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Институт за безбедност, одбрана и мир/Institute of security, defence and peace
Уредувачки одбор/Editorial board: тел. (+389) 2 3066 232, email: sd@fzf.ukim.edu.mk

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ПРЕДГОВОР НА УРЕДНИКОТ

Почитувани читатели,

Меѓународното научно списание „Безбедносни дијалози“ кое егзистира пет години, влегува во шестата година од своето постоење. Од овој број уредувачката улога ја преземаат доц. д-р Тања Милошевска како главен и одговорен уредник и доц. д-р Горан Зенделовски како заменик уредник на списанието. Ја користам оваа можност да им изразам благодарност на претходните уредници проф. д-р Билјана Ванковска, проф. д-р Оливер Бакрески, проф. д-р Тони Милески и проф. д-р Митко Котовчевски за зародишот и успешниот растеж на ова научно списание кое е етаблирано на Институтот за безбедност, одбрана и мир при Филозофскиот факултет во Скопје.

Воедно, во изминатиот период, постигнати се видни резултати на полето на меѓународно индексирање на меѓународното научно списание „Безбедносни дијалози“ во одредени бази на научни списанија. Овој тренд претставува поттик за натамошна софистикација на процесот на рецензирање, подобрување на уредувачката политика, техничката подготовка и сл.

Во првиот број за 2015 година читателите ќе имаат можност да прочитаат научни анализи за современи безбедносни настани на национално, регионално и на светско ниво. Првиот труд се фокусира на семејното насилство кое се уште претставува безбедносен проблем за огромен дел од популацијата. Ова истражување ги испитува врските помеѓу ставовите кон родовата еднаквост дефинирани како традиционален и модерен сексизам, стресот кој настанува заради потребата за придржување кон маскулината улога и прифаќањето на погрешните уверувања (митови) за семејното насилство кај мажи од општата популација. Трудот “Предизвици со кои соочува системот за образование и обука во одбраната” се однесува на проблематика која ги проучува новите услови кои бараат да се инвестира во образованието, критичко размислување, нови наставни програми и наставни методи за активно учење, со цел да се создаде нова генерација на воени и цивилни лидери. Интересна анализа нуди трудот за феноменот на тероризмот, односно теоретската и практичната важност за разбирање на овој феномен.

Фреквентната анализа која е применета во овој труд покажува кои елементи се најчести во дефинициите на поимот тероризам, но и детектира нови елементи. Во продолжение, можете да прочитате труд кој се однесува на заштита на бизнис тајните и личните податоци. Авторите посочуваат дека е битно секој вработен да има безбедносна култура, попрецизно знаење од областа на заштита на бизнис тајните. Следува труд кој преку разгледување на надворешната политика на ЕУ дава анализа дека унапредувањето и почитувањето на човековите права, демократијата и владеењето на правото на Европската Унија се темел за одржлив мир и просперитет на секое општество и на светот во целина.

Шестиот труд во ова издание се обидува да одговори на прашањето „Кој може да ги спроведе реформите во одбраната“, во контекст кога се чини дека институционалниот интегритет, без оглед на природата на современите предизвици и развојот на граѓанското глобално општество и социјалните медиуми и движења претставува една од клучните основи, предуслови и перспективи на одбранбено – безбедносното организирање. Интересна анализа нуди трудот „Недржавните актери и нивното влијание во креирање на надворешната и внатрешна политика на државите“. Текстот е обид да се демистифицира улогата на недржавните актери во креирањето на внатрешната и надворешната политика на државите како и нивното место во трансформирање на меѓународниот систем на управување. И на крај, читателската публика на „Безбедносни дијалози“ ќе може да прочита труд кој го објаснува управувањето со ризици од катастрофи, состојбите и перспективите во Република Македонија. Во таа насока авторот формулира предлог за преземање на сите потребни активности за воспоставување и одржување на организиран и институционален систем за следење, проценување и управување со сите актуелни и потенцијални ризици по безбедноста и безбедноста на граѓаните.

Со почит,

Доц. д-р Тања Милошевска

Главен и одговорен уредник

PREFACE BY EDITOR

Dear Readers,

International scientific journal "Security dialogues" which exists five years, comes in the sixth year of its continuation. In the meantime, in this issue the editing position has been taken over by Ass. Prof. Tanja Miloshevska as the Main Editor and Ass. Prof. Goran Zendelovski as the Executive Editor of the Journal. I am using this opportunity to express my gratitude to the previous Editors, Professor Biljana Vankovska, Professor Oliver Bakreski, Professor Toni Mileski and Professor Mitko Kotovchevski, for the foundation and successful pulse of this scientific journal, which is established at the Institute for Security, Defense and Peace at the Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje.

In addition, during the past period it were accomplished prominent results in the field of international indexing of the international scientific journal "Security dialogues", in various bases of scientific journals. These trends represent a challenge for further sophistication of the process of reviewing, quality of editorial policy, technical training etc.

In the first issue for 2015 readers will be able to read scientific analyzes of contemporary security events at national, regional and global level. The first paper is focused on domestic violence, which remains a leading human security problem for the vast majority of the population. This study explored the relationships between attitudes towards gender equality (operationalized as old-fashioned and modern sexism) masculine gender role stress, and domestic violence myths acceptance among men in general population. The paper "Challenges facing the education and training system in the defence" deals with issues about new conditions which require investments in education, critical thinking, new curricula and teaching methods for active learning in order to create a new generation of military and civilian leaders. Interesting analysis present paper about phenomenon of terrorism, particularly, the theoretical and practical meaning for understanding of this phenomenon. The frequency analysis, which is applied in this paper, shows which of the elements are most commonly used for defining terrorism, and is detecting new elements. In continuance, you can read a paper in relation to protection of business secrets and personal data. The authors stressed that is important that every employee possess a security culture, i.e. knowledge in the area of business protection. Next paper is focused on EU foreign policy, which provides analysis that the promotion and respect of human rights, democracy, and rule of law are the cornerstones of sustainable peace and prosperity for any society, as well as for the world in general. The sixth paper in this edition is trying to answer the question: "Who can carry out defence reforms?" in the context, when it seems that the institutional integrity, regardless of the nature of modern challenges and the development of the global civil society, social movements, and media, is one of the key foundations, conditions, and prospects of the defense - security organization. Remarkable study offers us a paper "Non-state actors and their Influence in the creation of external and internal politics of states".

The text is an attempt to demystify the role of non-of-State actors in the creation of internal and external politics of states as well as their place in the process of transformation of international system of conduct and rule. As a final point, the readership of "Security Dialogues", can read a paper that explicate disaster risk management, situations and perspectives in Republic of Macedonia. In this sense, author formulate a suggestion of all necessary actions needed for establishing and maintaining an organized and institutionally based system for monitoring and management of all current and potential risks for their safety and the safety of its citizens.

Sincerely,

Ass. Prof. Tanja Miloshevska

Editor in Chief

IT IS IN HER HANDS TO PREVENT THE RAGE: PREDICTORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MYTHS ACCEPTANCE AMONG MEN**СПРЕЧУВАЊЕТО НА БЕСОТ Е ВО НЕЈЗИНИ РАЦЕ: ПРЕДИКТОРИ НА ПРИФАЌАЊЕТО НА МИТОВИТЕ ЗА СЕМЕЈНО НАСИЛСТВО**

Nicolina Kenig, PhD

Faculty of Philosophy – Institute of Psychology

nikolina@fzf.ukim.edu.mk

Biljana Blaževska-Stoilkovska, PhD

Faculty of Philosophy – Institute of Psychology

biljanab@fzf.ukim.edu.mk

АПСТРАКТ: Семејното насилство се уште претставува горлив безбедносен проблем за огромен дел од популацијата. Ова истражување ги испитува врските помеѓу ставовите кон родовата еднаквост дефинирани како традиционален и модерен сексизам, стресот кој настанува заради потребата за придржување кон маскулината улога и прифаќањето на погрешните уверувања (митови) за семејното насилство кај мажи од општата популација, на возраст меѓу 18 и 50 години. Како испитаници во квантитативната студија учествуваа 325 мажи со хетеросексуална ориентација, сите етнички Македонци, од 16 различни градови во земјата. Податоците за овој дел од истражувањето беа прибирани со помош на три инструменти: скалата за мерење стрес кој произлегува од притисокот кон придржување на маскулината родова улога, скалата за прифаќање на митови за семејното насилство и скалата за утврдување на сексистичките ставови, како традиционални така и модерни. Квалитативната студија беше спроведена на пригоден примерок од 38 испитаници со слични демографски карактеристики кои одговараа на кусо интервју за тоа како гледаат на изворот и динамиката на семејното насилство. Откако беше утврдено дека сите инструменти имаат соодветна релијабилност а варијаблите ги задоволуваат барањата за спроведување мултипла регресија, беше спроведена статистичката анализа. Квалитативните податоци пак, беа обработени со помош на тематска анализа и истите се ставени во функција на поддршка на наодите од квантитативните податоци. И двата извора на податоци упатуваат на тоа дека мажите во голем степен се ја лоцираат одговорноста за насилството кај жртвата и дека истото го минимизираат и рационализираат. Со оглед на тоа што резултатите покажуваат дека сексистичките ставови се најважен предиктор на митовите за семејно насилство, кои пак

се поврзани со подготвеноста истото да се врши, дискусијата е насочена кон препорачување на стратегии за ефикасна примарна превенција на семејното насилство.

Клучни зборови: митови за семејно насилство, безбедност, стрес поврзан со маскулината улога, сексизам

ABSTRACT: Domestic violence remains a leading human security problem for the vast majority of the population. This study explored the relationships between attitudes towards gender equality (operationalized as old-fashioned and modern sexism) masculine gender role stress, and domestic violence myths acceptance among men in general population, aged between 18 and 50. Participants who took part in the quantitative study were 325 male heterosexual ethnic Macedonians from 16 different cities in the Republic of Macedonia. Data were collected by using three instruments: Masculine Gender Role Stress (MGRS) scale by Eisler & Skidmore, Domestic Violence Myths Acceptance Scale (DVMAS) by Peters and Old-fashioned -Modern Sexism Scale by Swim et al. The qualitative study was carried out with a convenient sample of 38 interviewees with similar demographic characteristics who shared their views on the origins and the dynamics of domestic violence. After demonstrating that all instruments exhibit satisfactory reliability and that all included variables meet the statistical requirements for performing multiple regression examination, the statistical analysis was performed. The qualitative data were explored by thematic analysis approach and they were used to support the quantitative findings. Taking into consideration that both data sources suggest that the strongest predictor of domestic violence myths acceptance (that is on the other hand strongly connected to domestic violence proclivity) the discussion is directed towards recommending strategies for efficient primary prevention measures.

Key words: domestic violence myths, human security, masculine role stress, sexism

INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence still remains a predominant human security and public health problem in the vast majority of countries worldwide. Recently, it has been estimated that this form of violence is not only as costly as warfare in terms of money spent, but also, even more devastating in lives lost (Fearon&Hoeffler, 2014). Although these costs do not only affect the present generation (in terms that girls who witness abuse in the home are more likely to be abused in the future and boys are more likely to become abusers themselves), the horrifying pieces of evidence have been so far more or less overlooked. Thus, domestic abuse is neither yet well understood nor properly addressed by vast majority of security studies scholars. On the other hand, the popularization of human security

as a concept referring to the individual instead of the state has 'opened the door' to recognizing that state security does not unavoidably transfer to (all) individuals in the state, especially not to groups that are marginalized or less powerful. In debating necessity for introducing this paradigm shift, feminist security scholars (e.g. Blanchard, 2003; Hoogensen and Rottem, 2004) addressed the role of women and gender based power asymmetry, thus enabling researchers to deconstruct security from the perspective of women's experiences of violence by interrelating violence on the individual, community, national and international levels, and by scrutinizing structural inequities instead of only focusing on the direct violence of war (e.g. Tickner, 1992).

In order to respond adequately to women's insecurity stemming from domestic violence, one has to understand the spectrum of risk factors and factors that in some ways cause domestic violence. Prominent scholars offer different taxonomies, usually identifying several wider (e.g. cultural norms, legal regulations, economic and political status) versus narrower factors that operate on individual level (substance abuse, level of education, socio-economic status etc.). Despite of many differences in determining their role in increasing the likelihood of this kind of abuse, all of them agree that these numerous contributing agents reinforce each other and cannot be treated as isolated causes (UNICEF, 2000; Krug et al., 2002). Although the risk factors are many and their influence is yet to be fully examined, an important development in linking domestic violence with human security is that states are more increasingly seen as responsible for protecting the rights of women in violations committed within the home, by their intimate partners.

Within this article, we are making an effort to shed light on a very particular human security need – prevention from domestic violence. To do so, we focused on providing data on the prevalence of acceptance of so called domestic violence myths among general male population in the country. Our decision to focus on exploring these myths defined as: "*stereotypical beliefs about domestic violence that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and which serve to minimize, deny, or justify physical aggression against intimate partner*" (Peters, 2003: 138) is primarily connected to the research data which strongly suggest that there is an association between violence-supportive beliefs (such as domestic violence or rape myths) and the actual performance of violent behavior (Flood & Pease, 2009). Further, we explored several potential predictors of endorsement of these attitudes and analyzed qualitative data on how the dynamics of domestic violence is understood and interpreted by heterosexual men. In this particular instance, the term domestic violence refers to "*assaultive and coercive behaviors that adults use against their intimate partners*" (Holden, 2003:155), which is the narrower definition of the phenomenon and comprises only the intimate partner violence component.

RELEVANT RESEARCH

Data on domestic violence prevalence

The most common form of violence experienced by women worldwide is intimate partner violence (WHO 2013). Relevant findings from cross-cultural research on nationally representative samples at ten different countries have shown that this form of violence against women is indeed considerably

widespread. The range of lifetime prevalence of physical or sexual violence, or both, by an intimate partner was 15% to 71%, whereas current violence (acts of violence in the year prior to responding) has been reported in the range was between 3% and 54%, with highest frequency falling between 20% and 33%. At the same time, the reported current rate of emotional abuse ranged between 20% and 75% (WHO, 2007).

In the Republic of Macedonia, the most recent estimated prevalence of domestic violence on a representative national sample for females is 39,4%. Despite the methodological problems that the authors of this research have faced, they registered prevalence of physical violence as high as 6% among the female respondents and prevalence of 1.3% of sexual violence at home .In most cases (over 50%), the perpetrators of the abuse were their intimate partners¹ (Popovska, Rikalovski and Villagomez, 2012). According to data gathered by questionnaires, every fourth women in the country has experienced physical violence within intimate relationship at least once in a lifetime (ESE, 2010). In addition, we are currently witnessing that the number of female victims who are killed by their intimate partners is growing despite the recent efforts of the government for strengthening the national capacities for responding to domestic violence. Moreover, in the last year and a half (from the beginning of 2014 to the mid of 2015), the number of women being killed by their intimate partners in the country was 8. Similarly to any other country, this serious threat to security and integrity has clear gender dimension. The analysis of Court decisions on domestic violence cases clearly continue to show evidence that the vast majority of perpetrators are men and that overwhelming majority of victims are female (Mircheva, Chacheva and Kenig, 2014; Груевска-Дракулевска, 2013).

