

2. Владеење на правото и фундаменталните права:

- да се подобри ефикасноста на правосудството;
- да се подобри квалитетот на правосудството и независноста на судството;
- да се зајакнат антикорупциските мерки и нивната проверлива природа;
- да се зголеми ефикасноста и транспарентноста при управувањето со истражната техника на следење на комуникациите;
- да се подобри дијалогот меѓу заедниците.

3. Реформа на јавната администрација:

- да се подобри управувањето со човечките ресурси;
- да се подобри рамката за управување со управни постапки;
- да се продолжи со процесот на децентрализација.

4. Реформа на изборите:

- да се обезбеди доволна одвоеност на државата од партијата;
- да се отстранат пропустите и нејаснотиите во Изборниот законик и
- да се заврши со деталната ревизија и со прегледот на избирачкиот список.

5. Зајакнување на пазарната економија:

- да се подобри пазарот на трудот и образованието;
- да се подобри деловната средина,
- да се зајакне креирањето на економската политика и нејзиното спроведување.

Се смета дека добивањето на препораката за почеток за преговори со Република Македонија која ја потврди Европската комисија по четврти пат во октомври 2012, се должи токму на овој Дијалог на високо ниво како катализатор за забрзување на реформите во клучните области. Но истовремено, во истиот извештај, нагласено е дека проблемот со името мора да биде решен, односно да се постигне договорено и заемно прифатливо решение, во рамките на ОН, а со активен ангажман од страна на Унијата. Тоа треба да се случи во раната фаза од ЕУ-переговорите, што за некои македонски експерти тоа преставува нов услов, односно нов "benchmark".

## ЗАКЛУЧОК:

Врз основа на горенаведеното, може да се заклучи дека определбата на Република Македонија за полноправно членство во Европската унија ја позиционира дипломатијата на преден план. Патот кон полноправно членство во ЕУ води преку остварување на активностите од преземените услови ( "benchmarks" ), обврски и имплементација на истите. Македонската дипломатија во реализација на стратегиските



определби на Република Македонија е во фокусот на настаните и има клучна улога во спроведувањето на определбите.

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# THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL POLICY ON SUSTAINABLE PEACEBUILDING THE CASE OF KOSOVO

## ВЛИЈАНИЕТО НА СОЦИЈАЛНАТА ПОЛИТКА НА ОДРЖИВОТО ГРАДЕЊЕ МИР - СЛУЧАЈОТ НА КОСОВО

Novica Nakov, nnovica@gmail.com

**ABSTRACT:** This paper examines some of the contradictions that arise as a result of policies implemented during the peace building process in relation to the underlying goal of building positive peace. Previous research in the field of social policy provides evidence that social policy is a useful instrument for improvement of socio-economic conditions for large groups of people in a country. The analysis of the case of Kosovo presented here suggests that countries that have experienced conflict do not put attention or effort towards systematic use of these instruments, and that the typical usage is that of ad-hoc, short-term policies whose long-term effects are questionable. I argue that the existing trend of guiding the peace building process by a neoliberal agenda is at least part of the reason why instruments of social policy are limited and narrow. As a result, counter-intuitively, welfare of citizens turns out not on the top of the list of priorities. To overcome this situation, I argue that intervention is needed in three areas: first, that peace accords consider the long-term goals of a society they are aimed at, second, that similar awareness and subsequent adjustment of policies must exist among the international organizations involved in the peace building operations, and third that, broad and in-depth inclusion of state-level and local communities must be ensured.

**Keywords:** Conflict, Economic policy, Neoliberalism, Peace building, Social policy.

**АПСТРАКТ:** Овој труд испитува некои од спротивностите кои настануваат како резултат на политиките кои се применуваат за време на процесот на градење на мирот, а во врска со главната цел за градење на позитивен мир. Истражувањата во полето на социјалната политика нудат докази дека таа е корисен инструмент за подобрување на социо-економските услови на големи групи луѓе во една земја. Анализата на случајот на Косово презентирана овде сугерира дека земјите што имаат искусено конфликт не

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посветуваат доволно внимание или не вложуваат доволно напор за систематска употреба на овие инструменти, и дека типичната употреба е на *ad-hoc*, краткоторчни политики чии долгорочни ефекти се под знак прашалник. Аргументирам дека постоечкиот тренд на водење на процесот на градење мир согласно неолибералната агенда најмалку е дел од причината зошто инструментите на социјалната поликата се ограничени и тесни. Како резултат, контра-интуитивно, благосостојбата на граѓаните не се наоѓа на врвот на листата на приоритети. За да се надмине оваа ситуација, аргументирам дека е потреба интервенција во три области: прво, дека мировните договори треба да ги земат предвид долгорочните цели на општествата; второ, дека согласно со ова, меѓународните организации вклучени во мировните операции треба да ги прилагодат своите програми така што тие ќе им служат на целите; и трето, дека е потребна широка и сеопфатна вклученост на државата и локалните заедници во процесот на градење мир.

**Клучни зборови:** Градење на мирот, Економска политика, Конфликт, Неолиберализам, Социјална политика.

## INTRODUCTION

Post-conflict peace building is a complex endeavor, as states need to address collapse of political institutions, economic decline and unemployment, physical and psychological trauma of citizens, all at the same time. The peace building process has several facets. First, in present-day conditions it is mostly concerned with establishing peace after intrastate conflicts usually in underdeveloped (or developing) countries. Second, its aim is to bring positive peace, meaning not just absence of war, but removal of reasons for conflict and of possibilities for its recurrence. Third, the international community, represented through international organizations, alliances and powerful states, is heavily involved. Fourth, given their relative power, the political-economy promoted by these organizations and states is channeled throughout the process. Fifth, post-conflict states are faced with little choice as conditions for financial help and donations are often bundled with the proposed reforms.

High level of unemployment coupled with former militants who are also jobless is a typical problem for a post-conflict country. The intuitive approach to solving this is providing more jobs from by state in the public sector. However, at the same time, given the nature of the peace building operations, states are confronted with the demand to shrink their public sector and public spending in general. Countries are also pushed to create a more competitive labor market. While meritocracy may be something that is presupposed in the markets of developed countries, what is needed in post-conflict conditions may indeed

be the opposite – positive discrimination – especially if the conflict was fueled by perception of inequality and discrimination.

Similarly, tax cuts and decreasing social benefits also target large groups of people and may endanger groups of people who depend on benefits and thus fuel new inequalities and grievances, when the old ones are not yet mended. Nevertheless, these are promoted under the flag of attracting foreign investors as the main generators of growth. Reforms that bring less revenue for the public treasury mean less government involvement. While that may seem like the needed condition for a modern state, government involvement in a post-conflict setting may be needed because of experience, institutional capacity, or better inclusion. Therefore, the retreat of the state, at a time when it should (re)construct its legitimacy, is questionable. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the role of social policy, focusing on labor market interventions and social benefits, in the given set and setting of peace building. The paper examines some of the contradictions that arise as a result of the policies being implemented through the peace building process in relation to the underlying goals of building positive peace. The case of Kosovo's post-war peace building is analyzed more closely, mostly regarding social policy. The findings suggest that in the case of Kosovo the policies that limit the role of the state, and hence the social policies it can provide, are more influential. There is little evidence of systematic use of policies for labor markets and social benefits for the broad population. In fact, the typical usage is that of ad-hoc, short-term measures whose long-term effects are questionable.

## UNDERSTANDING PEACEBUILDING

The word peace, by itself, can carry the meaning of different things from absence of violence to a lasting condition of “positive peace” which addresses the roots of conflict. This understanding of a broader peace is present in the first UN document to refer to peace building – Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report *An Agenda for Peace*, published in 1992. Within this report, peace building is defined as an “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 5) and explains its role in that “once these (*peacemaking and peace-keeping*) have achieved their objectives (*put an end to hostilities*), only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation”, concluding that “post-conflict peace building is to prevent a recurrence (*of a crisis*)” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 15).

Expanding on Boutros-Ghali's definitions, Diehl (2006) outlines five dimensions of peace building. First, “to prevent recurrence of conflict”, where he notes there is a critical distinction in the “disagreement over whether this idea of “negative peace” (the absence of

violent conflict) should be extended to include elements of "positive peace," including reconciliation, value transformation, and justice concerns". Second, "the strategies and accompanying activities designed to achieve the goal(s)". Third, there is the dimension of "the timing of activities". Fourth, "the context in which peace building should be carried out. And fifth, regarding "the actors that will carry out the peace building actions" (pp.108-110). The scope of the different dimensions is determined on the decision of the stakeholder on whether to extend their effort on building positive peace. Thus, the strategies may be limited to peacekeeping or expand to remove the causes for conflict. Involved parties include external agents in the form of the UN and its agencies, NATO, the International Financial Institutions etc. and domestic representatives from both sides of the front. Their roles and tasks could also be determined on the principal decision on whether the goal is to develop positive or negative peace.

However, despite these differences in the academic debate on the scale and scope of peace building, most peace building operations de facto are concerned with the idea for positive peace. Endeavors rarely stop at merely disarming the forces and destroying the weapons. Quite the opposite: in El-Salvador the post-conflict activities involved establishment of new democratic institutions, reintegration of ex-combatants in civilian life, and rebuilding of physical infrastructure, as well as macroeconomic policy developed in close cooperation with the International Financial Institutions (Boyce, 1995), in Sierra Leone the United Nations is working with the local government to create conditions for better youth employment opportunities (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2010), and in Kosovo's post-conflict development, the European Union is running Kosovo Trust Agency - the organization in charge of privatization of state and social assets (Pugh 2010). Moreover, Iraq is possibly the first country where "the post-war plan was to turn it into a model neoliberal state" (Pugh, 2010, p. 3).

Thus, positive peace carries its own values. Not only the states that host peace building operations can rarely settle with just ending violence, but they usually have to follow the lead of international agencies in creating conditions for development of what is considered to be a model country of the peaceful and developed world. As Mullenbach (2006) writes, most of the peace building missions that have been subject of research in the past 15 years, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and El Salvador, are in fact examples "third-party peace building", i.e. "peace building missions have been initiated by a variety of third-party actors in nearly every region of the world" ( p. 53). The third parties include the Western states and the International organizations that they largely manage or control. The peace building they deliver is subject to their ideology. Roland Paris (1997) emphasizes this

point: "A single paradigm -liberal internationalism- appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peace building. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic policy and a market-oriented economy." (p. 56) Ahearne (2009) makes a similar point that "the prescribed remedy these peace building operations have sought to apply is the establishment of liberal democracy and a free market economy based upon neoliberal criteria as the surest foundations for peace"(p. 2). The first step toward the laying of foundations for peace is the peace accords. Most of these documents are broad and far-reaching. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina's peace agreement deals with: military aspects of the peace settlement, regional stabilization, inter-entity boundaries, elections, arbitration, human rights, refugees, national monuments, public corporations, international police task-force and civilian implementation. In the case of Kosovo post-war reforms included "media and election rules, the courts and judicial system, economic policy and the constitutional division of powers"(Chandler quoted in Latif, 2005, p. 250).

To summarize, peace building is imagined to be an effort to bring lasting peace that will ensure peace and development for the war-torn countries of the Global South, but with the tools and instruments that are conceptualized, engineered and implemented by the powerful, developed West. Paris (2002) draws a clear picture of the peace building operations as "not merely exercises in conflict management, but instances of a much larger phenomenon: the globalization of a particular model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the core to the periphery of the international system" (p. 638). This corresponds to the idea of normalization (Kolozova 2011 & Buden 2007) which the countries of the former Eastern bloc need to go through to reach the capitalist liberal-democracy.

## UNDERSTANDING NEOLIBERALISM

Neoliberalism, being the ideological paradigm of the day, occupies more or less the same period in history - the last 30 years in which peace building also became an important part of the agenda of the international community. Thus it is not unusual to see that neoliberal criteria are used as a yardstick to measure the progress of every country, including those who emerge from armed conflict.

Briefly, according to this economic paradigm, every state action is viewed as a distortion of the free market. That is why intervention in fiscal and monetary policy by the government, institutions for social protection and organizations of workers such as trade unions are merely obstacles to the market forces. Therefore, the role of the state should be

minimized, and if present at all should only focus on providing transparent rules and let the market solve every problem (Pallye, 2005). For the less developed countries the neoliberal agenda materializes in the form of structural adjustment programs, mainly delivered by external organizations such as the International Financial Institutions. Structural adjustment programs are used a precondition on receiving loans from these institutions and usually they include “cutbacks in public spending, currency devaluation, export promotion, opening up of both trade and capital accounts, privatization and tax reductions” (Colás, 2005, p. 87).

Structural adjustment programs are not exclusive to peaceful developing countries en route to economic success. Boyce (1995) notes that in El Salvador the peace building activities did not play any role in the type of the structural adjustment that was carried out by the government and the International Financial Institutions. The policies would have been the same even if the country was not coming out of war. Kosovo under United Nations Mission in Kosovo has followed transformation through privatization of socially owned companies and providing laws and other conditions for foreign investment (Pugh 2004), a strategy akin to what was typical for Eastern European countries post-communist transition in the early 1990-ties.

