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Година 3, Број 1, 2012.

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СПИСАНИЕ ОД ОБЛАСТА НА БЕЗБЕДНОСТА, ОДБРАНАТА И МИРОВНИТЕ НАУКИ



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## ПРЕДГОВОР НА УРЕДНИКОТ

Почитувани читатели,

Списанието „Безбедносни дијалози“ кое егзистира две години, полака но сигурно преминува во една понапредна фаза од своето опстојување. Ваквата констатација произлегува од следните неколку аргументи. Во меѓувреме, од овој петти број уредувачката палка ја преземаат проф. д-р Тони Милески како главен и одговорен уредник и проф. д-р Митко Котовчевски како заменик уредник на списанието. Воедно, ја користам оваа можност да им изразам благодарност на претхоните уредници, проф. д-р Билјана Ванковска и проф. д-р Оливер Бакрески за пионерските чекори и зародишот на ова научно списание на Институтот за безбедност, одбрана и мир. Исто така, во краток временски период изработен е веб сајт на списанието (<http://sd.fzf.ukim.edu.mk>). Сајтот овозможи архивирање на досегашните броеви од „Безбедносни дијалози“ и понуди прегледни можности на потенцијалните автори за правовремено информирање околу сите постапки кои се однесуваат на поднесување на научните трудови. Читателите ширум светот можат слободно да ги прочитаат сите содржини на списанието со оглед на фактот што истото е категоризирано како списание со отворен пристап (open access). Слободниот пристап е поддржан и преку лиценцата - creative commons attributions. Оваа лиценца претставува одредена рамнотежа во рамките на традиционалното „all rights reserved“ за авторски права. Алатките на оваа лиценца на секој индивидуален креатор, компанија или поголема институција овозможуваат стандардизиран начин на доделување авторски права и дозвола за користење на нивната креативна работа. За брзо време списанието ќе премине на Open Journal System платформа која ќе овозможи негова уште поголема промоција. Оваа платформа ќе го стандардизира и забрза начинот на аплицирање, едитирање и рецензирање на трудовите во самото списание.

Во период од шест месеци, сите трудови од „Безбедносни дијалози“ се индексирани во престижната база на податоци Index Copernicus, како и во две електронски универзитетски библиотеки во Хамбург и во Регензбург – Германија. Исто така, првата фаза од регистрацијата во EBSCO е успешно помината што дава реални шанси наскоро списанието да биде приклучено и во

таа база на електронски списанија. Од ERIC (Education Resources Information Center) дигиталната библиотека, е добиен повратен одговор дека единствено трудовите објавени на англиски јазик ќе бидат земен предвид за индексирање во нивната електронска база. Оттука, произлегува и препораката до сите автори кои имаат желба да објавуваат научни трудови истите да ги поднесуваат на англиски јазик првенствено заради можноста за индексирање во повеќе дигитални бази на податоци. Од друга страна, на тој начин авторите ќе се самопромовираат на поширока читателска публика и ќе придонесат за популаризација на списанието.

Во петтиот број од списанието „Безбедносни дијалози“ читателите ќе можат да прочитаат интересни содржини. Како оригиналните научни трудови се класификувани од страна на рецензентите и редакцијата трудовите за обликувањето на системот за кризен менаџмент во Република Словенија и трудот за енергетскиот дискурс во рамките на НАТО. Следуваат прегледните научни трудови кои се однесуваат на демократијата, човековите права и етничките конфликти во рамките на процесите на глобализација и европска интеграција, потоа трудот кој се однесува на поделената историја во постконфликтните општества – случајот Македонија. Следи трудот за влијанието на интеркултурните фактори врз донесување одлуки за азил во Република Македонија. Двата прегледни научни труда кои следуваат ги објаснуваат глобалните геополитички импликации врз светот како резултат на негативното влијание од климатските промени и влијанието на глобализацијата врз еколошката безбедност на Македонија. На крај се поместени приказите за разузнавачко-безбедносната заедница на Балтичките држави, безбедносниот регионализам низ призмата на концептите за безбедносен комплекс и безбедносна заедница и трудот кој одговара на прашањето дали постои контрола над меѓународните мировни операции под водство на САД. Во петтиот број на „Безбедносни дијалози“ ќе имате можност да го прочитате и интервјуто со заминик министерот за одбрана, г-дин Емил Димитриев, поврзано со состојбите во одбраната и Армијата на Република Македонија во изминатите 20 години.

Со почит,

Проф. д-р Тони Милески

Главен и одговорен уредник

## EDITOR'S NOTE

Dear readers,

The "Security Dialogues" Journal, which has been published for two years, is slowly moving into a more advanced stage of its existence. Such a statement has derived from the following arguments. In the meantime, in this fifth issue the editing post has been taken over by Prof. Toni Mileski, PhD, as the Main Editor, and Prof. Mitko Kotovchevski, PhD, as the Executive Editor of the Journal. At the same time, I use this opportunity to express my gratitude to the previous Editors, Prof. Biljana Vankovska, PhD, and Prof. Oliver Bakreski, PhD, for the pioneering steps and the foundation of this scientific journal at the Institute for Security, Defence and Peace. In addition, the web site for the Journal was created in such a short amount of time (<http://sd.fzf.ukim.edu.mk/>). The web site enables archiving of the previous issues of "Security Dialogues" and offers concise opportunities for potential authors of being duly informed about all the steps that refer to submitting scientific works. Readers from over the world can freely access the whole content of the Journal taking into consideration the fact that it is categorized as an open access Journal. This open access is supported by the license - creative commons attributions. This license represents a certain balance in the framework of the traditional "all rights reserved" for copyright. The tools for this license enable any individual creator, company or larger institution, a standardized way of assigning copyright and the permission to use their creative work. It is not long from now when the Journal will move to an Open Journal System platform, which will enable its even greater promotion. This platform will standardize and accelerate the way of applying, editing and reviewing the works in the Journal itself.

In a period of six months, all the works in "Security Dialogues" have been indexed in the prestigious Index Copernicus database, as well as in two electronic University libraries in Hamburg and Regensburg - Germany. In addition, the first stage of the EBSCO registration is successfully finished, thus giving a chance for the Journal to soon be included in that base of electronic journals as well. ERIC (Education Resources Information Center) has given a positive reply to the fact that only the works published in English will be taken into consideration for being

indexed in their database. Hence the recommendation to all the authors who wish to publish scientific works, to submit them in English, primarily because of the opportunity to be indexed in more digital databases. This way authors will also promote themselves to the wide readership and will contribute to the popularization of the Journal.

In the fifth issue of the "Security Dialogues" Journal, the readers will have the chance to read interesting content. The reviewers and editorial board have classified the article about the shaping of the crisis management system in the Republic of Slovenia, and the article about the energy discourse in the framework of NATO, as original scientific works. Then come the concise scientific works that refer to democracy, human rights and ethnic conflicts in the framework of the processes of globalization and European integration, followed by the article that refers to the divided history of the post conflict societies - the case of Macedonia. Afterwards comes the work about the influence of the intercultural factors on bringing decisions about asylum in the Republic of Macedonia. The two scientific works that follow explain the global geopolitical implications on the world as a result of the negative influence of the climate changes and the influence of globalization on the ecological security of Macedonia. At the end are the reviews of the security intelligence community of the Baltic countries, the security regionalism through the prism of the concepts of a security complex and a security community, and the work that answers the question whether there is control over the international peace operations under the leadership of the USA. In this fifth issue of "Security Dialogues" you will have the opportunity to read the interview with the Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Emil Dimitriev, connected to the state of the defence and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in the past 20 years.

Yours faithfully,

Toni Mileski, PhD  
Editor in Chief

SHAPING THE NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
SYSTEM IN REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA  
ОБЛИКУВАЊЕ НА СИСТЕМОТ ЗА КРИЗЕН МЕНАЏМЕНТ  
ВО РЕПУБЛИКА СЛОВЕНИЈА

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## ABSTRACT

This paper is a case study of how Slovenia as a member state of EU and NATO adapted to the complex security environment. During its war for independence an effective and comprehensive crisis management system was established, however many key lessons were later forgotten due to the fierce interministerial competition (1991-1994). The 9-11 created conditions for a second wave of reforms directed to improve horizontal interagency cooperation in crisis management. This paper explains some of the reforms and activities that could potentially be a role model for other similar states. However, the paper concludes that Slovenia is still far from the optimal horizontal and interagency crisis management system.

**Keywords:** crisis, crisis management, Slovenia, system

## АПСТРАКТ

Трудот претставува студија на случај за тоа како Словенија како членка на ЕУ и НАТО се прилагодуваше на комплексното безбедносно опкружување. Во текот на сопствената војна за независност воспоставен е ефикасен и сеопфатен систем за справување со кризи, а многу клучни лекции подоцна беа заборавени заради силната меѓуминистерска конкуренција (1991-1994). 9-11 создаде услови за вториот бран реформи насочени кон подобрување на хоризонталната меѓагенциска соработка во менаџирањето на кризите. Трудот ги објаснува дел од реформите и активностите кои можат потенцијално да бидат пример на модел за други слични држави. Како и да е, трудот заклучува дека Словенија е сè уште далеку од оптимален хоризонтален и меѓагенциски систем за менаџирање со кризи.

**Клучни зборови:** криза, менаџирање со кризи, Словенија, систем.

## INTRODUCTION

Contemporary security environment is generating many crises related to the politico-military conflicts, terrorism, natural disasters, infectious diseases, information disruptions, ethnic or religious violence and others. Many of these crises have a strong effect to the security and safety of people. Accordingly, the states with their national security systems represent the most critical and decisive element in responding to the current crises. This is why, all European states struggle with complexities and problems of shaping a responsive, robust and flexible national crisis management framework.

The existing experience by the NATO and EU countries in the field of national crisis management is quite heterogeneous; however some common denominators can be identified. The analysis of Defence Research Centre from the University of Ljubljana (see Prezelj, 2005) has shown that 9-11 experience gave a strong incentive to many states to develop a more crisis-oriented instead of a war-oriented national security system. These reforms have been implemented relatively simultaneously at the national and international levels (NATO, EU). Common finding of many developed European countries was that the existing security mechanisms and institutions did not reflect the changed requirements from the security environment. We can say that these reforms predominantly focused on the following activities:


- introducing a formal definition of crisis and crisis management in strategic documents or even laws,
- shaping mechanisms for comprehensive threat assessments,
- rethinking the mechanisms for declaration of national crises or emergencies,
- shaping comprehensive multidisciplinary and multiagency crisis planning mechanisms,
- carrying out multiagency crisis management exercises,
- reshaping and improving the structure of national interagency crisis decision-making bodies (such as National Security Councils and other governmental or interministerial bodies),
- developing efficient information support mechanisms for integral crisis management, etc.

Slovenia, as an EU and NATO member state, has been a part of the above described reform trend. The goal of this paper is to present and assess the Slovenian approach to shaping national crisis management mechanisms since its independence. The text will focus on some of the above mentioned reform activities aiming to show what approach was undertaken to increase its capacity of managing complex crises. The author argues (based on his study of national security documents and participation in some interagency bodies) that while the Slovenian case of shaping integral crisis mechanisms can be a positive guidance for other similarly small states, the remaining interagency difficulties reflect a lack of will to create a truly functional integral crisis management system.

## INTEGRAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISM IN THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE IN 1991

Slovenian declaration of independence was a result of a long-lasting political and economic crisis in Yugoslavia. The resulting military intervention by the Yugoslav Federal Army was perceived as a major threat to the existence of the newly created Slovenian state. It was very important for the success of the whole Slovenian endeavour that the comprehensive crisis management system was created. This system was actually a hierarchical and horizontal structure for integral planning and decision-making in response to the constantly changing threats. It embraced all relevant national, regional and local military and non-military institutions that could play a role in national crisis management. Its structure is shown in the next figure.

Figure 1: Crisis management system in the war of independence 1991 (Prezelj, 2005: 271).



Defence Council of the Presidency (War Cabinet) was responsible for political coordination of the whole crisis management process. Extremely important was the establishment of National Operational Coordination Group for crisis situations several months before the declaration of independence. This coordination group was led jointly by the ministers of interior and defence. It consisted of military (TO), police, civil defence, intelligence services, etc. This was key coordination body for operational planning and management.

Seven Regional Coordination groups were subordinated to the national coordination group they also consisted of representatives of different regional non-military and military bodies. At the field level, the coordination was carried out on an ad hoc basis, depending to a large extent to the personal cooperation among the commanders and heads of active units and bodies. Our analysis of the war has shown many positive examples of integral crisis management, such as joint planning, joint guarding of strategic objects, joint barricades, joint protection of border crossings, joint decision-making, mutual help in training, help in equipment, joint negotiating, joint monitoring of movements by the Yugoslav military, joint guarding, joint defence and attack, etc.

One of the key elements for success of Slovenia in this war should be attributed to the existence of the above mentioned coordination mechanisms. Then the war ended, the country was recognised by the international community and started to face a challenge of shaping national security system.

## **THE RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO CREATE A PEACE-TIME COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT APPROACH**

After gaining independence, an unfortunate struggle for power among some ministers and related political elites begun. The war unity has disappeared and the place for merciless competition for power among the ministries has begun (e.g. the Ministry of Defence versus the Ministry of Interior). In this period, the state was focusing on building the basic pillars (institutions) of national security system. Horizontal crisis coordination was neglected and set aside. The first Slovenian National Security Strategy (1993) was adopted to define the basic elements of national security system. National security system was defined as a totality of mechanisms that provide national security by preventing and responding to threats. The strategy defined basic three-pillar structure of Slovenian national security system, consisting of defence subsystem, security subsystem and protection and rescue subsystem. National intelligence system was also defined in early nineties, which is also relevant from the crisis management perspective (see Predstavitevno gradivo komisije za nadzor nad delom varnostnih in obveščevalnih služb, 2002: 4). The term



crisis was not mentioned in the strategic and doctrinal documents. Also the term crisis management was not extensively or systematically used.

In 2001, the analysis of Slovenian crisis management system showed that Slovenia has not developed a comprehensive national security system at all relevant levels. It had relatively well developed crisis management mechanisms in specific sub-systems of the national security system. The report also stressed that the national security system was too war- and disaster-oriented (*Krizno upravljanje v RS*, 2001). The existing division of crisis-management responsibilities among ministries indirectly stemmed from the Law on Organisation of Ministries (*Zakon o organizaciji in delovnem področju ministrstev*, 1994) and sectoral legislation. Accordingly, the MOD was responsible for providing military and civilian defence, including protection and rescue in case of disasters, Ministry for Work, Family and Social Affairs responsible for employment policy and social security, Ministry of Economy responsible for development and condition of economy, trade and basic supplies, Ministry of Culture for protection of cultural heritage and values, Ministry of Interior for protection of national borders, prevention and sanctioning all forms of crime, protection and maintenance of public order, Ministry of Environment responsible for safeguarding the environment and nature, including nuclear safety, Ministry of Health for health safety, especially in the field of infectious diseases, etc. This division of work was suitable for the so-called vertical approach to crisis management, but not sufficient for achieving a strong horizontal and interagency approach. The assessment by Napotnik (2003) and Najzer (2003) has showed the following key problems with crisis management in Slovenia:

- crisis management was not adapted to the contemporary security environment,
- insufficient interministerial organisation in complex crisis management (which was confirmed at all crisis management exercises at the beginning of new millennium), and
- slow adaptation of legislation in the field of crisis management, etc.

They recommended the following solutions:

- shaping more comprehensive assessments in relevant crisis areas (e.g. health, economy, agriculture, transport, communications, information technology, internal security, military defence, protection and rescue, etc.),
- strengthening the interministerial cooperation and exchange of information,
- shaping a comprehensive crisis management system as demanded by the National Security Strategy,
- shaping adequate military and civilian mechanisms for crisis management of national and international crises,
- start with permanent and comprehensive threat assessment in Slovenia,
- intensifying the research in the field of crisis management and

- introducing the digital radio communication system TETRA in the crisis management community.

Due to the lessons of 9-11, some relevant conclusions by some Slovenian authors in the field of crisis management (see Prezelj 2005, 2007; 2008; 2009; Brandstrom and Malesic, 2004) and conclusions by the special Interministerial working group on shaping a comprehensive crisis management system, some relevant changes were finally implemented. Especially the issue of interagency coordination has become more relevant as almost all ministries have identified interest for strong horizontal coordination. Also their reform processes were streamlined into direction of better horizontal cooperation.

### **SLOVENIAN DEFINITION OF CRISIS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

The comparison of two national security strategies (1993; 2001) shows that Slovenia perceived an increasing number of threats. This strongly influenced the Slovenian understanding of crisis and crisis management. It was in 2001 when the National Security Strategy (*Strategija nacionalne varnosti*, 2001: 5742) defined crises as situations in which the fundamental social values are threatened and where an uncertainty and relatively short time for response exist. The document contains also understanding that crises transfer state borders and produce intersectoral effects. Transnationality of crises contributes to better coordination of preparations with neighbouring countries and international organisations (especially with NATO and EU). Also other national security documents adopted after 9-11 mentioned crisis and crisis management as relevant elements of the national security (e.g. Defence Strategy, Doctrine of Civil Defence, Military Doctrine, etc.). The Sector for Civil Defence at the Ministry of Defence had also developed a relevant definition of crisis. According to their definition, the crisis refers to timely limited, undesired and critical situation, event or process in regional or broad strategic environment that might seriously threaten national security. Crisis can not be handled by the ordinary means of states and societies; one has to activate national security or crisis management mechanisms (Najzer, 2003; Napotnik, 2003).

In the process of amending the Law on Police in 2003 (see *Zakon o policiji*, 1998), the proposal of introducing the term crisis was debated. The idea was that the article 17 (that defines conditions for the use of police in changed circumstances, that is in emergency situations and wars) would be supplemented by a more general notion of crisis. The police would then have a legal basis for strengthened operational activities in all crises, in all situations declared as emergency and in war. The proposal was rejected. Some of the arguments against contained also the idea that crisis should be made a constitutional

category (together with existing constitutional categories – war and emergency situation) and only then this law could be supplemented in such a way (see Gaber & Anžič, 2003).

National Security strategy (2001: 5738, 5742) as fundamental security document set the goal of connecting the elements of national security system into efficient crisis management system that would be capable of contributing to endeavours of Slovenia and international community to solve contemporary complex crises. The document also stated that Slovenia will strive for developing such national security concept that will, in consistency with constitutional limitations, stress the role of national crisis management as the hub of virtually separated fields of security planning and preparations. Crisis prevention, preparation, reaction and post-crisis restoration were defined as common activities of all national security fields, which require coordination of efforts and also overcoming the traditional divisions between civilian and military spheres. In the Slovenian currently valid National Security Strategy (2010), the term “national crisis management system” was withdrawn. This document only states that Slovenia will apply the valid crisis management solutions in the EU and NATO. The intention to upgrade the existing national security system to better cope with complex crises exceeding the competences of individual agencies and ministries is expressed only at the end of this document. The strategy concluded with the expression of an intention to form a special body for coordination of various dimensions of crisis management. This is quite surprising intention as this task actually already belongs to the National Security Council.

## **GOVERNMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS SUPREME NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT BODIES**

Government of Slovenia is responsible for managing, directing and coordinating the executive power in all circumstances: peace, crisis and war. It is the supreme coordinating body responsible also for coordination of all relevant executive bodies in times of crisis. It also defines national security policy and is responsible for protection of population and critical infrastructure. Because the ministers are extremely busy in conducting their daily work, the government has established the National Security Council in 1998. The council plays a role of a consultative and coordination body for the field of defence, internal security, protection and rescue sub-system and all other national security questions (Odlok o ustanovitvi in nalogah SNAV, 1998). In other words, coordination of national security policy is its key task. Other specific tasks of National Security Council (NSC) are:

- advising the government in the field of national security,
- advising the ministers in implementation of national security interests and goals,
- coordination of opinions and measures of ministries and other state bodies in implementation of national security tasks,

- coordination of opinions of ministries and other state bodies before the meeting of the government on the national security topic,
- threat assessment and defining the counter-measures, etc.

Members of NSC are: the President of Government as the president of the Council, ministers for defence, internal affairs, external affairs, justice, finances, environment and Director of civil intelligence service (SOVA), who is also the secretary of the NSC. For operational and coordinated implementation of measures, the Secretariat of NSC was formed. The secretariat is composed of Director of civilian intelligence service (head), Director General of Police, Chief of General Staff, State Secretary at Ministry of External Affairs, State Secretary at MOD, Director of Defence Intelligence service, Chief of Civil Protection Staff, Adviser for National Security of the Prime Minister, etc.

Crisis management mechanism of the NSC works on the demand basis, meaning that each minister can demand its meeting if the problem at hand is too complex for one ministry. Government and NSC can organise a meeting immediately after the demand. Various communication technologies can be used in support of prompt decision-making. All relevant members of NSC and its secretariat are reachable 24 hours per day (Prezelj, 2005). Also various governmental interministerial groups were established with general goal to coordinate or help superior bodies to coordinate also in times of crisis.

It turned out that the NSC has one deficiency, namely the lack of decision-making powers in comparison with the government itself. Additionally, some Slovenian governments did not understand the coordination potential of this body, so they did not use it up to its capacities.

## **NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER**

Government of Slovenia decided to form the National Crisis Management Center (NCKU) at its session in September 2000. The goal behind establishing such center was to provide communication and information support for operation of the state leadership in case of crisis and emergency situations. NCKU became operational in January 2004. Legal basis for its operation is the Law on Defence (art. 72 and 84). Basic structure and tasks were determined by the governmental decree (Uredba o organizaciji in delovanju NCKU, 2006).

NCKU is operating at the Ministry of Defence on a 24-hour basis. Its main task is to provide facility, technical and telecommunication support for the work of government in times of national or international crisis and also war. NCKU has the following specific tasks:


- providing the information and communication connection for exchange of information with the Office of the President, General Secretariat of the Parliament, General Secretariat of the

Government, National Security Council, ministries, governmental services, Operational and Communication Center of the Police, Civil Protection Information Center, Force Command of the Slovenian Armed Forces and operational centers of other relevant bodies.

- Providing communication and information support for international exchange of information, etc.


Relevant national operational centers report to the NCKU in predefined format. The relationship of NCKU with other national bodies is shown in the following two figures.

Figure 3: Horizontal connections of NCKU with other crisis-management actors.



The centre consists of operational and analytical group. Operational group consists of operators who are responsible for technical support, while analytical group consists of representatives of various ministries, acting as liaison officers and analytical capacity. This group is responsible for assessing the security situation, preparing joint assessments, if needed, coordinating implementation of adopted decisions, preparing harmonised and coordinated proposals of decisions, etc. (Uredba o organizaciji in delovanju NCKU, 2006: art. 8). Analytical group is activated based on the need for crisis management.

Figure 2: The vertical role of NCKU.



## CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXERCISES

The frequency of crisis management exercises in Slovenia has increased since 9-11. Increasing focus has also been on the interministerial exercises that combine many relevant national security actors that interact or learn how to interact and coordinate better. The first large crisis management exercise in Slovenia since its independence was CMX/CRISEX 2000. This was the first joint NATO/WEU exercise, which tested the operation of crisis management mechanisms between both organisations and national support crisis mechanisms. For the purpose of the exercise, the national coordination analytical group was established and composed of representatives of various ministries. The exercise showed that a communication center is needed for integrating and preparing the national solutions to be sent to Brussels. Additionally, other CMX and CME<sup>1</sup> crisis management exercises were carried out. Perhaps, we should mention the IZZIV 2003 (Challenge 2003). This was one of the biggest national crisis management exercises that tested coordination of measures among key institutions in the national security system. Links with international organisations were tested, NCKU was tested. Around 300 participants were involved,

<sup>1</sup> CME exercises are conducted in the framework of EU and CMX exercises are conducted in the framework of NATO.

coming from the government, ministries, Mission of RS to NATO, nongovernmental sector, etc. Also military participated, which reflects that also civil-military cooperation was evaluated. The exercise took place on various locations, yet the central location was in the technically very equipped simulation centre (ORIS).

Since then, Slovenia conducted many similar crisis management exercises where the coordination mechanisms were tested. The common features of these CMX and CME exercises have been their long preparation time, one macro international crisis scenario with many national sub scenarios, multiagency national and international participation. Special attention has been devoted to the communication systems linking all the relevant crisis actors in an effective and protected network. Many exercises have tested the national multiagency response, bilateral and multilateral response to a broad spectrum of civil and military scenarios. It should be also stressed that some of these exercises have partially involved also the national governments themselves in order to test the political decision-making response.

## **THE SPECIFIC ROLE OF SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT**

Strategic concept of defence is based on the premise that major armed conflict is no longer key aspect of defence preparations (Obrambna strategija RS, 2001: 6). Military tasks from the Law on Defence were operationalized as tasks in peace, crisis and war. Tasks in peace are providing preparedness, prevention of threats and protection of military infrastructure, equipment and staff, participation in peace-keeping missions and humanitarian operations, creating the confidence with international partner cooperation, etc. Tasks in crises are preventive deployment of forces, readiness for intervention, mobilisation and support of activated forces, participation in crisis management operations, etc. War tasks are the same as is the case with all other armed forces (see Obrambna strategija RS, 2001: 10). Accordingly, Slovenian armed forces have three types of organisation: peace, crisis and war organisation. Staff process is more or less the same in all three circumstances.

Slovenian military participates in civilian crisis management at international level (in crisis management operations) and national level (in support of protection and rescue activities in disasters). Military activation in support for civilian disaster management depends on the invitation or call by the competent civilian authorities (Government, Minister of Defence or Chief of General Staff). Legal basis for such activation is represented by the Law on Defence (Zakon o obrambi, 1994: art. 37) and Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters (Zakon o varstvu pred naravnimi in drugimi nesrečami, 1994: art. 83). Use of military units must be strictly under civilian command or supervision in the

stated cases. Direct leadership is performed by the military commanders, who are coordinated by the competent civilian authority or individual (e.g. head of intervention). Slovenian Armed Forces participate in disaster management in accordance with national plans. These are plans that defined potential tasks of military in case of floods, earthquakes, fires, accidents in mountains, high snow and sleet, airplane accidents, train accidents, accidents on the sea, infectious diseases, etc. Based on this plans, several exercises are conducted every year. Naturally, protection and rescue of own people, own equipment and infrastructure is even more important crisis management task of the armed forces. The following tasks represent an example of military activities in case of disaster (e.g. flood):

- evacuation of the military equipment and personnel,
- evacuation of threatened population and goods,
- transport of humanitarian help and rescue equipment,
- protection of threatened areas and objects,
- preventive measures around objects,
- cleaning of area (e.g. outflows),
- help in building barriers,
- providing clean water for the authorities,
- temporary accommodation of threatened and homeless people, etc.

## **CONCLUSION ON THE PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES OF SHAPING THE COMPREHENSIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

We can say that Slovenia sensed at the right time the impulse on the need for reorienting its national security system from the war-oriented to the more general crisis management system. Scientific studies were initiated, interagency working groups formed to think how to introduce and implement these changes. Also some books were written suggesting some further system changes. Especially vital was the formation of complex multilevel interministerial crisis management structure in the war of independence. This war could not be won without such horizontal interaction. However, the horizontal lessons from this war were soon forgotten due to the high pressure for establishing the vertically operating structures and strong competition among some ministries for jurisdiction and power. The lessons from 9-11 had some impact on integral crisis management as many horizontal processes were initiated. However, we can also say that general understanding of the complex demands from the security environment is disappointingly low at the political level and top ministerial level. In principle many people agree with proposed changes, however very soon the typical interagency competitive thinking becomes the key thinking framework. Thinking outside the box is the luxury of only some high officials, who naturally



cannot change the entire system. Many times the existing legal structure was mentioned as the reason to block changes. Complex crisis management is today not a real political priority. Without real political interest and initiation, the tempo of changes will be slow.

Perhaps the main reason is that Slovenia as a small country of 2 million people does not face many crises, especially big ones. This means that Slovenia has a unique opportunity to learn from experiences from other more developed states on how to react and how not to react to complex crises. However, many examples of crises worldwide showed that the only real impulse for learning comes from the direct experience. Only direct experiences create the will and intention for profound system changes.

Accordingly, Slovenia has achieved much in relation to shaping integral crisis management system, however this is likely not enough for dealing with truly complex crises. From one perspective, these achievements can be a positive guidance for other similarly small states, but on the other hand, there is much to be done in the future.

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**NATO - ENERGY SECURITY DISCOURSE****НАТО - ЕНЕРГЕТСКО БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН ДИСКУРС**

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**ABSTRACT**

This paper presents an attempt to approach and clarify the debate for energy security in the framework of the "evolving" NATO. The contemporary states point to the fact that energy supply is not only an economic topic, but also something that more and more often occupies the work agendas of the other institutions on the international scene as well. More precisely, this paper discusses the attempt for politicization and securitization of the energy supply, the involvement and role of NATO in the field of energy security, as well as the complexity in defining such a role of the Alliance. The chronology of the beginnings of the inclusion of NATO in the area of energy security as elaborated in the strategic documents of the Alliance is represented. The paper views the arguments that contribute to the need for more serious involvement of NATO. In addition, the elements that can present a problem for the clear definition of the place and role of NATO in the field of energy security are also analyzed. The energy security discourse presents a serious pointer for the possible directions of the evolving of the Alliance and its future engagement in contemporary international relations.

**Key words:** NATO, energy, energy security, security, resources

**АПСТРАКТ**

Трудот претставува обид за приближување и појаснување на дебатата за енергетската безбедност во рамките на „еволуирачкиот“ НАТО. Современите состојби укажуваат на фактот дека енергетското снабдување не претставува само економска тематика, односно сè повеќе ги окупура работните агенди и на другите институции на меѓународната сцена. Поконкретно, трудот се осврнува на обидот за политизација и секуритизација на енергетското снабдување, вклученоста и улогата на НАТО на полето на енергетската безбедност како и сложеноста во дефинирањето на таквата улога на Алијансата. Претставена е хронологијата на почетоците на вклучувањето на НАТО во сферата на енергетската безбедност елаборирани во стратегиските документи на Алијансата. Во трудот се разгледуваат аргументите кои одат во прилог на потребата за посериозно инволвирање на НАТО. Исто така, анализирани се и елементите кои би

можеле да претставуваат проблем во јасното дефинирање на местото и улогата на НАТО во полето на енергетската безбедност. Енергетско-безбедносниот дискурс претставува сериозен показател за можните насоки на еволуирање на Алијансата и нејзиниот иден ангажман во современите меѓународни односи.