Domestic violence, sexism and traditional masculine role

This research is grounded in theories that suggest that abusive behavior in men is strongly related to gender role socialization (e.g. Barnett et al.,2005; Straus et al., 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 1979) but also acknowledges that men engage in this behavior because they need or desire to control women (Radford, 1987). Its purpose was to make a contribution to the existing corpus of evidence in the field of domestic violence by providing empirical data on predictors of domestic violence myths in general population of heterosexual men in the cultural context that has not been much explored previously, by examining the relationship between DV myths acceptance, modern sexism and masculine role stress. The choice of expected predictors has been made on the basis of theory and available body of literature related to the issue (see for example Driskell, 2008).

Some feminist scholars consider domestic violence to be a strategy of exerting control by male partners over the woman (Yilo, 1993). From this perspective, violence in intimate relationships has an instrumental function for the individual abuser and it serves in providing and maintaining the superior position of men. Along these lines, domestic violence myths have social function of facilitating the aggression against women. These widely spread set of beliefs that domestic violence is trivial

¹ Less typically, the perpetrators are other members of the family – the parents in law, the children or the siblings.

and that the victim is largely responsible for provoking and not avoiding the abuse are proved to be a useful tool for reducing social support for the victim by transforming her from a victim to provoker.

In general, men are more likely than women to agree with myths and beliefs supportive of violence against women. Research of the predictors of domestic violence myths endorsement is important since there is a clear evidence for the consistent relationship between men's adherence to sexist, patriarchal, and/or sexually hostile attitudes and their use of violence against women. Men who endorse misogynistic gender-role attitudes are more likely to practice marital violence (Heise, 1998) and young men with more rape supportive attitudes are more likely to have been sexually violent (Anderson, Simpson-Taylor, & Hermann, 2004).

Many other biological, social, and psychological correlates of abusive behavior in intimate relationships have been explored, but only recently the focus has been shifted on understanding how conforming to masculine norms is associated with men's use of violence. For example, Murnen et al. (2002) found that masculine ideology was significantly associated with sexual aggression and Locke and Mahalik (2005) have found that adherence to masculinity norms reflecting power with women were strong predictors of sexual aggression perpetration. Along these lines, men's violence has been described as a form of gendered practice. Several studies have shown that using force can be perceived as a way of 'accomplishing' masculine gender role (Anderson and Umberson, 2001; Boonzaier, 2008). In explaining their abusive behavior against women, many men used the rhetoric of maintaining the patriarchal authority and masculine pride. For instance, Wood (2004) showed how violent men argued that their female partners disrespected their power as men, and that it was precisely perceived as the main reason why they had the "right to discipline" them by means of force.

One of the most frequently used concepts that capture the rigidity of male role in the hetero normative context is male gender role stress (MGRS). It designates the stress brought about from a belief that one is incapable to meet the norms of the male role defined by the society (culture) Such stress-producing situations for men are those in which they perceive themselves as being physically inadequate, emotionally expressive, subordinate to women, intellectually inferior, or inadequate in their sexual performance. Empirical data has shown that masculine gender role stress is related to high levels of anger, anxiety, depression, psychosomatic disorders, and hostility in men (Eisler, 1995; Eisler & Skidmore, 1987; McCreary et al., 1996; Rochlen & Mahalik, 2004), but also with traditional attitudes towards gender (Good, Dell, & Mintz, 1990; Sharpe & Heppner, 1991). Copenhagen et al. (2000) found that substance-abusing men with higher gender role stress experience higher levels of anger and that they were more likely to have performed abusive behavior within their intimate relationships over female partners. Compared to those with low gender role stress, individuals with higher MGRS also reported more negative attributions and affect and endorsed more verbal aggression toward threatening behavior of their female partners (Franchina et al., 2001). Among clinical sample of men, gender role stress regarding failure to perform in work and sexual domains was the only factor associated with psychological aggression, gender role stress regarding appearing physically fit and not appearing feminine was the only factor associated with sexual coercion, and gender

role stress regarding intellectual inferiority was the only factor associated with injury to partners (Moore et al.,2008). In their review, Moore and Stuart (2005) conclude that intimate partner violence increases when (1) gender roles are inconsistent and changing, which leads men to overcompensate for their challenged masculinity and (2) that intimate partner violence could be predicted by using indirect approaches, i.e. attitudinal measures. Recently, it has been also shown that MGRS has a mediating role in the relation between adherence to dimensions of a hegemonic masculinity and hostility toward women (Gallager& Parrott, 2011).

Based on this review of body of relevant literature, it has been hypothesized that MGRS and conservative values have more significant role in explaining adherence to domestic violence misconception than sexist attitudes. In other words, it was assumed that conservative values “pressuring” the adherence to masculine role contribute more to intimate partner myths acceptance than the endorsement of traditional gender roles, as well as that modern sexism is weakest predictor of the criterion variable.

METHOD

Participants

The sample for the quantitative study has been selected by following the quota sampling strategy. A quota-type grid was developed with the predefined number of participants in each age and education level cell as well as in each geographical region. The sample consisted of those individuals who expressed interest to contribute after being approached personally by the recruiters and asked for participation. The potential participants were approached by recruiters (trained psychology students) who explained the purpose of the research and the right to refuse participation at any time without any consequence. As a result of this procedure, it was comprised of 352 men from 16 different cities in the country (56% from Skopje) who reported to be heterosexual and ethnic Macedonian. Nearly half of them (52%) have finished secondary education whereas the rest have completed higher education at the time of responding. In terms of relationship, almost half were married (49%), 24% were single and the rest were in some other kind of relationship (divorced, separated, having a girlfriend or else). The age range is from 18 to 50, with mean age of 34.5 years SD=10.1. All participants took part voluntarily based on previously given informed consent and their participation did not involve any kind of compensation.

After gathering quantitative data, a subsequent sample of 38 men at the age ranging from 25 to 50, all heterosexual and ethnic Macedonian, living in 10 different cities in the country were conveniently selected in order to provide answers to 5 questions on the role of victim and the abuser in provoking and preventing domestic violence.

Instruments

The endorsement of domestic violence myth acceptance of the respondents has been measured by using the scale Domestic Violence Myths Acceptance Scale developed by Peters (2008). The scale consists of 18 statements on a 7-point scale that are related to victim blaming, either by claiming that she provokes the violence or that she actually enjoys in it, or to vindicating the abuser and minimizing the violence. The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient of 0.83 in the present study shows that the scale possesses excellent internal consistency.

The masculine role stress has been measured by the Masculine Gender Role Stress Scale by Eisler & Skidmore (1987). It is a 40-item self-report inventory that provides indication of the degree to which men cognitively assess the stress they would experience in different situations that are culturally defined as challenging masculinity. Examples of such situations are having a female boss or not being able to perform sexually. A highest possible score of 200 could be reached if the respondent estimates that all 40 situations are extremely (5-points) stressful to him, whereas the score 0 designates absence of stress related to such challenges. Authors report that factor analysis revealed that MGRS items cluster around the following dimensions: Physical Inadequacy, Emotional Inexpressiveness, Subordination to Women, Intellectual Inferiority and Performance Failure. The internal consistency of the whole scale for this sample was very high: Cronbach alpha coefficient =0.92.

The Old-fashioned - Modern Sexism Scale developed by Swim et al. (1995) was used to assess the endorsement of contemporary sexist attitudes. It is a 5-point Lickert scale and consists of 2 subscales that measure two aspects of sexism. *The Modern sexism scale* (MSS) is composed of 8 statements (6 of them with reversed scoring) that reflect denial of contemporary gender inequality, or resistance to addressing sexism and advancing gender equality. Thus, highest possible score for this subscale is 45. Cronbach alpha coefficient =0.61. Old-fashioned sexism scale has 5 items that capture endorsement of traditional gender roles, presented by differential treatment of women and men and stereotypes of women's reduced competence in comparison to men. Taking into account its length, it demonstrated satisfactory internal consistency with Cronbach alpha coefficient=0.64.

Respondents have also appraised the individual importance that they ascribe to a set of values that underlie political conservatism. An adjusted version of Social and Economic Conservatism Scale that has been designed to measure political conservative beliefs, was also administered (Everett, 2013). This form was comprised of only 8 as opposed to 12 items in the original version. Due to the considerably different cultural context, only those items that "survived" the test of factor structure similar to the proposed model were included in the further analysis².

² In order to examine the structure, principal axis factoring extraction with direct *Oblimin* rotation was used. Based on the examination of data, 8 items were selected for the final version of the instrument.

The highest possible score is 90 (maximum conservative beliefs) and the lowest is 0. Cronbach alpha coefficient =0.66 which could be considered as acceptable taking into account that the number of items is small.

Procedure

The data gathering process for the quantitative study was carried out in December 2014³, by 68 psychology students who have been trained specifically for this purpose and were supervised by the authors. The subsequent field work organized for gathering qualitative data took place five months later. Trained interviewers, also psychology students were carried out brief structured interviews with the selected respondents who voluntarily accepted to participate in the study, in their households. All statistical tests were performed by using Statistical software SPSS 17 for Windows.

RESULTS

The descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study are presented in Table 1. All averages do not visibly exceed those reported in similar studies. It is worth noting though, that the distribution of the scores for conservatism scale is positively skewed, suggesting dominance of lower acceptance of conservative values in this particular sample.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the included variables

	<i>N</i>	<i>Min.-Max.</i>	<i>Mean (SD)</i>	<i>K-Sz (p)</i>
Domestic Violence Myths Acceptance	343	2 - 106	61.1 (18.1)	0.88 (>0.05)
Modern Sexism	351	10 - 38	21.4 (5.2)	1.7 (>0.05)
Old-Fashioned Sexism	350	5 - 25	20.4 (4.3)	1.6 (>0.05)
Masculine Gender Role Stress Scale	340	0 - 168	83.4 (30.1)	0.76 (>0.05)
Social and Economic Conservatism	348	10 - 80	55.9 (13.5)	1.8 (<0.05)

The occurrence of agreement with domestic violence myths is presented through average percentages of respondents who stated that they ‘somewhat’, ‘mostly’ or ‘completely’ disagree or agree with different components of these myths. Table 2 shows that considerable proportion of the male population (nearly 40% in average) *fully agreed* with some of the statements claiming that the vic-

³ The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

tims character is the basis of domestic violence. This might be either accepting that women victims of violence actually enjoy being maltreated, that they deserve it or that they can easily escape the circle of violence only if they would want to do so. Another strongly endorsed group of myths is denying that domestic violence happens frequently and that when it happens, it is not in a form of terror against the women, but a mutual fight. The least common rationalization of intimate partner’s violence is claiming that the perpetrator is not aware of what he is doing (vindicating the abuser), because only 17.6% strongly agree with it. Worth noting is that in all of the clusters, the most dominant responses were those in the category ‘fully agree’ with the myths.

Table 2. Average percentages of respondents who (dis)agree with different aspects of DV myths

<i>Subscale</i>	Fully disagree	Mostly disagree	Slightly disagree	Neutral	Slightly agree	Mostly agree	Fully agree
Minimizing violence	12.1%	11.4%	7.0%	14.5%	11.1%	19.8%	23.9%
Victim’s character	17.6%	6.7%	3.4%	12.7%	7.6%	12.5%	39.4%
Victim’s behavior	19.1%	9.2%	2.5%	16.1%	12.2%	17.0%	20.6%
Vindicating the abuser	18.8%	9.7%	5.3%	19.3%	13.5%	15.5%	17.6%
AVERAGE	16.9%	9.2%	4.55%	15.6%	11.1%	16.2%	25.4%

The thematic analysis of the responses to questions why domestic violence happens, how it could be minimized and who is responsible for it, almost mirrors the findings from the quantitative analysis. Generally, respondents declare that they do not accept violence of men against women. However, most of them explain that to a certain extent, it is justifiable because women/girls are those who trigger it and they are those who can prevent it. It is generally believed that women and girls who “respect, “obey” and are “tactful” with their partners can easily prevent battering. For instance, one respondent at the age of 38, (single, high education) explained: *“If the woman knows her man, she should know how to behave with him. In order to prevent the battering, she should not increase the volume of her voice”*. An elderly respondent at the age of 58, with completed secondary education, married, almost proudly explained:

“A few months ago, I grabbed my wife’s hair with the two hands, pulled it and yelled at her face because she had showed disrespect. She should have respected me!”

Moreover, many respondents believe that the victims aggravate violent reactions from their partners "on purpose" in order to dominate in the relationship or to manipulate them by making him feeling guilty. Some respondents raise the question of "asymmetry" in the way interpersonal violence is treated, by angrily claiming that in the eyes of the society it is always men who are treated as abusers although women "*slap their frequently partners*". The following statements are illustrative of this kind of opinion:

"Women have always been smarter for some things than men, especially regarding man-women relations. They know that after being battered they are the only victim at the end, regardless of how they have contributed to the quarrel and they knowingly create and use such situations".

High education, 27, in a relationship

"In 70% of cases women are those who create the problem and make men appear as their executors! Women can overcome this problem with their (proper) behavior".

Secondary education, 56, married

On the other hand, the actions of the perpetrator are in many accounts more rationalized than unquestionably condemned. Frequently, the aggression of male partners against women is described as reaction to the "*provocation*", or as a result of their "*powerlessness*", "*cowardly behavior*" of men and in some instances as a consequence of pathological disorders or substance abuse. Although nobody declared that domestic violence is acceptable, majority of the interviewed respondents are *de facto* justifying the violent attacks because they see valid reasons for that. Most frequently, the excuses are sought in the victims' behavior and thus violence is seen as means for disciplining women who behave "inappropriately". These are examples of such reasoning for the roots of the violent acts:

"Violence happens when the wife does not meet the needs of her husband and if she cheats on him or lies. The man will beat her in order to teach her a lesson and she will not repeat that again".

Secondary education, 38, single

"I consider battering as a corrective measure for the women who do not want to participate in solving the problem. It has nothing to do with courage - he just has to show her where her place is."

Secondary education, 57, married

The data revealed deeper complexities and contradictions in men's beliefs about the role of masculinity in domestic violence cases. On one hand, majority considered it a cowardly or non-manly

act to beat a woman, because it is easy to do that and at the same time they implicitly argued in favor of gender power asymmetry and the need of controlling and dominating women. Only several respondents condemned violence completely and tried to link it with patriarchy and gender roles as opposed to the behavior of victims or some personal weaknesses of the perpetrator.

