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ПРЕДГОВОР НА УРЕДНИКОТ

Почитувани читатели,
Меѓународното научно списание „Безбедносни дијалози“ влегува во петтата година од своето постоене. Успешниот растеж и популяризацијата на списанието претставуваат евидентен доказ за нашата заедничка успешна приказна. Почитувани, во меѓувреме продолжи трендот на индексирање во престижни бази на научни списанија, а по долгиот процес на евалуација од страна на Глобалниот импакт фактор (Global Impact Factor-GIF), кој обезбедува алатки за квантитативно и квалитативно рангирање, евалуација и категоризација на научните списанија добиени се вредности од 0,423 за 2012 година и 0,462 за 2013 година. Овие вредности претставуваат потстрек за понатамошно подобрување на целниот процес на стручно рецензирање, научниот квалитет, на уредувачката политика, на техничката подготвка и сл. Исто така, „Безбедносни дијалози“ претставуваат еден отворен и гласен дијалоз на научниот средин на широката публика, кој претставува важна платформа за размена на научни информации, за развој на научните концепции и за преглед на важните научни и социјални тенденции на нашиот време.

Почитувани читатели, првиот број на „Безбедносни дијалози“ за 2014 година низ квалитетните научни трудови ќе Ви отвори широки научни хоризонти од повеќе научни области соодветни за научното подрачје со које се занимава списанието.

Првиот труд ја проучува дипломатската стратегија на Република Кина во односите ЕУ-Кина. Анлаизата се потпира на реализмот како теоретска основа за проучување на дипломатската стратегија на Кина. Следува труд кој се занимава со феноменот на македонското национално ослободително движење (македонското прашање, воопшто). Авторот на трудот потенцира дека движењето настанало во еден мошне специфичен историски, геополитички, геостратегиски, воено-стратегиски и воено-политички контекст. Во оваа научна студија е направен концизен пресек и расветлување на сите значајни фактори во континуитет, во контекст на искуствата на Париската комуна и учењето за „вооружениот народ“. Во продолжение можете да прочитате труд кој се обидува да одговори на прашањето „Која е улогата на полицијата во борбата против тероризмот?“. На страниците од списанието, во наредниот труд, се пренесени најновите солидарности за безбедносните и одбранбени аспекти на Европската унија и како тие аспекти ќе влијаат на научната полета.
врз идното проширување на ЕУ. Интересна компаративна анализа нуди трудот кој се фокусира на прашањето дали и како финансирањето на одбраната на држава членка на НАТО и намалувањето на одбранбениот буџет влијае врз градењето на одбранбените способности, при што се анализира висината на одбранбениот буџет на Република Словенија во периодот од 2001 до 2013 година. Во доменот на мировните науки, списанието пласира труд кој ја разгледува студентската перцепција на емоционалната клима како можне значаен дел од културата на мирот. Акцентот е ставен на состојбите во Република Македонија, која е една релативно млада демократија, насочена кон реализирање на својата европска перспектива. Следува труд кој преку разгледување на актуелната политичка мапа на Балканот со краток осврт на сите нејзини одлики и историски процеси кои й претходат, се осврнува на нејзино концептуализирање преку примена на основните геополитички концепти на Хартленд и Римленд со нивните својства и одлики во контекст на просторот на Балканот. И на крај, читателската публика на „Безбедносни дијалози“ ќе може да прочита труд кој се занимава со анализа на компаративното законодавство на државите од непосредното опкружување на Република Македонија. Во таа смисла, во трудот се прави критички осврт на правната регулатива која го регулира приватниот безбедносен сектор во државите на Балканот.

Со почит,
Проф. д-р Тони Милески
Главен и одговорен уредник
PREFACE BY EDITOR

Dear Readers,

International scientific journal “Security Dialogue” comes in the fifth year of its existence. The successful growth and popularization magazine pose significant proof of our joint success story. Dear, in the meantime continued to crawl in prestigious scientific journals bases and after a long process of evaluation by the Global Impact Factor (Global Impact Factor-GIF), which provides tools for quantitative and qualitative ranking, evaluation and categorization of scientific journals obtained values of 0.423 for 2012 and 0.462 for 2013. These values represent a challenge to further improve the process of expert reviewing the scientific quality of editorial policy, technical training, etc.. Also, “Security Dialogue” has been assessed by the Index Copernicus which is an international platform for the promotion of scientific progress, and support of national and international cooperation between scientists, publishers of scientific journals and scientific subjects. Index Copernicus in 2012 awarded an official journal index list of journals with a value of 3,97 (ICV-Index Copernicus Value).

Dear readers, the first edition of “Security Dialogue” in 2014 through quality research papers will open wide horizons of scientific research areas more suitable for scientific area that deals with the magazine.

The first paper examines the diplomatic strategy of the Republic of China in EU-China relations. The analysis relies on realism as a theoretical basis for the study of China’s diplomatic strategy. Following a paper which deals with the phenomenon of the Macedonian national liberation movement (the Macedonian issue in general). The author stresses that the labor movement emerged in a very specific historical, geopolitical, geostrategic, military - strategic military and political context. In this scientific study is a concise overview and clarification of all relevant factors in continuity in the context of the experience of the Paris Commune and the doctrine of “armed people.” Below you can read a paper which attempts to answer the question “What is the role of the police in the fight against terror.” The pages of the magazine, in the next paper, transferred the latest insights on security and defense aspect of the European Union and how those considerations will influence future EU enlargement. An interesting paper offers a comparative analysis that focuses on the question of whether and how financing the defense of a NATO member country and reducing the defense budget affects building defense capabilities, which analyze the amount of the defense budget of the Republic of Slovenia from 2001 to 2013 year. In the field of peace science magazine
marketed paper that examines student perception of the emotional climate as a very important part of the culture of peace. Emphasis is placed on the situation in the country, which is a relatively young democracy, aimed at realizing its European perspective. Paper that follows by considering the current political map of the Balkans with a brief overview of all its features and historical processes that proceeded refers to its conceptualization through implementation of basic geopolitical concepts Hartlend Rimlend and their properties and features in the context of space Balkans. Finally, the readership of “Security Dialogue” can read a paper which deals with the comparative analysis of the legislation states the immediate environment of the Republic of Macedonia. In this sense, the paper makes a critical review of the legislation governing the private security sector in the Balkan countries.

Sincerely,

Prof. Dr. Toni Mileski
Editor in chief
Abstract: The Republic of China has lost more and more diplomatic relations with the third countries since 1971, and consequently, the legitimacy of the Republic of China faces critical challenge from the international community. When Republic of the Gambia severs diplomatic relations, a part of citizens from the Republic of China doubt President Ma Ying-jeou’s diplomatic strategy that claims the Republic of China (Taiwan) is “One China,” Diplomatic Truce (外交休兵), and Viable Diplomacy (活路外交). As a matter of fact, it is true that President Ma Ying-jeou’s diplomatic strategy paves a survival way for the Republic of China’s diplomatic engagement with the third countries or international organizations, particularly the EU supports the current diplomatic policy operated by the Republic of China.

This paper is designed to study the Republic of China’s diplomatic strategy in the EU-China Relations, particularly the EU and China cooperate more and more; this paper uses Realism to be theory base to research What impact and influence of the Republic of China’s diplomatic strategy in the EU-China Relations, and employs the Historical Review to study the interaction between the EU, China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the period of President Ma Ying-jeou’s diplomatic strategy. This paper concludes that the EU and China agree Diplomatic Truce (外交休兵), and Viable Diplomacy (活路外交), because both approaches do not challenge the EU and China’s common position in the term of “One China” which symbolizes the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan)
supports “One China” is interpreted by the EU and China to be a friendly diplomatic strategy to respect the sovereignty and territory of the People’s Republic of China.

Keywords: One China Policy, One China Principle, Viable Diplomacy, Diplomatic Truce, the EU-China Relations

INTRODUCTION
This paper exams the Republic of China’s Diplomacy in the EU-China Relations, and the main research questions are: 1. Diplomacy Truce (Principle) and Viable Diplomacy (Approach), 2. EU and China’s reaction toward the Republic of China’s Diplomacy in President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration. In 2008, Mr. Ma Ying-jeou won a clear mandate (over 58% of the vote) to change the trajectory of Taiwan’s external policy by forging better relations with Beijing and seeking its acquiescence for independent foreign policy initiatives. Part of this was a ‘diplomatic truce’ which Ma hoped would let Taiwan relax its expensive, unseemly and increasingly fruitless efforts to compete with Beijing for recognition. (OxResearch Daily Brief Service, 2013).

President Ma is very proud of diplomatic truce, because this principle makes him better relationships with the People’s Republic of China, the United States, and other countries that do expect the People’s Republic of China and Republic of China in confrontation. The diplomatic truce is principle, and viable diplomacy is approach. President Ma believes that Republic of China still explores diplomatic survival space, even though diplomatic truce freezes the zero-sum competition against the People’s Republic of China in diplomacy.

After literature review, there are several articles related to President Ma’s diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, and these papers refer to:


Alexander examines Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy in the Caribbean basin, and his article concludes that Taiwan diplomatic truce eases diplomatic competition against China, but Taiwan still continues diplomatic engagement in this area with public diplomacy. This article concludes that Taiwan diplomatic truce is incorporated into the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by the PRC and Taiwan. Even though this article analyses Taiwan diplomatic truce, this paper does not analyses the Taiwan diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Tubilewicz analyses Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organisation with diplomatic truce. This articles concludes that China agrees Taiwan to enjoy partial right to participate the World Health Organisation, and this paper demonstrates that diplomatic truce is practical to relax China-Taiwan diplomatic tension, and diplomatic truce provides Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty to participate more international organisation activities. This paper does not focus on Taiwan diplomatic truce in the EU-China Relations, but this article exams Taiwan’s legal sovereignty in the World Health Organisation.

Gilley, B. (2010). Not so dire straits. Foreign Affairs, 89(1), 44-56

Gilley’s article reviews President Ma’s diplomatic strategy, and his paper agrees diplomatic truce to release tension between China and Taiwan. This paper concludes that President Ma’s diplomatic truce is a new approach to rebuild confidence between China and Taiwan, and avoid potential military dispute over the Taiwan Strait. In advance, this article has several positive analysis and conclusion in diplomatic truce that reduces hostility between China and Taiwan. This paper analyses diplomatic truce, but this article does not aim diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.


Tubilewicz and Guilloux review Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy 2000-2008, and analyse diplomatic benefit and loss. This article criticises Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy 2000-2008 is failure, because Taiwan does not explore more diplomatic space with foreign aid approach. This paper argues that Taiwan did not engage in generous financial aid and prosed that this parsimony, rather than futility of aid diplomacy as a strategy to expand Taiwan’s international space, should be considered as contributing to Taipei’s diplomatic failures from 2000 to 2008. (Tubilewicz & Guilloux, 2011:). In accordance with Tubilewicz and Guilloux’s analysis, their research reviews Taiwan diplomatic strategy but has less discussion about diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.


Charney reviews the development history of the Cross-Strait Relations from middle-age to modern history, and discusses disputable sovereignty issue between China and Taiwan. In addition, this paper analyses and compares Taiwan and China diplomatic
strategies. Obviously, this paper has no discussion about President Ma’s diplomatic truce in the framework of EU-China Relations.


Hickey’s article suggests that it will be difficult for the two sides to sustain the momentum in cross-strait relations unless Beijing--and to some extent Taipei--begin to recalibrate their relationship in a more pragmatic way and adopt some new thinking on the concepts of sovereignty and the political status of the ROC. This paper analyses that It is probable that the return to the “1992 consensus” is decisive turning point to make diplomatic truce optimistic between Beijing and Taipei. This is a tacit understanding whereby the two sides agreed to stop stealing each others diplomatic allies. (Hickey, 2013: 7). Nonetheless, this paper does not concern diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.


Liaw and Sasuga analyse Taiwan’s economic diplomacy in Vietnam, and discusses Taiwanese and Vietnamese relationships and engagement. This article has no focus on diplomatic truce apparently.


Tai’s paper exams political interaction among China, U.S. and Taiwan, and this article has no analysis of diplomatic truce. However, this paper outlines that President Ma administration initiated the “diplomatic truce” to explore more international space for Taiwan. However, Beijing has never employed the same term. It is true that Beijing has since then exercised self-restraint by refraining from taking away diplomatic recognition from any country which recognises the Republic of China (essentially Taiwan) as the regime representing the entire Chinese territory. But other than that, Beijing still adopts a policy in restricting Taiwan’s international space. (Tai, 2013: 92-93)


Cabestan concerns that China and Taiwan still exist potential armed conflict, even though both sides have deep economic integration. As regard to potential armed conflict, China and Taiwan still have more or less confrontation in diplomacy. This paper argues
that President Ma proposes the diplomatic truce strategy to heat up Taiwan’s international space, but avoids diplomatic confrontation. Even though diplomatic truce is not written in any document, China initiates several friendly proposals to appeal Taiwan into economic integration and co-operation, such like ECFA. This paper has no discussion about Taiwan diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.

Brown, D. G., & Scott, K. (2013). China-Taiwan relations: Relative calm in the Strait. Comparative Connections, 15(1), 75-85,

Brown and Scott analyse the Cross-Strait Relations development, and recognise President Ma’s contribution of peaceful resolution in China-Taiwan sovereignty dispute, but criticise both sides to have slow and less progress in the Cross-Strait Relations. This article has no focus on diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations.


Ding analyses that China’s new approach and rapprochement toward Taiwan independence, and this paper has no discussion about Taiwan diplomatic truce. Nevertheless, this paper’s analysis outlines that in addition to broad agreements in the area of economic cooperation, Beijing also responded positively to Ma’s call for a “diplomatic truce” by offering several concessions. Beijing allegedly turned down the offer made by the recently elected president of Paraguay to switch diplomatic relationships from Taipei to Beijing, for fear of disrupting the rapprochement with Taipei. (Ding, 2009: 188)


Muyard exams President Ma’s administration, but discusses diplomatic truce a little. However, this article still analyses that in terms of Taiwan’s international space, some progress has been made. As an extension of the understanding over a One China principle with Beijing, President Ma proposed a diplomatic truce and a policy of mutual non-denial, meaning that both sides should avoid negating the other’s existence and refrain from poaching the other’s diplomatic allies. Nonetheless, this paper has no discuss diplomatic truce in the framework of the EU-China Relations. (Muyard, 2010: 8).

After literature review, this paper is designed to study what content of Taiwan’s diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, and also analyses what reaction comes from in the framework of the EU-China Relations.
DIPLOMATIC TRUCE: NEW PRINCIPLE OF DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

Why the Republic of China (Taiwan) seeks for diplomatic truce? What is diplomatic truce? Since Mr. Ma, Ying-jeou won presidential election in 2008, he has been active to improve relationship with China. Because of former President Chen, Shui-Bian’s diplomatic strategy, China had less confidence toward Taiwan, and China was worried about Taiwan’s diplomatic competition or Taiwan independence. Due to China-Taiwan in the diplomatic confrontation, China posed unfriendly toward Taiwan in diplomacy as well as the Cross-Strait affairs. When President Ma took oath, he prioritises the Cross-Strait affairs and diplomacy in order to better China-Taiwan relations.

President Ma addresses that Taiwan freezes diplomatic competition or confrontation against China, and proposes peaceful resolution to manage diplomacy and the Cross-Strait affairs. President Ma initiates the diplomatic truce to reconstruct mutual confidence between China and Taiwan. The diplomatic truce is oral and unilateral commitment, but China never responds negatively. Even though China has no comments or opinions on Taiwan’s diplomatic truce in public, China endorses President Ma. According to Taiwan’s parliament reports, President Ma’s speech and diplomatic policy, and foreign minister’s report and speech, the diplomatic truce refers to:

No dollar diplomacy. The diplomatic truce stops unreasonable foreign aid to appeal the third country to establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan or to persuade the third country to sever diplomatic relations with China.

One China Principle. The diplomatic truce recognises the 1992 Consensus that outlines “One China Principle but Self-interpreation”, and President Ma reinforces One China Principle to make China feel safe and comfortable, and China decides to accept the Taiwan’s diplomatic truce. (Powision-Neue Räume für Politik., 2009, Juni 2).

Co-existence and co-prosperity. The diplomatic truce is a means for Taiwan to seek co-existence and co-prosperity with China in the international diplomatic arena under the framework of a “modus vivendi” diplomatic strategy. (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Sep 9)

No dual recognition. President Ma’s proposal of a “diplomatic truce” with China does not mean that the government is trying to work on a “dual recognition” system. (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific., 2008 Aug 17).

No diplomatic vacation. President Ma states that diplomatic truce is expected to strengthen current diplomatic ties, not to antagonize with Taiwan’s allies. (Peter Stein, a. T.,
2008 Aug 08).

No diplomatic zero-sum game. Taiwan’s diplomatic truce meant that both China and Taiwan compromised on the diplomatic front, kept their existing diplomatic allies, suspended „money diplomacy”, and maintained the status quo. (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Sep 12).

Taiwan Strait stability and global peace. Former Vice President Vincent Siew of Taiwan explained (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Aug 26), „President Ma Ying-jeou’s pursuit of a „diplomatic truce“ with China will not only lead to lasting peace in the Taiwan Strait and global stability, but will also help to attract more investment to Taiwan and strengthen the country’s move towards globalization“.

The diplomatic truce appeals China but not the opposite party in Taiwan. The opposite party criticises that the diplomatic truce collapses Taiwan’s diplomacy. The opposite party fustigates the diplomatic truce:

The former chairwomen of the opposite party criticised (2008, Aug 9), „President Ma Ying-jeou’s foreign policy advocacy of a „diplomatic truce“ with China, saying the idea is...
tantamount to a „unilateral surrender of arms“ on Taiwan’s part. “

The opposite party lambasted that the diplomatic truce did not stop China’s diplomatic engagement toward Taiwan’s allies as well as did not explore more international space for Taiwan in international organisations. (Yan, 2009:8-9)

The opposite party mocks that the diplomatic truce is „surrender diplomacy“ and „shock diplomacy“（外交休克）, because China has no response toward the diplomatic truce, and Taiwan unilaterally stops diplomatic engagement with other potential allies. Besides, the opposite party feels dissatisfied that diplomatic truce humiliates Taiwan’s allies, because they expect no future cooperation (中評社, 2009, July 6).

Gambia severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 15 Nov. 2013. The opposite party condemns diplomatic truce as a failure of President Ma’s diplomatic policy, because President Ma delivers friendly message to stop diplomatic contest against China, and also recognises One China Principle to satisfy China. Nonetheless, the diplomatic truce cannot keep Taiwan’s ally. (RFA, 2013 Nov 15)

Former Prime Minister analysed, „diplomatic truce might cease hostility between Taiwan and China, but Gambia still severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Obviously, President Ma’s diplomatic strategy is full of problem.“ (Ettoday, 2013, Nov 18).

The opposite party analyses, diplomatic truce does not stop Taiwan’s allies to start economic and trade co-operation with China, and diplomatic truce may avoid diplomatic confrontation against China, but it cannot consolidate Taiwan allies. (顏建發, 2013:73-75).

VIABLE DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACH IN DIPLOMACY

Even though the diplomatic truce triggers critical argument, President Ma still maintains this diplomatic principle. Instead of the diplomatic truce, President Ma initiates „Viable Diplomacy“ approach to promote diplomatic truce. President Ma argues that the diplomatic truce cannot be understood or interpreted that Taiwan freezes any diplomatic engagement with current or potential allies, but Taiwan explores more international space actively in the condition of no-confrontation against China. President Ma demonstrates that the diplomatic truce appeals China’s trust and friendly response, and China offers more economic and trade co-operation with Taiwan as well as other countries.

President Ma explains that the diplomatic truce make China comfortable and other countries satisfying, and he refers to:

Bilateral trade agreements. Singapore and New Zealand has signed Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) with Taiwan, and more countries plan to follow. (OXRESEARCH DAILY BRIEF SERVICE, 2013).

Effective participation in I.O.s (international organisations). President Ma addresses that the diplomatic truce make Taiwan’s international space larger in international organisations, such like WHO, ASPA (Asian Science Park Association), IATA (International Air Transport Association), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).

China-Taiwan economic co-operation and integration. President Ma is optimistic about the Cross-Strait economic co-operation with diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy. Even though China has no active response toward President Ma’s diplomatic strategy, China agrees to deepen and broaden mutual economic and trade co-operation to integrate Taiwan’s economy. In final, China and Taiwan sign the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and the Trade in Service Agreement under the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy. (Schmidt, D, 2012:48-49)

By reason of negative stereotype of diplomatic truce, Preisdent Ma decides to promote the viable diplomacy to explore more co-operation with other countries and internatinoal organisations. President Ma outlines the viable diplomacy:

The viable diplomacy is diplomatic approach of diplomatic truce. President Ma argues that the diplomatic truce generates the viable diplomacy to explore more friendship with other countries. For example, former Panamanian counterpart President Martin Torrijos praised (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2008 Aug 14), President Ma Ying-jeou’s proposal to seek a „diplomatic truce“ with China and his „modus vivendi“ strategy for Taiwan to obtain more international space.

The viable diplomacy is not dollar diplomacy but prosperity of liberty and democracy. President Ma believes that the viable diplomacy is not checkbook diplomatic approach, and the viable diplomacy can earn more respectiveness from Taiwan’s allies.

The viable diplomacy refers to equal sovereignty, economic capacity, flexibity, and dignity. The viable diplomacy agrees to seek for official diplomatic relationship with any countries, and to protect national pride. The viable diplomacy explores more trade and economic opportunities and co-operation with other countries. The viable diplomacy agrees to use various titles to participate international organisations to explore more international space for Taiwan.

The viable diplomacy paves the way to 3-win strategy. President Ma explains that the viable diplomacy connects with the diplomatic truce, and this combination can release China’s
anxiety in sovereignty, and it also benefits Taiwan’s allies, and it favours the international community as well.

The viable diplomacy is public diplomacy and soft power. President Ma introduces that there are many NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) in Taiwan, and Taiwan government co-operate with them to explore international space, and the viable diplomacy uses soft power to consolidate Taiwan’s allies as well as to influence other countries.

The viable diplomacy makes Taiwan enjoy more visa-free status. President Ma demonstrates that the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy make China and other countries comfortable, and many countries expect peaceful interaction and resolution between China and Taiwan. The viable diplomacy makes Taiwan trustable for China and other countries, and this is the major reason why many countries grant Taiwan visa-free status.

Apparently, the viable diplomacy cannot stop Gambia to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but it actually discovers more international space for Taiwan.

NEW PRINCIPLE AND APPROACH IN THE EU-CHINA RELATIONS

This paper agrees that diplomacy seeks for national interest, and diplomatic is relative, particularly diplomacy surrounding with hostility. Even though China and Taiwan maintain friendly interaction under President Ma’s administration, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy cannot erase sovereignty dispute between China and Taiwan, particular diplomacy connects with sovereignty. Realists conclude that interest seeking is power, and realism explains how country to gain power. This paper applies the Historical Review to review President Ma’s diplomatic strategy, and uses Realism to analyse diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy in the EU-China Relations.

President Ma outlines diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy in 2008, and he plans to abandon „checkbook diplomacy“ on the purpose of no diplomatic zero-sum competition between China and Taiwan. The diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy seek for harmony of interest, and President Ma expects China and other countries to provide more opportunity and co-operation with Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan is granted more international space in diplomacy until now, but diplomacy is connected with sovereignty. Even though diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy relate to One China doctrine, China is still cautious and suspicious about Taiwan sovereignty and diplomacy.

After literature review, few papers relate to President Ma’s diplomatic strategy in the framework of the EU-China Relations. Nonetheless, the EU and China discuss about
Taiwan issue on the EU-China Summit. From the 4th to 12th EU-China Summit, the EU and China have exchanged and discussed about Taiwan issue:

“the EU side reaffirmed that it would continue to adhere to the one China principle and hoped for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China principle and reiterated its principled position on the settlement of the Taiwan question in accordance with the basic principle of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”.” (EU, 2001: 2).

“The EU side reaffirmed that it would continue to adhere to the one China principle and hoped for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The EU side took note of recent developments across the Taiwan Straits, as briefed by the Chinese side. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China principle and reiterated its principled position on the settlement of the Taiwan question in accordance with the basic principle of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”. “(EU, 2002:2)

“The EU side reaffirmed that it continues to adhere to the one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the settlement of the Taiwan question in accordance with the basic principle of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems”. “(EU, 2003:3)

“The EU side reaffirmed its continued adherence to the one China policy, and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated the EU’s commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the Taiwan question. “(EU, 2004:3)

“The EU side reaffirmed its continued adherence to the one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated EU’s commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the Taiwan question.” (EU, 2005: 2)

“The EU side reaffirmed its continued adherence to one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The Chinese side appreciated EU’s commitment to the one China policy and reiterated its principled position on the Taiwan question.” (EU, 2006: 2)

“The EU reaffirmed its commitment to one China policy and expressed its hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question through constructive dialogue. The EU reiterated its concern over the intended referendum on UN membership in the name of Taiwan as this
could lead to a unilateral change of the status quo across Taiwan straits to which the EU is opposed. In this context, the EU expressed its concern over the Taipei authorities’ intentions about the future status of the island.” (EU, 2007:4)

“The EU reaffirmed its commitment to one China policy and supported peaceful development in the relations across the Taiwan Straits. (EU, 2009:3)”

After the 13th the EU-China Summit, the Taiwan issue has not been on the agenda anymore until now. Former President Chen’s administration started from 2000 to 2008, and the EU and China agree to support One China Policy, One Country Two System, Peaceful Resolution, and Denial of UN membership on Taiwan issue. President Ma’s administration begins from 2008 to 2016, and the EU and China agree to One China Policy, and support peaceful development between China and Taiwan. Obviously, China expects to have more co-operation with Taiwan, and also has possitive response toward the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy that avoid disputable sovereignty issue.

Table 1 EU-China’s position on Taiwan issue from 2000-2016

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<th>President Chen 2000-2008, Republic of China (Taiwan)</th>
<th>President Ma 2008-2016, Republic of China (Taiwan)</th>
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<td>EU-China’s position on Taiwan issue</td>
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<td>• Denial of the UN membership on Taiwan issue</td>
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Consequently, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy result in peaceful development between China and Taiwan, and the EU welcomes the Cross-Strait peaceful dialogue. Nevertheless, Taiwan is on the horns of dilemma—relative interest and harmony of interest. Realism analyses interaction and relation of power and interest. According to Realism, Taiwan loses potential opportunity to access the UN membership, and its sovereignty may be violated, but diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy bring harmony of interest for China and Taiwan. On the opposite site, Taiwan drops diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, and Taiwan can maintains relative
interest.

Taiwan seeking the UN membership violates China’s One China Policy, because China justifies its sovereignty, and Taiwan cannot be separated from One China sovereignty. On sovereignty issue, Taiwan and China are in trouble of zero-sum game, but as regard to trade and economic co-operation Taiwan and China achieve harmony of interest. The EU would not detail the course of Cross-Strait relations based on the 1992 Consensus, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy. The EU expects and welcomes peaceful development and constructive dialogue between China and Taiwan, and explores more trade and economic opportunities with China and Taiwan. The diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy make the EU comfortable in the Cross-Strait relation, because the EU just aims on trade and economic co-operation with China and Taiwan, and is not enforced to get involved into the Cross-Strait sovereignty issue.

CONCLUSION

This paper concludes that diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy contribute peaceful resolution and development for the Cross-Strait relations, and President Ma’s diplomatic strategy satisfies China. No doubt, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy generates more international space and economic-trade co-operation with China as well as other countries. However, this research argues that diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy sacrifice Taiwan’s UN membership application. In addition, diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy help China legitimate and justify One China Policy, and Taiwan problem is unsolved China’s sovereignty problem.

This article analyses that China persuades the EU to reaffirm its position in the Cross-Strait sovereignty issue, and requests the EU to support China to promote One Country Two System in Taiwan issue. Besides, China succeeds to stop the EU member states to support Taiwan’s application of the UN membership, and reinforces the EU to reaffirm One China Policy.

This research concludes several research findings: 1. diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy explores more international space for Taiwan in organisations, and more and more countries support President Ma’s diplomatic strategy. Many countries believe that the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy provide peaceful resolution to the Cross-Strait sovereignty issue. 2. diplomatic and viable diplomacy release political pressure for China’s and
Taiwans’ allies, and they can exchange co-operation opportunity. These allies does not have to choose side to stand. 3. the diplomatic truce and viable can be agreeable between China and Taiwan by reason of One China Policy. If one party does not recognise One China principle, the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy cannot function. 4. The EU is an influential actor in international politics, and the EU welcomes the diplomatic truce and viable diplomacy, because the member states can get rid of the Cross-Strait diplomatic competition. 5. China reinforce the EU reaffirm its position on Taiwan issue during the EU-China Summit very often, and China plans to make Taiwan issue be strategic and variable to affect the EU-China relations.

LITERATURE:


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ABSTRACT: The phenomenon of the Macedonian national liberation movement (the Macedonian issue in general) has occurred in a very specific historical, geopolitical, geostrategic, military - strategic and military-political context. The Macedonian movement has been forced to build its own authentic national, political and military strategy and specific armed forces in order to achieve its historic goal and to reach the pedestal named freedom.

This study aims to give a clarification of all relevant factors in continuity in the context of the experience of the Paris Commune and the knowledge for "armed people." Undoubtedly, not only that the Macedonian experiences correspond with the experiences of "armed people" of the Paris Commune, but in many elements they even go beyond and enrich. Even though they occur in the same time period, they are historically independent, which confirms their originality. The experiences of the Macedonian national liberation movement, the concept of the military organization and the form of the insurgency, in great measure, enrich the theory of the armed people and the theory of the people’s war in all dimensions and military - historical aspects.

Instead of conclusion, we would like once again to emphasize the confirmed scientific and historical knowledge that the armed people have immense strength, vitality and they are undestroyable. This has been confirmed by the continuity of the struggle of the Macedonian people through many centuries.

Key words: liberation movement, people’s war, armed people, revolutionary movement, resistance.

АПСТРАКТ: Феноменот на македонското национално ослободително движење (македонското прашање, воопшто)настанал во еден мошне специфичен историски,
The Macedonian national liberation movement of the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century was characterized by the current centuries-old “hopes and aspirations of the Macedonian people to come out of the misery, to strive towards freedom and equal existence in the family of free nations” (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985:6).

“Located on the main point that separates the East from the West, Europe from Asia, Macedonia was searching for prospects for its own existence in the family of the free world. That path of Macedonia in those windy times, that had left ineffaceable traces upon its logical historic development in the course of centuries, was pursued through many Scilas and Haribdas. But, it consistently went down the path of resistance, of Prometheus’s act of revolution”. (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985:9).