**Клучни зборови:** НАТО, енергија, енергетска безбедност, безбедност, ресурси

## INTRODUCTION

Problems related with energy security have not only represented a basic thematic content only at economic forums for a long time, but they have also increasingly represented the main content within interstate high-level political meetings. The trade exchange of basic energy resources does not represent only an economic issue, but ever more a political issue. In addition to the previously mentioned, if we add the fact that military-political alliances, such as NATO, in their working agendas are ever more incorporating regularity and stability in the supply of energy, this is the confirmation that from primarily an economic issue, the supply of energy also represents an issue for the security corps.

What does energy security actually represent? Energy security at the global and national level means the availability of energy, in sufficient quantities and affordable prices, the stable delivery, as well as the physical security of gas and oil pipelines. Having in mind the fact that global energy resources are limited, the issue of energy security receives significant meaning. This is a result of the increased demand and consumption of energy resources, which is being increased together with the rise of the world population and the development of new technologies. Also, the geographical distribution of resources and their consumption is extremely uneven. The largest consumers of natural gas are European Union nations, and their main supplier is the Russian Federation, which possesses one third of the gas reserves in the world. On the other hand, the USA and the "Asian Tigers", and the countries from the Middle East as the main oil exporters, have the largest demand for oil.

The uneven ratio of power in the demand and consumption of energy causes the appearance of dependence that occurs between the producer and buyer. At the same time, such dependence is not unidirectional, the nation's importers of energy from the producers are not the only ones who are dependent, but the producers themselves are also dependent on the stable demand and the market where they will sell their products. In economic terminology, the initial assumption would be that the market and its conformity to law represent a main regulatory mechanism, as well as the assumption that the main actors are behaving rationally in that market. However, resources of basic energy are limited and non-renewable, and the demand for them is in constant rise because the functioning of modern

economies is unimaginable without them. All this causes energy trade to become even more of an issue of public importance for each country, which means the engagement of all state institutions, and represents a subject of state policy. In conditions when the energy supply is raised to the level of state policy, then the relation between supplier and buyer is not only determined by economic logic but also by political motive and foreign-political interests. As a result of such relations and the politicization of energy supply, we have the occurrence of unpredictability and an increase in uncertainty and distrust between all participants in the chain of dependence on energy.

The setting of energy issues at the political level also imposes the initiating of discussions for securitization and militarization of energy issues. Securitization represents a process where some object or certain value is determined as an object of primary significance for engagement in its defence. One of the final methods of acting in such cases may be the use of military power. However, it may not mean only the use of military power, but other methods, which are in the domain of foreign political means, are also possible, or the introduction of sanctions or termination of diplomatic relations (Radoman, 2007). The efforts for securitization of energy supply may also be understood as an extreme version of politicization, where a problem, in addition to being of public meaning, is also denoted as an issue for the survival of a certain country, nation or certain group. When a military-political union, such as NATO, addresses a certain topic in the context of global security, then we speak of efforts for securitization in that topic. Today, NATO's profile slowly but surely is evolving, which means that it is more different than the period when the Alliance was created. NATO is a relevant factor in the global security stage that can carry out the act of securitization, convincing the member states and those that are not, about the significance of a certain issue. In the previous period it seems that the Alliance is undertaking steps, discussing the need for securitization of the energy supply and incorporating energy security in its priority tasks.

## **ALLIANCE INVOLVEMENT AND THE ROLE IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY SECURITY**

The opportunity for involving the role of NATO in energy security contains two crucial moments. The first has a more military-security focus which reflects the dual requirement of the Alliance for carrying out practical and logistic planning of the protection of energy supplies, especially oil, maintaining at the same time wider security of its member states and the stability of its operational capability.

Such a conclusion implies contemplating military threats to energy installations as well as the supply routes of energy resources. The possibilities for escalation of commitments for establishing control over the producers, transitional nations in terms of energies (oil, gas pipelines) as well as personal security are relevant factors of possible

military confrontations. Certain analysts estimate that the possibility of approaching energy resources may become subject to large military confrontations and it represents a serious problem in the functioning of the modern international system. Pirate and terrorist attacks increase this risk. According to a study it is indicated that there have been at least 330 terrorist attacks on oil and gas plants all over the world between 1990 and 2005, including NATO and Partner nations (Moran and Russell, 2008).

The second moment for NATO's involvement in the discussions for energy security focuses more on political pressure and threats for energy security. Such a position may be identified and emphasized especially after the dispute between Ukraine and the Russian company "Gazprom". The political pressure was manifested with gas supply disruptions at the beginning of 2006. Russian authorities explained this strictly with economic reasons. The rising prices of oil and gas for the countries of the former Soviet Union marked the end of an era where they were purchasing energy at a lower price. In that manner Moscow insists on keeping the debate on economic terms, stressing that the increased price has an economic, and not political meaning (Radoman, 2007:40). Such events stimulated the discussion for energy security within NATO.

Both moments undoubtedly resulted in conceptual differences in terms of realizing the main goal. Namely, the dilemma is set at the following level: whether the Alliance should adopt a wider "thematic" approach towards energy security, where the interest of the country "producer", the "transit" country and the country "consumer" can be seen effectively in a similar light – against the threats that undermine the interests of all, such as an attack of a main supply route? Or should it adopt a more regional and direct approach, where the interests of the "producer" and the "consumer" differ – which basically carries the influence of a powerful Alliance in support of the country "consumer" in what is considered as competitive dialogue of the "producer" and "consumer"?

In context of the need for involving the Alliance in energy security, especially important is the Riga Summit, held in November 2006. Namely, the Riga Summit Declaration included a short paragraph where it was explicitly announced (for the first time) that energy security is NATO's concern, giving the Alliance a task to examine the specifics of that role. The nature of discussion was changed in that manner in the Declaration; it was not anymore of whether the Alliance has a role, but that it now confirms that it has one. The question is now set regarding the nature of that role. A second significant moment was the speech by the American Senator Richard Lugar in the margins of the Riga Summit. The speech indicated threats from terrorism, as well as the fact that energy will probably be the source of armed conflicts in Europe as well as in the surrounding regions. In that manner, Lugar noted that it would be irresponsible for NATO to reduce its commitment in the field of energy security. But, his focus was directed towards the potential for political manipulation with resources

and the use of "energy weapon" (Luger, 2006). Luger's speech was the subject of attention of almost the entire international community.

The political moment, after the adoption of the Riga Declaration, continued to receive greater significance, especially after the dispute with the gas supply disruptions between Russia and Belarus in December 2006 and January 2007. The same occurred the following years. On January 31, 2008, Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine as a result of unpaid bills and as a result of gas prices. The Russian-Ukrainian dispute regarding gas prices left ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe without that energy. Moldova, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia were left without gas for heating and production of electricity, while Turkey, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Austria were faced with a lack of gas. It seems that the political moment reached its peak in January 2009. The cut of Russian gas supply through Ukraine caused great discomfort in the European Union because the EU receives 40% of the requirements for natural gas from Russia, and 80% of that gas goes through Ukraine. The crises ended on January 19 after the negotiations between the Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and the Prime Minister of Ukraine, Julija Timoshenko. Then it was agreed Ukraine in 2009 to pay Russian gas 20% less than the market value, and from 2010 to begin paying the price like the other countries in Europe, or 470 dollars for 1000 cubic meters. Until then Ukraine enjoyed a favoured price for Russian gas in the amount of 179.5 dollars for 1000 cubic meters.

The Riga Declaration represents a significant starting point for any type of analysis regarding NATO's role in relation to energy security. Namely, in Article 45 of the Declaration it is indicated that the security interests of NATO may be affected with cuts to vital resource supplies. The Alliance supports the coordinated international efforts for assessment of risks to energy infrastructure and the promotion of energy infrastructure security. The individual engagement of NATO member states was identified even prior to the discussion for the role of the Alliance in the field of energy security. We may detect this even in the period of the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Then, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands participated in the operation "*Earnest Will*" where they secured the routes of tankers in the Persian Gulf (Varwick, 2008: 38).

Overall, prior to the Riga Summit, the Alliance pointed to problems of energy security rather vaguely, that NATO activities were moving in the direction of preventing supply disruptions of vital resources. Defining the prevention is the key challenge for the Alliance illustrating the gap in the consensus between the military threat to vital resources and those with political motivation. NATO's mandate defined with the Riga Declaration provides a certain explanation of the interests of the Alliance and its focus towards energy infrastructure security, but not towards the other dimensions of energy security. The focused and limited agenda defined with the Riga Declaration formed the basis for official

talks in 2007 and the beginning of 2008. The former NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, confirmed that the Alliance considers energy security as a “collective” challenge for which a “collective” response must be provided; a response which is greatly linked with coordination between national governments and international organizations”.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the role of NATO in such a collective response would focus where it could give contribution, or that the Alliance should consider its own role in the protection of supply routes, especially in the transport of liquefied natural gas with tankers on open sea, and protection of critical energy infrastructure when a certain high level of threat exists.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the same approach was confirmed. The Alliance will insist on giving contribution and fully coordinating with the activities of the international community, which consists of numerous organizations that specialize in the field of energy security. However there are still some vague phrases – the Alliance will commit to “projecting stability” and advancing international and regional cooperation. At the same time the focus directed towards civil defence and dealing with crisis and energy infrastructure, remains clear. This leads us to a “deepened” role that NATO would be able to realize.

In that context, NATO’s role might be directed towards giving contribution in the coordinated international effort with the goal of improving energy security in two broad areas, they are: sharing information and planning and response.

Firstly, sharing information represents one of the key principles of energy security. NATO may contribute acting as an important bridge between the energy and security community. This is clearly designated with the Riga Declaration, and confirmed with the Bucharest Declaration, i.e., NATO may contribute for information exchange acting as a forum for exchange of reports. Certain opinions are moving in the direction of enhancing the link between the security and energy community through the establishment of permanent monitoring and assessing the mechanisms for acting in cooperation with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and similar organizations, including the companies as well. Also, NATO may give its own contribution in the exchange of data through the practical use of its assets and capacities. That is, assets for maritime surveillance and early warning may be used for providing current information on main maritime transport routes which are not covered sufficiently by national capacities of certain countries. Secondly, the Alliance may give its own contribution in achieving energy security through making available its own military capacities and expertise where needed. It primarily means physical protection, patrolling and escort during the path of critical infrastructure. NATO already has

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<sup>2</sup> Speech by the NATO Secretary General, Scheffer, on the 44<sup>th</sup> Munich Security Conference:  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080209a.html> accessed on 15/05/2012.



a clearly defined role in the protection of oil and gas capacities in the North Sea, in case of armed attacks. NATO (and EU) maritime capacities are already being used for protection of oil and gas shipments in the area of the Horn of Africa and Western Africa, especially from attacks by pirates and terrorist attacks. Such possibilities for responding to threats are manifested by the operation *"Steadfast Jaguar 06"*, held on Cape-Verde Islands in June 2006.

At the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 in article 41 and at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, in Article 52, the Alliance noted: "A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. Article 41 at the Lisbon Summit Declaration indicates that: "The Alliance will continue to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security in accordance with decisions at previous Summits and in line with our new Strategic Concept. We will further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas, agreed at Bucharest, where NATO can add value. In advancing our work, we will enhance consultations and cooperation with partners and other international actors, as agreed, and integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO's policies and activities". The same line is retained in Article 52 of the Chicago Summit Declaration. More precisely, "NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security. Today, we have noted a progress report which outlines the concrete steps taken since our last Summit and describe the way forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO's policies and activities. We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis. We welcome the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania as a contribution to NATO's efforts in this area. We task the Council to continue to refine NATO's role in energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions. We task the Council to produce a further progress report for our next Summit".

## **ALLIANCE COMPLEXITY ROLE**

According to the above, NATO receives a mandate to reassess its potential role in the field of energy security, internationally. The Riga Declaration, specifically the part that deals with energy security is faced with a number of complex elements that slow down the

practical definition of the role of the Alliance. The officials and analysts from several NATO member states are of the opinion that energy security remains a national problem and should be treated as such. So, according to them, it is inconceivable to deploy NATO troops on oil platforms or to guard oil and gas pipelines. In that context, one NATO diplomat responding to speculations regarding the deployment of troops as “police of oil pipelines” in regions such as the Caucasus, will emphasize that energy security and security of installations and transport routes represent a national responsibility. The engagement of the Alliance would be primarily directed towards giving advice and assistance rather than be actively engaged on the ground.

The Turkish experts and analysts who say that the Turkish state has achieved much more than the Alliance when fighting against the Kurds in terms of protection of key energy infrastructure, also share the same opinions. Azerbaijan, whose territory lies on a significant energy route (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline), through its President of the Government, Abid Sharifov, noted that the Alliance has no experience in protection of oil pipelines and communications that pass through countries which are not members of NATO. Such positions for not requiring assistance from NATO, concretely for the mentioned oil pipeline, arise from the fact that it is protected by the Azerbaijan government and the companies who believe that protection has also been achieved through other measures such as deep entrenchment of oil pipelines and pointing out to the local population about the importance of security of oil pipelines.

On the other hand, if we move to the north of the planet, more precisely to the North-Atlantic Region, and we analyze the discussions of the experts and analysts there, we would see different conclusions. Namely, the Norwegian Sea and the transport routes for oil and natural gas that pass through here, promote discussions for the need of considering issues for maritime security. It is noted that NATO members from both sides of the Atlantic must work together on energy security, as a central part of the security policy of the Alliance, and primarily on security of transport, and then on energy security. According to Bjorn Bjarnason, energy security represents a new dimension that redefines the northern areas of the Atlantic region in the political and military stage of NATO, or it reiterates the maritime identity of NATO (Bjarnason, 2006).

According to other opinions the energy security role would dilute or distort the agenda of NATO to the detriment of existing missions. Energy security is also connected with other issues from the complex agenda of NATO, such as the debate on the further expansion of Article 5 to include energy security. In his speech in the margins of the Riga Summit, the already mentioned Senator Lugar proposed the effective energy strategies to include the new relations with the countries from the Caucasus and Central Asia and

particularly the relations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, where the eventual membership in NATO would have to be put on the table" (Monagan, 2007).

The arguments for expanding Article 5 are related to the possibility of destroying national economies if energy is used as a "weapon". In this manner the Alliance would be obligated to appropriately respond to attempts and use of energy as a "weapon" against its member states.

Although cooperation with other international organizations is an important intention noted in Riga, it is also showing to be quite problematic. Defining NATO's role in the framework of energy security enables broader discussion and stating different opinions that are often on the same "frequency". This may be illustrated, for example, with the difference in defining threats to energy security on a national and institutional level. Taking into account different geographical regions, sources of resources and infrastructure capacities, along with their individual energy strategies, most countries in the EU and NATO look differently on the situation with energy. Therefore in the framework of each organization, there is a problem to define any advanced level of clarification and consensus about the nature of the threat and for whom it is aimed at.

The majority of EU and NATO member states still view the energy crises to be an economic problem which should primarily be regulated at the market, and not with foreign political and security measures. We could generally agree that the U.S. tends to emphasize energy security as protection of energy supplies, while the EU defines it in terms of management with energy demand. Such different approaches in defining the energy issue represent an additionally complicated situation, especially after the different reactions in the EU and NATO on some issues which brought energy security on the agenda of the Alliance. All this undermines the prospects for establishing complementary energy relations between NATO and the EU.

An additional problem is the Russian view of the discussions for involving energy security in the agenda of NATO. The Alliance is making efforts for the debate for energy security not to be interpreted by Moscow as an anti-Russian signal. In this direction it is interesting to mention the statement by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, at the end of 2007, where he condemned the politicization of energy security to the detriment of nations-producers and stressed that what is represented as purely economic is politicized with the attempt to unify the consumers to contradict Russian energy monopoly (Monaghan, 2008). Just as NATO is beginning to speak about energy as a security issue, so is Moscow, which formed a new Military Doctrine where energy security has its place.

## CONCLUSION

In the process of redefining NATO as a security guarantee of its members, the need to seriously consider security of energy supplies is being increasingly pushed. Threats to energy security are widely established in international policy, but also at the national level. In addition the problems are also seriously elaborated in the academic community. However, views that are not in relation to accepting NATO's role in solving threats to energy security, still dominate.

In relation to existing foundations of the Alliance, regarding Article 5, it may be understood that energy security is contained in it. Article 4 of the Washington Agreement stipulates that Parties "will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened". Article 5 as well is potentially relevant, taking into account the nature of most threats: "the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". Taking into account the fact that with this, energy installations do not distance from remaining goals, and from the other side the nature of threats to energy infrastructure by terrorists, pirates, and even states will most probably be in the form of an armed attack, we may assume that an armed attack on energy installations may be reason to invoke Article 5. The only exception would be the deliberate shutdown of production of required amounts of energy and their distribution to end users, which would affect national economies and certain political positions would be undertaken over the nation producer. In this case it would be symptomatic to invoke Article 5.

Negative overtones in terms of the proposed agenda for the role of NATO in energy security seem to be too simply understood. That is, speculations generally go in the direction of only military response by the Alliance in case of a threat to energy security. To say in addition the unreal agenda or provocation for discussing to amend the existing Article 5 of the Washington Agreement and the potential membership of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, the new strategic horizon is evident which may be created by the future international context in which the Alliance will function.

In defining its role within energy security, the Alliance is facing two parallel debates directed towards defining cuts in energy supplies. Whether it will be a military shut down, caused by armed attacks or maybe in the context of competition for access to certain resources, it should determine the efforts of the Alliance for finding most appropriate solutions. Its engagement would be in the direction of cooperation with Partners, capacity building, defence reforms and training of Partner nations. In extreme situations it is possible to also include military protection of infrastructure from armed attacks. The second

debate would go in the direction of determining the shutdown of energy supplies by involving political reasons for such an act, which most often are very difficult to define and prove. In such a case it is very difficult to count on a consensus of all Partners in the eventual undertaking of certain measures. On the other hand, such a situation might motivate considering certain solutions inside within the Alliance, such as the intention for improving its own efficiency in the consumption of energy as an asset for reducing the dependence on external conditions.

In conclusion, the Alliance will need to work more actively in its role in energy security, in the context of its evolving path of survival and functioning in the international security stage.

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## DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS WITHIN THE PROCESSES OF GLOBALIZATION AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

## ДЕМОКРАТИЈА, ЧОВЕКОВИТЕ ПРАВА И ЕТНИЧКИТЕ КОНФЛИКТИ ВО РАМКИТЕ НА ПРОЦЕСИТЕ НА ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЈА И ЕВРОПСКАТА ИНТЕГРАЦИЈА

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### ABSTRACT:

The aim of this paper is to elaborate relationships between democracy, human rights and ethnic conflicts within the process and globalization and European integration. The first part is devoted to analysis of the assumed preventive and resolving impacts of democracy (and human rights respect) on the ethnic conflicts.

The second part elaborates the well known more or less negative impacts of the ethnic (and some other) conflicts (particularly violently escalated ones) on the democracy and respecting human rights within the mentioned context of globalization.

The main predicted conclusion could be that if a system cannot be qualified as democratic one and respectful for human rights, appears the complex dilemma. Namely, the dilemma is what should come first: developing democracy (and respecting human rights) or eliminating ethnic conflicts and/or preventing their escalations/deescalating them. It will be also presented various theoretical and practical answers and solutions of this dilemma within the process of globalization and European integration. In addition, a few open questions related to the process of globalization as possible source of conflicts, human (in)security, etc.

**Keywords:** Democracy, human rights, ethnic conflict, globalization

## АПСТРАКТ:

Целта на овој труд е да се осврне на односите меѓу демократијата, човековите права и етничките конфликти во рамките на процесите на глобализацијата и европската интеграција. Првиот дел е посветен на анализата на преземените превентиви и влијанието на решенијата на демократијата (и почитување на човековите права) на етнички конфликти.

Вториот дел ги обработува добро познатите, помалку или повеќе негативни влијанија на етничките (и некои други) конфликти (особено оние со насилни ескалирања) на демократијата и почитувањето на човековите права во рамките на споменатиот контекст на глобализацијата.

Главниот заклучок би можел да биде во насока, доколку системот не може да се оквалификува како демократски и таков кој ги почитува човековите права, појавува комплексна дилема. Имено, дилемата е она што треба да дојде прво: развој на демократијата (и почитување на човековите права) или елиминирање на етнички конфликти и/или спречување на нивното ескалирање/деескалирање. Исто така, ќе бидат презентирани разни теоретски и практични одговори и решенија на оваа дилема во рамките на процесот на глобализацијата и европската интеграција. Покрај тоа, елаборирани се неколку отворени прашања поврзани со процесот на глобализацијата, како можен извор на конфликти, човековата (не) безбедност, итн.

**Клучни зборови:** демократија, човекови права, меѓуетнички конфликти, глобализација.

## INTRODUCTION

According to definitions of *democracy*, it is a rule of majority and a procedure used for the non-violent elimination of political, ethnic, economic and other *conflicts*<sup>3</sup> and discrepancies in interests, i.e. positions in society. Very rear ethnic and other conflicts can be solved by democratic or other means. This is a part of human nature.

The classic theory of democracy has elaborated the issue of the ethnicity in cursory manner and mostly periodically. Since the end of the Cold War the interest of numerous scholars has been focused on the security aspects of the ethnic conflicts (ethnic aspects of security in the world), and on political aspects of the development of democracy or

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<sup>3</sup> See conflict definitions: Galtung, J. (1990) "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", in Vasquez J. A (ed.) *Classics of International Relations*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, p. 247; Wiberg, H. (1998) "Identifying Conflicts and Solutions", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XLIX, No. 1070-71, p. 176; Michell, C. R. (1981) *The Structure of International Conflict*, New York, St. Martin's Press, p. 29.



transition toward democracy (i.e. its general pattern). The democracy has its formal and substantive meaning and dimension.

The political systems constitute democracy that is a *sui generis* political model influenced both by their legacies and by weaknesses and strengths of historical and modern features of democracy, including their nationalistic, even chauvinistic and other elements. The *human rights* situation after the end of the Second World War has been featured by their gross and other violations in the world and entering into force the International Covenants in 1976. In addition, several other international acts on human rights were adopted in UN, EU and elsewhere in the world. However, the third generation of human rights (composed of so-called solidarity rights including the right to peace) has not been usually included among internationally recognized human rights yet. (Isakovic, Z, 2002). The numerous human rights bodies established under the UN umbrella, within EU, etc. have their weaknesses, particularly the lack of any enforcement or mandatory power (with some exceptions). (Kindred, H et al., 2000).

The nature of *globalization* theoreticians define in the various ways. In this work it is observed as the process of emerging global rule.<sup>4</sup>

Many theoreticians disagree in defining globalization. Its nature they express in the following ways:

1. the process of diffusion driven by the new information and communication technologies, i.e. shortly "ICT revolution";
2. the new form of imperialism emerging after the end of the Cold War;
3. the new ideology, in which case it is called globalism rather than globalization;
4. the process of international integration of markets, goods, services and capital;
5. the process that "can foster a standardization of cultural expressions around the world" etc. ...).

In theoretical and practical regard, the power ability contains the main following components: inner and outer.

The international relations disappear and the rules governing them are becoming global relations thanks and during the process of globalization.

I would also suggest explaining more on globalization.

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<sup>4</sup> See more details: Isakovic, Z. (2000) *Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 137, 242, and 245; *Encyclopædia Britannica* (2008) Ultimate Reference Suite CD; Kegli, Č. V. Jr., Vitkof, J. R. (2004) *Svetska politika: trend i transformacija*, Beograd, Centar za studije Jugoistočne Evrope, Fakultet političkih nauka i Diplomatska akademija Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije i Crne Gore, str. 401; Stojanović, R, (1982) *Sila i moć u međunarodnim odnosima*, Beograd, Radnička štampa, pp. 26-9.

*European integration* – having one of its main sources in the conflict resolution attempt (Nakarada, R., 2006) – is also in the process of transition from international organization to state organization. The process will be lasting until the EU adopts and begin to apply its constitution.

Clear manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism are generators and indicators of ethnic conflicts. This belief is further corroborated by the global economic crisis as well as inclination toward establishing ethnically and in tribal regard pure states or 'states', confinement to one's own borders, national particularism, selfishness, xenophobia or hegemonism, domination, authoritarian rule over other nations or parts of them, etc.

This paper is a scholarly attempt to explore the relationships between democracy, human rights and ethnic conflicts within the processes of European integration and globalization. Unfortunately the publishing space is limited.

## DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ETHNIC CONFLICTS

The collapse of what was called "communism" (or, more precisely 'communism', since basic economic preconditions were not fulfilled) and the re-emergence of a number of small, at least to some degree multiethnic or multitribal and easy to manipulate states or 'states' having rather poor democratic traditions (partly thanks to the fact that many of them were born in the war conditions) have represented earthshaking events. They have heavily influenced the re-emergence of numerous ethnic conflicts and tensions within the states as well as in inter-state relations.

Interethnic relations in many states, regions and continents are burdened by the presence of strong ethnic stereotypes (representing an important base for ethnic mobilization) and the bitter historical legacies in society in general including in what is called civil society (associations, political parties and trade unions). (Basic, G. 1996). In some cases within the interethnic relations, one could discover marks of their authoritarian past.

Sometimes, even democracies considered as old and mature corroborate by their undemocratic practices thesis that no one is perfect. In any case, one can make assessments about whether a process of genuine democratization is under way, and how it can affect elimination and/or preventing escalation of ethnic conflicts in societies by "managing", "mitigating", "regulating", "mediating", "transformation", "resolving", its "marginalization", etc. (Isakovic, Z. 2000:4).

In 1995 Lijphart stressed that the fulfillment of stable democracy and consociation needs cooperation between élites belonging to different groups, and the possibility that organizations and individuals of different ethnic groups affiliate themselves and cooperate beyond borders of their respective federal or ethnic units. The developments in ex-Yugoslavia and processes in other countries demonstrated that "political élites monopolize

the mediating role between the groups, and reduce the possibilities of direct cooperation between citizens and organizations from the areas they have the control over. It is said that élites support heterogeneity of the society as a whole, i.e. between the ethnic groups, but act very energetically in order to impose homogeneity within the groups they control (Elazar)". (Stanovčić, V. 1996).

In 1991, one predicted that – although democracy will win – many countries would be faced with significant challenges during the democratization process. It is considered that ethnic terrorism and violence in general will be continued in decreasing parts of the world and number of countries. (Fukuyama, F. 1991:659-663), (Hobsbawn, E. J. 1995:164).

There is the open question of the extent to which democratic and human rights devoted countries could support others in the globalised world. There are the numerous open questions boiling down to whether force can be used for an export of democracy or 'democracy'. (Barzun, J. 1987), (Gillies, D. and Schmitz, G. 1992). In that way, democracy (thanks to the process of globalization) could become conflict generator and thus global problem instead of a world benefit. As the a several presidential and other elections repeatedly demonstrated, nobody is perfect as far as democracy is concerned (Isaković, Z. 1998) and thus cannot have, pretend or claim the monopoly in this regard.

As it was mentioned, the EU was created as conflict resolution institution. In cases of Cyprus Transylvania and some other, it became the institution for conflict settlement. New conflict emerged in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and others.

Lutovac concluded, "International pressure will play a positive role only if it initiates the creation of authentic democratic potentials". (Lutovac, Z. 1997:14). If the internal and/or international pressure is too great and thus coercive – is it going to be counterproductive?

One can define features of democratic state's engagement in the process of conflict escalation. First, the states are vulnerable to foreign and/or local propaganda and political pressures linked to conflict. The conflict parties are tempted by the mediator's vulnerability. They perceive the conflict as own opportunity for launching a propaganda war over the issue of the mediator. In addition, the mediator's suitability to remain efficient and accepted is reduced by the one party's victory in that war. The vulnerable mediator is more likely to allow their initiatives to be conditioned by political and propaganda pressures exerted on them than by the successful mediation requirements. (Isakovic, Z. 1999).

Democratization has a potential to assist mitigate ethnic conflict. However, in some cases such a potential has been wasted, as the transition towards democracy produced a fertile ground for ethnic animosity, hatred and political demands of power-thirsty domestic and foreign political leaders and forces. Democratic turnabouts allowed

many ethnic tensions including conflicts, but because democracy was fragile and young, it had not been able to manage them peacefully and properly.

The proper way of democracy's defense is its development and widening of the human and other rights that compose it. The more democratic mechanisms for eliminating ethnic conflicts are available the less it is likely that they will become violently escalated conflicts which endanger democracy; the less the conflicts become violent the more are chances that they could be transformed or removed in a democratic way, etc. However, democratic systems, especially if endangered, may sooner or later start to defend themselves by means which could be passed in a democratic procedure, but in its essence are undemocratic.

Finally, security should be maintained by the experts and democratic procedures associated with diplomacy and conflict resolution, and not only by police, soldiers and armaments. Otherwise, armies and polices could follow the unfortunate destiny of the Second Yugoslavia and its army, but in some cases having much poorer resources.

## ETHNIC CONFLICTS AND THE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In some cases – perceived widely as disputes democracy vs. authoritarian rule – it was later shown that, in fact, there were border conflicts. In that way, a struggle for democracy could serve as an excuse for conflict escalation, territorial expansion and for camouflaging own authoritarian rule. At the other side, as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Hugh Shelton told the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 3, 2001, "terrorists are adaptive adversaries who constantly look for ways to strike where their victims are most vulnerable". Terrorist could feed authoritarian and terror rulers and *vice versa*.

In some situations, at least a fragile and temporary peace it was possible to be established by force and it seems to be a more efficient way when ethnic conflicts are removed by even illusory arguments in the narrow or proper meaning of that term. *"Conflict-resolution is not about harming or killing people. It is about killing problems and harnessing the human and circumstantial attraction to violence. Violence is always part of the problem, never the solution"*. (Øberg, J. 1994:140).