In order to test the research hypothesis, we performed hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis. The analysis was conducted in three steps: in the first step social and economic conservatism variable was entered, in the second block old-fashioned sexism and modern sexism were employed, while in the third step of the analysis masculine gender role stress variable was entered to examine their contribution to domestic violence myths acceptance prediction. Table 3 shows only the third step of the hierarchical regression analysis which contains all study variables⁴. As can be seen, conservative values explained significant 5.1% of the variance in domestic violence myths acceptance ($F(1.323)=17.495, p<.001$), whereas old-fashioned and modern sexism accounted for evidently larger part - 15.4% of the variability of domestic violence myths acceptance ($F(1.322)=31.061, p<.001$). Masculine gender role stress contributed to very small, albeit yet significant 1% in the variance of domestic violence myths acceptance ($F(1.321)=4.238, p<.05$).

Table 3. Hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis: criterion variable domestic violence myth acceptance

<i>Model 3</i>	B	Beta	R ² _{change}
Constant	86.94		
Social and Economic Conservatism	6.59	.183***	,051***
Old-fashioned sexism	1.178	.286***	,154***
Modern sexism	.800	.229***	
Masculine gender role stress	.062	.105*	,010*

Results showed that old-fashioned sexism ($\beta = .286, p < .001$) followed by modern sexism ($\beta = .229, p < .001$) had the strongest contribution to acceptance of domestic violence myths. Namely, when these attitudes were highly expressed, domestic violence myths acceptance among male increased. Persistence of explored violence myths was positively related to social and economic conservatism as well ($\beta = .18, p < .001$). Respondents who reported higher

⁴ The other models are not presented due to the limitations in space. The presented model has the best statistical fit.

gender role stress experience, also demonstrated tendency to accept domestic violence myths ($\beta = .105, p < .05$) although the contribution of this variable to endorsement of domestic violence myths is considerably smaller in comparison to the other variables included in the model.

DISCUSSION

Domestic violence is a serious threat to women's security. Directly, it causes physical harms and pain, frequently resulting in serious injuries and sometimes death. Apart from being serious threat to physical integrity, domestic abuse profoundly damages the emotional, mental and social well-being of women. It has been well documented that domestic violence victims suffer from various health problems, psychological disorders, significantly higher levels of suicidal thinking and suicidal attempts, substance abuse and poverty in larger proportion than women who have not been subjected to this kind of aggression (Campbell, 2002; Ellsberg et al., 2008; WHO, 2010). In addition to this, domestic abuse has long term negative effects to the security of children and other family members. Some children from households where there is intimate partner violence may suffer from behavioral and emotional problems linked to violence witnessing that can result in increased difficulties with education and employment (Dube et al., 2002).

How could finding from this study be interpreted in the human security framework? Descriptive results from this study have shown that the prevalence of domestic violence myths expressed mainly through shifting the responsibility for intimate partner abuse from the perpetrator to the victim and by denying the seriousness of it is really overwhelmingly high. On average, more than half of the respondents accept in different extent various aspects of domestic violence myths. Taking into account that the connection between violent behavior and these attitudes has been empirically confirmed, it can be concluded that many men in the country are well equipped with the psychological prerequisite to perform such kind of violence. Believing that victims character or behavior are the main cause for domestic violence might on the other hand deepen the misleading beliefs about the responsibility for the violence and the expectations for proper response of the relevant institutions to it. High prevalence of acceptance of attitudes that blame victims themselves inevitably create hostile societal atmosphere for the victims and certainly prevents them in deciding to report intimate partner violence. Understandably, being aware that the belief about their responsibility in being battered is widespread, they might both fear that reporting will contribute to making things worse and blame themselves for the violent attacks.

The results clearly support the feminist scholars' thesis on 'normalization of violence', particularly domestic violence. Since such 'events' are becoming part of everyday life (Dobash & Dobash, 1998) they should be understood as an expression of systemic gender inequalities and injustice and thus reflective of a deeper, structural violence. However, situated in a context where the institutions are based on patriarchal values, intimate partner violence is typically perceived as being pathological in common sense, media or legal constructions, and even more through professional interventions. Thus, the interconnections between domestic and structural violence are blurred and violence is constructed as treatable at a psycho-social level.

The regression analysis sought answers to the question which of the included potential predictors of myths acceptance is the strongest one, in order to help in prioritizing the areas in which policy makers should focus their future activities. It failed to confirm that the pressure to adhere to the male gender role among heterosexual men largely sustains promoting intimate partner violence misconceptions. This most probably means that being “tough” with the female partner is not very important piece of the culturally defined masculine gender norm. Therefore, those who fail to follow it do not anticipate social exclusion and most likely, do not face anxiety and low self-esteem in regards with that. On the other hand, the analysis showed that the concatenation of sexist beliefs supported by conservative values is considerably related to attitudes supportive to violence against women. These beliefs and attitudes shape men’s controlling and violent behavior against women and therefore, for designing operational prevention or intervention domestic violence programs, it is necessary to prioritize demystification of these negative gender stereotypes and to alter the traditional gender ideology.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary prevention of violence by intimate partners is often dominated by a large number of activities designed to deal with the immediate consequences of violence. That is understandable, however, far from being very efficient. It has been documented in many instances, especially in this country, that even high quality legal instruments fail to bring about effects at the implementation level because civil servants in the relevant institutions lack gender sensitivity or cannot link this issue with human security or human rights (Mircheva et al, 2014; Mircheva & Kenig, 2015). This practice might be seen as an illustration for the gap between human security and human rights as normative ideals and the process by which they are realized which leads to results emptied of any radical or transformative promise it may have held (Christie, 2010). That is why considerable number of scholars insist that in order to achieve effective improvement in women’s human security, the changes in social institutions’ political, economic and legal structures need to be in line with feminist perspective (e.g. Hampson, 2004; Apalaghie, 2015).

Consequently, both policy-makers and activists in this field have to prioritize the undeniably important mission of creating a social environment that promotes gender equality based on confronting deep-rooted beliefs that gender roles are essential or useful and revealing the negative consequences and huge costs of traditional patriarchal values for both genders. In doing so, they have to take into account that the strongest support to widespread misconceptions of what domestic violence is and who is responsible for it, comes from the traditional form of sexism followed by modern sexism. In other words, the focus needs to be put almost equally on traditional attitudes toward women’s position in society and newly developed beliefs that women had got everything they called for. Additionally, the role of conservative values should not be ignored, too. This conclusion is based on conducted regression analysis which did not demonstrate that the stress of drifting from the culturally prescribed masculine role is considerably linked to misconceptions about violence towards

women in intimate relations. The data in this study support the perspective that aggression against women is largely sustained by “non-deviant” cultural norms like beliefs that traditional gender roles are acceptable, useful, essential and that they are inherently connected to the biological sex, thereby justifying the idea that violence is used as a tool for keeping the gender regimes in a status quo. In addition, significant sustenance to these beliefs is provided by conservative social values. It suggests that continuation of favoring such values will certainly reinforce broader social relations of male power and female subordination, which allows flourishing of domestic violence.

Based on the study from this rather exploratory study, we could conclude that primary prevention should be strongly concentrated on challenging the *institutional acceptance of male dominance* as well as on changing attitudes towards traditional way of defining gender and gender regimes. The first steps in addressing this might be taken within the realm of formal education by targeting young peoples’ gender equality attitudes. The evaluation data suggests that such programs in schools do have impact when carried out in both primary and secondary education and can be successful in producing attitude changes (Harne&Radford, 2008). At the same time it needs to be admitted that educational programs alone cannot be a comprehensive solution to preventing gender violence without a parallel public campaigning aiming to deconstruct or at least seriously challenge those sexism generating values and norms that are deeply embedded in the culture. Unless this happens, campaigns that tackle only the need of reporting domestic violence or its consequences will not be effective, simply because the widespread beliefs that women ‘provoke’ or ‘deserve’ their experiences or that these events are rare will remain the same.

Last, but not least, exploring the subtleties of how domestic abuse is constructed in the everyday discourse might have valuable effects on understanding violence in general. Recently, it has been proposed that both the roots and the dynamics of terror experienced in intimate relations might contribute to enhance the understanding of violence on national and international level because they have shared foundations and points of direct connectedness, especially in the way in which they attempt to exert control over victims (Pain, 2014). Acknowledging the similarities of violence that happens in the private sphere with intergroup violence, especially in the ways in which they are mediated by relations of power and privilege will certainly contribute to creating better and more inclusive responses to human insecurity. Critical discussions of the idea of human security from a feminist perspective (see Trypp and Ferree & Ewig, 2013) that offer valuable contributions in defining the ways in which security might be achieved through transforming power and power asymmetries, seem to be the right answer to the epidemic gender based violence.

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ПРЕДИЗВИЦИ СО КОИ СЕ СООЧУВА СИСТЕМОТ ЗА ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ И ОБУКА ВО ОДБРАНАТА**CHALLENGES FACING THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM IN THE DEFENCE**

Zlatko Kuzmanov, PhD

Ministry of Defence

E-mail: zas3mak@yahoo.com

АПСТРАКТ: Новите услови бараат да се инвестира во образованието, во менувањето на начинот на кој луѓето мислат (критичко размислување), во нови наставни програми и наставни методи за активно учење, со цел да се создадат нови генерација на воени и цивилни лидери. Притоа, важна е и потребна трансформација на академскиот контекст. Наставата треба да вклучува различни експерти вклучени во системот национална безбедност и тоа: претставници од Армијата, министерствата за одбрана, надворешни работи, трговија, внатрешни работи, правда и оние кои учествувале во мултинационални операции. Целите на високообразовните институции на Армиите на западните држави обично се слични, со мисии кои упатуваат на потребата за развој на офицери со критичка мисла, подготвени за високи командни позиции и кои ќе служат ефикасно на национални и мултинационални штабни позиции. Иако, целите се јасни, процесот на постигнување на истите обично не се остварува така лесно. Една од причините е тоа што не секогаш определен број на офицери и цивили од одбраната се подготвени за темелна анализа на процесот на военото образование и обука, иако, тоа од нив се очекува како континуиран процес. Имено, врвните воени и цивилни лидери треба да бидат подготвени да им дадат на политичките авторитети јасни и точни совети за суштинските воени прашања, меѓу кои и за военото образование и обука, дури и ако тој совет не е она што политичарите посакуваат да го слушнат. Всушност, за да се постигне посакувано воено образование, министерствата и вооружените сили мора да имаат јасна и сеопфатна визија за системот за оспособување и усовршување на офицерите - од базичното школување на Воените академии, во текот на кариерата на вработените, па до стратешките школи и курсеви за усовршување на полковници, идни генерали и висок раководен цивилен кадар.

Клучни зборови: воено образование и обука, нови предизвици, нови воени и цивилни лидери, интеграција, меѓународно опкружување.

ABSTRACT: New conditions require investments in education, changes in the way people think (critical thinking), new curricula and teaching methods for active learning in order to create a new generation of military and civilian leaders. In addition, transformation of the academic context is important and necessary. Instruction should include various experts involved in national security system and representatives from the Army, Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Interior, Justice and those who have participated in multinational operations. The objectives of higher education institutions in the armies of western countries are generally similar, with missions that indicate the need to develop officers with critical thought, ready for senior command positions and to serve effectively on national and multinational staff positions. Although the goals are clear, the process of achieving them usually is not so easily accomplished. One of the reasons is that not always a definite number of officers and civilians from defence are ready for a thorough analysis of the process of military education and training, although it is expected of them as a continuous process. Namely, the top military and civilian leaders should be prepared to give political authorities clear and accurate advice on the essential military issues, including the military education and training, even if that advice is not what politicians want to hear. In fact, to achieve the desired military education, the ministries and the armed forces must have a clear and comprehensive vision of the system for training and professional development of officers - from basic education at military academies, throughout the employees' careers, to the strategic schools and courses for professional development of colonels, future generals and senior civilian management staff.

Key words: military education and training, new challenges, new military and civilian leaders, integration, international environment

Context in which military education and training is conducted

To understand the need for changes in the system of military education and training, the current conditions in which it is realized should be foreseen. This involves consideration of changes in the missions of the Army, impact of the method of performance on modern combat actions, personalized needs of the Army, professionalization, reduction of its numbers and increasing its mobility, process of transition to a democratic society and civilian control over the armed forces, economic situation in the countries and budget constraints, as well as the needs to amend the current legislation governing this area.

Environment in which the need to develop the system for military education and training in democratic societies and modern armies is characterized by several main groups of factors. The first group is associated with the changes in international political relations, which results in the change in military doctrine and military missions. The second group refers to the rapid technical

- technological development, where the greatest impact on armies has the development of information technologies and the effects of transition to a democratic society, the economic situation and budgetary constraints. (Angelevski, 2007. Taken from Gray, A. and T.D. Tagarev)

There have been new threats to security in international political relations since the bipolar era, whereupon the way the perception of threats has changed. Terrorism, especially international terrorism, proliferation of weapons, drug trafficking, organized crime and regional conflicts are a serious security challenge for the countries. Doctrinal changes concerning use of military potential are required to deal with such threats and challenges. There is a need for new missions such as peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peace-building, counter-terrorism, stabilization and reconstruction missions and others. This leads to the need for training of members of the armed forces to participate in international missions led by coalition forces. Military missions and operations in such conditions require military leaders to be educated and trained in consideration of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity and respect for human rights, which are regulated by the International Humanitarian Law. Development of new technologies, especially information technologies have a major impact in shaping the system of military education and training. These technologies impact on the way how future military operations will be conducted, especially in the process of planning and execution, organization, communications, command and control, and intelligence.

The strategic goals of the Republic of Macedonia for Euro-Atlantic integration, i.e. achieving full membership in NATO and the European Union, involve the development of military education and training in the direction that will ensure the achievement of interoperability with partner countries, the ability to participate in military operations led by coalition forces and building democratic civil - military relations. Preparation and implementation of standards for full integration into Euro-Atlantic alliances, amid a complex economic situation and budgetary constraints, inevitably leads to a reduction of the armed forces and the construction of a small modern army, which means giving priority to quality in terms of quantity. Some of these factors are short-term, while other long-term impact on the development of the military education and training system in defence and the army. In any case, all factors should be thoroughly analyzed and taken into account when building the system as well as in the implementation of a thorough analysis of how the current system solutions represent a good basis for the provision of quality education and training of military and civilian personnel for the needs of defence and the Army.

The research up to now on the current functioning of the segments of the education and training system in defence and the Army, shows that the situation is complex, with independent operation of entities in the system Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) and the Military Academy (MA) and initial efforts by the MoD to integrate the functions of all subjects. The last few years the MoD has undertaken measures and activities for managing the system of education and training and its integration in the whole cycle of human resources management and managing the careers of military and civilian personnel in the MoD, ARM and MA. The remarks found refer to the practical implementation of the planned tasks and activities that are not exercised with the desired dynamics. There are problems regarding the positioning of the organizational units which are responsible for the activities, in the selection and placement of personnel, in the area of the incomplete application of the provisions of already adopted strategies and a lack of continuity in upgrading, updating and amending the already adopted documents and regulations in the field of education and training. These problems have also been identified in the analysis of all stages of the development of education and training for the past twenty three years, suggesting that the past experiences have insufficiently been applied and that there have not been comprehensive analyses. Ministry of Defence is trying to establish complete mechanisms for successful management, integration and coordination of the education and training system in the country and abroad. The legal competencies of the ARM and MA are clear. They have greater autonomy in the field of education and training; however, it is necessary for them to engage more in helping the Ministry of Defence to implement its integrative function. The solution is still in the MoD, because it should build a mechanism that will respect the autonomy of the ARM and MA, and also will motivate and commit more strongly to participate in building an integrated system, especially for those functions and tasks which must be centralized and managed from one place.

