100 YEARS AFTER BUCHAREST PEACE AGREEMENT

Security Dialogues
International peer reviewed journal

ISSN 1857-7172
eISSN 1857-8055
OPEN ACCESS

http://sd.fzf.ukim.edu.mk
100 YEARS AFTER BUCHAREST PEACE AGREEMENT

Ss. Cyril & Methodius University in Skopje, Faculty of Philosophy - Institute of Security, defence and peace has entered into an electronic licensing relationship with EBSCO Publishing, the world’s most prolific aggregator of full text journals, magazines and other sources. The full text of Security Dialogues can be found on the following EBSCO Publishing’s databases collections: International Security & Counter-Terrorism Reference Center.
СОДРЖИНА/CONTENT

ПРЕДГОВОР НА УРЕДНИКОТ/EDITOR’S NOTE
Toni Mileski........................................................................................................................................................... 7

Original scientific article

2. Sinisha Daskalovski - A HUNDRED YEARS AFTER THE BALKAN WARS: LESSONS AND MESSAGES......................................................................................................................................................... 35

3. Toni Mileski - MACEDONIA THROUGH THE THEORY OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION: ONE HUNDRED YEARS BEFORE................................................................................................................ 45


5. Sergej Cvetkovski, Goran Zendelovski - TERRITORY OF MACEDONIA IN MEETING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE BALKAN STATES AND GREAT POWERS...................................................... 73

LIST OF REVIEWERS...................................................................................................................................... 99

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS................................................................................................................ 101
ПРЕДГОВОР НА УРЕДНИКОТ

Почитувани читатели,

Бројот кој што го имате пред вас е целосно посветен на стогодишнината од Балканските војни. Редакцијата на меѓународното списание „Безбедносни дијалози“ одлучи да посвети еден број на најтрагичните настани во повеќевековната историја на војните на нашите простори. Значењето на настаните од пред 100 години е исключително, како од историски и геополитички, така и од економски, национален и социолошки аспект. Мноштво научни трудови, како од домашни, така и од странски автори, се обидуваат преку научниот инструментарийм, да ги расветлат настаните кои се случувале на овие простори во минатото. Сё уште, до ден денешен, низ превезот на големиот притисок на големите сили од тој период и еднострани видувања на соседните држави, се нижат прашањата на кои македонската наука сё уште активно талка по вистинските одговори. Зарем македонското население во таа далекна и кобна 1913 година не ја заслужи својата независност на собствената територија? Зарем политичкото дејствување на македонските организации не сакале иста цел, слобода и независност за Македонија? Зарем не било волна воената организација и мобилизација на македонското население да биде гарант за успешна борба? Зарем, не можеле да се одбегнат братоубиствените војни во 1912 и 1913 година? Зарем големите сили не можеле да помогнат во остварувањето на желбите за автономна и самостојна Македонија? Големите сомнежи, испуштената историска шанса и сё уште не доволно разјаснетите состојби од тој период, постојано претставуваат солидна научна провокација за македонската научна мисла.

Токму од тие причини, „Безбедносни дијалози“ посветува еден број на Балканските војни и Букурешкиот мирен договор. Настани, кои ставиле крај на надежите за самостојна и целовита етно-географска Македонија.

Во овој број ќе имате можnost да прочитате за македонските и албанските интерпретации на Балканските војни. Авторот на статијата се прашува и се обидува да одгатне, преку анализа на колективната меморија и наследство од Балканските војни, како истите се вградени во меморијата на Македонците и Албанците во Република Македонија. Централна точка на анализа е концептот за „политичкото во меморијата“, а се прави обид да се истражи секакањето на настаните од пред сто години кај група кreatorи на јавно мислење, како и влијанието на овие секакања врз пошироката јавност и на тековните политички случувања. Врската помеѓу „реалната историја“ (историјата каква
Security dialogues

100 YEARS AFTER BUCHAREST PEACE AGREEMENT

што навистина се случила) и когнитивната историја на Балканските војни (историјата како што се перцепира) е прикажана низ призмата на двете доминантни етнички заедници. Основната премиса е дека т.н. „субјективна историја“ (која се состои од перцепции, емоции и ставови) е онаа која живее во света на денешните актери, па оттука таа има многу поголемо влијание врз уверувањата и вредностите кои се основа на нивните акции отколку што е тоа случај со историските факти и знаењето формулирано од професионалните историчари. Стогодишнината од Балканските војни покажа дека двете етнички заедници споделуваат ист мит на виктимизација, кој сепак повеќе ги конфронтира одошти ги зближува. Освен тоа, ваквата состојба дополнително за продлабочува општествената дела која се му се заканува на опстанокот на политичката заедница.

Вториот труд од тематскиот број на „Безбедносни дијалози“ се однесува на обидот за утврдување на местото и улогата на Балканските војни во типологијата на конфликтите од 21 век, базирани на научни анализи на историските и современите материјали за големите вооружени конфликтки. За да одговори на поставените прашања, авторот, поаѓа од идејата за војната како социо-историска категорија која има карактеристики кои можат, генерално, да се идентификуваат и споредат со други војни, како и карактеристики кои можат да се искористат за да се направи разлика помеѓу војните. Во категоријата на посебни карактеристики, авторот ги вклучува македонскиот народ и територија, каде што најмногу се одвивале Балканските војни, и каде што најмногу се судирале интересите на соседните држави и големите сили.

Понатаму, научните експликации елаборирани низ редовите на „Безбедносни дијалози“ се однесува на обидот за утврдување на местото и улогата на Балканските војни во типологијата на конфликтите од 21 век, базирани на научни анализи на историските и современите материјали за големите вооружени конфликтки. За да одговори на поставените прашања, авторот, поаѓа од идејата за војната како социо-историска категорија која има карактеристики кои можат, генерално, да се идентификуваат и споредат со други војни, како и карактеристики кои можат да се искористат за да се направи разлика помеѓу војните. Во категоријата на посебни карактеристики, авторот ги вклучува македонскиот народ и територија, каде што најмногу се одвивале Балканските војни, и каде што најмногу се судирале интересите на соседните држави и големите сили.

Следува труд кој што се занимава со конкредтни историски опсервации на Првата балканска војна. Во него се потенцира дека македонската историографија, иако релативно млада научна дисциплина во однос на другите балкански историографии, до сега ги има разработено главните настани и процеси поврзани со балканските
војни (1912-1913). Меѓутоа, сосема е разбирливо дека во иднина сите тие ќе треба да се надополнуваат со нови наоди и пристапи кои произлегуваат од одредени нови историски извори и анализи. За таа цел, трудот анализира одредени воени активности на грчката војска во Отоманска Македонија во текот на Првата балканска војна, кои, до сега, во македонската историографија не се дозволно претставени. Оваа статија има намера да ја објасни грчката национална политика и намери на Атина во врска со македонското население и територија, со посебен акцент на воената и политичка стратегија на Грција за време на Првата балканска војна.

Тематскиот број на „Безбедносни дијалози“ завршува со трудот кој се занимава со територијата на Македонија во замислите на балканските држави и големите сили. Анализирајќи соодветна литература авторите на овој труд ќе заклучат дека сите учесници во Балканските војни страдаа од разочараност и пораз во обидот да го реализираат прашањето кое ги воведе во војна. Но, вистинските страдалници се Македонците кои беа предмет на поделба.

Со почит,
Проф. д-р Тони Милески
Главен и одговорен уредник
EDITOR’S NOTE

Dear readers,

The number you have before you is entirely dedicated to one hundred years of the Balkan wars. Editorial board of the international journal “Security Dialogue” has decided to devote a number of the most tragic events in the more centuries’ history of wars in our region. The significance of the events of 100 years ago is extremely, both from historical and geopolitical, and economic, national and social aspect. Multitudes of scientific papers, from both domestic and foreign authors are trying through scientific instruments, to highlight events that have occurred in this region in the past. There is still unto this day, through the veil of the great pressure of the great powers of the period and one-sided views of neighboring states, string Macedonian issues that science is still active haunting the right answers. Was the Macedonian population in that distant and terrible 1913 not deserve their independence in their own territory? Were the Macedonian political action organizations like the same order, freedom and independence for Macedonia? Was not it possible the military organization and mobilization of the Macedonian population to be the guarantor of a successful fight? Was not be able to avoid gross the murderous wars in 1912 and 1913? Did the great powers could help in achieving the desires for autonomous and independent Macedonia? Great doubts, missed a historic opportunity and still not enough explained conditions of that period, are consistently solid scientific provocation Macedonian scientific thought.

Because of these reasons, “Security Dialogue” devotes a number of Balkan wars and the Bucharest peace treaty. Events, which ended the hopes of independent and ethno-geographical Macedonia.

In this issue you will have the opportunity to read about the Macedonian and Albanian interpreting the Balkan wars. The author of the article asks and tries to solve through analysis of the collective memory and legacy of the Balkan wars, as they are embedded in the memory of the Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia. Central point of the analysis is the concept of “political memory” and an attempt to explore the memory of the events of a hundred years ago with a group of opinion makers, and the impact of these memories and the general public on current political developments. The relationship between the “real history” (history as it really happened) and the cognitive history of the Balkan Wars (history as perceived) is shown through the prism of the two dominant ethnic groups. The basic premise is that the so-called “Subjective history” (consisting of perceptions, emotions and attitudes) is the one that lives
in the minds of today’s actors, hence it has a much greater impact on the beliefs and values that are on their actions than is the case with the historical facts and knowledge formulated by professional historians. Centenary of the Balkan wars showed that both communities share the same myth of victimization that still confront more than it brings. Moreover, this situation additionally deepens the social acts which threaten the survival of the political community.

The second paper in the thematic issue of “Security Dialogue” refers to the attempt to establish the place and role of the Balkan wars in the typology of conflicts of the 21st century, based on scientific analysis of historical and contemporary materials for major armed conflicts. To answer the questions, the author starts from the idea of war as a socio-historical category that has features that can generally be identified and compared with other wars, as well as features that can be used to distinguish between wars. In the category of special features, the author includes the Macedonian people and territory, where most Balkan wars took place, and where most collided interests of neighboring countries and major powers.

Following work that deals with specific historical observations of the First Balkan War. It is emphasized that the Macedonian historiography, although relatively young scientific discipline over other Balkan historiography, until now it has developed major events and processes related to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). However, it is quite conceivable that in the future they will need to be supplemented with new approaches and findings arising from certain new historical sources and analyzes. For this purpose, the paper examines some military activities of the Greek army in Ottoman Macedonia during the First Balkan War, which, until now, the Macedonian historiography are under-represented. This article intends to explain the Greek national policy and intentions of Athens about the Macedonian population and area, with special emphasis on military and political strategy in Greece during the First Balkan War.

Further, scientific explanations elaborated through the ranks of the “Security Dialogue, will take you to the paper deals with the interpretation of the theory of territorial integration of the American geographer Richard Hartshorne. Labor through political-geographical and geopolitical analysis deals with a problem that was current more than 100 years, and refers to conditions that are reflected through centripetal and centrifugal forces that are essential in the creation of states. Basically analyzed the situation in the territory of Macedonia in the Ottoman Empire until the start of the Balkan wars and territorial division of Macedonia in Bucharest peace treaty.

Thematic issue of “Security Dialogue” ends with the paper deals with the territory
of Macedonia imagines the Balkan states and Great Powers. Analyzing the relevant literature authors of this paper will conclude that all participants in the Balkan wars suffered defeat and disappointment in trying to realize the question introduced at war. But the real sufferers are the Macedonians who were subject to division.

Sincerely,
Prof. Toni Mileski, Ph.D.
Editor in chief
Macedonian and Albanian Interpretations of the Balkan Wars: Collision of Historical Narratives

Abstract: This article deals with the collective memories and legacies of the Balkan wars (1912/1913) as they are enshrined in the popular memory of the Macedonians and the Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. The focal point is on the political in memory; i.e. an attempt is made to examine remembrance of those past events among the public opinion-makers and the impact of memory on the general public and on the current political developments. The relationship between the ‘real’ history (history as it actually was) and the cognitive history of the Balkan wars (history as it is perceived) is portrayed as it is seen by the two dominant ethnic groups. The basic premise is that so-called ‘subjective history’ (which consists of perceptions, emotions and attitudes) is in the minds of the today’s actors so it affects the beliefs and values underlying their actions much more than the historical facts and knowledge gained by professionals. The centennial of the Balkan wars proves that the two major ethnic communities share the same myth of victimization; yet it confronts rather than brings them together. Furthermore it adds to the ongoing deepening of the societal division that threatens the existence of the political community.

Key words: Balkan wars, collective memory, history, legacy, ethnicity
INTRODUCTION

Antagonizing and highly politicized debates over the past of (and in) the Republic of Macedonia have been ongoing for years. However, this process is nothing specifically related to this country because many speak of so-called “epoch of memory”. Jacques Derrida notes that recent events signify “a universal urgency of memory” (Derrida 2001, 28), while Pierre Nora uses a concept of ‘global upsurge of memory’ (Nora 1993). Apparently, the centennial of the Balkan wars (1912/1913) coincides with something that has been taking place on the wider scene. The revision of history (or as some authors name it “re-writing” of history) is particularly typical for post-authoritarian societies and in the ones that have recently gained independence, i.e. everywhere it is a societal priority to give new answers to the old questions - such as, “who we really are”. The debated in Macedonia not only embrace a very long time span (from antiquity up to the more recent history) but more importantly they include not only historians (and even quasi-historians) and scholars but also non-historians (intellectuals, politicians, religious leaders, journalists, etc.). In the cacophony of voices it is often hard to refine well-articulated and reasoned interpretations based on credible facts and arguments. Such a societal ambience represents a challenge for any researcher interested in examining the way in which a particular historical period is situated and (mis)used in the context of ongoing political and interethnic tensions and clashes. The Balkan wars’ period is selected only as an example that may help understand how the collective memories affect the present
state of affairs and how they impact the future of the modern Macedonian state.

The ongoing proliferation of scholarly works on memory and its utility as a creator of identity prove that what happens is a global trend. No surprise that Nora's notion has gained such a support among scholars who deal with political in memory or the politics of memory. The process described by Nora includes elements, such as: critique of the official versions of history and the return to what was hidden away; search for an obfuscated or ‘confiscated’ past; cult of ‘roots’ and the development of genealogical investigations; boom in fervent celebrations and commemorations; legal settlement of past ‘scores’ between different social groups; growing number of all kinds of museums; etc. At glance it is obvious that upsurge of memory has not by any means bypassed the Republic of Macedonia but the focal point of the numerous analyses has been the project “Skopje 2014” (Koteska 2011). Prior to embarking to the analysis devoted to the Balkan wars’ legacies and collective memories it is necessary to define some key concepts that the paper relies upon.

The epoch of memory is characterized by a construction of social experiences through public discourse over the past events, which is an endeavour that requires imagination in remembrance, as well as a process of narration. A growing number of authors have introduced the distinction between the concepts of “politics of memory” and “the political in memory”. The second one, i.e. political in memory is the one that questions the notion of “collective memory” and the “social frames of memory”. It refers to and highlights the cohesive and reproductive force of memory in the collective processes of identity construction; on the other hand, remembrance of past events that do not fit well into the collective narrative of “our common history” is the factor that produces uneasiness and disturbances. Truly, “to contest the past is also to pose questions about the present, and what the past means in the present. Our understanding of the past has strategic, political, and ethical consequences. Contests over the meaning of the past are also contests over the meaning of the present and over ways of taking the past forward” (Hodgkin and Radstone 2003, 1). Despite the apparent focus on memory (politics of memory and/or political in memory), there is insufficient work on exploration why some events preserve political salience or elaboration of the process through which they become important in domestic and inter-state politics. In practice of everyday politics, memory exerts effects in two ways: from the bottom up, as interpretations of the past that affect the identities and understandings of political elites, and from the top down, as public figures place certain events into the national consciousness while ignoring others. To use Anthony Smith’s phrase (quoted from Hosking and Schöpflin 1997, 37), the
basic question that is to be addressed in this article reads: does this particular historic period (the Balkan wars) qualify as “usable past”? Nietzsche’s thought that the state never has any use for truth as such but only for truth which is useful to it, still rings true. However, this paper does not deal with history of 1912/1913 wars as such and even less with historical truth about them. The focal interest is on their interpretation(s) by the intellectuals in the Republic of Macedonia. Thus the following text is an analysis that revolves around concepts such as public discourse, cultural trauma, historical consciousness, narratives, contested past(s), etc.

Halbwachs (1992) has a point when he argues that the collective memory is socially constructed, and that the idea of an individual memory absolutely separate from social memory, is an abstraction almost devoid of meaning. Construct or not (as nationalists usually claim), the IR theorist Wendt (1999, 225) rightly draws out the similarities in the role played by memory in individuals and collectives: “People are distinct entities in virtue of biology, but without consciousness and memory – a sense of ‘I’ – they are not agents, maybe even not human. This is still more true of states, which do not even have ‘bodies’ if their members have no joint narrative of themselves....” This applies on any self-conscious societal group. In the words of the famous holder of Pultzer Prize for history Arthur Schlesinger (2007), as persons deprived of memory become disoriented and lost, not knowing where they have been and where they are going, so a nation denied a conception of the past will be disabled in dealing with its present and its future. The relationship between memory (collective memory, especially) and history is not straightforward. Since recently, due to the growing interest in memory (so-called memory studies) some scholars argue that it should be treated as something distinct from history; majority of historians disagree and challenge the utility of this distinction. On the other hand, some authors point out that neither memory nor history seems objective any longer. In both cases one should be aware of conscious or unconscious selection, interpretation and distortion of facts, which is socially conditioned. Schlesinger (ibidem) believes that all historians are prisoners of their own experience: “We bring to history the preconceptions of our personalities and of our age. We cannot seize on ultimate and absolute truths. So the historian is committed to a doomed enterprise – the quest for an unattainable objectivity.” According to some scholars (Fogu and Kansteiner quoted from Lebow et al, 2006) memory is not history, least of all in the academic sense, but it is sometimes made from similar material. The slippery borderline between memory, truth, myth and history is evident in many cases so a comprehensive concept has been named mythistory (McNeill 1986). Others speak about history as narrative and of historians as
narrators (Munslow 2006). Unlike history, collective memory is not about objective facts, but how events of the past are understood. Memory studies are interested in the reasons, actors and ways collective perceptions of historical events are constructed and the manners in which they affect present state of affairs (Ballinger 2005, 5). For the purpose of this analysis, the common definition of memory refers to simultaneously dealing both with what individuals (in this case, the intellectuals from two ethnic campuses) think they remember about the past, and with the efforts by various actors to affect interpretations of the wartime past.

THE CENTENNIAL OF THE BALKAN WARS - REASON FOR MOURNING AND/OR CELEBRATION

If - to quote Kissinger - history is indeed the memory of state, consequently a range of intriguing questions arise with regard to the Macedonia’s statehood and history. The majority citizens, members of the Macedonian nation, had had no state of their own, no archives and no specialized institutions for historical research until the Second World War. On the other hand, as far as the Albanians (who comprise the second biggest ethnic community with 25% of the population) are concerned, they shared the political destiny of the Macedonians but never truly felt a part of the common polity. Among other instances, this was proved by the 2001 conflict and even its aftermath: the issue to whom the state belongs i.e. which community has greater/smaller role and share in the statehood is still an open one.

In order to appreciate an institution adequately, it is necessary to understand the historical process in which it was produced (Berger and Luckmann 1991, 72). The institutionalized world is experienced as objective reality because tradition gives it a character of objectivity; in other words, this is a man-made, constructed objectivity (ibidem, 78). Yet the Macedonian state institutions as well as the academic ones (i.e. the ones that deal with history as such) have just a short tradition of existence. A deconstructivist (Munslow ibidem, 6) argues, “just as it is impossible to have a narrative without a narrator, we cannot have a history without a historian. What is the role of the historian in recreating the past? Every history contains ideas or theories about the nature of change and continuity as held by historians – some are overt, others deeply buried, and some just poorly formulated. The theories of history mustered by historians both affect and effect our understanding about the past, whether they are explicit or not.” As history is written by historians, it is best understood as a cultural (and institutional) product existing within society, and as a part of the historical process, rather than an objective methodology and commentary outside of society. Karl Marx (1852)
rightly argued that men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they
do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past. Martin Luther King rephrased the same idea:
we are not makers of history; we are made by history. The same applies to the researchers,
historians, anthropologists, etc. and their worldviews, no matter how objective and neutral
they claim to be.

At the beginning of Macedonia’s democratic transition and independence (1991), the
first steps were directed towards denouncing everything that looked like a fabricated historical
narrative within the Yugoslav framework with supranational teleology. The endeavour ended
in an equally fabricated narrative(s) although in an opposite (national/istic) direction. The
Macedonians discovered that they had already been portrayed by others as an “uncertain
nation” or even as mythical “Yeti”. On the other hand, the Albanians in Macedonia were
enthusiastic in seeking for their historical roots and the common pan-Albanian past. Up to the
eve of their centennial, the Balkan wars had not been a focal point of the collective awareness
because both nationalisms were far more ambitious in their historical quest. Having faced
a cold welcome of the international community and the denial by the neighbouring states
the Macedonians gradually embarked on a search of their origin since the antiquity; the
Albanians’ claims to be Illyrians, i.e. the oldest (and the ‘most authentic’) inhabitants of the
region, that used to be subdued now could flourish more freely (Proeva 2010, 1-2).