In the case of some conflicts the most appropriate way seems to be, at least theoretically, when all not directly engaged actors have the role of conflict mediator as a complex *consortium* or *enterprise*, trying to employ their democratic, human rights or other advantages, and to avoid their temptations or handicaps and weakness. However, some politicians of some of the conflicts parties use more arguments, and some more force as an argument.

The (quasi)ethnic and similar conflicts have created major challenges for the some countries in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The UN and other major world actors have been insufficiently

capable for creating ethnic conflicts analysis, which could be used for peacefully preventing conflict escalation and deescalating them.

It seems that the result of the debate whether democracies wage wars or not could depend on accepted definitions of both the democracy and the war. One could consider democracies could begin wars, but do not wage wars as in these circumstances the democracies actually become temporary (to extends wars could be perceived as transient phenomena) constitutional dictatorships featured by some characteristics common with permanent dictatorships. Hence the Dimitrijević's conclusion that "notwithstanding the democracy of the system, all nuclear states are actually dictatorships at these 'moments of truth', because one individual decides on life or death, thereby expressing all his traits, including permanent or temporary insanity". (Dimitrijević, V. 1985:212).

The crucial question is how to prevent or eliminate escalation of existing ethnic conflicts in order to provide democratic power a chance to assert itself? The advantages of the development of civil society and democratization in general may be used as a platform for conflict elimination depending of, among other circumstances, the forms which escalation of ethnic conflict may take. The more violent conflict escalation is the advantages seem harder to use, including eliminating the conflict in a peaceful way. Examining this thesis, in this paper will be analyzed the cases of terrorism and terror as means used for achieving the goals for which armed force would otherwise have to be employed.

The chief weapon of both terrorism and terror is causing fear "created for a political goal, it is linked to maintaining or seizing power. Both terror and terrorism have dual targets, dual addressees: the victim of the violence and the threat recipient. Finally, both terror and terrorism are in discord with certain norms of political behavior, which are different in case of terror and in case of terrorism, because, as a rule, terror is an action taken by those possessing legislative power, while individual terrorists are non-sovereign ... private individuals, differently subjected to a legal order". One author by definition eliminates governmental violence (terror, which can be observed as a form or cause of ethnic or other conflicts) as a form of terrorism as the state has a legitimate violence monopoly. Even here, there are differences between situation, types, tactics, activities, degree to which social, psychological, etc. dimensions are important. (Merkel, P. H. 1986). In both cases the mass production of fear is justified by superior principles and goals utilized as a means for ruling over society.

Some communications are possible to be established by choosing the time, place, means and some other modalities and circumstances of action and by the (un)selective choice of physical victims, and all this does not to be sufficient for reflecting the terrorists' political, ideological and other goals and values in greater detail. If these efforts would be exhausted in violence, the terrorists' message utilized to generate fear would be lost.

Terrorists' resort to additional propaganda and other communications to win publicity and announce their goals among the intimidated people often is practiced via mass media. Their messages are used as amplifiers or resonators of intimidating messages that is often obvious in the instances portraying the terrorists as "extremely efficient", "omnipotent men-machines", even "ready to do anything", etc.

The intimidated people and others try to gather as much information as possible attempting to secure them, out of sensationalism or curiosity. It is difficult to achieve longer-lasting secrecy of data on terrorists' actions – including the very fact that they were committed, particularly if they themselves want publicity, and particularly if the acts were committed in public, in presence of groups of people, etc. There is controversial assumption that terrorist acts would not be conducted if the terrorist knew those acts could not win publicity and on the attitude that there would be no terrorism without contemporary globalized communications. (Schmid, A. P., and de Graaf, J. 1982:15)

However, journalists – particularly in democratic systems – are usually not willing to accept outside censorship of their reports. In addition, application of contemporary technology for combating terrorism could jeopardize and violate certain human rights (such as the right to receive and convey information).

Terrorist (and terror) acts are among first class negative sensations with extreme high attraction for people. Thanks to this, most newsmen are ready to publish any news devoted to every terrorist (and terror) act.

Journalists (as well as governments) qualify some terrorists by words having positive connotations (independence or freedom fighters, dissidents, resistance movements, etc.), and some terrorists are called criminals, gunmen, terrorists, mercenaries, even communists, etc. This provoked one author to try to create a neutral definition of the terrorism as the utilization of force or its threat supposed to achieve a political goal by producing fear, frustration or uncertainty. (Mozaffari, M. 1998:182).

A compromise might be found applying the principle that *the media should inform on terrorist and comparable acts but not turning them into the mouthpieces of the terrorists*. Informing should be accompanied by explanations of the background and ultimate goals of the terrorist acts.

Between the avoiding being the mouthpiece of terrorists and commitment to inform the public on their acts, there is a broad area that may contain a rather large space for journalists' inclination for sensationalism, bureaucratic arbitrariness in determining what will, and what will not be published and the terrorists' strivings to gain publicity. Thus, the mentioned stand does not adequately resolve the problem of the position of the media toward the terrorist and similar acts, in the first place because it seems to be too general. "Theoretical thought is faced with the insoluble riddle of valuing contemporary forms of

terrorism. Due to its proneness to the same factors imposing double standards on the media, it, too, can fall prey to them. If departing from the position that there should be full understanding of terrorism, theoretical thought risks to clash with moral and humanistic values, because terrorist methods are directed against them. If, however, science departs from the position that every existing order is justified, it risks fully turning into apologetics and abandoning the critical distance and option of revolutionary change. This temptation is attractive as well, again, because of the difficult evaluation of means used in terrorism". (Radojković, M. 1988:47-50).

The dilemma on the media attitude on violence has not been resolved as people are still not ready to condemn any violence, notwithstanding in which circumstances it was committed, who is committing it and what are her/his motives and goals, who its victims are, etc. Even in societies with long democratic traditions and that can be perceived as democratic ones, escalated ethnic or other conflicts make all sides to (try to) restrain democracy and/or reduce substantive (the role of media as a way for introducing political debate), formal (the freedom of expression, etc.), and democratic practice and principles and the certain human rights.

Thanks to its violent form, both terrorism and terror degenerate and degrade the advantages of democracy along with the results of the civil society development, which may be used as a platform for conflict de-escalation and elimination and as a basis for its resolution. *The more violent conflict escalation is the advantages and achievements are harder to use including eliminating the (potentially) violent conflict in a nonviolent way.*

A fearful situation – which within conditions of ethnic conflicts stimulates ethnonational mobilization and division – cannot be assessed as favorable for the development of democracy, human rights, European integration and globalization. The kind of democracy which may appear within such conditions could be similar to that existing in some of the old Greek city-states exclusively reserved for the ruling class of citizens, and not accessible for slaves. In many parts of the globalized or 'globalized' world there are no slaves any more but there are national and other divisions.

Present globalized economic crisis, and particularly recession (possible decline of production, GNPs, earnings, and employment) and a assumed lowering of degree of socio-political cohesion in the world probably will contribute to the nervous way in which terrorists, states and other ethnic and conflict actors will (re)act even in situations in which a goal could be reached by means other than violence. What the predominant group/state sees as "law and order" may be seen as deliberate discrimination by others; and what the former sees as peaceful assimilation and/or globalization may look like (planned) ethnocide or imposition of own system and culture in the eyes of others. (Wiberg, H. 1995:49). However, the more the conflict sides use terror(ism) the more they will be lacking socio-

political cohesion bringing additional readiness to utilize terror(ism), lack of the cohesion, etc. What can help sides in world, regional and local (intra-state) conflicts is a stable and socio-politically united (globalized) society and (global) state.

External threats seem to be counterproductive as much as they aim to eliminate the conflict by protecting minorities who try to disintegrate state or other political entity whose part they are. The more outsiders threaten to use force, the more they reinforce the cycle of violence and make democracy future distant phenomenon. Many generally democratic oriented people cease to perceive democracy as a way for disintegration of their state. In a similar way, chauvinists also get what they need, as the threats became more or less valid excuses for achieving their goals, i.e. isolation of their ethnic group and the whole society from the rest of the (globalized) world.

## CONCLUSIONS

In the case of the relationships between democracy, human rights and ethnic conflicts within the processes of globalization and European integration there are not simple solution and advises. The world is complex and there is no cure for this problem or 'problem'. There will be the end of the world if we would be all the same.

There is the thesis that the relationship is two-sided: democracy and human rights have the potential to help eliminate or at least mitigate ethnic tensions and conflicts, but democracy and human rights could create a fertile climate for biases, hatred and thus conflicts. There are possibilities of conflict elimination within the context of democracy and *vice versa* (in some way, their relations could be compared with those between water and fire).

What it could be done in the processes of European integration and globalization in order to promote democracy and human rights? First, most promising seems to be the mentioned consociation type of democracy. Second, the democratic oriented forces should acknowledge and recognize the ethnic diversity existing in the state along with the fact that nobody is perfect. Third, they also have to discover a way – commonly perceived to be fair – to accommodate the interests of different groups and their human and other rights.

On the one hand, the democracy provides a propitious setting for allaying ethnic problems, preventing their transformation to conflicts that should be avoided and/or their escalation, and on the other hand – successful democracy needs national unity as the basic precondition. Another precondition for democracy, respecting human rights and for dampening or preventing ethnic conflicts is at least some economic prosperity, which could be also harder reached and maintained in conflict situations and the present world economic crisis.



Conflicts (and particularly escalated ones) along with some governments (particularly terror ones) are (among) worst enemies of human rights and democracy. Thus, violating human rights and democratic rules governments could use their chance by escalating or provoking ethnic or other conflicts escalation by the other sides in purpose to hide their own role in the violating the rights and the rules.

In general, national unity can hardly be fulfilled due to the existing ethnic conflicts, particularly in multiethnic societies elsewhere. Even in societies that can be considered as democratic ones and with long democratic traditions, escalated ethnic conflicts have lead their parties to restrain democracy and reduce and suspend democratic principles and human rights, and limit the functioning power of their democratic institutions and processes. In this way, ethnic conflicts, and especially escalated ones, have negative impacts on democracy and human rights, and at least partly disable the democratization and human rights development process. The more conflicts, the harder it is to achieve democracy and human rights protection and even more so to experience them. An analogous conclusion can be created for the relationships between ethnic conflicts (especially escalated ones), and globalization as well as the European integration process.

Democracy includes mass manipulation, which is regularly easier in young than in mature and old democracies. In a society in transition, the manipulation could be directed toward many issues including even the very idea of democratic society. Simultaneously, acceptance of its imperfection is regarded as a strong side of democracy. However, *ethnic mobilization (an ethnic conflicts escalation conditio sine qua non) could become possible with democratization, but the mobilization could threaten and in good part destroy democracy itself.*

*'Protecting' or protecting themselves in armed conflicts (all states, movements, and other actors defend and wage just wars at least according their public statements) democracies spoil themselves, particularly if warfare lasts a longer period of time.*

Majority nations will not be secure unless the individual and collective human rights of the minorities will be protected to a feasible and necessary degree. "As soon as minorities become majorities, new minorities appear. If the present number of nation-states is doubled, the number of minority problems may also be (roughly) doubled". (Eriksen, H. T. 1992:221).

Within these conditions, minorities should be deprived only of the democratic right to self-determination interpreted as the right to secession. Majorities should be deprived only of the 'right' to violate and imperil minorities' human and democratic rights, which are the safeguards and guaranties of minorities' dignity and distinct identity. In this way, the majorities' states could protect their territorial integrity and they could (at least in some cases) gradually lose their reputations of the "powder kegs" or similar. For this reason, the

countries need stable democracies, systems of human rights, which are protected by law along with traditional and other habits and developed economies. (Isaković, Z. 1994:35).

The more a minority is far from being loyal to state in which it has been living, presumably the more the state will use its repression; looking from the other side, the more the repression is used by the state the less is the minority likely to be loyal and to perceive the state power or authority as legitimate, but perceiving it as "plain domination". (Duverger, M. 1972:18).

Before any proposal for conflict elimination, resolution or management is made one should learn and understand how to cope with conflicts with peaceful political means. However, when existing system cannot be qualified as democratic one, appears the complex dilemma what could and should come first: developing democracy (including human rights) or eliminating, preventing escalation or deescalating ethnic conflicts.

The conflicts can be observed as parts of the process of globalization which seems to be a source of conflicts as well as cooperation. The processes of globalization, regionalization, national and tribal homogenization, and world segmentation (in numerous cases in keeping with the ancient Roman saying "divide and rule") apparently represent fertile ground for the emergence of comparatively numerous and diverse conflicts both within societies and in emerging global relations.

As it was shown, the economic (and political) crisis and conflicts in EU could have probably negative impacts on other countries, democracies, and conflicts in them and with the other countries and actors and *vice versa*.

In addition, there is the dilemma *does the globalised world needs both peace and respect for human rights or just one of them* thanks to the possibility that the definition of peace could include respect for (some of) the human rights. The dilemma can be avoided or resolved in one of the inclusions:

- Of peace within the categories of human rights or
- Of respecting human rights within notions of peace.

If such inclusions are not acceptable, at least in situations in which they are in collision, then one must decide which one of them is more important. In that case, an additional dilemma could appear: *does any violation of one of the two phenomena or their segments represent sufficient reason for sacrificing the other phenomena or its segments?* *Although the general theoretical conclusion could be that people(s) should not have to choose between human rights and peace, in real life situations there is sometimes a choice to make.* (Isakovic, Z. (2000:12).

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## SHARING HISTORY IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY – THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

### ПОДЕЛЕНА ИСТОРИЈА ВО ПОСТКОНФЛИКТНИТЕ ОПШТЕСТВА – СЛУЧАЈОТ НА МАКЕДОНИЈА

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#### ABSTRACT

This paper is about sharing history in a post-conflict society, as viewed from the perspective of the teaching of history. Through analyses of the referenced articles and reports, it discusses history teaching as one of the tools of transitional justice. It goes on to review the successful case of sharing history through the Franco-German textbook project, but only from the aspect of the media coverage and comment. Finally, the paper examines the Macedonian case related to the topic, drawing on the findings of other scholars, the response of Macedonian media to the joint history textbook project of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation of Southeast Europe, as well as materials from interviews conducted by the author of this paper.

**Key words** – reconciliation history teaching, unite, divide, coexistence

#### АПСТРАКТ

Овој труд ја обработува темата за споделување на заедничка историја во едно пост конфликтно општество видено преку призмата на наставата по историја. Преку анализи на написи и извештаи во трудот се дискутира за наставата по историја како една од алатките на транзиционата правда.

Трудот дава еден преглед на успешен случај на споделување на историја изразен низ француско – германскиот проект за учебниците по историја, но само

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во поглед на медиумската покриеност и нивните коментари. На крај, во трудот се прави преглед на македонскиот случај поврзан со темата, преку истражувањата на други научни работници, реакцијата на медиумите во однос на проектот за заеднички учебник по историја на Центарот за демократија и реконсилијација на Југоисточна Европа, како и материјалите од интервјуата спроведени од авторот на овој труд.

**Клучни зборови** – реконсилијација, настава по историја, обединува, раздвојува, коегзистенција

## INTRODUCTION

The theoretical part of this paper is based on the special report on the conference organized by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), the article "Rewriting School Textbooks as a Tool of Understanding and Stability" by Mirela-Luminita Murgescu, the article "Transitional justice and reform in history education" by Elisabeth Cole, since they deal with the teaching of history as one of the mechanisms of transitional justice. Also, the interviewees for the research part of the paper were selected from among the participants in the Macedonian project presented at the USIP conference.

## UNITE OR DIVIDE?

Elizabeth Cole and Judy Barsalou argue that the way schools navigate and promote historical narratives in the classroom partly determines the roles they and those who control the schools play in promoting conflict or social reconstruction. Actually, it is the pedagogy, i.e., the way the teacher teaches which is very important for the success of reform. Very often pedagogy is inseparable from content in history education reform, but it sometimes receives less attention than curriculum. This is especially the case in resource-poor settings. Methodologies which emphasize students' critical thinking skills and which expose them to multiple historical narratives can strengthen the democratic and peaceful tendencies in transitional societies that are emerging from conflict. Therefore, helping history teachers promote critical analysis may be more urgent than reforming history textbooks.

Structural issues in the education system are crucial when determining the role of education in post-conflict social reconstruction. Such issues include: funding,



ethnic segregation, access and equity, the choice of language for classroom instruction in ethnically divided societies, the system of national examinations, and the relative value given to history in comparison with other subjects.

The often neglected mechanism of history education should be understood as an integral part of transitional justice and social reconstruction. It can support or undermine the goals of tribunals, truth commissions and memorials, and other transitional justice mechanisms.

In societies recovering from violent conflict, questions of how to deal with the past are sensitive, especially when they involve memories of widespread victimization, death, and destruction. After episodes of violent conflict, political leaders and others often seem to prefer social amnesia, as they try to “move ahead” and promote stability.

Therefore, the question arises as to whether the teaching of history can help transitional societies become more democratic and whether it can contribute to the development of empathy for, or even social cohesion among, former enemies in societies in which some groups were marginalized or were deprived of certain rights.

An additional issue is whether history classes reinforce other transitional justice processes, such as truth telling and legal accountability for crimes committed during the conflict. Finally, there is the question of whether the history curriculum can promote belief in the rule of law, resistance to a culture of impunity, and greater trust in public institutions, including schools themselves.

The institute conference raised a number of specific concerns about the development and adoption of post-conflict history curricula. These include: Who decides what version(s) of history will be taught? What impact do those choices have on promoting stable, cohesive, and tolerant societies? What is the relationship between the (re)writing of history by academic historians and the development of secondary-school history textbooks? What impact do transitional justice processes have on the development of new secondary-school history textbooks and the way history is actually taught in schools?

The pedagogic issues that need to be considered are as follows: What challenges do teachers face in the classroom when addressing controversial historical subjects, and what are some of the different approaches they use? How can teachers be trained or prepared to address these subjects, and how can they be supported and protected in environments where disagreements over history might

give rise to violence? Given limited resources, should teacher training take priority over curricular reform?

One of the particularly problematic issues for post-conflict school systems in divided, multiethnic, and multilingual societies is determining which languages will be used to instruct schoolchildren. Although it is important for children of a multilingual country to learn the language (and, by extension, culture) of other main groups of citizens in addition to their own mother tongue, having too many official languages in the schools can promote semi-literacy, poor performance, high repetition, and dropout rates (as seen in many African countries). At the same time, the rising importance of English as the language of the global marketplace is increasingly influencing language policies. Ethnic segregation or integration of schools also is an important structural aspect of education. When different ethnic groups are educated separately within the national education system, and especially when one ethnic (or gender) group receives more educational resources than another, such arrangements can convey important overt or hidden messages to students. The report notes that some educational systems (such as Macedonia's) permit the use of different history texts in ethnically segregated classrooms. In this case, history instruction in Macedonia is the same for Albanians and Slavs—but only in the sense that each group separately learns a remarkably similar history of victimization by the other, and each claims the same distinctions, such as a longer presence in the region. State and national examination systems, are a nearly universal challenge for history education reform. For example, in East Asia, school systems stress memorization to improve students' chances on exams that reward this type of pedagogy. Such exam systems usually do not encourage innovation in history education. In many regions, including Europe and, increasingly, the United States, the pressure on teachers to "teach to the exam" makes it difficult for them to use supplementary materials beyond the state-approved textbooks. While the compulsory textbooks may have education ministry approval and are less likely to be innovative, supplemental texts can avoid politically-charged approval processes more easily and address controversial historical subjects in new ways. Another challenge is the decreasing priority given to the teaching of history and the humanities by post-conflict societies' intent on preparing their students to compete in the global marketplace, with more emphasis on subjects seen to have practical value, such as foreign languages, math, science, technology, and vocational training.

Thus the potential for schools to promote social reconstruction through history education in post-conflict societies is not being fully realized.

In post-conflict countries receiving substantial foreign attention, post-conflict reconstruction increasingly tends to be transnational, although “insiders,” or locals, are the ones who will have to live with, and take responsibility for, the long-term results of reconstruction and reform work. Outsiders who work on history-education reform tend to be from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rather than transnational organizations or foreign governments; some academics from foreign universities also are becoming involved. Often, however, powerful outside actors, particularly funders, view education as a domestic issue that “insiders” are best qualified to tackle. They consider other transitional justice processes, such as trials and elections, worthier of their time and support. On the positive side, outsiders can get insiders engaged in reform processes that are too touchy for locals to handle on their own, by bringing together groups otherwise disinclined to work together.

A number of participants at the conference stressed the importance of focusing on pedagogy, noting that the most devastated educational systems may lack even basic textbooks, and the time and money to produce them quickly. If so, the immediate focus should be on helping teachers gain the necessary skills and confidence to help their students address the past through open analysis and critical thinking, even without new textbooks. In that case, the teachers can use old texts to produce “teachable moments” by helping students understand how the texts promoted narrow historical interpretations that directly or indirectly incited violent conflict. In addition it is important to remember that much of history depends on the viewpoint of those writing it. Although post-conflict societies can benefit from accounts of history that play down the differences between former enemies, some truths do exist: the so-called forensic truths, the “who did what to whom” facts that human rights investigators seek to illuminate. The challenge in these situations is to teach history that acknowledges these facts while finding enough common ground for former enemies to work toward a shared future.

Thus, pedagogical reform is attractive as a strategy because it may be less controversial or threatening than attempts immediately after conflict to change historical narratives through curriculum reform. But pedagogy reform is most effective when combined with curriculum reform. Violeta Petroska-Beshka, a

Macedonian educator at Sts. Cyril and Methodius University, developed one such experimental program. She has been working with teachers from the Albanian and Slav communities to design curricular materials that present each group's historical perspectives, with similarities and differences offered for analysis and discussion. Petroska-Beshka also has been breaking new ground by mixing the two ethnic groups in professional teacher-training workshops. Her goal has been to open teachers' minds to accepting the presentation of different historical perspectives in the classroom, even when the teachers do not agree with the contending historical narratives.

Those pushing for reform should understand that teachers and school administrators willing to embrace change often do so at the risk of strong public criticism, or worse. For example, a recent edition of the website *Balkan Insight* (No. 20, February 20, 2006) described a "storm" of controversy that erupted over Petroska-Beshka's efforts to reform the teaching of history in Macedonia. In a typical comment, Blazhe Ristevski, the director of the Macedonian Academy of Science and Arts, said, "As a scientist, I can't allow that truth can be found through this kind of 'partnership.' It just adds more petrol to the fire between the two sides." Ljupcho Jordanovski, Speaker of the Macedonian parliament, said not enough time had passed since the recent conflict between Macedonian Slavs and Albanians, and objectivity is impossible because "we were all either direct or indirect participants."

Countering that such reforms are hard to undertake at any time, Petroska-Beshka argued, "If we don't speak openly about these painful issues, we leave a space to create ethnically colored, opposing versions that will affect the definition of official history." Teachers need strong support from parents, school administrators, and other authorities to teach new curricula and use new pedagogies. Such support must be ongoing, as teachers suffer from burnout, especially in high-stress situations. It is this group of teachers from Petroska-Beshka's project that is the target population of the research part of this paper. They have been trained and enough time has passed for us to learn something from their experience.

## TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND REFORM IN HISTORY EDUCATION

Elizabeth Cole's article considers why history education matters, what conditions complicate its reform and what recommendations can begin to be offered with regard to the relationship between history education and transitional justice.

Cole points out there are many pressing reasons to identify and analyze the connections between the various processes and goals of transitional justice, broadly defined, as well as the ways that young people learn about the past and the content of what they learn. A strong argument can be made for the promotion of closer collaboration between transitional justice actors and educators. It should be stated at the outset that there are significant obstacles to the ability of history education to support the work of transitional justice, to contribute to such desired necessities as accountability, the rule of law, truth, repair, reconciliation between deeply divided groups, democracy and ultimately, to greater respect for human rights. But those obstacles should not be taken to mean that there is no role for education, including history education, in transitional justice. Just as history education can potentially contribute to the goals of transitional justice, so also can it undermine them if reform of this sector is left unaddressed. The last 10 to 15 years have produced a rich collection of writings on transitional justice, and there is a growing body of work on history education and its relation to political change, democratic citizenship, international relations and globalization.

A growing understanding of transitional justice has opened space for other types of discourse about political and social problems that need to be addressed, such as how the history of a conflict and its background are perceived by different actors. Barkan, one of the authors Cole refers to in her article, writes that history used to be a largely factual (and largely uninspiring) victors' history. Increasingly, however, we recognize the growing elasticity of history and that it is anything but fixed. More recently, as history has become increasingly malleable, it has simultaneously become more central to our daily life. It informs our identity more intimately today, and being subject to interpretation, it has also become a space for contesting perspectives.

While most historians would argue that interpretation has always been a central part of the historian's craft, there is widespread agreement that collective memories of suffering have become a major part of group identity and group politics and that popular and political pressure has increased to make sure that nationally accepted historical narratives do not whitewash acts that inflicted major suffering nor exclude the experiences of non-victors, including minorities, women, the economically marginalized and, in the case of international conflicts, citizens of other states who were victims of historical violence perpetrated by the in-group's

state. Maier, another author cited by Cole in her article, summarizes the changed significance of history and memory thus: 'Increasingly, the fabric of civic life in modern democracies involves a politics of recognition, and at the basis of this politics in modern democracies, for better or worse, is usually the acknowledgment of collective suffering.'

Calls for new approaches to the historical narrative produced by professional historians and consumed by societies have an abstract quality and apply mainly to the work of the intellectual elites. One place where history becomes more concrete and relevant to non-elites is in schools: in history classrooms but also potentially in related subjects such as civics (most often taught by history teachers) and in literature. Engaging schools as a part of the transitional justice process can expand the range of institutional and individual actors involved in transitional justice to include ministries of education and education officials at various levels, parent-teacher-type councils, curriculum experts, teacher-training institutions, principals, teachers, parents and students themselves.

History education at the secondary school level, however, also conceptually fits into some aspects of the work of transitional justice, which is another reason why Cole argues that it should have 'a place at the table' of transitional justice, meaning that it should be a part of transitional justice planning.

Schools also present an important vehicle to carry the work of transitional justice instruments beyond the original period of their activity and scope of influence, a challenge that has plagued truth commissions and trials. Transitional justice mechanisms have ambitious goals to change societies, but have been limited in their impact for a variety of reasons. Courts and trials, for example, are covered in difficult legal language and theory, and ad-hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have by necessity taken place outside the societies where the human rights violations took place.

Beyond the possibility that educational initiatives, school-based and non-school-based (the latter would include museums, monuments and other cultural projects) can help to carry forward the work of transitional justice mechanisms and allow ordinary people to take ownership of the transitional justice processes. How does creating new approaches to history education relate to the specific goals of transitional justice? The purpose of history education in the modern state has

generally been to transmit ideas of citizenship and both the idealized past and the promised future of the community. History and civics textbooks in most societies present an 'official' story highlighting narratives that shape contemporary patriotism. Education helps articulate relations between state and society and sets the boundaries and terms of citizenship.

If the representation of a group's past is now recognized as an integral part of identity, and identity includes not only how one views one's own group but also the groups designated as 'other' or enemies, then understandings of history are crucial to a society's ability to reckon with the difficult past for the sake of a more just future.

Working with teachers to change their pedagogical methods may be more realistic than expecting them to be agents of social change through new content; the challenge is to provide them with appropriate pre- and in-service training and with strong and consistent support for transitional justice processes - tend to belong to the recent past. Secondary school history is much more politically sensitive than university level history or the work of academic historians and often lags behind them in terms of progressiveness and risk taking, because younger students are seen as highly impressionable and politically 'pure'.

It is partially for this reason, although also for more practical reasons such as limited resources and the complex procedures of program and curriculum reforms, textbook creation, production and distribution, that the reformation of history textbooks in the aftermath of massive human rights abuses tends to take a long time. Jelin, another scholar cited by Cole, suggests that the processes of incorporation of difficult issues into the education system have a very strong institutional component, since they require reaching a minimum consensus and an institutionally legitimized version of what took place. If the political conflict is not yet resolved, it is impossible to elaborate such a version of past events.

Other obstacles to reforming history education are more practical than political but no less important to consider. One such obstacle is the low priority placed on history as well as literature, arts and social studies, in favor of math, science, technology and vocational training in many parts of the world. This is true for developing countries with scarce resources for education as much as for developed.

Finally, Cole points out that some surveys indicate that history as a school subject is one of the most unpopular subjects with students, and in the memory of adults – despite the fact that nonacademic vehicles for history, such as movies, popular histories, the creation of family genealogy and historical sites are popular. This may indicate that reforming the history classroom to support the work of transitional justice will be a very hard – but may also show that the problem is not that the past cannot be made compelling for students, but rather that it has rarely been done thus far.

New technological approaches to history teaching, fortunately, are not the only sources of hope for a wider role for history education in transitional justice. Two globalizing tendencies in history education, although not without problems of their own, may contribute to a history education that can better complement the work of transitional justice processes. These are ‘social-scientization (an increasing focus on contemporary history and on society as opposed to the state) and a steady globalization.’ The global spread of these two tendencies is well attested by a recent report on dramatic changes in Chinese history textbooks. The new books focus more on society, economics, culture and international history, and less on ideology, leaders, wars and political history. In his comments on the new books, education professor and textbook author Zhou Chunsheng refers to global trends in history education: ‘History does not belong to emperors or generals ... it belongs to the people. It may take some time for others to accept this, naturally, but a similar process has long been underway in Europe and the United States.’ As the article points out, gains in the area of giving students access to the voices and experiences of many new actors are offset by other problems: Chinese history text-books do not yet grapple with periods of mass political disasters in the history of the People’s Republic and may in fact deflect students’ attention from recent political events. But the new approaches to history may allow Chinese students to gain some of the skills and perspectives to approach, at some later point in their lives, the difficult past their parents and grandparents lived through.