Macedonia, being the central part of the Ottoman Empire, cruelly surrounded by the megalomaniac and invading appetites of the Balkans dynasties and their bourgeois regimes,
was attempting to find its own path of national liberation development. This position gave rise to the phenomenon entitled Macedonian national liberation movement (or to the Macedonian issue, in general), which was forced to search the way to reach the pedestal of freedom with its authentic force.

In the 7th, 8th and 9th decades of the XIX century, Macedonia began to express its revolt in the most transparent way, as a continuation of its revolutionary tradition, created through the everlasting resistance of its painstakingly hard but rebellious history (the rebellion in Debar nahi in 1560, the rebellion in Ohrid sanjak from 1566 to 1574, the rebellion in Gjavato from 1639 etc.).

A noteworthy and important factor in this revolutionary survival was the Eastern crisis (1875-1878), when new aspects to the solution of the Eastern question appeared and when most of the Balkan peoples were struggling for their independence in the process of creating their independent nation states, by staging uprisings and rebellions. The revolutionary liberation wave in that period strongly affected Macedonia as well, where it started with rebellious movements, and later developed into the Razlovtsi uprising from 1876, whose purpose was to liberate Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire.

In addition, the revolutionary movements, which were best embodied by the Macedonian Kresna uprising from 1878-1879, laid a solid foundation for the revolutionary paths of resistance “It is the most significant attempt for organizational formation of revolutionary resistance and moreover, it made the Macedonian nation-building traditions even more prominent.” Namely, “The Macedonian Revolutionary Committee of the Kresna uprising” in 1878 adopted the document “Constitutional Rules” which was of utmost importance. This “Constitution” serves in fact as the Macedonian “Charter of liberty”, because it declares clearly and comprehensively the national thought and virtuous consciousness of the Macedonian people, as well as their centuries-long yearning for free and independent life, and for creating their own Macedonian national state” (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985 :16). (as well as Macedonian Army). According to the Rules of the Macedonian Revolutionary Committee, the main political strategic objective of the uprising was the liberation of the Macedonian people and the establishment of the Macedonian state.

What is important for this research is the military organization of the insurrectional armed forces and the way in which the insurrectional actions were performed, with the purpose of clarifying the XIX century phenomenon of the “people's war”, including all its particularities in the Macedonian region.
The adopted political strategic concept of the uprising, in general expressed the following objectives:

A. Keeping the autonomy of the Macedonian uprising, which was led exclusively by the forces of the Macedonian people. This clearly indicates the appearance of the “armed people” on the historical scene, i.e. establishes the objective for including the entire population (Macedonian people) in the people’s war.

B. The unification of all uprising, Haiduk and volunteer forces across the territory of Macedonia under one command. This significant decision is in favour of the previous one, since its purpose was to contribute to a mass movement and expand the uprising across the whole country, i.e. the battle zone was supposed to cover a significant part of the country.

C. The uprising in its initial phase should be developed in a partisan way in Eastern Macedonia, and later turn into a popular uprising all over Macedonia.

This kind of orientation created the possibility for the people’s uprising (war) not to be suppressed by one single catastrophe.

This thesis is further supported by the results of newer research regarding the existence of similar centres of the uprising in different parts of Macedonia (except in Kresna - the territory from both sides of the river Struma, in Berovo, Petrich and Melnik, as the first centre of resistance - emphasized M.K.). “In this way, the area among Bitola, Korcha and Kostur in South-West Macedonia is also an arena for intensive uprising activities of the Macedonian and other christian population. That kind of uprising movements, with greater or lesser degree of intensity, existed in other regions of Macedonia as well, especially in the Western part of Macedonia. The Ottoman authorities succeeded in partially suppressing these movements in 1881, which was two years after the suppression of the Kresna uprising, and three years after the diplomatic solution to the crisis in East Berlin was reached”. (Pandevski:Manol, 1978:5). The circumstances were similar to the mass movement and the size that Razlovtsi uprising covered.

“Although when we speak of the Razlovtsi uprising we usually refer to the location of Razlovtsi village and the region of Maleshevo, there were uprising movements and rebellions in the wider region of East Macedonia. The Turkish authorities had information that in Strimica and its region the people were staging an uprising, and similar movements were observed in Radovish, Melnik, Petric and Gorna Djumaja...The research showed that the objective of both the Razlovtsi (Maleševo) uprising and the rebellion movements in Strumica were national
liberation and they initiated a popular uprising movement, which in its first phase covered the entire Thessaloniki Vilayet”. (Dimevski, 1980 :214).

These historical facts shed new light upon the massive dimension of these uprisings and they posed new challenges to the historians for their clarification. This means that they were not entirely suppressed and defeated in military terms, which speaks of the indestructible character of the massive people's war, guided by the people that are about to take over the historical scene, determined to fight against the enemy. A prove that this is true, that the Macedonian people weren't suppressed in that period can be found in some new historical events: the glorious Ilinden epopee of the Macedonian people. The everlasting battle of the Macedonian people became even more determined and fierce.

The “armed people” from the era of the Paris Commune, enriches these experiences even more. These events all take place in almost exactly the same time interval and they are independent one from another, which confirms their originality. We believe that in future the experiences related to the “armed people” in this revolutionary period and the “Paris Commune”, that are also very important, will be studied with the same enthusiasm.

All these revolutionary components and assumptions of the resistance witness of the revolutionary setting in Macedonia, immediately prior to the organizational formation of the Macedonian national liberation movement.

Without striving to entirely clarify all questions related to the creation and progress of the armed forces of the Macedonian national revolutionary movement in the pre-IIlinden period, we will only give a short overview of the events which are significant for the military organization and activity in that revolutionary period.

Every revolutionary movement in order to achieve its goal, i.e. to defeat the enemy, creates their own armed forces that represent the military dimension of the movement—the uprising. For that purpose, the leadership of TMORO had the task to develop a political-strategic concept for organizing and leading the uprising, and in that context, to offer a strategy for the creation and progress of the armed forces of the Macedonian revolutionary movement. The essence of the political-strategic concept of TMORO was to achieve freedom by its own forces in an armed uprising, i.e. by means of “a general uprising spread over the entire territory of the country”, (Lape, 1965 :335).

Therefore, the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization and its leadership, when deciding upon the form of the uprising, opted for a general uprising that will take place at the same time across the entire territory of Macedonia, with the purpose of achieving the
strategic goal - liberation of the Macedonian people. This decision upon the form of the uprising remained through the entire preparatory period prior to the uprising, and it still persisted during the Ilinden uprising.

However, after the decision for the beginning of the uprising had been made, the leaders of the Organization, Goce Delchev, Gjorce Petrov and others, made an assessment that the decision had been premature and forced since the people were still not prepared for that kind of uprising, and thus disagreed with the decision and demanded that the time and adopted form of the uprising be changed.

“Thus they put forward an idea of organizing a partisan method of uprising instead of general one that would be spread across the entire territory of the country. Gjorce Petrov in his “Memoires” explains that they must move from passive to active actions by the armed structures of the movement, he strives that the committees undertake greater initiatives and the companies undertake greater military activities across the country, with the purpose of inflicting losses on the Turkish army and through that kind of military activities, strengthen the companies of the Organization”. (Pepeljugovski, 1988 :117).

Regarding Goce Delcev’s position on these matters, Professor Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, the greatest expert on the life and work of this Apostle of the Macedonian revolutionary movement, wrote: “Goce Delcev again had a categorical position that staging this uprising would be a crime, since the people were not ready and the circumstances in Macedonia were not ripe enough for such a radical move. He advanced the thesis that a massive uprising should be organized as soon as the conditions were favorable. He insisted on carrying out guerilla actions and dynamic ventures in the key points”. (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985 :138).

This entailed perpetual resistance which “like a slow gradual heat, it destroys the foundations of the enemy's army” (Clausewitz). However, we can get the most vivid impression on Goce’s points of view from his discussion with the people of Bansko in the end of December 1902, immediately before the decision to stage the uprising was made, as if he had a premonition concerning the forthcoming decision.

“For the time being, we are not going chest-to-chest against a bigger and far more numerous enemy, like standing in front of the train. But, we are that strong, although we have less number of people, to extract some screws, so he can fall. Through that kind of actions, we will encourage the fighting spirit, we will slightly disintegrate the force of Ottoman Empire and we will convince the people that is possible to win a war against a far more numerous
enemy.” (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985 :209)

Goce Delchev was striving to encourage the fighting spirit of the people which was a valuable experience that will help meet one of the essential conditions for successfully leading a people’s war, which according to Clausewitz, is “the character of the people goes hand in hand with the measures adopted” (by the Organization).

For that reason, in March 1901, Goce Delchev said: ““The moral revolution - the revolution of the mind, heart and soul of the people, is our greatest task.””. (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985 :206)

This affirms that Goce Delchev was striving for a comprehensive moral and military preparation of the entire nation as the priority towards achieving the final goal – the liberation of the people. Only the people themselves can contribute to their liberation by massively taking part in the uprising, thus increasing the effects of the uprising and preventing it from being suppressed by one single catastrophe.

“If 1-40 people could stage an uprising, Macedonia would have been a free country a long time ago: since that is impossible, and we need more people in order to do that, what should we do? The people should wake up from the five century heavy sleep…” (Andonov-Poljanski, 1985 :202)

In order to fully clarify all vital matters related to the organization, preparation and staging of the uprising, it is important to refer to some of Gjorche Petrov’s views who was in favor of the partisan form of uprising: “Similar tactics of partial activities, if they are spread across the entire country, in my opinion, would have created a state of permanent uprising in the country, without announcing a formal uprising. In that way, we could have tortured the country for several years and Turkey couldn’t say that there was an open rebellion”. (Institut za nacionalna istorija, 1950 :129)

Analyzing the views of Goce Delchev and Gjorche Petrov on these historical questions, we can conclude that their ideas were partially in favor of the partisan warfare, only up to the point when the subjective conditions had ripened and more favorable external conditions had been created for staging a popular uprising, i.e. their idea was to initially use the armed structures of the movement in order to “nibble” at their enemy’s army, which would afterwards lead to a popular uprising. In their opinion, Macedonia should have turned into “the haunted fortress” to the Ottoman rulers. The separate actions should have been expanded all across the country, thus growing into a continuously progressive uprising, until the conditions across the entire territory of Turkey became insufferable.
In that way, the uprising would be intensified by its natural course, leading to a major battle in which the goals would be achieved.

In the Thessaloniki Congress Protocol, concerning the debate upon the form of the uprising, the following was noted...“the topic upon the form of the uprising was discussed, whether it should be partial or popular - strategic; it was decided that it be popular - strategic”. Lazar Dimitrov, who participated in the Congress, wrote in his “Memoirs”: “it was decided that the uprising would not be massive, but instead, partisan – rebellious”. (Lape, 1965 :415)

In the last guidelines prior to staging the uprising, in the letter “to the brothers of the forest”, regarding the form of the uprising, it was noted: “Plan and objective of the uprising: we will engage in a Partisan battle, accompanied by terroristic and anarchistic actions. In other words, small military units will grow into uprising troops that will operate at the same time across the entire territory”. (Lape, 1965 :477)

In the Protocol of the Smilevo Congress, concerning the form of uprising, the following was stated: “In regards to the form of the uprising, after a long discussion, it was determined as follows:

A. That the uprising is general - all regions from the county will be comprised.

B. Taking into account that only one part of the people is armed, to make the military actions more lasting and more persistent and to engage the armed part of the people in the battle, it was decided as follows: to operate unanimously and in a partisan way”(Lape, 1965 :452). We believe that this decision of the Smilevo Congress is worthy of more elaborate analysis, as being rather original for those historic conditions. That decision suggested that a popular uprising should be staged in Macedonia, which would be raised by the rebellion companies and other smaller armed units performing terrorist actions, combined with form of partisan warfare (partisan tactics and strategies). Armed people’s uprisings, as a form, are the ones with the widest social base, which provide the initial conditions for actively involving the majority of the people in the armed uprising. In this case, the rebellion companies would be responsible for encouraging the people to rebellion, staging the people’s uprisings in Macedonia and Odrin and lead them. Partisan warfare offers great possibilities to inflicting casualties on the enemy by using smaller and less armed forces, to develop fresh initiatives and major revolutionary activity of the people. Spreading the partisan form of warfare would
lead to a popular uprising, which, in its turn, would create a wider free territory, which will become the base for further partisan warfare. If the armed battle could be spread across the entire Macedonian battleground, that would come as a great strategic surprise to the enemy forces and would “nibble” at their military force, because that kind of massive uprising is the most explosive one. In fact, that is how the War of National Liberation in Yugoslavia and Macedonia started, and it was the solution for the initial problems in the War of National Liberation. Massive people’s uprisings, staged in the form of a partisan warfare, are the key to military success, i.e. the partisan’s war and the people’s uprising do not stand in contrast. Partisan war in those conditions will be just a form of people’s uprising. This attitude is largely connected to Goce Delcev’s, and especially to Gjorche Petrov’s views, who was striving for great military activity of the troops across Macedonia, that will afterwards transform into a continuous uprising.

Instead of conclusion: regarding these important decisions upon the form, i.e. the way of staging the uprising, we can conclude that the decisions taken during the Smilevo Congress were significant from both theoretical and practical military perspective and they shouldn’t be overrule or quash these decisions unilaterally. From our point of view, they were a highly acceptable option for staging the uprising. However, these significant decisions were also abused by the Supreme Committee – supporters of the Bulgarian cause, whose task was to stage the uprising prematurely, i.e. to ensure there were no sufficient preparations and the uprising was not staged appropriately, in order to achieve their single purpose – failure of the uprising.

Immediately after the Smilevo Congress, in the circular announcing the beginning of the Ilinden uprising, in which the people are summoned by the Main Headquarters, it was said: “The day fixed, when the people of the whole of Macedonia and Odrin should come out publicly with arms in their hands against our foe, is 20th of July 1903.”

All the efforts of Goce Delchev, Gjorche Petrov and some other eminent revolutionaries to postpone the beginning of the uprising and to change its form in these general and specific conditions, taking into account the current circumstances in the Organization, i.e. in its leadership, came to nothing since the overall preparations for the revolutionary movement and its armed structures were made on the basis of the already adopted form of a general uprising, spread across the entire territory of the country at the same time. In addition, the efforts put at the Thessaloniki and Smilevo Congress to stage a partisan form of uprising
failed for exactly the same reasons.

The adopted form of uprising (general and spread across the entire country) served as the strategic basis to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization on which it solved and developed other strategic questions of the revolutionary movement. The overall preparations, from political, organizational, material and military character, were subordinated to and conditioned from the adopted form of the uprising.

According to the views of general Pepeljugovski, this form of the uprising had the following characteristics:

“It implies long and simultaneous preparations across the entire territory of Macedonia, which cannot be temporally restricted, because they are conditioned not only by the ripening of the subjective conditions, the readiness of the people to accept the idea of revolutionary movement and to take part in the uprising, but also by the creation of more favorable external environment, i.e. by the ripening of the objective conditions.

The preparations of the Organization, and the revolutionary movement in general - preparing the people in terms of: political, organizational, military and material aspect - the preparations are intended for a longer time period and are made in such a way that does not directly confront the enemy. Namely, the preparations are made by political and agitation elaboration of the movement’s goals, the supply of weapons and other war materials is performed in secret, by means of buying, and not in direct confrontation with the enemy, i.e. the armed structures are in a relatively stagnant position, they are not involved in any military activities, but instead, they take part in agitation and organization regarding the preparation for the movement.

This form - simultaneous uprising, demands massive arming and training of the people for the uprising, unlike the partisan form of uprising, which begins the uprising with the currently available arms, and does not wait until all the people, or at least the majority are armed, but solves the problem of arming in the armed battle, during the continuous confrontation with the enemy. The Macedonian Revolutionary Organization solves this problem by purchasing arms from inside and outside the country, and in terms of some other fighting materials it relies on its own sources - organized workshops. This way of providing the arms and equipment encounters a series of problems: providing the money, transfer of weapon and other materials across the border, their distribution, stocking and maintenance, which increase the risks of enemy activity (the case of “Vinica affair”).

In regards to the creation of the armed forces of the revolutionary movement, this
form is only the initial organization of armed forces and will remain in this form until the beginning of the uprising. This means that only the basis of the armed forces is created, which people would join once the uprising has been announced. Consequently, this form of uprising does not demand that the forms of military organization are created until the uprising has been announced, unlike the case with the partisan warfare. (The Battle for National Liberation requires that the initial forms gradually grow into more complex and improved forms of military organization, i.e. that larger military formations are created - leading to the creation of revolutionary Army).

Upon the elaboration on the influence of the form of the uprising, defined by the Constitution of the Organization and other documents, it can be concluded that this form of uprising relies on defensive strategy and tactics, especially in the preparatory period, and on offensive strategy and tactic once the uprising has begun, and thus increases its offensive capacity, as in the case of the Ilinden uprising\textsuperscript{18}.

The analysis of the impact that the adopted form of the armed Ilinden uprising had upon the development of the armed forces is very significant, as it provides an insight into an important strategic element of the Macedonian national revolutionary movement.

It is a large and inexhaustible treasure of experiences worthy in the clarification of the phenomenon of "armed people" and people's war. In many of its characteristics, the Macedonian revolutionary and national liberation movement is unique and original to the history of these movements i.e. revolutions of that time period. Despite all the clarified experiences, one specific experience is worth mentioning, which would be a contribution to the expansion of Clausewitz teaching on the conditions necessary for a successful National War, and this experience is as follows: In addition to the character of the people (referring to the people's readiness and organization), which should correspond with the measures taken, it is necessary that the socio-historical circumstances, i.e. the internal and external circumstances, as well as the attitude of the forces go in favour of the revolutionary and liberation forces.

The Macedonian revolutionary movement was the only one in the history of Europe that was supposed to develop and fight not only against one enemy, but against multiple enemies, without any assistance.

Who has turned against this movement?
1. The Turkish authorities and all executors of that authority – the army, the police and others, who were considered as eminent and suppressive forces, but not the Turkish people themselves;

2. All organizations and individuals from the country and abroad who acted as supporters of the Turkish government;

3. The political propaganda and military hostile activities of Serbia, Greece and especially Bulgaria, which attempted to break the Macedonian revolutionary movement and subjugate the country by the Supreme Committee “Vrhovisti”.

4. The great forces, who were not interested in solving the Macedonian question but achieving their own goals in this territory;

5. The large number of domestic traitors whose activity posed one of the greatest problems to the movement that had severe, even catastrophic consequences. “I don’t believe there is any other nation that has suffered as much from its renegade sons as the Macedonian....” is what Goce Delchev wrote in a letter to N. Maleshevski from 22.04.1889.

All these enemies shared a mutual goal – to divide and tear up Macedonia, thus replacing the Turkish slavery with a new, yet bloodier one.

Therefore, assuming that any variation of the uprising was adopted, and assuming that the summoning of people from the entire territory of Macedonia and the Odrin region to rise against the enemy, had more symbolic meaning and was of mobilization character, and not a fraudulent activity to change the character of the uprising, the possibility that it was successful, although it was not sufficiently prepared, would have been much greater, or even realistic, if they were fighting only against the Turkish adversary, i.e. if they had only one opponent.

The extremely difficult situation of Macedonia required extensive and serious preparations, unlike some other uprisings and movements that were staged in a different setting, where the circumstances were far less complex and the opponent had far weaker military force.

An extensive and overall preparation of the Macedonian people would allow for the uprising to spread across the entire territory of Macedonia. The offensive actions at the beginning of the uprising would pose an exhausting battle to the enemy, would tear up his armed forces into smaller units that could be destroyed more easily, which would eliminate the enemy’s privileges and increase the advantages of the forces of uprising. This would allow that the forces of the uprising take full initiative, create free territories which would
afterwards expand and merge, and then let the uprising take its natural course. In this action, what is also important is to ensure coordination of the activities, i.e. to take leadership and command over the entire uprising, which should be explored as one of the characteristics of the Ilinden Uprising and see to what extent it was efficient.

From the characteristics of the influence of the shape of the rebellion, defined by the Constitution of the organization and other documents may be concluded that this form of uprising assumes a defensive strategy and tactics, especially in the preparatory period of the uprising, and offensive tactics and strategy – whit the beginning the uprising, which offensiveness increases and grows, as was the case with the Ilinden Uprising.

The elected and proclaimed form - the partisan form of uprising, wasn’t applied in the Krushevo events, especially not in the defence of Krushevo.

However, the acknowledgment that the uprising, depending on the military circumstances, would have started to progress gradually, following the logic of its progress (successful or unsuccessful), is proved by the following fact: when the headquarters of the Krushevo uprising on 12 August 1903 had a discussion with the dukes and the leadership of the Republic when they concluded that the general uprising did not include all the revolutionary areas of the Bitola Revolutionary Region, so they decided to change the tactics, i.e. to pass from defensive and frontal to forest-partisan warfare (another valuable experience for the evolution of the various forms of armed struggle).

This speaks of the vitality of the uprising, i.e. of the vitality of the armed people to find the most optimal forms of warfare, irrespective of the abominable determinations and orders of the Supreme Committee. In his work “The revolution and counter-revolution in Germany,” Engels speaks of the important principles that the uprising must adhere to and when comparing the values and weaknesses of the armed forces of the uprising to the existing army, he underlines the following:

"The uprising is a skill, just like war, just like any other type of skill. It is subject to certain rules … First; you should never play with an uprising if there is no determination (and full readiness - emphasized M.K.) to go to the very end. The uprising is an equation with many indefinite sizes, whose value may change every day. The military forces against which the uprising is staged have all the advantages in terms of organization, discipline or traditional authority and if the insurgents cannot mobilize considerable forces against their opponent, they will be smashed and destroyed. Secondly, once the uprising has begun, it should be performed with the utmost determination and to launch an attack. The defence is the death
of any armed uprising; the uprising will fail during the defence, even before they measured strength against the opponent." (Fridrih, 1960 :29)

Not questioning the validity and accuracy of Engels’s claim, it is important, however, to emphasize another important point which is the basis for every uprising. This is the vast and unflagging social foundation from which the forces of rebellion stem – the people. It is the most important factor that provides armed people with the will, strength and indestructibility.

And even if we assume that the enemies will completely break the armed forces of the uprising (which is not possible even in theory - the tactics will be changed, and ultimately, the forces will withdraw etc.), they will not accomplish their goal. The fate of a country, a nation, and their overall survival does not depend on a single battle. Finally, the strength of the people will outstrip the strength of the enemy, no matter how strong they are. By mobilizing new forces, by launching new armed actions, the circumstances may change in our favour.

"In any case, the decisive defeat which any state may suffer (i.e. revolutionary, national liberation movement - emphasized M.K.), with the withdrawal of military forces to the interior of the country, must be an activity provoked by the fortress and armed people... If the winners are in the middle of their siege; if they have left behind strong garrisons to secure their connecting route, or have even sent forces to ensure the freedom of movement and to keep control over the liberated areas; if after various losses of animate and inanimate armed forces they have weakened - then it's time for the defender's army to take over the battlefield and to waver the attackers in their unfavourable position with the right strike". (Klauzevish, 1951 :415)

All this points to the advantages of the defending forces (the Revolutionary Forces) that are fighting on their own ground, and to the weaknesses of the enemy, who even after the victory, is "trapped" in the fortress – country of the armed people. We believe that there is a great truth and historical verification in these claims, not because Clausewitz said it, but because all revolutionary wars, i.e. national liberation wars or uprisings (according to Clausewitz – people’s wars) that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as well as the modern wars for national liberation, have indisputably confirmed this theory.

We believe that the greater confirmation for this lies in the five century struggle and resistance of Macedonian people against many enemies. Apart from fighting the Turkish enemy, the Macedonian people had to deal with the strong and aggressive attacks of the neighbouring countries in a difficult environment. There are almost no forms, methods
and shapes of the arsenal of special warfare that the neighbouring bourgeoisies did not aggressively apply against the Macedonian national liberation movement. The terror of these actions was greater than the terror of the Turkish enemy forces. However, the Macedonian people were not broken, and they rose again like a phoenix after five century of revolts, uprisings and wars, thus confirming in the most original way the vitality and indestructibility of the Macedonian people who were determined to fight for their freedom. That confirms the continuity of five century struggle and resistance of the people, which leads us to a new and bolder thinking, that neither the Razlovtsi, nor the Kresna, nor the Ilinden uprising, or any other battle for that matter, were completely suppressed or destroyed, but in the context of these complex historical conditions, they just did not reach their ultimate goal.

Instead of conclusion, I will once again underline that the armed people have insurmountable strength - indestructible and vitality, which confirms the continuity of the struggle of the Macedonian people in their history.

Modern history need to make new efforts towards more thorough clarification of these events in their continuity, and in terms of teachings about the armed people and the people's war, in which way it will significantly enrich the world's treasury of experiences on armed people and the people's war in all its dimensions, as an original use of force in specific historical conditions.

REFERENCES
ТАКСАТИСТ: Политичката мапа на светот е во постојана динамика која се одвива на непроменливот физички географски простор поради што анализите за распореденоста на државите и потенцијалите за нивната моќ кои произлегуваат оттаму се неизбежниот темел на геополитичките концептуализации на светот и одделни негови региони. Балканот како место со извонредно голема динамичност и променливост на политичката карта е неизбежен предмет на геополитичките анализи и концептуализации во локална и глобална смисла. Преку разгледување на актуелната политичка мапа на Балканот со краток осврт на сите нејзини одлики и историски процеси кои ѝ претходат, овој труд се осврнува на нејзино концептуализирање преку примена на основните геополитички концепти на Хартленд и Римленд со нивните својства и одлики во контекст на просторот на Балканот. Претставувајќи ги основните премиси, значења и замисли на концепот на Хартленд на Макиндер, Македонија и Србија се препознати как своевиден балкански Хартленд со големо поклопување во однос на одликите и својствата на географската местоположба и воено-безбедносните, сообраќајно-инфраструктурните, политичките и историските фактори. На истиот начин, во рамките на овој труд се определува и балканскиот Римленд составен од Бугарија, Грција, Албанија, Црна Гора и Хрватска, кои го окружуваат балканскиот Хартленд. Початоцна анализа, преку актуелните случувања и процеси на Балканот во контекст на ваквата концептуализација на балкански Хартленд и Римленд, укажуваат на големото значење на балканскиот Римленд врз основа на одвивањето на самите процеси по неговите линии и замисли. Конечно, анализата на актуелната политичка мапа и случувања на Балканот врз основа на концептуализацијата од основните геополитички концепти дава заклучок за геополитичката важност на Балканот и перспективите за развојот на тековните геополитички процеси и активности.

Ключни зборови: Балкан, политичка мапа, геополитичка концепти, Хартленд, Римленд
ABSTRACT:
The political map of the world is in constant dynamic that takes place on invariant physical geographical space for which the analyses of the distribution of states and their power potential that are evolving from them are the inevitable foundation of the geopolitical conceptualizations of the world and its particular regions. The Balkans as a place with extremely high dynamism and volatility of the political map is inevitable subject of geopolitical analysis and conceptualization in local and global terms. By examining the current political map of the Balkans with a brief overview of all its features and historical processes that preceded, this paper addresses its conceptualization through application of the basic geopolitical concepts of Heartland and Rimland and their characteristics and features in the context of the space of the Balkans. Presenting the basic premises and meanings of the Mackinder’s concept of Heartland, Macedonia and Serbia are recognized as a Balkanic Heartland with much overlap in terms of features and characteristics of geographic location and military security, traffic-infrastructural, political and historical factors. In the same way this paper determines the Balkanic Rimland comprised of Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Montenegro and Croatia, surrounding the Heartland of the Balkans. Further analysis of the current events and processes in the Balkans in the context of this conceptualization of Balkanic Heartland and Rimland indicates the importance of the Balkanic Rimland due to the integration and political process conducted by its lines and ideas. Finally, the analysis of the actual political map of the Balkans and current developments based and reviewed through the prism of the conceptualisation by the basic geopolitical concepts concludes with an opinion about the geopolitical importance of the Balkans and the prospects for the development of the current geopolitical processes and activities.

Key words: Balkans, political map, geopolitical concepts, Heartland, Rimland.
трите јужни полуустври на европскиот континент, помеѓу Јадранското и Јонското Море на запад, Егејското и Средоземното Море на југ, Црното и Мраморното Море на исток и на север ограничен од теченијата на реките Дунав и Сава (Тодорова, 2009: 30), политичко-географскиот состав и разместеност се предмет на чести и постојани промени, спорови и спротивставености. Честата промена на границите и бројот на држави на Балканот како и расцепувањето на поголемите државни еднини на помали најчесто спротивставени и во завојувани непријателски односи довел до настанувањето на геополитичкиот термин „балканизација” кој е прилично раширен во политичката, научната и секојдневната култура на живеење. По периодот на релативно извесна и долготрајна стабилност во однос на територијалната распределеност на државите и нивните граници на Балканот, кој настапи по Втората светска војна со завршетокот на Студената војна, настапи нова фаза на територијални промени кои уследија пред сè од распадот на Југославија, а резултираа со појава на повеќе независни држави како и внатрешни територијални раскошувања и организацији врз основа на етничките, верските и јазичните одлики на населението. Крајот на Студената војна и сите последователни промени во поглед на политичката, економската и општествената поставеност кои настапија на Балканот по 1991 година, трајно го нарушија геополитичкиот баланс на силите воспоставени и одржувани врз основа на формулата 2+2+2 во смисла на 2 држави членки на НАТО (западни сојузници), 2 држави членки на Варшавскиот пакт (сојузници на источниот блок) и 2 неутрални држави (Милески, 2005: 49) со што се отвори можност за промена и на геополитичката карта на Балканот. Дотогашната примарно идеолошка заснованост на геополитичкото дејствување на Балканот е трајно заменета со етно-националната и верско-религиозната мотивираност која заедно се оживува и повторно актуелизира на големонационалните територијални и иредентистички концепти повторно го врати на прво место значењето на територијата (посед, проширување) и со самото тоа телурократското геополитично мислење кај балканските држави. Територијалните промени кои ја усложнија и надополнија дотогашната и воедно ја обликувава актуелната геополитичка карта во најголема мера настанаа врз основа на линиите и границите на поранешните југословенски републики, како резултат на одлуката на главните светски геополитички актери САД и СССР како предводници на меѓународната заедница, дека нема да признаат промени на границите преку употреба на сила, со што меѓународно признатите држави кои настанаа како последица од распадот на Југославија мораа да бидат засновани на нејзините федерални еднини. Ваквите територијални промени резултираа со појава на повеќе држави во
средишниот и северозападниот дел на Балканскиот Полуостров.