Institutional memory describes efforts by political elites, their supporters, and their
opponents to construct meaning of the past and propagate them more widely or impose them
on other members of society (Lebow et al ibidem). Precisely this institutional memory was to
be built av ovo - along with the newly independent state in very unfavorable international and
regional constellations that existed in 1991. The conventional wisdom reads that the state
has ceased to be the only actor that has power to re-consider the usefulness of the historical
facts/truth. In an ethnically divided society the situation has been even more complex because
of the existence of numerous and competing ‘guardians’ and ‘interpreters’ of the past events.
The present incessantly reinvents the past. In this sense, all history, as Benedetto Croce said,
is contemporary history. Conceptions of the past are not stable because they are perennially
revised by the urgencies of the present. The legacies of the Balkan wars (1912/1913) have
not been an issue for quite some time because of the latest cycle of Balkan (ex-Yugoslav)
wars (1991-2001) as well as because of the urgency to establish a new polity and to gain
international recognition for the state.
More than twenty years after gaining independence, the national-building and revision of the national history are processes far from being completed. In the recently published memoirs, the former Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski points at Macedonia as the greatest falsifier of history.\textsuperscript{1} Almost at the same time, another ex-prime minister cum former President of the Republic (Branko Crvenkovski) accuses the ruling party IMRO-DPMNU (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) of ‘historical engineering’ through the “Skopje 2014” project.\textsuperscript{2} The official response to these allegations may be summed up in the following way: the preceding absence of monuments to any Macedonian national heroes spoke by itself of the confiscated past and intentionally erased/suppressed memories by the Yugoslav regime. The current government legitimates the rebuilding project as something that should have been done decades ago. The crucial effect of the rather expensive endeavour is expected to be “strengthening of the national spirit with the Macedonians”. However, the project known as “Skopje 2014” (Chausidis 2013) has become a flash point of intra- and inter-ethnic tensions that illustrate that instead of building national unity and common narrative of the political community it has turned into the opposite (Kolozova 2013). However, the heated debate over the monuments and the memorialisation of the past heroes that shakes the intra-ethnic relations in the Macedonian campus disregards another fact: the upraise of heroic past was initiated by DUI (i.e. Democratic Union for Integration, the party that was formed by the former UÇK combatants and since 2002 is almost continuously member of the ruling coalition). It was in 2006 when it insisted and succeeded to erect a monument to the all-Albanian national hero Skenderbeg in Skopje. Since then the spiral was made loose. The project “Skopje 2014” indeed predominantly symbolises the “Macedonianness” as understood by the ruling IMRO elites but the Albanian ones act on a regional level and in an orchestrated manner. For instance, monuments of the same historical personalities (Skenderbeg, Hasan Prishtina, etc.) have been built in Tirana, Prishtina and Skopje.

The centennial of the Balkan wars has been seen as an opportunity to address old grievances, traumas and/or glories. The interpretations of this historical period made by the Macedonians and the Albanians have been done not only in a detached but also

\textsuperscript{1} During the public promotion of his autobiography “That’s me”, Georgievski gave such a public statement, which surely provoked wave of reactions. The former Prime minister who got Bulgarian citizenship some years ago now advocates the Bulgarian origin of the Macedonian people. See more http://www.mkd.mk/40860/makedonija/ljubcho-georgievski-toa-sum-ajas/ (accessed on 4 October 2012)

\textsuperscript{2} Actually, two former prime ministers, Georgievski and Crvenkovski, have created a joint opposition front against the current government led by Nikola Gruevski.
in a confrontational/competing manner. On the eve of this anniversary there was general confusion and dilemma, especially among the Macedonian political and other elites - is this something to be marked, or even celebrated, at all? While the Macedonians were reluctant, the Albanians had already built a consensus (nationally and on a regional level): it was a perfect occasion to celebrate Albanian statehood understood in wider terms as a historical achievement of all generations of Albanians who fought for a state of their own, regardless the fact that they had been living in different political communities dispersed in 4-5 Balkan states. As expected, at the end of the day there was a cacophony of interpretations. The ethnic Macedonians share a common belief that those events represent the greatest national trauma and gross international injustice: the Balkan wars symbolize a separation of what once was a whole, i.e. the imagined fatherland of all Macedonians. At the same time, the emotions among the Albanian elites were also high but at unlike the Macedonians they shared feelings that were a combination of national pride and sorrow: pride for the centennial of the Albanian statehood and sorrow because of that state's imperfection in terms of not uniting the Albanians from the region in a 'natural' nation-state. Very few have paid attention to the attitudes and emotions of the Turkish minority in Macedonia or the Serbian one - i.e. the representatives of the historical 'losers' and 'winners'. Speaking in terms of victors and losers, comparative review of the national historiographies shows that the Macedonian and Albanian along with the Turkish one (and partially, the Bulgarian one) belong to the same category of historiographies that contain element of victimization and define the Balkan wars as aggressive rather than wars of national liberation (Georgiev 2012).

In general, the Macedonians wonder why they would even mark this centenary that symbolizes forceful separation of the Macedonian ‘natural/ethnic body’. The public discourse has been that of lamentation over the misfortune and international injustice inflicted on the Macedonians. The dominant popular narrative goes that the first two decades of the 20th century Balkan wars were traumatic and important episode of the Macedonian people's hard history. For instance, in a newspaper columnist (Filov 2013) wrote the following: “The Bucharest Agreement of 10 August 1913 inflicted the gravest injustice a people, a state, can go through. Macedonia was divided among the Balkan states, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece.” According to some critical historians the ethno-centric approach wrongly puts the (non-formed) Macedonian nation on the centre-stage and depicts Ottoman Macedonia as already

---

3 In a TV show in Albanian in early 2012 Ermira Mehmeti-Devaja, a member of the Macedonian Parliament stated: “If you ask me personally, I as any other Albanian, hope for unification, I want unification of all Albanians - but the question is how to achieve that. Is there any platform, a manifest or a document about that?”, Vecer, 21 March 2013.
defined fatherland of all Macedonians. Briefly, according to the national historiography and the general belief, during the Balkan wars the Macedonian revolutionary movement suffered internal weaknesses and clashes, while the international support was missing. Furthermore, the newly established Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian states had already manifested competing claims over Macedonia, which became ‘an apple of discord’, prior to the Balkan wars. The Bucharest Treaty meant de facto division of the spoils of war, i.e. the territory of Ottoman Macedonia and its population. This version, of course, collides with the grand narratives and experiences of the other non-Macedonian inhabitants of today’s state. Behind the facade however there is a feeling of national embarrassment because of the failure and disorganization of the Macedonian Revolutionary Movement in a very critical moment of Ottoman Empire’s dissolution.

Concurrently, the Albanian ethnic community is far more focused and concrete: it has been celebrating the centennial of Albanian statehood through a range of political, cultural and other events (financed with the state budget of the Republic of Macedonia) as well as through numerous trans-border events and meetings of the Albanians in the region and the Diaspora. The latest proposal launched by some Albanian politicians refers formation of so-called Balkan Benelux (political union that would embrace all countries in the region with significant Albanian population - Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro). The celebration of the centennial of the Albanian statehood revolved around more nationalistic (and politically more useful) interpretations of the past. The traditional narrative that does not changed much goes as follows (Pollo and Puto, 1981): the Albanians’ struggle for freedom and independence dates as far back as 15th century (the era of Skanderbeg) and progressed in linear fashion. On the eve of the Balkan Wars, a vast popular movement demanding independence arose across Albania, demonstrating the remarkable level of political maturity the masses. This narrative conveniently downplays the complex identities and loyalties of the masses as well as their illiteracy, backwardness and the traditional tribal organisation - all factors that obstructed build-up of a more coherent community based on a distinct national identity. Furthermore, as Bernd Fischer (2002) rightly points out, Albanians found themselves in a favoured position within the Ottoman Empire and therefore did not share the level of discontent with foreign rule felt by most of the other Balkan peoples. Quite the contrary, the Albanians often saw the Turks as protectors against the often hostile Greeks and Serbs. For many Albanians, the Ottoman Empire provided a career with the opportunity for advancement in the army or within the administration, where they served in disproportionate
numbers. The decline of Ottoman rule was the momentum for gaining state independence but Albanians were not united in their decision to join the Balkan League. Despite practical efforts of the Serbs and Montenegrins to make Albanians choose their side in the First Balkan War, Albanians followed the dogma “better the devil you know”. Some of today’s Albanian interpretations (Ramadani, Ameti and Celiku 2013, 2) claim that “one of the main goals of the Balkan countries was to invade Albanian territories.” On the eve of the Balkan Wars Albania lacked all of the necessary preconditions for nation-state’s emergence: it could not look back to a powerful medieval empire, it had no religious unity and no leadership offered by a self-conscious class; it had little foreign intellectual stimulus and lacked linguistic unity. Finally, it did not even have a population particularly discontented with foreign rule (Fischer ibidem). In sum, Albanians were not the ultimate arbiters of their statehood. The state came into being as a result of a bargaining of the Great powers. The state created on the negotiating table in 1912 with no concern for the people has become one of the major national (and regional) traumas. More than a half the population was left out of the borders of the artificially created state.

Given the fact that the Macedonian society is fractured along bi-ethnic lines, the centennial of the Balkan wars left behind a bizarre picture: while one group laments over its ‘lost fatherland’, the other one celebrates one-hundred years old ‘imagined community’ and summarizes the overall pan-Albanian progress. From the ethnic Macedonian point of view the general conclusion is that in addition to the motherland Albania today there is Kosovo as a second Albanian state, the power-sharing regime in Macedonia that gives the Albanians a status of constitutive nation, and improved minority rights status for the Albanians in Montenegro (and less in Serbia proper). It is something that causes more fear than relief. The Albanians, from their side, still stick to the rhetoric of a divided nation and to the dream of all Albanians in one state (or at least, in the European Union). While the Macedonian government did not embark into any manifestation to mark the anniversary, some of its ministers and even the President of the Republic welcomed the political guests from Serbia who celebrated their historical battles and glories on what is today’s independent state. It caused grumbling not only among the Macedonians but also among the Albanians who still see Serbia as archtype of eternal enemy. The ruling IMRO-DPMNU was caught between two fires and tried to find a compromise claiming that there is nothing for Macedonians to celebrate and that the historical IMRO fought both against the Turks and against the Serbs while the ministerial attendance of the Serbian commemoration of Kumanovo battle was made out of respect for the neighboring state and in the spirit of the European values and good neighborly relations.4

4 See: “ВМРО-ДПМНЕ: Зебръяк не треба да го прославуваат Македонците, министерката...”
In addition to a few modest academic conferences and public round tables, the most active in this regard was the Macedonian Diaspora (i.e. United Macedonian Diaspora and the Macedonian World Congress). The Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts held two conferences - one purely national and the other one modestly international (with few international speakers) but the general conclusion was the same. The president of the Academy summed it up in the following way: “Macedonia was the greatest victim”. On the other hand, the Albanian community was far more active and creative, especially during 2012. The members of the ruling DUI and of the intellectual community took part in various events organized by the Albanian diaspora as well as by Albania and Kosovo. Despite the attempts to keep interethnic tensions calm, the members of the political elite could not refrain themselves and thus miss the opportunity to gain from the momentum. By default the celebrations were accompanied by strong nationalistic rhetoric and gigantic national flags. It served well the Albanian party DUI ahead of the local elections but raised many worries among the Macedonians in many parts of the country where they are a minority on a local level. Commemorations and celebrations are over but the interethnic tensions have remained alive.

**INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BALKAN WARS AMONG THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS**

In an era of expansion of memory, historians have lost the position of exclusive guardians of the interpretation of the past. The historians in Macedonia complain of the...
unprincipled competition of the quasi-experts and “popular historians” who have taken the central position in the public debate. Instead of comprehensive and boring elaborations of the past, the citizens rather consume popular history like fast-food. Some historians believe that they should refrain from taking part into the public debate even if it concerns new readings of the past. The others have been trying to make their voice heard even in the international political arena. The promoters of popular interpretations are easily identified among politicians, journalists, writers, artists, and even NGO activists - that is, people that are influential as policy-makers and/or public opinion-makers. They have become alternative guardians of the historical memory of the Balkan wars, too. Collective memories and myths reproduced and interpreted by them are in a dialectic relationship with the academic and/or “official” historiography. This is especially important in a society preoccupied by, if not obsessed with, historical themes, i.e. they dictate the discourse and divert the public opinion off the more urgent and existential issues (Proeva ibidem, 176). For the purpose of this research, the author interviewed over sixty leading intellectuals, journalists, NGO activists, university professors, actors, writers and poets of Macedonian and Albanian origin. (With their permission some of the most interesting or the most illustrative attitudes have been quoted in the following text.)

As already said, the Macedonian society is deeply divided along ethnic lines, and an ongoing conflict between the two dominant groups revolves around the basic question: to whom the country belongs? And who has a major say in designing the future of the political community? The Ohrid Framework Agreement that concluded the 2001 armed conflict institutionalized (or better, constitutionalized) the ethnic differences, which only entrenched the divisions and perceptions on literally everything. The centennial of the Balkan wars took place only 12 years after the internal conflict, and at a critical point of implementation of the power-sharing system. Thus no wonder that any historical event has been (mis)used to prove one’s current political position. At this point it is important to remind that ethnicity is very much about the past. Virtually all ethnic groups, and virtually all theoretical conceptions of ethnic groups, make some reference to the past. Anthony Smith gives six attributes of ethnic groups, two of which are past-related: “a myth of common ancestry” and “shared historical memories”. In the context of this paper, the second one seems much more relevant than the

---

8 Prof. Žežov has addressed the Greek president Papoulias in an open letter on 7 July 2012 (available at http://kurir.mk/makedonija/vesti/77045-Pismo-od-prof-r-Nikola-Zezov-do-grckiot-pretsevatel-Papulas, last accessed on 4 October 2012). He appealed to the Greek president to acknowledge the existence of the historical reality and the existence of the Macedonian national identity but also refers to the period of the Balkan wars and Greece’s territorial appetites since the beginning of the 20th century.
first one. At least, the ethnic differences are so visible and clear that no ethnic group has a potential to assimilate the other. The point of agreement is precisely in the thesis that “we do not share a myth of common ancestry”.

Regardless their ethnic background, the interviewed public personalities by and large agree over the dominant perception of the Balkan wars and their consequences. Both groups, more or less, point out several postulates: a) on the eve of the Balkan wars there were Albanian and Macedonian peoples who sought independence and self-determination but they had always been freedom-loving people who had not waged aggressive wars against anybody; b) they were exploited and unjustly treated in the Ottoman Empire but at least they lived together with no borders to divide them; c) during the Balkan wars “their ethnic territories” were an object of conquest among the aggressive Balkan neighbours; d) the major war consequence was a shattered fatherland (be it “natural” Macedonia or Albania); e) Macedonians/Albanians were the biggest victims of the Balkan wars and major international injustice was inflicted on them; f) the Balkan wars period was one of the most tragic events in the national history; g) the neighbouring nation-states betrayed the Macedonians/Albanians i.e. stabbed a knife in their backs; h) the Balkan wars were not wars of national liberation but wars of territorial expansions at the expense of the smaller Balkan nations. The Turkish occupier was replaced by the Balkan ones.

Despite these points of agreement one can also distinguish a number of differences: having been divided in three parts, the Macedonians became strangers in their own homeland; the process of national awakening was brutally suppressed and they became an object of harsh assimilation by the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks. Unlike them, one part of the Albanian people gained an independent state, i.e. their statehood and nationhood were internationally recognized. Yet it is still perceived as a national tragedy by those parts of the Albanian nation that ended up as (unrecognized) national minorities in the neighbouring states. Regarding the character of the Balkan wars at glance it seems that the intellectuals from Macedonia are unanimous: Macedonians/Albanians did not gain anything/much from either of them. To the contrary, there is even a dose of “nostalgia” for the Ottoman times - because of different reasons, of course. There is obviously lot of romanticism and selective memory unlike the memory of Yugoslav times (especially among the Albanians). Interestingly, among the Macedonians the trauma is only occasionally related to human costs of the war but is mostly perceived as a collective tragedy and a lost opportunity for self-determination. On the other hand, the Albanians insist on war crimes and even genocide committed by the Serbs and
Montenegrins. Only few more critical intellectuals point out that the dominant narrative is a part of national imagination: the Macedonians and Albanians could not lose something they did not have at the time. In the words of a Macedonian analyst, the Balkan wars represent a watershed: the beginning of the shortest Macedonian century that started with these wars and ended up with the establishment of the full independence in 1991. According to the Albanian intellectuals, for all those who were excluded from the independent Albanian state what followed was murderous and discriminatory life under Serbian (anti-Albanian) rule. The Macedonians have slightly different perception: Ilinden Uprising (1903) was only a beginning, the second ‘Ilinden’ (1944) is related to the national self-determination and equality within Yugoslavia, while the third ‘Ilinden’ (1991) to the full-fledged statehood.

Asked to reflect on how much the dominant perception of the Balkan wars coincides with the historical events, and particularly with the way they are presented in the historiography, the majority interviewees find high degree of concurrence. The respondents consider themselves well-informed, but the same does not apply to the wider public. There are opinions that the general public have deliberately been made disinterested in their past: first, in Yugoslavia the history was levelled in order not to open wounds; and nowadays due to the flammable inter-ethnic relations and the complex regional complex, the international community takes over the role that used to belong to the communist elites - it imposes the attitude that past is less important than the future. Some analysts identify two basic stances among the population. The majority is ignorant and indifferent to events from one hundred years ago. It looks at them as if they are related to somebody else’s history: past is a foreign country for them. The other part of the society (although a minority) is congruent around a nub that is still nameless because the veil of anonymity has covered the people whose fight and suffering remained unrecognized as if they never existed. These people are intrinsically interested in the past and are in desperate need to document the truth of what happened to their ancestors. The family narratives and oral folklore keep that urge alive: they still want to get recognition of the pain which was and still feels real, because if they find the answer to this pain, it will be a cure too. According to the Albanian journalist, the Albanian historiography (meaning the one from the Republic of Albania) has been going through the process of de-politicization and revision of the old interpretations of events/historical personalities. Given its huge influence on the public opinion among Albanians that live in the other Balkan countries, what matters the most is the dominant ethnocentric approach and self-victimization. Critical historians and intellectuals are still exceptions in
all Balkan states. As far as the direct participation in the military operations is concerned, the Macedonians think of themselves as participants (voluntarily or forcefully recruited) in various Balkan militaries, while the Albanians have an opposite opinion: their ancestors were not welcomed by the Balkan League and their territories were perceived as war loot, while the population was something to be get rid of. The attitudes vis-a-vis the other Balkan nations among the Macedonians differ as they often cherish mixed feelings of brotherliness and hostility. A journalist argues: “The political elites have always been engaged in myth-making in order to cover their ineptitude or in order to create a mentality of an ‘unlucky, pitiable and incapable Macedonian’. But even the analysis of the folklore and the traditional songs shows that the half-educated audience has chosen to be in a role of a sufferer and victim rather than to be an active agent and a fighter.” On the other hand, the Albanians cherish a myth of a heroic warrior but with the respect of the Balkan wars many of them ‘skip’ the historical facts regarding mass participation in the Ottoman military and political structures.

Having been conscious about the handicaps of the historiography the respondents are not very trustful in the “official truth”. Some have greater expectations from the process of re-writing history since 1991. The subtle distrust is probably the reason why most of the respondents emphasize the importance of collective memory i.e. the narratives that have been transferred from one generation to another. Again the Macedonianness/Albanianness i.e. the continuity of the people’s self-awareness is the focal point in both campuses. For a Macedonian political scientist collective memory is modus vivendi for any people with short, complicated and denied state/constitutional history as the Macedonian one is. Without collective memory the national consciousness could have not been preserved especially in an absence of a state of one’s own to take over such functions. She asks: “Is it possible for written materials to have greater power than the words of those we love, respect and trust when they tell us - I am Macedonian, my father was Macedonian and his father was Macedonian too?” Almost all respondents regardless the ethnic background share stories about their grandparents who made time-charts of their memories in accordance to who was the occupier or in whose state institutions their ancestors worked (“during Ottoman times”, “during Serbian or Bulgarian time”, etc.).

Along with the memory of mass murders and expulsions, representative of both ethnic groups emphasize lack of historical acknowledgement of national suffering and reconciliation. A poet puts this in a more emotional form: the reliance in our collective memory should be increased, because the general public should be convinced that the
sufferings our grandparents went through were not fiction but fact. He argues: “One cannot be indifferent when s/he has lost her/his ancestors of two different generations, while the official historiography does not even mention them or classifies them as “others” or mere statistics.” Along with the notion of a shattered and divided fatherland, there is a feeling of being castrated and deprived from any memory. Those whose relatives were refugees or war victims in the Balkan wars say that the pain is the only thing they possess, along with the memories about the trauma and the narratives of the witnesses of those events. In his words, today, more than ever, division and pain define the Macedonian ethos. However, the Albanians have claims over trauma and pain too. Two Balkan wars as well as a good deal of the WWI were waged on the Macedonian soil but history has no remembrance of any Macedonian victims (be they civilians or soldiers). Even the graveyards that are well preserved are named according to the respective state army that took part. Within a project related to remembering the First World War a retired Macedonian ambassador proposed a symbolic name “Macedonia: necropolis of foreign soldiers”. The soldiers were buried under different state flags and symbols, i.e. remained anonymous and unaccounted. The most illustrative material testimony is a soldier’s gravestone.

Objectively few respondents have preserved any family evidence or photos of that time. Some point out that memories is mainly intimate/family category that is unreliable because it is an object of exaggeration, self-censorship or selective oblivion. Somewhere in-between the picture of the greatest national tragedy and the painful individual memories there is the gross emptiness, i.e. absence of any memorial that would relate to this period. This is evident even in the new museum of the Macedonian revolutionary battle with few exponents that would illustrate this period. It is questionable if this is a result of subconscious embarrassment because of the failure to create a nation-state (as it is perceived by the Macedonians), and especially change of sides during the wars. One respondent clearly points at unpleasant issues that are neglected not only in the historiography but also in the family narratives: only recently he found out that some of his ancestors were collaborators with the occupying forces. He concludes: “Probably we are unwilling to accept the fact that some of our ancestors used to declare themselves as Bulgarians, Serbs or even Greeks.” Professor of psychology points out a gap between the general picture of these events and the individual/family memories that are shattered across the region (i.e. preserved in what is named

---

9 Liskovski Petko from the village of Dobruševo, Bitola region, according to the data on the gravestone served in three armies: in the Turkish (1910-1912), the Serbian (1914-1915) and the Bulgarian one (1916-1918). The photo is available at: http://united_macedonia.blog.mk/tag/%D1%81%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0/?afilter=status (accessed on 17 September 2012)
emotional remembrance).

In a 2011 survey a specific question referred to events that had strong influence on ethnic groups in Macedonia, few respondents (less than 6%) chose an event prior to the Second World War (Klekovski 2011, 11-12). The leading researcher draws a conclusion that older historical experiences have been forgotten or pale in the face of more recent events (such as the 2001 conflict). An artist recalls that the citizens still have no complete picture of what happened 11 years ago and that memories even about war crimes have been buried quickly mainly because of the “peace at home” and the international community’s persistence. A writer concludes that the collective memory is important but at the same time it is legitimate to ask to which degree was it “tailored”, or - what and why we do remember or decide to forget other events? A journalist is sceptical if it is possible to speak of collective memory of any population (be it Macedonian or Albanian) that has been living in different societal, cultural and political settings since 1913. Experience shows that collective memory is alike pastry - it could be modelled and manipulated throughout time. Another journalist concludes: “Nationalism is always somewhat artificial. It does not call for better and deeper knowledge about events from the past; it takes advantage of some general points and in doses that are useful, no more and no less.” The quest for the guilt-bearer is a never-ending story of any nationalist agenda.