One prime topic might be to investigate what the relationship between historical/history textbooks commissions and history education reform can tell us about truth commissions and history education, since more is known about changes in history education in the aftermath of historical commissions. Although historical commissions are not yet counted among mainstream transitional justice



mechanisms, they have been used in long-term reckoning with the past, particularly in Europe, and are currently being tried in the context of several historical conflicts.

Textbooks have been revised as a result of the findings of historical commissions and are often cited as important components of furthering long-term reconciliation between Germany and several World War II-era victim groups, particularly France, Poland and the Czech Republic. There is ample documentation of the changes in narratives that young people in Germany, France, Poland and the Czech Republic have learnt as a result of history education reform, particularly through the studies done by the Georg Eckert Institute, which both consults on history education reform as well as carries out research on history textbooks as they relate to conflict and democracy. The evidence from European historical commissions and history education reform may well be useful in trying to assess the effects that history education revision, as a long-term follow up to TRCs, may have on intergroup relations.

Finally, this is a field still in its infancy. More research is needed to understand such specifics as how the education division of Peru's TRC worked and what obstacles it faced, and how truth commissions and trials are reflected, if at all, in classrooms in places where different transitional justice mechanisms have been held. Greater general understanding is needed of how young people's historical and moral consciousness develops in transitional societies, in history classes per se, but also in religion and literature classes and outside the classroom as well. In addition to the work that academic researchers can contribute to this field, voices from the classrooms are crucial to hear in order to better understand the experiences, needs, fears and hopes of both students and teachers in transitional, post-violence societies as they prepare for the future in the shadow of difficult pasts. It is the voices of the teachers that are expressed in the research part of this whole paper.

## THE CASE OF MACEDONIA

Finally, how does the foregoing translate to Macedonia's post-conflict society? This paper has already noted the work of Prof. Petroska-Beshka with history teachers in the Republic of Macedonia. It has also been mentioned that for the research part of this paper the interviewed teachers were selected from among the participants in Prof. Petroska-Beshka's project, "Understanding history", which led to development of a lesson on the 2001 armed conflict in the Republic of

Macedonia. It is noteworthy that the selected teachers were from some of the scenes of the conflict (Kumanovo, Tetovo and Skopje) and some of them even belonged to the category of conflict-vulnerable citizens. The fact that they had undergone training in understanding and resolving conflict also made them ideal subjects for this study. My aim was to see whether their perceptions have changed and how they actually see history teaching in the Republic of Macedonia. As one of the Macedonian respondents who had the role of expert in Prof. Beshka's project emphasized the projects "Clio in the Balkan", "Joint history textbook project" "The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe" I believe that it is a good idea to talk about the work of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) as a starting point for the Macedonian case.

*The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe* is a non-governmental, non-profit organization that seeks to foster democratic, pluralist, and peaceful societies in Southeast Europe by advocating principles of social responsibility, sustainable development, and reconciliation among the peoples in the region. These goals are accomplished via seminars, conferences, research projects, exchange programs, opinion polls, and publications.

Macedonia has been a contributor to that work through its scholars. One of the Center's publications titled "*Clio in the Balkans*" includes contributions from Macedonian scholars. I shall refer to two articles. The first was written by Nikola Jordanovski. The second is by Emilija Simovska. Their analyses should give a global picture of history teaching in Macedonia and raise some issues for consideration.

In an article entitled "FYR Macedonia", Simovska (*Clio in the Balkans, the Politics of History Education*, pp 495-497) says that national history is not a separate subject in any school and is only taught as a part of world history. The main method of teaching is based on pure presentation of historical information, with almost no evaluation and very little additional information, an approach which sometimes makes the subject very difficult for the children to understand. She says that the Pedagogical Office, which is an expert body of the Ministry for Education, approves all textbooks. Textbook writers are selected by an open-bidding process. Simovska goes on to say that the biggest problem is that the same circle of people write the textbooks and approve them, which makes it difficult to break this relation and establish normal competition, something that would definitively result in better

quality. The novelty has been in amending the laws on primary and secondary education, giving schools the right to choose supplemental textbooks.

*Nikola Jordanovski (Clio in the Balkans, the Politics of History Education, pp.265-276)* analyses the treatment of the common Yugoslav history in the textbooks, with the intention of showing how some crucial questions of recent history were addressed. The vocabulary and the style used in the new books are inherited from the old ones. Also the message has remained the same. Jordanovski says that interethnic violence is a subject one might think would be given more space in the textbooks; in fact, there is only one passage on that issue, in the book for the 4th year of gymnasium, which will speak for itself when quoted in its entirety: In the books the *occupier is to be blamed for everything!*

Jordanovski says that the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the 1991-1995 wars do not form a part of the history textbooks. The final two sentences in the unit about Yugoslavia are as follows: "Because of the ongoing crisis, the republics which constituted the federal state SFRJ had no interest in remaining in it. So, by the end of the '80s and the beginning of '90s dissolution of the federation took place and more sovereign and independent states were created. As for what preceded the crisis itself, the books describe it as a combination of the ineffectiveness of the system of self-management and enterprises not being able to survive and pay salaries to the workers, all this provoking a general crisis of the state. This "... resulting with demands for changes in the political and economic system...", or in other words – "pluralism in the political sphere and privatization of the state-owned property and introduction of market economy". With this, the narrative about Yugoslavia actually ends. (For more details see the full article.)

## CONCLUSIONS

Considerable effort has been invested in Macedonia in the teaching history. But it seems that it gets neglected when it comes to the actual application in practice. Albanians seem to see the teaching related in percents. Some of them use additional materials to teach about Albanian history and use books from Albania (Albanian respondent, expert in the project). The Ministry of Education allows use of additional materials, but it seems that teachers are not very eager to use them.

Sometimes, both Macedonian and Albanian history teachers form their opinion based on hearsay rather than on reading books. They all agree that silence

is a preferred practice instead of hot debates. It took them a year to write a few pages as one joint lesson on the recent past. And it still had to contain three versions (Macedonian, Albanian and a consensual one). Sometimes, the joint work lasts as long as the project, and it seems as if there is no initiative for sustainability.

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# THE INFLUENCE OF INTERCULTURAL FACTORS ON ASYLUM DECISION MAKING IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA ВЛИЈАНИЕТО НА ИНТЕРКУЛТУРНИТЕ ФАКТОРИ ВРЗ ДОНЕСУВАЊЕ ОДЛУКИ ВО АЗИЛОТ ВО РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

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## ABSTRACT

In 2011, in Republic of Macedonia, **740** applications for asylum were submitted in front of the Section for asylum (SfA), Ministry of interior<sup>i</sup>. Vast majority of them were submitted by applicants coming from the world's most vulnerable countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia. However, none of these applicants was granted with convention status<sup>ii</sup> (meaning **refugee status**) or complementary protection status<sup>iii</sup> (according the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection<sup>iv</sup>, Article 4-a- **subsidiary protection**).

This study is designed as an experimental research with a goal to examine whether intercultural factors such as **gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion and language**, have influence on the asylum decision- making<sup>v</sup>, at the same time allowing us to fabricate the profile of the so- called "new asylum seekers". As a sampling group (respondents) we will use all asylum seekers that applied for asylum in Republic of Macedonia from 01 of January till 31 of December 2011, therefore the research does not claim to be representative for the comparative previous period before 2011. The researched sample is represented by twenty four nationalities, including both men and women, from a range of age groups. Additionally, through examination of four individual cases from 2011, selected on the basis whether an interview was conducted with the asylum seeker, particular attention will be

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addressed to the process of communication in the asylum cases, as a form of intercultural communication.

**Keywords:** asylum, decision- making, intercultural factors.

## АПСТРАКТ

Во 2011 година во Република Македонија беа поднесени 740 барања за признавање на правото на азил пред Одделението за азил при Министерството за внатрешни работи. Најголемиот дел од овие апликации беа поднесени од страна на баратели кои доаѓаат од најранливите земји во светот, како Авганистан, Пакистан и Сомалија. Меѓутоа, ниеден од овие баратели на азил не се здоби со конвенциски статус - статус на признаен бегалец или комплементарен статус на заштита (согласно Законот за азил и привремена заштита, Член 4-а, супсидијарна заштита).

Оваа студија е дизајнирана како експериментално истражување, со цел да истражи дали интеркултурните фактори, како што се: полот, возраста, етничката припадност, националноста, религијата и јазикот, влијаат врз донесувањето одлуки во областа на азилот, едновременно дозволувајќи ни да го фабрикуваме и профилот на т.н „нови баратели на азил“. Како истражувачки примерок се избрани барателите на азил кои аплицирале за добивање азил во Република Македонија преку Македонското здружение на млади правници, во периодот од 01 јануари до 31 декември 2011 година. Оттука, ова истажување не се поставува како репрезентативно за компаративниот, претходен период, пред 2011 година.

Примерокот за истражување се состои од 24 различни националности, вклучувајќи мажи и жени од различни возрасни групи. Дополнитено, преку истражување на четири индивидуални случаи од 2011 година, избрани врз основа на фактот дали со барателот на азил е извршено интервју, посебно внимание ќе обрнеме на комуникацијата во постапката за азил, како форма на интеркултурна комуникација.

**Клучни зборови:** азил, одлучување, интеркултурни фактори

## MACEDONIAN ASYLUM SYSTEM - SHORT HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND THE CURRENT DECISION-MAKING

The choices that asylum seekers are able to make (in terms of where to apply for asylum) are shaped by their country of origin, age, gender, socioeconomic status and education, as well as links with others who can help facilitate the journey and open up possibilities for the future.<sup>vi</sup> The chances of gaining protection on the other side depend greatly upon the procedures used to assess asylum cases. Even most founded and impelling claim for international protection can fail if it is not fully and fairly considered by the respective authorities.


On January 18, 1994 Republic of Macedonia signed and ratified the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees with which guarantees the right to seek asylum to foreigners and stateless persons "expelled" because of their democratic political beliefs and activities. In the period between 1992 and 1995 a number of 32.000 to 35.000 cases were registered from the Bosnian refugee crisis. The Ministry of interior affairs at that time was conducting a process of policy- making of illegal immigration in the country. In 1999 the first steps towards establishing a separate organizational unit- Section for asylum and illegal immigration were taken in order to facilitate the refugee issue. In the same period, the country faced a massive influx of about 360.000 refugees due to the war crisis in Kosovo, most of them ethnic Albanians, and Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Serbs and Gorani. Following the trends in this area in the European Union (EU), in March 1999 the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted decision with which all refugees were provided with status of temporary humanitarian assisted persons (Directive on temporary protection in EU was adopted 2001). Simultaneously, the Section of asylum and illegal immigration began to act upon individual requests submitted for recognition of refugee status. In December 2002, the Government adopted the National Action Plan on Asylum and Migration. In August 2003 the new Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection was adopted. After the entry into force of this law, the remaining persons from Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, which previously had the status of temporary humanitarian aid since 1999, according Article 74 of the new law were treated as persons with temporary protection.

However, because the maximum duration of the temporary protection of two years was expired and the situation in the country of origin was still not changed in terms of their safe and sustainable return, all remaining persons from Kosovo were

allowed to submit individual application for asylum without interrupting any of their previously acquired rights. Consequently, during 2003 the Section for asylum received 1153 applications for asylum for 2311 persons (most of them ethnic minorities from Kosovo). In April 2006, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the module for asylum suggested in the EU report of the country's progress in order to establish a compatible legal and institutional framework in the field of asylum, migration and visa issues with the one of the European Union. In 2007 through amendment and modification of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection new kind of international protection was introduced- the right to asylum for subsidiary protection. In the period between 2003 and 2008 a total number of 2.631 asylum seekers were registered, of which 2.580 (or 98.1%) were from Kosovo. In October 2008 passed another Law amending the Law on Asylum and Temporary protection- the term person under humanitarian protection was replaced with the term person under subsidiary protection, further change was made in the applicant's right to use appropriate remedy- namely the possibility of an administrative dispute against the decisions of the Section for asylum in front of competent court. In Republic of Macedonia two ministries share the responsibility regarding the procedure and care of the asylum seekers - the Ministry of interior and the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. The Section for asylum processes the asylum applications, whether the application is submitted at the border crossing, inside the territory of the country or at the airport. During the asylum procedure, including the appeal period, asylum seekers are allowed to stay in the country; additionally the state covers all costs for their care and residence. With fair and thorough procedures benefit both refugees and host countries, mainly by producing high quality asylum decisions at first instance.




*Graphic picture 1: Scheme of the asylum procedure in Republic of Macedonia*




In 2011, through Skopje based NGO-Macedonian Young Lawyers' Association<sup>vii</sup> 744 applications for asylum were submitted in front of the Section for asylum, Ministry of interior. Vast majority of the asylum seekers were from war torn countries like **Afghanistan** (427 asylum applications), **Pakistan** (170 asylum applications) and **Somalia** (53 asylum applications).

*Graphic picture 2: Asylum seekers applied in 2011 in RM divided by country of origin*



In this period the Section for asylum (SfA, MOI) concluded the asylum procedure for **466** asylum seekers, thereby bringing **404 conclusions for stopping the procedure** (on the grounds that the asylum seeker has left the country), **61 decision for rejecting the asylum application** (from which 56 on the ground of the safe third country<sup>viii</sup>, 2 on the grounds that the person constitutes a danger to the security of the country<sup>ix</sup>, 1 on the grounds that there is no fear of prosecution, 1 because the asylum seeker was not present at the scheduled interview and 1 on the ground that his/her claim was unfounded) and **1 decision for rejecting the applicant and conclusion for stopping the procedure**. The rest of the asylum applications are still in procedure.

*Graphic picture3: Initial decisions brought by the SfA upon submitted applications in 2011*



From the stated above and the graphic picture presented, we can clearly see that there is **no positive decision** brought by the respective authorities, therefore none of these applicants was granted with convention status (meaning **refugee status**) or complementary protection status (according the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection<sup>x</sup>, Article 4-a- **subsidiary protection**).

## INTERCULTURAL FACTORS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE ASYLUM DECISION MAKING

Culture is defined by UNESCO as "the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterise a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs". Spencer-Oatey (2000) defines the concept of culture- *"Culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural norms, and basic assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each member's behaviour and his/her interpretations of the "meaning" of other people's behaviour."*(Spencer-Oatey, 2000, p.4). Law and legal systems are cultural products; like religion, ideology or art, they are: *"structures of meaning in terms of which individuals and groups of individuals live out their lives,... symbols and systems of symbols through whose agency such structures are formed, communicated, imposed, shared, altered, reproduced (Geertz, 1983:182)"<sup>xi</sup>.*

Many of the legal scholars and practitioners who deal with asylum cases may firmly argue that a credible evidence of "well- founded fear" of persecution is the most important factor for refugee status determination. However, this adjudication process is exceptionally complex and despite legal, psychological, linguistic and overall cultural factors (as gender, age, ethnicity, nationality, religion, language etc.) have significant influence on it. Through examining individual level data- cases of asylum seekers whose asylum procedure was concluded and initial decision by the respective authority (Section for asylum) was brought, we'll be able to assess the degree of their influence on the asylum decision- making in Republic of Macedonia.


Analyzing the selected cases in this manner will give us the opportunity to observe whether today in the Macedonian asylum system the indicated intercultural factors, also called "unobserved factors"<sup>xii</sup> have influence on the brought initial

decisions, or maybe the Section for asylum is led by various different factors while examining each case individually.

### *1. Gender*

Although gender is not specifically enumerated as one of the grounds for establishing Convention refugee status, the definition of Convention refugee may properly be interpreted as providing protection for women who demonstrate a well-founded fear of gender-related persecution by reason of any one, or a combination of, the enumerated grounds. When woman submit asylum application, that is to seek protection from a various of human rights abuses in her home country- maybe she was persecuted by her state because of her involvement in political activities for which she might be even detained. Human rights reports<sup>xiii</sup> observe that in many countries such detention frequently includes raping by state officials. Alternatively a woman may have been persecuted by her family or community and the state authorities did not protect her, situations common in countries where there are no adequate laws or where laws are not effectively enforced. These forms of persecution tend to be particular (although not exclusive), to women and include domestic violence, rape, sexual violence, forced marriage, "honor" crimes and female genital mutilation. The persecution experienced by women often differs from the experience of the men; the asylum system tends to interpret it through a framework of the male experiences. Consequently, a gender- sensitive asylum system is not just recommended but absolutely needed.

*Graphic picture 4: Asylum seekers with initial decision by SfA (MOI) presented by gender*




As we can see from the graphic presentation of the number of asylum seekers with received initial decision by the SfA, we can notice that the majority of them 93,13% were male and 6,87% were female asylum seekers. Conclusions for stopping the procedure are brought because the asylum seeker has left the country and there are no positive decisions in 2011, so the initial decision where the asylum seeker is rejected are more appropriate for discussion (the authority has actually decided upon the merit of the claim). In this context, 90,16% of the rejected asylum seekers were male and 9,84% female.

## 2. Age

Refugees and asylum seekers belong to one of the most vulnerable groups of people in the world. Among them there are particular groups of asylum seekers who are exposed to a greater extent of risks and problems because of their age—unaccompanied minors and older people.

*Graphic picture 5: Asylum seekers with initial decision by SFA (MOI) presented by age*




According to the statistic in 2011, most of the asylum seekers upon whose application an initial decision was brought 90, 54% were adults between 18 and 59 years. Very small number of 0, 86% were older people (60 years old and above) and 8, 60% were minors, among which are calculated and the unaccompanied children-asylum seekers.

### 3. Nationality

Asylum seekers are a diverse group. In 2011, asylum seekers from 24 different nationalities asked for protection in Republic of Macedonia. The graphic picture below represents the numerical representation among the asylum seekers with initial decision brought by the Section for asylum.


Graphic picture 6: Number of asylum seekers with initial decision brought presented by nationality



As we can notice, the majority of asylum seekers with initial SfA decision were with Afghan nationality- 53,65%, following by the ones with Pakistan nationality- 30,69% and in the ranking as thirds are the asylum seekers with Somali nationality- 3,22%.



*Graphic picture 7: SfA initial decision for rejecting the asylum seeker, presented by nationality*




#### ***4. Ethnicity and Religion***


Current developments like emergence of new States, the crisis of the Welfare State, economic and cultural globalisation, lead to massive increases in all forms of international population movements among which are the asylum movements, thus impact and increase possibilities for inter-ethnic and inter-religious contacts, as well as patterns of different ethnic and religious relations between people. This permanent presence of different ethnicities and religions in Europe influences

towards creating and nurturing various forms of intercultural relations, at different levels of the society.

*Graphic picture 8: Initial SfA decisions presented by Ethnicity*



Majority of the asylum seekers whose right to asylum was rejected with initial decision were from the Punjabi ethnic group- 30, 65%. Further with 16, 13% asylum seekers from Pashtun and Tajik ethnic group.

*Graphic picture 9: Initial SfA decisions presented by Religion*

As we can see from the graphic picture above 85, 48% of the rejected asylum seekers or 89, 91% from the asylum seekers with initial decision brought by the Section for asylum (both rejected and the ones with conclusion for stopping the procedure) were from Islam religion.

## ***6. Language***


Language barriers make it very difficult for the asylum- seekers to access the overall asylum procedure. An asylum seeker who does not speak the language of the host country or language from which the host country can provide an appropriate interpreter, there are big chances that his application for asylum will not be recognized. In this context we can take in consideration the assumption that the initial decision – credibility testing – may be prolonged or disturbed because the state capacity for further analyzing is reduced due to technical incapability concerning the language (and/or translation).

From the graphic picture below we can see that the percentage of respondents who speak or understand English (as language most commonly known in the world) is very low, approximately around 2, 15% of the asylum seekers with brought initial decision from the SfA.


*Graphic picture 10: Spoken languages and knowledge of English*

## Spoken languages

■ Arabic ■ Pashtu/Farsi ■ Urdu ■ Other



## Knowledge of english



## Intercultural communication in the asylum procedure

As we previously defined, the term "culture" refers to all characteristics common to a particular group of people that are learned and not given by nature. Social reality is constructed of objective and subjective aspects of culture. As Milton states, the less obvious aspect of the culture is its subjective side which refers to the psychological features that define a group of people—their everyday thinking and behaviour<sup>xiv</sup>—rather than to the institutions they have created, which as such represent the objective aspect of culture.<sup>xv</sup> Triandis is the one that introduced this concept of "subjective culture" or a "characteristic way of perceiving its social environment" (Triandis, 1972, p. viii). Precisely this less obvious aspect of the culture is the exclusive focus of the intercultural communication. Common language, behaviour patterns, and values form the base upon which members of the culture exchange meaning with one another in conducting their daily affairs demonstrate that monocultural communication is *similarity-based*. In this type of communication, difference represents the potential for misunderstanding and friction. Thus, social difference of all kinds is discouraged<sup>xvi</sup>. On the other hand intercultural communication approach is *difference-based*<sup>xvii</sup>. Here cultures embody variety in patterns of perception and behaviour, values and languages, approaches to communication in cross-cultural situations which guard and encourage the consideration of difference. Compiling the above mention, ***intercultural communication*** can be defined as "a process that occurs when two or more cultures or co-cultures exchange messages in a manner that is influenced by their different cultural perceptions and symbol systems, both verbal and nonverbal".<sup>xviii</sup>

Gadamer argues that *prejudice and fore-meanings in the mind of the interpreter consciousness are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstanding.* (Truth and Method 263).<sup>xix</sup> It is in the act of interpretation that fore-meanings and prejudices become evident not prior to it. As we interpret and interact with the social world, our prejudices are increasingly fore-grounded<sup>xx</sup>. Gadamer argues that 'prejudices' are constitutive of who we are; they shape and enable our very being. According him there are productive prejudices- those that we become aware of because of the interpretative process and then there are prejudices which obstruct understanding (Truth and


Method 263). The conclusion from his theory is that in order to adopt an intercultural mode of interpretation, we need to acknowledge that the other is not an end but a means with which we enlarge our understanding and knowledge of ourselves and the others.

Communication in asylum cases is a form of intercultural communication. Communication even in normal settings requires constant interpretation of meanings and different cultural varieties, especially language differences play significant role. Moreover, this is exceptionally crucial in legal context where every participant has a previously defined role and as such is expected to behave on a certain manner. The intercultural communication as a form of communication is most obviously present and crucial in the *interviewing phase* of the procedure. The interview is the most important opportunity for clarifying the basis of receiving international protection. Successful interview is the best basis for making a decision that complies with the guarantee of legal protection<sup>xxi</sup>. Nienke Doornbos identifies four factors by which he makes a difference between the everyday conversation and asylum interviews<sup>xxii</sup>: *First, communication in asylum cases is primarily a form of institutional interaction, often in bureaucratic context and with question- answer structure. Second, the interviews take place in strict legal context, where the aim is fact-finding. Third, communication in asylum cases is a form of intercultural communication. People tend to judge one another on group characteristics (profession, residence, gender, religion, ethnicity, language and age). These perceived difference often result in prejudices. Usually the subjective perception of the "otherness" plays a dominant role in intercultural communication rather than the actual difference. Lastly, the interlocutors often do not speak the same language. In the majority of cases the officer (inspector) conducts the interview with the assistance of an interpreter, whose primer job is to bridge the gap between the interviewer and the interviewee. Nevertheless this presence of a third person can as well complicate the communication during the interview, since the interlocutors depend on the translator's interpretation of the questions and replies.*

From the submitted **744** asylum applications, significant number of the asylum seekers left the Reception center for asylum seekers even before the formal procedure take further development (the procedure was finalized with *Conclusion for stopping the procedure*). Nevertheless, in 2011 were **scheduled 396 interviews**, from which only **6 (six) were conducted**. In **9** of the scheduled interviews the

respective authority brought a decision with which the applicant was rejected and the rest of the interviews- **373** (i.e. cases) were closed with the conclusion that the applicant has left the Reception Center for asylum seekers in Vizbegovo and the territory of the country.

*Graphic picture 11: Scheduled and conducted Interview*



In relation to this we have to mention that from the conducted six interviews, two of the applicant had submitted their application for asylum in 2010 and the other four



in 2011. Since the period we are examining and the sampling group is consisted only from asylum seekers that applied in 2011, we'll discuss only the four cases in which an interview was conducted.

In the 2011 cases where an interview was conducted, two of the asylum seekers were from Afghanistan, one from Ukraine and one from Georgia. After the conducted interviews, the asylum seekers from Afghanistan still wait for initial SfA decision upon their claim, the applicant from Ukraine was rejected because the claim was unfounded-*"no grounds for fear of persecution because the application has not been submitted for reasons established by this law, but for the possibility of employment and better living conditions or when the asylum seeker gives no data that he would be subject to persecution or when his claims are impossible or contradictory"*; *"the application is based on a deliberate deception or an abuse of the procedure for recognition of the right to asylum"*<sup>xxxiii</sup> and on the ground of *Safe Third Country (First country of asylum)*. The applicant from Georgia voluntary renounced from the claim, so Conclusion for stopping the procedure was brought. Two of the interviews were conducted with an interpreter from Russian, one with interpreter from English and one with interpreter from Roma language.

It has to be highlighted that in practice, decisions in asylum cases often are made on the basis of the statements given during the interviewing phase in front of the SfA. Therefore the relevance of this stage in the asylum procedure is substantial.

## CONCLUSION

The conducted empirical study suggests that the influence of the intercultural factors is notable, but yet not strong enough to make any significant difference in the outcome in asylum decision making. From the graphics and tables presented above it is obvious that we cannot talk about degrees and likelihood of granting status because in 2011 (selected as time frame for this research) there is no single positive initial decision brought by the Section for asylum. What we can conclude is that factors other than those specifically related to the merit of an individual's rights claim, but well observed in the presented results above, are influential- the decision of the asylum seeker to leave the territory of Republic of Macedonia even before initial decision by the SfA was brought, as well as the country's technical incapability- difficulties concerning providing translation.

We must take in consideration that the examined experimental sampling group is small and the results in this case are only suggestive. Wider (comparative) period of

time should be taken into account in order more accurate conclusions to be extracted. Ultimately, comprehensive study concerning this question is clearly needed.

However, even with results narrow as the one we got from this research, it is safe to say that societies influenced by globalization and migratory movements need to develop strategies that aim to build a more intercultural and inclusive society. They have to ensure that the basic rights and needs of refugees and asylum seekers are properly recognized and included in the asylum and overall state system. At the same time training for intercultural dialogue and intercultural communication for all included actors (asylum officers, judges, interpreters, employees in the Reception center, as well as the lawyers providing legal aid) in the asylum procedure is an imperative.

Finally, the conducted research draws attention to the need for more wide-ranging research and analysis of this kind in the field of asylum. If the asylum officers can be more aware of the biases that influence their decisions, perhaps that will be the initial and proactive step towards reducing them.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The author acknowledges the financial support of the UNESCO Vennice office and the cooperation of the UNHCR Representation office in Skopje, as well as the Macedonian Young Lawyers' Association (MYLA). Without them, the dataset would never have been created. The author is part of the legal team of MYLA, working on the UNHCR project for Legal Assistance and Representation.

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- <sup>iv</sup> Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia Number 19, Year LXV and its amendments- Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia number 146, Year LXV
- <sup>v</sup> In order to get better focus and concise research, we'll focus on the initial stage of the decision- making process when asylum seekers present their case and it is decided upon it in front of the Section for asylum. Therefore the appeal proceedings before the judicial authorities are not subject of examination in this study.
- <sup>vi</sup> Crawley. H. (2010, January), "Refugee Council Chance or choice? Understanding why asylum seekers come to the UK" p.5
- <sup>vii</sup> In this research we'll use the unique data base of the Macedonian Young Lawyers' Association's (MYLA) project for "Legal assistance and representation of persons of concern", funded by the UNHCR Representation Office in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
- <sup>viii</sup> Article 10, Safe third country (First country of asylum), Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia Number 19, Year LXV and its amendments- Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia number 146, Year LXV
- <sup>ix</sup> Article 6, paragraph 2, Reasons for exclusion, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia Number 19, Year LXV and its amendments- Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia number 146, Year LXV
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- <sup>xi</sup> Kalin. W., "Troubled Communication: Cross- Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-hearings", IMR Volume xx, No.2, p.230
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- <sup>xiii</sup> Human rights violations/ Violence against women-Retrieved from <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic/4565c22532/4655a1462.html>
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- <sup>xviii</sup> Samovar, et. al., 2007
- <sup>xix</sup> Gadamer, H. G.(1975)., Truth and Method. London: Sheed and Ward
- <sup>xx</sup> Marotta, V. (2009) "Intercultural Hermeneutics and the Cross-cultural Subject", Journal of Intercultural Studies, 30: 3, 267 – 284
- <sup>xxi</sup> Not less important is the intercultural communication in the Reception center for asylum seekers, but since their presence there has no direct influence over the decision- making of the respective authorities concerning the claim, in this research we'll address only the influence of the intercultural communication during the interviewing phase.
- <sup>xxii</sup> Dornbos. N, (2006)" Institutional communication in the asylum procedure", Chapter 6 On being heard in asylum cases evidentiary assessment through asylum interviews, Electronic copy retrieved from: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590082>
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Article 35, paragraph 1, line 1 and 2, Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia Number 19, Year LXV and its amendments- Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia number 146, Year LXV



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Scientific article

GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORLD AS A  
RESULT OF THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE  
ГЛОБАЛНИТЕ ГЕОПОЛИТИЧКИ ИМПЛИКАЦИИ ВРЗ СВЕТОТ КАКО  
РЕЗУЛТАТ НА НЕГАТИВНОТО ВЛИЈАНИЕ ОД КЛИМАТСКИТЕ  
ПРОМЕНИ

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**ABSTRACT**

Frequent debates and analyzes the impact of climate change on security represent the initiator of profound scientific observations by the academic community. Climate change is a phenomenon that affects virtually all vital areas of the planet and humanity. The importance of incorporating climate change in geopolitical analysis comes into focus when you consider the future consequences of climate change on specific regions and strategic directions, which would change the geopolitical power in the world. These assumptions rely on geographical power is abstracted from global changes that alter the environment today. This paper provides answers to several questions and focuses on geopolitical changes today and will take place in the world due to the negative impact of climate change.