However, the neoliberal policies do not fit well in post-conflict settings. Free markets weaken social cohesion, and macroeconomic policies that have priorities in repaying debts, sacrifice the role of the state in the social, labor and industrial policies (Pugh 2004). This has not gone unnoticed by the International Financial Institution, but as Pugh (2005) argues “the reform has been largely cosmetic” (p. 59). Studdard (2004) goes on to elaborate that “The set of economic policies relied upon by the donor community and International Financial Institutions (IFI’s) do not treat war transformation as distinct from economic crises unaccompanied by violence. To secure a lasting peace, it is necessary to understand that policies aimed at privatization, foreign direct investment, and deregulated markets may have debilitating effects on peace building” (p. 5). Cramer (2008) explains more specifically that labor markets “barely feature as a policy focus in the programmes for economic recovery after wars that are encouraged by international development agencies.” (p. 121)

Countries that have just emerged from war have plenty of problems to solve. Regardless of the underlying causes for conflict, the challenges they face probably include some or all of the following: reconstruction of physical capital in the form of communication, housing and transports infrastructure in war struck regions, rebuilding of or creating new political institutions and building public trust in them, dealing with the economic decline, reestablishing of markets, providing basic goods and services such as



water, electricity and medical assistance, dealing with the physical and psychological trauma of their citizens, as well as demilitarization of ex-combatants. All these are activities that traditionally have fallen in the domain of the state.

The collision of the peace building process with the neoliberal reality in which the states exist is obvious. The problems that may arise are recognized in Secretary General Kofi Anan's report for peace building in Africa. He makes a clear appeal for "easing the conditionality that normally accompanies loans from the Bretton Woods institutions" (Anan, 2004, p. 29) so that economic reforms will not endanger the peace.

### THE ROLE OF SOCIAL POLICY

Social policy is part of government's public policy that provides help for citizens facing difficulties regarding employment, health, disability and/or is casualties of violence. The practices are closely related to Keynesian economic theory which emphasizes the importance of the state, especially in providing employment and increasing production. Therefore it is not surprising that social policy played important role in post-World War II reconstruction of Europe. The policies helped the establishment of the modern welfare state, providing benefits for the full population of a country. Even more, it has been shown that social policy in Western Europe has helped in nurturing security by reducing the possibilities for homegrown terrorism (Burgoon 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks 2010).

Another study by Taydas and Peksen is more revealing regarding social policy and civil conflicts. Analyzing data for period of 30 years, they find that welfare policies that improve the living standards of citizens diminish the incentives for rebellions. The social policies that yield these results are specific to employment, health and education, unlike general public spending that has no influence either way. Taydas and Peksen (2012) argue that this is owed to the "powerful and effective redistributive instruments that can decrease vulnerability of marginalized citizens" (p. 284). This essentially shows to the people that the government cares for them. The establishment and maintenance of this type of welfare network in turn creates larger costs on the rebellion and gives greater worth to the peace. Put differently, welfare redistribution up keeps the legitimacy of the state.

In a post-conflict setting the number of people who are in need of basic goods and services is bigger than in peaceful times, and the state may have lost its credibility. Still, peace building operations can be inattentive towards social issues, and the positive effects of social policy can be overlooked. As Cocozzelli explains, political dimensions are usually the primary focus of peace making, which in turn may overlook many of the other issues. To illustrate, the Rambouillet peace accords, that eventually failed to bring peace to Kosovo in

1999, had focus on political and civil rights, while social rights were “left off the table during negotiations” (Cocozzelli, 2006, p. 1).

Nevertheless, it would be difficult to envision successful peace building without some input to the process from the side of social policy. As discussed hitherto, the aim of the post-conflict peace building is to establish positive peace by dealing with the root causes of the conflict and with that to promote justice and inclusion. As Cocozzelli notes (2006, p.14) “social policy lays a normative and economic foundation for post-conflict reconstruction” where all stakeholders “who are engaged in post-conflict reconstruction need to pay careful attention to social policy in order to design programs that contribute to long-term success”.

In other words, social policy, if put on the agenda and conducted systematically, has the capacity to deal with the central questions of the post-war society. Being broad and inclusive it can provide benefits to the population as a whole assuring their basic immediate needs. It can also create preconditions for long term reform and legitimize the state giving it a caring image. Finally it can make armed fighting more costly and less attractive for the population.

However, it is questionable if the post-conflict states can provide generous welfare programs for their citizens, especially if they are not engaged in building a welfare state. While the academic research may be clear regarding the benefits of the social policies, the inertia of neoliberal state-building may be too big to overcome.

### THE KOSOVO PEACEBUILDING PROCESS: A SYNTHESIS

The pre-war period of Kosovo's history is marked by exclusion of the population of Kosovo from public life. Bekaj (2010) emphasizes that after the nullification of the autonomy in the 1980-ties “more than 100,000 Kosovar Albanians are expelled from their jobs, while university and most secondary schools are closed to Kosovar Albanian students. In effect, Kosovo enters into an apartheid system.” (p. 43). Cocozzelli (2006, p.15) makes a similar point that “Kosovo Albanians were denied their full rights of participation.”

The status<sup>28</sup> of post-war Kosovo in 1999 was regulated by a resolution from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) no. 1244. The resolution put Kosovo under the jurisdiction of international organizations: “The UN High Representative was to be the de facto ruler of the province with the power to remove elected representatives, curtail institutions and close down media organizations, with no right of appeal.” (Chandler quoted

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<sup>28</sup> The statehood of Kosovo is disputed by many countries including Serbia, some EU member states such as Spain and Slovakia, as well as Russia and China who are UNSC members.

in Latif, 2005, p. 250). The newly established administration made possible for return of Albanian refugees and fast integration of Albanians in public life. However, the backside of this process is the isolation and exclusion of minorities from the mainstream of the new social order. This is manifested the most within the Serbian communities still existing in Kosovo. Additional problems were created with the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons. While the war resulted with a huge wave of ethnic Albanian refugees, termination of hostilities resulted in Serbian and other minorities fleeing the province with the Yugoslav soldiers "fearing revenge attacks and retaliation" (Latif, 2005, p. 273). Their return has been slowed because of "lack of freedom of movement, discrimination to access housing and land, employment opportunities, availability of public services for minorities especially health and education and the hostile attitudes of the receiving communities" (International Crisis Group as quoted in Latif, 2005, p. 274). Also the question of Serbian refugees was part of a political struggle between Kosovo and Serbian authorities where the "Serbian government encourages and manipulates the Kosovo Serbs to return for its own political objectives in Kosovo." Simultaneously, "... Kosovo Albanians are not so keen on minority refugee returns for the opposite reasons." (Latif, 2005, p. 273). Overall, there is lack of evidence that there are active policies to overcome this condition.

The international community carried out reforms in Kosovo, including reforms in the government, the police and the military, and the judicial system. The international mission to Kosovo also put forward the economic model for the province – a market economy, a condition that is written in the provisions of the constitution and that local leaders had no choice but to accept (Pugh, 2004, p. 57). This effectively excluded the local stakeholder from the decision making process. Shortly after, the economic reforms were swiftly under way. Kosovo Trust Agency was formed in 2003 in order to manage the socially owned companies. This was soon followed by a plan to sell 500 socially owned companies despite protest from the worker's unions and the Serbian Government and reforms that made the local economy friendly to foreign investments (Pugh, 2004, p. 57).

However, the reforms are not successful as they fail to make up for the lost industrial employment. The labor force is distributed among small and medium retail companies, agriculture and international organizations. As Pugh (2004, p. 58) concludes, "as in Bosnia, de-industrialization without alternative sources of employment not only makes crime pay, but has encouraged youth to escape abroad, leading to depletion of future skill and talent". The reforms also created problems where there have been none before the war. For example, the appropriation of Trepca mining complex by NATO's Kosovo Force left the Serbian community without its major employment source in effect excluding part of the population from active economic life (Pugh 2004, p. 57).

The circumstances after the war provided for a “clear start” in the labor policies because “the war brought complete loss or disappearance of previous institutions in this area” (World Bank Report No. 25990, 2003, p. 66). Since the laws that existed in FR Yugoslavia were out of force in the newly established legal realm of Kosovo, new laws were necessary. In 2001 the Essential Labor Law in Kosovo was put in force and pensions and social assistance were also introduced. The policies followed the notion that Kosovo will be developed as a market-economy. As the World Bank Report (2005) highlights: “Kosovo’s labor market policies are generally right on track for the flexibility that characterizes well-functioning labor markets in market economies.” (p. iv).

### **LABOR MARKET INTERVENTIONS IN KOSOVO**

A recent study of the labor markets in Eastern Europe shows that “youth employment programs are a dominant labor market intervention in Kosovo.” (Kuddo, 2009, p.62). Additionally, labor market policies in Kosovo are funded by donors. According to the World Bank (2005) the lack of resources of the local government is not the only problem. Employment counselors who can carry out active labor market programs are also deficient.

The war and the destruction of inter-ethnic trust have created employment problems for minorities. The World Bank report (2005) states that “ethnic minorities have faced exceptional labor market difficulties. Econometric results show that the members of Kosovo’s ethnic minorities have faced higher probability of being unemployed, and have been paid less, than Albanians with similar characteristics” (p. vi.). The failure to provide equal ground for everyone on the labor market regardless of ethnicity is a worrisome condition and active labor market policies are lacking in this aspect.

There are some examples of extensive use of government intervention regarding employment, although the funding again comes from international donors. That is the case with the Kosovo Protection Corps Resettlement Programme lead by the Kosovo United Nations Development Programme. The program provided benefits for around 1600 former members of the dissolved army organization, including benefits to help start own business initiatives, various trainings and employment for those individuals who preferred a job in the public sector. The project was evaluated as successful. The majority of persons who participated at the end had equal or greater monthly wage than the one they received while working in the Kosovo Protection Corps. Special focus was given to women by receiving “customized support and mentoring” in line with United Nations commitment to gender equality (Kosovo United Nations Development Programme, 2011, p.17).

## **SOCIAL BENEFITS IN KOSOVO**

The social welfare system in Kosovo, similarly as other public institutions, had to start from scratch after the war. To illustrate, the pension system in Kosovo had suffered “damage or loss of pension insurance contribution records” (International Labor Organization (ILO), 2010, p. 21), and pensions ceased to be distributed with the start of the war in 1999. After the war the United Nations mission started developing new system to fit the new situation on the ground. That was coupled by the reactivation of old institutions such as the Centers for social work which begun its renewed operation as early as 2000.

The benefits that try to address the consequences of war include “pension schemes for special groups”. These schemes are aimed at former members of Kosovo Protection Corps and at former workers of the Trepca mining complex. The benefits for both of the groups, total of no more than 4200 persons, on average were up to 4 and 2 times higher respectively, than the basic pension received by the rest of the population. The higher benefits aimed at former soldiers can be justified by the need to maintain security in Kosovo. Their benefits amount to 70% of the net wage they received while working. On the other hand, the general pension is set at 15-20% of the average wage in Kosovo. Similarly, former miners receive higher benefits. This can be due to the fact that the mining complex was taken over by NATO after the war and in effect the fate of the jobs in Trepca was determined by the outcome of the military operations. (ILO, 2010, pp. 27-28).

Social assistance schemes also include a different module for persons affected by the war – social benefits for persons with disabilities. This includes both soldiers and civilians that became disabled during the war. Again, on average, these benefits are greater than the benefits that are received by the general population. For comparison, the total amount of social benefits received by 34.307 families (or 149.227 persons) in 2008 was 26 million Euros. The same year 11.509 disabled beneficiaries received almost 18 million Euros (ILO, 2010, pp. 31-33). It is questionable if this level of spending can be maintained over a longer period of time.

### **Peacebuilding in Kosovo and positive peace**

Kosovo achieved peace in the sense of “absence of violent conflict”. However, achieving positive peace that includes “reconciliation, value transformation and justice concerns” remains an open challenge. In this context it is useful to note that social policies, or more specifically, labor market interventions and benefits, were used to address problems of specific groups of people rather than the general population.

As discussed so far, active labor market policies in Kosovo are weak and underfunded and social benefits are reduced, modest at best, and often provide benefits and resources

below the poverty line. There is also a big variation between the benefits received by the general populations and those received by the ex-combatants. The goal of the policies aimed at ex-combatants is to pacify a group of people who are not unfamiliar with the use of force and weapons. Restoring them to civilian life has positive effects not just for the group or the individuals, but also for the society as a whole because it contributed to security. However, it remains to be seen whether these bigger entitlements are acceptable for the society on the long run, or they can create grievances among the Albanian population remains to be seen. Alas, instead of repairing the social fabric they might create more damage.

## CONCLUSIONS

This paper gives overview of the debates regarding present-day peace building operations and their implementation in post-conflict conditions. There is evidence that broad and inclusive social policies can create preconditions for long term changes, legitimize the state and give it a caring image. They can improve social justice and act as glue for the society. Hence they have a dual role in amending old wounds and improving the conditions for the future well-being. In this way armed fighting becomes more costly and less attractive for the population minimizing the chances of relapse into war. However, arguments presented herein suggest that despite this evidence, the implementation of social policies in peace building operations is sometimes rare, while their scope is often inadequate and uneven with respect the latitude of the targeted population.