For the past few years the MoD has made distinctive efforts to promote training and professional development of civil servants, which is coordinated with the activities of the Ministry of Information Technology Society and Administration and the Agency for Civil Servants. This approach and work can serve as an example, how the MoD should coordinate activities for better management of education and training in the defence and the army.

The data for planning and implementation of training and professional development in the ARM indicate that still there is a constant in the professional development in the ARM. Continuity is seen also when analyzing the development of training and professional development in the past period in the ARM. The process of transformation, organizational improvements, construction of new bodies and preparing new documents, rules, instructions and acceptance and introduction of new NATO standards in training and education in the ARM has not been terminated. This allows constant training of the ARM personnel and professional development of their training, skills and readiness to perform military tasks. The ARM gradually follows the pace in the field of training and exercises which should allow a constant interoperability with other NATO armies. One of the main problems on this road is the insufficient funds for training and exercises.

Military Academy since its reactivation in 2009 has seen continuous development. A highly trained teaching faculty, quality study programmes and appropriate conditions for work and residence of the faculty and cadets are necessary for its successful operation. Since five years ago, the teaching faculty at the Military Academy consists of ten new young doctors of sciences that are the basis for the Academy's further development. The study programmes have been changed and upgraded in order to monitor and accept innovations in military education in the EU and NATO. With enrolment and education of cadets from other countries, the Military Academy is being promoted as a regional military institution, which of course is of great importance for more rapid development of the whole defence system of education and training. But this development and results are not sufficiently met in terms of material and financial support by the Military Academy. It is urgently necessary to improve the working conditions and accommodation, construction of more premises for professional military education, for learning foreign languages, information technology equipment, introduction of distance learning, applying simulation methods and exercises, building a gym and a modern library.

The development and improvement of the system of education and training in the defence and the army is a continuous process which does not tolerate improvisation and inconsistencies. It is necessary to have coherent implementation of the provisions of already adopted strategic documents, especially in the area of human resource management and the integration of the system of education and training. To ensure continuity in the development what is needed is to constantly update and improve strategies, regulations, guidelines, study programmes, curricula and annual calendars for training. It is especially necessary to invest in the human potential, building expert, professional and motivated personnel that will be responsible for the education and training in the defence and the army. The preparation and updating of the system documentation and investment in the personnel should be monitored by proper organizational and formational changes and improvements of the design of organizational units responsible for training and development in the MoD, ARM and MA.

Suggestions and solutions to improve the system of education and training at the Ministry of Defence

According to the Strategy for Human Resource Management and the Strategy for Education and Training in the Defence, the MoD through its organizational units in the Human Resource Department (HRD) should perform a strategic management with the system for education through coordination of competences and responsibilities of all parts of the system which will enable the implementation of goals of the Strategy for Human Resource Management.

HRD is responsible for the entire system of education and training in the defence, and in this regard it should:

- develop the Strategy for Education and Training for the MoD (MA) and ARM;
- develops policies for education and training for military and civilian personnel in the MoD and ARM;
- develop policies, executes planning, coordination and standardization of activities for learning foreign languages;
- coordinates and directs international cooperation in the field of education and training;
- enables all efforts to be put in compliance with applicable regulations and proposes amendments when there is a need;
- determines future needs / requirements for education and training in coordination with the GS of the ARM and education entities in the defence to align programmes with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES)
- determines the cost-effectiveness of education and training;
- monitors the development, studies and proposes budget for education and training in order to meet the priorities;
- avoids duplication of efforts, eliminates the risk of applying different standards in the training and education of personnel in defence and establishes cooperation and exchange of experiences with other governmental institutions for education and training in the system for security and protection of the Republic of Macedonia;
- develops more economical approach for the implementation of education and training, primarily through the introduction of new educational technologies;

- conducts annual review of policies for education and training and updates the policies if necessary.

The indicated definition of goals can ensure sustainable development of the abilities and capacities of military and civilian personnel to fulfil missions through effective management of the system for education and training through adoption and implementation of policies and programmes in the field of education and training, planning, distribution and coordination of competences and responsibilities of all entities of the system that execute education and training in the MoD, ARM and MA.

To achieve this we will mention certain suggestions for improving the system solutions in the Ministry of Defence, according to the priority of implementation.

*It is necessary to make changes and amendments to the Law on Defence and the Law on Military Service in the ARM, in the area of professional training and development for the employees in the MoD and the ARM and the training of the reserve forces.

*The Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the ARM and MA should develop a new Strategy for managing human resources, which will enable better management of the human resources, full execution of the missions of the Army, as well as achieving the legal powers and responsibilities of the MoD. In this respect, it is necessary to revise policies for managing human resources (to remove some parts, some to define appropriately and to include some new ones, according to the current and future needs).

*The Ministry of Defence in cooperation with the ARM and MA should develop a new Strategy for education and training in the defence, which will be in coordination with the provisions of the new defence strategy, the changes and amendments to the Law on Defence, the Law on Military Service in ARM, the new Long-term plan for the development of the defence (2014-2023), the Law on Military Academy and the Law on Civil servants.

*It is necessary to update the content of the Concept for professional development of the officer corps and the Concept for development of the NCOs, under the provisions of the new Defence Strategy, the changes and amendments to the Law on Defence, the Law on Military Service in the ARM, the Long-term plan for the development of the defence, the Law on Military Academy, the Concept for learning foreign languages, the Training doctrine and according to the needs of the new organizational structure and formation of the ARM.

*The Ministry of Defence, through its organizational units should consistently coordinate the activities, to prevent duplicating efforts and capabilities, to differentiate functions and responsibilities and to establish cooperation for the optimum use of available human and material resources.

*MoD through the HR Department to implement strategic management and coordination of the system for education and training by organising an annual Conference for planning and coordination of the education and training in defence and Conference for budgeting of the education and training, as it is regulated in the Army.

*MoD through the competent departments to draw up medium-term recommendations on what profile of prospective officer is needed for the Army and the defence, as a result of monitoring and studying the new needs and challenges in the country and abroad. Such recommendations would be useful for the ARM, and are designed for MA in the preparation and modification of curricula and lesson plans.

*MoD through the HR and the Department for International Cooperation (DIC) in collaboration with the Finance Department - FD and the Policy and Planning Department - PPD), to draw up a separate annual analysis of the effects, the results and the rationale for the proposed and implemented training for professional training and development of employees abroad.

*MoD through the HR, DIC, FD and PPD to prepare a training catalogue necessary for conducting work tasks for each specific position of the employees, which will be annexed in the systematization of work positions in the MoD.

*It is necessary to develop a medium and long-term plan for development and promotion of the Regional Communications Training Centre - RTCC of the MoD. The aim is to improve the coordination of capacity utilization of RTCC as NATO / PfP Centre for Education and Training.

*MoD should continue to maintain and nurture strong relations and links with the regional and international partners in defence. This will allow the employees to train abroad, and also foreign instructors to conduct training with us. The training and education of personnel of the defence in international educational institutions gives opportunity for better promotion of the defence and of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia, and the trainees in the schools and centres abroad have the chance to broaden their experience and increase their knowledge. International environment implies having acquired language competence, mostly English language, which emphasizes the need for training in knowledge of foreign languages within the education system and training in the defence. One of the objectives of the regional cooperation, such as the Adriatic Charter "A5" SEDM initiative and others, is organizing joint training and education which develops trust between the regional partners, fosters multicultural, multi-religious and multi-national values.

*MoD should initiate the establishment of a coordinating body for developing regional cooperation in military education and training through exchange of experiences, teaching faculty, joint use of resources for education and training, greater mobility of students of military academies, exchange of young officers for participation in training courses for professional training and development.

*Create conditions for planning and implementation of training in the country and international defence institutions by the use of techniques for distance learning - Advanced Distribution Learning, through the application of information technology. This concept of education and training enables, simultaneously, training and development of a greater number of people, intensive use of the teaching faculty and reduction of the cost of conducting the educational process in terms of classical methods.

*The annual training program for civil servants in the MoD and the Annual plan for professional development and training of employees in the MoD and the ARM should allow for the development and improvement of civil defence personnel, strengthening the commitment of civilian control over the armed forces and the apolitical role of the military in the society. The curricula, through part of the contents, should enable mutual education of military and civilian personnel and to create conditions for joint research on complex issues. This will improve the building of personal relations between the civilian and military personnel in the defence. The civil servants employed in the Ministry of Defence and other segments of the national security system are also a vital element of the comprehensive national linkage in the defence. Modern armed forces cannot operate without the support of the staff of professional civilians engaged in areas such as logistics, education, medicine, administrative support, law enforcement, as well as research and development. Recognizing the key specialties that civil servants should cover, and the need to be able to effectively support the armed forces, pushed the idea that civilians in the MoD should have education similar to the one provided for the key personnel in the armed forces.

*Identifying appropriate professional and managerial employees in the MoD and the ARM with a desire and capacity to carry out duties in the field of education and training and their continuous development in the career.

*Stimulating and encouraging individual researchers from MoD, ARM and MA to write scientific papers and researches in the field of education and training for the needs of the defence and the army.

*Establishment of a system of continuous information for the personnel directly involved in carrying out tasks in the area of education and training in the MoD, ARM and MA, with content of all laws and strategic documents, rules and guidelines governing the field of education and training.

*Introduction of institutional cooperation of the MoD with higher education institutions and training centres in the country and abroad. This cooperation should allow medium-term planning of needs and opportunities for professional training and development of employees in defence and the Army under policies and programmes for career development of the employees.

*As a part of the education and training policies, develop training programmes for managerial employees in the MoD, ARM and MA in coordination with the Ministry of Information Society and Administration, and according to the Annual Programme for generic training of civil servants in the country.

*Establish a Centre for simulations and distance learning in the Training and Doctrine Command in the ARM. This centre would enable an efficient and cost-effective training and implementation of simulation exercises for commands and unit headquarters of the ARM. The centre would enable the use of electronic materials available for distance learning, implementation of interactive courses and computer simulations. The main reason for using high-tech solutions in the process of military education and training is shortening the time needed for training, achieving better quality in teaching and training and saving finances. Distance learning allows the army officers after completion of formal schooling to continue with professional development and training, with minimal absence from the workplace. Of course, the first step would be to train the teachers who are to use platforms for e-learning and distance learning in best way, in order to master the use of new software modules for installing platforms for distance learning. The Centre for simulations and distance learning would also be proactively used for education and training of cadets and students of the Military Academy.

*MA in cooperation with GS and MoD should create a career system of military education and training through existing courses and schoolings, or through organizing additional forms, which will allow officers and elected civil servants from the MoD, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other entities within the system of national security to be sent by their organizations on regular training and development.

*Education of mid-level officers and senior officers acting in a multinational environment is essential and at the same, it should be strengthened and improved in the future. In addition to training courses for martial arts, there should be instruction that is appropriate to the role of today's soldier / officer. This means incorporation of subjects and topics like working in an international environment with other international / inter-agency actors; measures for military stabilization, doctrines and integrated approach; border management; gender issues; PR and media; disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation; management of humanitarian activities; psychological operations; military diplomacy; familiarization with the police, legal and customs matters; role in the measures for stabilization and reconstruction; military observation and distinction; sexual violence; anticorruption and others.

*Introduction and studies of current trends in educational programmes should be done with careful planning and clear assessment of what, how much, where and at what level of education and improvement to increase the number of classes, because this entails a reduction in the number of hours someplace else. This means that the need to introduce curricula that reflect the new military

realities which require development of additional skills that are not always associated with purely military capabilities, be exercised successively and continuously through all stages of education and professional training and development. In other words, to determine the amount of content that needs to be presented to cadets and officers in all phases, according to their professional / career development and the need to perform combat and other tasks for the appropriate position.

*It is necessary to strengthen the capacities of the organizational unit for evaluation and analysis of education and training.

*Enable the STANAG 6001 team, that tests the employees' level of English proficiency, to complete all basic training in the country and abroad, required for certification of the teachers/testers; create optimal conditions for its continuous improvement and collaboration with other STANAG teams from NATO or PfP countries and uphold full administrative long-term support for the team's task completion.

*Establish a centralized database of existing capacities for education and training in the MoD, ARM and MA for efficient use and updating.

*Create conditions for a more intensive use of English in education and training, and in performing certain tasks at different work positions in MoD, ARM and MA.

*Plan and approve more funding for education, training and exercises. Current rates of spending the budget funds shows that priority was given to employees and maintenance of equipment and infrastructure at the expense of investment in training, modernization, readiness, increase of operational capabilities, improving living standards, research, development, etc.

CONCLUSION

The top civilian and military leaders and policy-makers should always plan long-term. Defence and the Army cannot function effectively without well-educated and skilled management personnel. This requires larger funds in order to be achieved. Attempts to save money in the defence and the army at the expense of the conditions for education and training are the worst possible choice one can make. Interoperability with other NATO structures implies constantly improving standards in education and training. Improvement of the standards will enable the MoD and ARM employees to actively participate in international peacekeeping operations, and such multinational environments among others will teach us that the military profession transcends national boundaries and cultures.

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THE PLURALITY OF MEANINGS 'TERRORISM'-THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE PHENOMENA**Prof. Mirko Bilandžić, PhD****Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb****E-mail: mbilandz@ffzg.hr****Danijela Lucić, MA****Sociology at Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb****E-mail: lucic.danijela@gmail.com**

ABSTRACT: Systematic scientific research of terrorism has begun in the 1970s, when the terrorism was recognized as a differentiated security threat in the social reality and public discourse. However, scholars and experts still have not agreed about terrorism definition. Terrorism is an 'ambiguous concept' at three levels: political, ontological, and conceptual. Scientific and expert knowledge is frequently the starting point for making policies and strategies. If there is such a disagreement about definitions, which leads to a lexicographical cacophony and a fixation on the particular aspect of terrorism, which depends on interests of actors involved, thus the efficiency of defined national and supranational policies and strategies for counterterrorism is questionable. The definition as a fundamental starting point affects the study of terrorism. Moreover, institutional definitions of terrorism are an integral part of security strategies. Thus, the efficiency of defined national and supranational policies and strategies for counterterrorism is questionable if there is such a disagreement about definitions that leads to a lexicographical cacophony and fixation on any particular view of terrorism, which depends on interests of actors, involved. In addition, such state of art in the field of terrorism studies does not contribute to the development of discipline and the accumulation of knowledge or has had a paralyzing effect on substantive research. Therefore, even for scientific and moreover for practical (counterterrorism policy and strategy) reasons, all interest-ed groups should strive to clear terms and solid definition of terrorism and should eliminate the concept of 'subjugated knowledge' which is evident in determining the origin of knowledge in the study of terrorism. The authors analyze available terrorism definitions (N = 334), systematized in the database of definitions that was constructed from the scientific and academic sources, the

expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. The basic analysis was conducted on 334 definitions with key descriptive variables while the further analysis included 306 definitions, i.e. those created after 1973. The content analysis establishes the key elements of the definition, and frequency analysis shows which of the elements are most commonly used for defining terrorism. The analysis confirmed the earlier findings of the surveys about terrorism definitions, where the highest percentages have the following elements: violence/force, political element, fear/terror, threat, psychological effects, victim-target differentiation, etc. In addition, some new elements have been detected like: state as actor, social aspect/motive, international aspect, ideology, religion, etc.