As far as the historical legacies are concerned, the two ethnic groups obviously hold different positions: given the ongoing denials of the Macedonian nation (mostly related to the so-called “name issue” but also extended in many other respects), the Macedonians believe that the consequences of the Balkan wars and divisions are still alive. The Albanians are more optimistic: the nationalistic version of the EU integration promises fulfilment of the dream for “all Albanians in one state”. Yet the blockade of the Republic of Macedonia by the Greek veto, both in NATO and EU, raises inter-ethnic tensions. The most radical Albanian leaders speak of “going to Europe with or without the Macedonians”. The European officials also warn of a possible security threats and fragmentation in case the Macedonian state is not moved forward towards full membership in NATO/EU.

In sum, in the view of the intellectuals it is very important to claim that (our) history is no foreign country, while others accept that forward-looking tactics and diminish the importance of historical knowledge. Only few argue that war histories should not be explored at all; wars in general mean sufferings, death, destruction and narratives that try to identify who was right and who was wrong de facto keep the seeds of mutual hatred. Such cries
remind of Nietzsche’s arguments against scientific-historical forms of knowledge in favour of unhistorical living.

CONCLUSION

Historiography, to use Napoleon’s aphorism, may be seen as a fable agreed upon. It is often seen as a process of selection and arrangement of facts (or ‘facts’) according to apparently reasonable patterns. Such patterns simply provide for one possible representation of ‘history’ out of the chaos of the available primary ‘facts’. Generally, any concept and debate within the social sciences is biased and reflects a certain philosophy and understanding of the societal relations upheld, explicitly or implicitly by the researchers themselves or their institutional and societal setting. Quite often appearance and development of certain theoretical standpoint is not a result of any actual change in the reality. According to the critical thinker, Robert Cox (1981, 128), theory is always for someone and for some purpose.

The centennial of the Balkan wars displayed the similarities in the collective memory of the Macedonians and the Albanians; yet, they do not contribute to creation to a national narrative that would overarch ethnic separatism. On the contrary, politics has been contaminated and historicized, while the history has become even more politicized. Any attempt for the Macedonians and the Albanians to find a joint narrative leads towards identification of a common enemy. As the former Great powers are not possible to be presented as such - they have transformed into preferable allies - the only ‘solution’ is to find one among the neighbours, most likely the Serbs and Greeks. The most disastrous politics is still the one that claims that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The Macedonians and the Albanians that are citizens of the common Macedonian state have failed to identify “shared historical memories”, i.e. a common myth of belonging to the same political community. The intra-state conflict is still alive while few even think of the necessity of reconciliation. Furthermore, the common vision for the future - membership to NATO/EU - seems to have become something that divides than rather than brings them together as the price for it is to be paid only by the Macedonians (their name and national identity).

REFERENCES:


[4]. Cox Robert, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: beyond international relations theory”, Millennium, Vol. 10, no.2 (Summer 1981);


[9]. Halbwachs Maurice and Lewis A. Coser, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992);

[10]. Hodgkin Katharine and Susannah Radstone, Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory (New York: Routledge, 2003);


[16]. Munslow Alun, Deconstructing History, London and NY, Routledge, 2006;


[19]. Proeva Nade, “Modern Macedonian myth as a response to the national myths of the neighbors (Albanian panilyrism, Greek panhellenism and Bulgarian panthracism)”, Historical Review, Ljubljana, vol. 64, 2010, no. 1-2;


Abstract: This paper tries to ascertain the position and the role of the Balkan wars in the typology of 21st century conflicts, based on an analysis of both historical and contemporary research material on greater armed conflicts. In an effort to do so, it starts by the notion that war, as a socio-historical category, has characteristics that can be considered as general for identification with other wars, and distinctive characteristics that can be used to make distinction between wars. In the category of distinctive characteristics, we can also include the Macedonian people and territory, where the Balkan wars were mostly fought, and which mostly sparks the interest of the neighbouring countries and the great powers alike. It has been conjectured that the lessons and messages of these wars may serve a useful purpose to the Macedonian people and the Macedonian country, in the sense of overcoming the problems created by armed conflicts in all situations of life and in the development of the country.

Key words: war, armed conflicts, lessons, messages, experiences, people, territory, country.
INTRODUCTION

War, as a socio-historical category, in its evolutionary development originates in the most elementary forms of destruction, and it will reach the most complex ones, having a destructive power that can cause unfathomable consequences with global proportions. In terms of destructiveness, the Balkan wars, and the First and Second World War, represent a step forward in relation to wars led in the 19th century, and a significant signal that the industrial approach to application of force opens wide possibilities for increased destructiveness. It is certain that this relates mainly to countries as lead roles in international relations, and to war as a regular threat. In such conditions, armed forces as separate state institutions are the most significant instruments for realisation of goals of the political strategy practiced by war. On the other hand, peoples that had no country and no armed forces of their own faced every danger that war and expansionist policies of the neighbouring countries and the great powers imposed at the given period. In that sense, and as a historical experience, this will be subject of interest and analysis in the first part of this paper.

In the second part of the paper, attention will be paid and analysis will be performed on the current aspect of larger armed conflicts, which represent the contemporary reality of armed conflicts, and which have undertaken the primary importance of classical warfare as a significant trait of 20th century wars, including the Balkan wars.

At the end of the paper, at the place of conclusions and deductions, lessons and messages, significant to the Macedonian people and country will be incorporated.

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES OF THE BALKAN WARS SIGNIFICANT TO THE MACEDONIAN PEOPLE

The attempt for a deeper immersion into the Balkan wars phenomenon opens an entire range of issues that impose the need for analysis from several aspects. Thus, the issue
of the historical experience of the Macedonian people can be analysed by at least two aspects, as a general historical experience, and as a national historical experience.

From the aspect of a general historical experience: how to efficiently form a condition and processes that converge more with the needs and interests of peoples who have already constituted their countries, especially those peoples whose countries have already been established as great powers, mostly due to the fact that at the beginning of the 20th century, most significant actors in the international relations were great powers, such as imperial Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey and others. Smaller countries, each by its own and allied with other countries have tried to impose their influence and fulfil their interests, above all in their immediate proximity, in the meanwhile striving to incorporate their interests into those of the larger countries. Almost without exceptions, they would adjoin to some of them and would seek support and assistance in realising strategic interests and goals which were expansionist. In the case and period relative to the Balkan wars, it regards to the neighbours of the Macedonian people, who had already formed their own independent countries, such as Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. Thus, for instance, the mentor of Bulgaria and Serbia is imperial Russia, which is evident in the friendship and alliance agreement, made immediately prior to the start of the First Balkan war. Namely, it is evident in the secret annex – a secret part of the agreement where it is stated that the possible misunderstandings surrounding the division of the territory are to be solved and decided upon by imperial Russia (Потемкин, Б.П., 1949:193). The Balkan Peninsula is of the utmost importance to Russia due to its access to the ‘warm seas’. At first, Russia wanted to actualise this intention through Serbia, so when this failed, Russia attempted to do this through Bulgaria. For this purpose, the Russian diplomat, the duke Ignatiev, will create the concept of a Greater Bulgaria (a San Stefano Bulgaria), through which Russia will have access to the sea. In this process, no heed has been paid to other territories and peoples, especially to the Macedonian people and the territory they lived on, which was under the influence of Turkey. Unlike the Macedonian people, the new concept was found not only very suitable by ruling circles in Bulgaria, but it will become their main preoccupation, ambition and a guide in the actualisation of expansionist interests. The access to the ‘warm seas’ was the desire and interest of the Serbian bourgeoisie as well, members of which also held positions in imperial Russia. Differences arose regarding the use of Serbian territory for the needs of imperial Russia. However, the sole attempt at realisation of this concept, speaks volumes about the estimates of the Russian diplomacy that it is viable, and it is founded in the already established relations. The issue of interests is another
matter, since interests can either converge or disjoin.

The issue of the countries’ interests can also be raised to the level of establishing of new relations, different of the already mentioned, as alliances between the smaller countries that will venture to disobey the recommendations of the great powers. For instance, despite the recommendation of the great powers not to wage war against Turkey, the Balkan countries will embark upon the First Balkan war. In fact, in a time when Turkey is facing a general system crisis and an uncertain future, the gates will be widely open for the visibility of the expansionist policy of the great powers, especially of the countries already constituted on the Balkans. The Balkan countries, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece, feeling the auspiciousness of the moment for realisation of their expansionist interests, will organise and prepare both separately, and as an alliance, to reach their goals. Indirectly, this will signify the ignoring of the great powers’ interests or a perfect timing needed to favour their own interests which would potentially be endangered by the great powers. However, in both cases the subject of interest is the European part of the territory then still ruled by Turkey, especially the territory on the Balkan Peninsula. Thus, the main instruments for realisation of the expansionist interests were their armies. The army is a special state institution that held the role of ‘warlord’. In that sense, the army was paid a great deal of attention and was greatly supported by the countries, aiming to improve it in quality and quantity. Quantity is expressed through the formation of a several thousand soldier army, equipped and trained for military actions and activities. In fact, it regards a clash of a million soldiers war, the largest part of which – around three hundred thousand soldiers each belong to Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey, while Greece had an army of about one hundred thousand soldiers, and Montenegro had little above thirty thousand soldiers (Vojna enciklopedija – 1, 1970). In order to avoid confusion, there are other data (Тодоров, 1938), different from the above mentioned, but essentially, as already mentioned, it regards a clash of armies of the type of mass armies, with more than one million troops.

With regards to quality, relative to the needs and strategic interests of the countries, the army follows the trend of development of industrial technologies, and in accordance to the needs it applies these in the direction of increasing fire power. This is especially evident in artillery tools through the introduction of groove artillery, increase of the quality of gunpowder, and the introduction of wide-range and automatic weapons. Ultimately, this will find a most unfavourable reflection on the troops, whose loss will increase several times. For instance, the number of casualties in the World War II only will be 168,900, 93,000 of which
are Bulgarians, 44,500 are Serbian, 20,000 Greek, 6,000 Romanian, 4,000 Turkish, and 1,400 Montenegrin (Скоко, 1975).

This will favour the need for great armies that are capable, like in the case of the Balkan wars, to commence a second war after the first, despite the great loss of manpower. To meet those needs, they are certainly going to use their capacities and forces, but they will not let go of the capacities and forces of peoples who live on the territory they were fighting for, which was under Turkish rule. This is mainly with regards to the Macedonian territory and the Macedonian people, which brings us closer to the second aspect of the Balkan wars analysis.

NATIONAL HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND MEMORY

The closest experience of the Macedonian people, in the battle for freedom and a country of their own before the eruption of the Balkan wars, was the Ilinden uprising. The attempt to create a Republic will work, but will be short-lived. In a period when the revolutionary forces and the Turkish army will clash on Mechkin Kamen, the qualitative and quantitative advantage of the Turkish army will be obvious, ultimately resulting in harsh consequences for the Macedonian people, and especially the revolutionary organisation, which was the foundation, the pillar, and the moving force of the resistance, and of the fight for freedom and creation of a country. It became obvious that the Republic cannot persist without a constant organised armed force to guard it from every danger. This will prove to be very significant in a period when Turkey faces a ruling crisis over the Balkan territories. The crisis will be a meaningful signal for the revolutionary organisation to return to their old fight for freedom and autonomy. This time, unlike past chances, the organisation will face new enemies, unfortunately expecting them to afford assistance. Namely, the Macedonian people believed that its neighbours would offer aid in the fight for freedom, through participation and contribution in the war the Balkan countries Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro were preparing against Turkey. The enthusiasm and the expectations were so great that the Macedonian people, and especially its Revolutionary Organisation were prepared as volunteers to participate in the war for realisation of century-long fight for their freedom and their own country. The Revolutionary Organisation, especially in the district of Ser, had well-organised bands, capable of performing military activities.

More widely, on the territory of Macedonia, there were thirty-four bands. Forty-four bands were formed in Bulgaria, amounting to seventy-eight along with the ones formed in Macedonia. The Bulgarian Supreme Command formed special headquarters for organisation
of the Macedonian bands, which will later be entitled ‘Headquarters of the Macedonian Regiment (Opolchenie) – volunteers’. Greater tactical units – brigades were also formed, ten of which were purely Macedonian.

Macedonian volunteers were also present in the Serbian army, organised in volunteer bands, while later there was a volunteer regiment of 2,400 Macedonians, Albanians and Turks under the command of the Greek army in the so-called ‘Holy Band’ comprised of andartes – volunteers chetniks from Aegean Macedonia (Историја на македонскиот народ, 1969:364-365).

Macedonian volunteers acted either as a vanguard or along with the regular units of the Bulgarian, the Serbian or the Greek army, mostly in the first battle lines. They were given the most difficult army tasks, and when major tactical units were formed, such as the brigades in Bulgaria, they were sent to the front in Thrace. Although these forces are insignificant compared to the dimensions of the Bulgarian army, this move made it obvious that they were striving towards elimination of any chance that may incur any risk that might trigger unfavourable connotations for the Bulgarian expansionist policy, centring on the territory of Macedonia.

On the other hand, Macedonian volunteers acted both in cooperation with regular units of the Allies, and independently. In many places, they activated and organised the Macedonian population as village militia. In that sense, the role of the independent squad of Jane Sandanski amounting to 500 chetniks was especially significant, especially from the aspect of the experience and memory of the Macedonian people, as to the opportunity to expose their wish for freedom even in times of war, when lacking an army of their own.

**CURRENT ASPECTS OF THE BALKAN WARS**

One hundred years after the end of the Balkan wars, in the prestigious London Strategic Research Institute ‘The Military Balance’, war is defined as ‘an international conflict that implicates the beleaguered parties – governments into an armed conflict over sovereignty or territory’ (The Military Balance, 2008).

War and conflict act as the general and the distinctive, whereby the general represents conflict, and the distinctive represents war. Each war in turn represents an armed conflict. However, not every conflict is necessarily a war. According to the UN and in the prestigious Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI Yearbook, 2006), any larger armed conflict between the armed forces of two parties, at least one of which being the government
of a country, resulting in at least 1,000 victims on the battlefield in a given calendar year, can be called a war. In the case of the Balkan wars, it is evident that these can also be placed under the term of international armed conflict which implicates the governments of the Allies: Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece, against Turkey in the First Balkan War; and the governments, i.e. the armed forces of Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Turkey against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War. The First Balkan war will be led by the Allies against Turkey over a territory that was still under Turkish rule, mostly regarding Macedonia. In the Second Balkan war, the centre of attention is still the Balkan territory, but this time the issue is its division. Namely, Bulgaria deemed that the previous division, effectuated after the First Balkan war, was against its interests, hopes, and aspirations for a Greater Bulgaria, therefore igniting a new war. Bulgaria will be defeated, and not only will it fail to acquire the desired part of the territory on the Balkans, but it will also be denied what was previously awarded by the First Balkan war. However, of the territory won by Turkey, Bulgaria will be awarded 21,000 km$^2$, Greece will be awarded 55,000 km$^2$, Serbia 39,000 km$^2$, Montenegro 11,000 km$^2$, and Romania 800 km$^2$ (Скоко, 1975), which clearly shows that the conflict has been led for acquiring territory. In other words, and in relation to the style of warfare, it is evident that it regards a territorially focused approach.

Regarding victims, for instance, in the Second Balkan war, starting on 30 June 1913, and ending on 30 July 1013, during a month of conflict, the number of victims will reach an astonishing 168,900 victims, most of which are Bulgarian: 93,000. Therefore, it can be concluded that this was a style of warfare that is focused on incapacitation and infliction of as great as possible damage in manpower on the opponent. Certainly, a great deal of the fault for this lies in the warfare means, which due to the application of the advantages of the industrial revolution, will have much greater impact and fire power, than other previous wars. This trend, unfortunately, shows signs of increasing from that period on.

On the other hand, this leaves no room for comparison with the definition of a conflict which has 1,000 casualties within one year to be transformed and to grow into a war. However, this opens up opportunities for further analysis, especially significant for the new millennium, in which a multi-polar conflict environment fraught with irregular and diffuse threats is formed, which is not the case with the Balkan wars.

In essence, when it comes to analysis of the Balkan wars from a contemporary aspect, when we are already well into the 21st century, we can say that it regards a bi-polar conflict environment filled with regular threats and regular forces. More exactly, the armies
of the beleaguered parties represent regular forces, and the war is a regular threat, all else ignored. We will also ignore the participation and the contribution of the Macedonian people, who instead of being liberated, will fall under another rule, and its territory will be divided among the Balkan countries.

With regards to the status of the Balkan wars, in comparison to contemporary conflicts’ status, without exceptions they cover the area relative to active conflicts, ceasefire/amnesty, and peace treaty (The Military Balance, 2008). Ceasefire is an agreement between the beleaguered parties, whereby all military actions are regulated and ceased. It does not stand as an official conflict resolution, and it suggests that all conflicts have been disrupted. The case with the Balkan wars, especially the First Balkan war, confirms that, and especially that despite the truce, warfare activities will indeed continue. A peace treaty, on the other hand, represents an official conflict resolution by authorised parties, and it can regulate the manner of realisation of the post-conflict commitments. This is especially with regards to the commitments of the party that lost the conflict. However, as was the case of the London treaty of 30 May 1013, it may happen that one of the victorious parties – in the given case Bulgaria, is not satisfied with the division of the territory ruled by Turkey on the Balkans, and that it starts a new war within a month – in this case the Second Balkan war. The Second Balkan war will last for a month, during which there will be a truce, and a further continuation of warfare, ultimately ending with the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 10 August 1913. This treaty only effectuates the division of the territories that have already been divided.

This was the actual state of matters at the time of the Balkan wars, when the greatest influence in international relations was in the hands of countries, mainly through the armed forces as their main instruments, put in the function of expansionist policy and interests. Today, this seems to be a good foundation for estimation and expression of strategic interests and goals of the Macedonian people, in a time when we live in a kind of a storm. Acting otherwise means facing the consequences we have already seen, stated and felt during a significant period of time. This is one of the lessons and messages, alongside with the lesson that the number of casualties in the Balkan wars is really big, and refers mostly to military persons, rather than civilians. Armies can be said to have been mass, and practiced the territorially-focused approach, and the approach that enable them to inflict the greatest possible damage to the opponent. The conflict environment was bi-polar, and filled with regular forces and regular threats, which were in the function of realising expansionist policies and interests of the countries as lead roles in international relations.
The Macedonian people were abused, manipulated, and indoctrinated, which along with the lack of a unique military organisation and a country of their own, will be most unfavourably reflected in the fight for freedom and a country at the time and under the given circumstances.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
[1]. Битоски, К. и сор. (1969) Историја на македонскиот народ, Скопје: Институт за национална историја;
[2]. Потемкин, В.О., (1949) Историја димпломатије, Свеска друга, Београд: Архива за правне и друштвене науке;
[3]. Скоко, С., (1975) Други балкански рат 1913, Књига друга, Београд, Војно издавачки завод;
[5]. Тодоров, К., (1938) Политичка историја савремене Бугарске, Београд;
[7]. Vojno izdavacki zavod (1970) Vojna enciklopedija, Drugo izdanje-1, Beograd: VIZ.
Abstract: This thesis, through political-geographic and geopolitical analysis, deals with a problem that was relevant more than one hundred years ago, and it refers to the situations that reflect through the centripetal and the centrifugal forces that are fundamental in the creation of the states. Basically, the paper analyzes the situations on the territory of Macedonia during the Ottoman Empire, until the break out of the Balkan wars and the territorial partition of Macedonia. The theoretical basis of the political-geographic analysis relies on Richard Hartshorne's theory of territorial integration, a model which, with certain modifications, will be applied for the territory of Macedonia under Ottoman rule, and a model which enables specific case studies.

Keywords: territorial integration, centripetal forces, centrifugal forces, Macedonia, Balkan Wars.

Апстракт: Трудот преку политичко-географска и геополитичка анализа обработува проблем кој бил актуелен пред повеќе од 100 години, а се однесува на състоябите кои се рефлектираат преку центрипеталните и центрифугалните сили кои се основни при создавањето на државите. Во основа, анализирани се състоябите на територијата на Македонија за времето на Отоманската империја, до отпочнувањето на Балканските војни и територијалната поделба на Македонија. Теоретската основа на политичко-географската анализа се потпира на теоријата на Ричард Хартшорн за територијална интеграција, модел кој, со одредени модификации, ќе биде применет за територијата на Македонија под турска власт, и модел кој овозможува одделни студии на случај.

Ключни зборови: територијална интеграција, центрипетални сили, центрифугални сили, Македонија, Балкански војни.
INTRODUCTION

The Balkan is an area in which the natural-geographic predispositions, as well as the complex internal and surrounding anthropogenic structure, determine the political-geographic dynamics as the basic characteristic of that part of the planet which is characterized by division, antagonisms, border problems, territorial pretensions, spheres of interest, national, religious and political exclusion, influence of the Great Powers, economic polarization, and else.

The political-geographic and the geopolitical processes become synonyms for the Balkan due to the historical, 100 years continuity and constancy of the “actors”, the methods, the final effects that are manifested by transformation of the position, the population and migration processes, socio-economic systems, political-territorial structures, geostrategic postulates and the foreign interests both in the whole Region, as well as in certain parts of it.

The contemporary political map of the Balkan is a product of a centurial historical development and an interaction of various, often diametrically opposite elements with geographical, political, military, demographic, economic, and cultural character. For example, if we go back to the Balkan in the period of long-term (centurial) presence of two powerful, but internally-politically divergent countries, Austro-Hungary and Turkey (Ottoman Empire), we will notice that what was created is, on one hand, a line of civilization split and, on the other hand, a huge internal, interethnic and historical intertwining/mix. Going into the sphere of building nations/states, the phenomenon of each state/nation proving its own ethnic “purity” comes to the surface. Barbara Jelavich in her work “History of the Balkans: 20th Century”, points out: “...in all regions, the population is a union of natives and consecutive conquerors, that is to say, a “mixture” created through military conquering by a stronger group via absorbing one nation by another nation due to greater number of the population, or via accepting another language due to the cultural attractiveness offered by some more advanced civilization...” (Jelavich, B. 1999: 521-530). In such a condition, the attempts to establish an acceptable model of coexistence among the numerous entities which are constitutive elements of various states, during the political-geographic process were very complicated and followed by redrawing of the political map. Namely, the practice so far, confirms that on several occasions and under certain circumstances, the latent or the overt rivalries became a substitute for the rational solving of the problems, resulting in potentially unstable or violent situations, which burden the political-geographic process in the Balkans during this whole past period of time.
The political-geographic and the geopolitical processes which take place in the Balkans are caused by internal and external factors. However, this classification of these two factors is conditional, given the mutual entanglement and interconnection of the common interests and goals. The type and the essence of the impact of certain factors exceed the stereotyped understanding of the direct or the indirect, political-diplomatic, economic and military strategy and tactics as possible mechanisms for effectuating the specific interests. The local factors, as instigators of the Balkan political-geographic and geopolitical processes, are various, and their status, almost without exceptions, is defined by the illusion of their own place in the international relations, due to which they often end up in the labyrinth which as a final result turns them into a “fill-in” of the stronger, in the re-designing of the political-territorial setting. The Macedonian factor, its historical destiny, is a typical example of this Balkan dualism.