The circumstances in which peace building operations are conducted are the main reason for this outcome. The internationally negotiated peace accords and post-conflict operations handed out by international organizations – often with different agendas than the troubled society – frequently lack coordination with the objectives of states they are supposed to mediate. Such treaties push the welfare of the general population down on the list of priorities. Furthermore, neoliberal economic policies lessen the role of the state in public policies and weaken social cohesion. The countries' often uncritical implementation of these reforms further diminishes the prospects for a more systematic approach towards social policies. Finally, because post-war states also have degraded capacity and limited possibilities to undertake more broad social reforms, they can more easily fall hostage to interest groups.

All these points of critique can be identified in the example of Kosovo. Kosovo had an internationally negotiated peace with the sovereignty of the state effectively put in the hands of the international community. The new state was designed along neoliberal ideas for market-oriented economy with little regard for the welfare of the population. Finally, the

only social reform that provides benefits above poverty is carried out in direct response to security threats. Its target is limited to a relatively small group of ex-soldiers neglecting the remaining population and inadvertently causing even more inequality.

These findings suggest that solutions to the observed mutual exclusiveness of peace building policies need to seek balance between strategies that presuppose a bigger role of the state versus those who advocate the exact opposite (market-oriented policies). Peace accords should take into account long term goals of the societies they are attempting to bringing peace to. The international organization, and more specifically the International Financial Institutions, should be aware of those provisions and accommodate their programs to help-war torn states meet their goals. States' top-level and diverse local actors need to be included in decision making throughout the process, creating opportunity to develop social policies with the long-term goals of society in mind.

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## БУНТОВНИШТВОТО И НЕГОВАТА МУТИРАЧКА ПРИРОДА ВО XXI ВЕК

### INSURGENCY AND ITS MUTABLE NATURE IN THE 21 CENTURY

М-р Ненад Танески, Министерство за одбрана, Воена академија – Скопје,  
nenoreal@yahoo.com

**АПСТРАКТ:** Бунтовништвото како форма на конфликт денес и понатаму останува најголем предизвик со кој се соочуваат конвенционалните воени сили. Во моментот САД се вовлечени во најдолгиот период од својата историја во кој изведуваат операции за одржување на мирот во Ирак и се соочуваат со хроничен бескраен бунт во Авганистан. Во поголемиот дел од Африка, Азија и Латинска Америка, активни се конфликти со бунтовнички предзнак. Проучувањето на бунтовите, анализирањето и доведувањето до успешен крај е од витално значење за воените стратегии и политичари.

Националната стратегија за домашна безбедност на САД ја означува Ал Каеда, како „најголема непосредна и сериозна закана.“ И покрај недостатокот на консензус на прашањето што претставува тероризам, конвенционалните теории велат дека Ал Каеда е класична транснационална терористичка организација. Меѓутоа, последните проценки на воените аналитичари укажуваат на тоа дека постои голема веројатност ова движење да постигне глобални бунтовничко-револуционерни цели. Преку методолошка анализа на делувањето на Ал Каеда во овој труд ќе утврдиме дали разликата помеѓу бунтовништвото и тероризмот е само теоретска, исто како што справувањето со овие закани од страна на државните актери е сосема различно.

**Клучни зборови:** бунтовништво, тероризам, конфликт, противбунтовничка борба, Ал Каеда.

**ABSTRACT:** Insurgency as a form of conflict continuously remains as one of the biggest challenges for the conventional armed forces. At the present moment, the United States of America are being involved into the longest period of their military history by performing numerous peace-keeping operations in Iraq, while facing both chronic and seemingly endless rebellion in Afghanistan. There are several active conflicts with an indication of an insurgent revolt. The research of the insurgencies, as well as their detailed analysis and successful termination has a vital meaning for the war strategists and politicians, respectively.

The American National Strategy for home security and safety flags Al Qaeda as the biggest immediate and severe threat. Despite the lack of consensual agreement upon the

question which aims to define the concept of the terrorism, the conventional theories claim Al Qaeda to be a classic trans-national terroristic organization. Yet, the latest analysis of the war strategists and analytics point out to the fact that there is a great possibility for this movement to achieve global revolutionarily rebellious goals. Throughout a thoroughly conducted methodological analysis of Al Qaeda's actions within this paper, we will determine whether the difference between the insurgency and the terrorism is merely theoretical and whether it differs in the same manner as the combat of these threats conducted by the state officials.

**Key words:** Al Qaeda, conflict, counter-insurgency, insurgency, terrorism.

## ВОВЕД

По преземањето на командата врз американските сили во Авганистан во 2010 година од страна на генерал Дејвид Петреус тој во еден говор кон своите војници изјави дека „ние сме тука да победиме.“ Меѓутоа што всушност значи победа во современа противбунтовничка кампања. Дали тоа подразбира уништување на бунтовничките групи во Авганистан, елиминирање на нивните лидери, изнаоѓање на некој вид на преговарачко решение или уништување на мрежата на глобално поврзаната терористичка група Ал Каеда? Поради неповрзаноста и разидувањето на политичката и воената стратегија во спроведувањето на противбунтовничките кампањи многу е тешко да се даде одговор на ова прашање.

## БУНТОВНИШТВО – БОРБА ПОМЕЃУ СЛАБИТЕ И СИЛНИТЕ, КОНЦЕПТ И СТРУКТУРА

Денес како главни глобални безбедносни закани можеме да ги идентификуваме четири типови на недржавни вооружени групи: бунтовници, терористи, милиции и криминални организации. Овие закани претставуваат директна стратешка опасност за нациите – држави во светот. Помеѓу овие вооружени групи постојат големи разлики. Разбирањето на тие разлики е од суштинско значење за борба против секој од овие видови на вооружени групи.

Колку и да е стара војната, во исто време еволуирале бунтовништвото и неговите тактики. Без разлика на начинот на кој се одвиваат бунтовите, тие во суштина претставуваат вооружена борба против власта од една или повеќе групи кои не можат да ги постигнат своите политички цели со конвенционални методи (Steven and Millen, 2004:2).

Стратегиите разработени од страна на бунтовничките групи и организациски и оперативно се разликуваат од другите видови на недржавни вооружени групи.

Бунтовите се долготрајни форми на неконвенционално војување преку водење борба со нерегуларни воени сили и нелегални политички организации. Бидејќи бунтовничките сили имаат послаба воена моќ од државните владини безбедносни субјекти, бунтовите се карактеризираат со употреба на асиметрична војна како централна алатка за поткопување и соборување на власта. Инструментите на насилство кои се користат од страна на бунтовниците се движат од герилски операции, тероризам, саботажа, политички акции, психолошки операции и разузнавачки активности. Бунтовите се борба за власт и легитимитет, а нивната цел е уништување на моќта и легитимитетот на владата и во исто време преземање на истите под нивна контрола. И покрај тоа што вооружените напади врз владините институции се клучни за бунтовништвото, клучната битка се одвива во долгорочно освојување на „срцата и умовите“ на населението, како клучен фактор за победа и трансформација на општеството. (Bell, 2009: 15)

Според Бард О’Нил, автор на „Бунтовништво и тероризам: во срцето на модерната револуционерна војна“, бунтовништвото е опишано како „свесно користење на политичките ресурси и насилството за уништување, реформулирање или одржување на легитимноста на еден или повеќе политички аспекти.“ (O’Neill, 1990: 13) Според анализите на ЦИА од 1980 – тите години, „бунтовништвото е долгорочна политичко-воена активност, насочена кон остварување на целосна или делумна контрола врз ресурсите на државата, остварена преку употреба на недржавни воени сили и нелегални политички организации.“

Според „Водичот за анализата на бунтовништвото“ на ЦИА, се утврдени четири варијации на бунтови кои се разликуваат по својата типологија – политичко, воено, традиционално и урбано организирани. Клучните варијабли по кои може да се направи разлика помеѓу нив се идеологијата, мотивацијата, лидерството и нивното минато, организациската структура и оперативната стратегија.

Според нивните аспирации, О’Нил издвојува неколку различни видови бунтовнички движења:

- *анархистичко*, има далекусежни нереални цели. Тие бараат преку насилство и штрајкови, да се елиминираат сите институции на системот кои за нив се нелегитимни и непотребни;
- *револуционерно бунтовништво или бунт за рамноправност*, има за цел да наметне нов политички и општествен поредок на државата врз основа на систем на вредности. Раководството на овие движења формира централно контролиран апарат или организација, која го мобилизира народот за радикално да ја трансформира социјалната структура во рамките на постоечката политичка заедница;

- *традиционално бунтовништво*, има за цел фундаментална промена на политичкиот и општествениот поредок. Традиционалните бунтови често се идентификуваат како „национални“ и „ослободителни“. (Thomson, 2011: 2) Националните бунтови се организираат против власта и нивните разлики во идеологијата, етничката припадност, економската класа и останати политички прашања. Од друга страна, на ослободителните бунтовнички движења, цел им се елементите во државата кои ги перцепираат како окупатори. Како класични случаи на бунтовништво во XX век можеме да ги посочиме Виетнам, Малаја, Сомалија, Босна, Сиера Леоне, Конго, Колумбија и Косово. (Metz, 2000: 22);
- *милениумски бунтовни*, се движења кои не планираат да го заменат постоечкиот систем со нов или некој од минатите години, туку со режим кој постоел во далечното минато и е со вкоренети врски со нивните предци и религијата. Милениумските бунтови се света војна помеѓу силите на „доброто и злото“. Тие по обем се транснационални. Милениумските бунтови имаат многу заеднички елементи со револуционерните бунтови, а главна заедничка карактеристика им е почитта и посветеноста на идеологијата, како одраз на апсолутната вистина и правда. Радикалното исламско движење најчесто се идентификува како милениумски бунт. Најистакнати потомци кои денес се најактивни, се припадниците на Муслиманското братство кое е основано 1928 година од Хасан ал Бана и претставува глобално салафи џихад движење;
- *плуралистички бунтови*, чија цел е револуционерна трансформација на политичкиот систем, во кој се потенцирани вредностите на индивидуалните слободи, права и компромис;
- *сецесионистички бунтови*, претставуваат обид за отцепување од државата и воспоставување независна политичка заедница;
- *реформистички и заштитнички бунтови*, се помалку амбициозни во однос на нивните аспирации. Тие се стремат за правична распределба на политичките и економските добра на системот, а не за радикални преуредувања. За нив пожелно е да го задржат бунтот на статус-кво, бидејќи од таквиот статус очекуваат да произлезат релативни предности. (O'Neill B. 2005: 19-29)

Врз основа на горенаведените фактори, можеме да заклучиме дека основни карактеристики на бунтовништвото се:

- преземање на долготрајни политички и воени активности, насочени кон делумно или целосно стекнување контрола на територија на една држава;
- бунтовниците ги постигнуваат своите цели преку употреба на неконвенционални воени сили и нелегални политички организации;

- бунтовниците користат тактики кои се движат од герилски операции, тероризам, саботажа на политичка мобилизација, политичко делување, психолошки операции, разузнавачки и контраразузнавачки активности.

Секој од овие инструменти на бунтовништвото е дизајниран за да ја ослаби моќта и легитимноста на владината коалиција, а во исто време зголемување на моќта и легитимноста на бунтовничката група. Бунтовништвото може да се дефинира како „масовно движење кое се стреми да го собори *status quo* преку субверзија, политичка активност, востание, вооружен конфликт и тероризам“. По дефиниција, бунтовничките движења се „подмладоци“ на востанијата кои се стремат кон соборување на формираните влади или општествени структури. Сите тие се масовни востанија кои ги користат оружјата на послабите (субверзија, герила тактики, тероризам) против воспоставената моќ на државите и конвенционалните воени сили. Голем број од нив, вклучувајќи го и исламистичкиот цихад, ги земаат своите борци од редовите на сиромашните социо-економски групи, а нивното раководство – од отуѓените, радикализирани елити.

## МУТИРАЧКА ПРИРОДА НА БУНТОВИТЕ ВО XXI – ОТ ВЕК

Во контекст на глобализацијата и на заживувањето на исламистичката идеологија, војните во Авганистан и Ирак ни илустрираат колку еволуирале карактеристиките на бунтовништвото во XXI век. Содржината на бунтовничката идеологија премина од марксизам во исламизам. Ова предизвика голем број стратешки промени во бунтовништвото. Исламските бунтовници не бараат да се исполнат некои практични цели, туку исполнување на тоа што тие го сметаат за нивен верски повик. Што се однесува до стратешките цели, некои исламистички групи сè уште се стремат за воведување „исламска држава“ што подразбира воена победа врз власта во државата, додека други се обидуваат да ја поткопаат власта и да се ослободат од странското присуство. Религиозните лидери се двигатели на политичка мобилизација. Исламизмот повикува на концептот на мачеништво и ветување на награди во животот по животот, што резултира со зголемување на самоубиствените напади како многу популарна бунтовничка тактика.

Идеологијата на транснационален радикален ислам која ги внесе бунтовите во XXI век, е изразувањето на незадоволството кон САД, во кои се гледа лидер и главен корисник на неправедниот и неизбалансиран процес на глобализација.