По пат на демократско гласање на референдуми за независност, на крвави граѓански војни и помали воени судири, но и на интервенции на меѓународната заедница и безбедноси (воени) сојузи на геополитичката карта на Балканот во актуелниот период од 1991 година се надополни со следните држави: Македонија, Србија, Црна Гора, Босна и Херцеговина, Хрватска, Словенија, како и квази-државните единки со де-факто независен или полуезависен федерален статус како Косово, Република Српска и Федерацијата Босна и Херцеговина кои не се членки на ООН. Во рамки на геополитичката карта на Балканот во целост влегуваат и териториите на претходно постоечки независни држави Бугарија, Грција, Албанија. Различните дефиниции во зависност од појдовното стојалиште, односно од историски, политички, културологички аспект, како дел од Балканот вклучуваат и држави чиј делови од територијата спадаат во физичко-географските граници на Балканскиот Полуостров како што се: Турција, Романија, а некои автори доа до како балканска држава дури и Молдавија (Данфорд, Британика: 2014) која во минатото била дел од Отоманската Империја. Сепак, за потребите на ова кратко истражување во однос на примената на геополитичките концепции на Хартленд и Римленд, предвид ќе се земат само природните физичко-географски граници и државите кои целосно влегуваат во нивниот состав. Постојната геополитичка карта на Балканот се одликува со висок степен на фрагментираност и расцепканост, доколку се земат предвид сите меѓународно признаени и непризнаени политички територијални единки кои се 13 на број со просечна големина од 40.000 км² (Илиќ, 1995). Покрај ваквите одлики кои во најголема мера може да се земат како причини за високиот конфликтен потенцијал на Балканот, ваквата политичко-географска карта овозможува примена на геополитичките концепции на Хартленд и Римленд и препознавање на простор кој соодветствува целосно или делумно на нивните значења, дефиниции и сфакања. Имајќи предвид дека првично и оригинално овие концепти се замислен и применет на глобално-светско ниво, во овој труд тие се применети и споредени со географските и актуелните услови замислувајќи го Балканот како своевиден микрокосмос.

ХАРТЛЕНД (HEARTLAND) НА БАЛКАНОТ

Несомнено, најзначајниот геополитички концепт кој всукупност самоот по себе претставува и основа на геополитиката, со што воедно се одржува со својата релевантност, се до денешни дни е концептот на Хартленд (или срцевината на светот).
Концептот и поимот, како што е добро познато е создаден од британскиот научник и политичар сер Џон Халфорд Макиндер. Во неговиот концепт поттикнат од британските империјалистички интереси, Хартленд првично претставен како стожерна област (Pivot Area), е географски сместен во долбаката внатрешност на Евроазија (Коен, 2003: 13), во непристанните копнени предели од каде што е лесно достапно за напад секое место на „Светскиот Остров“ така што со можноста за лесно одбивање на поморските сили како неминовна последица од поседот на оваа област произлегува светска доминација. Од гледна точка на Макиндер, Хартленд именуван и како „светска тврдина“ е првично подрачје на подвижност (мобилност) на копнените сили, непристанно за поморските сили (Џонс, 1955: 498). Во тоа време како главна поморска сила во светот доминирала Велика Британија, па оттаму геополитичката замисла за Хартленд на Макиндер била во контекст на јакнењето на начините за копнена подвижност кои сё повеќе влијаеле за зголемување на моќта на британските соперници – копнено заснованите империи и големи сили како Русија и Германија. Земајќи ги предвид актуелните збиднувања и настани во своето време, Макиндер ќе го надополни, преосмисли и ревидира својот концепт за Хартленд на двапати. Еднаш во 1919 година, проширивајќи ги граничите на областа сметана за Хартленд вклучувајќи ги областите на Источна Европа од литоралот на Балтичкото до Црното Море како најважен дел во неговата значајна изрека за контролата на светскиот остров и доминација со светот. Следната измена на концептот била направена во 1943 година, кога покрај повторна промена на граничите (исфрлување на средишните и источните делови на Сибир – т.н. Леналренд) била главно насочена кон промена на теоретското значење на самиот концепт. Имено, во оваа ревизија Макиндер го променил суштинското значење на концепцијата на Хартленд од арена на подвижност (област на мобилност на копнените сили) во средиште („тврдина“) на моќ заснована на луѓе, ресурси, суровини, внатрешни сообраќајни-комуникациски линии и јадро на индустриската инфраструктура (Коен, 2003: 16). Поради ваквата промена на значењето на концептот настанало распространување на употребата на поимот Хартленд за повеќе различни делови во светот, што придонело до тоа терминот да се дефинира повеќе од аспект на тоа што е отколку каде се наоѓа (Џонс, 1955: 494-499). Ова всушност значи дека употребата на концептот Хартленд во двете значења, како јадро на копнените сили во смисла на област каде што подвижноста е олеснета и место од каде што може лесно и едноставно да бидат нападнати сите останати поврзани места или како јадро на моќта засновано на човечките, природните и индустриските ресурси во комбинација со поволната географска положба и услови, каде
што и во двата случаи контролата на овие подрачја овозможува изгледи за доминација – може да биде применета на светот, како на глобално таа и на регионално ниво. Во таа смисла, коцнептот на Хартленд може да биде применил и разгледан и во однос на Балканот, како што ќе биде прикажано подолу во текстот.

Во однос на географските одлики на Балканот во контекст на Хартленд како средишна област од каде што лесно може да се нападнат и доминираат сите останати места, земајќи ги предвид актуелната геополитичка карта и границите воспоставени по 1991 година, Македонија и Србија несомнено сочинуваат и претставуваат Хартленд (на Балканот). Македонија и Србија се сместени во централниот дел на Балканскиот Полуостров, двете без излез на море и со самото тоа непристални за поморски сили, но со извонредно поволен релјеф кој овозможува лесен пристап до секој предел на Балканот, а воедно ги поседуваат и главните сообраќајни и комуникациони оски и артерии.

Положбата на Македонија и Србија како Хартленд на Балканот е непосредно и посредно искажана и потврдена во повеќе трудови, анализи, книги и размисли на домаќини и странски светски автори, стратези и политичари, како и од практичните случаи од историјата и тековните збиднувања во регионот. Македонија како средишна држава на Балканот несомнено претставува Хартленд на Балканот (Милески, 2005: 79). Во тој контекст е и постојаната и непроменлива централна положба на Србија околу „природните траектории“ на Балканскиот Полуостров (Илиќ, 1995). Македонија ја поседува стратешки извонредно значајната Вардарска Долина која со својот композитен релјефен состав на клисури кои наизменично се надополнуваат со котлини и поврзаноста со долините и сливовите на своите притоки кон исток и запад претставува првостепена природна оска на комуникација од север кон југ до Егејското Море и второстепено претставува место каде што се вкрстуваат сообраќајните врски од исток кон запад. Извонредно големото значење на Вардарската Долина и Македонија воопшто, се истакнати повеќепати низ историјата, особено за време на Балканските војни и Првата светска војна, кога е преземено геополитичкото решение за поделбата на Македонија како последен остаток од Отоманската Империја. Големото геополитично и геостратешко значење на Македонија може исто така да се заклучи и од мислата на поранешниот српски премиер Никола Пашиќ во стилот на Макиндеровите изјави: Историјата покажува дека оној кој ја поседува Македонија бил секогаш прв на Балканот (Јамбаев, 2003. Шатилова, 1992: 189. Никовски, 2013: 238-239). Дополнително, Македонија се наоѓа во центарот на балканскиот геополитички крст (Котовчевски, 2011: 227) што дефинитивно ја потврдува положбата на
Македонија како дел од своевидниот балкански Хартленд. Исто така, Србија ја поседува долината на Морава која што се вкрстуваат сообраќајните рути од исток кон запад. Но, сепак, најзначајно е тоа што долините на Вардар и Морава се мегусебно географски поврзани во правец север-југ со меѓународниот пан-европски коридор 10 и на тој начин со својата географска положба претставуваат Хартленд на Балканот. Следните геополитички согледувања и опсервации, исто така, ја потврдуваат оваа претпоставка за положбата на Македонија и Србија како балкански Хартленд. Вардарската Долина која завршува со устието во Солунскиот (Термајски) Залив, а е сместена во срцето на Македонија, поврзана со долината на реката Морава сместена во централниот дел на Србија, која, пак, се влева во Дунав, кој продолжува понатаму на север до некогашната чехо-словачка граница, завршувајќи на реката Висла (во Полска) е идентификован како Централноевропски коридор од страна на познатиот чехословачки политичар Милан Њош во неговиот предлог за Дунавска Федерација (Крејчи, 2005: 253).

Турција и Блискиот Исток (ЦИА, 2014) и истовремено претставувајќи крстосница на меѓународните пан-европски коридори 7 и 10. Со положбата на своите територии и сообраќајната инфраструктура Македонија и Србија преку патна и железничка мрежа ги поврзуваат источниот дел на Балканот (Бугарија и Романија) со западниот (Албанија, Црна Гора, Босна и Херцеговина и Хрватска), како и јужниот дел (Грција и европскиот дел на Турција) со внатрешноста на Европа на север, што дефинитивно овозможува големи изгледи за лесна експанзии во воен и економски поглед. Геополитичката и геостратегиската важност на оската Вардар-Морава како стожер и Хартленд на Балканот се потврдува и преку планот за изградба на пловен канал кој ќе ги поврзува овие две долини со што ќе се овозможи пловидбата од Дунав (а оттаму и Рајна, Северното Море и Атлантскиот Океан) до Егејското Море (а оттаму во Средоземното Море преку Суецкиот Канал во Индискиот Океан). Идејата за изградбата на овој пловен канал настанала уште во 19 век (Јовановски, 2011), а во последните години е повторно актуелизирана со предлозите и иницијативите на српската до македонската влада, како и со подготвеноста на кинеската државна градежна компанија која ја истакна профитабилноста од изградбата во 2013 година (Курир, 2013). Од воено-безбедносен аспект, територијата на Македонија има предности во поглед на лесна одбрана благодарение на високот планински релјеф на границите кои ја заградуваат внатрешноста која пак овозможува лесен пристап, односно претставува средиште за евентуален напад кон сите четири правци. Покрај тоа, близината и многу краткото растојание до Егејското (80 км) и Јадранското Море (100 км) (Милески, 2005: 161) надополнета на тешкокрстапниот планински и ридски релјеф во внатрешноста на грчката и албанска територија и дава висока вредност на маќедонската територија во однос на лесно одбивање на било каков надаоѓачки напад или амфибиска инвазија на поморско-копнени сили додека истовремено пружа и големи можности за брз и успешен напад и пробив за заземање на контролата на овие крајбрежја. Слично на ова, територијата на Србија со изключение на покраината Војводина која се наоѓа во Панонската Низина северно од реките Дунав и Сава (што се смета за природна физичка северна граница на Балканскиот Полуостров) е лесно одбранлива благодарение на релјефниот состав со долините на притоките Морава кон запад, југ и исток, обезбедува возможности за напад кон сите четири правци, особено кон внатрешноста на Босна и Херцеговина, Црна Гора и нејзиното крајбрежје на Јадранското Море, како и североисточниот дел на Бугарија каде што е сместен нејзиниот главен град Софија. Врз основа на изнесеното може да се претпостави включено одлука за поделбата на Македонија.
во 1913 има многу значајно геополитично значење во спречувањето на формирање на една единствена држава со излез на Егејското Море и контрола над сите точки на пристап како што се речните долини во Егејскиот Слив. Покрај разгледувањата на географските релјефни карактеристики и положбата на областа која е овде сметана за Хартленд на Балканот, неколку позитивни примери од историјата ја потврдуваат претпоставката дека поседувањето и контролата на териториите на Македонија и Србија е од клучно значење за проширување и доминација на целиот Балкан. Именно, македонското кралство на Филип II и Алексадар III Македонски во антиката, средновековното македонско царство на Самоил, Римската, Византијската и Отоманската Империја кои се појавиле, односно произлегле од овој простор или, пак, по освојувањето на оваа средишна област (Хартленд), набруг потоа се прошириле и се добиле со контрола на целиот Балкански Полуостров. Земајќи ја предвид констелацијата на политичката моќ на Балканот по 1991, како чинител во севкупната геополитичка анализа на овој географски простор препознаен како Хартленд на Балканот, забележителна е една заедничка и поврзувачка одлика во однос на геополитичката позиција на државите кои го сочинуваат овој средиштен стожер на Балканот. Додека сите други делови и држави около и на границите на оваа средишна област (т.н. Римленд, како што ќе биде објаснето подолу во трудот) се интегрирани и се дел од НАТО, двете држави од кои се состои оваа средишна област не се членки на овој воен сојуз, ниту пак има изгледи дека ќе станат во блиска иднина, иако тие официјално се стремат, активно придонесуваат (Македонија) и соработуваат (Србија). Во таа смисла, од самитот на НАТО во Букурешт во 2008 појаво на претенциите на грчкиот грчкиот сообичник (Лунгеску, 2008) и успори од иднината на членството на НАТО, дека Македонија ќе добие покана за членство по решавањето на спорот за името, настапи на основи на предвидот дека по противставени позиции на Македонија од аспект на заштита на правото, слободата и идентитетот и Грција од аспект на геополитички калкулации и придобивки од блокадата, очигледно е дека Македонија нема да стане полноправна членка на подолг рок. Имајќи го предвид фактот дека на противставени позиции со НАТО поради интервенциите и бомбардирањето за време на Косовската криза во 1999, Србија во 2007 година официјално обажи воена неутралност преку усвојување парламентарна резолуција во декември истата година (Ејдус, 2012: 229), се чини дека двете држави кои се чине противставени Балканскиот Хартленд нема да бидат интегрирани во НАТО алијансата во подолг временски период во иднината. Сепак, членството на сите други соседни држави, блиската соработка
и активната вклученост во евроатлантските интегративни процеси, не оставаат простор за било какви неочекувани геополитички пренасочувања како што се склучување на мегусебен сојуз настапи на останатите држави или склучување сојуз со надворешни актери – големи сили со што би се довело до единствена и заедничка геополитичка позиција - посед на срцетата на Балканот што, пак, може сериозно да ја наруши стабилноста на регионот. Уште еден интересен факт кој ги поврзува државите кои го сочинуваат балканскиот Хартленд е тоа дека тие споделуваат голем број сличности во поглед на религијата (и покрај долгогодишниот мегусебен црковен спор), јазиците, политичката и популарната култура, степенот на економски и општествен развој, навики и верувања. Во прилог на овие поврзувачки показатели за државите од балканскиот Хартленд се и резултатите од неодамнашната анкета на јавното мислење на граѓаните во Македонија кои покажуваат дека по Турција (со 16%) за најпријателска земја се смета Србија со 12,2% (Дневник, 2013). Згора на тоа, во врска со размислувањата кон петте соседни држави со 42,5% од македонските граѓани Србија се смета за најпријателски настроен сосед (Макфакс, 2013).

Што се однесува до второто теоретско сфакање на концептот на Хартленд како област која е јадро на мокта во однос на човечките, природните и индустриските ресурси, прилично е тешко да се идентификува една единствена срцетина-Хартленд на Балканот. Имено, Балканскиот Полуостров има прилично ниско ниво на економски развој во споредба со Западна, Централна и Северна Европа (Илиќ, 1995), а дополнително во поглед на економската интегрираност и мегузависност на земјите првенствено во индустриски и ресурсен аспект, целоти регион се одликува со прилично слаба и недоволна развиеност. И покрај фактот што балканските земји имаат до одреден степен умерено развиена интеракција и интеграција во трговски и пазарен аспект, сепак Балканот не претставува единствен економски ентитет кој има свој јадро во поглед на човечките, природните и индустриските ресурси во комбинација со поволната географска положба и услови, како што е тоа случај со Европската унија и одредените јадра како Рур, Сар, Шлезија итн. Во таа смисла секоја баланска држава има свој сопствен област кои не се поклопуваат во целост како јадра на човечките, природните и индустриските ресурси. На пример, јадрото на човечките ресурси и индустриската база на Македонија се наоѓаат во и около главниот град Скопје во долината на реката Вардар, додека јадрото во однос на рудните богатства е распрснато во североисточниот и западниот дел за металните руди, југозападниот дел за наоѓалиштата за јаглен, а производствената база за производство на храна е, исто
така, распределена во Пелагонија за жито и југоисточниот дел на државата односно Струмичката Котлина и долниот тек на долината на Вардар за производство на зеленчук. Слично е и во однос на Србија, каде што популационата и индустриската база се наоѓа во близината на главниот град на северниот крај на долината на Морава во басенот на Дунав и Сава, додека другите бази на природни ресурси како што се рудните наоѓалишта и производството на храна се распределени во источниот и северниот дел на државата, соодветно. Интересно од геополитически аспект е тоа што најголемите резерви на јаглен и лигнит, односно над 70% од рудните наоѓалишта и 90% од наоѓалиштата на јаглен (Томпсон, 2012: 489) кои се од суштинско значење за енергетската безбедност и стабилност на Србија се наоѓаат на просторот на Косово. Со овој недостаток на ресурси Србија беше дополнително погодена од стратешки аспект. Оваа распрснатост на базите на човечките ресурси и индустрĳата концентрирани околу главните градови и јадрата на природните ресурси во различни делови на државата е својствена и присутна во сите балкански држави: Бугарија, Албанија, Босна и Херцеговина, Хрватска, Црна Гора како резултат на автентичниот историски развиток на националните економии и централистичките тенденции спроведувани во периодот на комунизмот. Дури и Грција која не била под комунистичко владеење не отстапува од овој тренд, со јадро во производството на храна и индустрĳата во северниот дел на државата и концентрација на човечките ресурси околу главниот град. Сепак, врз основа на показателите во однос на богатството со рудни наоѓалишта, човечките ресурси во делот на демографската состојба, како и географската положба во средишниот дел на Балканот, опкружено од три страни со Македонија и Србија, Косово може делумно да се препознае како балкански Хартленд во смисла на ресурсно јадро. Но, иако Косово ги има најбогатите резерви на јаглен (14 милијарди тони лигнит) и метални руди (олово, цинк, осмиум) не само на Балканот туку и во Европа, кои според одредени проценки се доволнi за искористување за следните 13 века (Флаундерс, 1998), највисоките стапки на природен прираст и наталитет во однос на човечките ресурси, централната положба во регионот, сепак во целост не може да претставува Хартленд на Балканот. Ова се должи на ниската, односно неразвиена индустриската база, највисоките стапки на невработеност и низок степен на образование, но најповеќе поради тоа што не претставува област која ги привлекува интересите на другите држави, со исклучок на Албанија и Србија, да се судрат и борат за неговото поседување. Накратко, покрај неколкуте помали области кои се јадра во различни региони во рамките на полуостров, на Балканот не постои една единствена област која е јадро или Хартленд од стратешко
значење во економски и ресурсен аспект за чија контрола се војувало во минатото, како што е тоа случај со областите Сар, Рур, Шлезија или појасот „Сина Банана“ (Blue Banana Belt) во Европа, ниту пак постои таква област која е цел на територијалните претензии од националните стратегии на балканските држави во актуелниот период по 1991 година.

РИМЛЕНД НА БАЛКАНОТ

Пред да се посветиме на аналзиата на балканскиот Римленд, неопходно е да ги елаборираме основните претпоставки на таа теорија. Николас Спајкман (1893-1943) претставува директен наследник на доктрината на Махон во геополитички смисл. Тој ја сметал геополитиката како важен инструмент на меѓународната политика, како аналитички модел кој ќе овозможи најдобрите и најефективните стратегии. (Желтов, 2012:162). Спајкман е автор на „Американската стратегија во светската политика“ и „Географија на мирот“, публикувани во 1942 и 1944 година. Спајкман промовира две географски величини во светската политика и тоа Стар и Нов Свет. Првиот го сочинуваат Евроазија, Африка, Австралија и помалите острови кои се наоѓаат во близина на споменатите континенти, додека вториот или Новиот Свет го сочинуваат Америка и западната хемисфера. Двата света, според Спајкман се исприпелкуваат еден со друг преку Атлантичкот и Тихиот Океан. Основна карактеристика на Новиот Свет е неговата хегемонистичка суштина под влијание на САД, додека Стариот Свет е разделен и во него недостасува доминирањето на една сила. Според анализите на Спајкман најдобра стратегија на САД во поглед на одржување на разединетоста на Стариот Свет е истата да се валоризира преку активна надворешна политика. Таквата определба САД би можела да ја реализира преку воспоставување сојузи со послабите држави во тој регион. Спајкман ја парафразира познатата фраза на Мекиндер на следниот начин:

Кој го контролира Римланд, тој управува со Евроазија;
Кој управува со Евроазија, тој ја определува судбината на светот.

Значењето на приморските или маритимни области произлегува од отворениот пристап до сите трговски патишта. Во рамките на светките маритимни области можеме да ги вклучиме следните геополитички региони: Англо-америка и Карибите, маритимна Европа (еден дел од државите на Балканот) и Магребските држави, Азија, Јужна Америка и Африка јужно од Сахара. Геополитичките подрачја не ги опфаќаат сите територии, билејки надвор од нив се наоѓаат три независни региони: Јужна Азија, Блискиот Исток (shatterbelt – чувствителна зона), како и Средна и Источна Европа. Целиот Балкан можеме да го
окарактеризираме како чувствителна зона, затоа што претставува стратегиско подрачје во кое настапила политичка фрагментација како резултат на влијанието на маритимното (таласократија) и континенталното (телурократија) подрачје.

Доколку ја аплицираме теоријата за Римленд на Балканот, ќе видиме дека токму по тие претпоставки се одвива интеграциските процеси на државите во регионот. Првично претпоставката на НАТО и ЕУ со Бугарија, а потоа и Хрватска, како и вклучувањето на Албанија во НАТО – држави во маритимниот дел на Балканот, јасно ја потврдува појдовната премиса на овој труд. Очекуваното вклучување на Црна Гора во НАТО, најверојатно планирано за 2015 година, ќе биде уште една kontrolна хипотеза која ќе ка потврди појдовната премиса за значењето на државите од балканскиот Римленд.

Бугарија со својата геополитичка положба и маритмини карактеристики, е неопходна за спојување на јужното крило на НАТО со нејзините членки Грција и Турција. Оваа геостратиска и геополитичка алка е од непроценливо значење за идните процеси на проширување на Алијансата кон исток, конкретно кавкаскиот регион (Грузија). Бугарија се наоѓа на јужното крило на познатата „врата на народите”, односно во широката проодна зона помеѓу планината Урал и Црното Море. Геостратискаата важност на Бугарија произлегува од претпоставката дека во случаи на регионална или светска војна, територијата на Бугарија ќе претставува солидна стратегиска основа за преземање воени операции од големи размери, особено кон југ и кон исток, притоа потпирајќи се на европското војувалиште како простор најопремен со воена инфраструктура, ресурси и воени сили. Територијата на Бугарија целосно се наоѓа во зоната на малоазиско-панонскиот, односно панонско-малоазискиот можен стратегиски правец на дејствување кој се протега до блискосточните региони богати со нафта, до срединоевропските урбано-индустриски региони за кои нафтата претставува важен стратегиски ресурс. Истовремено, Бугарија остварува контрола на две значајни пловни артерии. Прво, контрола над црноморско-средноевропската пловна артерија која се одвива по реката Дунав и системите од пловни канали во северозападна Европа и како второ, делумна контрола над средоземноморско-црноморската пловна артерија која има големо воено и економско значење за речиси сите европски држави. Источниот дел на Бугарија претставува солидна основа за заштита на централниот дел на Балканот, затоа што претставува погоден мостобран во случаи на воена инвазија од исток. Исто така, низ нејзината територија поминуваат комуникациските коридори број 4, 8, 9 и 10 (Ниш-Софија) кои ќе поврзуваат Европа со блискосточните региони. (Милески, 2005:193).
Хрватска треба да претставува „gateway“ држава на Балканот. Што значи нејзиното членство во НАТО и ЕУ? Нејзиното значење произлегува од контактната положба на геостратешките подрачја, геополитичките региони на Хартленд и Источна Европа со редовните на моритимна Европа и Магреб, како и со допирот на европските региони, Средна и Југоисточна Европа. Теоријата за Хрватска како „gateway“ држава, според Цвртила, треба да овозможи Хрватска да стане важен фактор на економски план, да ја промовира политичката стабилност и безбедност на регионот (Cvrtišta, 2000: 164). Хрватска, според Бжежински, претставува дел од демократскиот мостобран кој го сочинува Западна Европа како мостобран на САД во Евроазија. (Brzezinski, 1999: 52-53). Силните залагања на Германија за независноста и интегрирањето на Хрватска во европските интегративни процеси, јасно покажува дека таа претставува интересна сфера на Германија заради можноста за валоризирање на нејзината положба како моритимна држава и дел од балканскиот Римленд. Ваквите констатации јасно укажуваат дека Хрватска била значајна алка во заокружувањето на западните интереси во југоситочна Европа, што несомнено, ги забрза интегративните процеси и придонесе кон создавање на современата политичко-географска и геополитичка слика на регионот, доминантно базирана на концептот за Римленд.

Анализирајќи го концептот на Римленд, во контекст на современата концептуализација на политичката карта на Балканот, исто така, не може да се прескокне Албанија. Албанија како моритимна држава, ја контролира Отранската Врата и влезот во Јадранското Море. Таа претставува значајна моритимна држава која во рамките на Балканот има солидна геополитичка валоризација, генерирајќи заокружена поставка на Римленд теоријата за овие простори.

Република Албанија го зазема западниот дел на Балканскиот Полуостров. По распадот на Варшавскиот договор, територијата на Албанија добива големо геостратешко значење, особено за НАТО, заради неговата потреба од зголемување на оперативната длановина за дејство на јужното крило. Поатаму, просторот помеѓу Драч, Валона и Елбасан претставува погоден оперативен простор, за собирање, стратегиско прегрупирање и логистичка поддршка на сили за евентуална инвазија кон запад. Најкратката оддалеченост помеѓу Аленискитот Полуостров и албанскиот брег кај Отрантската Врата изнесува 70 км, а најдолгата 810 км на линијата Валона – Венеција. Високопланинскиот релјеф на територијата на Албанија го заштитува средишниот дел на Балканот. Оттука, нејзината контрола е значајна за сите случувања кои се однесуваат на централниот дел на
Балканскиот Полуостров. Просторот на Албанија се наоѓа на оддалеченост од околу 30 км од косовско-пелагонискиот оперативен правец на дејства и околу 120 км од вардарско-моравскиот оперативен правец. Двата правци претставуваат најпогодни копнени проодни зони за преземање воени операции кон север и кон југ.

Конечно, Грција може да се смета како чисто поморски позиционирана држава која географски ги поврзува двете крила на целиот појас на балканскиот Римленд. Извонредно важната геостратешка положба на Грција во рамки на балканскиот Римленд произлегува од нејзината контрола на целиот предел на поморските линии и патишта од излезот на стратешки важните Дарданели (и Босфор - т.е. турските теснеци), преку целото Егејското Море, каде што нејзините територијални води зафаќаат 35% од неговата површина (врз основа на посед од само 6 наутички милји додека според грчките повикувања на право на 12 наутички милји тие би опфатиле 63,9%) (Милески, 2005: 72), Медитеранот кон Јонското Море блиску до влезот во басенот на Јадранското Море. Исто така, Грција поседува голема рамница на Солун во јужниот дел на долината на реката Вардар, кој обезбедува територијалната база со пониско значење за блокада на продор од балканскиот Хартленд, но несомнено нејзината најголема важност е поседувањето на целата област на поморско заобиколување на Балканот.

Вредно е да се напомене дека во поширокиот геополитички и геостратегски контекст, двете ключни геостратегски точки или мореузи кои се значајни за балканскиот Римленд (Отрантската Врата и Босфор и Дарданели) имаат исламско-католички предзнак, а воедно се под контрола на НАТО алијансата. Овие две извонредно значајни мореузи кои се поврзуваат chokepoints (теснеци/тесни грла) според терминологијата на Махон, покрај тоа што го потврдуваат значењето на балканскиот Римленд, тие укажуваат на уште поголемото значење на Балканот во пошироки регионални и глобални рамки особено во контекст на источното средоземје и Црното Море, кое ги поврзува глобалниот европски Хартленд и Блискиот Исток.

ЗАКЛУЧОК

Од изнесеното во овој труд и анализа на постојната геополитичка слика и мапа на Балканот преку апликацијата на основите геополитички концепти на Хартленд и Римленд, може да се извлечат повеќе заклучоци од аспект на географската положба односно разместеност на државите и од аспект на нивната примена во контекст на геополитичките дејствија на внатрешните и надворешните актери и чинители. Од гледна

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точка на географската распореденост на државите на актуелната геополитичка карта на Балканот по 1991 апликацијата на основните геополитички концепти на Балканот земен како микрокосмос покажува дека на туха може јасно да се препознаат, идентификуваат и определат региони кои се Хартленд и Римленд според своите физички и политичко-географски одлики. Со својата централна положба, недостапноста за поморските сили и поволноста за напад и доминација на регионот, Македонија и Србија несомнено го сочинуваат балканскиот Хартленд. Повеќе анализи на балкански и светски стратези, политичари и геополитички автори како и заедничките политички, просторно-географски, инфраструктурни, сообраќајни, воено-безбедносни, историски и културни одлики недвосмислено ја потврдуваат положбата на Македонија и Србија како своевиден Хартленд на Балканот. Во однос на заемно поврзаниот концепт на Римленд, географски погледнато целото појас на приморски држави кои концентрирани опкружуваат балканскиот Хартленд може јасно да биди препознаен како Римленд на Балканот. Во состав на балканскиот Римленд влегуваат: Бугарија, Грција, Албанија, Црна Гора и Хрватска. Државите од Римлендот на Балканот, имаат силно влијание и значење за развојот на целот регион, особено од аспект на реалните геополитички дејствија и случувања во периодот по Студената војна. Анализата на концептите за Хартленд и Римленд ни покажа дека концептуализијата на современата политичка карта на Балканот, од аспект на западните интеграционски процеси, се базира на концептот за Римленд. Со оглед на актуелниот момент во кој сите држави од балканскиот Римленд се дел од НАТО алијансата додека земјите на балканскиот Хартленд се надвор од овој сојуз без изгледи за поправно членство на подолг рок, ваквите состојби отвораат сериозни можности за инклинирање на надворешни фактори кои би пројавиле сериозен интерес за контрола на балканскиот Хартленд. Во тој контекст можат да се препознаат стратегиските акции кои во одредени временски периоди можат да се очекуваат од Русија, па и од Кина. Кина пројавува доста голема инвестициска активност, автопатски солуции во Македонија, контрола на пристаништа во Груција, изградба на железничка инфраструктура по главната баланска комуникациска оска. Русија преку проектот за Јужен поток, исто така, отвора можности за валоризирање на потенцијалното значење на балканскиот Хартленд. Ваквите актуелни процеси укажуваат на извонредно голема важност на Балканот во контекст на глобалната геополитика и активностите на големите светски актери кои несомнено ќе се одвираат и ќе можат да се анализираат според линиите на концептуализијата на засебните Хартленд и Римленд на геополитичката карта на Балканот.
ЛИТЕРАТУРА:


Abstract: Today’s police face a range of tactical challenges that, while not necessarily new, require an evolved operational response.