Key words: terrorism, counterterrorism, terrorism definition database, terrorism definition elements.

Introduction: semantic controversies about terrorism

For two centuries, whether a greater or lesser extent, the terrorism has been and still is on the world stage and is an integral part of social and political processes. Its current significance of national and international processes is such that is justified to point out that it is one of the key concepts in today's political vocabulary and the phenomena which takes a central place on the agenda of international security and national security (Buzan; Hansen, 2009; Scmhid, 2004). Especially in contemporary conditions, terrorism is certain, as Verena Erlenbusch (2014) says 'incessant agony'. At the same time, terrorism is a very complex phenomenon also wrapped with many controversies. The fundamental controversy already is causing the answer to the question: what is terrorism? Extensive research efforts, scientific and professional community's interest as well as an interest of a wider audience have not resulted with generic definition of terrorism. Moreover, some authors point out that this is 'intrinsically ambiguous' symbol (de la Calle; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2011), concept wrapped with 'hollowness' (Ramsay, 2015), and that the chase for 'canonical definition' is wasting time (Meisels, 2009), whereby the defining of terrorism is not only useless, but also impossible if seriously considering the historicity and stability of the concept (Erlenbusch, 2014). Decades of insisting on claims that the generic definition of terrorism was not achieved simply because there was no definition that can fully cover all terrorism variations that have occurred throughout history (Laquer, 1987) is still resistant to the refutations. The extensive use of the term 'terrorism' in different historical contexts prompted the authors (Richards, 2014) to put to question the meaningless of the term, and even to talk about the 'definitional quagmire' and whether about the definitional failures as a cause of terrorism. Brian Jenkins, besides all, the problem of defining terrorism has called the 'Bermuda Triangle of terrorism' for a long time, claiming that the word terrorism has become a 'fad word' as it was (is) used as a reference to violence regardless of the nature and character of that violence (Jenkins, 1980). Many of today's versions of terrorism assume that understand terrorism

means realizing that it is a term that cannot be fully understood (Furedi, 2009). The complexity of the heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon of terrorism, convincingly painted by Thomas H. Mitchell, pointing out the negative approach to the definition of terrorism, according to which the definition of terrorism must clearly define what terrorism is not (cited in Schmid, 2004: 408). However, Philip Schlesinger, British sociologist, considers that consensus definition of terrorism has not been achieved since the process of defining is a part of a wider dispute in relation to the ideological and political goals (cited in Schmid, 2004). The concept of terrorism could not be separated from the broader social, political, cultural and linguistic context, which constitutes an necessary prerequisite for any discussion of terrorism (Erlenbusch, 2014). Definitional approaches are faced with resistance of different kind of reasons: fundamental epistemological, methodological and analytical. The ubiquitous conceptual debate and the lack of consensus on the concept of terrorism, as pointed out by Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca (2014), in return, point to deep anomalies in the study of terrorism. The controversial issue is whether 'lexicographic fixation' contributing to the development of the discipline and the accumulation of knowledge within the discipline or is paralyzing substantive research. It may be questioned: is the terrorism within the academy located in some kind of 'pre-theory stage' (Richards, 2014). Should terrorism, even be defined or it will never be defined as its meaning is in the debates about terrorism where the actors of debates are producing it with its own meaning and importance (Ramsay, 2015). Depends on the perspective, goals and research interests, each author (actor) defines the term terrorism differently. Obviously, the explanations of the reasons for the enormous number of definitions of terrorism could be found within the framework of the sociology of knowledge and science as a discipline which deals with connection of human thought and society (Matić, 2013). According to this framework, science should not be *a priori* considered as an intellectual activity which takes place in a social vacuum and in an isolation of its protagonists from the impact of the wider society. The science is oriented towards goals which are collectively supported making that scientific cognition constitutively of social character. Sociologists agree that knowledge has constructivist character; it is not merely the product of the social structure, but rather the force with which the social order (reality) is constituted. The autonomy argument as an element of the scientific dogma which claims that the science follows the internal logic of development and that the scientific research are not influenced by the values and interests which are active in its close socio-cultural environment seems not credible in terms of defining terrorism. Social scientists who study terrorism appear to be under constant attack of public and political discourse of the communities in which they operate. With these actors, they share a common language with which social preferences and political power has been expressed. Social scientists agree that terrorism from the beginning of the 1970s was diagnosed as a social problem that has become the object of expert knowledge and scientific research. This is also the beginning of the development of separate studies - terrorism studies (Riegler, 2009; Jackson; Breen-Smyth; Gunning; Jarvis, 2011; Stampnitzky, 2013). Four decades earlier terrorism was a marginal social problem, while the results of academic work indicate the existence of 'mature' terrorism studies (Crenshaw, 2014). Still definitional and other controversies within the social science of terrorism suggest that the terrorism studies have analyt

ical deficits and limits. Is it even possible to produce objective knowledge about terrorism? Could we therefore understand terrorism if it is not possible to define the meaning of a term which is the origin of all knowledge and opinion. Also, there is a question about possibility of scientific study of terrorism, though it is not defined? Scientific and professional positions are polarized. Harvard sociologist Lisa Stampnitzky, analyzing terrorism studies convincingly proves that expert discourse on terrorism operates between science and politics, between academic expertise and state (Stampnitzky, 2013). Hence, the plurality of meanings 'terrorism' and the absence of objective, coherent and consequently definition which allows subjective labeling of a phenomenon and behavior as a terrorist, link into consideration of the relationship between knowledge and power (Foucault, 1994). In the asymmetric conflict as terrorism is the state has a monopoly on the definition of terrorism, government is a principal defining agency that maintains the 'power to define'. Surely, this is one of the reasons that some knowledge about terrorism is unrecognized and excluded from the study of terrorism. Studies of terrorism are characterized by a dominant form of knowledge and, as Michel Foucault says, form of 'subjugated knowledge' evident in determining the origin of knowledge in the study of terrorism (Jackson, 2012). Regardless of the methodological and analytical flaws of terrorism studies, normative bias, focus on problem-solving theory, rather than on the perspective of critical theory (cited in Joseph, 2009), a research effort aimed at the search for a universal definition of terrorism is a venture of that academy and professions should not give up. Terrorism definition should specify concept uniqueness and its distinctions in relation to other forms of human behavior and political violence. This is useful for at least two reasons. First, without usable definition, as Roberta Senechal de la Roche (2004) says, theory is not possible. Second, the knowledge is absolutely necessary prerequisite for resolving terrorism, which has a form of modern social scourge, 'social cancer' and negation of 'social being' which represents the dark side of human civilization (Jalata, 2010). The knowledge is the best tool for good policy. Scientific results undeniably contribute in defining of quality national policies as well as strategies for combating terrorism. Having this in mind, the efforts for further investigation of terrorism and practical application of research results in particular attempts to resolve 'the terrorist conflicts' are imposing as a basic need. This work has just such a direction, its goal is with an empirical analysis of existing definitions, provide a further contribution to the understanding of the term terrorism.

Methodology

In order to get the deeper insights into a part of the existing knowledge about terrorism with the emphasis on the existing definitions, the database with 334 terrorism definitions⁵ was constructed. The greatest part of the database contains 262 definitions that could be found in the section *The Definition of Terrorism* in the master work of Alex Schmid – *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* from 2011. The database used in this work was extended for 72 new definitions that have been selected from various types of sources. Hence, there are scientific and academic definitions, definitions of experts, the definitions of the various institutions, organizations and associations (e.g. the UN, the EU, the FBI, the CIA, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, etc.), the definitions of news sources, and so on. For all the definitions, key descriptive data were defined – year, author and source. Also, certain attributes and types were assigned to all of the definitions with regard to whether they are academic, professional, organizational, where they occurred or with which country and region they could be linked and have they appeared prior to or post September 11 of the 2001. Since, the basic idea of this work was to analyze the definitions of terrorism after its scientific research had begun and after entered into a broad public debate, means since 1973, so 28 definitions that have been published up to 1972 were left from further analysis. The content analysis of 306 definitions confirmed previously known (existing) elements and extracted some new element and the frequency analysis defined the order of the most frequently used elements for determining terrorism. From a total of 31 elements that in a greater or less percentage appears in the definitions, 22 of them are known from earlier research and were for the first time described in the work of Schmid and Jongman in 1988 (*Table 1*). These elements are retained (confirmed) in the analysis of the definition used in this study (*Table 3*). Some of the 22 elements were slightly modified (in their description some synonyms were added to facilitate content search) but the meaning of “adopted” elements remained thus unchanged. All the elements obtained in the content analysis, 31 (22 + 9), have been introduced as attributes in the database in order to be assigned to the definitions in which they appear and ultimately, to conduct the frequency analysis and to show the frequency of appearance of elements in the existing database of definitions of terrorism.

A short review of earlier studies

Scientists have been for decades preoccupied with trying to determine the meaning of the term terrorism. In a very influential and cited research, Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (1988) investigated

⁵ It should be noted that the database, although it covers the longest period, and therefore the highest number of definitions of all previous studies of such type, certainly do not represent a comprehensive database of all definitions. Therefore, based on the results, and in addition to all previously presented controversies about the possible generic definition and related problems, we cannot have generalized and definitive conclusions on the concept of terrorism. Rather, it is possible to speak of observed changes or ‘trends’ in the existing origin of knowledge about terrorism. In addition, it is possible to draw convincing conclusions about the fundamental qualitative codes or elements of the concept of terrorism.

the frequency of specific words in the 109 relevant terrorism definitions, which were published to the mid-1980s⁶. The research results (Table 1) showed that violence/force, political and terror/fear are words which appeared in the most of definitions: violence 83,5%, political 65,0%, fear/terror 51,0% and threat 47%. This was the first case (1984) of the academic consensus definition of terrorism.

Table 1: Frequency of use single word in the terrorism definitions, N=109 (Source: Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 5)

Elements	%
Violence, Force	83,5
Political	65
Fear, Terror emphasized	51
Threat	47
Psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions	41,5
Victim-Target differentiation	37,5
Purposive, Planned, Systematic, Organized action	32
Method of combat, strategy	30,5
Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constrains	30
Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	28
Publicity aspect	21,5
Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	21
Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	17,5
Intimidation	17
Innocence of victims emphasized	15,5
Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	14
Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	13,5
Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	9
Clandestine, covert nature	9
Repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence	7
Criminal	6
Demands made on third parties	4

⁶ A critical review of this research could be found in Ramsay, 2015.

This consensus has brought 22 elements of terrorism and four of them (indicated above) had the highest frequency of occurrence in the existing definitions. The second 'academic consensus' of 1988 was based on comments by fifty scientists on the content of the definition (elements) of terrorism from the first 'academic consensus'. According to the results, the definition of terrorism included 16 elements (Schmid, 2004: 382). According to these elements terrorism could be summarized as: 1) an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated 2) violent action, employed by 3) (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for 4) idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. 5) The immediate human victims of violence are generally 6) chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or 7) selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. 8) Threat and violence-based 9) communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used 10) to manipulate the main target (audiences(s)) turning it into a 11) target of terror, 12) a target of demands, or a 13) target of attention, depending on whether 14) intimidation, 15) coercion, or 16) propaganda is primarily sought.

Fifteen years later Martha Crenshaw (2003) has identified thirteen elements of the definition of terrorism: 1) a specialized form of political violence, 2) conspiratorial and deceptive, 3) requires few numbers and resources, 4) symbolic targets, most often civilian and undefended, 5) performed for psychological effect on key audiences, including those who identify with the victims and those who identify with the perpetrators, 6) key element of surprise and shock, as well as fear in targeted audiences, 7) does not directly engage the armed forces of the enemy, 8) primarily seeks publicity and recognition for a cause, 9) usually performed in an urban environment, bombings being the preferred method, 10) strategy can serve different ideologies and goals (e.g. revolutionary, nationalist, reactionary or vigilante, single-issue), 11) can become an end in itself, although rarely successful in the long term if not combined with other methods, 12) usually associated with non-state organizations but can be used by state or state bureaucracies as a clandestine tool of foreign policy or against dissidents living abroad and 13) a 'contested' concept because of its pejorative connotations and use as a political label to condemn or delegitimize an opponent.

Almost at the same time, in 2004, research conducted by Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler was announced. These authors investigated the meaning of the term terrorism through exploring frequency analysis of 73 definitions of terrorism that have been published in 55 scientific articles between 1977 and 2001 in the three leading scientific journals that deal with the topic of terrorism: *Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. The results (Table 2) confirmed that the fundamental elements are: violence, political, fear and threat. Richard Jackson (2011), however, was exploring the minimum basic elements of the definition of terrorism.

Table 2: Frequencies of definitional elements of 'Terrorism' according to the three journals (Source: Weinberg; Pedahzur; Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004:783.)