Глобализацијата сама по себе го трансформираше лицето на бунтовите во последните неколку децении. Последиците од интернет револуцијата, овозможува

постоење глобална публика и брз начин за реклама на нивната кауза, привлекување на поддршка и создавање „виртуелно светилиште“ за бунтовниците (Kilcullen, 2006: 3).

Бунтовниците можат да испраќаат видеа на киднапирани лица и извршување на убиства речиси моментално, а преку меѓународните мрежи можат да пренесуваат снимки од борбите во реално време. Интернетот се покажа како моќно средство за собирање средства и поддршка не само од локалната туку и од глобалната публика. Оваа психолошка поддршка има големо влијание, бидејќи предизвикува привлекување на вниманието на медиумите и притоа непосредно ја зголемува публиката која е изложена на информирање, создава поголем број можни донатори и претставува дополнување и голема поддршка на бунтовничката мрежа.

Поради медиумите кои претставуваат глобален фактор, мали тактички напади можат да постигнат стратешки ефект. Затоа, на оперативно ниво, дифузните и автономни ќелии имаат тенденција да го заменат формалниот организациски Маоистички тип на бунтовнички организации. Ваквите бунтовнички формации се прилагодуваат на стратегијата на исцрпување и провокации и претставуваат главна карактеристика на бунтовништвото во XXI век. Влијанието на глобализацијата е очигледна во присуството на транснационален карактер на модерниот бунт. Директна соработка помеѓу бунтовничките движења е илустрирано преку мултинационалното присуство на Ал Каеда во Пакистан, Авганистан, Иран и Ирак.

Во однос на техничкиот напредок, експлозивните направи кои за првпат се користеа во Чеченија, многу брзо се размножија во Ирак и Авганистан. Исто така, употребата на самоубиствени бомбашки напади како оружје значително се зголеми, дури и во местата каде што претходно не постоеа како воена тактика. Ова може да се препише на преголемата изложеност на глобалните медиумски мрежи, на бунтовнички групи кои традиционално ги користат овие тактики на самоубиствени бомбашки напади.

Во минатото најзначајна компонента на бунтовите била нивната доминантна рурална компонента. Причината е јасна, бунтовниците морале да се кријат во руралните области за да преживеат. Денес е очигледна една нова мутирана рурално-урбана бунтовничка кампања. Класичната теорија за бунтовите како примарен го третира бунтот во руралните области, додека урбаниот бунт се смета како поддршка на изведената акција (Виетнам, Малаја или Ирската граѓанска војна). Бунтовничките кампањи во кои се вклучени урбани елементи се Аден, Алжир, Кипар и Палестина. Но, тие на крајот имале доминантна рурална компонента, бидејќи прикривањето е подобро и полесно во руралните области (Thompson, 1970: 21).

Но, денес оваа практика во случаите со Ирак и Авганистан е мутирана. Урбаната џунгла во Багдад и Кабул, со нивните забранети небезбедни области и секташки



сиромашни квартави, овозможуваат далеку полесно и подобро прикривање и маскирање отколку отворените пустини надвор од долините на реките Тигар и Еуфрат или населените пустини и шуми во Авганистан. Инцидентите во Авганистан и Ирак почесто се случуваат во урбаните центри со подметнување експлозивни направи и предизвикување многу цивилни жртви, отколку во приградските населби.

Овие изведени терористички напади се со помал обем и краткорочни, исто како и во традиционалните бунтови, но во овој случај напаѓачите се вклопуваат во урбаната средина и секогаш се присутни на теренот. Медиумското присуство исто така е поголемо во градовите, дополнително разгорувајќи ја пропагандата за применетите тактики, предизвикувајќи страв и шок кај населението и противничките сили. Како одговор на овие урбани напади, во немоќ, од страна на владините сили се преземаат традиционални противбунтовнички методи како блокирање и претрес на села, полициски час и контрола на намирници и храна. Во Ирак и Авганистан наидоа на остри критики, поради дополнително влошување на состојбата во урбаните средини и зголемена негативната пропаганда од страна на медиумите (Williams, 2008: 396).

Интернетот, мобилната телефонија и телевизиската покриеност, им овозможува мрежна координација, при што од корен се менуваат бунтовничките тактики. Тајните весници, пиратски радио станици и плакати, се користат во руралните места, каде што нема мрежна покриеност на теренот. Модерните бунтовнички тактики масовно како тактика користат бомбашки, наместо традиционалните рурални заседи. Импровизирани експлозивни направи (IED) и самоубиствените бомбашки напади ги заменуваат класичните напади кои се изведуваат со огнено оружје. Со оваа промена во тактиките намален е ризикот за жртви и не е потребен голем број борци за да се изведе акцијата.

Можеме да заклучиме дека денес бунтовите значително се разликуваат од оние во 60-тите. Примена на модерната технологија и преминување од рурално во урбано бунтовништво, тешко може да се сузбие со традиционални методи. Класичната противбунтовничка борба е неопходна, но не е доволна за успех против современите бунтови.

## АЛ КАЕДА ПОМЕЃУ ТЕРОРИЗМОТ И БУНТОВНИШТВОТО – СПРОТИВСТАВЕНИ ПАРАДИГМИ

Доколку детално ги проучиме терористичките организации и бунтовничките движења ќе откриеме важни разлики помеѓу нив. Во 60-тите години „тероризмот“ се користел како погрден збор за да ги дискредитираат и делегитимизираат различните типови вооружени групи. Прекарот „терористички“ беше користен од страна на владите

за пропагандни и политички цели во војната против бунтовничките движења. Целта им била да се обезвредни угледот на движењето, да се прикаже нивната кауза како нелегитимна и да се прикажат нивните методи дека се надвор од законите на војната. Како илустративен е примерот од 60-тите кога администрацијата на САД ги оквалификува бунтовниците на Виетконг за терористи (Winkler, 2006: 18).

Во 70-тите, голем број бунтовнички групи, во нивното дејствување се потпираат на терористички тактики. Како пример за тоа е бандата на Бадер Маинхоф – фракција на Црвената армија, италијанските Црвени брагади и јапонската Црвена армија. Тие немале посебна желба за да се воспостави масовно општествено движење, туку напротив, овие бунтовничко-терористички групи биле составени од мали ќелии на издвоени поединци вградени во општеството. Нивните клучни карактеристики биле:

- преку закани или употреба на насилство сееле страв за остварување на политички цели;
- терористичките акти биле дизајнирани да имаат застрашувачки психолошки ефект кој ќе се вкорени во пошироката публика;
- сè почеста цел биле недолжни цивили и останати субјекти кои според меѓународните норми имале статус на заштитени поединци и групи.

Според овие карактеристики можеме да забележиме дека постои разлика помеѓу терористичките и бунтовничките методи на дејствување. Важна разлика постои во поглед на целите и тактиките. Меѓутоа, бунтовничката употреба на насилство може да вклучува и терористички акти. Но, исто така, тие се потпираат на тактика на герилска војна, водена од неконвенционални мали единици, кои извршуваат напади против државните субјекти и безбедносните сили, за да ги вознемират и изморат, принудувајќи ги притоа да ги потрошат нивните ресурси.

Меѓународниот тероризам, кој се појави во 70-тите, беше инициран од „неидентификувани“ терористички групи, формирани од мали ќелии на отуѓени поединци во западното општество, а не од бунтовнички движења со определени остварливи цели. Иако, постоеле терористички групи кои својата дејност ја базираат на бунтовништво, како Палестинската ослободителна армија (PLA), која од страна на западните разузнавачките служби се смета за една од најважните и најопасните групи на Блискиот Исток, во западната народна култура, почетокот на тероризмот се поистоветува со неидентификуваните ќелии на радикализирани, нихилистички индивидуалци. Оттука, се појави нова парадигма која оттогаш има силно влијание во јавниот дискурс.

Во оваа широко прифатена концепција, која ја застапуваат многубројни претставници на законодавните институции и креатори на Западните политики, терористите се сметаат за нетипични, девијантни индивидуи, кои не се вклопуваат во

општеството. Терористите се криминалци, чии методи и цели се подеднакво неприфатливи. Тие применуваат насилство делумно за да го шокираат населението и владите, но и да извршат влијание врз нив, а бидејќи се психолошки или морално грешни (злобни) индивидуи со нив „нема преговарање“. Во оваа парадигма, тероризмот е првенствено проблем за спроведување на законот и оттука се применува приод базиран на случај, каде клучната цел е да се пронајдат и фатат оние кои ги извршиле терористичките напади.

Оваа парадигма има силно влијание врз приодот и водењето на „војната против тероризмот“ – бидејќи зборот „тероризам“ се содржи во неговиот наслов. Оттука произлегува дека примената на тероризмот како тактика е само една издвоена компонента од бунтовништвото, занемарувајќи ги другите аспекти на конфликтот. Неуспехот во победа врз тероризмот и уништување на терористичките групи се доказ за неуспех на водењето „војна против тероризмот“. Меѓутоа, одговорот на Австралија на бомбардирањата во Бали во 2002 беше првенствено фокусиран врз „изведување на терористите пред правдата“ – оттука централната улога на безбедносните агенции беше ангажирање во приод базиран на случај, на легални докази.

Парадигмата за бунтовништво е сосема поинаква. Според овој приод бунтовниците се сметаат за претставници на прашања или проблеми кои се прифатливи во рамките на едно општество. Владите се стремат кон тоа да ги поразат бунтовниците првенствено преку „освојување на срцата и умот“ на широката популација, процес кој нужно честопати вклучува компромис и преговори. Методите на бунтовниците се сметаат за неприфатливи, но нивните проблеми честопати се сметаат за легитимни, доколку за нивно решавање се залагаат со мирољубиви средства.

Од горе наведеното произлегува дека парадигмата за бунтовништвото дава подобар ментален модел за тековните конфликти отколку што тоа го дава стереотипот на тероризмот. Тековните акции во „војната против тероризмот“ се несразмерни, доколку се разгледуваат низ призма на парадигмата на тероризмот. Некои акции (како меѓународната соработка во доменот на спроведување на законот и акциите за спречување на финансирањето на тероризмот) прецизно се совпаѓаат со парадигмата на тероризмот, додека други (војната во Ирак и Авганистан, иницијативите против пролиферација, растечкото влијание во Централна Азија, задржувањето на Северна Кореја и Иран) се сомнителни и неповрзани со анти-терористичката агенда. Доколку се разгледува низ призмата на борба против бунтовништвото, овие акции сосема имаат смисла. Тие прецизно влегуваат во состав на трите текови од класичната борба против бунтовништвото - помирување, освојување на срцата и умот на граѓаните и спречување на создавање прибежиште и спонзорство од надвор.

Традиционално, бунтовите се внатрешни конфликти. Нивната цел е промена на власта во рамките на границите на една нација. Меѓутоа, нивните операции можат да преминат и на териториите на соседните држави, од каде што ќе добијат поголема поддршка отколку во рамките на сопствената територија. Преку анализа на Ал Каеда и нејзиното глобално дејствување, нејзините активности можеме да ги дефинираме како глобално бунтовништво. Концептот на глобален бунт, ќе го тестираме со истите принципи како традиционално бунтовништво.

Која е целта на бунтовите: промена на структурата на моќ, соборување влади, промена на општествен поредок? Која е целта на Ал Каеда?

Прво, групата е радикално сепаратистичка. Ал Каеда се стреми да го сочува и шири пуританскиот, строгиот фундаменталистички ислам со изолирање од модерната западна култура. Само со елиминирање на искушението на западните идеи, исламската заедница на верници може правилно да му служи на Алах. Во блиска иднина, ова би значело протерување на сето западно присуство од Арабија, што значи потреба од чистење на исламските земји од западното влијание. Строгиот исламски свет, дизајниран од Ал Каеда, неизбежно ќе се најде во судир со западните идеи. Тоа значи дека ќе биде неизбежен судирот помеѓу сепаратистичката идеологија на Ал Каеда и современиот демократски поредок (Martin, 2002: 8-9). Ал Каеда сама по себе не се обидува да се оддели од одредена влада, таа се обидува да го отргне и одвои исламот од западното политичко, верско и културно влијание. Ова секако претставува промена во структурата на глобалната светска моќ. Кој е мотивот на Ал Каеда?