In the new millennium, policing throughout the world has gradually more taken on contemporary security role, such that it might be expected that policing should be rapidly changing to meet its new challenges and to deal with contemporary security threats.

This paper seeks to answer the question “What are police doing to counter terrorism?” Certain density in the roles, functions, strategies, and structures of the police, modern-day policing has become even more multifaceted, being concurrently focused on preventing and responding to “ordinary crime,” and now to responding to domestic and international terrorism.

Counterterrorism refers to proactive policies that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups. Domestic operations involve coercive use of military, police, and other security forces against domestic threats. Many nations have special units within their police forces that participate in counterterrorist operations.

Knowledge about nature and police counterterrorism strategies is an essential and currently missing component in a contemporary security agenda.

Key words: police, counter-terrorism, special operation forces, contemporary security concepts.
да брзо да се менува за да одговори на новите предизвици и да се справи со современите безбедносни закани.

Овој труд се обидува да одговори на прашањето “Која е улогата на полицијата за борба против тероризмот?” Преку многубројните улоги, функции, стратегии и структури, полицијата во современи услови стана уште повекеслојна, истовремено фокусирана и на превенција и на одговор на лесните кривични дела, и истовремено одговорна за спротивставување на внатрешниот и на меѓународниот тероризам.

Борбата против тероризмот се однесува на проактивни политики кои конкретно се обидуваат да се ликвидира терористичкото опкружување и терористичките групи. Domашните операции вклучуваат употреба на сила од војската, полицијата, и другите безбедносни сили против внатрешните закани. Многу нации имаат посебни единици во рамките на полициските сили кои учествуваат во антитерористички операции.

Сознанието за природата на полициските стратегии за борба против тероризмот е суштинска компонента која недостасува во современата безбедносна агенда.

Ключни зборови: полиција, борба против тероризмот, сили за специјални операции, современи безбедносни концепти.

INTRODUCTION

While it is not necessary to define terrorism, it is necessary to state what we mean by counterterrorism. Counterterrorism will be used as a synonym for high policing, that is, it will refer to the covert activities of intelligence gathering and disruption directed against people considered to be terrorists. Counter-terrorism is a complex and multifaceted subject that encompasses a host of different strategies for dealing with violent extremism. Its central purpose can be described as devising methods and policies to cause non state groups that employ [terrorism] to stop using violence to achieve their political objectives (Art and Richardson, 2007).

Counterterrorism can be criminological analyzed as a matter of social control, including various mechanisms and institutions that define and respond to terrorism (Costanza and Associates, 2009: 91-115). The most formal component of social control is represented by the criminal justice system, including its agents and organizations, such as the police. In the realm of social control and criminal justice, the counterterrorism activities of police have been of growing importance (Brandl, 2007).
When we speak of police, we will be referring to agencies of law enforcement that operate exclusively within a country. This stipulation is necessary in order to distinguish police from the military whose unique responsibility is to protect countries from external threats. We will also confine our examination of terrorism’s impact only to the public police, that is, to agencies of law enforcement that are authorized and maintained by government (Bayley, 1985).

Although there is debate that the police should not be involved in counterterrorism, their precise role is unclear and indeed controversial. Some are concerned that expanding the police role in counterterrorism will change the character of policing in democratic states. In particular, that police will emphasize covert prevention of terrorism to the neglect of publicly visible policing of individual criminal victimization (Kempa and Associates, 2004: 562-581). Policing of this kind has been called “high policing” (Brodeur, 1985).

High policing has two distinguishing features – its substantive focus and its methods. High policing targets what might be called macro-crimes, that is, crimes that are considered threats to society in general, such as drug trafficking and an illegal immigration, as opposed to micro-crimes that affect only individuals (Bayley, 2006). In high policing, prevention is the key objective, utilizing the tactics of covert intelligence gathering, surveillance, and disruption.

“Low-policing,” by contrast, emphasizes prevention through visible patrolling and deterrence through the application of criminal law.

High policing differs sharply from the standard practices of normal or “low” policing because it is less transparent, less accountable, and less careful with respect to human rights (Thacher, 2005: 635-676). In general, high policing encourages a top-down command structure and changes the orientation of police from servicing to controlling the population.

At the same time, other analysis explains that full-service or general-duties policing should play a large role in counterterrorism, indeed, that it has unique advantages in a war on terror that should be exploited (Kelling and William, 2006). For example, general-duties policing provides unprecedented access to communities. Properly focused, it can obtain information about activities that are the precursors of terrorism. Furthermore, by being responsive to the mundane concerns of individuals, it raises the likelihood that the public will assist the police by providing information or accepting direction in the event of disasters. More particularly, routine policing can build bridges to communities that may shelter or give rise to terrorists. In short, the activities of low policing are not a distraction from counterterrorism but an essential “force multiplier.”
So two questions about the future of policing arise out of the new emphasis on counterterrorism post 9/11. First: what has happened to policing since 9/11? In particular, has high policing replaced low policing? Second: what is the appropriate role for uniformed, full service policing in counterterrorism? Should it undertake high policing? What are the advantages and disadvantages of doing so?

It is impossible to say with confidence whether the war on terrorism has changed the character of policing in developed democracies, in particular whether high policing has significantly impacted low policing. The evidence is fragmentary and impressionistic. It appears that specialized capabilities, especially for intelligence gathering and analysis, have been augmented in all countries. It is not at all clear how much traditional frontline policing in the form of uniformed patrol, response to calls-for-service, and criminal investigation has been.

There is impression is that general policing has been affected most in Israel and least in the United States. Great Britain seems to have adapted its policing more to the requirements of counterterrorism due largely to the terrorism associated with the “troubles” in Northern Ireland during the last 35 years. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, cluster toward the American end of and India tends more to the intermediate position. Countries in Western Europe range somewhere in the middle of this continuum.

The critical question is whether a shift to high policing, especially by general-duties police agencies, in Western democracies should be applauded or prevented. As we have pointed out, there are reasons why uniformed, general-duties police should take on a greater role in the prevention and control of terrorism, in addition to their inevitable role in responding to terrorist events and ameliorating their impacts. Local police can be enormously helpful in detecting terrorist-related activity, building bridges to informants in critical communities, and in coordinating security responses between public and private agencies. At the same time, acting as high police may come at a cost that policy makers and the public should be aware of. It may lead to a decline in crime-prevention services to the general public and undermine the investigation of ordinary crime, thereby separating itself from the population in general and reducing the possibility of obtaining useful information about terrorist activities (Weisburd and Associates, 2002: 80-109).

Taking stock of the advantages as well as the disadvantages of using general-duties police in counterterrorism, we believe that they can contribute more by focusing and fine-tuning their standard operations than by creating specialized high policing capabilities.
EVOLUTION OF POLICE TACTICS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH

Terrorism and counterterrorism have historically evolved in various ways. Terrorism has increasingly diversified in terms of the objectives that are pursued and the means that are used. Counterterrorism efforts have likewise proliferated across a range of institutions. Criminologists contribute to the study of terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena by focusing on terrorism as crime or deviance and counterterrorism as social control. Studying counterterrorism as a form of social control, criminological research can reveal important elements of counterterrorism that are not of a military, legal, or political character. Much of the contemporary public discourse typically focuses on counterterrorism in the world of politics and in relation to military interventions and war. Yet, every dimension of counterterrorism has to be researched carefully before any general pronouncements can be made.

The role of most police activities is not “operational” in the military sense. Police forces are small, and with the exception of large metropolitan regions, barely comprise the strength of a tactical military unit. Their role, however, is just as complex. Police have the responsibility to keep the peace in complex and diverse multi-ethnic urban environments, carry out counter-gang operations, and protect a broad array of targets from terrorists. Yet for most police doctrine has remained tactical in orientation. Additionally, the decentralized nature of American policing—in marked contrast to many European police services—limits the conceptual development of synchronized, operational responses.

A long-term police campaign against a gang, organized crime family, or terrorist group, can compromise many different tactical operations nested together. In adapting the operational language to police purposes, we argue that the level of command is not what determines whether something is tactical or operational per se, rather the purpose of the action or mission(s) determines the echelons needed for successful engagement.

As recounted by Lindsay Clutterbuck, the first shift in the expansion of policing outlook was the 19th century anarchist challenge, which created a pre-modern network of police forces. The elimination of the pre-modern “anarchist wave” of terrorism is a relevant (and hopeful) sign that today’s terrorism challenge is not insurmountable. This, however, would be the first of many advances in police doctrine and functions in response to the challenges of the industrial era (Clutterbuck, 2006: 33-51).

Police tactical doctrine changed again during the 1970s, when paramilitary terrorist attacks exposed weaknesses in command and control and tactical response. Police, in addition,
can utilize organic “combined arms” abilities through the combination of foot (dismounted) intervention, helicopters, and tactical response teams (special weapons teams, bomb squads), including the use of armored rescue vehicles (Sullivan and Elkus, 2010).

The purpose of violent responses is to attack and degrade the operational capabilities of terrorist. This can be done by directly confronting terrorists or destabilizing their organization.

Creating an operational concept for police counterterrorism response is a worthy project. Indeed to be effective, it needs to go beyond counterterrorism to address the whole range of complex police responses. This includes emergency and disaster response, counter-gang and counter-violence activities, organized crime suppression, public order (civil disturbance and riot response), and wide-area crime control efforts (pattern and series crimes). The need to mobilize and synchronized distributed police operations across and among metropolitan regions, and across jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries are essential to addressing complex disasters, complex criminal networks, and terrorist attacks.

Table 1. Counterterrorist Options: The Use of Force (Gus, 2011: 272).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterterrorist Option</th>
<th>Activity Profile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppression campaigns</td>
<td>- Symbolic strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Punitive measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Preemption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive covert operations</td>
<td>- Symbolic strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destabilization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Preemption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coercive covert operations</td>
<td>- Coercive covert operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destabilization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Preemption</td>
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</table>
A wide range of counterterrorism strategies have been developed to deal with the causes and consequences of terrorist activities. Politically, counter-terrorism involves measures taken by the governments of national states and by international governing bodies (INTERPOL and EUROPOL). Such (inter)governmental responses to terrorism are historically most developed, dating back to at least the second half of the nineteenth century, when governments in Europe sought to disrupt political activities aimed at overthrowing established regimes (Deflem, 2002).

There is a strong preference among police to engage in international counterterrorism missions in a unilateral manner or to engage in cooperation with only a limited number of counterparts from other nations. Larger international partnerships occur in a collaborative form, thereby affirming the contributions and perceptions of participating police agencies in the individual states. Though affording advantages in terms of the preservation of national sovereignty, this national persistence can also produce rifts in the global order of counterterrorism as the strongest participating agencies are the ones most likely to go about it alone in fulfilling stated counterterrorism objectives. Such unilaterally conceived counterterrorism strategies can produce unintended consequences, inasmuch as the security and police forces of otherwise friendly nations may turn against their more powerful counterparts, such as the law enforcement institutions in the United States, only because a more egalitarian cooperative spirit was missing.

NATIONAL MODELS OF COUNTERTERRORISM

We begin by asking who has responsibility for counterterrorism in Western democracies. In particular, is counterterrorism assigned to specialized agencies or to the police? If counterterrorism is a responsibility of the police, how are they organized to carry it out? Finally, in large police organizations is counterterrorism concentrated at central levels of the organization or delegated to subordinate commands, especially dispersed geographical commands?

Most countries have specialized agencies entirely separate from the police that engage in counterterrorism abroad—collecting information, penetrating potential terrorist and/or criminal groups, and taking preventive action. In several studies, the responsibility for counterterrorism – clandestine intelligence collection and disruption – is distributed domestically in three ways:

(1) To a national agency specializing in counterterrorism,
(2) to one or more national police services, and
(3) To all police agencies at any governmental level.

These modes of organization are not exclusive but may coexist in the same country.

All the countries in our review have created an agency that specializes in collecting domestic intelligence about potentially violent subversion - Australia (ASIO), France (DST), Israel (Shin Bet), Japan (PSIA), the United States (FBI), Serbia (VBA), and Macedonia (SAIS) (One of structural elements of the (sub) System of internal security of R. Macedonia includes Ministry of Interior (Police, Special Police and Special Forces, Crime Police and Security and Counter-intelligence Administration).

At the same time, they vary in their powers to take preventive action. Some national counterterrorism agencies do have full police powers and can detain, arrest, and submit for prosecution - India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Italy's Intelligence and Democratic Security Service (SISDE), Japan’s Public Security Investigation Agency (PSIA), Spain’s National Intelligence Center (CNI), Sweden’s National Security Service (SAPO). For this reason, they should be regarded as police forces that specialize in counter-espionage.

All countries that authorize the creation of police at sub-national, decentralized levels require them to undertake counterterrorism operations. Indeed, all sub national counterterrorism is carried out by police. There are no cases of agencies specializing in counterterrorism at sub-national levels. Thus, the police in all federal systems have counterterrorism responsibilities. The police in centralized systems may also delegate counterterrorism functions to subordinate levels of command for reasons of operational effectiveness. This occurs, for example, in France, Japan, and Israel. The United Kingdom is a special case. It doesn't have a federal system of government, nor does it have a national police force, but all of its 43 police forces have a dedicated intelligence capability (Special Branch) and, since 2004, a “Counter Terrorist Security Advisor.”

In sum, police in all democratic countries, centralized and non-centralized, are authorized to engage in high as well as low policing and the extent to which they actually do so varies widely.

CATEGORIES OF POLICE ACTIVITY

There is universal agreement among police officials, academics, and other observers that terrorism has sharply impacted the activities of full-service police departments since 9/11. This is true not only in the United States but for police agencies around the world, even
those with longer histories of dealing with terrorist threats.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police-IACP’s own survey of changes in policing as a result of terrorism showed that 86% of forces reported operational or policy changes since 9/11. Most of these (48%) were in strategic planning with respect to national alerts, WMD response, risk assessment, and first responding procedures. The other major areas of impact were in training, equipment, reorganization, redeployment, and interagency collaboration.

The impact of terrorism on policing, however, involves more than high policing. Besides collecting intelligence and undertaking preventive actions, counterterrorism involves limiting the damage from terrorism and investigating, arresting, and prosecuting those who have done it (Bradley and Lyman, 2006). It’s important to remember that all terrorist attacks are local. This means that although some counterterrorism functions can be made the responsibility of dedicated units deployed at centralized levels of organization, police on the ground will necessarily become involved wherever terrorism strikes or is likely to strike.

If the police are to be effective in the war on terrorism, there are at least ten categories of police activity that could properly be considered counterterrorism.

1. Covert detection
2. Disruption/dismantling of terrorist plots
3. Risk analysis
4. Target hardening
5. Community mobilization for prevention
6. Protection of important persons and infrastructure
7. Emergency assistance at terrorist incidents
8. Order-maintenance when terrorism occurs
9. Mitigation of terrorist damage
10. Criminal investigation of terrorist incidents

Full-service police agencies can make essential contributions to the war on terrorism in terms of preparedness planning, threat analysis of critical infrastructure, target protection, first-responding, order-maintenance, and post-event criminal investigation. Although not all frontline police agencies can do all of these things unassisted, their expertise and resources must be used because they are the first line of defense with respect to these tasks.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPACT OF COUNTERTERRORISM ON POLICE

Turning to the global dimensions of counterterrorism policing, variable legal and political contexts are seen to bring about differences and similarities in the policing of terrorism worldwide. In autocratic and highly centralized states, counterterrorism policing is generally subsumed under a national security regime, whereas more autonomy is accorded to police in democratic states. The institutional independence that modern police agencies can acquire across national boundaries also enables international police organizations with multilateral membership to address terrorism issues through enhanced means of communication and information exchange. As is the case with other crimes of a distinctly international nature, international cooperation is a central concern in the policing of terrorism. In the context of the persistent globalization of terrorism and related security concerns, counterterrorism functions transcend the jurisdictional boundaries of single national states and their institutions.

Terrorism does not impact the status and prominence of high policing in all police forces equally. We suggest that there are six factors that determine whether a police force alters its activities to include a greater number of high policing functions.

(1) Local incidents of terrorism. In countries where terrorist threats are serious and where the attacks are common, high policing is likely to have a much larger place in police operations. Furthermore, after a dramatic terror attack police responses will be affected by perceptions of local vulnerabilities. The greater the number of likely targets for terrorism, the greater will be preparations made by local police (Davis and Associates, 2004).

(2) The structure of police organization. The higher the governmental level at which police are organized, the more likely it is that preventive counterterrorism will be undertaken. Police agencies that are organized at a national level, such as the Israeli or the French, appear to take on high policing tasks with greater ease than police organized in a decentralized way. As a corollary to this, it seems likely that local police who are decentralized units within a national organization are more likely to undertaken high police functions than those which are independent.

(3) The size of the police unit. Specialization of function can only take place in organizations of scale.

(4) Time under threat. Terrorism will have a greater impact on policing the longer a country has experienced it.

(5) Intolerance of political dissent. Acceptance of “high policing” occurs more

1 This is clearly the reason why Israel and the UK have a long history of police involvement in homeland security and counterterrorism functions.
frequently in countries where dissent is not tolerated, whether for ideological, cultural, or political reasons (McCauley, 2007: 55-65). Authoritarian governments, notably, view dissent as a threat, and therefore treat it with the tactics of high policing.

(6) In countries which allow sub-national levels of government to develop autonomous police forces, such as federal systems (Brazil, India, Australia, Germany, the United States), local police may be required to do modify their operations by national laws, administrative directive, or inducements of money.

In sum, the threat of terrorism impacts almost all police agencies in one way or another. Centralized and higher level police agencies will engage more in specialized counterterrorism intelligence gathering and surveillance (high policing) than local ones. But most will be affected by the need to analyze risk and to respond to terrorist attacks, to maintain order, to relieve distress, and to investigate incidents. The extent to which they do so is only partly under their control. Subordinate police in decentralized systems will have greater control over their adaptations than police in centralized systems. But even the police in decentralized systems may find themselves powerless in the face of directives, mandates, and events.

DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES IN COUNTERTERRORISM—POLICE VERSUS ARMY

In matters of terrorism, there is today arguably no dimension more relevant and more discussed, next to the policing of terrorism, than the military involvement in counterterrorism and the conception of counterterrorism in terms of war. However, the ambitions that are connected to the war on terrorism from the political and legal viewpoint—to coordinate and centralize all aspects of counterterrorism—have not been accomplished at the level of the various institutions involved with counterterrorism. In the case of police, most distinctly, terrorism is not pursued in terms of a war but on the basis of acquired professional standards of crime control.

The purpose of legalistic responses is to provide protection to the general public, protect the interests of the state, and criminalize the behavior of the terrorist.
Table 2. Counterterrorist Options: Legalistic Responses (Gus, 2011: 291).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterterrorist Option</th>
<th>Activity Profile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>-Enhancement of security apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Demilitarization of counterterrorist campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic laws</td>
<td>Criminalization of terrorist behavior</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic laws</td>
<td>International consensus and cooperation</td>
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The confrontation of the policing of terrorism with the war-related dimensions of counterterrorism is of considerable importance as the differences between the policing of terrorism and terrorism-related military actions are profound (McCauley, 2007:55-65). From the policing point of view, the targets of counterterrorism are treated as suspects who are accorded certain rights of due process on the basis of publicly presented evidence in courts and who, upon a determination of guilt, can receive punishment. Military counterterrorism operations, by contrast, are oriented at enemies who can be killed in combat or who can be temporarily detained to be released when a cessation of hostilities has been declared. The respective logics of criminal justice policy and military counterterrorism operations, then, are very different, although they coexist in the wider constellation of counterterrorism, which is essentially multi-dimensional in nature (Deflem, 2010).

The aims of this paper should not be misunderstood to imply a defense of the policing approach to terrorism against the military model. The normative debate on counterterrorism has in this respect again been less than useful in occasionally assuming that a policing response and, more generally, a criminal justice model are better suited in terrorism cases. It is, therefore, typically assumed that a police response would not bring about the problems associated with military counterterrorism operations, such as the enormous loss of innocent
Security dialogues live in large-scale military operations (e.g., those in Iraq and Afghanistan). However, problematic consequences can also be involved in the criminal justice and police approach to terrorism. A large body of criminological research that exists has exposed many potential and real concerns in policing, such as the lack of democratic oversight that marks the actions of highly bureaucratized police agencies and the differential enforcement of criminal justice along the lines of existing disparities in race, gender, age, and class. If a sound normative debate is to take place in the case of counterterrorism, such problems cannot simply be ignored.

CONCLUSION
This paper shows whichever policy models that are suggested at the national and international levels of law and politics to more effectively detect and deter terrorism must also take into account the manner in which counterterrorism operations are undertaken by various institutions. From the viewpoint of the policing of terrorism, counterterrorism does not involve a war on terror but is instead viewed as a permanent function of crime control. Counterterrorism police strategies, therefore, adopt an approach that may very well be realistic in being based on the notion of terrorism as a permanent risk. In contrast, the war on terror is failing, not only because it has not been able to effectively coordinate and centralize all counterterrorism functions but, also because it offers an unwarranted optimistic sense of the possibility of a victory and a lasting peace without terrorism.

Counterterrorism police strategies can be developed on the basis of an explicit awareness that the world today is highly interconnected. Rather than trying to build a security order exclusively modeled after the experiences of the United States (or any other nation) in matters of security and law enforcement, a collaborative model of cooperation that can be elaborated takes into account the concerns faced by nations across the world. In this respect, it makes sense to contemplate further strengthening the global security order that has already developed, even among countries that can be very different in political, legal, and cultural respects.

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PRIVATE SECURITY THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF THE LEGISLATURE FROM SOME OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

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АПСТРАКТ:
The paper counterpoises an analysis of the comparative legislature from some of the Balkan countries. In that notion, the paper is a critical review of the legal regulation of the private security sector in the countries of the region. The subject of serious discussion is the thesis that private security should be accepted as a reality and as a component part of the overall security of all the countries that gravitate around the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, the study of private security within the overall security represents a part of the continuous efforts to ensure the required level of security for all citizens in the immediate vicinity. The elaboration made in this paper contains two elements: first, the paper makes an analysis of the legal regulation of this sector, and secondly, based on the analysis, it is identified the key differences in the regulation of this issue.

Ключни зборови: приватна безбедност, приватен безбедносен сектор, обезбедување, приватно обезбедување, услуги, законодавство.

ABSTRACT:
This paper counterpoises an analysis of the comparative legislature from some of the Balkan countries. In that notion, the paper is a critical review of the legal regulation
which regulates the private security sector in some of the Balkan countries. The thesis that
the private security should be accepted as a reality and as a component part from the total
security of every country that gravitates around the Republic of Macedonia is a subject of a
serious discussion. Correspondingly, the studying of the private security in the framework of
the overall security counterpoises a part of the continuous efforts for providing the necessary
level of security of all citizens in the immediate surroundings. The elaboration which is made
in this paper is consisted of two elements: first, an analysis is made of the legal regulation
in this sector and second, based on the analysis, the key differences in the regulation of this
issue are foreseen.

Key words: private security, private security sector, security, private security services,
legislature.

ВОВЕД
Приватната безбедност преку фирмите за приватно обезбедување настојува да
gи заштити правата и легалните интереси на своите клиенти, се со цел осигурување на
нивната безбедност и одржување на редот и мирот. Во настојувањето на остварување на
овав цел, приватните агенции за обезбедување извршуваат одредени активности како
своевидни услуги кои ги нудат на пазарот за да ги задоволат потребите на клиентите како
крајни рецептени на услугите. Освен тоа, зголемувањето на законите со кои се соочуваат
компаниите во нивното работење, како и обликот на производство и услуги, неминовно
се повеќе го услови приватниот безбедносен сектор да биде во функција на заштитата.
Тоа значи дека кругот на традиционалното обезбедување на работите се проширил и на
други, незаштитни функции, кои го промовираат начинот на работа на целиот систем за
приватно обезбедување.

Искуствата покажуваат дека освен стандартните и рутински начини на работа
кои ги извршува полицијата во практика, потребно е да се обезбеди и дополнителна
заштита од приватниот безбедносен сектор за да може да се обедини заедничкиот одговор
против потенцијалните закани, како и навремено да бидат во можност да придонесат во
откривање на изворите на загрозување, можните одговори (како сопствени, така и од
приватното обезбедувања) на опасностите кои доаѓаат (превентивно дејствување) или
правци и методи за намалување на негативните последици.

Основната цел на ваквиот начин на работа е воспоставување подобар однос со
„корисниците“ на услугите на полицијата, запознавање на одговорните лица на системот
за приватно обезбедување со новите достигнувања од делокругот на работа на полицијата и размена на искуства во заеднички борби против потенцијалните сторители на кривични дела. Се смета дека безбедносните компании во однос на современите ризици и закани може да се гледаат од два аспекта: поширок, односно целите на националната безбедност и државата како референтен објект во безбедноста; и потесен, односно деловната политика и целите на безбедносните компани (Кековић З., 2004).

Компаративниот преглед за обезбедување на лица и имот, како и придонесот на приватната безбедност кон заштита на деловните компании, нивниот имот и вработени, ќе продолжи преку примерите на анализираните држави од Балканот.

**ПРИВАТНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО РЕПУЛИКА ХРВАТСКА**

Република Хрватска за првпат целосно и институционално ги воведе различните облици на приватно обезбедување на лица и имот со донесувањето на Законот за заштита на лица и имот од 1996 година, кој во мегувреме двапати бил изменет, а во 2003 година е донесен целосно нов Закон за приватна заштита2 кој, исто така, како и претходното законско решение во 2010 година претрпи на двапати изменени, секако од објективни причини и како резултат на прилагодувањето на хрватското со европското законодавство.

Во текстот на Законот за приватна заштита се инкорпорирани некои решенија кои ги изразуваат најголемите стандарди во оваа област. Така, дејноста приватна заштита, освен тоа што можат да ја вршат правните лица и поединци кои се регистрирани за извршување на работи од делокругот на приватната заштита, исто така, таа дејност можат да ја осигурат според новите изменет од 2010 година и правни лица и поединци од државите членки на Европската унија и државите потписници на Договорот за Европски економски простор во согласност со важечките прописи во Република Хрватска.

Во согласност со член 5 од Законот за приватна заштита, дејноста приватна заштита ги опфаќа работите кои имаат за цел вршење заштита на лица и имот, а особено: обезбедување мирни настани и јавни собири, обезбедување станбен и јавен простор, непосредна телесна заштита (телохранител), заштита на природните добри и околината, обезбедување и транспорт на пари и вредни пратки. Правните лица и поединци ја спроведуваат приватната заштита врз основа на потпишан договор склучен со физички и правни лица кои се предмет на заштита (член 6), а работите од приватна заштита можат да се извршуваат внатре и околу штитениот објект, околу штитената личност, внатре

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2 Закон о приватној заштити (»Народне новине«, бр. 68/03. 31/10. и 139/10.)
во границата на периметарот на заштита за чијашто заштита се задолжени чуварите и стражарите на јавни места. Во однос на ова прашање, надлежната полициска управа може, на предлог на единиците на локална самоуправа да издаде одобрене, врз основа на кое, работите на приватна заштита се извршуваат на јавна површина.3

Правните лица, без разлика на тоа каква услуга нудат на пазарот, работите во делот на приватна заштита можат да ги започнат по добивање на претходно одобрене од страна на Министерството за внатрешни работи, што подразбира дека претходна дозвола за извршување на дејноста приватно обезбедување се дел од полициската област. Правните лица кои што ја извршуваат дејноста приватна заштита мора да исполнат одредени критериуми за да го добијат соодветното одобрене како: да поседуваат соодветен акт со кој се запишани во судскиот регистар, да имаат назначен одговорна личност за извршување работи во делот на приватната заштита, да поседуваат акт за систематизација на работни места, односно конкретни овластувања за секој работник за секое работно место, да имаат акт за заштитниот знак на правното лице, да поседуваат работен простор кој треба да биде уреден во согласност со посебните просторни и технички услови итн. (член 13).

Административна санкција им се изрекува на правни и физички лица во вид на предупредување или одземање на дозволата за работа во услови кога овие субјекти нема да го почитуваат законот, а неговите одредби сами по себе носат казнени санкции кои се во исключителни компетенции на Министерството за внатрешниработи. Според тоа, полицијата во Република Хрватска е овластена за издавање одобренија за работа на правните лица за обезбедување приватна заштита, како и одобренија за работа на лица вработени во секторот за физичка заштита. Според тоа, полицијата врши и управен, односно инспекциски надзор над спроведувањето на Законот за приватна заштита, како и на прописите донесени по тој основ. Конечно, инспекцискиот надзор над извршената работа за заштита на лица и имот, ја спроведуваат специјализирани овластени службени лица (инспектори) во Министерството за внатрешни работи, со тоа што во вршењето на надзорот тие можат да побараат помош од други полициски службеници.

3 Закон о приватној заштити ("Народне новинеч", бр. 68/03. 31/10. и 139/10.), Член 8.
Security dialogues

PRIVATNA BEZBEDNOST VO BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA

Системот на приватна безбедност на Босна и Херцеговина е сложен и се соочува со големи предизвици исто како што е сложена и самата структура на Босна и Херцеговина. Дел од тие предизвици се резултат на окупираната од одредени внатрешни проблеми, главно предизвикани од различни политички фактори, а некои од нив се: заостанатите политички и општествени анимозитети, настанати како последица од војната од 1992 до 1995 година и секако поттикнати од елементите кои заговараат различни видови националистички екстремизам; бавна имплементација на Дејтонскиот мировен договор; проблеми како резултат на политичката транзизија, кои резултираат со бавен развој на ефикасни и деловодни извршни, законодавни и судски органи; проблеми од економска природа, како резултат на ниското ниво на домашни и на странски инвестиции, слабата приватизација, технологијата заостанување на производните капацитети; поразната граница, која овозможува трговија со наркотици, оружје и луѓе; проблеми со високата стапка на невработеност; поседување огромни количини оружје и муниција, кои се наоѓаат во неадекватни складишни објекти; големиот број нагазни мини и неексплодирани минско-експлозивни средства на територијата на света БиХ; како и разни еколошки предизвици.