In this thesis, we deal with the situations on the territory of ethno-geographic Macedonia during a whole sequence of years before the fall of the Ottoman Empire until the period of the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest. We will refer to Richard Hartshorne’s theory of territorial integration, through which we will analyze the situations in Macedonia prior to the break out of the Balkan Wars. At the same time, the thesis will also refer to the political-territorial partition of ethno-geographic Macedonia after the Treaty of Bucharest and the migration processes of the Macedonian and other population as a result of these wars.

MACEDONIA THROUGH RICHARD HARTSHORNE’S THEORY OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION

The American geographer Richard Hartshorne is one of the elite intellectuals who dealt with studying the political geography and the territorial states. According to him and to the functionalistic approach towards the political geography, the basic purpose of the country is to link its different social and territorial segments in an efficient whole. He creates a theory called “a theory of territorial integration”. The territorial integration depends on two types of forces, centrifugal forces which divide the country and centripetal forces which keep it together. Hartshorne’s theory of territorial integration provides a model for analysis of specific cases. We will try to apply this starting theoretical approach, with certain modifications, onto the ethno-geographic Macedonia, which in the frames of the Ottoman Empire was characterized by the homogenous structure of the predominant Christian population that inhabited that
Security

territory.

As the most important centrifugal forces, Hartshorne emphasizes all those diversities in the nature of the population of a state, that is to say a territory. This diversity might be manifested in several ways. The most common reasons for conflicts in certain territories are the language, the ethnic and the religious differences, but also other elements such as the political philosophy, the education and the life style. Hartshorne identifies one basic, most important centripetal force and that is the idea of a state. Every state (in the contemporary world) or every territory in the frames of the Ottoman Empire had “reason d’être” – reason to exist. (Taylor, P. 1993: 150-151). By combining these theoretical premises, we will try to identify which forces were predominant on the territory of ethno-geographic Macedonia under the Ottoman rule. For that purpose, the period from the 16th century until the period of the establishing of the Balkan countries and Balkan Wars will be analyzed.

**CENTRIFUGAL AND CENTIPETAL FORCES ON THE TERRITORY OF MACEDONIA AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE BALKAN WARS**

The situation of the Christian population in the 16th century was characterized by paying high taxes, having no possibilities to get included in the state and the military authority of the Empire. They did not have the right to carry weapons. Converting to Islam was the only way to avoid the discrimination. The Dervish order of the Bektashis, whose beliefs were full of Christian and pagan customs which enabled an easier acceptance of the Islam had a special role in the spreading of the Islam. (Chepreganov, T. 2008:144).

The Ottoman Empire under the rule of Suleiman the Lawgiver (1520-1566) reaches its zenith. In that period, the Empire spread over three continents, including more than 20 million citizens in its borders. The defeat in the Siege of Vienna and Suleiman’s death marks the process of the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The military-political crisis which emerged in the Empire transferred on the social order as well, that is to say the change in the feudal relations in the Ottoman Empire. The military defeats on external plan, the loss of territories after each peace treaty and the ever growing dependence, both political and economic, on the Western European countries, as well as the ever growing arbitrariness of the local feudal lords, highlighted the crisis of the Empire even more. The crisis slowly opened the door to the anarchy, which due to the coming to rule of the incapable Sultans and the independent policies of the local feudal lords towards the central government in Istanbul, slowly but surely separated part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The anarchy conditions did not elude the territory of Macedonia, in which several powerful feudal lords, who even had their own
armies consisted of mercenaries, became independent.

These conditions in the frames of the Ottoman Empire deteriorated to a great extent the conditions of the peasants/common people, especially of the Christian population. Since then started the resistance by the Christian population which more and more difficulty coped with the responsibilities towards the feudal lords, and on the other hand, people became conscious of the possibility to free themselves from the slavery. The excessive economic exploitation enabled the development of an unarmed character resistance forms. First such rebellion was the Mariovsko-Prilepska rebellion dated 1564/1565. On the other hand, the armed forms of resistance manifested through the haiduks’ movement which had the character of “road robbery”, inherited from the medieval century, without any organized form of resistance against the government. The haiduks’ movement was especially evident during the wars of the Ottoman Empire with the European countries. In the period of the Austro-Turkish war (1683-1699), in the North-Eastern part of Macedonia, the haiduk leader, Karposh established a territory the Ottomans had no control over. The Karposh Uprising started in October 1689 when the Austrian armies advanced in Macedonia. The area of Kumanovo and Kriva Palanka was the centre of the uprising. In other words, the main stronghold of that territory was Kriva Palanka. In November already, the Ottomans perpetrated a decisive attack against the Austrians and against Karposh’s rebels. This uprising was Macedonian Christian population’s first attempt to counter the Ottoman rule.

In that period, the Archbishopric of Ohrid, which managed to keep its autonomous and privileged status and which in its frames comprised almost all of the Orthodox ecumena on the Balkan headed by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, had an important role. Through its organizational structure, the Archbishopric performed its function. The centre of the Archbishopric was Ohrid where the Archbishop and the Synod were, as the highest governing and legislative body. The Archbishop was responsible for the functioning of the Church and answered to the Ottoman authority regarding the peace among the Orthodox Christians. The borders of the Archbishopric of Ohrid depended, above all, on the “mood” of the authorities towards it. Besides the fact that its borders were changing, i.e. they were narrowing more and more, and the autonomous rights were decreasing, 9 eparchies stayed in its frames constantly. Those were the eparchies of: Kostur-Elbasan, Berat, Voden, Durres, Greben, and Sisan, as well as 5 bishoprics, i.e. the bishoprics of: Debar-Kichevo, Veles, Prespa, Meglen, and Goramokrensko. From the aforesaid, we could can that in terms of the religion there was a discriminating component which we determine as a centrifugal force.
In the frames of the Ottoman Empire, the Macedonian population, in terms of the administrative-political order, lived in the context of the Millet system (Rum Millet – Orthodox). That meant that the non-Muslim population had the right to organize and run the internal affairs in terms of religion and other citizens’ issues on their own, such as marriages, divorces, inheritance, education, and so on. The first serious territorial losses of the Archbishopric of Ohrid were felt with the renewal of the Patriarchy of Pec in 1557. The Northern Macedonian territories fell under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchy. This is a negative aspect in terms of strengthening the national consciousness among the Macedonian population, i.e. we can classify it as one of the centrifugal forces. Up until its abolition in 1767, the Archbishopric of Ohrid played a very important role in preserving the culture and the religion, as well as in spreading the literacy among the Christian population in the whole Balkan. The churches and the monasteries had a strong influence and were a strong centripetal force for strengthening the ethnic identity of the Macedonian population. (Chepreganov, 2008: 144-163).

The period that followed, especially the 19th century, was characterized by numerous reforms by the Turkish rulers who insisted in turning the Empire into a modern pro-western-European country. However, the political power in Macedonia stayed in the hands of the Muslims, while the religious-educational power, in the hands of the Patriarchy of Constantinople (Greek). This period is characterized by the Razlog Uprising which began on May 29, 1876, under the leadership of Dimitar Pop Georgiev. The following year, more precisely, April 24, 1877 Russia declared war to the Ottoman Empire, in which Serbia, Montenegro and a considerable number of Macedonian volunteers took part. The war ended on March 3, 1878 with the defeat of the Ottoman army and the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano. With this treaty, the autonomous Bulgarian country was established which covered the whole Vranje County, Korce and entire Macedonia. However, in June the same year, under the pressure of the Great Powers, the Treaty of San Stefano was reviewed on the Congress of Berlin, with which Bulgaria was divided in two parts: on the territory from Danube to Stara Planina the autonomous Principality of Bulgaria was established; while from Southern Bulgaria, the autonomous region – Eastern Rumelia. Macedonia remained under the Sultan’s rule, while Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were declared independent. Regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, a decision was made that it would be occupied by Austro-Hungary. Thessaly and Epirus were ceded to Greece, while Great Britain got the Island of Cyprus. Article 15 of the Treaty which provided a full autonomy of most part of Macedonia and Article 23 which provided the implementation of certain reforms that referred to Macedonia as well were
never effectuated.

The Kresna Uprising dated October 1878 was the next armed event which was a reflection of the unfavorable decisions of the Treaty of Berlin which reflected negatively on the situation of the Macedonian population. This uprising is the first serious and more massive Macedonian national revolutionary and liberation manifestation in the 19th century (Chepreganov, 2008:176). This event can be characterized as a strong centripetal force which, despite the misunderstandings that occurred regarding the aims of the uprising among those who dictated/directed from Sofia and the Macedonian insurgents who were of the opinion that the goal of the uprising should be the liberation of Macedonia. The Headquarters in Sofia regarded that the uprising should mirror the revolt that the Treaty of Berlin separated Macedonia from San-Stefan Bulgaria.

Article 23 from the Treaty of Berlin caused heavy armed movement in the South-Western regions of Macedonia. The result of these actions was the forming of an Interim Government of Macedonia by the National Assembly on June 2, 1880, on the mountain Gramos. The requirements by the Interim Government also have characteristics of a centripetal force which united the Macedonian population and was an incentive for developing of the national consciousness. Namely, the Assembly required the creation of unity of the population and unity of the country, so that solely the Macedonian interests and rights would be promoted (Chepreganov, 2008: 177). In that period of awakening of the Macedonian national consciousness, centrifugal forces were manifested by all four neighbors to Macedonia. Bulgaria and Serbia through the Slavic character of the language and its similarity with the language spoken by the majority of the population in Macedonia, tried to give proof for the Bulgarian i.e. Serbian character of Macedonia. The Bulgarian Exarchate among its other tasks, it also had the task to spread the Bulgarian national and political impact in Macedonia. In that, the methods that were used were really brutal. The Greeks emphasized their arguments through their “historical rights” considering Macedonia as their ancient inheritance, while they neglected the fact that in the period of the ancient Greeks, they considered Macedonia and the Macedonians as barbarian country and barbarian nation, that is to say enemies of the Hellenes. The Greeks found their own imperative for owning that territory and nation in their belonging to the Orthodox Church. (Chepreganov, 2008: 179).

These developments, with pressures and political propaganda from the neighboring countries, enabled the creation of one more centripetal force, i.e. the Macedonian revolutionary movement led by the Macedonian intellectuals from that period. Regarding
the social conditions in Macedonia in the context of the Ottoman Empire, and the fact that the most part of the Macedonian territory was inhabited by compact, uniform population, we can characterize the Macedonian revolutionary movement as a basic “idea” for creating independent Macedonian state. The Ilinden Uprising dated August 2, 1903 is a demonstration of the free spirit of the Macedonian population, because of the fact that especially in the Bitola County people stoved for overthrowing the much hated Government and for occupation of territories in which a special government/rule by the insurgents was being established. The Krushevo Republic, with revolutionary power and equal participation of all “nations”, reflects the policy and the desire of the Macedonian nation for autonomous, independent country.

In the period of the Young Turk Revolution, as an important centripetal factor, it should be mentioned that from the divided revolutionary movement, it was the left wing led by Sandanski which accepted the Young Turks reforms. Then, Peoples’ Federative Party was formed, which directed activities for rearranging the Ottoman Empire upon the principles of decentralization and peoples’ self-government, by which all the ethnic regions and minorities in the Empire would gain national equality. These requests would enable the Macedonian people to gain its national rights and to preserve its own territorial integrity. (Chepreganov, 2008: 209).

THE BALKAN WARS AND THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST AS CENTRIFUGAL FORCES

An important segment in the political-geographic process in the Balkan and in the forming of its political map is the so called Eastern Crisis dated 1875-1878. Winning this war, Russia signs with Turkey the Treaty of San Stefano, in favor of Bulgaria. The Great Powers did not agree with the decisions of the Treaty of San Stefano, due to which in the same year, 1878, the Congress of Berlin took place, during which the political map of the Balkan was redrawn (Grchikj, М. 2000: 451). Then, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro gained complete independence, and the Principality of Bulgaria was established (in 1908 it declared its independence, thus the last Vassal relations towards Turkey were rejected (Historical Atlas, 1999: 98) and the autonomous Turkish province Eastern Rumelia was also established (Hristov, D., Donev, J. 1994:71-90). In 1885, Eastern Rumelia with its centre in Plovdiv united with Bulgaria, and in 1879 there was an uprising on Crete which was actively supported by Greece through sending volunteers, but also through causing diversions in Epirus and Macedonia. The result was Crete’s autonomy. By solving the Crete issue, Macedonia is left the only Turkish province with predominant Christian population, which was still waiting for reforms. (Talevski, J. 1998: 20).
The Balkan wars had the greatest defragment character in terms of the territorial integrity of ethno-geographic Macedonia. In the political-geographic process, these wars caused long term changes in the Balkan, especially for Macedonia. Not had the Macedonian regions in the frames of the Ottoman Empire been the main topic towards the end of the 19th century only, but, later on, they will become the main point of discord among the Balkan countries. In that period, Macedonia did not have defined political borders, that is, it was a part of the three Vilayets: Salonica (Thessaloniki), Kosovo and Bitola. It is considered that in the North the region was bordered by Sar Planina; by the Rhodopes in the East; in the South – the Aegean Sea, the Olympus Mountain and the Pindus mountain range; and in the West, the Ohrid Lake (Jelavich, B. 1999:104). The region’s great geostrategic importance was of huge significance for it. It was situated in the heart of the Peninsula and included in its territory the valleys of the rivers Vardar and Struma. The main Ottoman port, after Constantinople, was the Thessaloniki Port, and the city of Thessaloniki was the economic centre of Macedonia. This city was linked to Belgrade by a railroad ever since 1888. Austro-Hungary, after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, had the same interest in the regions south of the Aegean, as was Russia’s interest in Bulgaria. Russia and Great Britain had their impact upon the Region’s destiny due to its vicinity to the straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles) and due to the role it played in the balance of the forces on the Balkan. For the Balkan nationalists, Macedonia had even more vital significance, that is to say, the one who ruled/possessed Macedonia had the dominant strategic position on the Peninsula as well. Thus, the fundamental opposition to the establishing of the San Stefano Greater Bulgaria was due to the fact that the territory that was to be given to Bulgaria, which included Macedonia as well, would have made it the most powerful state on the Balkan. (Jelavikj, B. 1999:104-105).

Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro emphasized their desires to own the economic wealth, besides the strategic advantages of Thrace, Macedonia and Albania. The Macedonian territory was the main geographic area which comprised the most important economic and communicational terrain for prevailing over the Aegean shores with Thessaloniki and the Adriatic shore in Albania. Especially important were the valleys of the rivers Vardar and Struma which enabled fast and secure approach to the Aegean islands, through the Thessaloniki Port and the Kavala Port.

In February/March 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (Hristov, D., Donev, J. 1994:162-166), according to which it was agreed in future to act
jointly and coordinate against Turkey and to jointly solve all the problems that would occur during their cooperative action. In May 1912, Bulgaria and Greece signed a Treaty of Alliance and Defense (Hristov, D., Donev, J. 1994:167-169), however, they did not make an agreement about dividing territories, while in October Montenegro signed a Treaty for Alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria.

The First Balkan War broke out on October 8, 1912, when the Montenegrin troops crossed the border of the Ottoman Empire and surrounded Shkoder. The Balkan Allies easily defeated the Ottoman army (700,000 allied forces, against 320,000 Turkish), (Jelavikj, B. 1999:114) and during the military operations until December 4, 1912, when the truce was concluded, and after that, until June 29, 1913, the day of the outburst of the Inter-allies war, they divided Macedonia as follows:

Serbia occupied the so called undisputed zone (Hristov, T. 2001:230) from the “Secret Annex” in the Serbian-Bulgarian Treaty for Friendship and Alliance, and that is on the North-West, form the line Golem Vrv – Gabovci Monastery on the Ohrid Lake, as well as the most part of the so called disputed zone from the line from Golem Vrv to Vardar, between the villages Pepelishte and Krivolak and along the river Vardar to Gevgelija, i.e. everything to the West of that line/border. In Gevgelija, a triple condominium came to rule, Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek armies and authorities. The Southern border between Serbia and Greece starched from Western of Gevgelija, through the mountains Kozhuv, Baba, including the Ohrid Lake up to the Albanian mountains (Talevski, J. 1998: 23).

Bulgaria occupied the undisputed zone recognized with the Treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria dated 1912, that is, East of the river Struma, i.e. the Pirin part of Macedonia, and part of the disputed zone East of the line Golem Vrv – river Vardar, between the villages Pepelishte and Krivolak, running down the river Vardar to Gevgelija; and on the South-East of it - up to the South-West of the Dojran Lake; then, on the South, towards the Arhan Lake, next to the villages Hami Mahale, Western of the villages Doksoibos, Semasi, Rodolivos, running towards South-Eastern direction and cutting through the Tahin Lake and along the altitudes 815 and 805 through the Kushnica mountain towards the village Doljani, coming to the Orfan Bay on the Aegean Sea. Eastern of this line, the villages and the towns Kavala, Drama, Serres, Sari Shaban, Pravishte, Zahna, Demir Hisar, and Kukush from Aegean Macedonia. (Talevski, J. 1998: 23).

Greece occupied the territory of Aegean Macedonia, on the North, coming to the southern lines of the territory occupied by Serbia, while on the East up to the border/line
with Bulgaria.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by the Balkan Allies in 1912-13, the Great Powers Austro-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, insisted on: establishing of independent Albania in the borders that were defined by them; the territories Eastern of Edirne, which were important for control over the strait, to be returned to the Ottoman Empire; and maintaining the autonomous privileges of the Athos Peninsula. The situation among the Allies was additionally complicated with the establishment of independent Albania, due to which the primary agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria was annulled. Besides the conquered parts of the “disputed zone” in Macedonia as a compensation for the lost territories in Albania, Serbia together with Montenegro divided the Sanjak Novi Pazar as well. Greece, besides Aegean Macedonia, obtained territories in Epirus and Western Thrace.

On July 29, the Second Balkan War broke out as a result of the desires by the recent allies for re-division of the Macedonian territory. The Bulgarian army was the first one to start with the activities, after the secret agreement (Hristov, D., Donev, Ј. 1994:180-185) between Serbia and Greece for dividing Macedonia between them had become known. Turkey entered the war unexpectedly, regained Edirne and continued operating down the valley of the Maritsa River; and Romania also got involved in the war, and occupied Southern Dobruja. With the Treaty of Bucharest dated August 10, 1913, Bulgaria lost Eastern Thrace and Southern Dobruja, part of Western Thrace was returned to it, and it maintained the territories of Eastern Macedonia (Pirin Macedonia) and the exit on the Aegean Sea through the Dedeagach Port (Alexandropoulis) (Grgich, M. 2000:455). The new border lines between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria established after the Treaty of Bucharest were state borders that divided Macedonia in three parts.

With the Balkan Wars 1912/1913 and the First World War 1914-1918, a division of ethno-geographic Macedonia which was until then part of the Turkish state was made. The sole principle for defining and drawing the borders was the principle/rule of the stronger, that is to say the weapons. The ethnic Macedonian territory which was 67,741,2 km² was divided into: Vardar Macedonia (over 99% in the borders of the Republic of Macedonia, and the rest is part of Serbia), Aegean Macedonia (belonging to the territory of the Republic of Greece), Pirin Macedonia (part of the Republic of Bulgaria), Mala Prespa and Golo Brdo (part of Albania) and the Gora region (in the territory of the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Kosovo).

In mid-December 1912, after the end of the First Balkan War, the London Peace Conference was called with the aim of signing an agreement between the Balkan allies and the
defeated Turkey. The Macedonian nation and the Macedonian territory, which were of interest for the other countries, immediately felt the burden of the foreign interests. The suggestion of the Conference for establishing an independent Macedonian state was not accepted, although the Macedonian nation actively participated in the war against the Ottoman Empire and expected that its participation will be respected and rewarded by the allies. Then, instead of a reward, the allies who surreptitiously agreed on dividing/distributing the Macedonian territory hindered the establishing of a Macedonian state, but on December 27 permitted the establishing of Albanian state. With the signing of the Peace Treaty in London on May 30, 1913, Turkey lost all its reigns on the Balkan Peninsula except Constantinople and Edirne with its surroundings. Thus, with the London Peace Treaty, Macedonia remained occupied by the allies’ occupation armies: Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. (Trajanovski, A. 2007: 421)

During the London Peace Conference, the Macedonian nation, occupied and surrounded by the allied armies, could not have had an impact upon its results, however, active on that plan appeared to be the Macedonian migrants in the USA, Canada, Switzerland, Constantinople, and especially in Russia, reacting against the permanent division of their homeland by the Balkan allies and occupiers. It is especially important to emphasize the Memorandum on the Independence of Macedonia dated March 13, 1913, presented by the Macedonian colony in St. Petersbourg headed by Dimitrija Chupovski, to the Conference of the representatives of the Great Powers in London, in which they asked for righteous solving of the Macedonian national and religious/church issue. After the London Peace Conference had ended, on July 20, 1913 a second memorandum was sent to the governments of the Balkan countries and to the Balkan Committee in London. In both memoranda, it was asked autonomy to be given to Macedonia, so that it could enter the Balkan League as an independent and equal state. In other words, it was asked Macedonia to be an independent country in its ethnographic, geographic, historical, cultural-educational, and economic-political borders and the old Ohrid Archbishopric to be established. (Trajanovski, A. 2007: 431).

On August 9, 1913, the Bucharest Conference on the plenary session adopted the text of the Peace Treaty. On August 10, 1913, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed between the belligerent sides in the Second Balkan Wars, and that is Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Greece on one side and on the other side Bulgaria which was forced to make compromises in this war. With this treaty, yet another division was done of the territories that were under Ottoman rule until then (Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija, Vasoevikji, Sanjak, Thrace and Northern Epirus).
Security dialogues

Serbia obtained the Vardar part of Macedonia, Kosovo, part of Metohija and part of Sanjak. With that, its territory was increased for 39,000 km² and 1,290,000 inhabitants.