Идеологијата е од клучна важност за опстанокот на еден бунт. Таа претставува инспирација за извршување на терористички напади. Во текот на неговиот живот Осам бин Ладен (а денес неговите заменици), многу јасно ја искажувал мотивацијата на групата, преку неговите декларации – фатви од 1996 и 1998 година за света војна – џихад. Во нив тој го искажува непријателството кон САД како верска должност, која ќе биде наградена од Бога (Mojsa, 2007: 18). Постојат многу известувања кои ја откриваат идеологијата на групата. Еве некои од нив:

- „Јасно е дека Америка и Западот воопшто, премногу го мразат исламот и муслиманите што тоа не може да се опише. Нашиот тероризам е добро прифатен, бидејќи е против Америка, а со поразување на Америка ќе престане и поддршката за Израел кој ги убива нашите деца.“ (изјава на Бин Ладен октомври 2001)(Murdico. 2007: 61);
- „Поминаа три месеци од благословените напади против глобалните неверници, против Америка, шефот на неверниците, два месеци од почетокот на волшебната

*крстоносна војна против исламот, овие настани се од особено значење за муслиманите“.* (говор на Бин Ладен на 26.12.2001 година);

- *„Правото за убивање Американци и нивни сојузници, цивили, војска, е индивидуална должност за секој муслиман кој може да го направи тоа, во било која земја, со цел да се ослободи џамијата Ал - Акса и Светата џамија од нивна окупација, а нивните војски да се протераат надвор од сите земји на исламот, да бидат поразени и да не можат да се закануваат на секој муслиман. Ова е во согласност со зборовите на Севишниот бог“.*

Како Ал Каеда ги исполнува своите цели? Бунтовниците ги мобилизираат своите ресурси. Тие организираат индиректни, неконвенционални, исцрпувачки напади со цел уривање на легитимитетот на власта, нејзината поддршка, принудувајќи ги на дефанзива. Бунтовниците се претопуваат во месното население, вешто се прикриваат на сигурни места, подготвувајќи и водејќи долготрајна, етапна кампања која се одвива во нивна корист. Ал Каеда има многу сличности во овој поглед. Следбениците на Осама бин Ладен, денес успешно ги мобилизираат сите оние кои се бесни на влијанието и присуството на Западот во исламскиот свет. Миграцијата на насилството кое го промовираше Осама бин Ладен, беше поттикнато од стационарање на американските трупи во Саудиска Арабија, најсветите места за исламот Мека и Медина, за време на Заливската војна. Многу млади исламски радикали ги напуштиле своите семејства, а често и удобниот и богат живот, за да ја посетуваат терористичката обука во камповите на Ал Каеда. Нивните напади не може да се каже дека во целост се насочени против соборување на некоја влада, но дефинитивно се во насока на уништување на волјата на американскиот народ и вршење политички притисок за повлекување на западното присуство од регионот. Овие напади се многу значајни за зајакнување на каузата помеѓу следбениците на Ал Каеда. Во 1996 година Осама бин Ладен го цитираше инцидентот во Сомалија и ја докажа очигледната политичка слабост на САД – јавното мислење, кога еден убиен американски војник беше влечен по улиците на Могадишу, по што следеше и повлекувањето на американските војници од Сомалија и Руанда.

Терористичките напади кои ги организира Ал Каеда од воена гледна точка се неконвенционални. Од 1998 година па до денес Ал Каеда изврши голем број напади преку самоубиствени бомбашки напади изведени со авиони, автомобили, камиони, врз цркви, синагоги, конзулати, училишта и воени бази и бродови. Целта им варираше од лесни цивилни мети до високо обезбедени воени инсталации (Schweitzer, 2010: 105-106).

Во периодот кога привидно мируваат и не се извршуваат напади, џихадистите на Ал Каеда се обучуваат и се организираат во оддалечени региони низ целиот свет. До

неодамна Авганистан беше светото место за обука, за подоцна камповите за обука да се дисперзираат во Пакистан и останатите држави на Блискиот Исток. Конечно, денес тие немаат потреба за криење и искористување на маскирните карактеристики на тешко пристапните терени. Тие денес се помешани во глобалната светска популација, живеат по домовите на европските метрополи и земаат часови за летање во училишта на крајбрежјето на Флорида. Останатите форми на надворешна поддршка која се состои од финансирање, разузнавачки информации, пристап, оружје и донации добиваат од државни и недржавни актери. Бунтовничкиот карактер на групата им овозможува флексибилност во изборот на место и време за извршување на напади. Тие се способни да извршат неколку континуирани напади, или да се кријат во неограничен период без никаква временска обврска за дејствување. Во еден регион од светот групата може да експанзира, додека во друг да тлее и да мирува.

Мрежата на Ал Каеда, центарот на гравитација во војната против тероризмот, претставува глобално движење, посветено на пан-исламската визија, група на чисти исламски држави, ослободени од западното влијание во регионот на Блискиот Исток. Нивниот начин на организација, неконвенционалната употреба на насилство, идеолошките мотиви и политичките цели имаат голема сличност со бунтовништвото, но на глобално ниво.

## ЗАКЛУЧОК

Традиционалната остра поделба помеѓу тероризмот и бунтовништвото повеќе не е соодветна поради еволуција на истите и нивните вкрстени методи за постигнување на целта. Со сигурност можеме да констатираме дека глобализацијата во голема мера го олесни сплотувањето и вкрстувањето на тероризмот и бунтовништвото, со што е створена една сериозна комплексна безбедносна закана. Покрај тероризмот, од страна на западните експерти и бунтовништвото се смета како манифестација предизвикана од религиозен екстремизам. Очигледно е дека Ал Каеда претставува мешавина од основата во бунтовничките стратегии – масовна мобилизација и вооружено делување. Ал Каеда не го претставува тероризмот, туку бунтовништвото изразено преку Салафистичката теологија која допира до целиот муслимански свет и го промовира теророт. Тоа е движење кое практикува урбана верзија на војување, со активности кои по природа се повеќе воени отколку политички. Тие не практикуваат употреба на герилски групи базирани во руралните области кои водат систематска кампања за соборување на владите. Напротив, Ал Каеда има разработена рурално-урбана стратегија на насилство која паралелно се одвива врз цивилни цели и владини институции, создавајќи нестабилност и недоверба во политичката способност и волја кај своите непријатели.

Исламското бунтовништво не е нов феномен. Целите на ова движење се револуционерни и предвидуваат промена на општеството на религиозна основа, а владата по природа е автократска и контролирана од страна на свештеници. Исламистичката влада во Иран, Талибанците во Авганистан и Судан се идеален пример. Новата Салафистичка администрација строго би го спровела шеријатскиот закон и би ги блокирала воените и културните влијанија на Западот.

Милитантната исламистичка идеологија, илустрира паралелна хиерархија позната како виртуелна држава, „дава“ (da'wa – долгорочна реисламизација и инфилтрација во општеството во секоја ќелија како начин за воспоставување политичка контрола). Со ова алтернативно општество се опфаќаат основните социјални програми, кои се наменети да докажат дека фундаменталната политика е успешна, а притоа ќе создадат масовна база на поддршка која подоцна ќе се претвори во политичка моќ. Тука спаѓаат исламските хуманитарни организации, невладини организации за помош, џамиите, медресите и болниците, преку кои се унапредува нивната идеологија и политичка идеја, за подоцна да преминат во масовно движење.

Некои од факторите кои ја направија стратегијата на Мао ефикасна, се присутни и во „револуцијата“ на Ал Каеда. Клучниот фактор за масовната мобилизација на Ал Каеда е во верската основа на нејзината идеологија, обидувајќи се да создадат еден нов начин за остварување на целта. Исто така, масовните терористички напади негативно влијаат и ја поткопуваат стратегијата и политичките цели на Западните сојузници, масовно го мобилизираат муслиманскиот свет, генерираат нови регрути, пари, престиж, демонстрирајќи ги глобалните капацитети за еден нов вид насилство.

Ал Каеда е една од стоте најсмртоносни исламски милитантни групи, формирани во последните 25 години. Опасноста која се наметнува произлегува од нејзината подготвеност за употреба на ОМУ, нејзиниот глобален дострел и најважно нејзината револуционерна и експанзионистичка идеологија. Големината на организацијата, нејзините политички цели, нејзините трајни врски со исламското фундаменталистичко социјално движење обезбедува силни докази дека Ал Каеда не е терористичка група, туку бунтовничко движење. Нејзина примарна стратегија се терористички акции и масовните мобилизациски техники кои го зајакнуваат нејзиното влијание и еластичност. Уникатни елементи во нивната методологија претставуваат транснационалните вмрежувања и коалиции со криминалните организации од мултиетнички состав.

Сите овие фактори заедно, претставуваат причина за справување со овој асиметричен непријател, на еден неконвенционален начин, преку водење една долга

неконвенционална војна, војна која ќе спречи оваа глобална исламска бунтовничка кампања да прерасне во војна помеѓу цивилизацији.

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## TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTS OF SECURITY ТРАДИЦИОНАЛНИТЕ И СОВРЕМЕНИТЕ КОНЦЕПТИ НА БЕЗБЕДНОСТА

Gojko Pavlovic, MA, Internal Affairs College Banja Luka, Republika Srpska

gojko.pavlovic@education.muprs.org

Marjan Djurovski, MA, Faculty of Security Skopje, Macedonia

mgjurovski@fb.uklo.edu.mk

**Abstract:** In this paper authors try to point out to that fact that the changes that have happened on the international scene after the Cold War caused the changes of ideas, especially of the concept of security in general. That is why it is said that traditional concepts of security are not any more able to explain or handle the complex nature, aetiology and phenomenology, of contemporary security challenges, risks and threats. The paper will first present traditional concepts of security, and then it will introduce certain points according to which the security is being defined in contemporary conceptual sense, and in the end it will explain contemporary concepts of security.

**Key words:** security, traditional and contemporary concepts

**Апстракт:** Во овој труд, авторите се обидуваат да го истакнат фактот дека промените кои се случија на меѓународната сцена по Студената војна предизвикаа промени во идеите, особено во генералниот концепт на безбедноста. Од таа причина се вели дека традиционалните концепти на безбедноста веќе не можат да ја објаснат и да се справат со комплексната природа, етиологија и феномен на современите безбедносни предизвици, ризици и закани. Оваа книга прво ќе ги презентира традиционалните концепти на безбедноста и потоа ќе воведи и одредени поенти во согласност со кои се дефинира безбедноста во современа смисла, за на крајот да ги објасни современите концепти на безбедноста.

**Клучни зборови:** безбедност, традиционални и современи концепти

### INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Security, as a condition for survival and activity of the individual, society, state and international community, is one of the fundamental social functions, the fact being evidenced by the continuous preoccupation with achieving security throughout the history of mankind. However, a multi-dimensional and complex notion, such as security, has not

had the same meaning throughout history, meaning that defining security and its content in traditional and contemporary concepts quite differs (Tatalovic, 2006: 64). Therefore, bearing in mind that security is a dynamic phenomenon, the concepts of referent values to be protected, imposed threats, compromised subjects and the ways and means of protection, have also being changed (Mijalkovic, 2009a: 65).

For this reason, the introduction of the term "security concept" stresses that the security is an open and dynamic system where concept, that is, idea of security stands for a long-term process and, in terms of needs and values, a desired environment, something that is yet to be (Kekovic, 2009: 144).

Security concepts<sup>29</sup>, in fact, represent the theoretical and practical ways of protection, and improvement of specific reference values and interests of certain categories of security subjects, which were established on the basis of relevant security practices, primarily with a view of its improvement. As a matter of fact, the concepts of security are products, but also a mean, of security theory and practice (Mijalkovic, 2009a: 65-66).

### TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS OF SECURITY

The idea of security originated in the heart of European political thought of the seventeenth century. It is an idea whose political significance, as well as the meaning of the very word, has changed continuously throughout history, mostly implying the state and the goal of an individuals, groups and countries. Thus, the most consistent sense of security, in this period, was that it represented a state or a goal which created a special relationship between individuals and the state (Rothschild, 1995: 60-61).

The concept that the state is seen as a main provider of security (Bailes, 2007: 1) can be traced back from Hobbes' concept of the legitimate government, which was created by the consent of the people through the social contract, up to Weber's idea of the state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. Together, these attitudes represent the basic philosophical pillar of state's role in creating and maintaining a monopoly over the means of force. Namely, since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (Schreier&Caparini, 2005: 1), signed 1648, it has been adopted the idea that the state is the one that must ensure and provide security to its citizens. The two main principles having arisen from this treaty are the sovereignty and equality of the nations. The state, therefore, has taken a monopoly over the use of force in order to secure its citizens and to ensure its sovereignty against internal and external threats (Pavlovic, 2011a: 5).

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<sup>29</sup> For more on the analysis of the notion, scope and contents of security see: Baldwin, David, "The Concept of Security", Review of International Studies, No 23, British International Studies Association, 1997, pp. 5-26.

Thus, Thomas Hobbes, known as "a theoretician of security and order" (Milosavljevic, 2011: 57), states in his *Leviathan* that the purpose of the state is the individual security. "I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth; in Latin, *civitas*. This is the generation of that great leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defense. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad." (Hobbes, 1885 - according to Bosnjak and others, 1954: 194-195).

Furthermore, the term security gained a new public prominence in the early, liberal period of the French Revolution. Natural rights of man consisted of liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression<sup>30</sup>. Thus, security is still the state of the individual, but now their natural right. Also, the security, as one of the fundamental natural and imprescriptible rights of man, was pointed out to in the famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1793 (Stojanovic, 1989: 26-27).<sup>31</sup>

Article 2 of the Declaration states that the aim of society is the common welfare. Government is instituted in order to guarantee to man the enjoyment of his natural and imprescriptible rights which are equality, liberty, security, and property. Article 8 of this Declaration emphasizes that security consists in the protection afforded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property (Pavlovic, 2011b: 296-296). Thus, security is conceived in terms of liberty from personal jeopardy, which should be provided by the civil society. It means that the individual, i.e. personal safety, in the spirit of the liberal thought of the Age of Enlightenment, represents a personal and collective good. It is a state and a goal of an individual, which can be achieved only in a kind of collective endeavor (Rothschild, 1995: 62-63).