Во ваква состојба се развива приватната безбедност во БиХ оптоварена со тековните проблеми и немањето соодветна законска рамка заклучно со 2002 година. Со донесување на Законот за заштита на луѓе и имот во Федерацијата БиХ во 2002 година (во понатамошен текст Федерален закон), започнува историјата на една сосема нова дејност. Претходно мора да се нагласи дека во една фаза од развојот на Босна и Херцеговина, со Законот на основите на општествена самозаштита од 1986 година, делумно е третирана оваа проблематика, а решенијата кои биле понудени не биле доволни за современите безбедносни предизвици и потребите на пазарот денес. (Аџич Ј., 2009). Исчекор во регулирањето на овој сегмент е направен во 1998 година кога Зеничко-добојскиот кантон

4 Векторијата на Босна и Херцеговина административно се дели на два ентитета и една област. Двета ентитета ги сочинуваат Федерацијата Босна и Херцеговина, лабава федерација составена од 10 кантони – области и Република Српска која административно се дели на региони, а потоа и на општини, како и областата Брчко како територија која е ставена под арбитража и не припаѓа на Федерацијата БиХ, ниту на Република Српска, туку со одлука на Арбитражната комисија за Брчко, ставена е под управа на државата Босна и Херцеговина како посебен дистрикт, во http://www.mfa.gov.ba/indeg (посетена на 17.04.2014)

5 Влада Босне и Херцеговине. (2005) Бијела књига одбране Босне и Херцеговине, Сарајево: Влада Босне и Херцеговине.
донесе Закон за приватна безбедност на кантонално ниво, но сепак целосното нормативно-правно заокружување на оваа дејност е направено со донесувањето соодветни закони во Федерацијата Босна и Херцеговина и Република Српска, со што се создаде можnost за формирање специјализириани агенции за извршување на работите од оваа област.

Новоформираните агенции за обезбедување се поjavуваат како носители на дополнителен надзор над криминалитетот, а свои услуги можат, во тој контекст, да понудат и продадат и на самиот пазар на работна сила. Утврдените стандарди ги задолжуваат фирмите/агенциите на професионализација на кадарот, самостојна специјализација и почитување на стручниот и етички кодекс при вршење на услугите за обезбедување (Аџич Ј., 2009). Работите кои се однесуваат за заштита на лица и имот на економските субјекти, установи и други правни лица, според овој закон, се вршат по пат на формирање посебни агенции специјализириани за вршење на тие работи или по пат на организирање на внатрешната служба за заштита на правното лице, во согласност со наведениот закон. Во надлежност на агенцијата, според овој закон, се работи кои се однесуваат на заштита на лицата и имотот. Мора да се истакне дека Законот во одредени одредби е рестриктивен во делот на извршување на дејноста со редица ограничувања како: агенциите не можат да вршат работа за заштита на лица и имот за потребите на војската на ФБиХ, не можат да вршат работа за заштита на лица и имот за потребите на органите на внатрешни работи, ниту пак работи за заштита на раководните тела на извршната власт и органите на управата, како ниту други тела и органи на ниво на Федерацијата, кантони, градови или општини. Многу важен сегмент на овој Закон е тоа што агенциите не можат да вршат работи за заштита на политички партии и нивните претставници.

Работите во надлежност на агенциите можат да ги извршуваат само лица кои ги исполнуваат следните услови: да се државјани на Федерацијата на БиХ, односно Република Српска; да имаат 18 години (за работна заштита), односно 25 (за детективска работа); да имаат дозвола за вршење на работна заштита; да се телесно и душевно способни за дозвола за вршење на работна заштита; да се дозвола за вршење на работна заштита; да поседуваат најмалку средно училиште (техничка насока за техничка заштита) додека лицата мора да имаат најмалку виша стручна подготовка, односно висока или виша подготовка (за детективска работа); против нив да не се води кривична постапка и да не се осудуваат за кривични дела кои се гонат по службена должност или за прекршок против јавниот ред и мир со карактеристики.

6 Закон о детективскоj делатности, Службене новине ЗДК, бр.07/98.
7 Закон о агенциjама за заштиту лjуди и имовине, (Службене новине ФБИХ, год IX, бр 50, 14. октобар 2002). члан 2.
на насилство; да немаат отказ од страна на полициските служби од страна на комесарот на Меѓународната полиција на ООН (International Police Task Force-IPTF) и да не е сменет од воената служба од страна на командата на Стабилизацијските тела (The Stabilization Force-SFOR) (Триван Д., 2012).

Во согласност со Федералниот закон, Агенција за заштита на лица и имот во ФБиХ можат да формираат само домашни правни и физички лица. Во самата постапка за формирање на агенција, основачот е долга добивање од одобрување за работа од надлежниот кантонален орган за внатрешни работе, по добивање на ова одобрение основачот поднесува барање во надлежниот кантонален суд за да се запише агенцијата во судскиот регистар. Во понуденото законско решение не се дава можност за формирање на агенции од страна на политички партии како и раководители во органите за извршна власт и органи за управа ниту пак на другите органи на ниво на Федерацијата, канцеларите, градовите или општините.

НАЦИОНАЛНА ЗАКОНОДАВНА РАМКА НА РОМАНИЈА

Во Романија позицијата на приватниот безбедносен сектор е регулиран со посебен Закон бр. 333 од 2003 година или поточно со Законот за заштита на објекти, добра, вредности и лица, врз основа на кој сите фирми (вклучувајќи ги и странските компании) кои даваат услуги како приватни обезбедувања мораат да имаат дозвола за работа која ја издава полицијата, за сите вработени во овој сектор, полицијата и Романската информативна служба служба (Serviciul Roman de Informatii-SRI) претходно вршат безбедносни проверки. Покрај одредените психо-физички способности, еден од условите за работа во приватниот безбедносен сектор е завршена обука за овој тип на работа во траење од 90 дена (Триван Д. 2012). Според податоците од 2010 година во Романија егзистираат 1282 приватни безбедносни компании кои вработуваат околу 100.000 лица.

Услугата на приватниот безбедносен сектор во Романија е наменета за различна клиентела. Клиентите се деловни, политички и меѓународни организации и компании во Романија кои доставуваат барање врз основа на закон да учествуваат во заштита на своите имоти и најголем дел од нив одлучиле оваа работа да му ја доверат на приватниот

8 Исто., член 5.
10 Службени гласник Румуније бр. 525 од 22.07.2003 година.
безбедносен сектор. Значи, услугата на приватниот безбедносен сектор во Романија се состои од физичка заштита на значајни објекти (странски дипломатско-конзуларни претставништва, финансијски установи и др.), обезбедување компаниите, објекти на инфраструктура, следење пари и стока во транспортот. Голем број фирми се занимаваат со техничко обезбедување (вградување и одржување алармни системи), помал број компаниите со заштита на личности, а некои фирми се специјалнизириани за одредување на типот на работа на обезбедувањето (услуга на брза реакција) (Триван Д. 2012).

Надзор над работата на приватниот безбедносен сектор во Романија врши Генерален инспекторат на полицијата. Во практика, мал број фирми од овој сектор ги почитуваат европските стандарди, особено во однос на прашањето на правата на граѓаните и правилата на службата, со кои вработените во обезбедувањето во текот на обуката не се запознаваат во доволна мера. Исто така, лошите услови на работа и малите плати, влијаат на ниското ниво на професионализам. Поради законските можности за тоа дека и државниот сектор за безбедност се занимава со давање комерцијални услуги, се јавува конфликт на интереси помеѓу јавниот и приватниот сектор за безбедност како и корупција (Триван Д. 2012).

**ПРИВАТНА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО РЕПУБЛИКА ЦРНА ГОРА**

Правна основа на актуелното функционирање на приватниот сектор за безбедност во Црна Гора претставува Уставот на Црна Гора и Законот за заштита на лица и имот од 2005 година кој неколкупати е изменуван и дополнуван. Во рамките на овој закон се уредени условите и начинот на извршување на дејноста и вршење на работите на заштита на лица, имот и добра кои не ги обезбедува државата, како и условите и начинот на вршење на работи од заштитен карактер, но и други прашања кои се од значење за вршење на работите во делот на заштитата.

Денеска областа на приватната безбедност во Црна Гора им е доверена на

14 Закон о заштити лица и имовине Црне Горе („Службени лист РЦГ“, бр. 29/05), Закон о измјенама и допунама Закона о заштити лица и имовине Црне Горе (СУ-СК број 01-68/7, од 22. априла 2010) и Закон о измјенама и допунама Закона о заштити лица и имовине („Службени лист Црне Горе, број 1/2014“ од 9.1.2014).
приватни фирми кои се занимаваат со давање услуги за приватно обезбедување. Тие услуги опфаќаат: заштита на имот и објекти од уништување, оштетување или кражби; заштита на природни богатства, добра и животната средина; одржување на редот на јавните манифестации; заштита на лица од облици на загрозување на нивниот живот, физичкиот и психичкиот интегритет, приватноста и личните права како и други облици на загрозување на нивната безбедност; извршување заштитни работи во транспорот (при носење пари, хартии од вредност, богаство итн.); заштита на имотот и објектите во фазата на проектирање, изградба и одржување на алармни и видео системи и централи, како и на другите технички системи.16

Давањето услуги на приватно обезбедување се дозволува само на посебни субјекти и правни лица кои се запишани во Централниот регистар на стопански субјекти и кои имаат одобрение за вршење на дејноста во согласност со законот. Одобрение за извршување на дејноста го издава полицијата во временски период од пет години. Во согласност со член 21 од Законот за заштита на лица и имот одобрение се издава под строго определени услови, а тоа значи заинтересираните правни лица треба да имаат: одговорно лице за вршење на работи од делокругот на заштитата, да имаат акт за организација и систематизација на работните места, да имаат кодекс за однесување на вработените, да поседуваат акт со заштитен знак, да имаат соодветен акт за униформи, да имаат најмалку четири лица вработени со дозвола за вршење на работите на заштитата, да имаат елаборат за техничка опременост во согласност со прописите за заштита од пожар, кражби и други хаварии и злоупотреби, како и да имаат на располагање просторни и технички услови за безбедно сместување на оружје и муниција, ако вршат работи во делот на физичка заштита со употреба на оружје.

Субјектите кои ја извршуваат оваа дејност мора да имаат потпишан договор за нарачаната услуга со компидентот. Исто така, субјектите кои вршат работи од областа на заштитата се должни да го информираат Министерството за внатрешни работе и полицијата за склучениот договор во рок од осум дена од денот на потпишување на договорот.17 Министерство за внатрешни работе, како орган кој издава лиценци за работа, спроведува контрола и надзор над фирмите кои се занимаваат со давање услуги на приватно обезбедување.

Во Република Црна Гора на приватниот безбедносен сектор му припаѓаат и

17 Исто, Член 10.
фирми који се занимаваат со производство на софтверско-технички комплекси за заштита на информациони системи, како и компани кои даваат услуги за информациона, комерцијална, противложана и екологошка безбедност.

Со оглед на експанзијата на приватниот безбедносен сектор во Црна Гора во почетокот на XXI век, евидентни се бројни напори за регулирање и на детективската дејност во Црна Гора како една посебна специфичност која е резултат на економската трансформација, социјалната еманципација и политичка демократизација. Законот за детективска дејност, се заснова на тоа дека со оваа дејност може да се занимаваат поединци, самостојно или во рамките на детективска канцеларија и тоа исключиво врз основа на одобрение на Министерството за внатрешни работи. Во согласност со законот за детективска дејност, детективските работи може да се извршуваат само врз основа на потпишан договор склучен помеѓу нарачалот на работите и преземачот, а кој извршува дејност заштита на внатрешноста на штитениот објект и лицето кое се обезбедува, или собира одредени информации за клиентот.18

ПРИВАТНА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО РЕПУБЛИКА СРБИЈА

Република Србија е една од земјите во регионот на Југоисточна Европа која најдоцна законски ја уреди областа приватна безбедност, иако во неа во изминатиот период егзистираа голем број компании кои даваа услуги за обезбедување. За ваквата состојба доминира размислувањето дека се одбегнувало тоа да се направи заради сфакањето дека безбедноста е ексклузивна функција на државата. Во ваков амбиент до донесувањето на Законот за приватно обезбедување во 2013 година, јавниот безбедносен сектор и приватниот безбедносен сектор функционирале паралелно, без заедничка соработка и остварени партнерства и без регулирани междусебни односи. Всушност, не постоела волја и подготвеност за заедничка одговорност за безбедноста во државата.

Со донесувањето на Законот за приватно обезбедување во декември 2013 година се смета дека полицијата е главен, но повеќе не и единствен провајдер на безбедност и дека ова е почеток на воспоставување конзистентен и функционален безбедносен сектор. Значи, со регулирањето на приватното обезбедување во Република Србија оваа дејност прераснува во комплексна дејност.

Со сигурност може да се потврди дека компаниите кои се занимаваат со приватно обезбедување, веќе се легитимирани на пазарот на услуги и дека постепено стануваат

18 Види: Закон о детективској делатност, (Службени лист РЦГ, бр. 29/2005).
19 Закон о Приватном обезбеђењу, (Сл. гласник РС бр. 104/13 од 5/12/2013).
релевантни субјекти во безбедноста и за разлика од минатите години кога имаше соодветен правен вакуум за оваа дејност, тоа овозможуваше да не постојат соодветни правила на игра во работењето и секој можеше да формира фирма за обезбедување без притоа да бидат исполнети минималните стандарди. Денес, ситуацијата е сосема различна бидејки нормативното регулирање веќе значи поголема одговорност на сите припадници на приватниот безбедносен сектор кон државата.

Во основа, аргументите за законско уредување на приватниот безбедносен сектор во Република Србија во изминатиот период беа бројни, а основната причина за уредување на оваа област беше соодветно тоа како е уредена оваа област во други држави. Ова се должи пред сè на спецификите во кои се наоѓа Србија, потребите на бизнис-заедницата, условите на дејствување на овој сектор во самоот политичко-безбедносен амбиент, процесите во економијата во домашни и глобални рамки, неравенство на одредени аспекти на дејствување како резултат на наредните чекори во гармонизацијата на законодавството на ниво на ЕУ итн.

Услугите кои ги пропишува Законот за приватно обезбедување во Република Србија опфаќа широко подрачје на дејствување на фирмите во оваа област. Така, во член 2 од Законот, приватното обезбедување се однесува на давање на следните услуги: заштита на лица, имот и работењето, заштита на работа при вршење на транспорт на пари и вредности, одржување ред на јавни собири, спортски приредби и други места на собири на граѓаните (редарска служба) итн. Во однос на давањето услуги, треба да се нагласи дека правните лица и другите субјекти коишто имаат лиценца за вршење на работи во делот на приватното обезбедување не можат да вршат работи около заштитата на лица и имот кои исклучиво се во надлежност на државните органи и да применуваат оперативни методи и средства, односно оперативно-технички средства и методи кои тие органи ги применуваат врз основа на посебни закони.

Генерално, за вршење услуги во делот на приватното обезбедување неопходно е правните лица и претприемачите за приватно обезбедување да имаат соодветна лиценца за одредени работи како: за процена на ризици во заштита на лица, имот и работењето; за заштита на лица и имот со физички и технички средства, како и работи за одржување на
ред на јавни собири и манифестацији и други места каде се собираат граѓаните во делот каде не е надлежно Министерството за внатрешни работи; за планирање, проектирање и надзор над системите за техничка заштита, монтажа и пуштање во работа, одржување на системите за техничка заштита и обука на корисниците; и за обезбедување на транспорт на пари и вредносни пратки во делот каде не е надлежно ресорното министерство за внатрешни работи.20 Потребните лиценци за работа ги издава Министерството за внатрешни работи.

Во однос на лиценците за вршење работи за приватно обезбедување, Законот за приватно обезбедување во член 10 ги опфатил условите за добивање лиценца од утврдените видови лиценца. Клучните услови кои се пропишани во законот, а се однесуваат на правните лица и на претприемачите, се однесуваат на задолжително запишување на фирмата во Регистерот за стопански субјекти во Србија, понатаму од нив се бара да имаат соодветен акт за систематизација на работните места и опис на работите и овластувањата на вработените за секое работно место; да имаат акт кој поблиску го пропишува изгледот на униформите кои ги носат службениците за обезбедување и изгледот на знакот; да имаат одговорно лице (да е државјанин на Србија, да е полнолетно, психофизички да е способен што се докажува со лекарски бележки од надлежна здравствена установа, да има најмалку средна стручна подготовка, да ја поминал потребната безбедносна проверка, да има лиценца за вршење работи од приватното обезбедување која се издава на физички лица и да поседува посебен простор за сместување оружје и муниција во согласност со прописите за условите за чување оружје и муниција од пожар, ако работите од приватното обезбедување се вршат со оружје).21

Покрај општите услови законот пропишал и посебни услови кои треба да ги исполнат правните лица и претприемачите за да ги добијат следните видови лиценци и тоа:

Лиценца за проценка на ризици во заштита на лица, имот и работење - се издава во услови кога има најмалку еден вработен службеник за обезбедување со лиценца која се издава за физички лица, односно како Лиценца за проценка на ризици во заштита на лица, имот и работа;

Лиценца за вршење работи поврзани со физичко-техничка заштита на лица и имоти и одржување на редот на спортските приредби, јавните собири и други места каде се собираат граѓаните - се издава во ситуација кога правните лица имаат вработено

| 20 | Исто, Член 6. |
| 21 | Исто, Член 10. |
најмалку 10 службеници за обезбедување со лиценца која се издава за физички лица, односно Лиценца за вршење на работи на одговорното лице за заштита или Лиценца за вршење на основни работи на службеникот за обезбедување - без оружје или Лиценца за вршење на специјализирани работи на службеникот за обезбедување со оружје; Лиценца за вршење работи за обезбедување во делот на транспорт и пренос на пари и вредносни пратки - условите се фирмите да имаат најмалку 10 службеници за обезбедување со лиценца која се издава за физички лица, односно со Лиценца за вршење специјализирани работе на службеникот за обезбедување со оружје и да поседува технички средства за транспорт и пренос на пари и вредносни пратки; Лиценца за вршење работи во делот на планирање на системите за техничка заштита, а условот е фирмите да имаат најмалку еден вработен службеник за обезбедување со средно образование од техничката струка со потребната лиценца која се издава за физички лица, односно со Лиценца за вршење работи поврзани со планирање на системите за техничка заштита; Лиценца за вршење проектирање и надзор над извршувањето на системите за техничка заштита - условот за добивање ваква лиценца е да имаат најмалку еден вработен службеник за обезбедување со високо образование во област на техничко-технолошките науки со потребната лиценца која се издава за физички лица, односно со Лиценца за вршење работи за проектирање, а и надзор над изведување на системите за техничка заштита; Лиценца за вршење монтажа, пуштање во работа и одржување на системите за техничка заштита и обука на корисниците - потребно е фирмите да имаат најмалку еден вработен со средно образование од техничката струка со потребната лиценца која се издава за физички лица, односно со Лиценца за вршење работи поврзани со монтажа, пуштање во работа и одржување на системите за техничка заштита и обука на корисниците.  

Во Република Србија прашањата врзани за детективската област се регулираат со посебен закон. Според Законот за детективска дејност, со детективска дејност во Република Србија може да се занимаваат правни лица и претпријемачи кои се регистрирани за извршување на детективската дејност, односно физички лица кои се вработени заради вршење работе исклучиво поврзани со детективските работе, односно не можат да извршуваат работе кои се во исклучителна надлежност на државните органи и не можат

22 Исто, Член 10.
да применуваат оперативни методи и средства или оперативно-тактичките средства и методи кои ги применуваат надлежните органи, односно истите тие ги применуваат врз основа на посебни прописи.\textsuperscript{23}

Во согласност со член 4 од Законот, детективска дејност во Република Србија можат да извршуваат правни лица регистрирани за детективска дејност и претприемач за детективска дејност, а детективските работи може да ги извршува детектив, ако има лиценца за извршување на детективска дејност, односно детективски работи која е издадена од страна на Министерството за внатрешни работи.

**ПРИВАТНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО РЕПУБЛИКА АЛБАНИЈА**

На крајот на XX век во Република Албанија се случија големи промени во општествено-политичкиот амбиент, но и во економската сфера. Како резултат на овие промени, дојде до интензивирање на напорите за осигурување на безбедноста на сите нивоа и во повеќе сектори, вклучувајќи го и приватниот безбедносен сектор.

Во Република Албанија работата на приватниот безбедносен сектор е регулирана со Законот за чуварска и службата за физичко обезбедување,\textsuperscript{24} додека за системското уредување на приватната безбедност е одговорно Министерството за внатрешни работи кое меѓу другото е задолжено да издава дозволи за работа на агенциите за обезбедување.

Компаниите за обезбедување даваат широк спектар облици на заштита почнувајќи од статично обезбедување, непосредна заштита, брзо реагирање и обезбедување транспорт на пари и вредности. Со либерализација на економскиот и финансискиот систем, компаниите за приватно обезбедување започнале да склучуваат договори за давање услуги наменети за банкарскиот сектор и соодветните институции, за независните медиуми итн., како и давање услуги за непосредно обезбедување на поединци. Уште еден знак на економскиот развој значеше појавата на нови градилишта, особено во Тирана кои се обезбедувани од страна на приватните безбедносни компании. Зголемениот број банки и нивни филијали во внатрешноста на земјата значеше поголема потреба не само од статичните чувари, туку и за поставување алармни системи на возилата и на кадарот осспособен за транспорт на пари и други вредности. Најголемите фирми ги нуделе сите облици на заштита, додека малите фирми тежеле само кон одредени специјализации.

Генерално, во Република Албанија компаниите за приватно обезбедување ги ангажираат бизнисмените, меѓународните организации, амбасадите, хотелите, банките, градилиштата

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\textsuperscript{23} Закон о детективској делатности (Сл. гласник РС бр. 104/13 из 05/12/2013), член 2.
\textsuperscript{24} Закон 8770 од 19.04.2001 и Закон 8936 од 23.05.2001.
Во зависност од големината на компанијата и каква услуга дава на пазарот, постојат три категории лиценци, и тоа: категорија А, вклучува фирми кои даваат услуги за обезбедување приватни и јавни згради; категорија Б, се однесува на фирми кои се занимаваат со физички обезбедувања; во категорија Ц спаѓаат фирмите кои се занимаваат со обезбедување транспорт на пари и вредносни предмети. Карактеристично за овие категории е тоа што фирмите со категорија Б и Ц даваат услуги во целата земја, додека тие со А дозвола извршуваат работи само во делокругот на активности (Триван Д. 2012). Значи, без разлика на која категорија ѝ припаѓа лиценцата, лиценците за извршување на дејноста приватно обезбедување се дел од полициската област. Личностите кои ја извршуваат дејноста приватно обезбедување мора да исполнат одредени критериуми и тоа: сопственикот на фирмата не треба да биде евидентиран во казнената евиденција, да не биде осудуван, ниту отпуштен од полицијата поради кршење на законот, се разбира, ако претходно бил во работен однос во таа институција итн.

Административната санкција во вид на надзор на правните субјекти кои нема да го почитуваат законот и неговите одредби само по себе носи казнени санкции кои се во изключителна компетенција на Генералниот директорат на државната полиција при Министерството за внатрешни работи.

ПРИВАТНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО ГРЦИЈА

Големината на индустриска индустријата на приватна безбедност во Грција е тешко да се процени исто како и нејзиното дејствување, што било речиси нерегулирано до создавањето на посебно законодавство во 1997 година. Сепак, според податоците од 2010 година од страна на CoESS во Грција се регистрирани 1200 приватни безбедносни компани кои вработуваат околу 30.000 лица.26 Компаниите во секторот за приватна безбедност се активни во работите на обезбедување објекти и индустриски постројки, обезбедување лица, обезбедување јавни настани, безбедност на аеродроми и други јавни објекти и во транспортот на пари и богатства (Даничић М, и Стајић Љ. 2008).

Работата во приватниот безбедносен сектор во Грција е регулирана со Закон за

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приватна безбедност што е донесен на 21 август 1997 година, а изменет и дополнет во 2008 година. Овој закон предлага дека за основање компанија за приватно обезбедување неопходно е да се бара согласност од надлежниот полициски орган. Сопствениците, менаџерите и оперативниот персонал се подложни на проверки на криминалното минато. Лица кои се кривично осудени на казна затвор подолга од шест месеци не можат да работат во секторот на приватната безбедност. На лицата кои се осудувани за некој од следните кривични дела, им се забранува извршување должност во компаниите за приватна безбедност како: граѓанска непослушност, загрозување на човековите права и слободи, сексуално вознемирање, акти на фалсификување и фалсификување со измама, уцени, нарушување на правото на слобода на говор, изразување, кражби, измами, предавство, давање и примање мито или корупција, угнетување, употреба на наркотични средства и криумчарење (Давидович Д. и Кешетович Ж., 2009): Оперативниот персонал треба да има завршено воен рок и соодветна обука. Обуката е доброволна и стандартите традиционално се многу ниски. Како резултат на тоа е формирана специјална комисија која воспоставува подобри стандарди во обуката. Носењето униформа е задолжително, а таа мора јасно да се разликува од полициската или од униформата на јавните службеници. Униформите мора да бидат одобрени од Министерството за одбрана. Лицата на должност мора да носат ИД картички. Поседувањето и употребата на огнено оружје е ограничено со законот на тоа како што се и барањата во однос на другите граѓани и обуката е задолжителна. Употребата на службени кучиња е дозволена во приватни објекти и во оградени простори. Се бара посебна обука за водичите. Лиценцата може да биде одземена ако некој од предусловите за добивање лиценца не се исполнол подолго време (Аџич Ј., 2009).

Треба да се потенцира дека во Грција покрај тоа што оваа дејност е регулирана со Законот за приватна безбедност, сепак постојат и други форми на регулација на овој сектор, односно има национален колективен договор врз основа на кој се регулирани условите на работа во секторот. Основниот законски документ се однесува на работното време, на условите за годишен одмор и на правата на привремените работници и работниците на одредено време. Работното време е регулирано со Закон 69 од 1982 година, поточно во член 41 којшто пропишал 40 часа неделно и 8 часа дневно. Меѓутога, во практика, компаниите често ги надминуваат тие работни часови. Со колективниот договор е одредена минималната плата на трудот. Условите за годишен одмор се регулирани со

27 Law no. 2518/1997.  
28 Law no. 3707/2008
закон за работа и додадени на колективниот договор. Должината на годишниот одмор се менува во согласност со работниот стаж и изнесува 20 дена во текот на една година до 25 дена по 10 години. Во согласност со Законот 2874/2000 и Законот 2639/1998, вработените со договор на дело и вработените на одредено време имаат исти права како и вработените кои имаат засновано редовен работен однос. Тие, исто така, имаат право да бидат информирани за полното работно време и за испразнетите места во компанијата.29

ПРИВАТНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО БУГАРИЈА

Во Бугарија, со донесување на Законот за работење на приватното обезбедување од 2004 година, се уредени условите и начинот на извршување на дејноста и вршење на работите на заштита на лица, имот и добра кои се надвор од надлежноста на државата, како и овластувања на лицата кои вршат работи за заштита. Законот налага фирмите кои се регистрирани за вршење на оваа дејност да бидат регистрирани во полицијата. Според податоците од 2010 година во Бугарија има околу 1200 приватни безбедносни компании кои работуваат околу 55.000 вработени во овој сектор.30

Генерално, фирмите за обезбедување во Бугарија ги нудат следните видови услуги како: обезбедување згради, инсталации, банки, амбасади, концерти, транспорт на пари и вредности, хотели, индустриски објекти, приватен имот, спортски сали, бензински станици, стадиони, приватни куќи, меѓународни организација и корпорации, државни и јавни установи, потоа одржување електронски алармни системи и системи за видео надзор итн.

Според Законот, активности за приватно обезбедување ќе бидат дозволени само со поседување соодветна лиценца или соодветна регистрација според одредбите на законот за приватно обезбедување, а лиценците се издаваат од страна на националната полиција или од личност која се оповестена со една национална полиција и од личност која се овластене лица од негова страна имаат право да издадат или да ја одбијат лиценцата во рок од еден месец од денот на поднесување на барањето.31

28 Law on private guarding activities enacted in 2004.
Во поглед на употреба на сила, законот е доста ригиден. Така според член 34 од законот употребата на сила е дозволена само во ситуации кога припадникот-вработен во приватното обезбедување не може да ја извршува службената должност, што значи дека физичка сила може да биде употребена само по претходно опоменување или во исключителни ситуации при изненаден напад.

Административната санкција во вид на надзор на правните субјекти кои нема да го почитуваат законот и неговите одредби само по себе носи соодветни казни. Analogично на тоа контролата на работнењето на овој сектор му е доверено на Министерството за внатрешни работи. Исто така, соодветна контрола се прави и преку парламентот и канцеларијата на народниот правобранител кои имаат законски овластувања за вршење надзор.32

ЗАКЛУЧОК

Законското регулирање на приватната безбедност се разликува од држава во држава. Тоа е заради фактот што секоја од анализираните држави има свои специфички, своја традиција итн., но сепак треба да се нагласи дека во услови на зголемени закани се појавува потреба овој сектор да дејствува надвор од националните рамки, па затоа се наметнува потребата за нормирање на одредени аспекти на дејствување, како и услогласување на законската рамка.

Од споредбената анализа можат да се извлечат повеќе заклучоци. Прво, утврдено е дека не постојат значителни разлики во законските одредби, како и во овластувањата коишто ги имаат вработените во приватниот безбедносен сектор во земјите од ЈИЕ. Исто така, не се евидентирани одредени разлики во делот на услугите кои ги даваат овие фирми во анализираните држави. Второ, во делот на издавање лиценца за работа речиси идентично во сите држави таа активност е во надлежност на Министерството за внатрешни работи. Сепак, компаративната анализа покажува одредени разлики од аспект на организирањето на приватната безбедност во Босна и Херцеговина. Системот на приватна безбедност на Босна и Херцеговина еложен исто како што е сложена и самата структура на Босна и Херцеговина и тој е организиран и од Федерацијата БиХ и од Република Српска поради двата ентиитет Република Српска и Федерација Босна и Херцеговина кои имаат посебни закои во оваа сфера. Разлики се забележани и од аспект на контролата, односно органите кои се инволвираани во неа. Во најголем број

анализирани држави контролните механизми му се доверени на Министерството за внатрешни работи, и на одредени соодветни органи во рамките на овој ресор, односно постои Генерален инспекторат, односно директорат на полицијата во Romaniја и во Албанија кои се овластени за вршење соодветна контрола и надзор на работењето на овие фирми. На крајот, врз основа на квалитетна и методолошки издржана споредба на приватниот безбедносен сектор во посочените држави со базичните елементи на повекето теоретски модели, може да се заклучи дека во сите анализирани држави работењето на овој сектор најмногу наликува (односно има најголем број слични елементи) на традиционалниот модел на полициско работење.