**Keywords:** Climate change, global warming, geopolitics, global threat, region

**АПСТРАКТ**

Зачестените дебати и анализи за влијанието на климатските промени врз безбедноста претставуваат иницијатор на продлабочени научни опсервации од страна на академската заедница. Климатските промени се феномен, кој ги засега практично сите витални области на планетава и човештвото. Важноста од инкорпорирање на климатските промени во геополитичките анализи доаѓа во фокусот кога ќе се земат идните последици од климатските промени врз одредени региони и стратегиски правци, кои би ја промениле геополитичката моќ во светот. Овие претпоставки се потпираат врз географската моќ што се апстрахираат од глобалните промени кои ја менуваат животната средина денес.

Трудот дава одговори на неколкуте поставените прашања и се фокусира на геополитичките промени кои денес и во иднина ќе се случуваат во светот како резултат на негативното влијание на климатските промени.

**Клучни зборови:** Климатски промени, глобално затоплување, геополитика, глобална закана, регион.

## INTRODUCTION

Climate change is considered as the „degree of change of nature“, degree which can be initiated by various parameters, including temperature, precipitation amount, frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and so on (Милески, 2011: 63). Climate change is a phenomenon that affects virtually all vital areas of the planet and humanity. The beginning of global warming was first discovered in 1827 by French mathematician Jean Baptiste Fourier, who emphasized the connection between the atmosphere and the effect of glass garden. In the fifties of the twentieth century scientist Charles Keling again conducted measurements of the level of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere. The results of measurements showed increased concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> in California, Hawaii and the South Pole (Scripps, 2012). Today the main body responsible for synthesizing the latest scientific climate change is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)<sup>1</sup>, his task is to assess the human risk caused by climate change, and based on scientific, technical and socio-economic information. The assessment is based on published scientific literature expert. (IPCC does not conduct research or monitor climate change). IPCC was established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization with support from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).

In its Third Assessment Report confirmed that there are new and stronger evidence that most of the warming observed over the past 50 years due to human activities. People in some areas may benefit from climate change. But very much will struggle to overcome. Developing countries will suffer more than others, because lack of resources makes them particularly vulnerable to accidents or emergencies of major proportions. Analyzing climate change geopolitical aspect, the paper will cover the benefits and losses we suffer certain regions in the world due to the negative impact of climate change.

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<sup>1</sup> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change



## CLIMATE CHANGE:

### A KEY VARIABLE IN THE CREATION OF GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL POWER

Geopolitics as a social science discipline concerned with studying the mutual relationship between the ethnic, demographic and economic aspects of the impact of political relations in a country. The term geopolitics was first used by Swedish scientist Rudolf Members (Rudolf Kjellen). According to his interpretation of geopolitics is a concept that explains the policy of the state expressing it through a natural geographical factors, geographic location and identification of geographic entities (Kjellén, 1916 :39).

One of the most concerned British geopoliticians is geographer Sir Halford Mekinder (Mackinder). For him, the geographical position and natural Resources are one of the major factors in determining the power and foreign policy of a country. In his lecture „The geographical Pivot of History“ before the Royal Geographical Society in the early twentieth century, was convinced that world politics will depend on the control of a specific part of the world.

According Mekinder, Euro-Asia is a potential seat of imperial domination of the region, the future world political power. With the rise of the industrial era, with the gradual disappearance of colonial borders, Mekinder believed that the possession of rich natural resources of Central Eurasia will be crucial to the global matrix of the twentieth century (Dodds and Sidawa, 2004: 292).

Mekinder opens new ways of thinking about the complex interactions between geography, politics and power, that geographical, environmental factors, climate and topography will affect the future balance of power. The purpose of Mekinder is to encourage thinking about the mutual relationship between geography and environmental geopolitics at a time when environmental change has become the topic of global concern. Today is a growing amount of evidence caused changes on the environment by man or nature, which has profound negative effects on the political, social and economic system. But these effects are largely ignored by most geopolitical analysis. An example can be cited in the report "Mapping (marking) of the Global Future" U.S. National Intelligence Council. The report is addressed slightly to change the environment in which to highlight the possibilities for regulating and developing technology in response to global efforts to reduce climate change.<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the U.S. CIA<sup>3</sup> report „Global Trends 2015“, lists the influences of demographic pressures and environmental changes as they could change the future of geopolitical stability, but the drawback is that it is highlighted how climate change

<sup>2</sup> National Intelligence Council, (2004) Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office

<sup>3</sup> Central Intelligence Agency

could complicate the global balance of forces that in future I will be not only an indicator for the occurrence of various natural disasters but also direct negative factor that directly affects the man himself and globally on planet Earth.

So far, only a few studies suggest some consequences of climate change on international security and safety systems (Purvis and Busby, 2004: 10) in most modern geopolitical studies, unfortunately, have no significant environmental dimension. On environmental changes directly affect the economic, political and demographic factors (Fraser et al., 2005). Therefore considering the geopolitical consequences of environmental change is a complex issue. In a world populated by more than 7 billion people, no more place the issue of environmental changes to be put aside. Events like the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004, floods in Pakistan in August 2010 clearly shows the human consequences of environmental as well as changes that may occur to the already overcrowded planet, producing a new group of vulnerable people „environmental refugees“.

There are more natural and human relationships with environmental changes that should be the focus of attention of geopolitics scene, but climate change is one of the most important factors that have a direct impact. What is known dramatic social and economic implications can cause climate change (Linden, 2006). So far in many scientific studies is emphasized negative impact of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere by man and implications on the global climate system (IPCC, 2001). The broadcasting of greenhouse gases and aerosols due to human activity warming an upward trend, so that in future expected changes in the atmosphere that affect global climate system. So far, several studies indicate that during the twentieth century the average global surface temperature has increased by 0,6 °C. For the same period the snow and ice cover decreased, global average sea level has increased, the temperature of ocean water is increased. These changes directly affect global rainfall.

While the international community is gradually confronting the implications of these changes or how climate will affect human systems, climate change becoming more reference providing consistently clear in which direction you move the man. Thereby it is important to consider how environmental changes associated with changing climate system can change the geopolitical foundations of international relations.

The importance of incorporating climate change in geopolitical analysis comes into focus when you consider the future consequences of climate change on specific regions and strategic directions, which would change the geopolitical power in the world. These assumptions rely on geographical power is abstracted from global changes that alter the environment today.

As a starting point in considering the negative implications of climate change on global security to analyze across several segments by analyzing the impacts of climate

change impacts on: agricultural systems, the availability of water, coastal impacts and analysis of transport pathways.

## **AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS**

The relationship between climate and vegetation system is a good indicator of potential impacts of warming and cooling, and thus the ability to grow the crops in different parts of the world. According, Fisher (Fischer, G) who did research on the negative and positive impacts of climate change on agriculture in certain regions in the world, produced a map showing the areas in which agriculture will spread decreases under the influence of global warming. Using various social, economic and climatic indicators, it identified areas of demographic growth in different countries, making correlation with having free-arable land for growing crops (Cincotta et al., 2003 ).

Northern coast of South America, northwestern Africa and parts of eastern China will face the consequences of global warming. Since increased levels of carbon dioxide, climate change will affect different in developed and developing countries. For example member of the Indonesian archipelago and parts of South Asia may have increased yields due to climate change. In the middle parts of the United States, parts of Eastern Europe and the Amazon Basin, will reduce productivity, but the consequences will be severe because these areas have a high demographic growth. Other factors that may affect the destabilization of agricultural systems on biodiversity, increased occurrence of pests, weather disasters, and the changing fish stocks.

## **AVAILABILITY OF WATER**

Significant parts of the world already face shortages of fresh water for drinking. According to UN estimates, more than half of the expected increase of eight billion people living on the planet in 2025, will be faced with a shortage of drinking water (Arnell, 1999: 9). Global warming and the greenhouse effect will change the hydrological cycle. According to the second report of IPCC (IPCC, 2011), global warming will likely increase the number of floods and droughts as well as getting to change the cycles of wet and dry periods in certain areas of the world. Although the global warming predicts an increased number of rainfalls in some parts of the world they will be reduced especially in overseas countries. Areas susceptible of low water due to climate change will be most of North, East and South Africa and parts of the Middle East in the future in large-scale face access to water resources.

Over the next few decades, increasing population and water consumption will be further pressure on global water resources, particularly in Africa, parts of South Asia and

Middle East. Changes in the hydrological system will affect the economic and social development in these countries.

Considering these disorders (environmental degradation and pollution, growth and concentration, conflicts of water resources, etc.), It becomes clear that water can be exclusive geopolitical importance. Although in the past water was not a direct source of conflict, however the implementation of certain strategies can substantially influence to avoid instabilities. In contrast, some regions may face an economic depression, mass migration and the border conflicts.

## COASTAL IMPACTS

Global rise in sea level could have a significant impact on the population lives near coastlines. Melting ice in Greenland and Antarctica (Rapley, 2006: 25) indicates that if current trends continue a possible significant rise in sea level. Areas in the world who are just 20 meters above sea level will be directly threatened.

Coastal zones are located in areas with relatively low levels of social development, potentially threatened by the rise in sea level (Africa, East and Southeast Asia). New 20 major cities in these areas in the future may be directly threatened. The increase in ocean temperature could increase cyclone activity, causing increased occurrence of storms and floods. It would have disastrous consequences for a country like Bangladesh, the Netherlands chii most of the territory is barely above sea level. According to the research that has made UNEP, the rise in sea level by 1.5 meters, direct consequences on the population in Bangladesh who will be forced to become displaced from the critical parts would be more than 17 million people.

The increased rise in sea level will affect the developed countries. According to a study by Caldwell (Caldwell et al., 2003), risk of damaging low-lying port facilities, airports, roads, rail lines, tunnels, pipelines, power lines etc. is particularly large. Many of these facilities are concentrated on the Atlantic Ocean, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, as though inland waterway. Just for illustration can mention Hurricane Katrina, which in New Orleans, Louisiana in 2005, showed the effects of coastal flooding.

Not spared even the small island states that are several meters above sea level. Small rise in sea level can cause salinization of fresh water, erosion and sinking of land, loss of coral reefs and sandy beaches, destruction of agricultural land, the occurrence of storms, high waves, etc..

Global warming in particular is concerning the Alliance of Small Island States (an organization that brings together leaders of island countries worldwide. Several island countries are already considered „Peoples scarce water“ (e.g. Barbados and West African islands). In these areas, climate change is expected to increase the frequency of droughts

and floods. Absorption of populations and even entire countries, forced to migrate because of the growing tide and ebb tide, may have profound implications for contemporary geopolitical movements.

## TRANSPORT ROUTES


Transport roads today are of particular relevance to current geopolitical configurations. Change and opening new transport routes could significantly disrupt the balance of power.

The decrease of Arctic ice in recent years, allowing the waters off the northern coast of Canada and Russia to become avenues for delivery of raw materials (especially oil) in the summer months (Picture 1)



**Picture 1:** Transport routes for delivery of raw

A quarter of world reserves of oil and natural gas lie beneath the Arctic Ocean (Bethge, 2006) (Picture 2). Norway and Russia have disagreed over the right to drill in the Barents Sea. The size of the Russian gas field Shtkman estimated at 3.2 trillion cubic meters, making it one of the largest known deposits in the world. Regional gas could be processed in the northern hemisphere and transported to Europe and North America. This would cause a significant change of the balance of power in relation to the current richest oil regions in the world in Asia and the Middle East.



**Picture 2: Oil and gas fields in the Arctic, Source: Aguirre 2006<sup>th</sup>**

## GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

What geopolitical scenarios are possible in the global arena as a consequence of global warming trend, you can enumerate the following assumptions:

1. China and India in the future will expand its global influence. The assumption that China and India will continue to move upward with economic growth relies on extrapolation of current economic and demographic changes. China could have significant agricultural problems in their fertile eastern plains as a consequence of global warming. Parts of northern India could face water shortages, direct effect may be hampered economic growth, the emergence of internal tension, which is inversely proportional to the efforts to strengthen political and economic level of these two countries.
2. U.S. will continue in development. The assumption that the U.S. can maintain its dominant position is based on the idea that they will be able to maintain its key international economic role and to continue to finance its large army. Consequences of global warming would be felt in agriculture, and increasing sea levels and increased intensity of storms can cause major flooding in East and Southeast of the country. These effects can seriously impair the means for the projection of American power.
3. Regional destabilization would have power to affect the expected trends of development. Today, most of the geopolitical analyzes focus on contemporary economic, political and ideological trends. Global warming will cause destabilization in most of North and East Africa and in Southwest Asia. Crisis and destabilization could easily spill over into other regions, so that each geopolitical scenario could be viable.

4. Scenarios of a unipolar world order and the clash of civilizations to the early 21st century, relatively few pay attention to potential new centers of power that are not negligible. With the creation of new agricultural areas, the development of new transport routes in the Arctic region, a huge benefit to have Russian agriculture and export of rich minerals and fossil fuels from their northern and eastern regions, thus confirming the position of Russia in the global geopolitical matrix.

## CONCLUSION

Physical impacts of climate change are complex and unpredictable, expressing with large average global temperatures, rising sea levels, the increasing shortage of arable land and lack of drinking water, the progress of the world is particularly sensitive to these influences. Projections of climate changes during the 21st century indicate the following: Global average temperature increased by 0,8°C from the early 20th century up to 2100 will increase by 2-7°C depending on the quantum of future emissions of greenhouse gases and the development technology. Rising sea levels will pose a threat to the population in coastal areas and infrastructure, creating a large number of „environmental refugees“. The combined effects of climate change and increasing demand for greater food production, predicted change in the productivity of major world regions for food production, and accelerated degradation of land in the fertile areas. Lack of water will increase in many places due to changes in the cycle of precipitation. In other areas, increased precipitation and frequency of monsoon will threaten agricultural production, will cause flooding and erosion which may threaten urban and rural population.

Weak economically developed countries have limited capacity to cope, and is likely to tend to adapt to challenges and environmental changes, if not to intervene-help international institutions. Extreme weather events and rising temperatures will increase instability because an immediate shortage of food and water. Long term effects include degradation of arable land, and increase internal and regional migration. Disrespect for human rights, corruption, among the factors that increase political instability in the country. (The conflict in Darfur in Sudan is an example of how climate change may affect the poor countries). The consequences of climate change will continue to redirect geopolitical purposes, the division of interests has become more apparent among a large number of advanced developing countries (China, Brazil, South Africa, India, Indonesia, etc.) and the rest of the developing countries. Such divisions and will be more pronounced, so that the collective response to tackling climate change will be difficult achievable. Greater regionalization has an array of advantages. Member states can more quickly respond to specific crises, and their interest in securing peace and stability within its own borders. In

any case, changes in geopolitics are already occurring and the impact of climate change is a constant challenge to international security.

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# IMPACT OF THE GLOBALIZATION ON THE MACEDONIAN ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY

## ВЛИЈАНИЕТО НА ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИЈАТА ВРЗ ЕКОЛОШКАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ НА МАКЕДОНИЈА

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### ABSTRACT

Problems with human security are met with protests against the current globalization. Some sudden accidents are not related to globalization (i.e. plane crash), but many trends are global movement (wars, a surge of unemployment, economic crisis). Consequently the protection of nature comes to globalization by engaging all local, national and intergovernmental institutions. World population is threatened by the continued atmosphere temperature increase, which in many nations is the foundation for a series of disasters such as drought, flood, desert storm, landslides, elevated sea levels, fires and pandemics. Impacts on health from climate change can be direct and indirect, through changes in agriculture, mutations in the food. Any emissions exceeding the threshold put the planet at risk of irreversible melting of a significant layer of ice of Greenland, thereby releasing large amounts of methane into the atmosphere (greenhouse gas). Local projections of climate change indicate that different climatic regions in Macedonia will react differently to a large scale in various aspects of life, especially health, agriculture, or water supply. The main blame for environmental degradation would not be sent to globalization itself as such, but towards the address of neo-liberalism as a special kind of globalization.

**Key words:** globalization, health and agricultural risk, vulnerability.

### АПСТРАКТ

Проблемите со човековата безбедност се исполнети со протести против актуелната глобализација. Некои ненадејни несреќи не се врзани со глобализацијата (пример паѓање на авион), но голем број движења се глобални (војни, напливот на невработеност, економската криза). Следствено и заштитата на природата доаѓа до глобализација со ангажирање на сите локални, национални и меѓувладини институции. Светската популација е загрозувана од постојаното покачување на температурата на атмосферата, што за многу нации претставува темел за низата катастрофи, како што се суша, поплава, пустинска бура, лизгање на земјиштето, покачено ниво на морето, пожар

и пандемии. Влијанијата врз здравјето предизвикани од климатските промени може да се директни и индиректни, преку промени во земјоделството, мутации во храната и слично. Секое надминување на границата на емисиите ја води Планетата во ризик на неповратно топење на поголем слој од мразот на Гренланд, а со тоа ослободување на големо количество на метан во атмосферата (стакленички гас). Локалните проекции за климатските промени упатуваат дека различните климатски региони во Македонија ќе реагираат различно во голем размер и во различни области, особено здравство, земјоделство, водоснабдување. Главната вина за деградацијата на животната средина, би се упатила на адресата на новолиберализмот, како посебен вид на глобализацијата, но не и на самата глобализација како таква.

**Клучни зборови:** глобализација, здравје и земјоделски ризик, ранливост.

## INTRODUCTION

People often draw parallels between the high vulnerability of the nation and intense globalization. Problems with human security are met with protests against the current globalization. Some sudden accidents are not related to globalization (plane crash), but many high-risk movements such as global war, a surge of immigrants unstable jobs, economic crisis, depleted natural resources, large floods, HIV-AIDS, are daily product of globalization. Indeed, some technologies associated with globalization (satellite monitoring on the weather and telecommunications), do help predict natural disasters, but on the other hand, global technologies, such as cargo marine transportation services for world trade, air transport and oversees nuclear power plants contribute to pollution global goods, i.e. air, water and soil. Despite the benefits, today computers contribute to greater use of paper for writing, which is negative for the world's forests. Especially a big impact the solid waste piled up in all corners of the world, which raised the whole trans-global organizations in efforts to recycle. Greenhouse effect, millions of years was a blessing for the Earth, but, it seems that in the last century turned into a serious threat to humans, caused by human activities. With industrialization and population growth, the consequences on greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels, cut logging and clearing of land for use in agriculture, are constantly increasing. To improve environmental conditions at the time of global development, intergovernmental mechanisms would have to overcome all measures to remove the degradation of nature and to introduce prevention. So, instead of applying the polluter-pays system, the principle of the Kyoto Protocol and Climate Convention on greenhouse gases, it is necessary to impose similar limits on emissions of sulphur dioxide, cutting of forests, use of pesticides etc.. Consequently protecting the nature comes to globalization by engaging all local, national and intergovernmental institutions. Even institutions convey to globalization by establishing intergovernmental environmental

organizations aware of the existence of climate change, such as Greenpeace, UNDP, GEO, GEF and WWF. However, positive globalization effects, the contemporary trans-planetary communications and organizations, in turn, allow a rapid distribution of humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in all parts of the world. Most anticipated consequences of global economic development are:

- More floods, more hurricanes: low landed countries like India, Maldives and islands will suffer the consequences for the sinking of the territory, or landslides.
- Less ice and snow: the trend of ice-melting is faster. In regions dependent on water from the mountains (6% of the population), this phenomenon causes drought.
- More extreme weather events, warmer waves, torrential rains, hurricanes: In the Mediterranean region through central Europe to Russia and Ukraine over the past century registered are lower amounts of annual precipitation down to 20%.
- Increased sea levels, due to melted ice, thermal expansion of sea, which with elevated 2 cm up to 1 meter height. Predicts that high sea levels will rise within the 9-88cm by 2100, but with significant regional variations.

## THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON POPULATION

Because the phrase climate change has become a regular description of natural disasters, the numbers of debates for our survival are organized around. But as it happen next debate, no doubt that changes are happening daily though global area down to everyone's house, and forest and desert. Pollution of natural media knows no administrative borders but affects all countries and continents, although arising in certain local sources. Impacts on health from climate change can be divided into direct and indirect. The direct impacts include diseases associated with temperature, extreme weather events, the effects of air pollution and spread of spores and moulds. The indirect effects include diseases associated with contamination of food, direct pollution, lack of drinking water and vector transmitted diseases. Warmer temperatures combined with increased ambient UV radiation and urban air pollution can highlight the photochemical smog and heat waves that will cause the hot flashes, exhaustion, convulsions and worsening of chronic lung problems, heart and kidney diseases. Global warming affects the occurrence of allergies and their intensification due to extended periods of flowering and pollen season in some plants, as well as the geographical spread of some plant species into new areas. Warming will have an impact on food safety, in terms of reduced yield, the risk of bacteria, etc. We are going to face poverty, food shortages and female workload will become more difficult.

## THE EFFECT OF INCREASED TEMPERATURE

According to the official report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projections show a possible rise in global temperature by 1.4 to 5.8° C in 2100. World population is threatened by the continued increase of atmospheric temperature, which in many nations is the foundation for a series of disasters such as drought, flood, desert storm, landslides, elevated sea levels, fires and pandemics. If G-77 countries agreed to limit the temperature increase worldwide for new 2°C, it means for Africa the 3-3.5°C, it means survival for 55 million. People will find at risk, while drying up of water will affect the new 350-600 million people. The whole southern world will be like holocaust, similar to classic stuffed people in oven, so heated people will die without water and food. The impact of increased temperature will be especially apparent in urban areas than rural. This difference in America is 12, 5 °C for a city of 1.000.000 inhabitants, and Europa is smaller, with a maximum difference of 8, 7 °C for Amsterdam. Arctic will warm up to 15°C will melt snow and ice, but will absorb more solar radiation. This will reduce the level of rainfall by 20% in western and southern Africa, Central America, the Mediterranean and coastal Australia. In contrast to India and similar areas will be more intense precipitation in 20%.

Considering the causes of climate change, we pull back to an issue of major emission of greenhouse gases from industry, traffic and urban planning. As emissions in one country spread across atmosphere towards the entire world, so the global anthropogenic emission of non-CO<sub>2</sub> substances (methane, nitrogen dioxide, CO, NMVOC) is equivalent to 9.000 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq for 1990 with forecast to grow by 44% by 2020. It is certainly usual scenario with all the planned reductions and opportunities for mitigation, according to the legal framework. Methane emissions will increase from 5,816 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq to 7,904 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq, and nitrogen oxides by 2,871 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq to 4,057 MtCO<sub>2</sub>eq. These gases have a cumulative assimilation. Although the number of landfills and the index of production and consumption worldwide in many countries are in increasing degree, the use of methane already is reduced, and somewhere there is a sectorial reduction, such as policies for reduced use of fertilizers and more efficient farming techniques. The largest globalization effect is noticed in changing the industry in countries in transition, such a closing the giant industry and mines during the transition, and subsequent gasification. In all countries except Eastern Europe there is an increase of substances that reduce the ozone layer. On the global level the aggregated ozone depletion gases are harmful to the planet, so the governments are posting limits through the Montreal Protocol and the Kyoto Treaty. Contracts as part of the global control still have no impact, because they are not signed by China, Brazil, India and the United States, the countries that show absolute increasing of emissions, respectively, up 197%, 104%, 86%, 64% and 58%. Global world glass-house-gases emission is dictated by rapid industrialization, international trade, population growth, unequal policies for mining

pits and waste reusing. The Population Survival Secure Area on planetary level, looking on side of protective ozone layer, according to scientists, moves to emission of gases and particles from 350ppm. Planetary industrialization has reached 390ppm, so the scientific society appeals on efforts to reduce emissions to the limit, which allows long survival of wildlife and slowing the warming of the atmosphere. Any exceeding of the threshold leads the planet at risk of irreversible melting of a significant layer of ice of Greenland, thereby releasing large amounts of methane into the atmosphere (greenhouse gas).

## **GLOBAL COST OF POLLUTION**

Climate change will cost the world around fifth of GDP in 2030. Individually each country goes to cover own risks with 19% of GDP. Developing countries are most vulnerable, due to inability to finance the risk of climate change. Prevention activities account for 40-68% of economic losses worldwide. Global economists calculated that it takes 2,5% of Gross World Product to achieve lifestyle changes, with such a radical step that would create jobs, develop new technologies and similar changes, as did the Cold War in 1950/60<sup>th</sup>. If countries need large portion of GDP to fund the pollution prevention, while nobody specifies where the finances flow from, then the poor countries remain to one solution with trading with carbon credits, instead of spending household budget. Europe is aware that countries will earn much money thanks to principle of trading CO<sub>2</sub> credits. Developing countries on the other hand, never had restricting emissions; so many governments do not know how much they loose through the trade. It is a new beginning of a new colonialism.

## **VULNERABILITY OF MACEDONIA FROM CLIMATE CHANGE**

Local projections of climate change indicate that different climatic regions in Macedonia will react differently to a large scale. Region with continental climate in the south-eastern part of Macedonia, near Ohrid and Prespa Lake, seems to have the weakest response to climate change in large scale in the context of changes in the absolute temperature and precipitation. The northwest Macedonia prevailing influenced by mountain-alpine climate, would have the strongest reaction on climate change. The expected change in temperature in Macedonia is much larger than the expected global change. The average annual temperature in Macedonia until 2100 may be increased to 3,8°C, and the average summer temperature can be increased by 6°C. The range of daytime temperatures is expected to decline in winter and to increases in summer. Hardly is expected change in precipitation during the winter time, generally, but the second national report on climate change indicates a reduction to 19%. The most worrying fact is the amount of precipitation in summer, which is predicted to decrease down to 23% by 2100, but in some places up to 84%. This would mean that in terms of increased temperature, the

consumption of drinking water is expected to increase to 30%. Factors of irrigation, increased evaporation and drought, are added to consumption (40% of the total water consumed in the country). Climate change will also affect the incidence of extreme hydrological events, floods and droughts, which have already been registered in increased frequency compared to the past. On the other hand in some areas with different climatic conditions, local intense rains occurred will affect the appearance of erosive processes that would adversely reflect on agriculture, forestry and water resources. Increased water temperature will adversely affect the water balance and the wildlife that lives in water, primarily because of reduced amount of oxygen in the water. Reduced water flows, will increase the concentrations of pollutants in water, discharged by industry and agriculture.

The biggest impact will have the agriculture.

All parameters necessary for proper agricultural production are changing in the direction of creating unfavourable conditions for agricultural production. Climate change will have a negative impact on all major agricultural regions, although the most threatened region is the Povardarie, especially in the Crna Reka River and Bregalnica River. Highly sensitive areas are the south-eastern region (Strumica), the southern part of the Vardar Valley (Gevgelija), valley of Skopje and Kumanovo (Ovce Pole), too. Less threatened agricultural areas are: Pelagonija Valley, and lakes region. Crops from climate change will suffer loss of yield of 21% to 84% by 2100. Increased temperature, decreased moisture in the soil and lack of water for irrigation will contribute to reducing the organic component of soil and increasing erosion and salination, which directly affect her fertility. Especially the impact will be higher over mountain areas and Povardarie, with consequences in the change of organic matter from biomass, temperature regime and soil moisture. Most sensitive regions of soil salinization are in parts of Ovce Pole and Pelagonia Valley. Increasing temperatures will increase heat stress and reduce productivity in domestic animals. Due to rising temperatures and humidity the natural habitats of insects will increase, so that a large number of typical tropical diseases could be transferred among our domestic cattle. Climate change will cause deterioration of the quality of food products, due to the occurrence of pathogens and biotoxins in it. According to research in several regions in Macedonia, it is evident that the health condition of forests is poor. In particular there is mass dry oak, pine, fir migration to the north area and higher mountain elevations, which will completely change fitocen situation in Macedonia. This will lead to physiological stress of trees that result in increasing the amount of dry timber, which is easily combustible per unit area and thus will increase the number of forest fires. The entire range of forest disturbances will increase the population of certain forest pests. Macedonia is characterized by a high degree of biological diversity. As a result of climate change we can expect that



various types of biological communities (ecosystems) cannot migrate either in horizontal or in vertical direction, so most of them will disappear. There are several species that are highly dependent on temperature (change of vegetation, the provision of food, etc.). The increase in temperature will cause problems with nutrition for certain domestic species, and therefore this will change their life cycle.

### Health effects

Climate change impacts completely the public health. This includes direct influences on rising diseases and conditions with lethal consequences, which are associated with changes in temperature. The health impacts caused by extreme weather conditions (floods, droughts and storms) and aero pollution are most frequent. Other health risks are result of indirect influences from distribution of diseases related to drinking water and food, or transmitting vectors (zoonosis). The public health is endangered by shortage of food and water in general. According to the predicted scenarios for trends of mortality as a result of increased temperature in the period 2035 year, the projected growth from 10% of monthly value is in the months April, May and June, compared with the period 1995-2004. Recent studies on food transmitted diseases show that salmonella sp. is frequent incubator for 5-10% for every 1°C raised of the average weekly air temperature below 5°C. According the scenarios of climate change there is projected increase in seasonal index of salmonella sp. diseases in 2030, during the winter months, as result from the rise of temperatures in average, despite the summer months, which were not so extreme.

### Specific losses

Damage caused by floods directly affects the already fragile agriculture and local rural economies. In June 2004, climate change manifested through the occurrence of high, intensive rainfall, caused flooding and storm water in 26 municipalities in the country located in the upper flow of the river Vardar and central southern and south-eastern part of the country. Economic losses experienced during the flash floods in 2004 show that 96.46% of the total damage is attributable to the Agricultural Production. Drought with a similar frequency and intensity do accelerate the social and economic conditions in rural areas of southern and eastern part of Macedonia. For example, a prolonged drought in 1993 damaged large part of the real yield on agriculture in many cases which led to total devastation of cultures. The damage caused by the drought in the country was 7.6% of total national income. Flooding landslides, land dropping, and the new damages since 2010, this is yet to be assessed. The limit of the target value for the protection of human health for ozone layer is exceeded in Kumanovo, Veles, Kicevo, Tetovo, Bitola and mostly in s.Lazaropole. The maximum daily 8-hours values of concentrations of carbon monoxide

exceeding the limit value for protection of human health, especially in Skopje and Bitola, which should be reached in 2012. The number of allowed overcoming the daily limit value for protection of human health for suspended particles of size to 10 micrometres is exceeded the entire territory. Communal noise is above limits in most of regions. Measurements of the presence of heavy metals in soil do exceed the recommended maximum permissible concentrations of mercury, cyanide, sulphide and all other heavy metals, especially in Buchim, Kavadarci and Zhelezara-Skopje. The measured substances in water, the ammonia, nitrite, nitrate, nutrients, iron, cadmium, zinc, lead, copper, nickel, chromium and manganese etc., are in average high concentrates, which in periods are under the limited level, and in some above. According to saprobiological analysis, the Macedonian waters are of moderately polluted quality. All those measures show the high physical risk for the public health and survival of the animals in the country, that in future must be taken seriously if we are planning the sustainability in all aspects of living in the country.