Montenegro obtained the Vasoëvikji territory, part of Metohija and part of Sanjak. It increased for 7,000 km² and approximately 260,000 inhabitants.

Greece obtained Northern Epirus, the Aegean part of Macedonia, the Halkidiki Peninsula including Thessalonica, part of Western Thrace and numerous islands in the Aegean Sea. With that, it increased for 51,300 km² and 1,624,000 inhabitants.

Bulgaria obtained the Pirin part of Macedonia, Strumica with its surroundings and part of Eastern and Western Thrace. It increased for 21,000 km² and 600,000 inhabitants. It obtained exit on the Aegean Sea from the Mesta basin to the Maritsa basin with the Dedeagach Port.

CONCLUSION

The historical-geographic destiny of the Macedonian ethno-geographic territory and the Macedonian nation is a unique example of a geopolitical and demographic engineering. The theory of territorial integration points to the fact that in the Macedonian case, in the period of the several-centuries oppression, dominant were those forces (the centrifugal, according to Hartshorne) that did not allow the establishing of a Macedonian state in spite of the gradual formation of consciousness about its own individuality.

The changes in the political-territorial ambient on the Balkan Peninsula confirm the thesis about Macedonia as the biggest/greatest looser and a “fill-in” of the instigators of the political-geographic processes. The Bucharest Peace Treaty determines the geopolitical dissolution of ethno-geographic Macedonia and initiates a new wave of migration/displacement of the Macedonian population. The forced and permanent migrations of the Macedonian population in that period changed the ethnic map of Macedonia to a great extent. These divisions and migrations, as well as the attitude of the Great Powers concerning the Macedonian issue are the key factors (centrifugal forces), despite the awareness of the uniqueness/individuality and the idea of statehood (strongest centripetal force), which contributed to the Macedonian nation establishing its own country behind schedule of all other nations on the Balkan.
LITERATURE:
THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE FIRST BALKAN WAR:  
ASPIRATIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
КРАЛСТВОТО ГРЦИЈА И ПРВАТА СВЕТСКА ВОЈНА:
АСПИРАЦИИ И ДОСТИГНУВАЊА

Doc. Dr. Dimitar Ljorovski Vamvakovski
Institute of National History, Skopje
dljorovski@yahoo.com
Doc. Dr. Strashko Stojanovski
"Goce Delchev" University - Shtip
strasko.stojanovski@ugd.edu.mk

Abstract: Macedonian historiography, even though a relatively young scientific discipline compared to the other Balkan historiographies, has so far elaborated the main events and processes related to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). However, it is understandable that in the future they all should complement each other with new findings and approaches derived on the basis of some new historical sources and analysis. The individual war actions of the Greek Army in the Ottoman Macedonia during the First Balkan War in the Macedonian historiography are not presented enough so far. Because of this, the purpose of this article is to explain the Greek national politics and aspirations of the official Athens regarding the Macedonian population and territory, with a special accent on the military and political strategy of Greece during the First Balkan War.

Key words: Greece, Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Macedonia, First Balkan War, Solun (Thessaloniki).

Апстракт: Македеонската историографија, иако релативно млада научна дисциплина во однос на другите балкански историографии, до сега ги има разработено главните настани и процеси поврзани со балканските војни (1912-1913). Меѓутоа, сосема е разбириле дека во иднина сите тие ќе треба да се надополнуваат со нови наоди и пристапи кои произлегуваат од одредени нови историски извори и анализи. Одредени воени активности на грчката војска во Отоманска Македонија во текот на Првата
балканска војна, до сега, во македонската историографија не се доволно претставени. За таа цел, оваа статија има намера да ја објасни грчката национална политика и намери на Атина во врска со македонското население и територија, со посебен акцент на воената и политичка стратегија на Грција за време на Првата балканска војна.

Ключни зборови: Грција, Отоманска империја, Отоманска Македонија, Прва балканска војна, Солун.

INTRODUCTION
The beginning of the First Balkan War marks the end of the Ottoman domination with the Balkan Peninsula. On the other hand, this marked the end of the territorial-ethnic integrity of the Ottoman Macedonia. Analyzed from a historical distance, the interests of the Great Powers in this period, mainly, determined the destiny of the already established Balkan nation-states, simultaneously showing indifference for the national-liberating movements of the other ethnicities which were still under the reign of the Sublime Porte. Understandably, there were exceptions, but we can always observe them throughout the prism of the global politics of separate European Empires.¹

The fact that the Great Eastern Crisis (1875-1881) and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 brought to allocation of the powers of the European continent until the First World War is indisputable. However, even though in a certain way The Treaty of Berlin suspended the agreed establishment of Vienna in 1815, also made some similar mistakes, especially when it comes to the nationalistic aspirations of the already established Balkan states, or the Balkan ethnicities that have pretensions to create their own state through the indigenous nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire (Παξιμαδοπουλού-Σταυρίνου, 2009: 29). On the other hand, the establishment of the two European Alliances and the desire of redistribution of supremacy between the Great Powers (which started during the last quarter of the XIX century, and was copied through the political and military conflicts for territories and resources in the colonial countries) determined the destiny of the Balkan Peninsula until the Balkan Wars. The agreed territorial status quo regarding the Balkans between Russia and Austro-Hungary in 1897 had been unconditionally respected by the other powers as well, predictably, until the moment when they agreed on the basis of some other mutual interest.

¹ So, for example, Austro- Hungarian empire and its strategy to support Albanian uprisings in the period 1910-1912, and promoted creation of the Albanian state, through which, she will establish her influence in this part of the Balkan Peninsula (Донев, 1988: 32, 33).
The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungary in 1908 was an example of this kind of mutual agreements. After the initial intense pressure by Sankt Petersburg, a diplomatic agreement was reached by which Russia supported the Austro-Hungarian annexation on this part of the Ottoman Empire territory, while Vienna committed to help with opening the Ottoman Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) for the Russian military ships (Jelavich, 1999: 111, 112). Regarding the territorial aspirations of the small Balkan countries, or the liberating movements of a part of the population within the European part of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers always tried to prevent and neutralize, or, if necessary, allowed The Sublime Porte to deal with the problems on its own.

The social and political establishment of the Balkans, established after the Great Eastern Crisis, which had mainly concentrated on the interests of the Great Powers, inevitably increased the national antagonism within the Ottoman Empire, which became an arena of the propaganda institutions of the Balkan nation-states. It was obvious during the developing stages of the Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian propaganda (which transformed from an educational and religious propaganda to an open paramilitary intervention against the population of the Ottoman Macedonia) that will culminate with an announcement of war of the Balkan countries against the Ottoman state. The preparations for the First Balkan War lasted for quite some time. The political elites in Athens, Sofia and Belgrade aware of the fact that they are not individually capable to confront military with the Ottoman Empire insisted on establishing mutual alliances, in order to accomplish their own expansionist aspirations. Besides the fact that until the eve of the Balkan Wars a series of treaties were signed, such as, the one between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1897, resigned in 1904, the agreements were rarely, or to be precise, never respected in detail (Donov, 1988: 51). Constant disputes were about the territory and the population of Macedonia. Namely, the Balkan nation-states always acted according their irredentist concepts, which included the entire or the larger part of the territory of Ottoman Macedonia in the framework of their imagined “great” (in some medieval context) national states. They claimed their “historical rights to Macedonia” on the criteria established by themselves, and these varied with time, according to their latest nationalistic needs. But, there was one mutual constant criterion for the three Balkan counties – they

---

2 The first negotiations between Greece and Serbia had happened in the first half of 1861, but the alliance agreement was not signed because of the Serbian opposition of “oversized” Greek Government territorial demands (Jovanovski, 2005: 71, 72).

3 The Serbian and the Greek greater state agenda are dating since 1844, the first also called “Nachrtanie”, while the second one “Megali Idea”. The Bulgarian one dates back to the period of the Great Eastern Crisis and the preliminary contract from San Stefano (March 3, 1878), which envisioned creating of Greater Bulgaria.
had declared Macedonia for “their own historical territory”, on which they “rightfully” claimed their rights. This fact was the reason that contributed, during the establishment of the Balkan Alliance (1912), for the ignorance of the question about the destiny of the “disputed area” – as Macedonia was usually referred to in the agreements or secret annexes, which were contracted between the Balkan states.\textsuperscript{4} These positions that Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia held undoubtedly caused the Second Balkan War.

THE KINGDOM OF GREECE: DEFINING THE EXPANSION OF THE STATE BORDERS

In the period before the Balkan wars, the imagined north border to which Greece had territorial pretensions, and it was, generally, pointed towards Ottoman Macedonia and Albania, stretched from Durrës to the Aegean Sea, crossing north of Ser (Serres) on the east, to Bitola and Ohrid in the west (Битовски, 2001: 57). These borders introduced the so called “minimalistic program”, which dated from the period of the Great Eastern Crisis, unlike the “maximalistic program” which included the entire territory of Macedonia. The Greek nationalism pragmatically decreased the territory of historical Macedonia for its needs, lowering its northern border towards south. Namely, after 1880, because of the fact that the claims towards the territories of northern Macedonia were estimated unsupported, official Athens changed the tactics, and declared the Macedonian population from those areas as Bulgarian or Serbian. Based on the requests\textsuperscript{5} of the Greek Prime Minister Harilaos Trikupis, and by initiative of the Thessaloniki’s consul Konstantinos Vatikiotis from the Greek Consulate Centers of the European part of the Ottoman Empire, Athens began to receive different suggestions related to the possible new territorial-administrative division of Ottoman Macedonia. The very interesting suggestion, through an adequate Memorandum from 2 July 1880, was sent by the Greek consul from Bitola, Petros Logotetis. He made the “division” of Ottoman Macedonia on two areas, north or “Bulgarian” one and south or “Greek” one. In his plan Logotetis took the political situation of the day as a basis, after the establishment of the Principality of Bulgaria and the “ethnic” questionability of the Greek arguments towards the

\textsuperscript{4} So, for example, in Serbo-Bulgarian agreement from march 1912 (in which there is included Secret Annex), was signed after long discussions and arguing and with help of Ambassadors of Russia in Belgrade and Sophia, were established two zones of action, Northern for Serbia and Eastern for Bulgaria (North from Shar Planina mountings and East from Struma river) and was established so called Contested Zone (most of Macedonia). The destiny of the last zone should be defined later after the war, and if necessary with mediation from the Russian Imperator (Павлович, 2001: 288).

\textsuperscript{5} In June 1880, H. Trikupis had send letters to the Greek Consulates in Solun, Bitola (Monastir) and Plovdiv (Philipopolis) with demand to give different suggestions and propositions for the issues of territorial reforms in Macedonia and the other parts of the Ottoman Empire, on the base of the Berlin Agreement framework (Јовановски, 2009: 321).
northern parts of Macedonia. Thus, the consul within the Memorandum stressed that: “the main ending borders which do not justify the Greek pretensions, and which must separate south from north Macedonia are: Krushevo, Prilep, Mariovo, the south part of Demir Hisar (Sidirokastro), Ser, and, finally, Drama” (Ιστορια του Ελληνικου εθνους, απο 1833 ως 1881, 1977: 379). Vatikiotis, within the Memorandum from June 1880, was more detailed, with an adequate analysis of the situation. As a division line he pointed out: “…the border between the Rhodopes and the Balkans continues to the mountain range Kresna and Malesh, crossing between Strumica and Radovish, then it continues along the River Vardar up to the mouth of River Crna, lifts around the area of Tikvesh and Bitola, leaves on the right the areas of Prespa and Ohrid, it includes, on the left side, the entire area of Korcha, and from there, across the Kolonja, Anaselica, and Grevena, it ends up on the new Greek-Turkish border line” (Βακαλοπουλος, 1990: 317). Logically, the Ottoman Empire, after the end of the Crisis, determined the administrative borders of the Thessalonki’s (and the other Rumelian) vilayet according to its needs. This idea of part of the Greek political elite remains to speak for their pretensions and the further plans and actions to rule over the Macedonian areas.

However, official Athens considered Bulgaria as its greatest danger when it comes to the territorial pretensions towards Ottoman Macedonia. It is known that during the negotiations for the establishment of the Balkan Alliance, the Bulgarian administration tried to impose the idea for creating autonomous administration in Macedonia and Edirne, which was followed by some fierce reactions by Serbia and Greece (Донев, 1988: 51-61). These last considered this act as a cunning diplomatic maneuver of the official Sofia, in order to create conditions for a repetition of the events from September 1885, when the autonomous area Eastern Rumelia was annexed to the Principality of Bulgaria. In parallel, the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos during the negotiations for concluding an Alliance with the authorities in Sofia refused to agree for the clear mutual demarcation of the Macedonian territories (Ιοβανοβσκι, 2013: 299). The Greek view was based on the fact that if negotiated on the issue of the demarcation, then a contract for Alliance would have never been reached. On the other hand, Venizelos was convinced that the Bulgarian army would point its troops mostly towards Edirne and river Maritsa, while the Serbs towards Skopje (which it really happened) hoping that in that way the Greek army would easily penetrate to Solun and Ser.6

6 In one of his speeches in the Greek Parliament, Venizelos states: “The Bulgarian none justify undermine the Greek army mainly because of her Thessaly defeat from the Turks in 1897. She (the army) should not be undermined and right away she will conquest the territories which present ours national aspirations. The future actions against Turkey probably will be in this order: The Bulgarians will focus their armies towards Maritsa valley and Edirne. The Serbs will move on Skopje. We will march on Solun and Ser. We will be there in the right time.
Finally, the mutual interest between the two sides to extinguish the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans prevailed, signing the agreement on 29 May 1912, leaving the question for the future territorial partition of Macedonia open (Стојанов, 1979: 77). However, if we observe the activities of the Greek authorities in the period before and during the Balkan Wars, it can be easily concluded that the line of the Greek territorial aspirations towards the Ottoman Macedonia had been almost identical with the one created at the time of the Great Eastern Crisis.  

**THE WARFARE OPERATIONS OF THE KINGDOM OF GREECE ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTTOMAN MACEDONIA**

The actual war preparations of the Kingdom of Greece for the following Balkan War started in 1910. The Prime Minister E. Venizelos, in order to secure more successful realization of the reforms in the army, and to purchase some modern weapon, personally conducted with the Department of Army and Navy. Likewise, French and British navy missions participated in the reforms of the Greek armed forces, while the budget surplus was used for a purchase of war equipment (Knor, 2000: 81). After the performed mobilization, seven divisions, two separate units, one cavalry brigade and a certain number of voluntary units were created (Φωτοπουλου, 2002: 12). The Greek army was divided on three parts. The first part or the, so called, “Thessaly Army” had been commanded by the Heir to the Throne Konstantinos, and the officer of the General Staff, the General Panaiotis Danglis. This army was composed of seven divisions, cavalry brigade and the volunteers, with a total of 93 000 soldiers. The soldiers from almost one division composed the “Epirote Army”, with about 13 000 soldiers, under the conduct of the General Konstantinos Sapunzakis. While, the third part, so called, “The Navy”, had been composed by four military ships, ten destroyers, one submarine, five torpedo ships, and a large number of auxiliary vessels, most of all, merchant ships (Ibidem). The total human resources of the Greek army counted around 110 000 soldiers. According to the military plan, “The Thessaly Army” should have operated towards Macedonia, while the “Epirote Army” towards the northern part of Epirus and south Albania. In the same time, and later the division of Macedonia will be on the base of occupied territories... “(Стојчев, Ванче и Александар Стојчев, 2011: 52).

7 On November 2, 1912, during the First Balkan war, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lambros Koromilas, had shown to the Bulgarian ambassador in Athens, Hadzimishev, the territorial aspirations of Greek state, which were projected over the line: west from the town of Kavala, passing through the mountains of Bozdog and Belasitsa, through Demir Kapia and Krushevo, and to the Lake of Ohrid, and further more to the Adriatic Sea, next to the Albanian town of Valona (Марков, 1989).

8 “The Thessaly Army” on October 4, 1912, had had 49 infantry battalions, 6 volunteer battalions, 60 machineguns, 26 artillery batteries, 5 mountain companies, 7 motorized companies, 2 telegraphic teams, 2 engineer teams and 4 airplanes (Υπουργειον στρατιωτικων, Γενικον επιτελειον στρατου, 1932: 64).
the Greek navy fleet was planned to rule with the Aegean Sea, to block the Ottoman fleet at the Marmara Sea, and to prevent the transfer of the Ottoman troops from Asia Minor to the European part of the Ottoman Empire.

The Greek army, or precisely, the “Thessaly Army” had a certain subordinate significance in the military-operative plan within the alliance military actions against the Ottoman army in Macedonia, and the easiest military task when it comes to the occupation of southern Macedonia (Стојанов, 1979: 153). The Ottoman “Western Army”, on the day of the start of the military actions on 18 October 1912, still had not finished with the mobilization, and from the planned military force achieved to gather only 188 000 soldiers, which had been a half from the planned mobile forces (Кочан, 2010: 106, 107). “The Western Army”, led by Ali Riza-pasha, was composed of four parts and minor garrison units throughout the entire Macedonia, which were mostly concentrated on the defense of the northwest, north and northeast parts of the Empire, or precisely, against the Montenegro, Serbian and parts of the Bulgarian army. “The Vardar army”, led by Zeki-pasha, was deployed on the front from Skopje to Kriva Palanka, while its southern group, reinforced with certain local garrisons, was dislocated in southern Macedonia, in order to confront to the “Thessaly Army” (Стојанов, 1979: 149)

The “attempts” for a diplomatic overcome of the differences among the Balkan allies and The Sublime Porte, with an arbitrage of the Great Powers, should be analysed solely through the prism of the military preparations and the search for a motive for a start of a military campaign. When all of the means for a peaceful solution of the differences had been exhausted, it became clear that they can only be solved with a military intervention. Greece declared war to the Ottoman Empire on 19 October 1912. Previously, on 8 October, Montenegro did the same, while Serbia and Bulgaria did it on 17 October (Стоичев, 2000: 518). Just before the start of the military campaign, the Greek King Georgios I announced, in front of the Greek nation, the Manifesto for War against the Ottoman Empire. What is characteristic for this Manifesto is that, besides the explanation of the military-political targets “for liberation of their brothers from the centuries of Turkish slavery”, the Greek King did not point the Greek population that should be liberated in the Empire. Here he referred to the “Christians”, especially referring to the members of the Rum-millet, thus increasing the range of the territorial gains which were planned for his country to gain in the war to follow.9

“The Thessaly Army” on 18 October, one day before the official Greek war announcement, crossed the Greek-Ottoman border. The first more serious military conflict

9 The all of this Manifesto was published by Petar Stojanov (Стојанов, 1979: 148).
happened in the Thessaly city of Elassona, which the Greeks succeeded conquering without some serious difficulties. After the successful start, “The Thessaly Army” moved towards Sarandaporo, a significant strategic place, where two Ottoman Divisions were located. A front line on the position Sarandaporo-Serfidze (Servia) had been created, however, it was forced through by the Greeks the night between 22 and 23 October, whereby, chasing the Ottoman army succeeded in conquering the city of Serfidze. After the conquering of the city, the largest part of the Greek army on 25 October located in the area of Kozani, while the 7th division, across the Petra strait moved towards the city of Katerini (Φωτοπουλου, 2002: 18).

In this period, during the stay of the “Thessaly Army” in Kozani, a sharp political confrontation between the Heir to the Throne Konstantinos and the Prime Minister Venizelos took place, on the issue of the further war actions plans. The Heir to the Throne being guided by a strictly military logics, however, at the same time wanting to secure the imagined northern border of the Hellenism, had in mind to continue the expedition towards the line Lerin (Florina)-Bitola, because there had been a possibility for the Ottoman forces to appear from that side, withdrawing from the “Serbian front” (the northern front) and continuing towards Kozani. Namely, the sixth Ottoman corpus counting 9 000 soldiers, which had been a part of the “Vardar Army”, withdrew from the Prilep-Kichevo front, in order to encounter the Greek army (Кочан, 2010: 117). Likewise, Konstantinos did not have the necessary information where exactly are the remnants of the Ottoman army after the defeat at Sarandaporo (Φωτοπουλου, 2002: 19). For that aim, the very first day when Kozani was conquered on 25 October, the cavalry units were sent in vanguard towards the cities of Siatista, Kostur (Kastoria), Kajlari (Ptholemaida), Ber (Veria), and the village of Ostrovo (Arnisa), while in the area of Kajlari some minor military conflicts with the Albanian basibozuk, and the local Ottoman units took place (Υπουργειον στρατιωτικων, Γενικον επιτελειον στρατου, 1932: 169).

Venizelos, who had a political way of thinking, but, primarily, far-reaching capabilities, sent a telegraph to the Heir of the Throne that he has to direct the army towards Solun (Ibidem). The reasons for this categorical command of the Greek Prime Minister, who had been led by the Greek national and strategic interests, were the information that the Bulgarian army and the Macedonian chetnik formations move fast from northeast to Solun. Besides the primary plans of the military administration to split the powers, in order one part to leave for Bitola, and the rest to Solun, still, after Venizelos’ strict order, the larger part of the “Thessaly

---

10 The village of Sarandaporo is located in the area of Elassona. It is located on a strategic position at the eponymous strait, between the Mountains Kambubica and Pieria’s mountain ranges. The strait “Sarandaporo” presents a natural border between Thessaly and south-west Macedonia.

11 The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, L. Koromilas, after the conquest of the town of Kozani, had...
Army”, reinforced with the 7th division, which previously conquered Katerini, moved towards Solun. In the meantime, during the expedition to Thessaloniki, the 5th division headed north of Kozani, in a direction towards Kajlari, and on the 31 October arrived at the strait Kirli Derven. The orders of the General Staff of the Greek army allowed the division to act freely, or to continue towards Bitola, or, to hold defensive positions, protecting the “Thessaly Army”, respectively with the information received on the Ottoman forces. The leader of the division, not having the right information and believing that he will face some weak enemies, gave the order to move towards Lerin and Bitola (Φωτοπουλου, 2002: 21). At the very beginning of the expedition the division was attacked by some fierce Ottoman units coming from the direction of Lerin. This was an Ottoman army, which withdrew against the Greek division, and which in the same time was reinforced by the greater part that withdrew from the “Serbian front”. On 6th/7th November “The Sorovica (Amyntaio) Battle” took place. The 5th Greek division suffered a severe defeat, losing 3 000 soldiers, which resulted with a retreat towards Kozani, while the Ottoman army, using the railway Solun-Bitola, headed to the, so called “Bitola (Monastir) Front”, holding defensive positions against the Serbian forces (Кочан, 2010: 117).