Later on, the security of an individual was considered as a political epigram, as a security of the nation. Thus Rousseau, like Locke and Montesquieu, described the social

<sup>30</sup> Article 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, French National Assembly from 26. 08. 1789. (Fr: *La Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen*).

<sup>31</sup> The Constitution from June 24<sup>th</sup> 1793 or so-called *Second Declaration*. Namely, after the monarchy was abolished in France, the Convent drafted a new Constitution know as The Montagnard Constitution whose introductory part consisted of the special declaration of rights so-called *Declaration Jacobine*. This Jacobin declaration kept the basic positions of the 1789 Declaration, but also introduced substantial amendments, so that number of articles increased from 17 to 35.

contract as a result of the desire of individuals for security of life and liberty, and pointed out that it represents the main problem which the institutions of the state should provide the solution to (Rousseau, 1964: 290). In Jeremy Bentham's opinion, the security is seen as a condition for the general welfare, the fundamental social objective, a political joy consisting of survival, abundance, equality, and security, of which the most important is security (Bentham, 1837: 302 - according to: Burke, 2002: 12).

According to the above mentioned, in the scientific analysis of those disciplines where security was a major area of research, the issue of security was, for very long time, related to the state. The traditional definitions of security started from the observation of the military power of the state and the general order of those states, and were based on three basic assumptions: the belief that the state is responsible for the security; security policy was directed toward the preservation of the existing situation; military threats required efficient and effective military defense which was the primary interest (Tatalovic, 2004: 50 - in: Vignjevic, 2004: 45-55). The fact that the sovereign state was an exclusive object, but also the subject of safety and security, contributed to the relative stability and predictability of international relations, thus making a sovereign state a major part of the international system whose foundations were laid, and that has essentially stayed unchanged, from the Peace of Westphalia until our days (Simic, 2002: 22).

In the period of the bipolar international system, according to the most researchers, the security was seen and defined as "objective state and subjective feeling or conviction" (Dimitrijevic, 1973: 43), so that one was able to talk about security only when "there were no threats imposed to specific default values" (Wolfers, 1952: 485).

It can be confidently claimed that not only the object of the security that was clearly recognizable, but also the nature of the threats, as well as the subject which took care that, by certain procedures, ways and means, it eliminated threats and provided a desirable state of default values, as well as a sense of serenity. Therefore, since the establishment of the international system of states, and throughout the period of bipolarism, the security was almost exclusively observed in military terms, while the main object and the subject of the security idea and system was a sovereign state. Thus, only through increasing its own military power or accessing to relevant associations, the states sought to completely exclude or reduce, as much as possible, the possibility to be defeated in an armed conflict (Simic, 2002: 23).

Concerning the above stated, one can note two traditional concepts of security (Mijalkovic, 2009a: 61):

a) the concept of national security – the one of the state-centered character where the central place is occupied by traditional vital state values which are taken care of by the state through its security system, and

b) the concept of international security - the one of the international character where the values of the international community and security of the international regions are promoted and which are taken care of by the states through their international relations, cooperation or through certain international organizations. The traditional concepts of international security are: balance of power, collective security and world government (See more: Bajagic, 2007: 39-51).

Therefore, it can be concluded that, in traditional terms, security was observed in the spirit of the orthodox concept of the national security, as well as the traditional concept of the international security, which was based on the principles of state-centered security (Mijalkovic&Keserovic, 2010: 62) and that the basic assumption of the traditional concept of security was that the state was secure only when it would achieve a balance between military threats and its own military capabilities to react to them (Simic, 2002: 24).

### **MODERN CONCEPTS OF SECURITY**

At the end of the last century Barry Buzan expressed the view that the traditional concept of security through studying force (realist school, security is the goal) and peace (liberal, idealistic school, security is a consequence) is not the most appropriate for the understanding that notion, and that such an approach does not provide a clear definition of security. Specifically, B. Buzan said that security should be considered in more comprehensive manner, that is, more openly had it had been observed up to that point, or members of the previous frame of observation, and that a clear difference should be made between concept of security and concept of national security (Buzan, 1991: 24).

Specifically, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarism affected the manner in which the concept of security was observed, and especially meaningful discussions were led about the nature and the meaning of security. One group of authors insisted on expanding the concept of security through the inclusion of new, broader potential security threats, primarily economic development, environmental degradation, human rights violations and large migratory movements. Another group of authors, starting from the broader dimensions of security, insists on expanding the agenda of security studies by including into researches a number of security segments such as individual or human security, national security or security of the society, as well as regional, international and global aspects of security issue. On the other hand, the third group of authors stuck to the traditional state-centered approach to security issue inserting into it new forms of

security (common security, collective security, cooperative security, etc) thus creating new theoretical models of multilateral interstate security relations, which could lead to clarification of the security issue in interstate relations (Tatalovic, 2004: 47).

Furthermore, the end of the twentieth century was marked by global changes that have contributed to the activation of the process of transferring traditional powers entitled only to the state to the private sector. Nowadays it has been increasingly spoken and written about the privatization of security as a phenomenon that is widespread and accepted more than it has been in any previous period in the history of the modern national state (Small, 2006: 4). Today we are witnessing the fact that various companies, individuals, international organizations, NGOs and even the government itself use the services and trust the private sector and let it take care of their security (Pavlovic, 2011a: 6).

So, after nearly four hundred years, the state and its institutions are not the only entities that take care of the internal and external security of its citizens (Petrovic, 2007: 13). Westphalia system of nation-states, as the undisputed pillar of the international order, has been replaced by a much more complex reality that put back to the scene the privatization of the war and conflict (Schreier&Caparini, 2005: 1), and a sector, a private one, operating on a commercial basis, appeared in a security system. The theory states that this new model of providing military and security services enables governments and public institutions to increase their efficiency by concentrating on the most important tasks, while responsibility for less important tasks is transferred to the private security sector (Richards&Smith, 2007: 3-5). Therefore, today, apart from the state, there are many other subjects that are significant for the security, such as individuals, social and private groups, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, etc, and they all can act on the national, but also on the international scene (Mijalkovic, 2009a: 79).

The changes after the Cold War<sup>32</sup> were those that largely motivated scholars of security studies to significantly broaden the concept of security from the traditional, state-centered, one towards a new, global or transnational focus. Security is now seen and understood as a complex issue that is necessarily related to the influence of man to the changes in the global environment, as well as to the influence of global change to man's behavior (see more: Rothschild, 1992 and Grizold: 1992).

As it was said by D. Simic, "it is the act of introducing of the individual, as an independent entity of global relations, that represents a "tectonic line", a differentia specifica of the new global security order in statu nascendi against all present and previous organizational principles and forms of national and international security" (Simic, 2002: 17).

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<sup>32</sup> Primarily, here is referred to the disintegration of the political environment and the process of globalization and interdependence which is expanding rapidly.



Therefore, the broadening of the security research field certainly implies broadening of the content of the security notion in all directions beyond the particular nation-state, i.e.: upwards - towards international institutions, downwards - towards regional or local governments and sideward (left and right) - towards non-governmental organizations, public opinion and the media, and the abstract forces of nature or the marketplace (Basic&Stoett, 2003: 152).

When defining security in contemporary conceptual sense the main disputes stem from a question on the values that should be protected nowadays (physical and material security, political independence, territorial integrity, international peace, and similar), as well as from the effort to define the basic entity that is the subject of protection (citizen - the individual, state, international community, social security, economic system, the environment, etc.) (Dragisic, 2009: 163).

Essentially all these questions can be brought down to a couple of the following: (Mijalkovic, 2009b: 56-57):

a) security for whom? - first of all, it is necessary to identify the center of security construction, and the role of so-called "referent object" or "referent subject" of protection can be given to the individual, social groups, the state and the international system (Baldwin, 1997: 13);

b) security for which values? - it is necessary to identify the values and interests that are the subject of protection or the object of jeopardy (Baldwin, 1997: 13-14);

c) security from whom/ what threats? - it involves the identification of the sources, subjects and forms of compromising protected values which may be natural, human or technological in their nature (see more: Vejnovic&Sikman, 2007);

d) who provides security? - it is necessary to identify the entities that protect the mentioned values (see more: Rakic&Vejnovic, 2006) and

e) the manner of providing security? - it is necessary to identify the methods, means and activities that will be deployed to protect specific, vulnerable values (Baldwin, 1997: 16).

Based on the above mentioned, various concepts or notions of security are being created, according to which the security in the contemporary conceptual sense is defined as (Mitrovic&Pavlovic, 2012: 20):

a) the security of man - the individual, people and society (see more: Bajagic, 2007);

b) the security of the state, or national security (see more: Mijalkovic, 2009a);

c) international security (see more: Pendarovski, 2009) - modern concepts: security of the community, security regime, security complex and cooperation in security (Simic, 2007: 165-193);

d) the global security (Gacinovic, 2007: 3-23).

Therefore, the breakdown of the bipolar security structure has caused significant changes of "Cold- War" security factors. The circle of non-state subjects that have an impact on the security has significantly expanded at the expense of reducing the role of the state. At the same time, there has been a change in the security sources and threats. Also, the number of objects occupying the security focus has been significantly expanded, as well as the manner, means and instruments for achieving security. The subjects of security concerns, in addition to national security, are now the security of individuals, common security, as well as international and global security (Vejnovic&Obrenovic, 2012: 66).

## CONCLUSION

Instead of a conclusion, here we provide a comparative overview of those elements that are included in the traditional concepts of security, i.e. national and international security, and contemporary concepts of security, i.e. security of people, countries, international security, and global security.

Thus, making a comparison of the contents of traditional and contemporary concepts of security it can be observed that (Mijalkovic, 2009a: 66):

- the focus of traditional concepts - or so-called state-centered security, consists of: state's territory and boundaries, external security of the state, military factor of the security, human factor, East-West relations, the willingness of the state to act, and the central role of the state in the security;

- the focus of modern concepts consists of - individuals and community, internal security of the state and transnational security, multidimensional security factors, natural and environmental factors, global security, preventive and revitalized role of the state, and the presence of non-state or private security entities.

It is obvious that the old, "Cold -War", theoretical concepts and practical models of security are obsolete, and that the remodeling of the up-to-present ideas and practices of security in the new socio-political relations and a variety of risks that are difficult to identify, has become an imperative for the present and the future (Vejnovic&Obrenovic, 2012: 66).

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## INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES FOR POLICY EXECUTION TOWARDS DIASPORA OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

### ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛНИ КАПАЦИТЕТИ ЗА СПРОВЕДУВАЊЕ НА ПОЛИТИКАТА КОН ДИЈАСПОРАТА НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

Ass. Prof. Zlatko Nikoloski

Ministry of the Interior – Sector for Border Issues and Migrations

E- mail: zlatko.nikoloski@yahoo.com

**ABSTRACT:** Executing migration policy including diasporas of the Republic of Macedonia depends on good establishment and organization of institutions, as well as their human and technical capacities. Functioning of the institutional capacities that execute the policy towards Macedonian Diasporas is of crucial importance for the country's national interests and Macedonian people.

Executing the policy and goals towards diasporas such as: preservation of national and cultural identity, protection of interests and rights of emigrants, provision of legal rights and obligations in foreign countries by providing consular and other services, promotion of commercial, scientific, cultural, sports and other liaisons between diasporas and the Republic of Macedonia, obviously requires timely and continuous cooperation and coordination by the most responsible, that is to say, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Culture, Emigration Agency, State Statistical Office and other bodies that deal with the diasporas issue.

**Key words:** institutions, migrations, diasporas, emigration, emigrants.

**АПСТРАКТ:** Спроведувањето на миграциската политика вклучувајќи ја и политиката кон дијаспората на Република Македонија зависи од добрата поставеност и организација на институциите, како и нивните кадровски и технички капацитети. Функционирањето на институционалните капацитети кои ја спроведуваат политиката кон македонската дијаспора, има исклучително значење за националните интереси на државата и за македонскиот народ.

За спроведување на политиката и целите кон дијаспората кои се поставуваат пред нас се: зачувување на националниот и културниот идентитет, заштита на интересите и правата на иселениците, обезбедување остварување законски права и обврски во странство низ давање на конзуларни и други услуги, унапредување на

стопански, научни, културни, спортски и други врски помеѓу дијаспората и Р.Македонија, очигледно е потребно, навремена и континуирана соработка и координација од најодговорните на овој план и тоа: Министерството за внатрешни работи, Министерство за надворешни работи, Министерството за труд и социјална политика, Министерство за образование и наука, Министерство за култура, Агенција за иселеништво, Државен завод за статистика, и други тела кои го допираат прашањето со дијаспората.

**Клучни зборови:** Институции, миграции, дијаспора, иселеништво, иселеници.

## INTRODUCTION

Independence of the Republic of Macedonia has opened new processes in self-organization of the Macedonians throughout the world. In accordance with the Article 49 from the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, and considering the complexity and specific weight of the emigration issues, Republic of Macedonia, as all the other states, attends to its emigration throughout the world and the Macedonian people in the neighboring countries. Thus, there emerges the obligation for creating and establishing appropriate institutions, bodies and instruments through which, the Republic of Macedonia as an independent and sovereign country, will carry out communication and ensure every day contacts with its numerous emigration throughout the world.