## CONCLUSION

Climate change largely brought heavy tasks for developing countries, especially those struggling with poverty. The situation creates a cruel environment for development. There is no money that would pull back the former healthy picture or would repair the damage, but additional donations would help to solve part of the problems. Expected climate change in XXI century will negatively impact on almost all sectors in our country. Because of the importance of the consequences of future climate change, we need to make special projects for modernization and establishment of a complete monitoring system for changes in Macedonia, and systems at the local level. The growing poverty does not recognize the principles of sustainable development, so does the manifest of excessive use of illegal logging, excessive use of other bio-resources, especially excessive hunting and fishing, unsustainable agricultural development etc. Uncontrolled urbanization, deagriculture (in the traditional sense) and industrialization are the main processes that disrupt the ecological balance (considering arising presence of pollution through cumulative effects). Generally seeing, the country has difficulties coping with extreme hydrological events (droughts and floods) due to a lack of financial, institutional capacities, and legal instruments. Even the average climate change, can also cause large problems in resources management. In order to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change in sectors, we must address adaptation priorities within an intersectional national plan. For developing countries such as Macedonia, which have no significant contribution to global emissions of greenhouse gases, the adaptation to change is the need and priority. The main blame for environmental degradation would be sent to the address of neoliberalism as a special kind of globalization, not to globalization itself as such. Thus, our obligations for the Planet are

joint venture, because the environment is part of globalization, we share bit of space and people and animals are together sinking or swimming in the problems around.

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**БЕЗБЕДНОСТИОТ РЕГИОНАЛИЗАМ НИЗ ПРИЗМАТА НА  
КОНЦЕПТИТЕ ЗА БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН КОМПЛЕКС И  
БЕЗБЕДНОСНА ЗАЕДНИЦА  
SECURITY REGIONALISM AND THE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY  
COMPLEX AND SECURITY COMMUNITY**

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**АПСТРАКТ:**

Овој труд го анализира значењето на регионалното/супсистемско ниво во објаснувањето на современите безбедносни динамики и релации. За таа цел, трудот посветува особено внимание на концептот за безбедносен комплекс и на концептот за безбедносна заедница. Тоа од причина што станува збор за концепти кои нудат соодветна основа за теориско објаснување на конекциите и поврзаноста на државите кои ја креираат нивната безбедност на регионално ниво.

**Клучни зборови:** регион, безбедносен регионализам, безбедносен комплекс, безбедносна заедница

**ABSTRACT:**

This article analyzes the contemporary security dynamics and relations of the states through the main point and influence of regional/subsystem level. For that purpose, the article is specially focused on the concepts of security complex and security community. The fact that the concepts offer an acceptable possibility for theoretical analysis and explanation of the connections and relations that creates security on the regional level between the countries is the main reason for that.

**Keywords:** region, security regionalism, security complex, security community

**ВОВЕД**

Проблематиката поврзана со безбедноста вообичаено се анализира од два аспекта т.е. нивоа: национално ниво (национална безбедност) и меѓународно ниво (меѓународна безбедност). Сепак, една од критиките на ваквото симплифицирано

гледање на нивоата за безбедност е дека на ниво на националната безбедност, државата е таа која е во центарот на интересот, додека системското и субсистемското ниво, како и влијанието на нивните динамики во овој случај се маргинализирани.

Истата критика се однесува и за меѓународното/глобално ниво, затоа што не постојат толку силни и јасни врски и поврзаност на глобално ниво кои би ги објасниле безбедносните релации на останатите нивоа, со исклучок на динамиката која ги објаснува релациите на суперсилите. Наспроти овие две: националното и меѓународното ниво, во рамките на средното субсистемско т.е. регионално ниво постојат многу повеќе безбедносни динамики каде што се прекршуваат националните и глобалните релации. На регионално ниво, безбедноста на одделни безбедносни актери/држави и влијанието на глобалните актери т.е. на суперсилите, може едноставно и соодветно да се перципираат преку безбедносниот регионализам. Всушност, средното, субсистемско ниво, исто така, има голема важност во анализирањето на современите безбедносни динамики и релации. Во тој контекст, овој труд ја анализира значајноста на регионалните безбедносни динамики, низ призмата на концептите за безбедносен комплекс и безбедносна заедница.

## РЕГИОН, РЕГИОНАЛИЗАЦИЈА, РЕГИОНАЛИЗАМ

Од етимолошки аспект, поимот регион потекнува од латинскиот збор “region” што значи одредена област, подрачје или територија. Во литературата начелно се присутни два различни концепти за регионот. Според едниот поширок аспект, регионот претставува неинституционално одреден простор кој го карактеризираат одредени својства кои можат да бидат од различна природа: културна, историска, географска, демографска, јазична и сл. Во тој контекст, регионот се перципира како територијална единица која има специфични историски, социо-економски и културни карактеристики што формираат специфичен регионален идентитет и кои водат кон зачувување на тие специфичности како посебен интерес (Popović, 2002).

Оттука, ваквото широко поимно определување на регионот може да се сфати како едноставна поделба на државата на територијални единици според одредени карактеристики, при што таквата поделба не мора да биде поврзана со системот на владеење, ниту пак со политичкото уредување на државата. Во оваа широка концепција, спаѓа и поимот регион во меѓународен контекст. Имено, во оваа смисла регионот означува простор со својствени карактеристики според кои се разликува од опкружувањето, со тоа што тој простор го сочинуваат повеќе соседни држави поврзани со одредени заеднички цели и интереси.

Според другиот, потесен концепт, регионот, исто така, претставува одреден простор со специфични карактеристики, со таа разлика што во овој случај регионот

задолжително е елемент на постоечката политичко-територијална поделба. Тоа значи дека регионот е експлицитен, политички елемент со прецизно утврден статус во нормативната регулатива. Затоа, во овој случај покрај прецизно утврдените граници на регионот, истиот поседува и одредени надлежности. Во таа насока, е и определувањето на регионот во рамките на Декларацијата за регионализам во Европа. Според декларацијата, регионот претставува субјект на јавното право, воспоставен на ниво под централната власт и истиот поседува политичка самоуправа. Декларацијата истакнува дека регионот треба да биде воспоставен и утврден со устав или со закон заради гарантирање на неговата автономија, власт и организациска структура. Ваквите регионални овластувања, варираат од држави до држави и поради тоа, Собранието на европските региони, разликува пет модалитети: 1) конституционални региони, кои имаат државни овластувања (Германија, Австрија, Белгија, Швајцарија); 2) региони со широка политичка и административна автономија (Шпанија, Италија); 3) региони во децентрализиран држави (Франција, Холандија, Полска, Чешка); 4) региони чијашто власт се формира посредно преку окрузи (Ирска); и 5) мали држави чијашто големина кореспондира со големината на регионот (Assembly of European Regions. 1996).

Процесот во кој националните власти или пак меѓународните субјекти креираат политика и истата ја пренесуваат кон регионите како адекватно ниво за нејзина реализација, е познат како регионализација. Ваквиот процес којшто е на полно централистички и технократски, особено е карактеристичен за државите членки на Европската унија (ЕУ).

Концептуално, спротивен процес на регионализацијата е регионализмот. Регионализмот се поврзува со идеологијата и политичкото движење кои ги одразуваат барањата на граѓаните на одредена територија (регион) за поголема контрола врз надлежностите во регионот и за воспоставување регионална власт. Според тоа, регионализмот како феномен е насочен „од долу кон горе“, тој е децентралистички и политички. Оваа појава е особено значајна во текот на последните 20 години. Врз успешноста на регионализмот влијаат мноштво фактори, како: политичката и економската култура, автономијата, социјалните приоритети, национално-историските корени и традиција, сепаратизмот и сл.

## БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН РЕГИОНАЛИЗАМ

Во теоријата постојат мноштво академски дефиниции за регионот во безбедносен контекст. Најчесто дефинициите варираат во зависност од нивните настојувања да го опишат, односно да го дефинираат регионот како концепт. Во тој контекст, регионот често се анализира низ призмата на група држави помеѓу кои постои

очигледна меѓузависност во однос на голем број различни прашања (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

Значајно за регионот како концепт за разлика од периодот на биполаризмот, е тоа што во современи услови тој стана исклучително влијателен во однос на безбедносната проблематика. Потврда за тоа претставува воведувањето и актуелизирањето на концептите за: *регионално соседство (regionhood)* и *регионалност*. Според Лагенхов, со поимот регионално соседство се прави обид да се разграничи еден регион од друг, додека со поимот регионалност се настојува да се опфатат историските, географските, економските, културните и социјалните состојби кои ги чинат овие разлики (Langenhove, 2003). На тој начин, всушност се прави дефинирање на регионот според неговото единство, според идентитетот и според опфатот на границите.

Во студијата за регионално соседство на Лангехов, регионот се дефинира како: „територијално базиран субсистем на меѓународниот систем“ (Langenhove, 2003: 26). Оваа дефиниција имплицира дека постојат повеќе видови регионални субсистеми со различна кохерентност. Имено, регионите може да се лоцираат на сите територијални нивоа. Постојат региони во рамките на државите, прекугранични региони на субнационално ниво, како и региони над државата т.е. на наднационално ниво. При дефинирањето на регионот и на неговите релации со безбедносните прашања, значајно е да се констатира дека иако голем број регионални договори и агенции при нивното етаблирање се повикуваат на одредбите од ООН, сепак Повелбата на ООН не содржи конкретна дефиниција за регион. Од друга страна, таа го опишува регионалниот договор (*regional arrangements*) како организација која врз постојана основа групира во одредена географска област неколку држави кои заради нивната блискост, заеднички интереси или културни, јазични, историски или духовни афинитети, стануваат заеднички одговорни за мирољубиво решавање на секој спор кој може да настане, како и за заштита на нивните интереси и за развојот на нивните економски и културни релации (Charter of the United Nations, 1945).

Според посочената дефиниција термините: договор (*arrangement*) и агенција (*agency*), исто така ја детерминираат перцепцијата за регионот со тоа што договорот е дело на суверени држави воспоставен со потпишување документ, додека агенцијата функционира како меѓувладина организација со правен ентитет и со функционален секретаријат и седиште на агенцијата. Во практиката се смета дека не постојат суштински разлики помеѓу нив, иако и едните и другите се повикуваат на Глава VIII од Повелбата и се насочени кон задоволување на критериумите за решавање на локалните спорови, кон целите за нивно мирољубиво разрешување и кон субординација во однос на Советот за безбедност на ООН. Во тој контекст, регионалниот договор претставува унија на држави или меѓународна организација базирана на колективен договор или



устав и во согласност со целите и принципите на ООН, чија примарна задача е одржување на мирот и безбедноста под контрола и во рамките на ООН (Simma, 1995). Оттука произлегува дека бројот на членките на ваквиот регионален договор или агенција мора да е помал од бројот на членките на ООН и да биде поврзан според територијален принцип за да може ефикасно да ги применува процедурите за разрешување спорови.

Во практиката евидентно е дека државите членуваат во повеќе од една регионална или субрегионална групација т.е. организација. Во однос на самите организации, Советот за безбедност на ООН идентификува три категории: меѓународни; регионални и субрегионални организации. Во контекст на меѓународните организации на кои се применува Глава VIII од Повелбата (според критериумот за членство) може да се издвојат шест видови организации: 1) *глобални организации* – кои имаат универзално членство од сите региони во светот; 2) *транснационални организации* – кои имаат членство од сите региони во светот, но самото членство е базирано на селективни критериуми кои водат кон универзалност – политика, религија, култура; 3) *прекурегионални организации* – со оперативен фокус на еден регион, а членството се проширува преку регионот; 4) *регионални организации* – со оперативен фокус врз регионот и членството се поклопува или е блиско до регионот, без членство на надворешни држави; 5) *субрегионални организации* – кои имаат оперативен фокус врз субрегионот во рамките на регионот, додека членството се совпаѓа со субрегионот, без надворешни членки; и 6) *прекусубрегионални организации* – имаат оперативен фокус врз субрегионот, додека членството произлегува од него или од регионот, но не и надвор од него.

Во однос на регионалните организации, треба да се истакне и фактот дека често може да се констатира постоење на нејаснотии во однос на нивниот фокус и апликацијата на нивниот мандат. Имено, додека едни имаат сосема јасно дефиниран мандат, кај други тоа не е случај што потоа се провлекува како прашање дали и како организацијата треба да делува. Дел од нив имаат интересен фокус, додека дел имаат екстерен фокус, односно ориентирани се на субрегионално, регионално или глобално ниво. Големи разлики можат да настанат во ситуации кога фокусот на организацијата излегува и го надминува нејзиното членство.

Од теориски аспект, вообичаено се идентификуваат три форми т.е. генерации на регионални интеграции.

*Првата генерација* регионализам се однесува на линеарен процес на економски интеграции кој вклучува интеграција на националните економии во рамките на поголеми регионални економии. Овој процес е започнат со формирањето слободни економски зони за преку царинска унија и формирање заеднички пазар да се премине

во одредено ниво на економска унија. Таков е примерот со Западна Европа по Втората светска војна, која откако ја формираше Европската економска заедница (Рим 1957 год.), премина кон воведување на царинска унија во 1968 година, потоа кон единствен економски пазар (80-тите год. на минатиот век), а од 2002 година воведо и заедничка валута.

*Втората генерација* регионализам или т.н. нов регионализам, ги опфаќа политичките димензии на интеграциите. Новиот регионализам тргнува од претпоставката дека економијата и трговијата не можат да бидат изолирани од другите сфери на општеството и дека не-економските аспекти се исто така значајна сфера на интеграциите. И во овој случај, ЕУ е соодветен пример затоа што со воведувањето на *Постојаната политичка соработка* се трасираше патот кон процесот на создавање Заедничка надворешна и безбедносна политика на ЕУ (ЗНБП) со Договорот од Мастрихт од 1991 година, а потоа со институционализација на политичката соработка, се отвори и можноста за ефикасна мултилатерална активност на Унијата.

*Третата генерација* регионални интеграции се однесува на предвидувањата кои врз досегашните интегративни искуства, укажуваат на можните правци за понатамошна интеграција. Според предвидувањата, овој вид интеграции треба да претставува чекор напред од претходните и тоа во три области: 1) дооформување и консолидирање на институционалните форми кои се насочени кон надворешните аспекти на регионалната политика; 2) регионите треба да станат многу поактивни и проактивни во однос на глобалната политика и проблематика; и 3) регионите треба да станат многу поактивно и поефикасно ангажирани во рамките на ООН.

## БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН КОМПЛЕКС

Воспоставувањето и развојот на концептот за безбедносен комплекс, произлегува од потребата за промовирање на ново, средно (субсистемско) ниво за анализирање на безбедноста. Притоа, како базични причини поради кои субсистемското ниво придонесува за поефикасна анализа на безбедносните прашања, можат да се посочат следните: а) фактот дека и на ова ниво постои рефлектирање на последиците од анархичната структура на меѓународните односи; б) наспроти националното или меѓународното ниво, можноста за поедноставно објаснување на изворите на заканите и на начините за нивно менаџирање во рамките на средното субсистемско ниво; в) можноста за перципирање и предвидување на идните безбедносни промени на ова ниво (Kostecki, 1996).

Посочените причини ја отворија можноста, концептот за безбедносен комплекс да се развива и употребува како аналитичка рамка, пред сè во работата и истражувањата на Копенхагенската школа. Во таа насока, во бројните реализирани

анализи на претставниците на оваа школа, констатирани се два дополнителни аналитички предности на концептот:

1. според моделот за безбедносен комплекс аргументирано може да се отфрлат тврдењата дека улогата на големите сили во развојот на безбедноста на локално ниво е пресудна, односно може да се тврди дека за развојот на безбедноста, исто така, треба сериозно да се земат предвид и улогата и влијанието на локалните фактори;

2. со воведувањето на идејата за основна структура на безбедносниот комплекс, се креира основа за идентификување и процена на промените на регионалните параметри на безбедноста (Graham and Felicio, 2006).

Во рамките на Копенхагенската школа, најупотребуваната дефиниција за безбедносниот комплекс е креирана од страна на Бери Бузан (Barry Buzan), според кој безбедносниот комплекс претставува „група држави чии примарни (најголеми) безбедносни перцепции и грижи се меѓусебно доволно поврзани (меѓузависни), така што нивната национална безбедност (безбедносни проблеми) не можат реалистично (разумно) да бидат анализирани една без друга (Buzan, 2003: 41).

Во контекст на оваа дефиниција, концептот за безбедносен комплекс начелно се поставува во рамките на регионалните безбедносни студии. Притоа, при неговото објаснување се тргнува од фактот дека вообичаено, но не и задолжително, него го сочинуваат соседски држави, или како што посочува Бузан, држави кои сочинуваат одреден географски ентитет. Сепак, треба да се истакне дека „физичкото соседство“ не го дефинира безбедносниот комплекс. Напротив, тоа се заедничката ранливост и заедничките грижи на државите во однос на ризиците и заканите по нивната безбедност. При теориската анализа и објаснување на безбедносниот комплекс, значајно е да се дефинира и терминот регион како дел од овој концепт. Во таа насока, регионите од безбедносен аспект не претставуваат единствено групи на држави, туку пред сè развиена мрежа од поврзувања, релации, конекции и чувства за заеднички регионален идентитет (Wæver, 2003). Како резултат на тоа, често се истакнува дека регионот го детерминираат повеќе компоненти: 1) *актери* – регионите се формација која ја сочинуваат повеќе актери; 2) *релации помеѓу актерите* – основна карактеристика е нивната меѓузависност; 3) *простор* – географскиот опфат и кохерентност на формацијата; и 4) *време* – траењето/одржливоста на овие облици.

Тргнувајќи од теоријата за регионални безбедносни комплекси, Бузан и Вивер посочуваат дека основната структура на регионалниот безбедносен комплекс се базира на четири клучни елементи:

1) *границите* на регионалниот безбедносен комплекс кои го одвојуваат од неговите соседи;

- 2) *анархичната структура*, односно регионалниот безбедносен комплекс мора да е составен од две или повеќе автономни единици;
- 3) *поларноста*, односно распоредување на моќта помеѓу единиците;
- 4) *социјалните релации/конструкции* кои го опфаќаат односот пријател/сојузник/непријател помеѓу единиците (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 51).

## ВИДОВИ БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ КОМПЛЕКСИ

Според општоприфатената теориска класификација за регионалните безбедносни комплекси, тие генерално се делат на: *стандардни* и *централизирани* (Георгиева, 2010). Стандардните регионални безбедносни комплекси ги сочинуваат две или повеќе сили и начелно се ориентирани кон воено-политички безбедносни проблеми и прашања. Распределбата на моќ во овој случај може да биде униполарна или мултиполарна, односно стандардниот безбедносен комплекс може да содржи една или повеќе регионални сили. Сепак, наспроти регионалните сили во негови рамки не е присутна глобална сила (на пр. во Африка, Средниот Исток, Јужна Америка, Јужна Азија). Тука е возможно да се направи разлика во однос на внатрешните динамики, како и во однос на влијанието на надворешните фактори т.е. на големите сили. Во однос на заемните релации, тие можат да бидат конфликтна формација, безбедносен режим или безбедносна заедница. За овој вид комплекси, клучно безбедносно прашање претставуваат внатрешните релации помеѓу регионалните сили.

Централизираните регионални безбедносни комплекси можат да се јават во неколку различни форми. Првите две форми, претставуваат специфични случаи во кои регионалните безбедносни комплекси се униполарни, но клучниот актер е голема сила или супер сила (на пр. САД во Северна Америка). Третата форма на овој вид безбедносен комплекс се разликува од претходните две. Имено, таа претставува регион интегриран преку институции, а не преку една супер сила. Пример за тоа е ЕУ, која може да се третира и како голема сила, но и како форма на регионална безбедносна заедница. Во таа насока, регионалните безбедносни комплекси мора да поседуваат динамика т.е. процес на секуритизација и во тој случај, актерите во регионот меѓусебно се секуритизираат (Георгиева, 2009). Наспроти тоа, во моделот на безбедносна заедница, актерите спроведуваат десекуритизација т.е. ја елиминираат перцепцијата за меѓусебни непријатели.

## БЕЗБЕДНОСНА ЗАЕДНИЦА

Во најширок теориски аспект, концептот за безбедносна заедница подразбира дека и на меѓународно ниво, актерите (државите) можат да споделуваат различни вредности, норми и симболи преку кои се формира нивниот специфичен социјален

идентитет. Во прилог на тоа е и фактот дека во меѓународните односи, државите се поврзани преку различни интеракции во безброј сфери во кои имаат заеднички интерес, прават реципроцитет и градат доверба или пак се справуваат со стравот и недовербата. Концептот за безбедносна заедница, уште во 1957 година, прв го елаборирал Карл Дојч (Karl Deutsch). Според него, безбедносната заедница претставува „група луѓе кои се интегрирани до тоа ниво што меѓу нив постои вистинско заемно уверување дека членовите на таа заедница нема да се борат меѓусебно со сила, туку на поинаков, мирен начин ќе ги решат меѓусебните спорови“ (Deutsch и соработници, 1957:32).

Студијата на Дојч, прави разлика помеѓу „обединети т.е. фузирани“ и „плуралистички“ безбедносни заедници. Во фузираните безбедносни заедници, претходно независните единки, формираат поголема единка, со заеднички орган т.е. влада. Во тој контекст, фузираните безбедносни заедници претставуваат релативно слични федерации со наднационалните централни влади. Како пример на фузирана безбедносна заедница, Дојч ги посочува САД, додека ЕУ според него претставува регионална организација која што го рефлектира идеалот на една ваква заедница (Deutsch и соработници, 1957). Како основни карактеристики на фузираните безбедносни заедници можат да се посочат: заедничката компатибилност на главните вредности; нераскинливите врски на секаков вид општествена соработка; развиените географски и комуникациски врски помеѓу териториите; мобилноста на личноста; разновидноста на трансакции и сл.

Идеално, регионалната безбедност би била резултат на успешното градење на заедницата, основана врз заедничка намера и заеднички идентитет и базирана на реализацијата на потребите за заеднички акции во спречување на потенцијалните и постоечките закани. Додека фузираните безбедносни заедници целосно „ветуваат“ висока меѓусебна зависност, можности за мирна коегзистенција и политичка интеграција на регионално ниво, плуралистичките безбедносни заедници, можат да постигнат доверба, верување и соработка која е потребна за обезбедување мирни релации помеѓу земјите-партиципанти.

Всушност, плуралистичката безбедносна заедница ја сочинуваат независни влади кои делат одредени основни вредности и сигурни очекувања од мировните промени. Главниот двигател за градењето на вакви заедници е комуникацијата. Таа со тек на време, треба да го развие „чувството за заедница“ кај индивидуалните актери на сите нивоа од социјалната структура, како и да продуцира еден континуиран динамичен процес на заедничко внимание и перцепирање на потребите и одговорностите во процесот на донесување одлуки.

Постојат три услови кои се значајни за формирањето на плуралната безбедносна заедница. Прво, неопходна е компатибилност на вредностите помеѓу

донесувачите на одлуки. Второ, треба да постои увереност за заедничката предвидливост на однесувањето на донесувачите на одлуки за деловите кои треба да бидат интегрирани. Трето, плуралистичката безбедносна заедница се карактеризира со заеднички одговорности, што претставува многу поодговорна цел за регионалната интеграција. Врз основа на посочените услови, може да се констатира дека доколку креаторите на политиката оперираат врз основа на разбирањето дека опсегот на традиционалната безбедност е реално проширен, дека истиот вклучува повеќе закани отколку непријатели и паралелно со тоа дека ги опфаќа економските, политичките, културните, човечките и предизвиците за животната средина, тогаш потенцијалот за безбедносна соработка и за креирање на плуралистичка безбедносна заедница, во голема мера е унапреден. Сепак, ваквата широка безбедносна агенда треба да биде усвоена од страна на донесувачите на одлуки, од политичките елити и креаторите на мислења кои поседуваат капацитет за создавање клима на заеднички потреби и заеднички одговорности. Всушност, доколку проширеното разбирање на безбедноста води кон посоефицицирано разбирање на безбедносните потреби и кон прифатливи безбедносни провајдери и доколку безбедносните провајдери имаат желба и се во можност да ги координираат нивните активности, тогаш стабилноста во даден регион може да се базира на цврста основа.

Теориската анализа на концептот за безбедносни заедници, препознава повеќе објаснувања зошто државите ја отфрлаат војната. Според Неореалистичкиот теориски пристап, главната причина за тоа произлегува од улогата на силата и нејзината одвраќачка функција. За неолибералниот институционализам, отрлањето на војната се должи на воспоставувањето норми и институции преку кои државите ги остваруваат заедничките интереси. Теоријата за демократски мир, го поддржува убедувањето дека поради специфичното политичко уредување и демократските принципи, демократиите меѓусебно не војуваат. Теоријата за безбедносни заедници укажува дека државите во безбедносната заедница покрај националниот, споделуваат и заеднички идентитет заедно со нормите и вредностите кои го сочинуваат. Тие наместо да се подготвуваат за организирано насилство и безбедносна акција која од другите држави може да се протолкува како воена закана, во безбедносната заедница функционираат механизми преку кои ќе ги разрешат проблемите без употреба на сила. Во таа смисла, според Вивер, Западна Европа во почетокот од нејзините интегративни процеси претставувала невоена заедница, која во подоцнежниот временски период се развила во збир/синтеза од воена и невоена безбедносна заедница (Wæver, 2003).

## ЗАКЛУЧОК

Современите безбедносни аспекти неминовно ја наметнуваат потребата за еден сеопфатен пристап кон безбедноста. Во тој контекст, особено внимание треба да се посвети и на нивоата за анализа на безбедноста. Притоа, треба да се има предвид дека покрај националното и меѓународното ниво (кои беа доминантни во периодот на Студената војна), значајни можности за анализирање на безбедносните динамики и предизвици, нуди и средното/субсистемско т.е. регионално ниво. Всушност, примената на ова ниво обезбедува надминување на вакуумот (карактеристичен за XX век) во објаснувањето на безбедносните појави и процеси. Тоа од причина што и на регионално ниво, се реализираат бројни динамики и релации помеѓу актерите т.е. државите, кои имаат соодветно влијание врз нивната безбедност. Од теориски аспект, соодветна можност за анализирање и објаснување на релациите и динамиките помеѓу државите во безбедносен контекст на регионално ниво, нудат токму концептите за безбедносен комплекс и безбедносна заедница. Притоа, основната теза и на двата концепта во објаснувањето на посочените релации, претставува ставот дека покрај на национално и меѓународно, безбедноста мора да се анализира и реализира и на регионално ниво, каде што истата има правопропорционален однос со степенот на развиени меѓусебни релации помеѓу државите, како и со степенот на нивната свест за прифаќање на заедничките стравови, грижи и одговорности. Потврда за тоа се интеграциите на државите во Европската унија, кои меѓу другото имаат за цел: одржување и проширување на европската безбедносна заедница и поефикасна заштита на виталните национални интереси на европските држави во пошироки меѓународни рамки.

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## РАЗУЗНАВАЧКО-БЕЗБЕДНОСНИТЕ СИСТЕМИ НА БАЛТИЧКИТЕ РЕПУБЛИКИ THE INTELLIGENCE-SECURITY SYSTEMS OF THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

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### АПСТРАКТ:

Трудот претставува своевидна анализа и критички осврт на разузнавачко-безбедносните системи на балтичките држави. Анализата е насочена кон споредбената димензија на разузнавачките сегменти, нивната работа и нивните импликации врз демократскиот амбиент во државата кој особено се рефлектира на политичките слободи во формална и вистинска смисла на зборот. Стартната премиса е дека во демократските општества мора да се овозможи разузнавачко-безбедносната заедница да дејствува канализирано за да не се овозможи простор, односно за да не дојде до непотребна акумулација на моќ. Елаборацијата која е направена за разузнавачко-безбедносните системи во овој труд содржи два елемента: прво, се прави анализа на основите на кои е поставена разузнавачката заедница во балтичките држави, и второ, анализата преку компарирање на позитивните искуства не води кон реалните сознанија за местото и улогата на овој сегмент во општеството како еден од најсигурните начини да се дојде до вистинските одговори за состојбите во разузнавачко-безбедносните системи.

**Клучни зборови:** безбедносен систем, разузнавачка заедница, разузнавачки служби, координација, Естонија, Латвија, Литванија.

### ABSTRACT:

This paper introduces a specific analysis and a critical review of the intelligence-security systems of the Baltic countries. The analysis is focused on the comparative dimension of the intelligence segments, their work and their implications on the democratic ambience in the country which are particularly reflected on the political freedoms in the formal and the factual notion of the word. The initial premise is that in democratic societies it is obligatory to facilitate a canalized action for the security community, in order to disable a space for, or not to let a certain accumulation of power. The elaboration made for

the intelligence-security systems in this effort contains two elements: first, an analysis is made for the bases on which the security communities are set in the Baltic countries and second, the analysis through comparison of the positive experiences leads us toward the real acknowledgements for the position and for the role of this segment in society as one of the most secure ways to get to the veritable answers for the conditions in the intelligence-security systems.

**Key words:** security system, intelligence community, intelligence services, coordination, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.