Elements	Terrorism N = 38	Studies in Conflict and Terrorism N = 10	Terrorism and political violence N = 25
1. Violence	68%	80%	72%
2. Political	63%	50%	60%
3. Fear	21%	20%	24%
4. Threat	50%	0%	44%
5. Victim	16%	50%	28%
6. Tactic	13%	70%	44%
7. Civilians	16%	30%	28%
8. Movement	24%	40%	32%

Finally, decades of rigorous academic and thorough expert analysis of the current definition of terrorism were the base for Alex Schmid (2011) to claim that revised/upgraded academic consensus on the definition of terrorism has been achieved, so-called 'revised academic consensus definition'. In terms of achieved consensus, ten elements are defined that constitute the term terrorism or represent the explanatory definition of terrorism: 1) the dual character of the concept of terrorism: it is a doctrine that postulates the effectiveness of the use of a special political violence and assumed its strategic effects, which should produce power in the political conflict in which victims of violence (primarily civilians and non-combat forces) are not the primary target; and it is the practice, tactics or method of (de)personalized killing and production shocking violence on the public with the aim to influence the political process or manipulate the process; 2) the triple context in which terrorism occurs: the rule of fear (eg. a repressive and illegitimate regimes); continuous protests and propaganda by other means that lead to disruption of public order; context of irregular, psychological or asymmetric warfare; 3) executors as sources or agents of violence: terrorism is the product of man, no terror without terrorists who are non-state and state actors; 4) political character: terrorism is a political (not criminal) violence; 5) violent acts of terrorism involving the commission of a demonstrative, intentional, unilateral, illegal or illegitimate and without moral restraint, selective or non-discriminatory act of violence, which causes death or serious injury and which is undertaken in peacetime or outside the zone of combat operations; its goal is deterrence or coercion against a third party who is directly or indirectly connected with the victims, with the ultimate aim of complying (subordination) executor goals; 6) communication based on threats: the threat of terrorist violence is a form of 'conditional killing', it is creating a climate of fear, which implies a threat coming impact anytime, anywhere and to anyone if they do not comply with the requirements of terrorists;

7) the distinction between direct civilian victims and the final target audience: direct victims who are subjected to threats of violence or use of violence execution are different from the final target audience; therefore anyone can be a victim of terror; direct victims are impersonal target; they are passive means to achieve the goals of terrorists; most of the victims regardless of whether they are representative or symbolic targets of violence actually are the objectives of the secondary character⁷; 8) terror/fear/horror: the intended act of violence is designed to produce the effect of extreme fear or intimidation (terror) which is above the proportion of the results of violence; terrorists are trying to cause public shock, fear and an exaggerated climate of terror⁸; 9) intent: a terrorist act is undertaken with the intent to terrorize the aimed target and exploitation of uncertainty created by the act of execution of a terrorist act; threat of future terrorist act is in compliance (subordination) function of the terrorists or deter the other side from taking any action inconsistent with the aims of terrorists; 10) terrorism does not make an individual act of terror, but it is a campaign that takes place in a series of terrorist acts.

⁷ In the case of non-state terrorism and having in mind that one of the fundamental functions of the state is to provide security to its citizens, a terrorist act causes instability of the social order proving that the state is unable to protect its citizens which brings into question the social contract between government and citizens.

⁸ The degree of fear of secondary victims means society (public) depends on the spatial and emotional distance to the direct victims and ranges from fear, over anxiety to despair. Social groups that have a positive attitude towards terrorists or negative towards the victims do not share such feelings.

Findings and interpretation of research results

Although the sample of the definition of the base dating back to 1972 is small (N = 28), and methodologically speaking, incomparable with those definitions created from 1973 to date, it is still possible to indicate some trends in the field of knowledge about terrorism. It is interesting that for the period until 1972, only 28 definitions were recorded in the database or 8.4% of all definitions, while from 1973 to date 306 definitions were recorded, or 91.6%. Terrorism as it is today usually define - threat or use of violence/terror to achieve political goals - if only briefly looked in the past to the year 1972, in social reality often appeared in its 'purest' forms, but scientific and professional community only in a small percentage spoke of terrorism as a separate phenomenon. Deeper analysis of 28 definitions of that period, says that 8 of them occurred within the revolutionary parties, 19 of them could be characterized as scientific (academic) and professional. Here it should be noted that for many of authors of that period the definition of terrorism was a 'by-product' since they were not specialized for the phenomenon of terrorism, but primarily for the general theme of political violence. It is interesting to emphasize that content of 25 (89.3%) of those definitions imply that the 'user' of such forms of violence could be any actor. In other words, those definitions are inherently neutral, the actor could be non-state, but it could be state as well which in some definitions is explicitly stated.

Therefore, while analyzing the production of definition from 1973 to date (Figure 1), it is evident that there are certain 'booms'. The first one was in the mid-1970s, which had followed the entrance of terrorism in the area of interest of scientists and experts. The special 'boom' is notable in the early 2000s, for which it is not necessary to say anything more than 9/11.




Figure 1: Frequency of definitions per years

In order to support the thesis of popularity of terrorism as a subject of study it should be noted that there are a large number of authors as 'producers of knowledge'. From the 1973 to date, there are 231 authors in the database who suggested one or more definitions of terrorism⁹. Whether this is the systematic and continuous scientific approach on the one hand or is this 'ad hoc' and perhaps for certain purposes ordered knowledge on the other, maybe is best illustrated by the fact that a very small number of authors had produced more than one definition of terrorism. The most productive authors of this period are: Paul Wilkinson (7); Brian M. Jenkins (6); Alex P. Schmid (5); Cecil A. J. Coady, Bruce Hoffman, Todd Sandler and Michael Walzer (4); Yonah Alexander, Walter Enders, Tomis Kapitan, Walter Laqueur, Edward Francis Mickolus, Wayman C. Mullins and Leonard Weinberg (3); Cynthia C. Combs, Ronald D. Crelinsten, Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, Brian Crozier, Khusrav Gai-bulloev, Boaz Ganor, Frederick J. Hacker, Gerald Holton, Michael Horowitz, Rex A. Hudson, Milivoje Karanović, Gary LaFree, Omar Malik, Jay Mallin, Christopher Mitchell, John F. Murphy, Benjamin Netanyahu, Jordan J. Paust, Ami Pedahzur, David C. Rapoport, Louise Mary Richardson, Joshua Sinai, Michael Stohl, Charels Tilly, Grant Wardlaw and Burliegh Wilkins (2)¹⁰.

⁹ Some definitions were published in the co-authors' work. In such cases, all the authors were separately listed.

¹⁰ The number of definitions of the respective author is placed in brackets after the name/names. Also, authors Crenshaw, Hutchinson, Crozier and Mallin have published one definition before and one after 1973.

From 231 authors 191 of them or 82.7% suggested one definition of terrorism¹¹.

If we analyze the geographical dispersion or state (Figure 2) in which these definitions after 1973 have appeared¹², the absolute priority is on the side of authors that are coming from the United States (182), followed by the United Kingdom (46), international/transnational definition (17) Germany (12), Israel and Canada (9), Australia (7), other countries (23) and unknown (1).

¹¹ The authors are: Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey F. Addicott, Eqbal Ahmad, Richard Allan, Fritz Rene Allemann, Vijay Kumar Anand, Sean K. Anderson, Chris T. Antoniou, Navin A. Bapat, Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Ruth Margolies Beitler, J. Bowyer Bell, Steven Best, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Michael Blain, S. Brock Blomberg, Bernhard Blumenau, Gaston Bouthoul, Joseph Boyle, Tilman Brück, John Bunzl, Brian Burgoon, Daniel Byman, Claudia Card, David Carleton, Peter Chalk, Richard J. Chasdi, Noam Chomsky, Predrag Cicovacki, Henar Criado, David Claridge, Richard Clutterbuck, Barry Collin, Joseph J. Collins, H.H.A. Cooper, J. Angelo Corlett, G. Davidson (Tim) Smith, Janny de Graf, Senechal de la Roche, Donatella Della Porta, Davor Derenčinović, Jacques Derrida, Philip E. Devine, Matthew G. Devost, Adam Dolnik, Laura Dugan, Frazer Egerton, Richard English, Alona E. Evans, Ahmed Galal Ezeldin, Geoffrey Fairbairn, Seymour Maxwell Finger, Nick Fotion, Thomas M. Franck, Chas. W. Freeman, Manfred Funke, Noemi Gal-Or, Daniel E. George-Abeyie, Danica Gianola, Anthony Giddens, Robert Goodin, L. C. Green, H. C. Greisman, Michael Gunter, Ted Robert Gurr, Lawrence Campbell Hamilton, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Heidi Heft LaPorte, Virginia Held, Henner Hess, Christopher Hewitt, Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Robert Paul Hoffman, Ted Honderich, John Horgan, Michael Horowitz, Brian Houghton, Martin Hughes, Ze'ev Iviansky, M.W. Jackson, Alison M. Jaggar, Asafa Jalata, Božidar Javorović, Cindy R. Jebb, Janera Johnson, Paul Johnson, Abraham Kaplan, Eban Kaplan, Irving R. Kaufman, Simon Keller, Haig Khatchadourian, Stacey L. Knobler, Edward Kossoy, Tim Krieger, Douglas Lackey, Nicolas K. Laos, William Lee Eubank, Burton M. Leiser, Jeff Lewis, Ruth Linn, Norman Linzer, Peter H. Liotta, Omar Lizardo, Juliet Lodge, George A. Lopez, Peter Lösche, Brenda Lutz, James Lutz, Edward A. Lynch, Adel A.F. Mahmoud, Joesph Margolis, Michael McKenna, Jeff McMahan, Lionel McPherson, Daniel Meierrieks, Ariel Merari, Dana Milbank, Martin A. Miller, Lyubov Mincheva, Fathali M. Moghaddam, Mehdi Mozaffari, Cathérine Müller, Brigitte L. Nacos, Jan Narveson, William D. Neale, Peter Neumann, Anthony Nocella, J.J. Nutter, Garrett O'Boyle, John N. Paden, Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez, Andrew J. Pierre, Neal Allen Pollard, Leslie A. Pray, Edward H. Price, Igor Primoratz, Anthony C.E. Quainton, Jacob Rabbie, Robert J. Rafalko, Walter Reich, Wayne G. Reilly, W. Michael Reisman, Marco Rimanelli, David Rodin, Danir Roguly, Romansheim, Jeffrey Ian Ross, Joachim J. Savelsberg, Peter C. Scderberg, Hans Joachim Schneider, Jan Schreiber, Yoram Schweitzer, Hans-Dieter Schwind, Timothy Shanahan, Thomas Sherlock, Richard H. Shultz, Yoginder Sikand, M. E. Silverstein, Peter Simpson, Baljit Singh, Christine Sixta, Martin Slann, Saul Smilansky, W.H. Smith, Lester A. Sobel, Ekatarina Stepanova, James P. Sterba, H. M. Stevenson, Jay Sweifach, Richard Thackrah, Judith Tinnes, Valery Tishkov, Harmonie Toros, Domenico Tosini, Charles Townsend, Austin A. Turk, Peter Waldmann, Clive Walker, F.M. Watson, Edward Weisband, Carl Wellman, David J. Whittaker, Michael Wievorka, M. Wilson, John B. Wolf, Franz Wördemann, Joseph K. Young, Robert Young, Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny, Oleg Zinam, Noam Zohar.

¹² The unit of analysis was the definition, not authors, which means that for each definition 'country of origin' was assigned. For example, if an author of published definition is the scientist/experts who is of Jewish origin, and works/worked and lives/lived in the United States, the US was assigned as 'country of origin'. If the definition was created as a co-author work of two or more scientists/experts, one 'country of origin' was assigned from which are both of the authors. In the case where co-authors are from different countries, the criteria for assigning 'country of origin' was from which country was/is first listed author.




Figure 2: Frequency of definitions by country

Frequency Analysis

Frequency analysis of the key elements for the definitions of terrorism (Table 3) is based on the results of Schmid and Jongman research (22 elements) that were previously confirmed/extracted from content analysis of 306 definitions. The content analysis indicated nine elements more which are highlighted in Table 3 (gray shaded). These are: state as actor, social aspect/motive, international aspect, ideology, religion, economical aspect, revolutionary aspect, warfare (unconventional) and deranged people as a perpetrator. After the elements were assigned to definitions, the frequency analysis showed the order of elements, means the percentage of appearance for all 31 elements in the analyzed database of terrorism definitions.

Table 3: Frequency and percentage of elements in the terrorism definitions, N=306

Elements	Frequency	%
1. Violence, force	245	80,1
2. Political, policy	223	72,9
3. Fear, terror emphasized	164	53,6
4. Threat	148	48,4
5. Psychological effects and (anticipated) reactions	121	39,5
6. Victim - target differentiation	105	34,3
7. Purposive, Planned, Systematic, Organized action	102	33,3
8. Group, movement, organization as perpetrator	96	31,4
9. Extra normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constrains	89	29,1
10. Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims	88	28,8
11. Method of combat, strategy, tactic	83	27,1
12. Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance	80	26,1
13. Publicity aspect	65	21,2
14. Arbitrariness, impersonal, random character, indiscrimination	58	19,0
15. Intimidation	55	18,0
16. State as a subject	54	17,7
17. Innocence of victims emphasized	39	12,8
18. Social, (socially motivated)	38	12,4
19. Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence	35	11,4
20. International	35	11,4
21. Ideological (doctrine)	26	8,5
22. Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others	25	8,2
23. Clandestine, covert nature	25	8,2
24. Religious	24	7,9
25. Repetitiveness, serial or campaign character of violence	19	6,2
26. Criminal	19	6,2
27. Economic, (economically motivated)	16	5,2
28. Revolutionary	16	5,2
29. Warfare (unconventional)	14	4,6
30. Deranged as perpetrator	13	4,3
31. Demands made on third parties	6	2,0

According to the findings of the analysis, the most common element is 'violence/force' with a very impressive number of occurrences or 80,1%. It is followed by the 'political aspect' (72,9%), 'fear/terror' (53,6%), 'threat' (48,4%) and 'psychological effects' (39,5%). The elements with a high percentage of occurrences are 'victim-target differentiation' and 'purposive, planned, systematic, organized action', etc. If we compare these results with some results from previous researches, especially with those of Schmid and Jongman from 1988 and with the results of Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler from 2004, it is evident that four key elements ('violence/force', 'political aspect', 'fear/terror' and 'threat') remained on the identical positions, with very similar percentages (Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3). Among the new elements extracted in the content analysis 'state as actor' (17,7%) has the highest ranking. It should be pointed out that in 185 or 60.5% of the definition of terrorism actor is not nominated, but terrorism is defined in terms of content as a phenomenon that is not linked to a specific actor, which means that an actor could be non-state and state as well. If we connect this finding with the fact that the element 'state as actor' took a high place (16th position among 31) it is reasonable to argue that this important aspect for understanding terrorism was marginalized and even excluded from previous considerations and researches. Comparing to Schmid and Jongman's ranking of elements in which the element 'group, movement, organization as perpetrator' had 16th place; here it is on a fairly high 8th with more than doubled percentages (14% versus 31%). These two findings - 'group as perpetrator' and 'state as actor' indicate that a quite number of terrorism experts are trying to explain it from the perspective of actor theory. Some other new elements that appeared in analysis are also important to understand, first knowledge and constructing knowledge about terrorism. Those are: 'social element', 'ideological', 'economical', 'religious' and 'revolutionary'. Some authors have used these elements to explain terrorism; especially the contemporary terrorism and this could be the reasons why in the earlier researches these elements were not detected as components of some definitions. Another interesting element of the analysis is the 'international aspect'. In fact, some authors are defining 'international terrorism' as a separate type, but actually it proved to be a constitutive element of many definitions, since most of these definitions have been created in the last 15 years and terrorism has become an international (global) problem which doesn't have boundaries. In summary, the key elements point to the fundamental definition of terrorism. Terrorism is thus a threat of use of violence/terror and the use of terror that by means of psychological effects is trying to achieve political goals.

Other attributes and elements extracted are additional help in the differentiation of terrorism from other types of political violence. Their number indicates the various forms of terrorism in its rich empirical appearance.