In any case, a real disaster of this part of the Greek army was escaped, especially because of the approaching of the 1st Serbian army to Bitola, but also thanks to the actions took by the chetniks of the IMRO in the areas of Kostur and Lerin.

In parallel with the war actions of the 5th division, the greater part of the “Thessaly Army” in the rapid expedition to Solun on 1 November, at the city of Enidze-Vardar (Giannitsa), confronted the Eight Corpus of Hasan Tahsin-pasha. The aim of the Ottoman forces was to prevent the further progress of the Greek army towards Thessaloniki. Still, it did not work. The Ottomans were defeated, which resulted with a retreat towards Solun, and in this way, all the connections between the two parts of the Ottoman “Western Army” were lost - the first in the area of Solun, while the other one in the area of Bitola (Ibidem). The number of the Ottoman forces after the defeat at Enidze-Vardar decreased to 20 000 soldiers, which along with a division of the Strumica corpus that counted 5 000 soldiers, retreated to Solun. Hasan Tahsin-pasha for the defense of the city had around 25 000 soldiers, which had been a minor number compared to the Greek and Bulgarian forces that moved in that direction. Still, Tahsin-pasha received a strict order by the Commander of “The Western Army” to protect the strategically significant city by any means (Ibidem, 118). The first armed forces that came near Solun were the chetniks of IMRO. Namely, on 4 November, under the command of Todor

send note to the Bulgarian Government that in direction of Bitola will be send 3 Army Divisions, and the rest of 4, including the 7-th Army Division, through the town of Ber will be directed towards Solun (Марков, 1989).
Aleksandrov they occupied Kukush (Kilkis), then headed towards Solun and liberated the village of Ajvatovo (Liti), but this is where they stopped, waiting for the 7th Bulgarian “Rila Division”. When Aleksandrov received the information that the Greek army moves towards Solun, he informed the command of the 7th “Rila Division” to speed up towards the city (Стојчев, Ванче и Александар Стојчев, 2011: 55). The Bulgarian army moved towards Solun from two directions. The first group from Ser and Demir Hisar, while the second one from Kukush and Dojran. The Bulgarians, having about 70 000 soldiers, decided to enter Solun on 7 November (Марков, 1989). In the meantime, after the victory at Enidze-Vardar, the Greek army moved towards Solun with a great speed under the command of Konstantinos. On 5 October “The Thessaly army” had been already deployed at the city gates, while the Greek fleet blocked Solun’s harbor, which enabled hampering the delivery of military material, and reinforcement of the Ottoman forces. In that moment, the diplomatic game between the Ottoman forces, representatives of the Great Powers, the Greek and the Bulgarian armies, which both wanted to occupy the city, took place. The political interests of the Great Powers and the Ottomans prevailed, being aware of the fact that if Bulgaria conquers this strategically significant city, then its powers and the influence at the Balkan Peninsula would increase. This did not suit the European countries, especially not The Sublime Porte, because in that moment the Bulgarian army headed towards Istanbul. Because of this, Tahsin-pasha decided to surrender the city to the Greeks without a battle, presenting the conditions he had to the Great Powers’ consuls. On 8 November 1912, the Greek army triumphantly entered the city of Solun. The next day, on 9 November, the chetniks of Jane Sandanski, Todor Aleksandrov and Dumbulakov, and a part from the Bulgarian cavalry entered the city. In this way, in the beginning, it was established diarchy, or a condominium in the city. This condition caused several minor military conflicts between the two armies. However, on 17 November, again with a strong influence of the consuls of the European Great Powers was decided Solun to be given to Greece. According to the treaty, it was decided the Bulgarian army to be transferred by Greek merchant ships from Thessaloniki to Dedeagach (Alexandroupoli), in order to participate in the military actions in eastern Thrace. Still, two units of the Bulgarian army remained in Thessaloniki, but were captured in June 1913 (Φωτοπουλου, 2002: 21).

12 In his Memoirs, the retired major-general Kl. Kleomenos, tells that even on November 7, there was an order from the prince Konstantinos for beginning of the march toward Solun. But, after the arrival of the army on the town entrance, near the place “Solunski bavchi”, a new order has been given by the prince, on which, every army movement has been stopped. Next day, on November 8, in the early hours of the morning began the entry of the Greek army in Solun (Κλεομένους, 1916: 5-6).

13 After the entry of the Bulgarians in Solun, a Serbian cavalry entered the city, as well.
After the conquering of Solun, the main actions of the “Thessaly Army” were to “clean the remnants of the Ottoman forces in the southwest Macedonia, also, to cut the path of the Ottoman Army, which after the defeat by the Serbs near Bitola (30 November 1912) withdrew towards Korce, which was of a strategic importance. There had been a possibility for furthering down of the Ottomans towards the city of Ioannina, which the Greek “Epirote Army” was trying to conquer for quite some time. In the other hand, the Greek state interests imposed the need for transfer of the army in the southwest Macedonia. Namely, after the conquering of Bitola, the Serbian cavalry units continued to south, “liberating” the city of Lerin.14 Thus, part of the “Thessaly Army” (two divisions and part of the cavalry) remained at Solun, where besides regulating the order within the city, had a task to expand the Greek authority, conquering the area of Solun and Chalkidiki while the other military forces were directed to southwest Macedonia across Voden (Edessa) and Ostrovo. (Ibidem, 23) After the battles at the villages of Gornichevo (Kelli), Cerovo (Klidi) and Koman (Komanos), the Greek army on 19 November conquered the city of Grevena, while on 23 November conquered Kostur. What it followed was a grouping of the Greek army in Lerin, whence it continued with the expedition towards the city of Korce, which was conquered on 19 December 1912, after which the Ottoman forces withdrew in the direction of Epirus, towards the city of Ioannina. After a siege few months before, on 6 March 1913, the Ottoman forces in Ioannina surrendered to the Greek Army. In parallel with the military actions offshore, the Greek navy fleet conquered the islands of Tassos, Chios, Limnos, Mitilini, and came near to the Dardanelles in the direction of Istanbul. (Σφετας, 2009: 492).

CONCLUSION
This paper reflects on new visions of interpretation of the First Balkan war, which were not incorporated into the Macedonian historiographical prism. The general preconditions of the First Balkan War are marked with the end of the political, social, and the economical establishment of the Balkan Peninsula, agreed at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Again, the scene had been taken over by the Great European Powers, which after the failure to localize the war between the Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire in a “shortest possible time”, also, because of the real threat the military conflict to endanger the “European peace”, called the

14 After the Serbo-Greek agreement for demarcation, from April 22, 1913, the town of Lerin and with big number of Macedonian villages (8 villages in the area of Gevgelia, 20 villages in the area around Lerin, 7 from Bitola area, 38 in the area of Prespa and 59 villages in the area of Ohrid) were given to Greece (Стојчев, Ванче и Александар Стојчев, 2011: 61).
The main focus of the paper was on military and diplomatic dilemmas with in the Greek army during the First Balkan war. For example we have noticed the case during the stay of the “Thessaly Army” in Kozani, when there was political confrontation between the Heir to the Throne Konstantinos and the Prime Minister Venizelos. Namely, on the issue of the further war actions plans, there was discussion on the future directions on the military action, toward Salonika or toward Bitola (Monastir). On the end, the political solution from Athena preferred Salonika as a priority, which strongly reflect on main Greek strategic and political goals projected with the Megali idea.

Later on, the territorial dilemmas were determined on the two conferences which were held simultaneously. At the first one attended the ambassadors of the Great Powers in London, while at the second one, which was also called “Peace Conference”, attended delegates from Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire. On the issue of the “Macedonian question”, or in other words, on the destiny of the Macedonian territories and the Macedonians which were under Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek occupation, it had not been discussed at all during the conference. However, even though the question for the future of Macedonia and its population had not been officially presented, the main conflict among the Balkan allies had been about its territories, and about the city of a significant strategic importance, Solun. It had been clear that none of the countries was satisfied with the conquered on the territory of Macedonia, which was a reason for new realignment of forces, and for making military plans among the former allies. This situation caused the Second Balkan War known also as inter-allies war, in which the main target of the warring parties was the territory of Macedonia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

On December 4, 1912, on the request of the Ottoman Empire, a truce was concluded, while on an initiative of the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Edward Gray, on December 16, 1912, the London Conference began working. The basic task of the first Conference had been to determine the western Ottoman border line, with the final status of the town of Edirne, to determine the question of the status of Istanbul i.e. the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardaneli, Aegean islands, and final, to determine the final status of Albania. All of the second Conference has been devoted on the pre-conditions for establishing future peace between the Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire (Стојанов, 1979: 169-171).
[10]. Кλεομενους, Κλ. (1916). Η καταλήψη της Θεσσαλονίκης, εν Αθηναίς;
[19]. Упукривен стратиштвен, Геников епитетев стратов. (1932). Ο ελληνικος στρατος κατά τους Βαλκανικους πολέμους του 1912-1913. Αθηναίς: Τομος Α’;
[20]. Упукривен стратиштвен, Геников епитетев стратов (1932). Ο ελληνικος στρατος κατά τους Βαλκανικους πολέμους του 1912-1913, Αθηναίς: Τομος Α’, Παραρτημα;
Abstract: The desire of the Balkan peoples to gain their large national states will be the main cause of the Balkan wars. A Balkan war has left open burning questions that are still subject to controversy and potential producer of instability. The model of large nationalist states which was successfully applied by some of Western European countries proved to be devastating for the Balkan states. In an attempt to follow the hawkish method of unification of Italy and Germany, at the beginning of the last century Balkan countries has started a war against Turkey and war between themselves. And although their aspirations wasn’t fully satisfied, however it can be noted that with the exception of the Macedonian people, the period of the Balkan wars is the only instance in modern history where some people have achieved their nationalistic goals. After the Young Turk Revolution, the Balkan nations will form the Balkan League and will begin accelerated preparations for war. Efforts of the Great Powers to prevent the outbreak of war was insufficient and futile. By the end of November 1912 armies of the Balkan League in war against the Ottoman Empire has been victorious almost everywhere. After the signing of the armistice on the ground, the diplomatic arena will be transferred to London. Two simultaneous conferences are held there in December 1912 in order to be determining the fate of the Balkan Peninsula. By the spring of 1913, antagonism between the Balkan allies has reached the endpoint. The new War for Bulgarians was a chance to annul established alliance with Serbia in order to be gained all Macedonia. In that way, the Greater Bulgaria could better dominate the Balkans. Greeks and Serbs haven’t been not only faced with the possibility of sharing rich region with each other, but also to prevent the Bulgarian hegemony. At the end of the Second Balkan War the Treaty of Bucharest on 10th August 1913 will be signed between Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. All participants in the Balkan wars have suffered disappointment and defeat in trying to realize
the question introduced at war. But the real sufferers are the Macedonians who were subject to division.

Key words: large nation states, Balkan Wars, aspirations, peace conferences, Bucharest peace treaty.

Abstract: The desire of the Balkan peoples to achieve their own large nation states was the main reason for the Balkan Wars. The Balkan states were left with open questions which continue to be the subject of debate and potential producers of instability. The model of large nationalist states, which successfully applied by some Western European countries, proved to be disastrous for the Balkan states. In an attempt to follow the method of unification of Italy and Germany, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Balkan states would start a war against Turkey and among themselves. Although they were not satisfied with their aspirations, it can be noted that except for the Macedonian people, the period of the Balkan Wars is the only example in modern history where certain peoples achieved their nationalist goals. After the Young Turk revolution, the Balkan peoples would form the Balkan League and start to accelerate their preparations for war. The efforts of the Great Powers to prevent the outbreak of war were not enough and their attitude was not favorable. By the end of November 1912, the armies of the Balkan League would be victorious almost everywhere. After the signing of the ceasefire, the diplomatic arena would move to London. Two simultaneous conferences were held there in December 1912 with the aim of determining the future of the Balkan Peninsula. By the spring of 1913, the antagonism between the Balkan partners reached its climax. The war for the Bulgarians represented a possibility to destroy the alliance with Serbia and to gain all of Macedonia. Greater Bulgaria would be able to better dominate the Balkans. The Greeks and Serbs were not only faced with the possibility of dividing the rich region between them, but also with preventing Bulgarian hegemony. The end of the Second Balkan War would be the Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August 1913 between Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. All participants in the Balkan Wars suffered from disappointment and failure in their attempt to realize the question that led them to war. But, the real sufferers are the Macedonians who were subject to division.
INTRODUCTION

The era of European history of nationalism and conflict begins with the complex Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 years. These wars represent the first simultaneous effort of the Balkan peoples to follow the example of Italy and Germany for the establishment of large national states. But these efforts will not go without the participation of major powers that with its rapid intervention will contribute to the establishment of appropriate resolution of the Balkan wars. The imposed sedation will reconfigure the boundaries of the Balkan Peninsula. With that Bulgaria has received Rhodopes and Western Thrace, Greece has got most of Epirus, Greece and Serbia between them has divided fairly disputed region of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro has split the region of Sandzak and Serbia has also get Kosovo. At the same time, at the European continent has emerged the independent state Albania and many national Ottoman Empire has nearly disappeared.

For the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula, the Balkan wars somehow lasted until 1918. Many of the fighting areas of the Balkan wars continued to be space battles. Because of overlapping rivalry and proclaiming territories, national appetites of post Balkan wars countries were not met. Since then, all of them persist in trial of achieving the national goals of the Balkan peoples. “Patriotic Macedonians have traditionally considered the period 1903–19 and, more particularly, the decade 1903–13 as the most tragic in their history. For Macedonian patriots and nationalists, the partition of their land—which the VMRO fought and the Ilinden Uprising sought to prevent but the European powers approved in 1913 and the Allies confirmed in the peace settlement in 1919—represented a tragedy. In Macedonian mythology, it represents the greatest injustice that Macedonia and its people have ever suffered.”(Rossos, Andrew, 2008: 117).

Balkan nations had very little time to recover after the end of fighting in 1918. Just two decades spaced them with the two world wars. Since Italy has annexed Albania in 1939, immediately after the war will expand again in the Balkans. Yugoslavia will capitulate before the attacks of Germany and Italy in 1941. Ruled by Italy, Albania will annex Kosovo and Bulgaria will again occupy Macedonia and Western Thrace. Battles with different intensity again has raged throughout Balkans in the next 5 years. In this region fighting has participated troops from Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. After the Second World War Yugoslavia will be
restored and most of the Balkans will fall under Soviet domination. Communist influence that emerged from the shadow of Soviet Russia was the deliverer of peace in the Balkans. The issues raised by the Balkan wars remained forgotten during the years of communist governance, but only to come alive again with the collapse of the regime in 1990. Nationalism erupted again and continued until the early years of this century. As with the previous fighting in the Balkans, also the wars that resulted from the breakup of Yugoslavia have call upon the diplomatic and military interventions of larger forces. Albania has been grappling with turmoil, while Kosovo became a scene of fighting and Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia faced the question of its existence.

The model of large nationalist states such as the example of Germany and Italy proved impractical for the Balkan peoples. Such states, is found here that are simply impossible, because there still persist folding claims of nationalists in each Balkan country. Every single attempt in the twentieth century to achieve these goals led to war and foreign intervention. The only solution that could disrupt this pattern of wars and interventions in accepting non nationalist perspective of the Balkan peoples.

THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM AND GRIEVANCES OF THE BERLIN CONGRESS

The concept of nationalism that originated in France and Germany moved to the Balkans in the early years of the 19th century. The initial influence was largely cultural. Intellectuals have made great efforts to standardize and make popular languages of the Balkans. In this effort, they have often conducted by medieval states that existed in the Balkans before it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. But soon afterward, the emphasis on nationalism becomes political. The strong desire to achieve national unity motivated Balkan nations to confront their Turkish conqueror. Their leaders assumed that only by achieving national unity their countries could develop and flourish. In this sense Balkan nations will try to implement political and economic success in Western Europe, especially Germany with the adoption of western European concept of nationalism as a model for their own national development. Balkan peoples on nationalism have seen as justification for the creation of a geopolitical entity. The concept of Western European nationalism has replaced the old millet system of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, which has allowed to each religious group significantly self governing with the opportunity of living of the same groups close to each other without having to impose on each other. It yielded the Balkan nations a degree
of cultural autonomy. “This increase in nationalism was accompanied by the inability of the Ottoman Empire that was rocked by internal unrest to maintain its territorial presence in the area of the Balkans. The lands – mainly those of Macedonia and Thrace- were the bones of contention for the enslaved Balkan States which will attempt to claim them in order to satisfy their own national interests”17

First Serbs in 1803 and then the Greeks in 1821 will rebel against their Turkish overlords, partly as a merit of vaguely understood sense of Western European nationalism. As a result, both in 1830 will create an independent Greek state and the autonomous Serbian state. As for Montenegro, Turkey had recognized its autonomy since the eighteenth century, although more due to the inaccessibility of the area rather than as a result of some kind of national awakening. True inspiration for Balkan nations was the success of the Italians in 1861 and the Germans in 1871 in achieving national unity. The military aspect of the unification of Italy and Germany was presented an example that should be followed. Each of the Balkan peoples predicted recovery of medieval empires on which they have based its national ideas. In 1876 Serbia and Montenegro started a war against the Ottoman Empire and that same year, Bulgaria will exhibit anti-Ottoman revolt. The next year, Russia will intervene in the Balkans on Bulgarian nationalist’s side. The predominance of Russians nine months later would be end the Russian-Turkish War with the signing of the San Stefano Treaty in March 1878 and creation of an independent state of Bulgaria and expansion of Serbia and Montenegro. With this agreement were fulfilled maximum territorial aspirations of Bulgarian nationalists. Thus, the former Bulgarian territory encompassed most of the eastern Balkan Peninsula between the Danube and the Aegean Sea including Macedonia. With the exception of the Macedonian people this was a situation where the first and only time in the modern history of the Balkan peoples have achieved their national goals.

San Stefano treaty reaches the negative response of the leading countries in Europe, which in the previous two centuries had the privilege to arbitrate international relations. These countries that existed in 1878 were known as great powers and comprised of Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy. The desire to reduce the ambition of the Russian Empire in the Balkans and to establish order in the chaos of Ottoman Europe, especially due to the Austro-Hungarian and UK, will bring great powers to agree to a conference in Berlin in resolution the Balkan issues. With the subsequent Congress in Berlin attended by leading diplomats in that time, by great will reduce the quantity and

17 The Balkan wars 1912 – 1913 through the hellenic and rumanian press of that time dis.army.qr/pdf/balkan_wars_en.pdf
the independence of the new Bulgarian state in whose place will be created autonomous Bulgarian principality under Ottoman control, semi-autonomous Eastern Rumelia under the rule of Ottoman sultan and Macedonia will be returned under the direct rule of the Sultan. This settlement of accounts will be disastrous for Bulgarian nationalism. (Ivan E.Geshov, 1916: 94). The Berlin Congress also will recognize the full independence of slightly decreased Serbia, and Montenegro will be divest by San Stefano treaty acquired gains of Herzegovina, Novi Pazar and northern Albania that will remain as parts of Ottoman empery. These areas will also remain targets of Montenegrin and Serbian national aspirations. Persistent Greece demands has led to a kind of consequence Berlin settlement, so the Great Powers in 1881 will sanction Greek annexation of Thessaly and part of southern Epirus.

The Bulgarians would not be needed much time to recover from the shock caused by their loss. The series of events though will cause great pain to Bulgarian nationalists, however it would not be fatal to all them as they has begun to indicate that the creation of a Greater Bulgaria is only a matter of time. Bulgaria will not be alone in their frustration with Berlin settlement. Greeks, Montenegrins and Serbs will also dig the Treaty of Berlin as an obstacle of achieving their national aspirations. After 1878 all Balkan countries will try to overcome Berlin outcome and to accomplish national unity.

BALKAN NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

Dissatisfied, Bulgarians are first to act against Berlin settlement. So in 1885 they unilaterally declared the unification of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. At that moment, the Great Powers will act directly to maintain the outcome of the Berlin Treaty. However, Serbia with the support of Austria-Hungary attacked Bulgarian same year. In the impending war between Serbia and Bulgaria, Bulgarians will successfully defend their union and apply a strong resistance to the Serbs. Only the interference of Austria-Hungary has prevented the Bulgarian invasion on Serbia. That hostility between the two Balkan Slavic countries would create an obstacle to the idea of Balkan cooperation against Berlin settlement and the Ottoman Empire. But it cannot be said that relations between Serbia and Montenegro, were suitable for the realization of national unity. Local and dynastic rivalries will prevent Serbia and Montenegro in achieving big-Serbian efforts against the Turks. Accomplishing the idea of a Balkan alliance began in 1891 when Greek Prime Minister proposed the Bulgarian-Greek-Serbian Alliance. At that time neither Bulgaria nor Serbia responded with enthusiasm. Slavic countries remained aside from their Greek orthodox brother’s lack of interest in Greek
aspirations in the Aegean and the rivalry because concerning Macedonia. In 1897 Bulgarians and Greeks will fail to achieve short-term co-operation in Macedonia.