## БОВЕД

Поради големите промени на општествено-политичките околности во маркантните историски периоди (Втората светска војна, завршувањето на Студената војна), сите три балтички републики: Естонија, Латвија и Литванија во текот на XX век повеќепати ја стекнувале и губеле својата независност. Паралелно со тоа, во нив многупати се менувал општествениот и државниот систем на уредување, додека пак, политичкиот и безбедносно-разузнавачкиот систем биле радикално реформирани.

Така, по вековите минати под данска, шведска, германска и руска власт, Естонија во 1918 година прогласила независност, која е меѓународно призната со Договорот од Тарту, потпишан во февруари 1920 година. По 22 години државна независност, земјата била насилно вклучена во составот на СССР во 1940 година. Естонија ја вратила својата независност во 1991 година, кога се распаѓал Советскиот Сојуз, а последните руски единици ја напуштиле нејзината територијата во 1994 година. Меѓутоа, Руската Федерација во 2005 година го повлекла својот потпис од техничкиот Договор за утврдување на границата со Естонија, потпишан во декември 1996 година, во знак на протест поради подготвувањето на унилатерална декларација од естонските власти со која се осудува полувековната советската окупација на таа земја. Билатералните односи ги отежнувало и незадоволството на Руската Федерација за положбата на етничкото руско малцинство во Естонија.

Латвија, низ историјата, позната како Ливонија или Terra Mariana, областа на денешна Латвија од XIII до XVI век била дел од вазалното кнежевство во рамките на Светото Римско Царство, под контрола на германските Тевтонски витези (Schwertbrüder). Тогаш, различни региони на Латвија за време на освојувачките војни биле окупирани од војските на Полска, Шведска и Русија. Од половината на XVIII век, по т.н. Голема северна војна и поделбата на Полска, целата таа област паднала под контрола на Руската Империја. Во периодот меѓу двете светски војни, Латвија имала национална независност за краток период, кој завршил со анексијата од страна на СССР во 1940 година. Земјата повторно си ја вратила својата независност со отцепувањето од

Советскиот Сојуз во 1991 година. Слично на Естонија, и односите на Република Латвија со Руската Федерација биле со нагласена грижа на Русија за бројното руско малцинство во Латвија.

Литванија, која меѓу двете светски војни била независна држава, била анектирана од страна на Советскиот Сојуз во 1940 година. По окупацијата од страна на нацистичка Германија (1941 - 1944 година), Литванија со навлегувањето на Црвената армија повторно паднала под власт на СССР. Меѓутоа, периодот од 1944 година до 1949 година се карактеризира со силно герилско движење против советската влада, во кое според некои податоци (Stanley, 1969: 85-108), учествувале околу 30.000 Литванци. Советските воени и полициски мерки против бунтовниците и отсуството на западна поддршка довеле до постепено задушување на бунтот, но вооружениот отпор траел сè до смртта на Ј.В. Сталин во 1953 година. Генерално, Литванија била првата советска република која прогласила независност (11 Март 1990 година), но тоа прогласување не било признато сè до септември 1991 година, односно, до неуспешниот државен удар во Москва. Последните руски единици ја напуштиле земјата во 1993 година. Литванија во изминатиот период успешно ја реконструирала својата економија и ја модернизирала јавната администрација во рамките на процесот за приклучување во европските и евроатланските интеграции, кој завршил во мај 2004 година. Иако е членка на Европската унија, Литванија применува поедноставен транзитен режим за руските државјани кои од Калининград патуваат преку нејзината територија кон Руската Федерација.

## 1. РАЗУЗНАВАЧКО-БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН СИСТЕМ НА РЕПУБЛИКА ЕСТONIЈА

Естонија (естонски: *Eesti Vabariik* или *Eesti*) е држава која што се наоѓа на североисток на Европа, на брегот на Балтичкото Море и Финскиот Залив. Таа се граничи со Русија на исток и Латвија на југ, а од Финска ја одвојува Финскиот Залив,<sup>4</sup> и на 45. 228 км<sup>2</sup> територија има население од 1.274.000 жители (јули 2012)<sup>5</sup> (68,7% Естонци, 25,6% Руси, 2,1% Украинци, 1,2% Белоруси, 0,8% Финци, 1,6% останати), во која во последните две децении успешно е спроведен реформскиот процес.

Според одредбите на Уставот од 1992 година, Република Естонија е унитарна држава и парламентарна демократија. На чело на државата е Претседателот на Републиката со протоколарни овластувања. Шефот на државата го избира парламентот со мандат од пет години. Извршната власт е олицетворена во премиерот, кој го именува

<sup>4</sup> <http://hr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estonija> (visited on 9.04.2012).

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html> (visited on 7.05.2012).

Претседателот на Републиката, а го потврдува Парламентот. Премиерот ги именува членовите на Владата, во чија надлежност е водењето на надворешната и внатрешната политика.

Законодавната власт ја извршува еднодомниот Парламент (Riigikogu), чии 101 пратеник се избираат на општи избори секои четири години.

Паралелно со стекнувањето на независност на Естонија во 1991 година течел и процесот за преуредување на разузнавачко-безбедносниот систем на оваа земја, кој вклучувал елиминација на дејствувањето на службите на поранешниот Советски Сојуз на територијата на државата, како и неутрализирање на влијанието на прокомунистичките противници на естонската независност.

Формирањето на новите естонски служби за безбедност било спроведено во првата половина на 90-тите години од минатиот век, со стручна, финансиска и техничка помош од разузнавачките служби на западноевропските земји и САД. Во оваа смисла, директно покровителство над службите на Естонија било спроведено од страна на шведските служби MUST и SEPO (IBP, 2008). За естонските служби карактеристично е тоа што во контраразузнавачката работа, за разлика од времето на КГБ, се користи строга конспирација (слично како контраразузнавачките служби на Германија и Велика Британија), така што седиштата на службите се легендирани како комерцијални компании и сл. Во нив, во првите години од независноста на Естонија имало значителен број американски инструктори. Инаку, естонските служби во Балтикот најзначајни резултати постигнале во разузнавачката работа против Руската Федерација. Според Законот за полиција и другите прописи, разузнавачко-безбедносниот систем на Република Естонија, во потесна смисла, се состои од цивилни и воени разузнавачки и контраразузнавачки служби, безбедносни и полициски сили.

Главна улога во делот на контраразузнавањето му е доверена на Штабот на безбедносна полиција (Kaitsepolitseiamet - KAPO) кој е централно-автономната цивилна контраразузнавачка служба и служба за безбедност. До 1993 година оваа служба била во рамките на Министерството за внатрешни работи и оттогаш преку Координаторот за национална безбедност е одговорна пред премиерот. Во надлежност на Штабот на безбедносната полиција се: контрашпионажата, борбата против меѓународниот тероризам, прекинување на дејствувањата насочени кон насилна промена на уставниот поредок и промена на државните граници, спротивставување на пролиферацијата и заштита на доверливи документи. На чело на KAPO стои извршен директор.

За извршување на наведените задачи, формирани се *линиски организирани единици* во седиштето на службата споени во Централната команда, на чело со Генералниот директор на безбедносната полиција. *Територијалната организација* KAPO опфаќа

четири сектори, во чиј состав се одделенијата (на ниво на област) и секторите во помалите градови.

За работата на цивилните офанзивни разузнавачки служби надлежна е Дипломатско-безбедносната управа во Министерството за надворешни работи, која преку своите пунктови во естонските претставништва во странство собира и анализира разузнавачки податоци и информации релевантни за националната безбедност, територијалниот интегритет и националните интереси на земјата.

Воената компонента на разузнавачко-безбедносниот систем на Република Естонија ја претставува Безбедносно-разузнавачката управа во Министерството за одбрана, во чија надлежност е офанзивното собирање на разузнавачки информации за вооружените сили на други земји (посебно за Руската Федерација) и за други извори на закани по независноста, суверенитетот и територијалниот интегритет на Естонија. Наведената ресорска служба, која е подредена на командантот на естонските одбранбени сили работи и во рамките на командата и воените единици, каде што врши контразузнавачка и безбедносна заштита на вооружените сили.

Координација на цивилните, безбедносните и разузнавачките служби на Естонија врши Комисијата за национална безбедност. Со неа раководи Координатор за национална безбедност, кој директно е одговорен пред премиерот.

Со законот се предвидени и механизмите за парламентарна контрола над законитоста на работењето на разузнавачките и безбедносните служби на Естонија, кои се спроведуваат преку Комитетот за безбедносен надзор.

## 2. РАЗУЗНАВАЧКО-БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН СИСТЕМ НА РЕПУБЛИКА ЛАТВИЈА

Латвија е земја во северна Европа која се граничи со Белорусија, Естонија, Литванија и Русија. Земјата се состои од четири културно-историски региони и тоа: Курземе (Курландија) на запад, Земгале во централниот дел, Видземе на север и Латгале на исток. На површина од 64.589 км<sup>2</sup> живеат околу 2.205.000 жители (59,3% Латвијци, 27,8% Руси, 3,6% Белоруси, 2,5% Украинци, 2,4% Полјаци, 1,3% Литванци, 3,1 % останати). Официјален јазик е латвиски, а во службена употреба се користат и рускиот и литванскиот јазик. Со значителен процент на атеисти, 19,6% населението е со лутеранска вероисповест, 15,3% се православни, а околу 1,4% се католици. Од 1 јули 2009 година, има нова административна поделба на земјата, која вклучува и 109 општини и девет републички градови.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lg.html> (visited on 7.04.2012).

Според одредбите на Уставот од 1991 година, повеќепати дополнуван и менуван со амандмани, Република Латвија е унитарна држава и парламентарна демократија. На чело на државата е претседателот на Републиката со претежно церемонијални овластувања, избран од парламентот на секои четири години. Спроведувањето на внатрешната и надворешната политика е во надлежност на Советот на министри - Владата на Латвија.

Законодавната власт ја врши еднодомниот парламент (Saeima), чии 100 членови се избираат на општи избори по пропорционален изборен систем на секои четири години.

По нејзиното осамостојување во 1991 година, Република Латвија пристапила кон формирање на институции на безбедносно-разузнавачкиот систем, потпирајќи ги на целосен дисконтинуитет со ситуацијата која постоела за време на Советскиот Сојуз. За тоа целосна материјална, техничка и стручна помош на Латвија ѝ обезбедиле службите на земјите од Европската унија, каде директен имплементатор на воспоставувањето на новите институции во таа област била Германската федерална разузнавачка служба (BND) (Трифонов, 2007: 172-201). Со одлука на латвискиот парламент од 2004 година, отворени се архивите и досиејата од поранешните советски служби КГБ и е формиран Центар за документирање на последиците на тоталитаризмот (Rozenvalds, 2005).

Во текот на последната деценија од XX век во Република Латвија биле воспоставени, односно, радикално реформирани следните безбедносно-разузнавачки установи: Биро за заштита на уставниот поредок, Министерството за внатрешни работи, Служба за безбедност при Претседателот и Парламентот.

Биро за заштита на уставниот поредок (Satversmes aizsardzibas birojs – SAB), е тајна државна служба на чело со директорот, кое има автономна позиција во однос на Министерството за правда во чиј состав формално се наоѓа. SAB е овластен со закон за да врши работи за цивилните разузнавачки и контраразузнавачки служби и службите за заштита на уставниот поредок. Како таков, акцентот на неговото работење е на офанзивното собирање и анализа на разузнавачките информации за изворите на загрозување на националната безбедност на земјата, борбата против меѓународниот тероризам, организираниот и економскиот криминал, саботажии, корупција, шверц на наркотици, оружје и опасни материји, безбедносна и контраразузнавачка заштита на владините институции и личности. Со цел да ги вршат задачите во рамките на својата надлежност, Бирото за заштита на уставниот поредок има овластување да користи средства и методи, кои отстапуваат од неповредливоста на писмата и на комуникацијата.

Во надлежност на Министерството за внатрешни работи е спроведувањето на владините политики во областа на јавната безбедност. Министерот за внатрешни работи

му помага на државниот секретар во водењето на министерството. Министерот, односно, државниот секретар, непосредно се поврзани со следните служби: Кабинет, Служба за инспекциски надзор, Одделение за информации, Одделение за човечки ресурси, Служба за внатрешна контрола, Одделение за заеднички работи и Одделение за финансиско-материјални работи.

Државната полиција (Valsts policija) при Министерството за внатрешни работи на Република Латвија, централно е организирана и директно потчинета на началникот на полиција (Valdas Voins). Во однос на Министерството, државната полиција има оперативна независност во дејствувањето за заштита на личната и безбедноста на имотот, како и во откривање и гонење на сторителите на кривични дела.

Воената компонента на разузнавачко-безбедносниот систем на Латвија се базира на Воената разузнавачка служба при Министерството за одбрана. Приоритети во работата на службата се дефанзивно и офанзивно работење против службите на Руската Федерација и вооружените сили на земјата, вршење контраразузнавачки активности за заштита и безбедност на вооружените сили на Латвија и подготовка на анализи и проценки за раководството на земјата за изворите на заканите за суверенитетот на Република Латвија.

Службата за безбедност на Претседателот и Парламентот е институција во составот на Генералштабот на вооружените сили, надлежна за безбедност и контраразузнавање за заштита на личности и државни објекти, поврзани со позицијата на Претседател на Републиката и Saeima.

Координација на работењето на цивилните и воените служби се врши на владино ниво, а воспоставени се и механизмите на парламентарната контрола од страна на надлежната комисија Saeima (Комисијата за национална безбедност).

### 3. РАЗУЗНАВАЧКО-БЕЗБЕДНОСЕН СИСТЕМ НА РЕПУБЛИКА ЛИТВАНИЈА

Литванија е источноевропска земја, која се граничи со Белорусија, Латвија, Полска и Русија. На 65.200 км<sup>2</sup> територија живеат околу 3.525.761 жители (јули 2012) од кои 82% се Литванци, 6,1% Полјаци, 4,9% Руси, 1,1% Белоруси, и 3,9% останати). Повеќето жители се католици (79%), а има и православни, лутеранци, протестанти, баптисти и припадници на еврејската вера. Државата административно е поделена на 10 окрузи.<sup>7</sup>

Според одредбите на Уставот од 1992 година, Република Литванија е унитарна држава и парламентарна демократија. Шеф на државата е претседателот на

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/lh.html> (visited on 5.04.2012).

Републиката, кој се избира на општи избори секои пет години. Во негова надлежност е именување на премиер кој, заедно со другите членови на Владата, е одговорен пред Парламентот.

Законодавната власт ја извршува еднодомниот парламент (Seimas), кој има 141 пратеник со мандат од четири години. Изборот на 71 пратеник се врши со мнозински, а на 70 пратеници на парламентот со пропорционален изборен систем.

Борбата на Литванија за независност, која започнала во март 1990 година, а завршила со целосното повлекување на руските трупи на 31 август 1993 година, била ненасилна револуција. Тоа ја олеснило работата за воспоставување на институциите на новиот безбедносно-разузнавачки систем, затоа што новата влада на својата територија не затекла герилски сили или специјални формации, туку редовни служби кои ја поддржале независноста. Посебна помош во формирањето на нови литвански служби и обука на персоналот е обезбедена од страна на ЦИА.

*Структурата на современиот безбедносно-разузнавачки систем на Литванија ја сочинуваат: Дирекцијата за државна безбедност, Службата за специјални истраги, Вториот оддел на оперативни служби*

Дирекцијата за државна безбедност на Република Литванија (Lietuvos Respublikos Valstybės Saugumo Departamentas - VSD), која претходно била дел од Министерството за внатрешни работи, од 1994 година е централно-автономна цивилна разузнавачка и контраразузнавачка служба за национална безбедност на Литванија. Надлежностите на оваа служба вклучуваат офанзивни разузнавачки активности, спречување на странска шпионажа и субверзија, собирање информации за меѓународните терористички организации, како и спречување на внатрешниот екстремизам и организираниот криминал. Директорот на VSD за своето работење е одговорен пред претседателот на Републиката. Се проценува дека Дирекцијата за државна безбедност на Република Литванија има околу 600 членови.

Службата за специјални истраги (Specialiųjų tyrimų tarnyba – STT), е формирана со соодветен закон од мај 2000 година, како специјализирана автономна служба со надлежности за превентивна разузнавачка работа за откривање на корупција и спречување на навлегувањето на криминалните структури во државните институции, која е одговорна преку директорот на претседателот на парламентот. Во седиштето на службата се формирани следните организациони единици: Прва управа, Втора управа, Управа за спречување на корупција, Оддел за борба против корупција, Оддел за анализа и проценка, Оддел за внатрешна контрола, Управа за администрација, Оддел за персонал, Оддел за планирање, Правна служба, Оддел за информатичка технологија, Оддел за жалби и Оддел за меѓународна соработка.



Територијалната организација на Службата за специјални истраги се базира на пет регионални управи (Вилнус, Каунас, Каипедиа, Паневажис и Шиаулаи).

Вториот оддел на оперативни служби (Antrasis operatyvinių tarnybų departamenatas - AOTD), организационо му припаѓа на Министерството за одбрана, а има надлежности и задачи како стратегиска воено разузнавачка и контраразузнавачка служба. На чело на оваа служба стои директор, кој го именува и разрешува министерот за одбрана. Вториот оддел на оперативни служби офанзивно делува и собира информации за вооружените сили на другите земји, првенствено за Русија, и со тоа обезбедува контраразузнавачка заштита на единиците на литванската армија (Visockas, 2006: 210-235). Некои од безбедносните функции на AOTD од 2008 година се од Министерството за одбрана префрлени на Заедничкиот штаб на вооружените сили, во кој функционира Службата J2, одговорна за спроведување на истраги, обезбедување на воените команди и штабови и воено-полициски должности. Според некои податоци, AOTD и J2 заедно имаат околу 400 припадници (Visockas, 2006: 215).

Работи од доменот на јавната безбедност - заштита на личности и безбедност на имот, одржување на јавниот ред, спречување на криминалот, откривање на сторителите на кривични дела, гранична безбедност и контрола на сообраќајот, централизирани се на ниво на земјата, и се во надлежност на Министерството за внатрешни работи (Vidaus reikalų ministerija), односно, на полициските и придружните служби во неговиот состав. На Министерот за внатрешни работи во работењето му помага заменик министерот и неговите помошници. Во седиштето на Министерството се воспоставени: *Одделот за јавна безбедност; Одделот за општа инспекција; Одделот за внатрешна контрола; Одделот за јавна администрација; Одделот за ЕУ координација; Одделот за регионални работи; Одделот за материјално-финансиски прашања; Правниот оддел; Одделот за административни работи; Одделот за човечки ресурси; Одделот за меѓународна сработка и Одделот за информации.*

Надзор и координација на работењето на воената компонента на разузнавачко-безбедносниот систем на Литванија врши Државниот совет за одбрана, додека координацијата на цивилните служби се врши на ниво на влада. Карактеристично е тоа што Државниот совет за одбрана нема извршни овластувања и неговите одлуки не се обврзувачки. Исто така, карактеристично е дека министрите за внатрешни и надворешни работи не се членови на тоа тело (Vaidotas, 2009: 213). Во надлежност на Собранието е контролата на законитоста на работењето на службата и одобрување на буџетот за оваа намена.

## ЗАКЛУЧОК

Институциите на безбедносно-разузнавачките системи во повеќето земји од Источна Европа се развивале во повеќе заемно различни фази. Некои од нив биле толку дивергентни што со право може да се зборува за тотална ликвидација на старите и за квалитетно изградени нови системи на национална безбедност. Ова е особено изразено во земјите кои во текот на XX век, поради големите промени во општествено-политичките околности во маркантните историски периоди (Втората светска војна, завршувањето на „Студената војна“), повеќепати ја стекнувале и губеле својата независност. Впечатлив пример за таков дисконтинуитет во транзиција се поранешните советски републики: Естонија, Латвија и Литванија. Во нив, по распадот на СССР, радикално бил реформиран безбедносно-разузнавачкиот систем, односно, биле создадени нови разузнавачки и полициски служби. Горенаведените реформи произлегле од процесот на евроатлантските интеграции, бидејќи сите три балтички републики во мај 2004 година биле примени во ЕУ и во НАТО. Паралелно со тоа, формиран е квалитативно различен политички систем, а со тоа и институциите биле одговорни за нивната координација и контрола на разузнавачките и полициските служби.

Сегашните разузнавачки и безбедносни системи на Естонија, Латвија и Литванија во потесна смисла ги сочинуваат новоформираните цивилни и воени разузнавачки и контраразузнавачки служби, како и безбедносните и полициските сили. Тие се формирани врз моделот на разузнавачките и полициските служби по примерот на неколку земји од Европската унија (Германија, Шведска), кои при воспоставувањето на новите институции им обезбедиле финансиска, техничка и стручна поддршка. Посебна помош во формирањето на новите служби и обука на персоналот им пружиле и САД (ЦИА).

Во програмската ориентација на дејствувањето на разузнавачките и полициските служби на балтичките републики, акцентот е ставен на собирање и на анализирање на податоците за изворите на закани за националната безбедност, борбата против меѓународниот тероризам, организираниот и економскиот криминал, саботажи, корупција, шверц со наркотици, оружје и опасни материи, обезбедување и заштита на институциите на власта и личности. Конечно, нема сомнежи дека во офанзивната разузнавачка и контраразузнавачка работа, службите на балтичките републики приоритетно се ориентирани кон Руската Федерација.

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**ПОСТОИ ЛИ КОНТРОЛА НАД МЕЃУНАРОДНИТЕ МИРОВНИ  
ОПЕРАЦИИ ПОД ВОДСТВО НА САД**  
**IS THERE ANY CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING  
OPERATIONS LED BY THE UNITED STATES**

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**АПСТРАКТ:**

Овој труд почетно би ги истражил причините за несоодветниот спој меѓу традиционалните начини за команда и контрола и мировните операции, имајќи ја предвид нивната сложена структура и актерите кои се вклучени во нивното извршување. Речиси во секој поглед, искуството на САД, како предводници во иницирањето и спроведувањето мировни мисии преку инструментите на ООН ширум светот во последните дваесетина години, покажува дека традиционалните концепти на команда и контрола, односно нивниот пристап и доктрина не се соодветно и доволно поволно прилагодени за мировните операции што вклучуваат мноштво владини и невладини актери и повеќе држави со сопствени правила и закони.

**Клучни зборови:** команда и контрола, безбедност, владеење на правото во меѓународните операции.

**ABSTRACT:**

This paper would initially explore the reasons for the inappropriate connections between the traditional ways for command and control and the peace operations, considering their complex structure and the actors engaged in their conduct. Almost every scope, points that the US experience, as leaders in initiating and enforcing peace operations worldwide through the UN instruments in the last twenty years, with their traditional concepts of command and control, respectively, their approach and doctrine are not appropriate and well adjusted for the peace operations that involve numerous governmental and non-governmental actors and many states with their own rules and laws.

**Key words:** Command and control, scrutiny, rule of law in peacekeeping operations.

## ВОВЕД

Со крајот на Студената војна и појавата на САД како единствена преостаната суперсила во светот што сè повеќе го карактеризира нередот, САД се најдоа себе си на средине бројни „мировни операции“ (Davis, A and Richards, H: 1995). Станува збор за сложени и нетрадиционални мисии што се исто толку политички колку и воени. Притоа, за нивното успешно спроведување е потребно армијата на САД да соработува со широк и разнолик спектар од институции; вклучително странски влади, ненационални политички актери, меѓународни организации и приватни доброволни организации (Private Voluntary Organizations PVO), како и мноштво американски владини агенции и странски воени сили што се типично составен дел од коалициите за мировни операции. Дебатата што се однесува на сознанијата и условите под кои САД треба да се вклучи во ваков вид мировни операции останува со ист интензитет и размери. Реалната состојба за одбранбениот естаблишмент е дека овие операции ќе останат исклучително важни и во блиска иднина. Последиците од неуспехот во нивната ефективна изведба не се пренагласени. Масовното кршење на човекови права во Хаити, изгладнувањата во Сомалија, геноцидот во Руанда, прогонот на малцинствата во Ирак, горките етнички војни во поранешна Југославија и континуираната граѓанска војна во Камбоџа, се едни од очигледните примери. Иако постојат многу разлики меѓу овие нетрадиционални операции и вообичаените и традиционални борбени мисии, и обете ја делат потребата за ефективна команда и контрола (C2). Со оглед на фактот дека надмоќната употреба на сила често ги совладува проблемите со командата и контролата во услови на војна, а исто така не може да се смета на неа во мировните операции, останува императивот за создавање командни аранжмани што се од исклучителна важност за мировните операции.

## КОМАНДА И КОНТРОЛА

Команда и контрола се сегмент од воената терминологија за менаџмент со персоналот и ресурсите. Со оглед на фактот дека војувањето е квалитативно различен феномен од другите аспекти на општеството, концептот на команда и контрола (command and control C2) претходи, и се развивал одвоено од индустрискиот менаџмент. Овие две клучни карактеристики го оформија аспектот на размислување за командата и контролата. Тука се вклучува и еден

од круцијалните воени термини, **команда**, што според американската терминологија е формално дефиниран како: *Авторитетот што командантот во воена служба законски го практикува над потчинетите со влијанието на својот ранг и задача. Командата го вклучува авторитетот и одговорноста за ефективно искористување на расположливите ресурси како и за планирањето на примената, организирањето, насочувањето, координирањето и контролирањето на воените сили за остварување на зададените мисии. Исто така, ја вклучува и одговорноста за здравјето, благосостојбата, моралот и дисциплината на назначениот персонал* (Davis, A and Richards, H: 1995).

Оперативната контрола е подгрупа на командата. Зададена е за одреден временски период или мисија и го вклучува авторитетот да се доделат задачи на силите на САД кои веќе се распоредени од страна на нивниот Претседател и доделени задачи на единици на САД предводени од офицери на САД<sup>8</sup>. Во рамки на ограничувањата на оперативната контрола, странски командант од ООН не може да: ја промени мисијата или да ги распореди силите на САД надвор од ареата на одговорност дозволена од страна на Претседателот на САД, да ги раздвојува единиците, да ги дели нивните резерви, да спроведува дисциплина, да унапредува некого, или да ја смени интерната организација.

Командата може да заземе три сосема различни форми во мировните операции: воена команда (COCOM), оперативна контрола (OPCON) или тактичка контрола (TACON). Воената команда подразбира поседување на силите. Командантот го има целиот опсег на овластувања и одговорност својствен за концептот на воена команда.

Заради фактот дека владите речиси никогаш не би го предале суверенитетот и аспектот на командување, какви што се структура на силите, унапредувањето и дисциплината, командантите во мировните операции ретко имаат вистинска воена команда над силите што не се од нивната нација.

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<sup>8</sup> Authority, Command and Control in Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping operations, Department of Field Support. 2008. Pdf <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Authority,%20Command%20and%20Control%20in%20UN%20PKOs%20FINAL%20SIGNED%2015%20Feb%2008.pdf> (17.05.2012)

Исто така, повеќето мировни операции вклучуваат блиска соработка со мноштво невладини организации и/или приватни доброволни организации како Црвен крст или Доктори без граници, чии хуманитарни или пак други функции ги прават важни за целокупното остварување на мисијата. Во некои случаи, како на пример, Сомалија или Хаити, американските сили (и останатите) мора постојано и непосредно да соработуваат и одржуваат контакти со локалните политички и традиционални лидери (племенски водачи или предводници на кланови и сл.). Ефективната воена команда и контрола зависи од организираната, ефикасна и ефективна интеракција со цел спектар релевантни вклучени актери. Односите со овие засегнати страни може да бидат наречени и дефинирани секако, но не и командно воени односи. Навистина, некои од нив ќе примаат насоки од воени водачи, но сепак, способноста да се постигнат воени мисии за време на мировни операции зависи од ефикасното справување со нив. Информациите мора да бидат разменувани со сите овие разновидни групи од играчи. Мора истите да бидат земени предвид кога се проценува самата ситуација, кога се развиваат и разгледуваат разни алтернативни правци на делување, кога се донесуваат одлуките, кога самите акции се координираат и кога се развиваат директивите од воените сили. Овој широк сплет на односи потребен за успех на мировните операции и нивната долгорочна добивка мора да биде соодветно развиен.

## ПОЛИТИЧКИОТ ПРЕДИЗВИК

Надворешните воени интервенции заради заштита на цивилите е контроверзна и во обата случаи – кога се случи – како во Сомалија, Босна и Косово – и кога не успеа да се случи, како во Руанда. За некои, тоа е активизам на одамна заостанатата интернационализација на човечката свесност и совест; за други е алармантно прекршување на државниот поредок зависен од суверенитетот на државите и неприкосновеноста на нивната територија. За некои, пак, единственото вистинско прашање е сигурноста и гаранцијата дека овие принудни интервенции се ефективни; прашањата околу легалноста, самиот тек на операциите и можноста за злоупотреба на преседанот се прикажуваат како многу поголеми.

Секако, најконтроверзниот пример е интервенцијата на НАТО во Косово 1999, кој придонесе за најинтензивно поглавје во дебатите за легалноста и легитимноста на интервенциите предводени од НАТО/САД. Членките на Советот



за безбедност беа на две мненија; легалната оправданост за воена активност без одобрение од страна на Советот за безбедност беше наметната, но исто така, и не беше образложена и не беше доволно дискутирана. Моралната димензија зад која стоеја оправдувањата за акцијата звучат силно, но истата беше обвиеана со критики и обвиненија дека самата интервенција произведе повеќе крвопролевања отколку што ги спречи истите. Исто така, останаа отворени и свежи во сеќавањето големиот број забелешки околу начинот на кој НАТО сојузниците ја изведоа целата операција. Според говорот на тогашниот Претседател на Генералното Собрание на ООН, Кофи Анан „... ако хуманитарната интервенција е навистина неприфатлив напад на суверенитетот како да реагираме на масовните и систематски кршења на човекови права како во Руанда и Сребреница што се одразуваат на секој аспект на тоа како ја поимаме заедничката хуманост?“<sup>9</sup>

„Одговорноста да се заштити“ е идеја дека суверените држави имаат одговорност да ги заштитат сопствените граѓани од катастрофи што можат да се избегнат – од масовни убиства и силувања, од глад – но, во услови кога се неспособни или пак неволни да го сторат тоа, таа одговорност се изнаоѓа во пошироката заедница на држави. Оттука произлегуваат и многу прашања кои се однесуваат на тоа кој треба да го практикува тоа, под чиј авторитет, под кои услови, кога и како<sup>10</sup>.