Conclusions

The study of terrorism has resulted in a vast number of competing and often contradictory definitions of terrorism. The failure of generic definition still characterized it as 'ambiguous concept'. Moreover, since the expert discourse on terrorism operates between science and politics, between academic expertise and state, many definitions are biased or open to political instrumentalization. Maybe for a full understanding is not so questionable term terrorism as an analytic category but the way of using the term in the discursive practice which is inconsistent and subjected to double standards. Terrorism simply shares the fate of many concepts that are the subject of social scientific research (for example, the lack of a generic definition of the war). Terrorism is socially constructed, it's meaning and practical appearance are changing in dynamic socio-historical conditions. This is a crucial reason for the failure of a generic definition of terrorism. Nevertheless, numerous definitions show that the concept of terrorism has been defined. The problem, then, is the lack of linkages between science and empiricism, or as Gilbert Ramsay convincingly concludes, the problem is in discrepancy of consistent image of terrorism because of endless, 'inconclusive debates' about terrorism definitions and coherent but different practical use of this term. What level of scientific approval is required or could be expected in regards to defining a social (societal, sociological) or political concept? The results of empirical research for 306 available definition of terrorism presented in this paper show that a minimum level of scientific approval on the defining of the concept of terrorism has been achieved. Based on the content and frequency analysis, key elements of the definition of terrorism are obtained. These are: 'violence/force' which occurs in 245 definitions or 80,1%, 'political aspect' (72.9%), 'fear/terror' (53,6%), 'threat' (48,4%) and 'psychological impact' (39,5%). Surely, they cannot be observed as atoms, as a separate base unit, but rather as qualitative and subjective codes that which logically connected and summarized enable a basic definition of terrorism. Terrorism is thus a threat of use of violence/terror and the use of terror, which by means of psychological effects is trying to achieve political goals.

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THE PROTECTION OF BUSINESS SECRETS AND PERSONAL DATA IN PRIVATE SAFETY

Prof. Milan Daničić, PhD

Faculty of safety and protection, Banja Luka,

E-mail: milan.danicic@fbzbl.net

Prof. Milan Milosevic, PhD

Faculty of business studies and law, Belgrade,

E-mail: milanmilos@fpasp.edu.rs

ABSTRACT: It is well known that sources which threaten data privacy of economic subjects through human interference, no matter if it is accidental or on purpose, could be divided into: inner, outer, and combined sources. As outer sources of threatening are considered persons, who are not employed in the economic subject, but whose damaging behavior could influence negatively on the subjects safety. To this group are also classified the companies that are in charge of private security, including detective agencies as well. While working on assignments in their scope of work, these safety subjects come regularly to the data, which are regarded as a business secret and should not be published. All the collected data and knowledge during their investigation work could only be used for the original purpose and in the end of investigation should be handed over to the client (except for the ones, which are not considered as significant for the job and which should be destroyed in certain period of time). When keeping the business secret, a company or an agency is obligated to abide by the regulations for personal data protection, no matter if the data analysis is done automatic, half-automatic or in some other way. If subjects of private security have a need to use personal data, this is allowed only under conditions, which are regulated by the laws in this scope of work, or with clients consent. As for determination of secret data, it is important to differentiate public from secret ones, and to respect public principles for the simultaneously protection of the society and the state. Additionally, a business secret should be differentiated from the professional one, as well as business intelligence from business espionage

Key words: private security, business secret, professional secret, personal data, protective precautions

1. Introduction

Globalization processes, quick and permanent technological changes, unexpected development of informational and communicational technologies, as well as consequences which came as a result of world economic crisis, force economic entities to adjust their strategies and to leave previous traditional working ways. That is why today it is almost impossible to implement some important business process without managing of business information, which is a kind of a support to the top management of companies, in accordance with determined business politics and the environment in which an economic entity works.

When it comes to countries with a long history in market economy, a big accent is given to the protection and security of business information. Therefore, a big amount of funding is generated to above mentioned purposes. Practice showed that the security of business subjects and related confidential information are one of the most important keys to the success on the market. The loss of confidential information can lead to serious misbalances in a company business, and sometimes even to the complete downfall.

One possible way of endangering business secrets and personal data could also be subjects in the area of a private security (companies that are ensuring private security and detective agencies), which are hired by management corporations as outsourcing companies. This is one of the reasons why more and more expressed influences of private security sector in the area, that was traditionally reserved for the state structures that are conducting force, causes a various polemics among professional and public circles, especially when it comes to the protection of generally excepted human freedom and rights, and on the other side, to need for safeness as a subject of professional and commercial service providing.

In Republic of Serbia a relatively small number of economic societies protect their business secrets in an organized way. These habits are inherited from the socialistic period, when economic societies not only did not protect their information and projects, but also gave away these information for free. That is why it is important that every employee possess a security culture, i.e. a knowledge in the area of business protection.¹³

¹³ Some definitions were published in the co-authors' work. In such cases, all the authors were separately listed.

2. Business secrets and sources of their endangering

It is not rare that terms business secret and business information are often used without a terminological difference. The expression business information is related to all the knowledge, which is in a function of market business and realization of interests and goals of economical entities. Today, when business is not limited just to single companies and economy as a field of human action, business information can have also a political, law, social, technological or scientific character. That means that every information, if and when needed, could be used as a business one; but it also means that any information does not have to be a business one, if it is not used as the one.¹⁴

The existence of a huge number of information leads to two aspects of business information- a relativity (some information is a business information to one business subject, and is not to the other one) and relevance (it is not looked for any business information, than for the one that is useful and worth to the company). On the other side, a term: business secret represents a number of an information and data, which are not just used in a business, but also bring economical profit and competitive advantage to the company they belong to.¹⁵

The subject of a business secret, which is being kept by its mediator, could be different things- production processes, technologies, inventions, business methods, ingredients of a product, content of a contract and many others.

The endangerment of business secrets by human action, irrelevant if it is done by accident or on purpose, could be divided, depending on the environment where the source is, into three groups: inner sources, outer sources and combined sources of endangerment.¹⁶

When it comes to inner sources of endangerment, they are caused by employees in the company. The area of endangerment cannot be precise defined just to the working hours. That means that employees beside the working hours, caused by not implemented or not enough implemented security culture, by accident or on purpose could jeopardize a corporation business by transmitting the important business data. In outer sources of endangerment are classified all persons that are not employed in the company, but with their harmful actions could influence on a company security.¹⁷

Finally, combined sources of endangerment are represented by common harmful actions of employees and persons that are not in a working relation to the company.

¹⁴ Refers to: Javorović Božidar, Bilandžić Mirko, Poslovne informacije i business intelligence, Golden marketing & Tehnička knjiga, Zagreb 2007., page 115.

¹⁵ Compare to: Katulić Tihomir, Uvod u zaštitu intelektualnog vlasništva u Republici Hrvatskoj, CARNet – Hrvatska istraživačka i akademska mreža, Zagreb 2006., page 50.

¹⁶ Trivan Dragan, original quote, page 146.

¹⁷ Extended in: Mandić Goran, Sistemi obezbeđenja i zaštite, FCO, Belgrade 2004, page 35-37.

Negative effects on the level of endangerment of business secrets are higher when the business is led outside the home country; the information system is decentralized; the business is connected to the national security; the cooperation with competitive subjects is on a high level; „joint venture“ investments are really high; dismissing of employees are in the process or are about to come in the near future; a high technology is used; there is no „business counterintelligence“ programs for a protection from a business espionage; electronic business is involved; branched business partnerships exist etc.

1.1. Subjects of Private Security and Endangerment of Business Secrets

The main principle for the establishing and functioning of different types of private security is the individual's right to self-protection, which is transmitted by a contract to the other subjects in a private security sector. Besides that, the key impulse to the process of the privatization of the security in developed countries was a demand for improvement of efficiency of state institutions. The answer was more and more popular outsourcing of security jobs, which were confided before just to the state institutions.¹⁸

Considering possible illegal actions related to business in the area of private security, including revealing business secrets, the security culture of employees working in that sector demands a full professionalism, respect of legal principles, knowledge of methods and mediums, that are used by jeopardizers, knowledge of adequate mechanisms and procedures which could prevent endangerment of business subjects, admission of job applicants with a total respect of security demands, an effective inner work control and cooperation during an outer control, respect for the principles of confidentiality, growing cooperation with other subjects in the security system, avoiding influences of formal and informal centers of power, strict adherence to security procedures, taking care of personal security and document security, as well as avoiding „conflict of interest“.¹⁹

When it comes to the Republic of Serbia, The Law of Private Security²⁰ determines the obligation of data protection, which is available to the subjects in the area of private security. The Clauses 30-32 of The Law determine that the data collected during the investigation of private security could only be used in that purpose, and cannot be given to other persons or publicized, unless if it is other declared or agreed. The person, to whom the data relate, has the full right to demand to see all the data, which includes overview, reading and listening, as well as noticing. On the other side, copying the material is also possible, but the person must bear the cost; as well as demanding for certain parts of data to be deleted or changed.

¹⁸ Extenden in: Toyne Sewell Patrick, „Private Security Companies: The Reasons Why“, Military Technology, Vol. 31, Issue 3, Mönch Publishing Group, Bonn 2007., pp. 60-61.

¹⁹ Compare: Danicic Milan, stajic Ljubomir, Privatna bezbjednost, VSUP, Banja Luka, 2008., page 223.

²⁰ „Sluzbeni glasnik RS“ 6poj 104/2013.

In the case of fulfillment or breach of contract, a legal entity, i.e. an entrepreneur for private security is obligated to hand over the data to the user or to delete them in the following 15 days from the day of the contract breach, or the agreement withdrawal; and the other data, which are not relevant or which the user refuse to take, should be destroyed in the following 8 days. The Law also established the obligation of the subjects of the private security to keep as a secret, in accordance to the law and other principles that arrange the data confidentiality, all the data collected during the work, except in the cases that are excluded by the law.

The Clause 68. of The Law of Detective Investigation²¹ determines that the data collected during the investigation can be used just for that purpose, and cannot be given to other persons or publicized, unless if it is other declared or agreed. In the case of fulfillment or breach of contract, i.e. written agreement withdrawal, a legal entity and entrepreneur for detective investigation are obligated to hand over the data to the user or to delete them in the following 15 days from the day of the contract breach, or the agreement withdrawal; and the other data should be destroyed in the following 8 days.

Besides that, a legal entity, i.e. entrepreneur for detective investigation, as well as employed detective are obligated to follow the law and other principles that arrange the data confidentiality, and to keep as a secret all the data collected during the work, unless if it is other declared or agreed. That obligation stays even after the investigation, i.e. after the employment of a detective. Otherwise, a legal entity/entrepreneur is obligated to keep all the contracts for years.

Adequate and effective regulations of private security sector, which means that democratic state institutions control and observe that sector, and the subjects in a private security on a professional and responsible way provide services to clients, is the main assumption that the sector contributes to the safety insurance in general. On the other side, private security without supervision and control, as well as weak regulated activities of the sector in developed countries can represent a serious problem that meanwhile in transitional and post-conflict countries can represent an obstacle to the establishment of peace, strengthening of the democracy and long-term development.²²

²¹ „Sluzbeni glasnik RS“ broj 104/2013.

²² Following: Pavlovic Gojko, Pravo privatne bezbjednosti – uporeda studij, Defendologija centar, Banja Luka, page 12.

1. The Protection of Business Secrets

Beside the standards of business ethics, business secrets exist because they are after all the protection from disloyal competition, support to the investigation activities and fomentation of innovation. In companies that are involved to development of new technologies, a business secret is used to keep safe the innovations during the patent admission process, and all the other data that are not covered with the patent (business strategies, data about business partners, deliverers, clients etc.)

The meaning of the protection of the business secret from disloyal competition is to legally sanction every act of illegal disclosure or acquisition of confidential information, which are legally controlled by an individual or a legal entity, i.e. the data usage by other persons in a way that is opposite to the law and good business practice. The main preconditions for enabling this kind of a protection are: that it is about the information, whose disclosure to other persons could harm the person, in whose possession the information is; that the information represents a secret, which as a whole or in a precise shape and as a part of an information collection, is not publicized or easy accessible to persons that are usually related to that kind of information; that the information has a commercial value and that is protected by its carrier in a certain way to keep its confidentiality.

It is considered that a program for a protection of business information, i.e. business secrets, has 3 functions: controlling over the information; enabling the individual access to the protected data, with previous identification of every individual, who is about to access; the existence of a technical possibility that in every moment it can be determined who, when, how, in which way and why had the access to the confidential data of the company, with an adequate record about that.²³

²³ Refers to: Kovacich L.Gerald, *Information Systems Security Officer's Guide: Establishing and Managing an Information Protection Program*, Butterworth Heinemann Boston/Oxford 1999., p. 50

1.1. **General and Special Ways of Protection of Confidentiality of Business Secrets**

The protection of business information, compared to inner sources of endangerment of business subjects, is possible to perceive through its organizational, personal and normative aspects. The establishment of every organizational structure demands a work distribution, grouping and connection of certain types of jobs, as well as the process of transmission of authorization and responsibilities in doing jobs. The choice of an inner structure model depends on a certain number of conditions and environment, such as a number and structure of executants, available technical-technological possibilities, a type and a character of data that should be protected, a number of data users and other factors, which opens space for different solutions.²⁴

Special protective measures in companies are: taking a special evidence about confidential data and about persons, who can access them; taking a written statements from the persons who have access to data, that they will not violate the confidentiality; giving secret names to the business documents; determining the number of copies and persons, who will access the data; copying or excerpting; keeping the secret documents in locked cases in the rooms with certain protective measures; organizing the transmission of documents using a courier, with a mandatory armed escort and all the possible technical protection measures; required written handover of duties between the persons, who use the secret documents, and the persons, who are keeping the documents safe; commission destruction of sketches, concepts, matrix and other material, that was used while working with the secret documents.²⁵

An important role also plays a business counterintelligence, which is directed to safety of a business subject, arranging mechanism for its protection from competitive intelligence operations, as well as for protection from industrial espionage and similar illegal acts. The goals of Business Counterintelligence are: maintaining the position in the business environment, estimation of possible risks, threats and challenges to business subject, and effective protection of business subject from competitive illegal and unethical actions. That can only be achieved if the protection and safety measures are applied to all business segments. As confidential information are being located in various data bases, certain measures are needed to get the ultimate protection, confidentiality and integrity of informatics and other communication systems in a company.

²⁴ Trivan Dragan, original quote page 146.

²⁵ Compare to: Stajic Ljubomir, *Osnovi sistema bezbjednosti*, Pravni fakultet, Novi Sad 2008., page 325.

²⁶ Extended in: Bilandžić Mirko, *Poslovno-obavještajno djelovanje: Business intelligence u praksi*, AGM, Zagreb 2008., str. 78

As employees also have access to the confidential data, certain protection mechanisms, procedures and norms of behavior need to be implemented. That is why it should be defined with certain acts which information are considered as a business secret, as well as which measures, actions and other procedures are required in order to preserve the confidentiality.²⁷ Likewise, certain safety mechanisms are required when new job applicants are being tested, so that the risk of a possible abuse of confidential data is minimized.