The Candidate status for joining the EU acquired in December 2005, triggered significant actions regarding diaspora mainly of legal nature. Of significant importance was defining the term diaspora by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "as a concept that encompasses Macedonian national minority and emigrants (former Macedonian citizens), as well as all citizens of Macedonia who reside and work abroad, regardless of the duration of their stay and ethnic Macedonians who have never had Macedonian nationality."<sup>33</sup>

Diaspora is of great importance and has a number of potentials which can contribute to the development and peace in the Republic of Macedonia, defined as socio-economic development and peace and as democratic-political development and peace (Nikoloski, 2010).

In order to utilize those potentials as well as preserve national and cultural identity, protect the rights of emigrants, ensure carrying out the legal rights and

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.mk> 15/12/2012

obligations abroad by providing consular and other services, promote commercial, scientific, cultural, sports and other links between diaspora and the Republic of Macedonia, an obvious need arises for timely and continuous cooperation and coordination of the most accountable in this area, and that is: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Culture, Emigration Agency, and State Statistical Office. Furthermore, if need emerges for institutional upgrading, the country should also undertake those steps solely in the interests of the Republic of Macedonia.

### MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the main role in carrying out migration policy, which also incorporates the diaspora policy of the Republic of Macedonia. In general, it deals with visa policy, among other things, as well as general entrance and exit of migrants.

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is an individual Directorate for Consular Affairs, which in cooperation with the Sector for Pursuing National Priorities, follows the activities of the Government, Parliament and their bodies, which refer to execution of the already established national priorities of the Republic of Macedonia. Furthermore, it deals with planning measures and activities including diaspora, cooperation with specialized non-governmental associations, research centers, academic and scientific institutes, as well as political consultancy houses which had been contracted for writing scientific papers, studies, theses, expert opinions, evaluation of political problems and public opinion which would serve for structuring the foreign policy of the Republic of Macedonia in terms of priorities. The area of national priorities also encompasses Macedonian diaspora and in that direction the Sector for National Priorities caters for the situation and rights of Macedonian people who, as national minority, live in other countries, promotes links and cooperation with Macedonian national minority, takes care of the situation of communities, Macedonian citizens living abroad, maintains, fosters and affirms national and culture-language identity of diaspora by affirming values and achievements of the Republic of Macedonia in the areas where they live, and also aids in organized activities of the diaspora.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.mk> 11/12/2012

The above mentioned activities of the Sector are executed via the Department for Macedonian National Minorities and the Department for Diaspora.

On 04.08.2005 the Government of the Republic of Macedonia passed a conclusion determining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a coordinator of the activities of all state subjects that cooperate and communicate with the Macedonian emigration and their organizations. In that direction, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked to establish a Coordination Body for Emigration which function would be execution of state policy towards diaspora by (co)financing actual programmes and projects, in accordance with the interests and needs of the diaspora itself, but also of the national and state interests of the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>35</sup>

The obligations and tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are prescribed with the Law on Government and the Law on Foreign Affairs and are in function of:

- creating, consolidating and executing the foreign policy of the Republic of Macedonia;
- suggesting standpoints in the area of foreign policy to the President of the state, the Government and the Parliament;
- establishing, developing and coordinating relations with subjects in the international law;
- promoting the Republic of Macedonia as a democratic and modern state and building respect within the international community and international public;
- cooperating with foreign partners at global level in the efforts of strengthening security and stability, supporting democracy, protecting human rights, tackling terrorism and other threats, reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development, protecting environment and so on.
- promoting and actively contributing to building policy of peaceful conflict resolution;
- strengthening promotion of the Republic of Macedonia abroad and further affirmation of its cultural values;
- protecting Macedonian citizens abroad and providing consular services;
- supporting Macedonian economic interests abroad and promoting economic opportunities of the Republic of Macedonia, above all in the direction of attracting foreign direct investments;

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<sup>35</sup> Government of the Republic of Macedonia, Conclusion no. 15-2990/1 from 04.08.2005



- affirming cultural values of the Republic of Macedonia;
- promoting and protecting Macedonian national identity in terms of global diversity of nations and cultures;<sup>36</sup>

## KEY POINTS IN THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOWARDS DIASPORA

The new approach in the work with and towards diaspora in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meant concentration of the recently diffused categorization into a new conception by the introduction of the term DIASPORA. Thus, basic conditions have been created which enabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to execute its function, that is strategic and politico-analytical dimension of acting towards diaspora.<sup>37</sup>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its activities ensures the situation of the Macedonian national minorities who live abroad and strives for improvement of the legal status and treatment of the Macedonian national minority in other countries, in accordance with international agreements as well as bilateral treaties and agreements, which present one of the important goals of the Macedonian foreign policy. Furthermore, the Ministry works continuously on promoting relationships and providing aid for development of cultural, educational and spiritual legacy of the Macedonian national minority / diaspora by merging both basic aspects:

- a) monitoring the respect of their human rights and liberties and the extent of their integration in the countries where they currently live, and
- b) developing effective and comprehensive relationships with the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>38</sup>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs is focused on application of international standards and support of solutions and decisions of appropriate international institutions and especially of the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, it works on concluding bilateral agreements for protection of national minorities and at the same time through the diplomatic-consular network and information centers,

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<sup>36</sup> Strategic Plan of MFA 2011-2013, Skopje, 2011, p.7, <http://www.mfa.gov.mk>, 11/12/2012

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/152>

<sup>38</sup> Strategic Plan of MFA 2011-2013, Skopje, 2011, p.7, [www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/438](http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/438), 11/12/2012

and according to the Constitution "attends for the cultural, economic and social rights of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia abroad."<sup>39</sup>

## VISA CENTER

A Visa Center operates within the Directorate for Consular Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose main task is to carry out visa policy at operational level and in accordance with the visa regime of the Republic of Macedonia. Its main aim is to connect diplomatic-consular offices of the Republic of Macedonia abroad with the Ministry of the Interior, that is with certain organizational units in the area of border police issues such as carrying out migration policy, as well as the very border crossings. Furthermore, it provides fast and comprehensive information via exchange of information through the central Visa Information System which enables electronic consultation and data exchange among Diplomatic office – Consular service, Central Body (Visa Center) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and also among border crossings and the Central Body, which as well aids for strengthening cooperation among services. In order to maintain a continuous process in executing migration policy and policy towards diaspora, creation of secure and effective structures through strengthening human capacities in the area of working with visas, work in a diplomatic office or consular service and border crossings is needed. As of February 2008, entrance visas for the Republic of Macedonia are issued through the National Visa System, where the whole procedure is being done via the system including printing a sticker with integrated photography.<sup>40</sup>

By connection of diplomatic-consular offices of the Republic of Macedonia abroad with the Visa Center, a full operability of the National Visa Information System has been achieved with 45 diplomatic-consular offices, 8 border crossings, the Ministry of the Interior – Aliens Department and the Employment Agency of the Republic of Macedonia. In all 45 diplomatic-consular offices the visa applications are distributed via the National Visa Information System and are directly processed in the Visa Center. Moreover, modern visa stickers are being introduced which are in accordance with the ICAO and EU standards and for whose secure elements appropriate specimen and brochures with information were distributed to all foreign

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<sup>39</sup> <http://www.mfa.gov.mk> 11/12/2012

<sup>40</sup> [www.mfa.neotel.net.mk](http://www.mfa.neotel.net.mk)

diplomatic-consular offices, for their further distribution to all relevant institutions of the countries they represent.<sup>41</sup>

What is more, it has been achieved harmonization of legal regulations and by-laws which determine precisely these issues with the following EU regulations: Common Consular Guidance for visas for diplomatic offices and Consular Services, OJ S 310, 19/12/2003 R 0001-0108, with amendments unified version of 27 September 2005; Council Regulation (EC) no. 539/2001 from 15 March 2001, which comprises a list of third countries whose citizens are deduced from such condition, altered with Council Regulation (EC) no. 2414/2001 from 7 December 2001; Council Regulation (EC) no. 453/2003 from 6 March 2003 and Council Regulation (EC) no. 851 from 2 June 2005 with alterations of Regulation (EC) no. 539/2001. (The changes with the last one do not contain the alterations for the list of countries, but comprise the changes of the so called solidarity mechanism).

## DIPLOMATIC-CONSULAR OFFICES

The accessibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic-consular offices abroad towards our emigrants and Macedonian national minorities indicates the readiness of the Republic of Macedonia for active contribution in protection of the interests and rights of its own citizens and emigrants abroad, in the extent that it does not confront with the laws of foreign countries where they live. Furthermore it mirrors the readiness for maximum support and help in preserving their national and cultural identity, education and information in mother tongue, promotes enhancement of contacts and relations with the country of origin and works continuously on promoting commercial, scientific, cultural, informative, sports and other mutual relationships.

As the most characteristic activities that diplomatic-consular offices of the Republic of Macedonia should pay attention to regarding diaspora issues we would emphasize the following: consular services and their efficient realization, cooperation with all Macedonian organizations and organizations of other ethnic communities in the Republic of Macedonia in the diaspora, clubs and other associations aiming at better internal communication and creation of unique

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<sup>41</sup> Strategic Plan of MFA 2011-2013, Skopje, 2011, p.23, <http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/438>, 11/12/2012

diaspora as well as establishment of efficient organizations and alliances with the possibility for greater influence in both the country of residence and the country of origin with full cooperation; visiting Macedonian diaspora in farther countries (holding consular days), carrying out consular services, carrying out talks and providing necessary information for our citizens; engaging in the enhancement and improvement of education in Macedonian language at all levels of education in the residence country and for that purpose cooperating with relevant authorities in the country of origin; helping in organization and realization of additional lectures in Macedonian language and aiding in preserving connections of diaspora with the country of origin at second, third and every next generation by fostering Macedonian language and culture; making effort for better organization and realization of cultural, sports and all the other manifestations of the Macedonian diaspora aiming at preservation of identity, culture, traditions and customs of the Macedonian people.

Diplomatic-consular offices of the Republic of Macedonia abroad should provide Macedonian diaspora with latest information on the policy of the Republic of Macedonia and the cooperation opportunities with the country of origin in all segments of their interests. Furthermore diaspora should comprehend Macedonia as a partner that would support establishing of their associations and their work, clubs and all the other forms of gathering, a partner that will help them, as much as the possibilities allow, in resolving possible problems better and more efficient, and thus contribute for enhancing the relationship with the motherland. However, despite all the activities it seems that there is still an open question whether there are enough capacities for quality consular services to be offered to our emigrants and people with temporary residence abroad as well as to foreigners who require such services.

Diplomatic-consular offices should have full responsibility to make estimations whether there is a risk of immigration. Due to these reasons there is a need for well-trained personnel in the diplomatic-consular offices, who should be able upon checking requests and applications to detect applicants who want to reside in the country based on false data for the purpose of travel, and so on.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Convention for Schengen Agreement from 14 June 1985, OJ 22.9.00 Common Consular UPATSTVA for Visas for Diplomatic-consular PRETSTAVNISTVA OFFICES, Official Gazette S 310, 19.12.2003 R.0001-0108 with amendments. Unified version 27/9/05.

Regarding harmonizing visa policy, the country gradually harmonizes its foreign policy with the EU policy, having in mind its national interest, and as part of its regional coherence as well. Therefore, it does not mean that the state should try to gain full harmonization with the EU visa policy before joining the EU, if that is not in accordance with its national interests.<sup>43</sup>

Here are the Schengen visa types accepted by our country:

- A (airport transit visa);
- B (transit visa);
- C (short-term visa 90 days);
- D (long-term visa more than 90 days).

## EMIGRATION AGENCY

Emigration Agency with its structure also plays an important role in executing the policy towards diaspora and as such responds to the obligations that emerge from its authorities prescribed by the Law on Organization and Work of the Organs of State Government (Article 31) and Conclusions of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia passed on 5.09.2006.

The execution of obligations the Emigration Agency conducts according to its organizational structure in two sectors, namely:

- **Sector for Legal, Economic and Common Affairs** which comprises the Department for Legal and Common Affairs and the Department for Economic Affairs and Reintegration. Its main task is specialized processing of legal regulations and by-laws of Macedonia and familiarization of the emigrants with them, providing information for the emigrants regarding economic affairs in Macedonia with an opportunity for their involvement in the economic flows in the country, and information regarding their registration as well as direction to relevant institutions in the country;

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<sup>43</sup> Article 2 point 2 from the Schengen Agreement: "Where public policy or national security so require, however, a Contracting Party may, after consulting the other Contracting Parties, decide that for a limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation will be carried out at internal borders. If public policy or national security require immediate action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary measures and shall inform the other Contracting Parties thereof at the earliest opportunity."

- **Sector for Maintaining and Promoting the Relationships** with the Emigration which comprises Department for Communication and Operative Cooperation with Emigration, Department for Providing Information, and Department for Cultural Development of Emigrants. This sector has a task to maintain regular contacts with emigration organizations and individual emigrants, to inform them electronically and via other media, issue books and brochures which are important for the emigrants, to include emigrants in the public and cultural life in Macedonia, to aid their cultural development in their countries of residence and enrich libraries of the emigration organizations.