That same year Greece will conduct its second attack on the Treaty of Berlin in an attempt to annex Crete. For one month the Turks will easily repel the attack of the Greeks and Great Powers will intervene to prevent Constantinople from achieving significant gains from this win and to keep Berlin’s outcome. Humbled Greeks will have to withdraw several positions along their border in Thessaly with the Ottoman Empire. However, Crete will gain autonomy under the auspices of the Great Powers but was forbidden to unite it with Greece. The failure of Greek showed difficulties faced by all Balkan countries faced with opposition to the fading power of the Ottomans. While the Greeks were focused on islands in the Aegean Epirus, Bulgarians looked upon to Thrace, Serbs to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegrins towards the Albania as to places of their aspirations. However, they all have claims that are overlapping at only one place - Macedonia. Vilajet Ottoman Macedonia consisted the most productive region in the center of the Balkan Peninsula. All three Orthodox Christian countries regarded Macedonia as their right, based on different cultural, historical and linguistic claims. Macedonia for the first time will become a problem in the year 1870 when the Russian government will push Ottoman Turks to allow formation of an Orthodox church that would be independent of the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. This so-called Exarchate included churches in Bulgaria and parts of Macedonia. As already mentioned above, eight years later the Russo - Turkish War resulted with independent Bulgaria. The initial San Stefano Treaty of 1878 created Bulgaria encompassing Macedonia. Treaty of Berlin in July 1878 will review the settlement and return the Macedonia under Ottoman rule. Balkans states throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, has not only challenging the Ottoman control of Macedonia but also with each other. Despite all of them, organized in Thessalonica in 1893 will start to act the largest revolutionary group IMRO. Her slogan: Macedonia for the Macedonians yet in that time supports the idea of an autonomous Macedonia under the Ottoman Empire opposite of joining of Macedonia to Bulgaria. „The ultimate aim remained “Macedonia for the Macedonians” (i.e., preservation of territorial integrity and achievement of one of the following: autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, outright independence, or equal partnership in some future Balkan federation).“ (Rossos Andrew, 2008: 118). In order to counters IMRO the Bulgarian government established Supreme Committee or External organization in 1985. Greeks has organized their Etairia League in 1894 to reinforce the goals of Greek nationalism in Macedonia. Serbs have already had established Association of St. Sava
in 1886. All these groups had promotional and educational purposes. They also have served as an addition to military organizations. Has not been a passive nor Ottoman authority that on similar way has also armed those elements of the population who were inclined towards them and promoted Islamic education and opportunities. Competition for Macedonia between Balkan countries created an obstacle to the formation of a Balkan alliance that would be against the Ottomans.

Apart from Macedonia, Montenegrins and Serbs together showed aspirations towards occupied by Austro-Hungary Sandzak area. It was a territory that has bulged out from Ottoman province Kosovo, and which separated Montenegro from Serbia. Also, Montenegro and Serbia were interested in Kosovo, which was called the heart of Serbia because of the epic battle in 1389 between the Balkan army led by Serbian army and the Ottoman invaders of the Balkan Peninsula. These rivalries in Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandzak escalated in the late nineteenth century. Macedonia will increasingly become a focus of Balkan aspirations. Ottomans manage to preserve power in Macedonia that will direct rival factions of Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs against each other. First Bulgarians favored by Constantinople, are those who will make educational and cultural breakthrough in Macedonia. In 1903 emerged famous Ilinden uprising in Macedonia led by IMRO which will be directed against Ottoman power. The uprising has been suffocated and by that was created opportunities for Greek and Serbian factions to improve their positions in Macedonia. The failure of the rebellion has caused considerable distress in Bulgaria, where by “public opinion at that time foreign policy of Bulgaria will revolve around a single issue - Macedonia”\(^\text{18}\) Unprepared to intervene during the uprising, the Bulgarian army will begin immediately its reorganization following year.\(^\text{19}\) Then Bulgarians thought about direct military action against the Ottoman Empire to achieve its national target. In response to the Macedonian Uprising, the Great Powers, led by Austria-Hungary and Russia, has formulated a reform program that proposes limited reforms to the European part of the Ottoman Empire. The program served to support the Berlin showdown, but failed to truly attract the attention of Ottoman rule.

Conscious of its own weaknesses, Bulgaria would join the union with Serbia in April 1904. Serb-Bulgarian treaty of 1904, actually the two separate agreements, is focused on economic and political issues. The agreement also provides mutual military assistance in the event of external attack and called for united action in Macedonia and Kosovo in case
these areas are under threat. However, the agreement remained unrealized due to pressure from Austria-Hungary and because of decrease in the Serb-Bulgarian relations. Because of reservations about the alliance, Bulgaria was to sabotage it releasing the contracts with Serbs before they were ready. It is worth noting that the Serbs will propose union to Montenegro but, this union will remain just on proposals.

Russia’s defeat in the war with Japan and the outbreak of revolution in Russia in 1905 will astounded Slavic Balkan countries, who saw Russia as the biggest Slovenian defender. Thus, Bulgarians will realize that external military aid (meaning Russia) might not be available in dealing with the events in the Balkans. Russians who liberated Bulgaria from Ottoman and who sponsored a Greater Bulgaria in San Stephen proved as too weak to endure. What followed was the endeavor of the Bulgarian army to strengthen in the near future to prepare for a future war with the Ottoman Empire.

**THE CREATION OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE**

After the Young Turk Revolution in 1908-1909, governments of Belgrade and Sofia decide to resolve their problems of national unity. (Radoslav Popov, 1974: 262-263). Serbia will seek support against escalating anti-Serbian policy of Austria-Hungary, while Bulgarians will remain focused on their aspirations in Macedonia and to a lesser extent in Thrace. Both governments hasted Young Turks to act before they can implement significant reforms. Another reason for strengthening the Serbian-Bulgarian efforts for the national questions has come from radical activists in their countries. After the failure of the Ilinden Uprising in 1903, the revolutionary organization IMRO will strengthen its power in Bulgaria and act effectively beyond the control of the government in Sofia. On the other hand, neither the Bulgarian government has completely controlled his Macedonian Organization-Supremacists. However, common to both organizations is that they had strong ties with the Bulgarian army. Other similar organizations (such as the Black Hand or Union) were in Serbia and operated within the military and outside government circles in Belgrade. “Both Bulgarian and Serbian paramilitary organizations were determined to achieve national unity with or without government support.” (Helmreich, E.C., 1969). Governments in Belgrade and Sofia realized that in order to maintain proper control over their national movements, they have to act forcefully against the Ottoman Empire.

The contacts between Belgrade and Sofia were strengthened in 1909. They were directed to the question of Macedonia. It was a most important question that had to be
decided in the future to but the solution should not eschew the Balkan states. After Bosnian crisis Serbs will have an additional incentive to make deals with other Balkan countries. Serbs were convinced that until they aren’t allied with the Bulgarians, their impact on the Croats and Slovenes would be insignificant. But in the alliance with Bulgaria, Serbia would become a center in that would gravitate all Slavic peoples. Serbs has increasingly perceived Yugoslavia as a weapon used against their Habsburg opponents, who were perceived as the main opponent of a Greater Serbia. This is just a small indication that not the overall Serbian aspiration was associated with the Balkans, nor the aspirations of Greeks who among others dreamed of controlling all of the Aegean Sea and the island of Cyprus, gaining Anatolia, despite their limited interest to the north. But to overcome the Balkan Peninsula, Balkan countries first had to secure the interests of each other and against each other starting from the first interest - Macedonia. Such attempts of the Balkan countries to overcome problems that separated them coincide with Russia’s decision to the active policy in the Balkans. (Edward Thaden, 1965: 38-57). After the military defeat of Japan and diplomatic defeat by Austria in 1909, Russians in search for an active role in the Balkans has begun to encourage the creation of anti-Austrian Balkan Union. In order to strengthen this position by 1911, rather will engage Russian ambassadors in Belgrade and Sofia. The outbreak of the Italian-Turkish war in September provided a further impetus for the Balkan Slavs to hurry a deal. Apparently that was the Italian-Turkish War, where one of the major forces attacked the Ottoman Empire, further undermined the Berlin settlement.

That same autumn, Bulgaria and Serbia will start exchanging proposals for alliance agreement and after three months of negotiations with the relief of Russian diplomatic help, they reached an agreement. This agreement, signed in March 1912, secured military cooperation against the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire and contract for Macedonia. The agreement clearly divided the interests of Bulgaria I Thrace and Serbia in Kosovo and Albania and determined that if would not be possible to implement autonomy in Macedonia, then that area to be divided. According to the Bulgarians, the division would be conducted so that they could get across southern Macedonia, including cities of Ohrid, Prilep and Bitola. Northern Macedonia including Skopje, with the contract awarded to the so-called disputed zone, where Russian tsar to act as arbitrary if Serbs and Bulgarians themselves cannot agree on territory belonging. The Bulgarians were more suited with establishment of an autonomous Macedonia because that would be one step closer to the Bulgarian annexation of Macedonia.

20 Voinata mezhdu Bûlgariya i Turtsiya 1912–13 god. Sofia: Dûrzhavna Pechatnitsa. I, 37
21 Ibid. 36
And only if this was not possible to achieve, they will invoke the provisions of the agreement on the division of Macedonia. The agreement although stressed Austria as a potential enemy, also its main force was directed to the war amongst the Balkan Slavic allies and the Ottoman Empire. While the Bulgarians were satisfied with the deal because a conviction that their traditional friend Russia will provide eventually disputed area to belong to Bulgaria, Serbia does not really watched with a lot of enthusiasm on agreement. Some disgruntled elements in the Serbian army, Serbs has stepped away too much leaving some Serbian areas that did not allowed to deviate even at the risk of collapse of the deal. (Alex N. Dragnich, 1974: 101).

The source of dissatisfaction was Macedonia because the contract clearly acknowledged only Serbian claim of Sandzak. They would only have received northwestern Macedonia due to the possible bias of the Russian arbitration. But the truth is that many Serbs experienced aspirations for the Macedonia as whole. Hence, then the change in the governing structure will give an opportunity to the new Prime Minister of Serbia Nikola Pasic - ardent nationalist - to stay as strict adherent of maxima list Serbian plan.

But on the other hand, even before they completed these arrangements, the government in Sofia will start negotiations with Athens for Bulgarian - Greek alliance, in which the Greeks had previously been interested if it is directed against Turkey. In fact, the Greeks since 1909 when they were humiliated by the crisis of Crete made numerous attempts for union with Bulgaria. Negotiations on a positive resulted in 1911 while at same time the Bulgarian negotiation with Serbia was ongoing. An agreement that was reached between Greece and Bulgaria in May 1912 has secured the political and military cooperation against the Ottoman Empire without specifying any division of Ottoman territories. This failure can be attributed to the Bulgarians, because they saw the union with Greece mainly as insurance used only by the Greek Navy against the Turks. Bulgaria was not convinced of the power of the Greek army on account of their strong army which arrogantly believed they could occupy areas in Macedonia before the arrival of the Greeks in the same territories.

In the third the Greek-Serbian relation, in the summer of 1912 was concluded just a gentleman’s agreement between Greece on the one hand and Serbia and Montenegro, on the other. (Katrin Boechk, 1996: 29). By the time of the outbreak of the First Balkan War the agreement was incomplete because of the issue of division of conquered territories and obligation to help Greece and Serbia if case of intervention of Austria-Hungary, because the Greeks has not felt a strong obligation for any of the Balkan Slavic allies except for struggle against the Turks.
Soon followed and then quickly contracted agreements of different weight on Montenegro with Belgrade, Sofia and Athens. Thus, the Balkan League was completed. Balkan allies were willing and prepared to fight to finally complete the process of national unity.

In the summer of 1912 the Ottoman control of the Balkans, especially in Albania and Macedonia was quite deteriorated. Appraisal in Albania will begin to spread. In Macedonia, as a result of explosions at a market in Kocani conducted by elements of the IMRO as a direct provocation, has resulted in a massacre of more than a hundred Slav Macedonians. This in turn will make Bulgarians angry. Ottoman army will remain engaged in fruitless efforts against Italians. A victim of this series of problems will be the Young Turks government that will be removed from power in August by fraction of anti - Young Turkish people in the military.

PREPARING FOR WAR

In striving for nationalistic purposes the Balkan states has built large armies who all drew a huge amount of national budgets. They have become so powerful so they could oppose to any constitutional or political constraints. In addition, they sought to accomplish their own nationalist agenda and they all on the war with the Ottoman Empire have looked upon like an exciting opportunity. On the other hand there was little enthusiasm for war with the Ottomans. Certain students in Istanbul demonstrated in favor of war with Balkan countries. (Yucel Aktar, 1988: 169-175). Recent wars in Yemen and North Africa has rather blunted the patriotic enthusiasm so the government has remained pretty carefree about the possible upcoming war.

At that time the Balkan allies has begun to develop plans for armies’ layout. Military Staff of Serbia and Bulgaria would agree that the main effort of the Bulgarian forces has been in Thrace and the efforts of Serbian forces have been in Macedonia. (Branko Perovich, 1959). In military terms this was completely clear because Bulgarians who had greater military might expect to encounter Ottoman forces because of their proximity to the capital of the Turks. But politically speaking, thus Bulgarian forces were located away from the main purpose of Bulgarian, the Macedonia. According to the schedule Serb forces needed to take and occupy parts of Macedonia that with convention in March were promised to Bulgaria. Bulgarian military leadership at that was not aware of the complications that this war schedule will create for Bulgarian aspirations. Later will really be confirmed that Serbian Orthodox occupation of land that was promised to Bulgaria will become a source of serious
Security dialogues

conflict whose consequences continue up to this day.

Upon commencement of mobilization on October 5, Bulgarians will also sign a military convention with Greece. The most important aspect of contract has been an insurance that the Greek fleet is to dominate the Aegean Sea so that the Turks would not be able to transfer troops by sea from Minor Asia to Europe. (Georgi Markov, 1912). It was also envisaged that if Serbs do not enter with 120,000 troops in Macedonia, that to be done by Bulgarians. Both sides also agreed not to accept a truce without prior consent of the other party.

Bulgarians assumed they would achieve their goals without the help or interference of the Greeks. That is why Bulgarians has not made precise delineation of activities in southern Macedonia, especially around Thessalonica which represents an obvious Greece destination but only Bulgarian unrealistic ambition. The final agreement on areas in southern Macedonia could might avoid the race for Thessalonica and deter subsequent hostility between Greece and Bulgaria.

Once the contracts of allies were being fully completed, Bulgaria has started to insist on the implementation of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, which they interpreted to mean the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia. When the Turks refused to consider reforms that would lead to autonomy in their European provinces, Balkan Alliance will be mobilized. Efforts of the Great Powers to prevent the outbreak of war were insufficient and futile. The First World War began on 8 October 1912 with the attack on the Montenegrins on Turkish positions. Turks has declared war on October 16 and the next day Balkan League adequately respond to Turkish declaration of war. Thus, the Balkans will be burned with fire raging to the next six years

FIRST BALKAN WAR

Campaign in Thrace in autumn 1912 started with amazing victories of Bulgaria. Their strategic plan succeeded in inflicting demoralizing defeat to their Ottoman opponents and led to the legendary 32 km from the capital Constantinople. Here they has refused Ottoman offer of peace and has continued the attack, but with poor logistical support and weakened by cholera wont be able to collect enough reserves of strength to overcome Ottoman positions and enter the city. If they has succeeded in capture of Constantinople they would actually achieved something that few armies in history have succeeded. They also would thus throw the great powers, especially Russia in jealousy and confusion. Eastern Ottoman army at the beginning of the campaign will be successfully defeated, and the losses will not be only Thrace
and Macedonia, but also Albania. However at the defense line Chataldza Ottoman army will achieve a significant victory by managing from defeat to successfully reposition to stop the advance of the Bulgarians. Thus the Ottoman army would have save the capital and re-gain the confidence lost in the initial battles of the war. This battle that was the most important victory against the Ottomans European army in the last 200 years will establish a precedent for victory at Gallipoli three years later. After the Chataldza battle the stalemate will come. Both opposing sides due to losses on assets and living force will be exhausted and for some time incapable of further military action. Thus, the Ottomans continued to hold three small parts of eastern Thrace: Chataldza, Gallipoli and Adrianople, where their continued presence in these locations was called into question.

Western theater that has covered the area of the western region of the Balkans, including Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, was of minor importance for war resolution the and the survival of the Ottoman Empire than it was Thrace. This was a region that was subject to national aspirations of Serbia and Montenegro and most of the aspirations of Greece. To some extent the aspirations of Montenegrins and Serbs overlapped for Sandzak and Kosovo. Serbian army has performed quite well in the First Balkan War. It has adapted quickly and successfully to the possibility of taking the city of Kumanovo. That victory would allow Serbs to progress much faster than they have imagined, according to their original plan, which assumed that the decisive battle would take place south of Skopje. Serbs came out as the big winners in the western theater in the initial phase of the First Balkan war. They not only defeated and drove Ottoman forces from areas of northern Macedonia and Kosovo to which they aspire, but also has occupied Central Macedonia and Albania all the way to the coast of the Adriatic Sea. This success was achieved at low cost of human and material losses. At that time Serbs faced a problem that does not originate from their enemies the Turks but by the Great Powers. Will the Great Powers, especially Austria-Hungary and Italy, allow them to keep what has conquered in Albania? Closely related to that problem was the issue of Macedonia. Serbs has occupied all territories of central and northern Macedonia, which include large areas that were promised to Bulgaria under the March alliance of 1912. Will Serbia give up these territories to Bulgaria after Serbia already shed blood for them? These issues has further complicated by the positioning of a one Bulgarian army division in southern Macedonia and transfer of one a Serbian army at Adrianople.

For Montenegro, the initial phase of the First Balkan War was pretty frustrating. Although Montenegrin army has occupied a significant part of Sandzak, however it was not
able to get to Prizren in Kosovo. Worse, Montenegrins will be stopped in northern Albania without clear expectation of victory.

The results of the first battles for Greeks were unclear. They have achieved their main objective, the capture of Thessalonica. However, in political and military sense their victory will be limited. Bulgarians has disputed Thessalonica proclamation of the Greeks. Beside that, the Greeks have lacked territorial agreement with Bulgaria. Conflicting claims of belonging of Thessalonica and also between Greeks and their bigger and stronger ally will undermine the Balkan League. Also, unlike the Serbian and Bulgarian allies, the Greek army will not achieve any significant victory against the Ottomans. Even at the time of the armistice which they have ignored, there were Greek soldiers who were trapped outside Ioannina. This war to Greeks brought little glory and no truce to bring relief. However, the Greek navy as expected proved to be a key asset to the success of the Balkan League. It successfully thwarted the Ottomans transportation of troops from Asia in the Western Balkans and allowed the Greeks to conquer islands in the Aegean which were held by the Ottomans.

The situation for the Ottomans in the western theater of the war at the beginning was not promising. Offensive strategy that has Ottomans applied in Kumanovo was not any more successful than in Thrace. They have failed to stop the Serbs in their advance to Bitola and the Greeks march to Thessalonica. If they happen to withdraw their army of Western Macedonia at the beginning of the war and entrenched that same army in Albania they could gain certain advantages because only there in Albania the Ottomans has enjoyed support from the local population against the Allies. From here they could with fresh troops attack their enemies during their movement through Macedonia and because of ability in Albania to retain unlimited its enemies, they would be get a additional time to bring their troops from Asia and used their numerical superiority to crush the Balkan League.22

**TRUCE AND THE LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE**

By the end of November 1912 armies of the Balkan League will become victorious almost everywhere. Efforts of war have exhausted them all. Ottomans also were exhausted in their defeat. Victory in Chataldzha still inculcates some hope for them. Neither side will be in a position to continue the fight by the previous level of intensity, nor did any of them have serious expectations for outside assistance.

---

22 Balkans wars 1912-1913. Prelude to First World War.
The terms of the truce were in favor of the Balkan allies. However, the allies have not got total satisfying. Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro further sought to acquire sieged positions. Ottoman resistance was fierce in a situation of Adrianople due to its proximity to Constantinople and also in cases with Janina and Skutari (the latter in northern Albania) due to determination of the Albanian population to avoid external governance. With regard to Bulgaria, because they have committed to arbitration on the issue of northern Macedonia, which showed possibility that they will not receive all of Macedonia, they have experienced anxiety that might get the Thrace as compensation to Macedonia. Their insistence on getting Adrianople secured that this issue will be put on the agenda of the London Peace Conference.

After signing the truce at Chataldzha, diplomatic arena has been transferred to London. Two simultaneous conferences were held there in December 1912 in order to be determined the fate of the Balkan Peninsula. With their proposal of January 1, 1913. Turkey has accepted the loss of all lands west of the province of Adrianople in Thrace, but has refused to recognize the lost of Thrace and the Aegean islands. (Ahmad, Feroz, 1969: 115). This would be completely unacceptable for Bulgaria and Greece. As a result, negotiations were brought to a standstill. On January 6th they were fully suspended.

The second conference held in London was more important than the former. There, dating was a synthesis of the ambassadors of the six great powers, signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. It was clear from the beginning that the Great Powers, by their ministers in London and not by representatives of the belligerent countries that meet there, have the ultimate privilege in deciding the settlement of the Balkan war. Great Powers sought to replace Berlin agreement with London Agreement. This was the last breath of Congress system that contained the ambitions of great powers since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 year. According to the outcome of negotiations, the period from the beginning of December 1912 up to the end of January 1913 is a great disappointment to members of the Balkan League and even bigger disappointment for the Macedonian people. None of the members of the Balkan League will achieve its goals. The pressure from the Great Powers would force the Serbs to withdraw from some of their conquests in northern Albania. This period will also be seen as isolation of Bulgaria. Although Bulgaria has achieved the greatest military effort during the war with great victories in Thrace, yet this win has not brought adequate territorial and political gains. Bulgarian disagreement with Greece and Serbia over Macedonia has become a threat to the security of the March 1912 agreement. Turks has gained little advantage from the duration of the truce and mutual friction in the Balkan League. Their garrisons seized
in three cities remained without help from Constantinople. In those two months of truce, in fact there will be no cessation of fighting in Skutari and Ioannina. Simultaneously in all three towns, soldiers and civilians have spent resources and food. The return to power of the Young Turks could allow these troubled locations and troops at Gallipoli and Chataldzha some psychological relief, but did nothing to improve their situation. The Turkish military, a little rested, at that time has found herself in a situation to fight again in an effort that previously visible has failed.

Renewed efforts to win the war have demonstrated energy and imagination of the Young Turk government, but that will only bear the additional loss. All three cities seized will capitulate. By the end of April 1913 Ottoman Europe was reduced to the Gallipoli peninsula and the flux area behind the line of Chataldzha. Greeks has captured Ioannina with relatively no damage. They will also acquire the location that guarantees control of the Ionian Sea stretching from the Gulf of Arta to the island of Corfu. The other Balkans winners has greatly benefited from the defeat of the Ottomans. Bulgarians has invested tremendous efforts for Adrianople and they have achieved great military victory there, but for most Bulgarians Adrianople is secondary in relation to Macedonia. Additional efforts to take Adrianople has further burden the already exhausted Bulgarian army and has distracted the Bulgarians from conflict that has prepared on the west. While Bulgarians has fought in Thrace, Greece and Serbia has preparing to defensive positions to preserve the achievements in Macedonia. Regard to Montenegrins, they have suffer two defeats in Shkodra. Their evacuation of Shkodra, after spending so many lives and material resources and acceptance of help from Serbia has become a complete military failure.