ЛИТЕРАТУРА
6. htpp://www.mfa.gov.ba/indег
8. Закон о детективској делатност, (Службене новине ЗДК, бр. 07/98.
15. Закон о детективској делатности, (Службени лист РЦГ, бр. 29/2005).

ABSTRACT:

Modern warfare challenges impose the need for continuous and necessary transformation of strategic and operational concepts in the application of decisive force, power projection and strategic agility and domination. These challenges continue to govern and manage the overall efforts in the area of transformation of the military factor, resulting from dealing with known and in response to the new challenges in the future. In addition, as a key part in the transformation of the armed forces, and as it is described in the Joint Vision 2020®, “the expressed possibilities of military forces for dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection of the forces.”

Modern operations require application of modern communication and information technologies resulting from the rapid technological development and application of new and sophisticated information technologies and means of communication. The usages of these technologies significantly facilitate the management of the military organization, i.e. the planning, organizing, coordinating, commanding, controlling and motivating.

With the new communication systems it is necessary to initiate deployment, receiving messages or to provide primary response to threat. System C4I (Comand, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence) means organizations and capabilities, opportunity to communicate securely or publicly, application of standard operating procedures, it automates alarm for monitoring and response to crises, and other services.

Key Words: Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Communication and Information Systems (CIS), Electronic Warfare, Immersive Virtual Reality.
INTRODUCTION
Studying the basics of Joint Vision 2020 by the U.S. Army stems from the need to constantly insight and monitor the transformation of the U.S. armed forces, leading economic, political and military state in the world today.

The primary purpose of the armed forces of the U.S. Army, as stated, „is and will be to fight and win the wars in which the present interest of the nation.” The ultimate goal of the upcoming transformation described in this paper is creating the forces that are dominant across the full spectrum of military operations-persuasive in peace, decisive in war and dominated in all other forms of conflict.

By 2020, as it highlights the American nation will face a wide range of interests, opportunities and challenges that will require the military to win wars, and both contribute to peace. Global interests and responsibilities of the United States is longstanding and there is no indication that would have threatened these interests and the interests of its allies.

Describing these capabilities Joint Vision 2020 provides a vector and a comprehensive program of exercises and experiments carried out by the combat commands and services to meet the need for constant evolution of military force.

The general focus of this vision is providing complete domination by force, in conducting full spectrum operations, develop appropriate doctrine for use of force, organizations, training and education, and utilizing new technologies.

The decision of the military commands of the units at different levels of command, in essence, it comes down to work on the commander and his headquarters in organizing the composition and deployment of the unit, in conducting timely, durable solutions in pursuit of some type of operation.

New systems for information and communication support their implementation in the process of making process which commands are implemented in the units at different levels, which is necessary to initiate the deployment, active application programming packages to help the commander and headquarters in decision timely, high quality and durable decisions that will ensure reliable defeat their opponents.

S4I System (Command, Control, Comunication, Computers and Intelligence) means organizations and capabilities, the ability to communicate securely or publicly, application of standards, operating procedures, automated alarm monitoring and response to crises and other services.

Joint Vision 2020 is based on fundamental views contained in the previous Joint Vision 2010 emphasizing the need for constant and continuous transformation of the U.S. armed forces. Primary goal of these forces, as it is emphasized, “is and will be to fight and win the wars which represent the interest of the nation.” The ultimate goal of the transformation described in this paper is in creating, making forces that are dominant across the full spectrum of military operations - persuasive in peace, decisive in war and dominant in all other forms of conflict. By 2020, as it is emphasized, American nation will face a wider range of interests, opportunities and challenges that will require the military to win the wars, but at the same time to contribute to the peace. Global interests and responsibilities of the United States are longstanding and there is no indication that would threaten these interests and the interests of their allies. The strategic concepts of decisive force, power projection, overseas presence, and strategic agility will continue to govern and manage the overall efforts for fulfilling the obligations deriving from facing the new challenges in the future. This vision describes the ongoing transformations of these new capabilities. As explained in Joint Vision 2020, the expressed opportunities for dominant maneuver, precise engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection of the forces (Scheme 1), as it was actually the case with the Joint Vision 2010, are planetary in by its nature and are keeping its significance further on.33

(visited on 09.03.2014)
STRATEGIC CONTEXT

As it is stated in the Joint vision 2020, there are three aspects of the world till 2020 that would have significant implications for the U.S. armed forces. First, the U.S. will continue to have global interests and will be engaged with various regional actors. Transport, communications and information technology will continue to develop and promote expanded economic ties and awareness of international events.

Second, it highlights the state of the real capabilities of potential adversaries who will have access to the global commercial and industrial base and with the same technology as the one of the U.S. military. The increased availability of commercial satellites, digital communications and public Internet of the opponents must be denied by the advantage of the quality of trained personnel, implementation of doctrine, organization and training that will enable to achieve combat effectiveness.

Third, it should be expected, potential adversaries to adapt as the capabilities to respond by engaging in military force will grow. Therefore, it is necessary to continually
develop superior conventional fighting capabilities, backed by effective nuclear deterrence, which is important to point out that this military balance is not static. Asymmetric methods and goals of the opposition often are far more important than the relative technological imbalance and psychological impact of the attack which may exceed the actual physical damage that is caused. The adversary can achieve an asymmetric advantage of tactical, operational or strategic level by identifying, recognizing key weaknesses and to devise concepts for asymmetric attack and use them.

**FULL DOMINANCE**

For allied forces engaged in the joint warfare, in the future, this goal will be achieved only through complete dominance - ability of the U.S. forces, or in combination with the multinational and inter agency’s partners who will be able to defeat any adversary and to establish control over each situation across the full range of military operations. The full range of operations includes maintaining strategic deterrence. It involves in conflict to use strategic forces and weapons of mass destruction, big wars, regional conflicts and small unforeseen conflicts. Achieving complete dominance means that the allied forces will fulfill the primary goal - win the war and achieving success across the spectrum of operations, which should take into account losses or difficulties in engaging forces.

**INOVATION**

Joint Vision 2020 identifies the technological innovation as a vital component in the transformation of joint forces. Innovations are primarily concerning the news in integrating doctrines, tactics, training, support operations and technology for the new operational capabilities. Effective innovative process requires continuous learning - this means exchange and interaction which assess, evaluate the achievable goals, operational lessons, exercises, experiments and simulations, as well as inclusion of feedback mechanisms. Services and commands must allow the highly trained and skilled professionals to create new concepts and ideas that may lead to future breakthroughs. However, experimental process with a low error tolerance makes the forces to identify and nurture the most important and most productive aspects of the new concepts, skills, capabilities and technologies. That is the reason why there is a high level of uncertainty and difference in the quest for innovation. Leaders must assess the effectiveness of new ideas, potential movements to new concepts, capabilities, opportunities of the potential adversaries, the cost versus benefits of the new
technologies and the organizational consequences of emerging capabilities. They need to put these estimates in context of the developing analysis of the economic, political and technological factors of the anticipated security environment. Each of these estimates will be uncertainly associated with them. But the best innovations often come from people who make decisions and achieve success regardless of the uncertainties and the limited information. Although the change in technology represents the primary carrier of environmental change, it is not the only premise in the changes which appear in the modern warfare. The search for innovation must entail the entire context of the joint, joint operations which means that the armed forces have to explore, to seek for changes in the doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and facilities as well as and primarily in the military and applied technology.

INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability is the foundation of effective, joint, multinational and inter-operation efforts. Allied forces need to make significant progress towards achieving the optimal level of interoperability, particularly in terms of continuing improvements. Such improvements will include refinement of joint doctrine and further development of joint technologies and processes. The exercises, personal exchanges, agreements for standard operating procedures, individual training and education and further planning will only increase and institutionalize these capabilities. Interoperability is a mandate for the Joint Force in 2020 particularly in the area of communications, common logistics and commitments, particularly in the area of information sharing. Although technological interoperability is important, it is not sufficient to ensure effective operations. It should have a convenient focus of procedural and organizational elements, while the decision makers at all levels must understand each other’s capabilities and limitations. Training, education, experience and exercises, joint planning and skillful communications at all levels of engagement of Joint forces will not only overcome the barriers of organizational culture and different approaches but will teach the members of the joint teams to appreciate the full range of service, officials capabilities and opportunities available to them. Future joint forces will have embedded technologies and adaptable organizational structures that will allow trained and experienced people to develop appropriate processes and procedures, to engage in the associated planning necessary to adapt to the new specific crisis situations. These features are not only important for the allied forces, but also for multinational operations and inter-agency operations.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Information, processing the information and communications networks are the foundation of every military activity. Throughout history, military leaders have regarded information superiority as the key to victory. However, the current information revolution creates not only a quantitative but also a qualitative change in the information environment that will result in profound changes in the execution of military operations. Actually, the advancement in information capabilities are very fast, so there is a risk of exceeding the capacity in terms of new ideas, formulating new operational concepts and qualitative development in capacities to assess the results. The word superiority suggests the state imbalance in one's favor. Allied forces must be able to take advantage of the superior information converted to superior knowledge to achieve superiority in decisions i.e. better decisions are made and implemented faster than an opponent can react, or in non-combat situation, as a pace that allows the power to shape, form or to react to changes and successfully complete the mission. Superiority in deciding doesn’t automatically result from the information superiority. Organizational and doctrinal adaptations, quality training and experience and the actual mechanisms and tools in command and control are also necessary. Development of information technology will allow including traditional forms of information operations with all sources of sophisticated intelligence, control and performing fully synchronized information campaign. Development of the concept that marks the global information network will provide a network-oriented environment required to meet this goal. The network will be globally connected, collection of information capabilities, associated processes and people that manage and provide information at the request of the parties of the war, policymakers and support personnel. It will increase the combined power and contribute to the success of military operations. Realization of the full potential of these changes requires not only technological improvements, but also permanent development of organizations and the doctrine as well as maintaining an advantage in information environment. Information superiority is basis for transformation of the operational capabilities of the joint forces. Allied forces from 2020 will use superior information and knowledge thus achieving superiority in decision making, will support the advanced command and control capabilities and will achieve the full potential of dominant maneuver, precise engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. The breadth and pace of this evolution requires flexibility and willingness in the application of innovations in all areas of technology and the applied environment in the society.

Information superiority in engagement of military forces is crucial in supporting the
military decision-making process, thus providing maximum effectuation of its operational capabilities and opportunities.

2. MEANING AND USE OF INFORMATION SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING

Decision making process of the military commands of units at different levels of command, basically is the work of the commander and his headquarters in organizing and deploying the composition of the unit, in conducting timely, durable, comprehensive solutions in pursuit of a certain type of operation. The process of military decision making is continuous and flexible working method, which begins with receipt of the mission, followed by analysis of the mission, alternatives of action and ends with making acceptable and approved plan of action that is assigned to a military unit in a form of an operational command.

During the phase of analysing the task and the assessment of the situation all influential factors that can contribute to the successful execution of the mission are studied. Information technology as a tool to support is applied in intelligence preparation of the battlefield, or the analysis of the effects and impact over: the terrain, infrastructure, weather conditions, demographic factors, opportunities to move units, opportunities for fire support, opportunities for supply, communication opportunities and similar. Moreover, such analyzes and estimates of the impacts and opportunities of using information technology can be performed on the two opposing sides, i.e. the enemy and friendly (own) forces. The results of these analyzes can be visually displayed by using animations of digital maps, or graphical and tabular signs/indicators, which facilitates the work of the staff in the next stages of the work, i.e. the generation of possible options for action and their analysis and comparison.

Application of information technology as a tool for support is suitable to be used for analysis of the relative ratio of the combat capabilities of the adversary parties, as well as to determine the weaknesses and the degree of vulnerability on the side of the enemy.

During the phase of generating possible options for action, and on the basis of each version a simulation scenario is created. Then it is normally to considere at least two variants based on the assumed effect of the opponent. Such suppositions of the effect of the opposing party are used for simulation testing of the suitability and feasibility of the suppositions about the effect of its strength during the phase of generating possible options for action and their analysis and comparison. By using simulation the activities and results from the action of each of the formational units and other elements of the operating schedule or operating order...
are being analyzed. The opportunities offered by information technology entail performing simulation during hostilities faster than the real time, dramatically reduce the time required to perform such analyzes and raise the quality of the same. After performing the simulation for each of the proposed options for action, each headquarters’ officer analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of individual variants from his perspective and related to the department involved.

Finally, in the phase of drafting the order and developing the combat documents by using information technology as a support, and based on various scenarios previously generated by different variants for the use of force, many of these combat documents can be made in a very short time by using databases that were previously used.

In modern armies today, lot of efforts are invested into the integration of information technology within the system that includes staff work, communications and intelligence and their use in real- time. The use of information technology in this way can help more efficient decision- making in the process of operations planning, or for better integration of information to understand the situation and generate various proposals for engagement of forces in carrying out combat actions.

**C4I- SYSTEM TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCES**

The systems for support when making decisions are computer tools designed to support decision making, serve to assist the Staff in making the best possible decision. They are in many respects innovative because often are designed with the capability of artificial intelligence ( typically using thousands of complex algorithms ), and can process large amounts of data in a very short period of time, and their design often promotes different levels of interaction which is determined by the user. Depending on the design of the system for support the decision making at various levels of automation it can greatly facilitate the task of the project and decision making.
Figure 2. Display of map with an example of displayed Armed forces (own & enemy)

C4I is a digital, command, control, communications, computer and intelligence system. This system includes a mix of fixed, semi-fixed and mobile networks and presents an integrated package that allows the Staffs to receive automatic review of the activities of the friendly forces, movement of the supplies, planned fires, review of the situation, intelligence reports, overview of the airspace and weather reports. This system by providing real information greatly accelerates the process of decision making. This system combines seven packages in a single system:

- System of Control of maneuver
- System for air and missile defense
- Combat service support System,
- Analysis of all sources System
- Artillery Tactical Data System,
- Tactical Integration Airspace System
- System for Tracking of its strength.

The following text will do a brief analysis of the above information systems without which the military decision making process and management of military force in modern conditions of warfare would be simply impossible.
MANEUVER CONTROL SYSTEM – MCS

The system to control maneuver is an integrated system consisting of hardware, software, standardized integrated command systems, personnel and procedures. It is supported by tools for graphical support of the decision which include digital maps, areal or satellite photos, dynamic three-dimensional view of the battlefield and analysis of the mobility of the terrain and overviews of security with maps of battlefield preparation as well as resources needed by the unit during a battle. During the mission, the system provides automatic updating of friendly / enemy unit movements. To simplify its operation, the system uses commercial office applications to generate reports, and display images, tables and graphs. The system for control and maneuver of the commandant and its headquarters provides a realistic picture of the tactical battlefield. The aim is to establish a basic level of capability to the commander and his forces to become more lethal and more durable.

Through this system, the commander and his headquarters can transmit critical information on the battlefield, such as information related to the mission: varieties of activities, schemes of maneuver, warning and operational orders, changes of priorities and intelligence, fire support, the status of Material and Technical Assets and requirements for air operations. The Control system helps the maneuver commander in the application of combat power at the appropriate time and the appropriate place in response to the great dynamics of the battlefield, which allows the commander to have sufficient flexibility and to act preventively on the development of a complex situation.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM - CSSS

The system for combat service provides support for decision-making aspect of logistics support for the armed forces in peacetime and wartime. It provides Microsoft tools to display the logistical capabilities. It offers a modular, tabular and graphic display in real time with tendency in the near future to meet the full range of logistical requirements of the battlefield.
Figure 3. Combat Service Support System

The system supports training, mission planning, exercises, and performing the all work with one tool in unclassified and classified environments, thus providing analysis to support the process of decision making tools that allows commanders to make careful decisions quickly and effectively to execute the mission.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM - AMDS

The System for Air and Missile Defense provides joint planning of the airdefense and missile defense planning personnel and represents a tool for presentation of the situation of the air defense at all levels of command. It is airdefense and missile defence component and provides a common airdefense and missile-defense tool for operational planning of the commanders of air defense at all echelons of command, and automatic planning of air defence and defense capability of the deployed units.
ANALYSIS OF ALL-SOURCE SYSTEM- SASSI

The system is a program for automated processing and analysis of intelligence from all sources and can be used on a tactical level so their deployment ranges from level of a corps to the battalion level. Intelligence provided by the system for analysis of all sources enables commanders and their staffs to identify key points for dominant maneuver and retrieval of high priority targets for precise targeting of the actions against them.

Figure 4. System for Analysis of all Sources

The System for analysis of all sources can analyze all incidents and assists in determining the pattern and methods of use of improvised explosive devices related incidents. With the help of this system commanders and their personnel can identify the exact locations that are typical for conducting shell attacks, so that they will have the opportunity to warn the troops of the existence of such a threat. Of course this is just a problem about which we can get solution from this system.

ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM-ATDS

Artillerisko tactical data system serves for planning and execution of fire support during each phase of combat actions, whether it relates to support of offensive or defensive combat actions. In this case computer technology and network connectivity has been used
to support the Staffs when solving problems and making military decisions. This system provides complete flexibility in managing combat actions on previously planned and time-limited purposes. Provides fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing fire support and effects.

TACTICAL AIRSPACE INTEGRATION SYSTEM – TAIS
Tactical Airspace Integration System is material solution for integration and synchronization of the airspace and control of the air traffic within the command system of the land forces. As part of the automated command system of the land forces provides airspace management and execution of air traffic services.

This system allows commanders to act against the enemy from very large distances but with very high precision.

MONITORING SYSTEM OF OWN (INTERNAL) STRENGTH – MSIS (C2PC)
The system for monitoring own (internal) strengths provides software and hardware tools that support the commander and his headquarters, and in almost real time offers situational picture of the units from brigade level to the level of a soldier. The system can integrate over 1,000 participants and can cover the entire area of interest of the brigade, including combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, tanks, helicopters, artillery and other combat and support elements.

The coverage of the system extends far beyond the line of visual communications. The system relies on sophisticated communications devices that integrate positional navigation and the ability to inform. There is also identification capability on the battlefield (such as monitoring of its strengths during the performance of hostilities).

The monitoring system of its own units has penetrated as a separate part - particularly in the army, base stations are also placed for monitoring units throughout the territory of Republic of Macedonia and it is operational too. In addition, this system is embedded in the Army APCs located in Kabul - Afghanistan and they are involved in a global monitoring system of own strengths via which from the operational Center of the Macedonian contingent in the main command in Kabul all armored transporters that are performing a particular task can be monitored.

CONCLUSION

Joint Vision 2020 stems from perceptions and future prospect and positioning and expressed needs of the military forces for dominant maneuver, precise engagement, focused logistics and full dimension of force protection in the field of warfare.

C4I (command / control / comms / computer / intel) means substantial nature of communications in the emerging fields of sophisticated engagement whose primary purpose is to provide greater security and quick response as well as ultimate interoperability. The success of joint and combined military operations will depend on the rapid exchange of information within a dynamic and highly mobile battlefield and the future operations will be conducted in the new hyper-linked digital world so that commanders will have to know the exact positions of all friendly and hostile forces, if they are to reach the goal.

Therefore, it is necessary to implement modern communication and information systems in the Army of Republic of Macedonia, which directly will affect the changes to the traditional decision making way. On the other hand, this will dramatically increase the need for information and its acquisition in real time, will affect the size of commands and Staffs, as well as the condition/state and structure of the armed forces, in order to ensure generation of rapid, correct and enforceable decisions.

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THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA DEFENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION IN THE PERIOD FROM 2001 TO 2013

ОДВОЈУВАЊАТА НА РЕПУБЛИКА СЛОВЕНИЈА ЗА ОДБРАНБЕНИОТ БУЏЕТ ВО ПЕРИОДОТ ОД 2001 ДО 2013 ГОДИНА

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Abstract: National defence capabilities as a concept as well as a goal are determined in the process of formulation of the defence policy. Among other factors, they depend on the economic power of the state and the defence costs allocation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Smaller allocations of the defence budget are in correlation with the development of defence capabilities of the country and influence them, thus it directly jeopardize the achievement of desired security goals. This paper analyzes the financing of defence capabilities, in the respect to the aspects related to the defence budget percentage of GDP. It focuses on the question: whether and how the financing of the defence sector of the NATO member state and decreasing of the defence budget affects building of the defence capabilities and analyses the amount of the Slovenian defence budget in the period from 2001 to 2013. Furthermore, the paper compares the defence budgets of the Republic of Macedonia, which is still an aspirant country for NATO membership and the Slovak Republic which, like Slovenia, is a member of NATO since 2004. The comparison that is made is due to the fact that all three countries after their independence undertook number of activities in order to meet NATO standards. They had the same homework, to meet the NATO criteria for defence spending of about 2% of GDP.

Key words: security and defence, defence capabilities, armed forces, defence budget, Gross Domestic Product – GDP.

Апстракт: Националните одбранбени способности како концепт и како цел се одредуваат во процесот на формулирање на одбранбената политика. Покрај другите фактори, тие зависат и од економската моќ на државата и степенот на издвојување за одбранбени трошоци од Бруто Домашниот Производ (БДП). Помалите одвојувања за одбранбениот буџет се во корелација со и влијаат врз развојот на одбранбените способности.
на државата, при што се доведува во прашање постигнувањето на посакувањите безбедносни цели. Во трудот се анализира финансирањето на одбранбените способности како што се движи процентот на буџетот за одбрана. Трудот се фокусира на прашањето дали и како финансирањето на одбраната на држава членка на НАТО и намалувањето на одбранбеното буџет влијае врз градењето на одбранбените способности, при што се анализира висината на одбранбеното буџет на Република Словенија во периодот од 2001 до 2013 година. Исто така, во трудот е направена споредба со одбранбените буџети на Република Македонија, која е суште земја аспирант за членство во НАТО и Република Словачка која, како и Република Словенија, е земја членка на НАТО од 2004 година. Споредбата која е направена се должи на фактот дека сите три земји по нивната независност презедоа низа активности со цел да ги исполнат стандардите на НАТО. Тие имаа иста домашна задача, да го достигнат НАТО критериумот за висината на одбранбеното буџет од 2% од БДП.

Ключни зборови: безбедност и одбрана, одбранбени способности, вооружени сили, одбранбен буџет, Бруто Домашен Производ - БДП.

**INTRODUCTION**

At the end of the Cold War, European countries cut, sometimes radically, their defence budgets. Faced with the peace on the continent the governments thought that they could finally benefit from “peace dividends” and could reallocate precious resources to other areas of public spending, which were electorally more promising. Thus, whilst on average Western European countries spent 3.1 % of their GDP on defence between 1985 and 1989, this figure had fallen to 1.7 % in 2008, and this was before the economic crisis that has hit European countries (Liberti, 2011:15). The defence capability of a state depends on the degree of modernization of the military organization, its structure, readiness and sustainability. The development and maintenance of national defence capabilities is a challenge for every country. Based on the assessment and perception of current and future security threats, risks and challenges and defined strategic goals, states develop capabilities and identify resources needed for their maintenance and development. This process depends greatly on the assessment of the threats but also from the economic capacity of the state to allocate the resources, for achieving strategic goals. In response to this dilemma (defence or security) states are determined to burden-sharing and responsibility with other countries within the military alliance such as NATO. In this sense, continued equipping and modernization of
the armed forces is imperative in order to successfully meet the set strategic goals and implement national security policy. Furthermore, building the appropriate capabilities should be in accordance with accepted obligations and responsibilities arising from the membership in the international security organizations such as NATO. Membership in NATO means that member countries are ready to participate in various types of operations, both Article 5 and non-Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This readiness is confirmed by real contributions and not by the mere promises. Alliance members need to achieve a standard level of equipment and training for joint operations within NATO. Only if the multinational structures are integrated, they can represent real capabilities for national and collective defence. Accordingly, Slovenia has to build and maintain capabilities that will be integrated into the joint forces of NATO, thereby defining sufficient resources for their maintenance and development.

THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE NEEDS OF THE DEFENCE SECTOR AND BUDGET DEFENCE ALLOCATIONS

Security and defence are among the primary functions of the state which are directly related to the effective maintaining of sovereignty and enabling survival. They have a direct impact on the economy of a country, impose great requirements and, go beyond the framework of a market mechanism. The imbalance between the defence requirements and the possibilities of a country’s economic sector to meet them may lead to disproportion in the development of relevant areas. Defence expenditures arising from the need to ensure security and defence of the state and are covered by the national budget, thus being part of the public expenses (Kustrova, 2012:51). The development of defence capabilities primarily depends on state allocations for the defence budget, which is a complex process, mainly if there are no clearly set priorities and goals. According to Kustrova (Kustrova, 2012:51-52) the amount of defence expenditures depends on the defence policy preferred by a certain country in a given time frame. For example, a state’s defence policy could be more focused on providing defence and, thus, on allocating greater assets to defence rather than on the development of other areas. In other cases, a country’s policy may be directed towards economic growth with a direct impact on the allocation of assets to the defence sector. According to Kustrova,

35 The end of the Cold War, the war in former Yugoslavia, attacks from 11th of September and the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, contributed of displacement the traditional defence organization of the states, to develop an appropriate approach for addressing the growing security problems, globally and regionally. These events also contributed to shift the traditional role of NATO’s collective defense, to new roles and missions.
finding a balance between the two options is a challenging task for the governments of individual nations. The solution is to actually make a compromise and provide for a high level of a country's defence, while also focusing on economic growth. For many countries, the increase in defence expenditures leads to a reduction in social spending, which indirectly leads to an increase in private expenditure on education, health care, pension, etc. Thus, the relatively inelastic income, private consumption increases as reflected in the reduced savings and thus lower social level of the savings and lower economic growth (Kopač 2006). The creation of appropriate defence capabilities and providing resources for their maintenance and development depends on security and defence policy, and the economic possibilities of the country. According to Ball (Ball, 2002), sound fiscal management of the security sector is essential if a country is to have effective, efficient and professional security forces that are capable of protecting the state and its populations against internal and external threats. According to Ball, in the absence of well thought-out and clearly articulated policies, it is impossible to manage the finances of the security sector in a rational manner, thus budgeting becomes ad hoc. In such a situation, the challenge is to understand how much does the development of adequate defence capabilities cost, to deal with contemporary security threats. In times of deep social and other changes when it is believed that the threat to the security of states is on lower level than previously, usually reducing the quantum of armed force and reducing the defence budget occurs (Даскаловски, 2010:475). Daskalovski (Даскаловски, 2010:483-485) emphasizes the fact that since 2000 onwards, European NATO member states without exception reduce defence spending, and if in 2000 they amounted to an average of 2% of GDP in 2006 decreased to 1.74% of GDP. He emphasizes the disparity in reforming the armed forces of the United States and European NATO forces and differences in national characteristics of the approach to budgeting, as well as differences in the estimates of threats. According to Daskalovski, these national characteristics in allocating assets to defence, like internal factor, have more influence in the reform process of the armed forces versus external factors, such as growing demand for multinational engagements outside their own borders. The assumptions that in terms of political and military crisis, beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, will increase the assets to defence are not confirmed, even if the declarative commitments by EU member states of NATO existed. NATO engagement in crisis areas on most direct way exposes the need for additional expenses and continuing engagement of armed forces with increased capabilities.

Also, according to Georgieva (Георгиева, 2010:151) concerns about the functioning of
NATO in the future is related to military readiness of the Alliance member countries, and the level of defence spending. Serious objections are addressed to almost all Western European allies, which after the Cold War gradually, but drastically reduce military spending. Georgieva emphasizes the example of Spain, Italy and Germany. In 1989 Spain allocated 1.85% of GDP and in 2008 that percentage was 0.73%. Italy, in 1989, allocated 1.94% of GDP and in 2008 0.96% of GDP. The example of Germany is a specific. West Germany in 1989 allocated 2.27% of GDP, and after the reunification, until 2008 that percentage decreased to 1.19% of GDP. In her analysis Georgieva also addresses to France and Great Britain. France from 2.98% of GDP in 1989 allocated 1.54% in 2008, and the Great Britain in 1989 allocated 3.98% and in 2008 2.33% of GDP. She also emphasizes the fact that only four NATO member states meet the criteria for defence spending of about 2% of GDP. At the end of the analysis, Georgieva concluded that the reduction of defence spending, produce skepticism and concern that reduced military capabilities of the Western states will worsen the defence cooperation and the division of responsibilities between the allies.

Capability development in NATO are determined based on political guidance on the scope, scale and nature of possible future engagement, where the limiting factor is the fact that the required capabilities have to be provided by nations which may results the shortfalls. In such conditions, reduced military capabilities of individual NATO member state affect the allocation of responsibilities within the Alliance. Joint funding of troops deployed in NATO missions, is one of the elements that need to be reconsidered, especially when a small number of states bear the burden of deployment (Георгиева, 2010:154). It may be necessary to consider the possibilities for reimbursement of NATO countries that bear the burden of military operations of the Alliance. More than necessary is to respect the common accepted principles and obligations of the NATO member states, so as not to jeopardize the ability and functioning of the Alliance.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies - CSIS in its analysis from 2010, “European Defence Trends", compares total defence spending and per soldier spending for 37 Europe countries in the period from 2001 to 2009. The results show declining of total defence spending and increasing of per soldier spending. The root case for these opposing trends is likely the significant troop reduction within European armed forces which have paced reduction in total defence spending. The increase of per soldier spending is due to the need to improve the quality of the soldier, with the aim on focusing on smaller, more

36 See more in: Bulletin of Slovenian Armed Forces, ACO-Allied Command Operation, NATO. http://www.aco.nato.int/page27971712.aspx
expeditionary-capable forces. The analysis does not capture the full impact of the economic recession. But, the analysis in 2012, for the period until 2011, raises the question of whether European states have reached the limits of force reductions, and if so, how will this affect their ability to make additional cuts to defence spending.