The Strategic Plan represents a foundation for carrying out the common and immediate goals of the Emigration Agency. Therefore, the Agency executes its activities based on the Program for Work with an established priority of realization. It includes five groups of activities, namely:

1. Reintegration of emigrants from Macedonia;
2. Inducing cultural development of emigrants;
3. Promotion of the situation and rights of emigrants from Macedonia;
4. Informing emigrants regarding the situation in the Republic of Macedonia;
5. Promotion of the relationships with emigrants from Macedonia.

As target groups towards which the Emigration Agency directs its activities, and which comprise the Agency's strategic plan, especially the activities regarding reintegration of emigrants from Macedonia and inducing cultural development of emigrants and in accordance with the strategic determination of the Republic of Macedonia, are the businessmen from the Macedonian diaspora and the youngest generation of emigrants from Macedonia.

Emigration Agency closely cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also helps in unifying the Macedonian diaspora, raising awareness for current Macedonian issues in different communities throughout the world.<sup>44</sup>

## **MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR**

Ministry of the Interior has a key role in the area of managing migration, and basically it deals with the issues regarding control and overseeing the state border, as well as migrations which it controls through the activity of the Sector for

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<sup>44</sup> [www.minisel.gov.mk](http://www.minisel.gov.mk) 11/12/2012

Border Issues and Migrations within the Public Security Bureau. Within the Unit for Civic Affairs operates the Department for Asylum, whose task is to control and execute procedures for granting asylum to asylum seekers in the Republic of Macedonia; Department for Citizenship, whose main task is to carry out procedures for granting Macedonian citizenship or revoking it and Department for Travel Documents, which deals with issuing travel documents of Macedonian citizens who applied in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as abroad, through the diplomatic-consular offices of the Republic of Macedonia abroad.

A great deal in executing migration policy the Ministry of the Interior carries out in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With the Government Decision passed on 26.08.2008 an Inter-institutional Group for Creating Migration Policy has been established and the Ministry of the Interior has been tasked for executing the activities. The group is comprised of representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Economy and the State Statistical Office.

### **INTER-INSTITUTIONAL GROUP FOR CREATING MIGRATION POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

The crucial activities of the Inter-institutional Group for Creating Migration Policy of the Republic of Macedonia are directed towards the following tasks: Advisory role of the Inter-institutional Group, through pointing out to the appropriate ministries the need for changing and amending the existing legal regulation in order to create appropriate migration policy of the Republic of Macedonia; Establishing mechanism for monitoring migration flows; Preparing resolution for migration policy according the provisions from the Law on Aliens and the Law on Employment and Work of Aliens; Defining and updating migration profile and following the dynamics and realization of the Action Plan for carrying out the Resolution of Migration Policy of the Republic of Macedonia 2009 – 2014 at annual level.

Within the frameworks of certain constraints prescribed with the international law, every country has its own sovereignty to regulate flows of migration in accordance with its laws. Every country can regulate who can enter its

territory, on what grounds, which border crossing to be used and what type of document. Traditionally, legal authorities in the area of migration are within the Ministry of the Interior together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having in mind that border police is part of these institutions, it plays a primary role in the migration process. More specifically, it controls the borders and most frequently after a short notice, it should establish the status of persons who cross the borders; checks and controls the lawfulness for entrance by checking visas and passports regarding their authenticity; differentiates among illegal migrants and persons who fled the country seeking international protection.<sup>45</sup>

In order to follow migration flows, as well as doing regular analysis of the migration flows, the Inter-institutional Group, among other things, follows changes regarding issues about entrance and approval for entrance of aliens, makes suggestions for amendments for visa practices and legislation based on statistical data for issued visas or denied visa requests, cause for denying entrance at the border to aliens who had been issued visa, visas issued at border and requests for visa extension at national level. This facilitates introduction of changes in the policy in this area regarding changeable immigration trends.

Safety of the state border considerably influences the security of the state itself, as well as the stability of the region and beyond. Securing state borders is part of the state border management system and it has to be perceived as an integral part of the management models, and therefore secure the borders at European level and worldwide. (Milenkoski, 2005).

Hence, one should emphasize that the main precondition for building and carrying out the migration policy and the policy towards diaspora is above all trained personnel of servants with professional and solid ethical behavior, as well as timely execution of control over the requests for residence and work permits, usage of identification documents, abuse of legal migrations and travels of our citizens in the EU countries and so on, that is control which will be carried out within the Republic of Macedonia. Traditionally immigration countries (USA, Canada, and Australia) put the emphasis on the external control rather than the internal one. In Europe, this refers to England (Mesic, 2003).

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<sup>45</sup> European Commission, Directions for Integrated Border Management in Western Balkans, October 2004, updated version, Project „Support and Coordination of Strategies for IBM“, January 2007.



## MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL POLICY

Ministry of Labor and Social Policy also has a key role in carrying out migration policy, especially in the area of carrying out social rights of the migrants as well as issues regarding their accommodation and food supply.<sup>46</sup>

Ministry of Labor and Social Policy in the last period has put sufficient efforts in building capacities for tackling migration flows in the Republic of Macedonia. In 2005, a Department for Asylum, Migrations and Humanitarian Aid was established, whose aim is to take care for improving the status and rights of refugees and aliens in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as monitoring the situation with refugees in the Republic of Macedonia, their movement and residence. Activities of this Department enable for continuous monitoring of legal acts and by-laws, conventions and protocols in this area and their application, implementation of a great deal of European directives for accepting refugees and overall undertaking of obligations that emerge from the legal regulations. It also controls the application of the Law on Employment and Work of Aliens and Law on Volunteers (in the part which treats volunteering of aliens). Furthermore, it controls the lawfulness of the work of institutions that take care directly for the refugees and internally displaced persons and suggests measures and models of social protection. The Department also undertakes activities regarding initial acceptance and attends for returnees from readmission agreements. It is initiator for preparing appropriate acts that would regulate initial acceptance and accommodation of persons who are in the state of social risk. As part of the capacities for dealing with migration pressures, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy in accordance with the Law on Social Protection (2007) made endeavors for starting the work of the Shelter Center for Asylum Seekers, located in the village of Vizbegovo, Skopje. It is a public institution where asylum seekers are accommodated, and its accommodation capacity is 150 beds. According to the Statute of the institution, the work of the Shelter Center is to provide accommodation, food, social services and other cultural and recreational services, in accordance with the minimum standards for acceptance of asylum seekers, prescribed in international acts ratified according to the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.

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<sup>46</sup> [www.mtsp.gov.mk](http://www.mtsp.gov.mk) 12/04/2012

Moreover, with the adoption of the National Strategy for Demographic Development of the Republic of Macedonia 2008-2015<sup>47</sup>, in 2008, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy identified the priority areas and tasks in formulating demographic policy. In order to avoid possible consequences, a certain number of countries including the Republic of Macedonia faces a significant challenge in order to improve their internal economic and social condition and in that way reduce the pressure especially from the younger generation. This triggers many important internal issues for the developmental policy of those countries as well as the Republic of Macedonia.<sup>48</sup>

### **MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE**

Ministry of Education and Science pays particular attention for learning the mother tongue by young generations in the diaspora by providing teaching staff and learning aids for elementary education in mother tongue based on an advertisement for selection of teachers which is issued in the following cases: due to expired contract of the teacher who had been engaged for teaching and upon request of citizens' associations of the Republic of Macedonia who reside abroad, depending on the number of children and upon approval of the body responsible for issues in the area of education of the appropriate state as well as provided space for conducting teaching. All these should also be in accordance to the regulations for the manner and procedure for selection of teachers who teach in primary education in mother tongue for the children of Macedonian citizens who reside abroad, and the regulations for the manner of establishing salaries and additional compensations to salaries for teachers who teach in primary education in mother tongue for the children of Macedonian citizens who reside abroad. This Ministry is furthermore engaged in issues for providing scholarships to students of Macedonian origin residing in the neighboring countries.

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<sup>47</sup> <http://mtsp.gov.mk/?ItemID=BD66FCC3A7FBCB47AB9150CBFECD2C96>

<sup>48</sup> Migration Management in Central and South-Eastern Europe. IOM Strategy and Objectives 2006-2007, International Organization for Migration, 2006.

## MINISTRY OF CULTURE

Within the frameworks of its authorities the Ministry of Culture finances and executes in continuation numerous activities aiming at presentation of advancement and creativity in all areas of Macedonian culture in front of the emigration, and enables performances of cultural people and cultural-artistic associations from diaspora in the Republic of Macedonia.

Ministry of Culture is responsible for things regarding:

- monitoring, analyzing and proposing acts and measures for development;
- organization, financing and development of the network of national institutions and financing programmes and projects of national interests in this area;
- protection of cultural heritage
- publishing, musical, film, gallery, librarian, archiving, museum and cinematic activities, activities of the houses of culture and activities for mediation in culture;
- protection of authorship right and similar rights;
- celebration of events and prominent figures of national interest with monuments;
- affirmation of national culture in the countries from the region, the EU and worldwide;

When noting the work of the Ministry of Culture, we have to emphasize the work of the State Ensemble for Folklore Dances and Songs "Tanec", which carries out its programme for work; it automatically carries out the strategic plan of the Ministry of Culture. It was established in 1949<sup>49</sup> having the following as a primary aim:

- to foster, develop and boost artistic meaning of folklore dances;
- to foster, nurture and work on folklore dances;
- to prepare a programme with folklore dances and songs and present them at public artistic performances in the country and abroad.

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<sup>49</sup> The Ensemble for folklor dances and songs of Macedonia „Tanec“ was established with decision of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in 1949, as a necessity for Macedonian culture, aiming at collecting and nurturing Macedonian folklore heritage: dances, songs, instruments, rich original costumes and present them within the country and abroad through concerts, festivals and other manifestations in the area of culture.

In its noble cultural mission "Tanec" is in continuous and close cooperation with the Macedonian emigrants in the diaspora. In that sense a numerous concerts have been organized in all countries where Macedonian emigrants live.

### STATE STATISTICAL OFFICE

The work of the state statistics is established with the Law on State Statistics.<sup>50</sup> The Law determines the structure and work of state statistics, methodological and organizational grounds of statistical research, collection, processing, presentation, preservation, protection and giving out of statistical data. The work of state statistics is executed by the State Statistical Office, a main carrier and coordinator of the statistical system of the country and authorized carriers which realize part of the state statistics within the frames of their authorities. The State Statistical Office and authorized carriers fulfill their activities through realization of the five-year Programme for statistical researches passed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

In accordance with the Programme for statistical researches, the State Statistical Office carries out regular statistical research on migrations. This research follows internal migrations (within the Republic of Macedonia) and external migrations that encompass entrance and exit of Macedonian citizens and aliens in and out of Macedonia.

Special registers due to providing data for the conditions and movement of aliens, as well as documents that are being issued to them according to the Law on Aliens, are collated at the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>51</sup>

Developmental legislation of the EU regarding special issue on data and statistical data comprises a small number of binding instruments:

- Convention for Application of the Schengen Agreement from 14 June 1985;
- Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council from 24 November 1995 for protection of persons regarding processing of personal data and free movement of such data;
- Regulation of the Council (EC) no. 322/1997 from 17 February 1977 for statistical data of the Community;

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<sup>50</sup> Law on State Statistics (Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia no. 54/97).

<sup>51</sup> Law on Aliens (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia no. 35/06)

- Regulation (EC) no. 45/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council from 18 December 2000 for protection of persons regarding processing of personal data by the institutions and bodies of the Community and free movement of such data.

Monitoring of the developmental legislation and especially the regulation for statistical data of the Community for migration and international protection is of great importance especially for development of national legislation and development of the statistical data on migration system. Following European practices, the Republic of Macedonia develops information systems through which the possibility for rapid preparation of safe and timely statistical information will be enhances, based on all imported and updated data on migration, but it seems that of particular importance is the need for faster development of such systems for updating data for Macedonian diaspora.

## CONCLUSION

In order to strengthen the communication, the Republic of Macedonia has to establish stronger formal links with the diaspora through preparation of a state programme which would be consistently carried out and upgraded in continuity depending on the need for it. In that direction, it is necessary for the links with the diaspora to be strengthen (cultural, economic, religious), and as the most significant activity imposes the question for computing the Macedonian citizens in the world that is census of the emigrants and their descendants.

Enhancement of communication and contacts between the Republic of Macedonia and diaspora is possible only with involvement of a greater number of institutions, organizations, associations and individuals in the Republic of Macedonia. Everyone within the frameworks of their work should initiate and enable contacts with our emigrants.

The necessity for institutionalization of cooperation with the Macedonian diaspora imposes due to the fact that for a longer period of time one can feel the absence of massive joint action within organized alliances in the countries of residence, that is institutional upgrade aiming at developing a relationship with the diaspora and utilization of its potentials for the interests of the Republic of Macedonia as well as for the interests of the diaspora itself.

Macedonian emigration through own organized activities in different area contributes for affirmation of own national culture and inclusion in the multicultural societies in the new states and thus contributes to the overall affirmation of the Republic of Macedonia in those countries. That contribution and utilization of such enormous potential can be even greater and at much higher level if there is a better form of organization of emigration, and thus enhanced forms of communication with the country of origin are established. In addition I also think that are necessary changes in the mutual communication and organization within the Macedonian diaspora.

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