The end of the fighting in the First Balkan War after long sieges has left all of the participants exhausted. It will be only a brief pause in the cycle of the Balkan wars. Two months since Montenegrins has left Shkodra, the Balkan League will break up with a new round of fighting. The end of the fighting also made Austria-Hungary and other major powers to be engaged in the Balkans more than ever before. Second time in less than six months the Double Monarchy has threatened with war against the state in the Balkans. Only concerted action of other major powers, especially their willingness to send a joint military force in the Balkans will stop the war. Such willingness has been a thin shell against the possibility of the Austro-Hungarian intervention in the Balkans.23

---

RESOLUTION

While diplomatic activity of the Great Powers and the Balkan allies has increased, simultaneously has facilitated dissolution of the Balkan League. By the middle of May the situation in Bulgaria became desperate. Pressed by their previous allies and Romania, by the lack of a final peace with the Turks and the increased uncertainty in protectorship from Russia, Bulgaria has sought solutions to their problems which will provide them Macedonia.

By the spring of 1913 the antagonism between the Balkan allies has reached the endpoint. In such a situation the smallest incident could become the initiation of a new war. According to the general attitude of the Greeks at that time, the war was inevitable and as such it was better to happen immediately when Greece was in a state of military readiness and before normal life and occupations to return than after a year or two when it would be necessary to initiate to fight again. (Cassevetti, D.J., 1914: 308). The same opinion has ruled in Bulgaria and Serbia. And any of these three states could provide the spark for an explosion. Their armies were ready for action, and their politicians had full control of the diplomatic and military situation. Emotions have prevailed before reason. And as addition, Romania and the Ottoman Empire anxiously have anticipated the possibility to benefit from this situation.

Although convinced of the righteousness of their cause and the strength of their army, the Bulgarians were increasingly isolated diplomatically and militarily. Their Russian liberator and protector appeared to have left. Their soldiers, worn out by huge efforts in the war against the Turks, have become increasingly anxious. These conditions have led to desperate action that will end disastrously. If then the Bulgarians were eager to give up their claims to most of Macedonia, then they would come out of the First Balkan War with the greatest territorial expansion. In this respect, Bulgaria would have reliable output on the Aegean Sea, which would extend from the mouth of the Struma River until the Gallipoli peninsula. In addition they would have gotten most of eastern Thrace and would control the retain of strategic threat to Constantinople. Even with these gains Bulgaria would become the dominant force in Southeast Europe and valuable property for allied alliances or the Great Powers. Russia, the only force that could lead such circumstances to a peaceful resolution, neither had power or determination nor intent to do so. Due to the failure of Russia to regulate relations in this sphere that was so vital to its interests, the strong position of Russia -based on Bulgarian led Balkan League- has collapsed. Later than one year, the events in the Balkans again have escaped from Russian control. This time the consequences will extend far beyond the Balkan Peninsula involving the whole planet.
SECOND BALKAN WAR

Bulgarian attack on Serb positions the night between 29 and 30 of June released the hostilities that were escalated from the previous fall. Not taking into account the state of the Macedonians, Balkan yesterday allies Bulgarins, Greeks and Serbs has perceived war as a means of resolution of their disputes. Essentially, all three countries fought for Macedonia. The new war for the Bulgarians was chance to annul alliance with Serbia in 1912 and to receive all of Macedonia. Greater Bulgaria could better dominate the Balkans. Greeks and Serbs have not only faced with the possibility of sharing the rich region with each other, but also with possibility to prevent the Bulgarian hegemony. Their alliances agreements in spring 1913 have secured northern Macedonia with town of Skopje to stay in the background of Serbia while the part of Macedonia with Thessalonica to stay in the background of Greece. After the commencement of hostilities, Romanians has seized the opportunity to resolve their dispute with Bulgaria regarding Dobruja, while Turks will take the opportunity to recapture Adrianople.

After initiating the Second Balkan War, the Bulgarians has been able to recover from the initial disaster in to the successful defense of their country against the invading Greeks and Serbs. The defeat of the Greeks at the end of the war might allow Bulgarians turn to Serbs to expel them from Macedonia. However, the presence of Romanians and Turks on Bulgarian soil negated the advantage that this victory has created. In fact, the Bulgarians lost the war the day when Romanians crossed the Danube. Largely, the Bulgarians were to blame themselves for their disaster in the Second Balkan War. Diplomatic this was started in early spring of 1912 when they failed to reach a territorial agreement as part of their alliance with Greece Recognition of Greek claims to Thessalonica in the initial agreement of the union could reach such a deal. Pleased Greeks would be so unlikely to associate with Serbia in support of Serbian claims for file audit. Another major diplomatic error of Bulgaria was the inability of resolving the dispute with Romania. Regarding the Romanian claims, seen as blackmail, Bulgarians has refused to make any significant concessions in Dobrudja. That act will cost them the territory of Macedonia. If Bulgarians has recognized part of the territory of Dobruja to Romania, they probably would not have tried with the invasion of Romanians in July 1913. And also the Turks probably would not have tried to reach a revision of the London Agreement without the support of Romania. „The defeated Bulgarians, whose influence in Macedonia had grown steadily since 1870 and who wanted desperately to annex it all and thus create a Great Bulgaria, ended up with the smallest part, Pirin Macedonia. The Peace
Treaty of Bucharest of 10 August 1913 sanctioned this arrangement and ended the Second Balkan War. (Rossos Andrew, 2008: 127).

If Bulgaria’s government and military command decided that the use of force against Serbia and Greece was the preferred means of resolution of the dispute called Macedonia, the government was that it failed to create the preconditions for diplomatic use of force. It has failed to provide support to Bulgaria from its traditional patron Russia. Instead that, the government has a little flirting with Austria -Hungary, but only got vague assurance on which could not commence military campaign. Provided patronage of Russia or Austria -Hungary would have deterred the attack on Romanians and Ottomans at Bulgarian undefended northern and southern boundary. Under such conditions the Bulgaria would win over Serbia and Greece. (M.I.Madzharov, 1940: 488). Another factor for Bulgaria defeat was social and political unrest that has manifested in the military in June 1913. Although this is not indicative of any national cause rejection of the Bulgarian troops, though concerns about these riots were the deciding factor Bulgarian command to adopt an aggressive policy. Finally, disruption in communication between government in Sofia and army headquarters had horrific consequences. The attack of the Bulgarian army on 29-30 of June (which was not well organized due to poor deployment of armies, with the flaw of unconsecrated forces in Macedonia, which was actually the main goal) was a huge mistake. Not only was hampered by well rested and outnumbered enemy, but also caused Bulgaria to lose the moral support that could have got among the great powers. To win the war Bulgarians were to destroy enemy forces or to occupy Macedonia, preferably both. They also needed to achieve it quickly, but difficult mountainous terrain of eastern Macedonia prevented those efforts and enabled the Greeks and Serbs to remain in control of much of the region. Bulgarians as obvious aggressors has deserved defeat but yet they have never ever lost the idea of a Greater Bulgaria which includes Macedonia and Thrace.

Greeks, Serbs, Turks and Romanians were the big winners in the Second Balkan War. Aside successes of the Turks who regained the key territory of Thrace and secured the capital, Romanians used only army to occupy desired southern Dobruja, not acting on the challenge to occupy Varna and Sofia because of the danger of Strong Bulgaria to be replaced by a strong Serbia. Treaty of Bucharest has not only verified to Greeks significant parts of southern Macedonia including Serres, Drama and Kavala but also has verified the significant border with Serbia. With its victory in the Second Balkan War, Serbia has become a dominant south Slavic force. By the end of the war most of the Macedonians lived under
direct Serbian control. By the Treaty of Bucharest the Montenegro will become a Serbia’s satellite. After acquiring prestige among the South Slavs, the Belgrade will compete with Vienna and Budapest for loyalty of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians who lived under the dual monarchy. Victory over Bulgaria has left Serbia as only Russian ally in the Balkans. Loss of Bulgaria has made Russia dependent on Serbia in order to maintain its influence in the Balkans.

**GEO-STRATEGIC OUTCOME OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT IN BUCHAREST**

Treaty of Bucharest was signed on 10th August 1913 between delegates of Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Bulgaria had been completely isolated in the Second Balkan War, with Romanian entrance on its northern border, on the western boundary with the allied armies of Greece and Serbia and at the east of Turkey’s army. Thus, Bulgaria in its helplessness was obliged to submit to the conditions of its enemies. All important arrangements and concessions involving the rectification of controversial international boundary lines were completed in a series of meetings, incorporated in separate protocols, and formally ratified by subsequent action of the general assembly of delegates.

With the terms of the agreement most benefited Romania in proportion to its victims. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, against the territory of 2,687 square miles which will belong to Romania the other territorial changes are as follows: Eastern border of Serbia will be drawn between the watersheds of the river Vardar and Struma River up to the Greek- Bulgarian border with the exception of the upper basin of Struma which to remain in possession of Bulgaria. The territory that Serbia would gain would encompass Central Macedonia, Kosovo and the eastern half of the area - Sandzak - Novi Pazar. With this arrangement Serbia increased her territory from 18,650 to 33,891 square miles with a population increase of more than 1.5 million; boundary line which separates Greece and Bulgaria was withdrawn from the ridge of the mountain Belasitza to the mouth of the River Mesta at the Aegean Sea. With this significant territorial concessions which Bulgaria resolutely contested, the Greece territory was increased from 25,014 to 41,933 square miles and a population from 2,660,000 to 4,363,000. At previously existing Greek territory with these changes to Greece are added Epirus, southern Macedonia with Thessalonica and Kavala and the Aegean coast to the river Mesta, that has shorten the Bulgarian landlock of the Aegean Sea on 70 miles. Greece will also expand the north-west border with inclusion of Ioannina and definitely has got awarded Crete. But Bulgaria also has contribution of division
of the spoils. Although significantly reduced, was not completely negligible it’s obtaining of territory that covers the Pirin part of Macedonia, Western Thrace and 70 miles of the Aegean coast with a net area of 9663 square miles by which it’s population growth up by 129 490.24

Humiliating relationship that was imposed to Bulgaria was merit to its intolerance and unreasonable levity. The territory which she received was quite limited, failing to release Macedonia which was actually its open goal for entry into war, with lost of Ohrid which was particularly desired. Greece, however, although had much, still been greatly dissatisfied. Purchases of Salonika were a real triumph; Greece was also awarded with the port of Kavala and the territory east of it. In an attempt to gain more, Greece clashed with opposition of the Italian to its proclamation of the territory of South Albania. Greece was deeply dissatisfied also with the award of the islands in the Aegean, arguing that should get much more islands.

The basic flaws of that agreement are: borders that were drawn had little connection with the nationality of the population (read mostly Macedonians) in areas that have been affected and that punishment of Bulgaria which, though probably well deserved in terms of starting a major offensive on Second Balkan War, was so cruel that Bulgaria could never accept the agreement as a permanent settlement. And although Serbia, Greece and Romania can not escape blame for the nature of the contract, it must not be forgotten that their activities in Bucharest were largely forced on merit of forcible settle scores among Balkan states by the Great Powers.25

**INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION**

As the first all-European conflict in the twentieth century, the Balkan wars introduced the modern era of warfare involving mass armies, machinery and entire civilian population. The conflict originated in the Balkans in 1912 will has continued in Europe with relatively short interruptions until 1945. Even much later, many of the problems associated with the Balkan wars will reemerged during and after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. This includes the status of Kosovo and Macedonia as well as trial of establishing a large Serbian national state.

One of the biggest tragedies of most of the Balkan Wars was a missed opportunity, especially Bulgaria and Serbia to establish a lasting Balkan alliance. Agreement in March 1912 between Bulgaria and Serbia gave grounds for such an alliance. United Balkans could

---

24 See The Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913. [https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos149.htm](https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/boshtml/bos149.htm)
25 Ibid.
boost economic development on the peninsula and could have avoided years of war between rivals Serbia and Bulgaria. Such a strong alliance also could deflect Austro-Hungary from taking the first fatal step against Serbian act of terrorism in July 1914 which was prelude to First World War. This alliance has failed for several reasons. First, the greed of Bulgaria in the division of Macedonia with Greece. Unrealistic expectations of Bulgaria, especially related with Thessalonica, have prevented the agreement between Bulgaria and Greece in the spring of 1913. Territorial satisfied Greece would likely not have a deal with Serbia. As secondly are underlined Austro-Hungarian and Italian interests in the Adriatic Sea. This has led to the creation of an independent state of Albania in order to repel Greek, Montenegrin and Serbian ambitions in the region. The failure of the latter to establish a presence on the Adriatic has lead to situation in which Serbs has seek compensation in Macedonia with territory proclaim to be Bulgarian. But even Serbs has stayed in Durres on the Adriatic, they could also tried to keep most of Macedonia. The third reason for the failure of the Balkan alliance was mercurial approach to Russia as a guarantor of the agreement of March 1912. Russia has failed to promote a sense of fairness and moderation between Bulgaria and Serbia. As a result St. Petersburg has lost its strong position in Sofia and by that the real possibility finally to establish physical control of the Straits. Instead, the Russians have found themselves in a situation to be associated with less favorable position of Serbia. It resulted that Russia had to follow Serbia in devastating First World War.

All participants in the Balkan wars suffered by disappointment and defeat in their efforts to realize the question which introduced them at war. But the real sufferers are the Macedonians who were subject to division. All other somehow changed their role from winners to losers or reverse with the exception of Macedonia that passed in every way disastrous. Bulgaria’s inability to fully realize its ambitions towards Macedonia in the Balkan wars has lead Bulgaria into the fight on the side of Central forces in 1915 and on side of the Germans in 1941. In both cases, the Bulgarian troops has occupied the part of Macedonia that was previously adopted by Serbia and also parts of Greek Macedonia, including the cities of Serres, Drama and Kavala. Anyway the Bulgarian presence there has proven to be short-lived. The legacy of defeat in the Second Balkan War has led to a defeat of Bulgaria in the first and then in the Second World War. With the peace treaty after the First World War, Bulgaria lost Thrace, with its Aegean coast and a few small parts of country near western border with the new Yugoslav state, including town of Strumica. Macedonia as entire has remained beyond the reach of Bulgaria. But the fate of Macedonia is such that not even today
it is whole as a country. The territory of Republic Macedonia of the present-day is territory of Macedonia gained by Serbia in Balkan wars. Serbia really was the big winner in the Balkan wars. Not only the Serbian forces triumphed against Turkish troops in Albania, Macedonia and Thrace and then over the Bulgarian troops in Macedonia, but Serbia has expand on large its territory and population. These gains to Serbia have brought enhanced power and prestige, but also a number of problems. The new territories included non-Serbian population. Armed Albanian rebels in Kosovo supported by IMRO and Bulgaria in Macedonia has opposed the Serbian government since 1913. Serbia has not established full control over these areas until after 1918. During that internal war period, the IMRO has disputed Serbian government in Macedonia. But despite that Serbian national appetites have remained hungry for Albania and Bosnia but unable to achieve it despite that Serbia in World War will be on the winning side. During the Second World War Italians has annexed Kosovo to their Kingdom of Albania, and after the war the two regions of Macedonia and Kosovo will be sort of separated from Serbia within the Tito’s Federal Yugoslavia.

LITERATURE:
[3]. A.Toshev, (1929-31) Balkanskite voini, Sofia;
[6]. Georgi Markov, “Voennite sporazumeniya v Balkanskiya sûyuz iobyavavaneto na obshta mobilizatsiya v Bûlgariya (Mart-Septembri 1912 g.);
[8]. Ivan E.Geshov, (1916) Spomeni iz godini na borbi i pobedi. Sofia;
[10]. M.I.Madzharov, (1940) “Radko Dimitriev za Mezhdusûyuznicheskaata voina,” Bûlgarski misûl XV 9 (November 1940) 488;
[12]. St Danev, “Kabinetût D-r. St Danev 1901–1903 godina,” Rodina III 4 (1941) 70;


[19]. The Balkan wars 1912 – 1913 through the hellenic and rumanian press of that time dis.army.gr/pdf/balkan_wars_en.pdf;

LIST OF REVIEWERS

• Biljana VANKOVSKA, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

• Costas DANOPoulos, PhD, San Jose State University, Department of Political Science, USA.

• Emanuela C. Del RE, PhD, University Niccolò Cusano of Rome, Faculty of Political Science, chair of EPOS International Mediating and Negotiating Operational Agency, Italy.

• Franz-Lothar ALTMAN, PhD, Bucharest University, UNESCO Dpt. for Intercultural and International Relations, member of the Board of Southeast Europe Association, Germany.

• James PETTIFER, PhD, University of Oxford, Faculty of History, Great Britain.

• Jan OBERG, PhD, Director of Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, Sweden.

• Lidija GEORGIJEVA, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

• Ljubica JELUŠIĆ, PhD, University of Ljubljana, Faculty od Social science - Department of Political Science, Slovenia.

• Marina MALISH-SAZDOVSKA, PhD, University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, Faculty of Security, Republic of Macedonia.

• Marina MITREVSKA, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

• Michael SHULTZ, PhD, University of Gothenburg, School of global studies, Sweden.

• Mirko BILANDŽIĆ, PhD, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences - Department of Sociology, Croatia.

• Mitko KOTOVČEVSKI, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

• Oliver BAKRESKI, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

• Rina KIRKOVA, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute
of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

- Sinisha DASKALOVSKI, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

- Toni MILESKI, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

- Vancho Kenkov, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

- Žarko PUHOVSKI, PhD, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences – Department of Philosophy, Croatia.

- Želimir KEŠETOVIĆ, PhD, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security studies, Serbia.

- Zoran Matevski, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of sociology, Republic of Macedonia.

- Zoran NACEV, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.

- Yu-Chin, CHENG, PhD, Charles University in Prague, Institute of Political Studies, Czech Republic.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

For writing papers used font StobiSansCn regular (English and Macedonian Support). Papers must to have abstract not more than 300 words. Key words not more than 5. Introduction, main part, conclusion and literature. The authors of papers are obligated to submitted and their personal photography (90 mm x 130 mm, 300 dpi - dots per inch and TIFF or JPEG format) that will be laid on the cover page on the paper. The paper need to contain from 4000 to 6000 words. This mean that papers can be (prepared according to the given margin) from 10 to 15 pages.

Preparation of handwriting

In order to facilitate the printing of the magazine „Security Dialogues“ papers needs to be submitted in electronic version. Especially note that the pages and attachments (tables, graphs, maps, etc.) should be numbered.

Papers should be written in Macedonian and English language, on the authors recommended title, abstract of papers, presentations and briefing statements to write on English language.

Papers that are not taken in printing will be back to authors with an explanation.

The manuscript should contain: title, authors, institution, abstract, keywords, introduction, contents of the paper, conclusion and literature.

Title: Size of fat (Bold) letters, 14 points, StobiSansCn Regular, central, first Macedonian (Cyrillic support), and then the English language (the abstract in English). Title of the paper need be short, but to give a faithful reflection of content and preferably contain as many keywords covered filed.

Example:

СОВРЕМЕНИ АСПЕКТИ НА РЕГИОНАЛНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ
CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Authors: name, institution, e-mail address, small fatty (Bold) letters, 11 points StobiSansCn Regular (Cyrillic support) or English language, centrally.

Example: Name Surname, Faculty of Philosophy – Institute of Security, defence and
Abstract: The first of the Macedonian language, 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular (Cyrillic support), and then the English language, 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular, single spaced. The content of the abstract should be an essential and independent entity.

Keywords: up to 5 words, 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular, single spaced, in Macedonian (Cyrillic support) and English.

Introduction: 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular (Cyrillic support) or English language, single spaced. The introduction should briefly indicate only the most important of the former research related rework issue and then explain the purpose and importance of work-study.

Contents of the paper: 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular (Cyrillic support) or English language, single spaced. The contents of the paper should cover theoretical foundations, experimental part and the results that have occurred.

Conclusion: 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular (Cyrillic support) or English language, single spaced. The conclusion should be a brief summary of the paper, and include the results that occurred in the survey.

References: 11 points, StobiSansCn Regular (Cyrillic support) or English language, quoted according to the instructions given below. The literature stated in a separate chapter in which is entered only bibliographic units that are used in the paper.

Books and monographs are cited as follows:
Surname, initials (year) Title. Place of publication: Publisher.

Examples:
Luxemburg: European Environment Agency.

Journals are cited as follows:
Surname, initials. (year) “Title of article”, name of journal in which it is published. Volume, number, pages.

Papers presented in the proceedings of various meetings are quoted as follows:
Surname, initials (year) “Title of paper”. In: Title of collection. Place of publication: publisher, pages.

If there are multiple authors, Proceedings quotation is as follows:
Surname, initials (eds.) Title of collection. Place of publication: Publisher.

Sources taken from web sites are quoted as follows:
name of author/editor, initials (year) “Title of article”. Title of the magazine. Date of publication, year, number, pages, Internet address (date of the first insights into the text on the website).

Master’s and doctoral dissertations are cited as follows:
surname, initials (year) Title of the dissertation, Place and institution where master/doctoral dissertation is defended.


Official Publications:
name of publication/organization/institution (year) Title. Place of publication: Publisher.


References in this work: quoted this work is listed in the paper and not in footnotes or endnoti. They are put in brackets, ie surname and year of issuance of the said act. For example: (Avijucki, 2009). In case a specific citation reads another page and, for example: (Avijucki, 2009: 112). Each note is stated as the first time. In case you cite two or more authors, it is done as follows: (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995) or if multiple authors are cited first author (Agnew and Associates, 1995). If used more literature on a published author in the same year then the year despite being added: a, b, c ... (Surname, 2012a, 2012b). Any reference used must be specified in the inventory of used literature.

Tables, graphs, maps and other items are numbered with Arabic numbers. Example: Table 1, Figure 1, Map 1 and so on.

Margins: B5 format with margins 17 cm to 24 cm (6.69 “x 9.45”), Header: 1.25 cm (0.49”) and Footer: 1.25 cm (0.49”)

Papers are prepared on site with the following workspace:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Layout – Margins – Custom Margins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Values in cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>top: 2 cm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom: 2.2 cm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>left: 1.7 cm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right: 1.7 cm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gutter: 0 cm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Applied manuscripts Editorial Board sent to reviewers. Reviewers and authors remain anonymous. Reviewed papers, together with any observations and opinions of the Editorial Board will be submitted to the authors. They are obliged, most within 15 days to make the necessary corrections.

Category of labor determines the Editorial Board based on the opinions of reviewers. Paper submitted by the above propositions and electronic version of the official e-mail magazine “Security Dialogue”.

Deadlines for sending papers: 31.05 and 31.10 in the current year at the following address:

ADDRESS:
Editor in Chief:
Prof. d-r Toni Mileski, toni@fzf.ukim.edu.mk or tonimileski.tm@gmail.com