THE DEFENCE BUDGET OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN THE PERIOD FROM 2001 TO 2013

The long standing practical assistance of NATO contributed to the building of national security institutions and the armed forces of the countries in the Southeast Europe region, that have essential impact on regional and global security. The NATO membership has become a strategic goal immediately after the declaration of independence of the Republic of Slovenia.

Transformation and upgrading of defence capabilities Slovenia has undertaken immediately after its independence, process which was intensified after 2001, when a number of activities were undertaken in order to meet NATO standards. For modernization of equipment and achievement of NATO standards allocation of recourses was required.

The aim of the reforms was to create defence forces, small in size, but well-armed, equipped and trained. Also, the reforms were aimed at achieving greater professionalization of the army and an increase in the level of defence expertise.\textsuperscript{37} It was necessary to create forces that will be interoperable with the NATO forces. Due to the fact that, after receiving the invitation for NATO membership, the reforms of political, economic, and defence issues were not fully realized, a timeframe for implementation of the reform process was established.\textsuperscript{38} The adopted Strategic documents constitute the basis for reforms that Slovenia has taken after its accession to NATO, while the Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia from 2010 reaffirmed the commitment to build: defence capabilities that are necessary for the national defence within the system of collective defence and security; capabilities for response to military and non-military threats to national security; and the capabilities for participation in international operations and missions, led by international security organizations.


Table 1 illustrates the amount of the defence budget of the Republic of Slovenia, as a percentage (%) of GDP, in the period from 2001 to 2013. As it can be seen in table 1, as well as in figure 1, the allocations for defence are below 2% of GDP. This probably arises from differences and the lack of a common approach to the issues related to security and the integration of Slovenia into NATO. According to Slovenia’s Strategic Defence Review from 2004 (Strategic Defence Review-SDR 2004), the continuously increasing of the defence budget was projected, so until 2008, the defence budget should be reached projected level of 2% of GDP and maintaining at that level until 2015. Also, the document emphasized the achieving of the anticipated growth in defence spending as a percentage of GDP and maintaining the level of 2% of GDP after 2008 as key factor to enable all the reforms to be carried out with the planed scope and dynamics. If the planned funds are not made available it will not be possible to carry out the planed changes in the defence system (SDR 2004: 31).

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Table 1: The defence budget of the Republic of Slovenia in the period from 2001 to 2013 (percentage of GDP), source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database-SIPRI

The structure of the defence budget and the system of planning and implementation of the defence budget had to be adapted in accordance with NATO accepted concept of defence budget allocation and the process of planning, programming, budgeting and executing. In the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2003, the Minister of Defence, in that period, Grizold (Grizold 2004:6) emphasis a importance of the success of the transformation and professionalization of the armed forces, which depends of the gradual increased of the defence budget allocations up to 2 % of GDP until 2008.
On the other hand, his successor, Erjavec (Erjavec, 2008:7) in the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2007 does not address the amount of the defence budget. He notes that by pooling of resources and strengths can achieve a great deal more, and knowledge, ability and experience will provide the necessary support. But, the reality is quite different. Today we have a situation that the Slovenian defence budget in and after 2008 is below the projected level of 2% of GDP. That leads to the conclusion that the development of the defence capabilities, the Republic of Slovenia will have to implement on the longer-term. In other words, the implementation of the mid-term plans for defence development is under possibility of failure. In the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2008, by the Minister of Defence, Jelušič (Jelušič, 2009:5-6), the influence of the financial and economic crisis is shown as a challenge. She emphasizes the modernization of the Slovenian armed forces through successfully carried out procurement of new military equipment. The economic crisis has compelled the Slovenian Government to make drastic reductions in defence spending. The mid-term Defence Plan for 2007-2012 initially anticipated defence expenditures reaching 2% of Slovenia’s GDP by 2009. In March 2009, Defence Minister Jelušič announced that the defence budget would be further cut and would only grow by 5.36% from 2008.39 The

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39 See more in: The Global Financial Crisis and its Impact on Defence Budgets, NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 178 ESC 09 E rev 1 2009 Annual Session
Croatian Daily online edition “Nacional” transferring the reporting of the Slovenian “Dnevnik”, wherein is stated that with additional reduction of defence budget, the Slovenian armed forces will remain stuck in the barracks and simply will not have enough funds for training and exercises. That put at risk the security of the country and capabilities of the Slovenian armed forces for participation in international operations and missions, which have direct impact to the national security of the Republic of Slovenia.\(^{40}\) The process of development of defence capabilities on the long-term are confirmed in the Defence Sector Strategic Review 2009 (Defence Sector Strategic Review- DSSR 2009), of the Republic of Slovenia, according to which in the period from 2004 to 2009 has not yet reached the projected budget of 2% of GDP. In that period 61% of defence budget were earmarked for Slovenian Armed Forces personnel, 20% for operational cost, and 19% for procurement and construction. The structure of the funds spent shows that the target structure (50:30:20) as recommended by NATO was not attained (DSSR 2009:16). On the closing ceremony of the exercise “Svizec 2009”, in November 2009, the Minister of Defence, Jelušič said that she was most pleased that the Slovenian Armed Forces had reached such achievements in this very difficult year for the armed forces. She also emphasized that 2009 will be remembered for great difficulties reflected in the defence sector, and a constantly decreasing defence budget.\(^{41}\) In the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2009, the Minister of Defence, Jelušič (Jelušič 2010:5) said that the first year of her mandate as a Minister was a year marked by the global economic and financial crisis and one in which there was a substantial reduction in budget funds. So, the purchase of some equipment in 2009 had to be relinquished\(^{42}\), and investments and

\[\text{http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1928}\]
\[\text{http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/62477/slovenska-vojska-pred-bankrotom-rebalansom-gubi-100-milijuna-eura}\]
\(^{41}\) See more in: “This year’s largest military exercise of the Slovenian Armed Forces successfully concludes”, News, Slovenian Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence, 13.11.2009.
\(^{42}\) According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2009, on account of the reduction of financial resources for modernization of Slovenian Armed Forces partially or fully waived the acquisition of certain equipment: ship’s weapons system; 16 medium wheeled armored vehicles -MWAV 8 x 8 (additional reduction of 16 vehicles: from the total of 42 vehicles planned, only 13 were purchased); engineering equipment (mining, demining and demolition sets, and telerobot modernization); set of command post elements etc.
operational costs in defence sector reduced. It led to the change of development goals, and, as a result, the defence sector was able to accomplish the key task in the areas of defence and protection against natural and other disaster, as well as make a responsible contribution to international peace and security.

On the other hand, due to the traditionally strong economy and the small size and high degree of professionalization of the Slovenian armed forces, defence spending below 2% of GDP, has not proven detrimental to Slovenia's defence capabilities (Le Jeune 2010:6). According to Le Jeune (Le Jeune 2010:6) Slovenia is known for its robust economy, which is arguably the strongest of all southeastern states. However, Slovenia was not excluded from the financial crisis that peaked in 2009, and as a result its defence budget has been cut accordingly. According to the Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025, adopted in 2010, the financial resources for the defence sector will be provided according to realistic capacity of the Republic of Slovenia and its economic situation. The defence system will be based on the principal of decreased overall proportion of personnel cost and increased sum total of operational cost and the cost of maintenance and modernization of the Slovenian armed forces, in order to achieve the ratio 50:30:20. Once the economic situation becomes more stable, the minimum growth in real-terms will ensured facilitating planed modernization of the Slovenian Armed Forces within medium-term defence programme, and the long-term defence expenditure will be oriented towards reaching 2% of GDP. But, due to the economic situation and wider social circumstances, the realization of this ambition could be feasible after 2025.43 This statement, somehow, provides justification for reducing the defence budget of the Republic of Slovenia, which in 2011 was 1.3% of GDP, and in 2013 when noted tendency of further decline and amounted to 1.2% of GDP (Table 1 and Figure 1). According to the report in “Delo” from 06.07.201144, the defence system now breaths on gills and the Ministry of Defence has the funds only for the payment of wages, while for the development and investment in the Slovenian Armed Forces, due to the last reduction of the budget, is out of question. In

addition, the defence budget for the first time is less than 5% of the state budget. When the economic security is more important than military security, it is very important how to spend public money which specifically refers to small countries with limited budgets. The smaller investment in defence in recent years, as a result of the global economic crisis, is a challenge to achieve the projected level of equipping, readiness and sustainability of the armed forces, in order to ensure a safety and security of the state. In the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence for 2011, the Minister of Defence, Hojs (Hojs 2012:5) highlighted the impact of the global economic crisis as a key factor for the reduction of investments in defence and equipping of the Slovenian Armed Forces where priority has completion of already started projects for equipping and modernization. “Slovenian defence budget reduced to 1.2% of GDP breaks NATO criteria” is the title of the portal „SEEbiz“. The portal reports the statements of the Minister of Defence, Hojs, who to the Board of Defence in the Parliament indicates the consequences of reducing the defence budget in 2012. He said that with the defence budget cuts, the medium-term defence plans will be in accordance to available resources. With the emergence of the global economic crisis is increasingly posing the question what happened with the stable Slovenian economy and according to report of the „Radio-televizija Srbije“ on its portal from 29.09.2012, the Slovenian economy is comparing with Titanic, and some is still waiting for someone to save them, as opposed to the need to undertake structural reforms. Certainly this situation affected the amount of allocations for defence sector, as well as the readiness and sustainability of the Slovenian Armed Forces. An interesting observation is in the edition of “Mladina” from 19.10.2012, where in the article “Death and hunger, Attention, Slovenia will again buy weapons” is said that Slovenian Armed Forces would not have problems with money, if in the past there was not dozens of political purchases of equipment. In the edition of „Market Research.com“ from 28.11.2012, Slovenia is member of NATO since

2004, and was given until 2014 to have its defence spending account for at least 2% of GDP. According to the portal this deadline will likely be missed, which is true.

The portal “The Slovenia times”\textsuperscript{50} reports that Slovenia further cuts its defence budget despite the calls from NATO to at least keep defence spending level. Furthermore, the Minister of Defence, Jakič stressed that the issue with defence spending would be solved like everywhere else, by increasing the budget alongside the economic recovery.

The situation is the same today. On the meeting of NATO ministers defence in Brussels, in February this year, Slovenian Minister of Defence, Jakič said that an increase of defence budget could not be expected in Slovenia, which is why it is vital that additional ways are found for reallocations within the present defence budget.\textsuperscript{51}

When we made comparison of the defence budget of the Republic of Slovenia with the defence budgets of the Republic of Macedonia and the Slovak Republic in the period from 2001 to 2013, Figure 2, it can be seen that the allocations of GDP in the Republic of Macedonia (not taking into account 2001)\textsuperscript{52} and allocations of GDP in the Slovak Republic, for the defence sector, are higher than in the Republic of Slovenia. But, there is an undisputed fact: according to data from “International Monetary Fund”\textsuperscript{53} until the emergence of the global economic crisis, the Republic of Slovenia, compared to Republic of Macedonia and the Slovak Republic, had more developed economy, which is one of the elements that directly affect the development of defence capabilities of the country.

\textsuperscript{50} “Slovenia to Further Cut Defence Budget Despite NATO Goals”, The Slovenia Times, 6 Jun 2013. \url{http://www.sloveniatimes.com/slovenia-to-further-cut-defence-budget-despite-nato-goals}

\textsuperscript{51} “Slovenia Can Not Afford Higher Defence Budget”, The Slovenia Times, 27 Feb 2014. \url{http://www.sloveniatimes.com/slovenia-can-not-afford-higher-defence-budget}

\textsuperscript{52} The defence budget allocation in the 2001 was 6.6% of GDP due to the conflict in the Republic of Macedonia. The funds were intended to provide additional weapon and equipment for the security forces of the Republic of Macedonia.

\textsuperscript{53} World Economic Outlook Databases, International Monetary Fund. \url{http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28}
The defence budget of the Republic of Macedonia until 2008, is in the projected frame of 2% of GDP and higher (2.5% in 2004), in order to meet the requirements of the Alliance, on the way of the Republic of Macedonia for gaining the full membership into NATO. From 2008 and onwards the defence budget of the Republic of Macedonia has been decreased, but the question is: whether the reason for reducing the defence budget is not receiving an invitation to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 or the emerging of the global economic crisis. Undeniable is the fact that, on account of the defence sector the funds of other public sectors have been increased (police, health, culture and education). The defence budget of the Slovak Republic until 2004, when the Slovak Republic became a full member of the Alliance, is nearly in the projected 2% of GDP (1.9% in 2001, 1.8% in 2002, 1.9% in 2003 and 1.7% in 2004), which was not the case with the Republic of Slovenia (Figure 2). In the years after 2004 the defence budget of both NATO member countries decreased, with smaller allocations of the defence budget in the case of the Republic of Slovenia. From 2010 and onwards the defence budget allocations is almost equal among the all three countries (Macedonia, Slovenia and Slovakia). This is probably as a result of the economic crisis and also of the approach to the issues related to safety and security. An opinion prevails that the threats of the security of the states are at lower level than previously, a perception that is specifically expressed in the European countries, which leads to a drastic reduction of military spending. Any substantial
increase in defence budgets does not seem very likely in Europe because every defence reform depends on the ability and willingness of Western public to allow more spending on defence. The fact that armament development cost will continue to rise and that the defence budgets are falling or stagnating will no longer allow the support of numerous national projects (Kešeljević and Kopač 2005:2-3). However, it must be noted that the reduction of the defence budget allocations is more pronounced in the "old" member countries (the example of Spain and Italy) versus the countries that recently have the privilege to be members of the eminent club NATO and aspiring to NATO membership.

CONCLUSION

The process of development and maintenance of the national defence capabilities depends on the assessment of the current and future threats, and economic capability of the state for defence budget allocation. The level of equipping and modernization of the national defence capabilities depends on the level of security cooperation in the frame of collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as well as the defence budget allocations. In terms of the imbalance of needs versus the defence budget allocations is very difficult to achieve continuous equipping and modernization of the armed forces. If we have in mind the fact, that NATO countries, almost without exception, began drastically reducing defence spending, a dilemma has been opened: whether with this level of defence funding, the states will have ability to ensure the safety and security of its citizens.

The common knowledge is established that the deal with new security threats is more successful if the fight against them is accomplished through partnership and cooperation or through membership in the collective defence systems, such as NATO. On the other hand, reduced military capabilities, especially of the European member states of the Alliance, questions the partnership and cooperation, and the division of responsibilities within the Alliance. In terms of continuously reduction of defence funds, states are facing with the challenges to find solutions for building, development and maintenance of the national defence capabilities and their compatibility within international security organizations, condition that has to be overcome.

The relevant statistic data of the defence budget allocations represent how much Republic of Slovenia allocates for development of the defence capabilities and what are the deviations from the NATO accepted concept of defence budget allocation. Compared with the Republic of Macedonia and the Slovak Republic there are differences. The defence budget
allocation of the Republic of Slovenia in the period from 2001 to 2013 is on average 1.4 % of GDP, while the Republic of Macedonia without 2001 allocates on average 1.9% of GDP, and Slovak Republic 1.5% of GDP. Characteristic for all three countries is that the allocations for defense budget are drastically decreased as a result of consequences of the global economic crisis (after 2010) and they are around 1% of GDP. In the analyzes of Le Jeune there is an opinion that not achieving the defense spending of 2% of GDP have not shown harmful for Slovenian defence capabilities, primarily because of the traditionally strong Slovenian economy. But the question is: how further, when the consequences from the global economic crisis are higher and when the GDP of the Republic of Slovenia in 2012 was about 23 thousand U.S. dollars per capita, compared to 2008 when GDP was about 27 thousand U.S. dollars per capita. Undoubted is the fact that NATO membership facilitates the process of building and developing national defence capabilities rather than to do it alone. In addition, the membership itself should not cause disinterest among the individual member states according to the need for investment in new facilities and technologies. To avoid compromising the defense cooperation and the division of responsibilities between the allies, it is necessary every member country of the Alliance to respect the common accepted principles as well as the policies and procedures for their implementation. It is certainly required from the aspirant countries, during the gaining of full membership, and after that, which is very important because the membership itself does not mean that the goal of providing greater safety, security and prosperity is achieved.

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Security

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SHAPING, PROGRESS AND THE FUTURE OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT

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ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to be perceived the security and defense aspect of the European Union, and how these aspects will affect the future enlargement of the EU. The European Union is significant example as the most developed integration in the world. In the same time it represents an attempt by the European politicians to create peace on the
European continent after the long history of wars. From its beginning in the 1950s, the EU has developed its own institutions, has gained significant power in policy creating, has reduced the national barriers for free trade, created its currency and expands its membership. The security and defense challenges of the EU are an important part of its existence as political phenomenon, but also a challenge for the future enlargement. The existence of a common security and defense policy of the EU, it allows it to increase its influence in the world politics and to be an important player in the international relations. 

Keywords: European Union, security and defense policy, strategy

INTRODUCTION
The European continent is composed of countries that differ in population and size of territory. Some of them are in the turbulent history waged war against each other, and today are part of the same continent and integrated into the European Union. Today the EU is an economic and political union, which has integrated 28 member states in Europe.

Each country aims to achieve security, stability and prosperity (Danzinger, 2001: 122). One of the most fundamental functions of states is to achieve security, and it is responsibility to the people to guarantee their life. Traditional maintenance of military forces as security guards, and the right to use military force for defense is an inseparable symbol of the sovereignty of states. In the history the European countries warred between themselves until 1945 and set Europe in a hopeless situation. The maintenance of power balance between the states in Western Europe and between various alliances was not enough to be achieved long-standing peace on the European continent. The only visible solution out of that situation was in achievement of economic interdependence by the eternal rivals I Europe like Germany and France, and they to realize that their best interest is in peaceful cooperation rather than armed conflict (Bejn, 2009: 366-367). The long-term peace in the European continent in the last 50 years is achieved in result of the economic interdependence and integration in the EU. Today the EU successfully exists and its enlargement in East and Southeastern Europe is just an example that its existence brings peace and stability.

In the contemporary world which is rapidly changing the EU faces with security challenges in its neighborhood. The Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU allow it to take a leading role in peace keeping operations, conflict prevention and maintenance of international security. Since 2003 the EU launched 30 peacekeeping missions and operations, which contribute to stability and security in Europe and the world.
IMPORTANT MOMENTS OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Today the European Union aims to have a single foreign and security policy, which is step-by-step evolution over the years from its formation. Its goal is to be a main player in the world’s politics and in the international relations. Today in the position responsible for the foreign and security policy of the EU stands High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The security policy of the EU is part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

The idea of a common defense policy in Europe begins with the signing of the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 by the UK, France and the Benelux countries. In that direction, is formed the western European Union (WEU), to ensure dialogue and consultations in the area of security and defense in Europe. TA the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Balkans stimulated the interest of the EU to improve its responsibilities in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. The conditions under which they can be deployed military units have been agreed by the Council of the WEU in 1992. These agreements are known as the Petersburg Tasks and are integrated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.

The first steps for the formation of a common European security and defense policy began with the establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was renamed with the Treaty of Maastricht in Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Treaty of Maastricht describes the central area of activity of the foreign and security policy of the EU (Вајденфелд и Веселс, 2009: 249). Using its foreign trade relationships the EU is present as influential player in the international relations. The member-states realize that their influence on the international political stage would be increased by joint forces in 1993 with the Treaty for the EU was created the legal framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and it became mandatory for all member-states. Up to that point the security policy of the EU acts via EPS and policy declarations, which proves to be too selective and ineffective in certain crisis situations of security aspect (Вајденфелд и Веселс, 2009: 249).

The key moments in development of the European security policy are the reforms stages of the Treaties of Maastricht (1993), via Amsterdam (1999) to Nice (2003). The purpose of these steps is to be created more effective decision-making structures and instruments for implementation of the security policy of the EU. The new dynamics in security issues and defense policy raised by the total relocation of the British politics in 1998, partly because of the weakness in Europe during the war in Kosovo, as well as new treats that have become
very obvious with the terrorist attacks of September 1, 2001 it led to further adjustments (Вајденфелд и Веселс, 2009: 251). After that at the European Council at Cologne in 1999, the key moment is The Berlin Plus Agreement, which allows the EU access to NATO military capabilities.

In 2003 the European Council approved the European Security Strategy prepared by the (After Lisbon Treaty - High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Strategy defines the EU security priorities: combat against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, solution to regional conflict, stabilization of the states, and stop to organized crime. It is one step further I consolidation of the European security policy and building of the institutional infrastructure of the Common Foreign Security Policy of the EU.

The essential elements of the CSDP come from the Treaty of the EU in 1993, as well as of the reform solutions of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. In fact, CSDP is a major element in the area of CFSP policy covering the defense and military aspects and civilian crisis management. The institutional structure of the CFSP is consisted of several hierarchical levels. At the top is the European Council as body that provides basic guidelines. The second level is composed of the EU Council of the Foreign Ministers, and in special cases there are placed the defense ministers. There is the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which monitors the international situation in the areas of CFSP. Formally, the CSDP is represented in the domain of the Council of Europe where meets the heads of the Member States of the Union. The other bodies are the European Defense Agency (EDA), which aims to increase defense capabilities, military research and establishment of European internal market for military technology. Also, the Institute of Security Studies of the EU has the mission to build common security culture in the EU and to help in development of the CSDP.

THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Some aspects of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU are positive step towards achieving consolidation and unified policy in the defense and security on the European continent. Beside the new challenges and achievements in in security aspects in Europe, its turbulent history has an impact in the present days.

The positive results of the CSDP are expressed in many reports, speeches of the High Representative, common strategies, statements, and many political meetings. CSDP
achieved many positive results that emphasize its strong aspects. It is about continual participation in the current security missions across the world sharing the security idea of the Union. The first serious test of the CSDP of the EU was the war in Iraq in 2003, when two contrast visions appeared of the European defense policy (Бејл, 2009: 267). Opposition to the views was expressed related to the public letter in support of the US and it was signed by the prime ministers of Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the UK, and of the President of the Czech Republic (Бејл, 2009: 267). CSDP crisis management missions and operations are continuing to provide a tangible and effective contribution of the EU to international peace and security.

Furthermore, since the establishment of the CSDP as and CFSP, the EU aims to send peacekeeping missions in crisis regions around the world. In April 2003 the EU launched the operation “Concordia” to keep the peace in the Republic of Macedonia with 250 troops from 15 EU member states. In June 2003 was launched the operation “Artemis” to keep peace in part of Congo, including 1,500 troops and it was the first EU mission outside Europe. In 2004 with the operation “Althea” the EU took the responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO. Also, in 2005 in Indonesia, the EU launched the first mission in Asia. In that context, the EU in style of the great powers imposes as a dominant player in the international political arena in security aspect.

However, the achievements of CSDP in the international arena and show some weaknesses. Major weaknesses of this policy are highlighted in the budget potential that is available to accomplish the missions and anticipated worldwide action. For example, through this security policy, EU race for dominance and compete with the United States at international stage. Especially about the war in Iraq, the European countries cannot achieve the same power at the US (Бејл, 2009: 368). There are two things that have influence on the competition for leadership in security area at international level. The first thing is the budget and the level of military expenditure on defense of the US compared to the EU member states (Table 1). Furthermore, it is very important the way in which the armed forces are organized. Defense analysts argue that research and development represent such a small part of the expenditure of funds and are very scattered that European forces risk to be overcome in terms of technological superiority or forever to be dependent of the US advanced technology, which is expensive to buy or simply Americans will reject unless their actions are justified (Бејл, 2009: 370).
In order to successful consolidation of the European security policy seems that the EU gives priority to the ideas for soft diplomacy and security community, which includes trade and aid, cultural ties and institutionalized political dialogue through a network of international organizations and space characterized by high level of transactions and communication that conflicts are always peacefully solved (Бејн, 2009: 368). After all seems that idea of security policy in the EU is developing in trend of soft power and with less military expenditure. Perhaps this is due to the limited resources in time of global economic crisis, but also during the expansion of terrorism in the world, development of security and defense policy should not be avoided and underestimated.

### CURRENT TRENDS IN THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Dealing with risks and threats in the 21st century, the triggers of the crisis and armed conflicts and actions as and the civil- military coordination and cooperation in complex peace operations is part of the EU’s CSDP. Current trends in the security and defense aspects of the EU need a “comprehensive approach” in dealing with serious crises which will allow future security environment to be less focused on traditional military threats (refer to hostile countries ), and many more with a wide perspective of various transnational challenges, different in character and especially complex in nature. Indeed, the future success of this European policy indicates the need for a comprehensive integration of civilian and military

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**Table 1. Comparison of the defense expenditure of the USA and the EU**

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<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>% change</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>€194 billion</td>
<td>€520 billion</td>
<td>€193 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of GDP</td>
<td>1,61%</td>
<td>4,77%</td>
<td>1,55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of Total Government Expenditure</td>
<td>3,20%</td>
<td>11,23%</td>
<td>3,17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita</td>
<td>€390</td>
<td>€1,676</td>
<td>€387</td>
</tr>
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facilities. Within the Petersburg tasks the concept of the EU Union is established, which lay EU at the top of organizations with facilities for taking and keeping the most complex operations of crisis management. This development was based on the needs of the EU, the mistakes of the past, the availability of EU Member States, as well as one of the most important conditions or differentiation from the role of NATO (Ginsberg, Smith, 2007: 14-21).

The first serious step towards moving towards Common defense and security policy occurred only in 1987 when the Single European Act, together with the economic and political aspects of security introduced European political cooperation. However, there was still restrained by some member states (Greece, Denmark and Ireland). Brand new turn of events happened after the collapse of the SSSR and the end of the Cold War. EC no longer depended on the military supremacy of the United States, and this opens a new course of action to the security policy of the EC. The present structure of the CSDP is set by the Lisbon Treaty. This agreement entered into force on 1 December 2009 and raised high expectations to improve the EU’s role on the global stage.

Although with some obstacles, the EU clearly determined purpose to develop security policies that primarily abstract but not suited to everyday challenges. The main Problem framework that is developed in the research series, says that one of the main reasons for the failure of the EU’s European Security field diversity, complexity and administration in making decisions in a short domain. However, despite its complexity, the EU take real actions taking in consideration also actions of civil, military, humanity aspect (Glaser, 1993: 20-28).

Certain trends have an impact on the future of the European security and defense. Firstly, it is necessary to take into account the new security strategy published by the Member States of the EU ever since they began sending peacekeeping missions around the world, particularly in the Balkans in the required fields (2003 mission “Concordia” in the R. of Macedonia, after year this mission was replaced with the police mission “Proxima”, police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003; mission “ALTHEA” in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2004 and EULEX in Kosovo in 2008, and missions through various parts of the world). It is particularly important to highlight how state members perceive the need for international cooperation. The set strategy it is needed to reduce potential differences and to consider it, and in that direction to determine the strategic objectives of the Union.

Another aspect of capturing the current trends of the European security and defense policy adjustments are internal and external aspects of the security. In this case, it is about of how member states have a general idea of the operationalized use of the defense and security
resources for preventive and protective action. In addition of this, the possibility of growing of the visibility of external missions was represented by setting of the “Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security” based on the Treaty of Lisbon (Article 71 TFEU). The main objective of this body is to promote and strengthen the coordination of operational activities of EU Member States in the field of internal security. In fact, by monitoring and implementing the strategy for internal security body shall take appropriate operations to successfully confront security risks and threats of the external field, i.e from terrorist attacks to natural and man-made disasters.

One of the current and especially actual strategies adopted in order to preserve internal unity and integration of the Member States of the Union is the “ EU Internal Security Strategy in Action “, adopted in 2010. It has several main goals: disruption of the international criminal networks; prevention from terrorism; strengthen security through border management and increased security through border management. The current interest in the application and the use of this security strategy is recognized through understanding of the threats facing not only the Union but also across Europe and beyond, as well as commitment to the sustainable use of all the security resources of the Union and the existence of appropriate expertise available to deal with them (The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action, стр. 4-9).

In order with the goal in the future to provide a high level of accomplishment and internal security strategy of the Union, there must be internal synergies within the Union, in terms of strengthening the economic situation. Moreover, if we analyze the prospects of economic growth in the euro zone, the situation seems pretty bleak. According Pichelman it is necessary and inevitable fiscal consolidation in order to restore sustainable public finances as well as weaknesses in the labor market. In addition, it is necessary for the member states to face with the macroeconomic imbalances, poor productivity growth and overall challenges of globalization, growing restrictions on natural resources and climate change (Pichelman, 2013: 2). The existence of economic sustainability is related to social inclusion and citizen participation in all aspects of the European society.

The actual trends and aspects of the promotion and realization of the security and defense policy of the EU are not designated as isolated situation (Wendling, 2010: 28). On the contrary, in terms of successful implementation of this policy, the EU’s future security strategies need to imply the basis of external security strategies of major powers (U.S., Russia, China, India). The current and future state is analyzed in terms of energy supply and other natural resources, natural significance, further management of migration flows, sustainable
development, achieving international law and universally recognized rights, the possession of nuclear war and weapons etc.

Europe 2020, set in 2010, aims up to wise, sustainable and inclusive growth within the EU. It is realized on the basis of national and European policy. The basis of this strategy rests the successful implementation of the Union's security strategy, because stability within the EU means stability of the decisions making and the taken steps.

Lisbon Treaty entered innovations in the security and defence policy of the EU. It includes, besides the new name of this policy (From ESDP to CSDP), also creating a place of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, established permanent structural cooperation, clause for mutual aid and solidarity, enhanced cooperation between Member States and etc. However, the future perspectives and challenges daily entered innovations introduced in the functioning of the common security and defence policy of the EU, with meaning that they require constant replenishment and modelling of the European policies and strategies adopted in this regard (Smith, 2011 : 20).

INTRA-STATE ASPECTS: IMPROVEMENT – “REWINDING” OF THE SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICIES IN THE EU

The current preoccupation of the leaders of the European countries is to care about the financial and economic governance and reduce of the budget for the defence policy, as and discussion about the possibilities for setting up the Union as a global security actor. All this affect the Union to form their own mental and strategic culture. To this end, Member States within the Union is required to form their own approach and strategy for fast action and intervention in circumstances where it is necessary. That strategic actions which will initiate common reflection of the Union or uniting of the member states, based on a common set of goals and interests will enable presenting the Union as an active player in political weight. However, there is a great divide between national strategies and to the National Union mentality of Member States, which actually answers the question: Why the European Union can’t be experienced as a strategic actor in the security and defence policy?

Discussion on the intra- state aspects within the Union highlighted the need to respect the common parameters for external representation of the security and defence policy. Thus, it is necessary to highlight the difference in the views of Member States, in terms of realizing their ambitions in the international security policy. Also, there is a different attitude in decision making, and strategic framework for taking the key steps for security and
defence cooperation. The distribution of the military forces is also an area of disagreement and inconsistency of internal level within the Union (Björkdahl, Strömvik, 2008:2).