Одговорноста да се заштити (R2P) е нова норма во меѓународната безбедност и заштитата на човековите права што се однесува на меѓународната заедница да превенира и да спречи геноциди, воени злосторства, етничко

<sup>9</sup> На Генералното собрание на ООН во 1999 и уште еднаш во 2000-та, Генералниот секретар Кофи Анан одржа говор кој беше окарактеризиран како обид за принудни, изнудени оправдувања спрема меѓународната заедница во обидот да се пронајде заеднички и заемен нов консензус за начинот на кој ќе им се пристапува на овие прашања. „Фалсификувано единство“ што се однесуваат на принципите и процесот кои се ставени во прашање.

<sup>10</sup> Како рационален и неопходен одговор на овој предизвик беше основањето на Меѓународната комисија за интервенција и државен суверенитет составена од дванаесет Комесари, објавено на Генералното собрание во септември 2000-та. Оваа комисија има за цел да ги совлада сите покренати прашања – легални, морални, оперативни и политички. Некои членови на Комисијата поддржуваат поголема флексибилност за воена интервенција надвор од доменот на Советот за безбедност, некои, пак помала.

чистење и злосторства против човештвото. Тоа е што е најбитно и од суштинско значење за обликување и постигнување на меѓународниот консензус во однос на меѓународните воени/мировни/хуманитарни/демократски интервенции е разграничувањето и дефинирањето на збирот мерки кои државите индивидуално и колективно можат и им е дозволено да ги преземат кога станува збор за ангажирање на сили за превенција и стопирање на хуманитарни катастрофи ширум светот. Дилемата е дали со отпочнување на интервенција (одобрена од страна на Советот за безбедност на ОН или не) нема евентуално да се предизвикаат и поголеми човечки страдања и прекршувања на меѓународните воени и хуманитарни закони отколку оние иницијалните што биле повод за покренување на самата операција. Во практика се испостави дека државите никогаш не постигнаа воспоставување единствена воена команда предводена од Организацијата на Обединетите нации, како највисокиот меѓународен владин орган со најголем легитимитет кога станува збор за уредување на меѓународните интеракции, што остава простор за маневри кога станува збор за одобрување, оправдување или избегнување на меѓународните официјални легални инструменти за преземање на политички сензитивните и мошне скапи меѓународни интервенции во краиштата на светот каде што е тоа потребно (актуелно) (Ванковска, Б: 2011).

## НЕМА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ И РАЗВОЈ БЕЗ ПРАВДА

По правило, и веќе според традицијата, ОН се фокусираат на безбедноста и развојот како на два различни столба во доменот на нивната работа. Јасни се водечките актери и поделбата на трудот. Советот за Безбедност при ОН ја има приоритетната одговорност за одржување на меѓународниот мир и безбедност, дава мандат за распоредување на приближно 100 000 сини шлемови вклучени во мировни операции. Работата на ОН во однос на развојот е координирана од страна на Развојната програма (UNDP). Сепак, овој пристап на менаџирање има свои ограничувања кога станува збор за контролата на криминалот.

Мировниците имаат недостиг од специјализирани полициски/контролни вештини потребни за да ги идентификуваат и да се избораат со коруптивните активности и поединци, а пак развојните агенции ја немаат потребната кривично - правна експертиза. Како резултат на тоа, скапите и долготрајни напори да се

промовира мирот и развојот се поткопани од страна на недоволниот капацитет за кривично право.

Ако се погледне на картата на светот каде ОН е моментно вклучена и активно учествува на терен, ќе се забележи дека станува збор за истите подрачја најранливи за организиран криминал.

Обединетите нации се вклучени во шеснаесет мисии за чување на мирот и речиси исто толку мисии за градење на мирот и политички мисии ширум светот. На речиси секоја сцена каде тие се ангажирани – од Тимор до Авганистан, или пак Косово до Гвинеја, се соочуваат со истиот проблем: организираниот криминал. На тој начин, меѓународните мисии што се создадени да го зацврстат и промовираат одржливиот мир се соочени со криминални актери кои профитираат од нестабилноста. Како што конфликтот и нестабилноста се добри за проблематичните бизниси, организираниот криминал може да има поттик при одолжувањето на непријателствата и на тој начин, може да ја минира успешната работа на мировните операции. Ова може да ја преврти инаку покорната и послушна ситуација во долгорочна нестабилност која ќе предизвикува насилство, човечки страдања, сиромаштија и зголемувањето на потребата од присуството на илјадници сини шлемови на ОН. Од сиве овие наведени причини, мировниците треба да бидат подобро подготвени и подобро опремени за да можат да се справат со оние кои ги изјаловуваат мировните мисии. Понатаму, краткорочните решенија би требало да бидат разгледувани во поширока и подолгорочна перспектива за зајакнување на безбедноста, правдата и развојот во служба на редукција на ризиците во одредена држава или регион кој запаѓа во истата почетна ситуација која го направила ранлив на криминал, конфликт и ниско ниво на развој.

16 мировни операции и една специјална политичка мисија во Авганистан. Сите се предводени од страна на Одделот за мировни операции, Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO).

#### *Африка:*

- Мисијата на ОН во Република Јужен Судан,  
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS);

- Времените безбедносни сили на ОН за Абиеј, Судан<sup>11</sup>,  
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA);
- Мисија за стабилизација на ОН во ДР Конго,  
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO);
- Хибридната операција меѓу ОН и Африканската Унија во Дарфур,  
United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID);
- Операцијата на Брегот На Слоновата Коска,  
United Nation Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI);
- Мисијата во Либерија,  
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL);
- Мисијата за Референдумот во Западна Сахара,  
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

*Америка:*

- Мисијата за стабилизација на Хаити,  
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

*Азија и Пацифик:*

- Интегрираната мисија во Источен Тимор,  
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor – Leste (UNMIT);
- Воените набљудувачи на ОН во Индија и Пакистан,  
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP);
- Мисијата за поддршка во Авганистан<sup>12</sup>,  
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

*Европа:*

- Мировните сили на ОН на Кипар,  
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP);
- Времената административна мисија во Косово,

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<sup>11</sup> Областа Абиеј со површина од 10 460 квадратни км во Судан, согласно „специјалниот административен статус“ од Протоколот 2004 за Резолуцијата за конфликтот во Абиеј во Сеопфатниот мировен договор што ја заврши Втората суданска граѓанска војна.

<sup>12</sup> UNAMA е специјална политичка мисија, под водство на DPKO.

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK);

*Среден Исток:*

- Надгледувачка мисија во Сирија,  
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS);
- Мисијата на Обединетите нации во Непал,  
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN);
- Ослободителна набљудувачка мисија на ОН<sup>13</sup>,  
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF);
- Времените сили на ОН во Либан,  
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL);
- Организацијата за надгледување на примирјето на ОН<sup>14</sup>,  
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

Владеењето на правото е правна и политичка рамка според која сите лица и институции, вклучително и самата држава се одговорни<sup>15</sup>. Воспоставувањето почит кон владеењето на правото е фундамент за постигнување траен мир во исходот од некој конфликт. Законите треба да се јавно донесени, еднакво спроведувани, независно досудувани и да се конзистентни со меѓународните норми и стандарди за човекови права. Миротворството делува за да ја зајакне полицијата, правдата и корективните институции, како и институциите кои ги одржуваат одговорни. Од 1999, сите

<sup>13</sup> Набљудувачките ослободителни сили на ОН се воспоставени на 31. 05. 1974 од страна на резолуцијата 350 на Советот за безбедност што следеше по договореното распаѓање на израелските и сириските сили на Голанската Висорамнина.

<sup>14</sup> Започната во мај 1948, UNTSO беше првата мировна операција воспоставена од страна на ОН. Оттогаш, воените набљудувачи на UNTSO останаа на Средниот Исток да го набљудуваат примирјето, да ги надгледуваат договорите за примирје, да превенираат ескалација на изолираните инциденти и да бидат поддршка за останатите мировни операции на ОН во регионот. Персоналот на UNTSO, исто така, беше на располагање за краткорочни цели, поточно за формирање на нуклеус за другите мировни операции ширум светот. Способноста и расположливоста на воените набљудувачи на UNTSO за речиси моментално распоредување откако Советот за безбедност креирал нова мисија е голем фактор за придонес во раното распоредување и успех на овие операции.

<sup>15</sup> The United Nations Rule of law indicators: Implementation guide and project tools. United Nations Publications, 2011.

поголеми мировни операции, како и многу специјални политички мисии имаат покрите да соработуваат со земјата домаќин за зајакнување на владеењето на правото (Бакрески, 0: 2012).

## ПОВТОРНА ИЗГРАДБА НА ИНСТИТУЦИИТЕ

Полициските станици, судниците и затворите се често распаѓаат, а во некои случаи и целосно уништени следствено на одреден конфликт. Најчесто клучните правни записи и останатите неопходни материјали се исчезнати. Вообичаено, независноста на судството е слаба, приходите на вработените се ниски и честопати неисплатени, со што се создава погодна почва за појава на коруптивни активности. Затворите најчесто страдаат од прекумерна густина на штитеници, без доволни резерви храна, недостаток и неадекватна медицинска грижа и ниски санитарни услови. Политичкото мешање го има во изобилие, а механизмите за надгледување и контрола се непостоечки или пристрасни.

Одделот за Мировни операции (DPKO) се стреми на сите овие три институции да им се обраќа истовремено и распоредува полиција, правни и корективни офицери. Првиот чекор во работата на Одделот е да ја стабилизира безбедносната ситуација и започнува да работи на краткорочни и среднорочни планови за повторна изградба на кривичниот правен систем. Во Либерија, Источен Тимор, Хаити и Демократската Република Конго, мировните операции работат со националните власти за развивање сеопфатни планови со кои се предвидува повторна изградба и конституирање нови полициски станици, судови или затвори. Во исто време, мисиите работат и со Владата домаќин за поддршка во развојот на политичките капацитети и човечки ресурси што се потребни за да се осигури дека овие институции можат да функционираат.

## ОБУКА НА ПЕРСОНАЛ

Несоодветно обучените претставници на законот, несигурната средина и општата култура на некажливост честопати го спречуваат или отежнуваат спроведувањето на правдата и влијаат на јавната доверба во државните институции. Полициските служби често наследуваат улога на инструменти за опресија, се наоѓаат во неред и имаат недостаток од основни полициски вештини. Во многу случаи, во нив доминираат поранешни борци, кои веројатно имале активно учество во конфликтот или станале милитаризирани во опремата

или во перспективата. Често постои и недостаток од квалификувани судски, правни или корективни професионалци, недостаток на капацитет да се обезбеди надзор и одговорност, а институциите за обука и образовните установи, дури и кога постојат – се без потребното ниво на ресурси. Како дел од целосната програма за повторна изградба на ОН, миротворството соработува со националните партнери и меѓународни донатори за да ги надгледува и рехабилитира центрите за обука, универзитетите и полицијата и да осигури дека истите се способни да го обучат потребниот персонал.

## МЕХАНИЗМИ ЗА ОДГОВОРНОСТ

Мнозинството од популацијата ширум светот ја поздравува и поддржува зајакнатата улога на ОН. Тоа подразбира на ОН да им се даде мноштво проширени моќи, што вклучува и постоење на постојани мировни сили, овластувања да истражува прекршувања на човековите права и моќ да ја регулира меѓународната трговија со оружје.<sup>16</sup> Според некои истражувања, националните влади кои обвинуваат за фингирани избори од страна на нивните опоненти, би биле задоволни ако од помош ги имаат набљудувачите на ОН. Ова се однесува и на оние демократии што веќе се во развој. Тоа што е најинтересно, според истражувањата на Јавното светско мислење, за генералниот дел од популацијата било дозволиво и оправдано ОН да преземат вооружени мерки во итната испорака на хуманитарна помош во случај ако релевантната влада се обидува да ја блокира помошта<sup>17</sup>.

## БАРИЕРИ ДО МЕЃУНАРОДНАТА ПРАВДА

Правната одговорност за злосторства против меѓународното право е можна повеќе од било кога, сепак две сериозни пречки стојат на патот до

<sup>16</sup> Draft Articles of Responsibility of the States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries. United Nations, 2001.

[http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9\\_6\\_2001.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf) (14.05.2012)

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international\\_security\\_bt/703.php?nid=&id=&pnt=703&lb=&gclid=CLrzscTdjLACFcNN3wodsU6Vrg](http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/international_security_bt/703.php?nid=&id=&pnt=703&lb=&gclid=CLrzscTdjLACFcNN3wodsU6Vrg) (19.05.2012)

целосна реализација<sup>18</sup>. Првенствено, моќните држави и понатаму стојат над законот, надвор од ефективниот меѓународен надзор. Од друга страна, пак, моќните држави манипулираат со законот заштитивајќи ги и своите сојузници од соочување со правдата и притискаат за одговорност најчесто кога тоа е во нивна политичка корист. Вршејќи го тоа, тие создаваат изговор и за други држави, или цели блокови држави да ја политизираат правдата на истиот начин.

САД и Судот

Иако 119 држави го имаат ратификувано Статутот од Рим (до октомври 2011), само 12 земји од земјите на Г20 го имаат ратификувано Статутот. Меѓу оние кои се оградуваат се: Кина, Индија, Индонезија, Русија, Турција и САД, на тој начин подривајќи ги меѓународните напори за универзална правда. И покрај долгата историја на вмешаност на САД во меѓународната правда, вклучително и учеството на дипломатската конференција што го усвои договорот за Судот, администрацијата на Буш се спротивстави на Судот поради стравувања дека Судот ќе биде политички користен против граѓани на САД. Во Статутот од Рим, пак, инкорпорирано е воздржување и чување од политички мотивирани прогони. Понатаму, Судот има надлежност да истражува вмешани граѓани на САД единствено ако САД не успеале да истражат потенцијални злосторства, и ако било одредено, да ги гонат лицата што биле одговорни. Во 2005, Владата на САД одлучи да не го блокира Советот за безбедност на ОН при гласањето што се однесуваше на истрага за злосторствата извршени во Дарфур, наменета за Обвинителот на Меѓународниот суд. Со овој потег се сигнализираше волјата од страна на САД да соработува во истрагата со Обвинителот на Судот. Уште понеодамна, Администрацијата на Обама почна повторно да соработува со Судот, како што беше во случајот кога присуствуваше на конференцијата за испитување, одржана во мај 2010 во Кампала, Уганда, и исто се согласи да ги поддржи истрагите на Судот на повисоко ниво, особено на оние во врска со Дарфур и случаите за ДР Конго. Во секој случај, единствено ратификацијата на Статутот од Рим од страна на САД ќе осигури целосна и постојана поддршка од

<sup>18</sup> Campaigning for Justice in the aftermath of crisis. Amnesty international USA; Crisis prevention and Response. Washington, DC 2003. Pdf: [http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ij\\_handbook\\_fall\\_2010\\_final.pdf](http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ij_handbook_fall_2010_final.pdf) (15.05.2012)



страна на САД за Судот и ќе помогне во мотивирањето на други држави да го поддржат и да се приклучат кон Судот.

## ПОЛИТИЗАЦИЈА НА МЕЃУНАРОДНАТА ПРАВДА

Втората бариера – политизацијата на меѓународната правда – го прави прогонот за одговорност корисен за разни политички агенди за поддршка на сојузници и поткопување на ривали. На пример, САД и ЕУ ги користат своите позиции во рамки на Советот за безбедност и понатаму го штитат Израел од силни мерки за одговорност за неговите акции во Газа. Дополнително, на Советот за човекови права на ОН, ниту една единствена азиска или африканска држава не гласаше против резолуција со што ѝ аплаудираа на владата на Шри Ланка за спроведување на војната против Ослободителните тамилски тигри. Неволноста на моќните да ги применат истите стандарди за самите себе и нивните политички сојузници оди во рацете на останатите, кои тогаш ги оправдуваат сопствените двојни стандарди, понекогаш користејќи погрешно наведени поими како „регионална солидарност“ на сметка на солидарноста со жртвите. Ова најјасно може да биде согледано во почетната реакција на африканските држави за издадениот налог за апсење на суданскиот претседател Омар ал-Башир заради геноцид, злосторства против човештвото и воени злосторства во Дарфур. Покрај сериозните обвиненија за злосторства од страна на Меѓународниот суд на правдата, Собранието на африканската унија побара Советот за безбедност на ОН да ја суспендира постапката против суданскиот претседател, при што одлучи дека земјите – членки на Африканската унија нема да соработуваат со Судот во неговото апсење и предавање и побараа африканска комисија да заседава со прелиминарен состанок на што ќе се дискутира за амандмани на Статутот од Рим.

## ЗАКЛУЧОК

Во рамки на спроведувањето на меѓународните мировни операции под водство на Обединетите нации (и САД како главен и најактивен корисник на механизмите) сè уште не е целосно дефинирано и разграничено кој ја понесува одговорноста за извршувањето на мисијата во согласност со истите оние принципи што е цел да се зачуваат и одбранат. Различната улога и различниот степен на одговорност на националните држави што партиципираат со свои

трупци во комплексните и долготрајни мировни мисии зависи од нивниот финансиски удел, од нивното политичко влијание и доминацијата при одлучувањето за отпочнувањето мировни мисии. Колку што е важно да се гонат извршителите на геноцид, воени злосторства и злосторства против човештвото, толку е и важно во борбата против сите овие злосторства да се запазат сите норми и закони пропишани со меѓународното право. На тој начин ќе се спречи практиката која би можела разговорно да се дефинира како „клинот со клин се избива“. Тоа што е најбитно е зад себе да не се остави ист таков, па и поголем пустош (како примерот со Авганистан и од најнеодамна Либија) и покрај повеќегодишните напори повторно да се воспостави мирот, да се изградат и унапредат демократските институции, поддржан од многу држави ширум светот со повеќе видови ресурси ставени на располагање. Дискутабилно е и вреди да се наведе дека ексклузивната контрола над извршувањето на мировните операции сè уште е неутврдена, а податокот дека и понатаму највисоката стапка на организиран криминал е присутна токму во регионите во светот каде се распоредени сини шлемови е појава на која треба да се посвети внимание од страна на меѓународната безбедносна и контролна експертиза. Покрај разните панел дискусии, резолуции, конференции и конвенции, потребно е заклучоците и фактите од истите да бидат земени предвид и при практичната изведба на мировните мисии – постојните, и веројатно – оние кои за жал ќе следат понатаму како потреба во делувањето и функционирањето на меѓународните односи.

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Interview

## MR. EMIL DIMITRIEV - DEPUTY MINISTER FOR DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

### SECURITY DIALOGUES: Where's the Army after 20 years?

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** To tell where the Army is after 20 years, it is inevitable to tell what were the beginnings, the building and nowadays achievements of itself. One of the first principals in the declaration of independence brought by the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia was the establishment of the Macedonian Army. By that day until today and in the future, the Army of the Republic of Macedonia represents and will represent synonym of its Macedonian independence. By that time's territorial defense and from the military personnel in the former Yugoslav Peoples Army with Macedonian origin today's Army was born. The strong enthusiasm and desire to build modern, equipped and highly professionalized army is verified within what's achieved today.

The full professionalization of the army of the Republic of Macedonia was partly achieved among the first countries of this part of Europe, but it is essential to be noted that the professionalization is realized by quality methods, which is why our army is a preferred partner of many of the more powerful armies in the world.

In the part of the Material Resources, today's army is on enviously high level, which allows realization of its main missions. The working conditions and the standard of our army personnel are improving constantly by its capacities, but there's more room for improvement. In the past period there was a raise of their income (especially in the part where raisings were 100%) and we plan to continue with them in the future.

### SECURITY DIALOGUES: The process of Army modernization?

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** Technical-technological development of the mankind determinates the modernization as a process which is in constant changes. This is the same with equipping and modernizing of an army. There are always new techniques and ways of managing of certain situations and every army strives to be equipped with the last word of techniques. As seen where we were 20 years ago, we've made much more on the plan of equipping of our army, but seen further in the future we still have much to do. The current condition of the equipment of our army ensures quality performance of the tasks but we have few other priorities on which we must concentrate in the future and that's our radar

systems, communication systems, the system of anti-air defense, and supplying of transporters normally bigger and more expensive systems. It is very hard to speak for its modernization in conditions of world crisis where many more powerful countries have stopped or prolonged the modernization process of their armies. It is important to mention that in all planning documents equipping has a very important place in the Ministry and according to the financial capabilities will be implemented with certain dynamics.

**SECURITY DIALOGUES: White Paper on ARM, what is the vision for further development of the Macedonian army?**

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** Defense White Paper 2012 is fully ready for publication. With the Defense White Paper 2012 the national values and interests are reaffirmed to achieve full realization of the priority objectives, especially those related to the prompt accession to NATO and the EU, including its contribution to the Euro-Atlantic and regional security and stability.

The Alliance recognizes Macedonia's commitment to the values of NATO as well our contribution to the Euro-Atlantic and regional security and stability. Additionally, the White Paper will contribute to improving the understanding, as well as the state leadership and political structures, and the public for her further needs of reforms and long-term investment in the defense too. Indisputable is the conclusion that the investments for development of the military capabilities of ARM in the coming decade suppose to start today. The White Paper also contains more details on the important details, projects and activities specified in the ten-year long-term plan for the development of the defense.

The White Paper is published in the year when we celebrate 20 years of the establishment of the Army of Republic of Macedonia, at the beginning of the new cycles of transformation of the defense, as well the improving of the Alliance's new strategic concept of 2012.

**SECURITY DIALOGUES: The Predicted reforms announced 50 percent of the next operative capabilities of ARM to be deployable out of Macedonia's territory for participation in the international operations and the collective defense of NATO**

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** The strategic commitment of the Republic of Macedonia is a long-term contribution to regional and Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as well the overall

readiness for assuming the obligations and responsibilities arising from the membership in NATO that obligates us to develop and maintain a deployable interoperable capabilities at a level of 50% of the overall structure of the Army ground forces. On a request of NATO we will deploy maximum military force level one medium infantry battalion group and national support element. The middle infantry battalion group is generated by the forces of the mechanized infantry brigade and the same will be fully completed, trained and equipped with all available equipment. Republic of Macedonia's contribution to NATO-led operations prepared prepares and maintains the following Army units and abilities:

- One medium infantry battalion, from the beginning of 2015<sup>th</sup> year will increase to medium infantry battalion group;
- Two transport helicopters
- One squad of military police
- One squad for deep observation
- One mobile hospital of level 2 from the beginning of 2014<sup>th</sup> year
- One engineer platoon
- One engineer platoon for demining
- Two teams of special operations

**SECURITY DIALOGUES: At what stage is the realization of the projects as Krivolak, Pilot school, the old barracks for new development, the training centers and etc.?**

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** Currently in the Department of Defense is on track an implementation of projects which by their complexity and financial need are large and their implementation will be multi-year. One of these projects is Krivolak military range, that with construction of more contents the last few years we have built it in a modern, attractive military training area to perform exercise actions, not only for our needs but also for other partner armies as well. With our capacities in the future we will upgrade the polygon, which is increasingly notable by the armies in the region and beyond. Renovation and construction begins on the training center in winter conditions-Popova Shapka. We build bungalows in the car park "St. Naum" in Ohrid. We provide modern accommodation that we've put it into the auto camping Dojran. The project "ARM my true home" completed the phase for selection of creditor banks, final survey of interested parties for the construction of dwellings were made. Next is the design phase, then construction phase. The process of divesting the old barracks I've brought to an end and with alienation of the barracks in Strumica and Dojran this major project will be completed. Ongoing is the alienation of

border posts for which we have documentation for user rights. Fourth year we enroll cadets at the Military Academy. Pilot school begins to work in two months, the selection after the first concourse has finished that we announced some time ago for pilot candidates. We prepare new concourses, which will be published next month.

**SECURITY DIALOGUES:** One of the priorities in focus of the Ministry of Defense in recent years is meeting of the criteria for membership in NATO. How far is Macedonia on that route? Will that process continue?

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** Republic of Macedonia is a unique example in the history of NATO on how a member state has fulfilled their conditions for full membership. However, for a certain period of time we are a partner, not a full member of NATO. It is known why we are not a member state. What was Ministry of Defense's part in terms of achieving NATO's standards is completed. The transformation of the Army and the ministry is fully completed; the agreed partnership goals that are defined with deadline and dynamics are realized with utmost care and seriousness. We do not want at any time, despite the name dispute, from our partners to blame Macedonia that doesn't meet certain other criteria. We invest tremendous energy on our international activities, all that means communion with NATO and NATO institutions, to be on finest way. NATO's Advisory team, who until recently was in a larger team in Macedonia and that was body that tightened-up the country with NATO, drastically cut its staff with a single explanation that Macedonia is already integrated and independently communicates with NATO, so there is no need for that kind of body. This tells enough how we are integrated into NATO, and the last problem remains to be resolved, the name dispute, in order for us to become a full member of NATO. Republic of Macedonia in NATO became known country for its contribution in international peacekeeping operations by a few elements. This contribution is analyzed through a number of our army members who are deployed in peacekeeping missions, and also for the quality of execution of those tasks. Throughout these elements, Republic of Macedonia is a respectable partner of NATO. Whether it is our involvement in Iraq, which ended very successfully, whether it is in Afghanistan, Bosnia or the support of KFOR in Kosovo, the Ministry of Defense shows that the army is on level of NATO member country and shows no differences. Army has reached the level that was a goal 20 years ago. Compared to the number of inhabitants, we are among the top five countries in the world, which is one argument plus, that we are ready and waiting at the door for our full membership in NATO.



**SECURITY DIALOGUES: The Budget of the Army is cutting. How will that reflect on the reforms and the modernization of ARM according to NATO standards?**

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** I am correct to say that after a period of reduction on the budget of the Ministry of Defense, for this year we received an increased budget in percentage higher than the total average budget increase of Macedonia. In money may not have been many, but the message was clear to the Government and strong - that we take care on financing of the defense, and in the future, according to the long-term plan for development of the defense until 2020 adopted by the Government, will provide continued growth on defense's budget. However, the circumstances imposed certain drop of the budgets of all ministries, including ours. This decrease will not reflect on the reforms, but will affect the buildup that will not stop, but may affect its dynamics. Some equipment and supplies provided for this year is prolonged for the next year. Macedonia, however, is no exception to the global trend of decreasing budgets. Motivation of the staff is our top priority and there is no room for doubt what level she is in. In recent years we have increased the salaries of the employees in the Army for over 20 percent, while wages in the missions are increased for 100 percent. We invested in training ranges, renovated several buildings of the garrisons, places that perform their daily duties. Again Military Academy works. With the Ministry of Health we signed a memorandum of certain preferences on medical services of the Army personnel. We started solving housing projects, started to share newly made uniforms. We enabled legal solutions for further increase of the salaries of the airborne forces and the science-teaching staff in the Ministry and other measures to keep the motivation high, but we can always do more and in the future we will work on it.

**SECURITY DIALOGUES:** Although Macedonia has implemented the necessary reforms for NATO membership, until the name dispute is resolved, the international community and the member states of the Alliance, will only give us a pat on the shoulder and congratulations, but not an official invitation? Does Greece abuse her position?

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** The position in which we are now, told by your vocabulary, perhaps assert that. By the Independence of Macedonia with consensus are set all main priorities for our international establishment, and one of those were the NATO membership. Considerable energy was invested in recent years to reform all areas in order to achieve compatibility with the societies that are part of this international organization. We reached

the stage of publicly not-recognized achievements in this field plan for our accession to the NATO Summit in Bucharest, collectively, without exception of any Member State. In evolutionary point of view we have completed our commitment without any notice and without false modesty. It is only fair time to acknowledge that many regional initiatives have been launched by us and in them we were leaders, which in turn affected the region's integration into NATO, in many areas were quite active. Viewed politically, also legally, I can only confirm your thesis that one member state for a bilateral dispute has abused her principle of consensus for making decisions.

**SECURITY DIALOGUES:** How many military attachés and the military diplomacy, used the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Hague, as an instrument in favor of the arguments, why Macedonia should be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** After receiving the verdict, clear instructions were given to the military attachés accredited in the NATO countries for using this very important point of dispute, because it comes from a real and credible address of this type of international disputes. The attachés as an instrument of the military diplomacy are active in the direction of achieving the stated goal - membership in NATO. Additionally we need to keep in mind that they are in direct communication with the military authorities of the member states. The military authorities that had insight into our international contribution have more open and transparent attitude that we deserve admission.

**SECURITY DIALOGUES:** The retirement age of professional soldiers from 38 to 45 is increased. What is due to this and what would be the result in these legislative changes? The age limit for admission to the professional soldiers from 23 to 25 is also increased.

**Mr. Emil Dimitriev:** Changes in the amendments of the Law on service in the army which passed in the Assembly are in order of significant improving of the status of professional soldiers compared to 2006, that their work engagement was increased by an additional ten years, i.e. then 35 to 45 years. After the age of 45 they will go into the active reserve to 50 years, depending on when they got the job, with beneficial service very shortly after ending the active reserve they will be eligible for their retirement. Additionally for the first time we completely erase the age limit of producing non-commissioned ranks, ie

transforming the employment of definite into indefinite period of time. In the future those professional soldiers who achieve the highest professional standards, regardless of age, can become NCOs (non-commissioned officers). We increased the limit for reception of 23 to 25 years in order to give chance to more young people who have desire for this profession. With the amendment changes to the law we enabled wage increase to the air force and science-teaching ministry staff.



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In order to facilitate the printing of the magazine „Security Dialogues” papers needs to be submitted in electronic version. Especially note that the pages and attachments (tables, graphs, maps, etc.) should be numbered.

Papers should be written in Macedonian and English language, on the authors recommended title, abstract of papers, presentations and briefing statements to write on English language.

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3. Nixon C.S. et. al. (2000) *Sustainable use of Europe's Water? State, Prospects and Issues*. Luxemburg: European Environment Agency.

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