Despite the fact of the heterogeneous relation between the EU states, in terms of the fundamental questions of the Union, such as the management of the national armed forces, there must be synergy and promotion of the common outside policy.

In order to avoid degradation in the benefits of the Common Security and Defence Policy, it is necessary to promote harmonization and synchronization among international actors and local actors, as and between the analysis, planning and implementation of an individual aspects of the EU’s CSDP.

EU in its past, except at the beginning when it established for safety reasons, until the 90’s of the last century marginalize the security policy. One of the main reasons for this marginalization is open to questions about sovereignty, security structures, as well as the national sovereignty.

Historically, one of the biggest successes of the security aspect of the EU is to preserve the foundations of the foreign policy interests, particularly the independence, security and integrity of the Union including the gradual definition of common defence policy and defences (military crisis management in terms of Petersburg tasks) and providing peace, strengthening democracy, rule of law, human rights and civilian crisis management. All this incorporated within the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) EU governments in the Member States was an active instrument of perception of national interests and the need to be interacting in conditions of globalization (Koops, 2009: 37-43).

The biggest criticism of the EU’s active action is presented as a result of slow, weak and unlinked activities of the Member States relating to the making of key decisions regarding defence and security policies. Although the EU becomes visible in the crisis and conflict management, however requires policy coherence on the idea of a future EU experience of the world: as a soft power that enables economic and political development, or as a solid force, which has a stake in creating security strategy and policy around the world, which will initiate the possibility of using armed forces.

**CONCLUSION**

Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the setting of the era of CSDP of the EU in 2010, allowed the Union to make substantial progress experienced by the solidarity and comprehensive institutional framework that leads to collective armed action. However, the
role of EU action in international crisis and conflict management is still weak and unlinked. Progress on EU security and defence force is far from its full realization. Rather, it has not yet been experienced as a global economic and political actor. Primarily, this is due to internal disunity of the national interests of member states. Further internal coordination leads to maximum use of capacity and European potential. It takes leadership and a sense of harmonization of common goals and needs to achieve the desired step.

The European Union is seen and experienced as a unique and particularly successful form of organization of regional integration and continental cooperation, in which the 28 member states realize their interests, and try to act supranational in order to achieve common goals and policies on the international field. However, the limited capacity of the Union concerning the realization of foreign and security policies and actions can be overcome only through a serious approach to the consideration of certain key issues relating to the EU’s CSDP.

The European Union must acquire the ability to act autonomously, based on the credibility of its military and armed forces, or through a common supranational decision-making to allow proper preparation and use of these powers to intervene under international crisis areas. For the Union, it is necessary to predict its responsibilities in relation to the use and availability of the Common Security and Defence Policy in accordance with the Petersburg tasks, and set out a strategic vision for the future development of common security and defence policy. The security forces of the Union is required to be self- sustainable, with the necessary control and intelligent capabilities, logistics, and other services that allow adequate preparedness to address the emerging issues of international security domain.

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THE CULTURE OF PEACE: STUDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE EMOTIONAL CLIMATE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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ABSTRACT:
This paper focuses on students’ perception of the emotional climate as one important aspect of the culture of peace. The accent is placed on the conditions in the Republic of Macedonia which is relatively young democratic society aimed to complete its European perspective of development. The research sample consists of students at the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje. Theoretical basis of this study are given in the first part of the paper where the main characteristics and processes of the culture of peace are presented. Research results indicate that situation is not alarming, but is either not so promising since there are many high scores on insecurity, anger and fear measures, and many low scores on measures of social trust and security. Respondents are concerned about future and mainly see the system as corrupted. They also question freedom of information, but not in so dark light. Findings are further discussed and future steps for strengthening and promoting the culture of peace in the Republic of Macedonia are presented as well.

Keywords: culture of peace, emotional climate, students, Republic of Macedonia
АПСТРАКТ:
Во трудот се разгледува студентската перцепција на емоционалната клима како мошне значаен дел од културата на мирот. Акцентот е ставен на состојбите во Република Македонија, која е една релативно млада демократија, насочена кон реализирање на својата европска перспектива. Истражувањето е спроведено на студенти од Филозофскиот факултет во Скопје. Во теоретскиот дел од трудот се изложени позначајните карактеристики на културата на мирот и на процесите низ кои таа се гради. Потоа се прикажани резултатите од проценката на емоционалната клима. Од нив се гледа дека состојбата не е алармантна, но не е ниту ветувачка, со оглед на тоа што се добиваат многу високи скорови на прашањата поврзани со чувството на несигурност, гнев и страв, а многу ниски скорови на прашањата во врска со општествената доверба и сигурноста. Резултатите се понатаму дискутирани, а кон крајот се дадени заклучни согледувања со насоки за јакнење на потенцијалите за градење и унапредување на културата на мирот во Република Македонија.

Ключни зборови: култура на мирот, емоционална клима, студенти, Република Македонија

INTRODUCTION
Establishing the culture of peace is complex and long-term process. Yet, it is among most important tasks on the “to-do” list of every democratic society in the world. This is true for both young democracies and the societies with old tradition of democratic practices. The first ones are aiming towards building it, while the later are focused on preserving it for new generations by constantly promoting it through various peaceful activities. Building the culture of peace affects not only the society itself but also the people who live in that society. In other words, on society level it can be understood as an important historical and societal change while on the individual level it is a significant developmental change of each person who is part of that transformative process.

When we speak of culture of peace, we often think of the transformation of values, attitudes and behavior in each individual that lead to the culture formed by peace and aimed towards peace (Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007). However, there is no universal definition of this concept which is usually understood as holistic and normative (Petrović, Selimović and de Rivera, 2010). Galtung (according to Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007), who is one of the leading authors in this area, argue that the culture of peace represents, in the same time, different
levels of culture and different levels of peace. The peace itself can be understood as positive emotional climate both inside individuals and outside of them i.e. around them. In that sense is Galtung’s famous line “Tell me how you behave in conflict and I will tell you how much culture of peace you possess” (Мурђева-Шкарик, 2007: 130).

Hence, promoting culture of peace is not at all an easy task, but it is substantially important and has to be taken seriously if people in every society are about to live together in long-term peace. This is especially true for multicultural societies and for post-conflict societies where a lot needs to be done for differences and misunderstandings to be overcome and transformed into mutual trust, respect and tolerance. Although there are some very efficient practices from western countries that can be used for this purpose, more complete and more successful results are obtained when concrete society stands on the capacities of its own people to mobilize their strengths to behave peacefully and nonviolently and to build those strengths in, what in future will be called, the culture of peace.

THE CULTURE OF PEACE: PRECONDITIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

De Rivera (2009) describes eight preconditions that have to be fulfilled for one nation/society to be recognized as a culture of peace. First, the light is shade on peace education and its importance in the process of building the culture of peace. Then is the gender equality with special focus on women rights as well as on the need for valuing women and their values more than previously. The third precondition is improved tolerance and acceptance of group differences which leads to social cohesion. Democratic participation is another sine qua non precondition for the culture of peace, so every society that inclines towards it has to place significant efforts to mobilize and provide opportunities for each individual to be actively involved in this process. Next is open communication among individuals and groups after which come human rights and peacebuilding. Later cannot be done if some substantial values, such as respect for others, mutual trust, tolerance of the differences etc. are not promoted. Last two preconditions are international security and sustainable development which are also crucial for establishing the culture of peace.

Beside previously mentioned preconditions, the same author accentuates various methods for building cultures of peace. Among more general ones he especially addresses nonviolent action and trust, negotiation, deliberate dialogue, restorative justice and police oversight. When it comes to more concrete methods targeting specific levels of influence, de Rivera (2009) focuses on personal transformations, achieving peace in family, community
reconciliation etc. Hence, he emphasize that a societies and their members need to be creative and able to envision the final goal they tend to achieve, in order to establish the culture of peace. Visions about the future are those driving elements that motivate people to behave constructively and move forward.

Nevertheless, de Rivera (2009) stresses that staying firm on the ground and facing reality is also one crucial part of this process. It is important to be aware of the fact that conflicts are present in everyday life and that people can behave extremely violently, but they can also be highly peaceful and cooperative. When people live in a culture of peace they are manifesting various positive characteristics, values and capacities. For example, they can be willing to help others, act in a caring and supportive way, be empathetic, brave and honest. This further means that they are able to accept the others that are different from themselves the way they are i.e. to be aware that each person is unique and has his/her own identity.

Wessells, Schwebel, and Anderson (2001; according to Mayton, 2009) highlighted seven substantial components that define the culture of peace. Those are social justice, human rights, nonviolence, inclusiveness, civil society, peace education, and sustainability. The theory of basic human needs can also be applied here. It describes conflicts as arising from unsatisfied basic human needs (ex. Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007; Staub, 2003). Therefore, the resolution of a conflict can be achieved only by satisfying those needs (or at least some of them) and by reaching social justice. In this sense, Christie (1997; according to Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007) argues that central for peacekeeping are the needs for security, identity, material goods and self-determination. Galtung (according to Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007) emphasize the needs for survival, well-being, identity and freedom. In the situation of direct violence, between individuals or nations, the needs for security and identity are becoming most important. When people are living in structural violence, where economic needs or the needs for freedom of speech and self-determination are not met, the road to violence is clearly open. Thus, as Christie puts out (1997; Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007), the permanent peace requires, at least, righteous satisfaction of human needs for security, identity, well-being and self-determination. Hence, psychologists and peace workers have to be constantly oriented towards transformations of structural violence into righteous social activities aimed for satisfying basic human needs.

Worldwide, there are examples of societies that are characterized as peaceful and nonviolent, although there is no universally accepted categorization among authors about what exactly defines nonviolent culture. In this sense, it is crucial to have in mind that not only individuals have their dominant emotions, but societies too can be characterized
with collective emotional orientation (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal, 2006; according to Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera, 2007). Hence, it is important to analyze the centrality of emotions in different contexts, especially social and political, both in intragroup and intergroup processes, due to the fact that they have potential to transform into societal phenomenon. Thus, the process of conflict resolution and peace making, particularly considering intergroup conflicts, could be better understood if analyzed from the point of the collective emotions and their role in this regard (Bar-Tal, Halperin, and de Rivera, 2007).

In the attempt to describe a model of nonviolent society, Bonta (1996; according to Mayton, 2009) discuss some useful guidelines. More precisely, a particular society needs to be “characterized by [1] a relatively high degree of interpersonal harmony; [2] little if any physical violence among adults, between children and adults, and between the sexes; [3] workable strategies for resolving conflicts and averting violence; [4] a commitment to avoid violence (such as warfare) with other peoples; and [5] strategies for raising children to adopt and continue these nonviolent ways” (Bonta, 1996: 405; according to Mayton, 2009: 128). The same author compare societies with these characteristics to less nonviolent ones and founds differences in all five points, beginning from the quality of interpersonal relations, socialization of children, ways of conflict resolutions etc. As Bonta emphasize, “within peaceful or nonviolent societies, cooperation is clearly the dominant orientation” (Bonta, 1996: 405; according to Mayton, 2009: 130).

Basabe and Valencia (2007), highlight four orthogonal factors that define four distinct dimensions of the culture of peace as recognized by de Rivera (2004; according to Basabe and Valencia 2007). Those are Liberal Development, Violent Inequality, State Use of Violent Means and Nurturance. The conflicts could arise in or among all four factors and thus can be differently resolved. Therefore, it is possible for societies to have unequal levels of peacefulness. Since the culture of peace is a holistic concept, the nonviolent actions have to be undertaken in all four dimensions in order for permanent peace to be established. The subjective dimension of the culture of peace can be measured by focusing on beliefs and values. Here, shared values are crucial in subjective culture. So are the subjective values, which are usually related to certain dimensions of emotional climate that are important to the culture of peace. As Basabe and Valencia (2007) further note, recent studies found cultural determinants of emotional climate. For example, in hierarchical societies there are more frequent negative affect (Basabe and Ros, 2005; according to Basabe and Valencia 2007). High correlations were also found between negative affect, Masculinity and Uncertainty.
THE EMOTIONAL CLIMATE AND THE CULTURE OF PEACE

The concept of emotional climate is still very new in the area of peace psychology. It was introduced by de Rivera in the last decades of XXth century. De Rivera distinguishes this concept from emotional atmospheres by pointing on the main characteristic of the emotional climate, which is its scope. More precisely, emotional climate incorporates the relationships among all members of one group, while emotional atmospheres are defined by the focus of all group members on a certain event (de Rivera and P’aez, 2007). The emotional part in the concept of emotional climate concerns the collective emotions that arise from the shared social interactions of group’s members, which are culture specific. As further stated by de Rivera and P’aez (2007), these collective emotions could be both constructed and measured in several different ways.

There are various factors that influence the construction of emotional climate in particular society. Among them are specific political policies and objective facts that have potential to create common state of feelings experienced by all society members, directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, emotional climate is under influence of individual and collective behavior as well. This means that its construction depends on the processes that extend from micro-social to macro-social level. Some aspects of emotional climate and of the culture of peace are related to certain norms and values that can vary across the societies. Although there are similarities between these two concepts, they are two independent aspects due to some important differences. Such differences become clearly obvious when individualistic and collectivistic societies have being compared (de Rivera and P’aez, 2007).

For measuring emotional climate in different cultures, De Rivera (de Rivera and P’aez, 2007) constructed a 24-item scale aimed to encompass the feelings of security, insecurity, confidence, depression, anger, love, fear, and trust. The target group was students from different countries. As expected, he found some very interesting differences. For example, the students who felt most secure were those from the United States, after which are students from Spain and Colombia. The students from Honduras and Nicaragua felt least secure. When it comes to confidence in individual opportunities and government empirical data showed that students from Honduras and Nicaragua had less confidence in these dimensions than their peers from Colombia and Peru. The anger was most expressed in Honduras, Colombia, and Nicaragua. Findings for Nicaragua also indicated that there was significantly less fear.
of speech. More detailed analyzes showed significant differences between Honduras and Columbia in the source of fear of speaking. Namely, in Honduras it was more related to governmental oppression while in Columbia to the fear of groups and the lack of adequate control of their behavior by the government.

The research on the emotional climate in the Balkan region is still very scarce. One recent study was conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tuzla) and Serbia (Belgrade). The same standardized questionnaire of 24 items with seven-level scale of agreement and disagreement whose author is Joseph de Rivera, was applied. Within the central part of the questionnaire the status of several indicators of the emotional climate of society that are of importance for a culture of peace, was determined. Among them were resentment or anger towards the government, fear of communication, security, insecurity (as an independent dimension), the sense of hopelessness and social trust. It was found that the most dominant factor in both countries was anger towards the government, but also other elements such as helplessness, insecurity and fear were also expressed. This indicates that the results in these two countries are similar to those of the other countries with economic and social problems (Petrović, Selimović, and de Rivera, 2010).

In the Republic of Macedonia, as far as authors of this paper are informed, this is the first study that measures the emotional climate using de Rivera’s questionnaire. It is also the first study focusing on students’ perception of the emotional climate. Since there is lack of relevant research on this topic in the present country, we will discuss the actual situation through some general indicators.

Republic of Macedonia, however young in its independence as a state, invested significant effort in the processes for peace building and peacekeeping, especially after the conflict in 2001. Such efforts are inevitable in the societies who are aiming towards reaching permanent peace and are “multi” in many ways (cultural, ethnic, religious etc.). This is the case with the Republic of Macedonia as well. Its people throughout history have faced many wars and conflicts and yet, stayed relatively nonviolent and tolerant in their nature.

According to the Global Peace Index Report for 2014, R. of Macedonia is ranked 87th which place her in the group of countries with medium state of peace. This means that there is still more to go until the state of permanent and stable peace is achieved. As previously noted, one precondition for building a culture of peace, is peace education. In that sense, R. of Macedonia developed various curricula at the university level particularly designed to address the importance and long term implications of nonviolence. Curricula on conflict
transformations and peace building are also present in elementary and high schools, whether as elective subjects or as projects implemented both by the Government and different NGO’s (ex. the project “Heritage and Dialogue” implementer by UNESCO as part of the broader topic on Culture of Peace and Non-violence, 2009-2014). The same is true for gender equality. Here, Republic of Macedonia signed all important and compulsory EU documents and developed national strategies in which reaching and maintaining gender equality remains a priority.

Tolerance and acceptance of group differences is promoted throughout various activities implemented on different levels and populations. The scope of those activities is wide and incorporates all relevant parties, institutions and individuals starting from the officials in the Government, through governmental and nongovernmental institutions, formal and non-formal education etc. Nevertheless, as we will see later in this paper, results from the study on the emotional climate in the R. of Macedonia indicate that more needs to be done in order for systematic change to be achieved.

Democratic participation is guaranteed for every citizen in the country, although sometimes it does not look like it is always practiced. Therefore, individuals and groups has to be continuously motivated to participate more in various forms of nonviolent and democratic activities that will both improve the awareness of the importance of democratic participation in the society and will enable its future promotion.

When it comes to open communication and human rights, some international reports (ex. “Commission Staff Working Document, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2012 Progress Report”; Amnesty International Report 2012, The State of the World’s Human Rights, etc.) are stating that these aspect needs to gain more attention in the Republic of Macedonia. For example, in the report of EU from 2012 about the progress of the R. of Macedonia, concerning the field of human rights and the protection of minorities, it is written the following: “Limited progress can be reported in the promotion and enforcement of human rights. Efforts were made to strengthen the implementation of the legal framework, and increase staff in institutions” (“Commission Staff Working Document, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2012 Progress Report”, 2012: 13). The latest Country Report on Human Rights Practices, released by U.S. Department of State (2013), points out that among most important human rights problems are “tensions between the ethnic Albanian and Macedonian communities; discrimination against Roma and other ethnic minorities; inadequate enforcement of labor laws etc.” (p. 1).

Finally, the issues of international security and sustainable development are
Security dialogues continuously in focus in all action plans of the Government of the R. of Macedonia. Therefore the progress can be expected in both these aspects of the culture of peace. Considering all mentioned above, there are some domains that still need improvement, in order for better quality of life to be achieved and systemic transformations to occur. Yet, this country committed itself to European perspective, which means putting all its efforts in building and maintain the culture of peace at all levels, permanently. It is hard and long process but certainly not unreachable.

EMPIRICAL RESEARCH OF THE STUDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE EMOTIONAL CLIMATE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

To build a culture of peace, what is important, is emotional climate among members of a society, the expression of their hopes, fears and anxieties. Moreover, it is crucial to determine this subjective potential for peace in countries that went through many challenges, including armed conflict and political turbulence, in the recent past, and in countries with uncertain economic status for many citizens. Since R. of Macedonia can be classified in this group of countries considering its recent past, the necessity to conduct a research that will focus on the emotional climate and the culture of peace becomes very important. Therefore, the main goal of this study was to analyze how students perceive the emotional climate in the country in which they live and where they are building their future.

The instrument used in this study has been developed by de Rivera and it is previously applied in neighbor countries: Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Petrović, Selimović, and de Rivera, 2010). Standardized questionnaire with 24 items with seven-degree scale of agreement and disagreement has been administered. Seven degrees used for answering each question are described as: no, a little, somewhat, more or less, quite a bit, mostly and absolutely - respectively. The 4 is theoretically average answer.

The questionnaire assessed several indicators of emotional climate of society that are of importance to the culture of peace, including: resentment or anger towards the government, fear of communication, security, uncertainty (as an independent dimension), a sense of hopelessness and social trust. In addition to these indicators, the questionnaire has a series of questions that determine the potential factors of that potential: gender, age, religious beliefs etc.

The sample consisted of 150 university students (mean age 21.20), predominantly females, 70% declared as Orthodox Christians and 10% as Muslims, from Skopje. The scale
shows good psychometrics characteristics, including coefficient of reliability.

The results, generally speaking, show that situation is not alarming, but is either not so promising. This further means that there are many high scores on insecurity, anger and fear measures, and many low scores on measures of social trust and security. It is even more problematic, having in mind that the sample consists of young people, with education and social status above average in the population. The analyzed questions are divided in several logical groups presented in the following tables.

Table 1. Descriptive results for perception of (in)security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security/insecurity</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are most people feeling secure that there is enough food, water, medicine, and shelter for themselves and their families, and that they will continue having these things?</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are people feeling insecure because the amount of violence is preventing people from living peacefully?</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do most people in this country feel secure that there are others who care for them?</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are people feeling very insecure because they are worried about what might happen in the future?</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do most people feel secure that they will receive help if they have a problem?</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. indicates that our subjects, generally, do not perceive their environment as a secure. Even on the question about the basic, existential needs, which is involved mainly for the Third world countries, “Are most people feeling secure that there is enough food, water, medicine, and shelter for themselves and their families, and that they will continue having these things?”, only 15% answered with “mostly” or “absolutely”, and the mean for the whole sample is above theoretical average, only 3.40.

One more similar question, appropriate in the first place for countries in armed conflict, also shows worrying answers. On “Are people feeling insecure because the amount of violence is preventing people from living peacefully?” 48% of subject agree (more or less,
answers from 5 to 7) while 39% do not agree (answers from 1 to 3).

Answers also show relatively high level of worrying because of potential future problems and because people are not sure that they can expect help from their communities.

Table 2. Descriptive results for perception of trust in society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social trust</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do people trust that the different political groups in this country trust each other and will work together for the progress of the country?</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do most people in this country sympathize with the difficult situation of some children and want to contribute to their betterment?</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do people from different organizations trust each other enough to work together to try and find a solution that works for everyone?</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do most people in this country respect each other enough so that they do not become violent when there is a conflict?</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do people from different ethnic and religious groups trust each other in this country?</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do men and women respect each other as equals?</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. shows also very low level of, what Putnam (2000) refers to as, “social capital”. According to the respondents’ answers there is not enough trust in any social relationship. The average point of 4 is found for the respect among genders. However, people mainly do not sympathize even with children with problems, and there are only less than 10% of people who agree that there is trust among organizations, people in general and ethnic groups. The lowest level of trust is registered among political groups.
Table 3. Descriptive results for perception of hopes for the future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future hopes</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are people feeling confident that there are good opportunities to make a better life for themselves and their families?</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are people feeling hopeless about things ever getting better?</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How confident are people that nonviolent methods (such as voting, peaceful protests, strikes that do not destroy property) can increase justice in this society?</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are most people confident that they can make their voices heard when they really care about something?</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is this country so hopeless that many people want to leave?</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our respondents are concerned about future, as we can see in Table 3. There are elements of anomia and hopelessness in the obtained answers. For instance one third of all respondents even question that “things ever getting better”. They are not sure in power of their voices, neither in power of nonviolent methods in pursuing justice and making things better.

Table 4. Descriptive results for peoples’ anger because of corruption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anger because corruption</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are many people angry with the government because it favors people who have money and power?</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the political system so corrupt that it is hopeless to use it to work for the public good?</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a lot of anger because there is not a fair distribution of wealth in this country?</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do people in this country feel insecure because the justice system isn’t working to punish people who commit crimes against other persons?</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are many people angry at the amount of corruption in the government?</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next group of questions deals with problems of injustice in society, embodied through corruption, Table 4. Our respondents mainly see the system as corrupted, and they
Security dialogues are very angry because of that fact. It is very dangerous combination when people are angry because of corruption and see themselves as hopeless and powerless to do something to change the inadequate conditions.

Finally, in Table 5 participants question also freedom of information, but not in so dark light. In other words, around 43% of respondents answered that people are generally not afraid to gather publicly for a peaceful meetings and/or to organize protest. Considering freedom of press, 51% answered with „mostly“ or „absolutely“ which indicate that they perceive the journalists and the media as afraid of publishing information that people should know. Finally, more than half of respondents (56%) perceive that people are “quite a bit”, “mostly” or “absolutely” afraid of saying what they really think because speaking out is dangerous.

### Table 5. Descriptive results for peoples feelings of freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feelings of freedom</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are people afraid of having peaceful public meetings to organize or protest?</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are journalists, and the media afraid of publishing information that people should know?</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are people here afraid of saying what they really think because speaking out is dangerous?</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Research findings on emotional climate in the R. of Macedonia are in line with the similar research conducted in the region. The main factor in all countries from the region is anger directed toward the government (Petrović, Selimović, and de Rivera, 2010). This is similar to the countries in the world that are facing economic problems (de Rivera and P’aez, 2007).

Results from this research can be explained in several ways. First, the fact that the students, generally, do not perceive their environment as a secure even when the satisfaction of basic human needs is in focus, is not surprising if, for example, the official data published by the State Statistical Office of the R. of Macedonia are considered. According to them, in the IV quarter of 2013, the unemployment rate was 28.6% which is still high, although there is obvious decrease in this percentage compared to previous years. Furthermore, as released
in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index Report (2014), poverty rate (which is a percentage of population living on less than $2 a day), is 9.1%. These findings, even though the target is student population, possibly indicate that many people in R. of Macedonia are living in uncertainty and are concerned for their future. They don’t have decent jobs and many don’t have jobs at all. On the other side, those who are employed are concerned about losing their jobs which will directly affect their quality of life and life satisfaction. This conclusion finds support in research results on unemployment from studies conducted in Macedonia and elsewhere, which confirm that prolonged periods of unemployment can lead to apathy and psychological death (Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2007).

Therefore, it is not surprising that many individuals, especially young people, are taking their chances abroad. This condition is clearly represented in the students’ answers to the question “Is this country so hopeless that many people want to leave?” which belongs in the block about perception of hopes for the future. Here, almost 70% of respondents answered with “quite a bit”, “mostly” or “absolutely” (i.e. answers from 5 to 7 on the scale). They are about to complete their education and look for a job in some foreign country rather than in their homeland. Such negative feelings of insecurity, hopelessness and fear all connected to the perception of the future, as indicated in the research of Basabe and Ros (2005; according to Basabe and Valencia 2007), are mostly found in hierarchical societies.

What is alarming in the findings from this study, is that even on the question about the basic, existential needs, which is involved mainly for the Third world countries, the percentage of those who “mostly” or “absolutely” agree that most people are feeling secure that there is enough food, water, medicine, and shelter for themselves and their families, and that they will continue having these things, is very low. From a psychological perspective, basic needs are conceptualized as the most fundamental motives. When they are not satisfied, or are violated, a person’s well-being, growth and development are compromised. It brings uncertainty and sometimes even apathy in many people’s lives. In such conditions, people will try to fulfill them either constructively, or, if obstructed, they will act destructively in ways that will harm themselves and/or other people (Staub, 2003). Considering what is previously mentioned, it is understandable why certain results in our research are indicating presence of anomia and hopelessness among young people.

Another important finding considers the state of the anger among students because of the corruption. Our respondents mainly see the system as corrupted, and they are very angry because of that fact. Considering the freedom of speech, it might also be inferred from
the results that respondents feel less free to speak up loudly and openly in public. De Rivera found similar results in these two aspects in his own research in different cultural settings (de Rivera and P´aez, 2007).

Nevertheless, the changes that have been made in the law for journalists, especially the decriminalisation of defamation indicate that in future, things might change for the better in terms of the freedom of speech. This is also supported by the evaluation from EU Commission about the progress in the field of freedom of expression and the media, presented in the 2012 progress report for R. of Macedonia: “Some progress has been made in the field of freedom of expression and the media. The overall constitutional and legal framework protecting freedom of expression is generally in place.” (“Commission Staff Working Document, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2012 Progress Report”, 2012: 14).

Findings about feelings of insecurity because the amount of violence is preventing people from living peacefully, as well as those concerning the social capital, providing evidence that there is no enough trust, in any social relationships, are partly supported by some of the latest relevant international reports and documents (for more details see: Bertelsmann Transformation Index Report (2014); and U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2013). When these results are considered together with abovementioned possible explanations for presence of anomia and hopelessness, we can see clearer picture about the conditions in which young people are developing. More precisely, they are facing frustration and uncertainty in the period of life when they are oriented towards completing their higher education and finding appropriate job. These are two very important developmental tasks. When they are not completed successfully, the whole process of personal development is compromised (Мурџева-Шкариќ, 2010).

Overall, the results show that many patience and laborious building of social climate is necessary in order to secure people, who will, in turn, with their more positive and more optimistic attitudes, make a positive feedback, that will ensure long peaceful development. As it is accent in the latest Human Development Report 2013, in order for some country to achieve long-term transformation it has to envision and establish “consistent and balanced approach to development” (p. 4). It further state that efforts should be continuously placed on enhancing equality among different individuals and groups so the human development could be promoted as a whole. In this respect education is one of the most powerful instruments a country can have. Following this is the need for increasing possibility for meaningful participation of people in various events and processes that influence their lives. This enables
satisfaction of self-determination which is one of the basic human needs.

The trust in social relationships and the feeling of security could be enhanced by reconciliation and forgiveness. As Bar-Tall (2009) explains, reconciliation is a complex process which requires profound changes – social and psychological – among all individuals and groups. In other words, he emphasizes that “The essence of reconciliation involves socio-psychological processes consisting of changes of motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions by the majority of society members (Kelman 1999; Lederach 1997; Shonholtz 1998; Wilmer 1998; according to Bar-Tall, 2009: 365). Reconciliation can be promoted into culture of peace if particular criteria are met. Those are: mutual knowledge, mutual acceptance, mutual understanding, respect for differences and focus on commonalities, development of cooperative relations, valuing peace, and mechanisms for maintaining peace. All of them have to be developed for this transformation to take place. Therefore, Bar-Tall concludes, “when society members, at least the great majority, internalize the values, beliefs, attitudes and practices of culture of peace, it is possible to characterize the society as peaceful, and its collective identity is imprinted by this characteristic” (Bar-Tall, 2009: 371).

One of the limitations of this study is the possibility that respondents exaggerated with their answers, and with level of pessimism, that is not in complete accordance with real state of affair. On the other hand, some of them maybe responded in socially desirable way, which could alter the results. We also have to bear in mind that we are analyzing students’ perceptions that sometimes can be quite different from factual situation. Furthermore, some variables couldn’t be controlled, since the respondents were not willing to share the information, for example, about their political beliefs, family conditions etc. Therefore, this study is aimed to identify the possible problematic topics in emotional climate and the culture of peace, on which we all need to work in future. With our results we pointed the indicators of culture of peace in R. of Macedonia and how these indicators are perceived by students. Now, it is a time for all social institutions, from Government, to educational system, to culture makers, journalists and others to do what is in their might, in order to build better and more secure worlds, not for some “other” people, but for all of us.

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(Footnotes)
1 All values from 1 to 7 are given in percents.
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