1. Normative Aspects of Protection Of Business Secrets in the Republic of Serbia

*The Law of Protection of Business Secret*²⁸ from 2011. represents a try to fill an emptiness and to generally solve problems related to the protection of business data and information, which were before protected just on the level of individual business subjects. As a consequence, as business secrets were declared various processes and procedures in companies, while in practice there was no sanctioning of real and harmful disclosures of business secrets. Even though the mentioned Law is still valid, court and business practice until now did not meet the acquirements, which were promised by the Law.

The main subject of the Law is a normative ordering of legal protection of business secrets, which belong either to national or foreign individuals and legal entities, from a various actions of disloyal competition. The legal definition of business secret covers every information that has a commercial value, with a condition that the mentioned one is not publicized or that its content is accessible to unauthorized persons, who could have some financial benefit while using or transmitting it. The business secret can exist only if its carrier is protecting it in an adequate way according to the law, business politics, contract obligations of business subject or valid national or international standards, with a goal to keep the confidentiality of information, assuming that the disclosure to other persons could have harmful effects to the carrier of business secret. That is why, the Clause 8. of the Law determines that any action taken within business activities, that as a consequence has a disclosure, collection, transmission or usage of data and information, that represent a business secret, with a condition that all the actions are done without an approval from a carrier, in illegal way and opposite to good business practice, represents an act of disloyal competition.

In this way defined a term of business secret direct us to the fact that not every information represents a business secret, neither can any arbitrarily be declared in that way. To have the status and to be accepted as the business secret by the law, the information has to meet the acquirements of confidentiality, market values compared to the competition and previous reasonable taken measures for keeping it confidential.

²⁷ Following: Ivandić Vidović Darija, Karlović Lidija, Ostojić Alen, *Korporativna sigurnost*, Udruga hrvatskih menadžera sigurnosti – UHMS, Zagreb 2011., str. 239.

²⁸ „Sluzbeni Glasnik RS“, number 72/2011

When it is said „in the way opposite to good business practice“, the Law implies on every action, which is taken in the market game, and which is harming or could harm competitive business subject or other individual or legal entity. That especially is applied to: violation of contract regulations, related to protection of business secret; a various number of cheats; abuse of business trust; business espionage; inducement to any of the mentioned actions; collection of the data and information, which represent a business secret, by persons who knew or had to know that such an information is a business secret, and that it is obtained from a person, in whose possession it is.

The Clauses of the Law of Protection of a Business Secret determine civil-law protection of subjects in this area, so that in cases of violation of the protection of business secret, the carrier has a right to sue, i.e. to activate the process in front of the judicial instance against all the persons, who took a part in the violation of the protection of the business secret. That applies to illegal collection, obtaining, disclosure, use or any other way of abusing of a business secret.

In the Clause 11, Paragraph 3 of the Law of Protection of Business Secret, a procedure for compensation of damage is determined (the real damage and the lost gain). If the violation is done on purpose, it could be legally demanded that instead of the compensation for the damage, the triple bigger compensation than a usual one is asked for. The Law also determines other sanctions, such as exclusion from the economic society, cessation of employment, and publishing the verdict at the expense of the defendant. Finally in these cases, the court can pronounce a temporary measure, that refers to exclusion and withdrawal of the subject and products, which came as a result of the violation of the business secret, from the market.

Criminal Law Code of Republic of Serbia²⁹

determines a criminal act, called Disclosure of Business Secret. This act exist in two shapes- disclosure of business secret and obtaining the business secret. Disclosure of the business secret is done by a person, who unauthorized transmits, hand over or in any other way make the confidential business data accessible, while the person, who collects these kind of information with the intention to hand it over to unauthorized person, does the criminal act of obtaining the business secret. The confidential data can represent a business secret for the whole state, a certain economic area or just for the one business subject. The Law determines data as the confidential ones because of their nature and the importance to keep them as a secret.

The criminal act Disclosure of Business Secret is alternative determined, i.e. it could be consisted out of transmission, handover or any way which makes the information available and a potential sales product. Transmission of the secret can be done in an oral or written way, direct or indirect, as well as using other communication mediums.

²⁹ "Sluzbeni Glasnik RS", number. 85/2005, 88/2005 - correcture, 107/2005 - correcture, 72/2009, 111/2009 and 121/2012, the Clause 240.

The condition that affirms the criminal act is that the business secret is transmitted, handed over or in any other way made available to other, uninvited person, i.e. every person, who is unauthorized to know the data or documents that represent data. Here the law makes no difference between the person who is transmitting and getting the business secret. Executor can be any person, and the act can be done direct or with eventual forethought, or from carelessness.

A severer form of criminal act Disclosure of Business Secret, which can lead to 2-10 years of imprisonment including a fine, is when the disclosure is done out of greed, or when some extreme confidential data are being revealed. The mentioned criminal act is done out of greed, when the executor did that to get some material benefit for himself or somebody else. Here is important to mention, that material benefit does not necessarily need to be obtained. The attention to disclose the confidential data is enough to determine a criminal act.

The Law of Economic Societies³⁰

from 2012. determines obligations of entities, who have special duties to the economic society, and which are referred to the matter of business secret. The Clause 72. of this Law defines the term of business secret as "an information, whose transmission to other entities could harm the society, as well as an information, which has or could have economic value because it is not published, or easy accessible to others, who could get some financial benefits by transmitting or using it; and an information, which is being protected by the society with certain protection measures." Compared to earlier law solutions, a term business secret is expanded, so that it cover economic (business) significance of a certain information, harder availability of the information, as well as the protection with certain measures.

The Clause 74. of the Law of Economic Societies detailed determines consequences of violation of business secrets, which are made by entities who had a duty to keep the secret safe, and against who a sue can be conducted, as well as a demand to decompensate the damage, to exclude certain persons out of the economic society or to dismiss employees.

³⁰ „Sluzbeni Glasnik RS“, number 36/2011, 99/2011 and 83/2014.

1. Personal Data Protection

The right to privacy in general is consisted of rights to respect an individual's private and family life, home and correspondence, as well as honor and reputation. A private life refers to a various number of rights, e.g.: personal data protection, a right to name and reputation, a right to moral and physical integrity, a right to respect of all forms of confidentiality etc.

To the privacy right appertain a personal data protection, which is guaranteed in the Republic of Serbia with the Constitution of Republic of Serbia.³¹ That is why any the use of personal data outside the original purpose is forbidden and punishable, except when it comes to conduct of criminal proceedings or when the safety of Republic of Serbia is in question. Any individual, except if the data are collected in accordance with clauses of Law of Personal Data Protection³² (collection of the data by state authorities, without a confirmation of the individual) has a right to be informed about his obtained personal data, as well to the court protection against its abuse.

The Clause 3. of the Law of Personal Data Protection defines a personal information as any information, which refers to the individual, regardless the form and the carrier of information; on whose order, on which name or for whom the information is obtained; the date of obtaining information; the place of obtaining information; the way of obtaining information (directly, by listening-in, by watching, or by obtaining the documents, which contain the information etc.); or any other information or data characteristics.

2. Conclusion

Privatization of safety business is closely connected to two processes: a process of real safety needs, respect for human rights and freedoms, and the needs to keep them safe, as well as freedom of choice of every individual, how and in which way he will secure himself from unethical behavior; and the process of adjustment, related to safety, historical, cultural and other terms, which exist in every country.

The principle of securing a business secret obligates a company/agency that provides private safety services, to secure the obtained data and information. This kind of information are considered as a business secret, but the agency/company can use the obtained data just for the original purpose. After the work is done, agency/company has to hand over all the data to the client, except for the ones that are not relevant and have to be destroyed maximum 8 days afterwards. These agencies/companies are not allowed to publish or to hand over the obtained data to any other entity.

³¹ „Sluzbeni Glasnik RS“ number 98/2006, The Clause 42.

³² „Sluzbeni Glasnik RS“, number 97/2008, 104/2009, 68/2012 – the Decision of US and 107/2012, The Clause 13.

As a part of keeping a business secret a company, i.e. agency, that provides private safety services, is obliged to follow the principles related to the personal data protection. Every individual has a secured right to keep his privacy and other freedoms safe, especially when it comes to personal data privacy, regardless if the processing of the data is done automatic, half-automatic or on any other way. If an agency or a company has a need to use certain personal data, then it could be done just following the rules, which regulate this area, or with a client's agreement. When defining which data is confidential, a certain extent should be determined between public and confidentiality, i.e. about respect for public principles and at the same time for protection of society and state values.

Otherwise, until the end of 2013. The Republic of Serbia was characterized by a normative chaos of private sector in the area of safety, which was a consequence of old regulations, consisted of ten laws, which did not recognize the specifications of this sector. The mentioned regulation was a part of the law system in the Republic of Serbia, but did not in an adequate way determine a specific state of private safety sector, starting from the fact that for grounding of a company, that will provide a safety services, was treated as any other economic subject.

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**ЧОВЕКОВИТЕ ПРАВА И ДЕМОКРАТИЈАТА ВО НАДВОРЕШНАТА
ПОЛИТИКА НА ЕУ****HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EU FOREIGN POLICY****Zorica Saltirovska, PhD.****Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Skopje****E mail: zorica_ind@yahoo.com**

АПСТРАКТ: Надворешната политика на ЕУ се темели на цврстата решеност за унапредување на мирот и стабилноста во светот во кој ќе се почитуваат човековите права, ќе се јакне демократијата и ќе има владеење на правото. Човековите права се универзални правни норми подеднакво значајни во секој дел од животот. Демократијата е, исто така, нешто кон што се тежнее бидејќи луѓето од целиот свет посакуваат живот во отворени и демократски општества во кои ќе се почитуваат човековите права и во кои тие ќе се чувствуваат безбедно, слободно и достоинствено. Унапредувањето и почитувањето на човековите права, демократијата и владеењето на правото се темел за одржлив мир и просперитет на секое општество и на светот во целина. Поради тоа, ЕУ посветено и одговорно соработува со своите партнери, мултилатерални форуми и меѓународни организации на полето на човековите права и демократијата, интегрирајќи ги во својата политика, програми и проекти. Активната политика во оваа сфера, ЕУ ја реализира преку политички дијалози, клаузули во договорите со партнерските држави, на меѓународни форуми, како и преку нејзините програми за помош на развојот, особено преку Европскиот инструмент за демократија и човекови права (ЕИДЧП), преку кој финансира широк спектар на проекти за човекови права низ светот. Покрај унапредувањето на човековите права и слободи, ЕИДЧП е фокусиран и на заштитата на активистите за човекови права низ светот и на јакнење на граѓанското општество, особено во држави и региони во кои има најголем ризик да бидат загрозувани. Преку Европската соседска политика, ЕУ успеа за прв пат да постави форуми за дискусија за човековите права во држави во кои тие најмногу без загрозувани (Јордан, Тунис, Мароко, Либан и други) и да предизвика реформи во насока на унапредување на човековите права, демократијата и доброто владеење. Справувајќи се со најзначајните прашања во својата надворешна политика за човекови права, ЕУ стана еден од клучните актери на меѓународната сцена во нивното унапредување и заштитата низ светот.

Клучни зборови: Човекови права, Демократија, ЕУ, ЕИДЧП, Безбедност

ABSTRACT: EU's foreign policy is based on the firm dedication to the promotion of peace and stability in the world in which human rights will be respected, democracy will be strengthened, and rule of law will be a standard. Human rights are universal legal norms, equally significant in any aspect of human existence. Democracy is a persistent aspiration for people around the world, since we all wish to live in an open democratic society where human rights are respected and where people feel safe, and lead a life of freedom and dignity. The promotion and respect of human rights, democracy, and rule of law are the cornerstones of sustainable peace and prosperity for any society, as well as for the world in general. In an effort to attain these three prerequisites, the EU is collaborating devotedly and responsibly with its partners, multilateral forums, and international organizations in the field of human rights and democracy, integrating these into its policy, programmes, and projects. The EU is implementing the active policies in this area through political dialogues, clauses in contracts with partner countries, at international forums, as well as through its assisted development programmes, most notably the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), through which it is providing funding for a wide spectre of human rights projects throughout the world. Alongside the promotion of human rights and freedoms, the EIDHR is focusing on protection of human rights activists worldwide, and strengthening of the civil society, especially in countries and regions where they are at most risk of being under threat. Through the European Neighbourhood Policy, for the first time the EU succeeded in organising human rights discussion forums in countries where human rights were under largest risk of violation (Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and others), and encourage reforms in the direction of promotion of human rights, democracy, and rule of law. Managing the most crucial issues in its foreign policy on human rights, the EU has become one of the key actors in their promotion and protection on a global scale.

Keywords: Human rights, Democracy, EU, EIDHR, Security

Introduction

The development of democracy and the protection of human rights are dependent on an entire array of factors, among which are economic prosperity, the character of the government, the existence of security threats, ethnic conflicts or conflicts of another nature, level of cooperation with other countries through international and regional mechanisms for human rights protection, and many more. Democratisation of societies and respect for human rights within those societies are essential prerequisites allowing for stable and secure societies, societies which will not generate violence, neither in the relation of one society to another, nor in the one of a society to its citizens as individuals or social groups. The efforts towards achieving this degree of social development in Europe dates back in history, being conceived in the Magna Carta of 1215 and the French Declaration of the rights of man and citizen of 1789, spanning across to the creation of the modern system of the UN where the promotion of human rights is granted a pivotal role. The adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the founding principles of the EU as well, and is therefore an irreplaceable prerequisite for its legitimacy. Alongside the promotion of freedom, democracy, and

human rights at the home front, the EU is working on their promotion and protection in countries and regions outside its borders. They comprise an essential aspect of its foreign policy and are the most valuable trait of the political cooperation with third countries and international partners and organisations, which make for more reliable partners and associates when they can guarantee the adherence to human rights and generate peace and stability.

1. **EU instruments for promotion of human rights and democratisation in its foreign policy**

In an effort to promote human rights and democracy outside its borders, the EU is using a wide array of instruments, ranging from traditional diplomacy and foreign politics (declarations, demarches through diplomatic representatives of third countries, resolutions, and interventions within the UN) to the implementation of various programmes for cooperation and assistance, and political dialogues with third countries. One specific legal basis of all operations in this direction is the human rights clause which, as a quintessential element, is embedded into almost all of EU's third countries agreements.

Within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU has created multiple instruments for the promotion of human rights and democracy:

- Specific directives for speedier and more efficient coherent actions on EU level in third countries, regarding fight against death penalty, torture and cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment, support for children in armed conflicts, support for human and children's rights activists, etc.;
- Common strategies and actions;
- Démarches and declarations;
- Dialogues and consultations with third countries; and
- Handbooks on EU policies regarding third countries and specific human rights issues in these countries.

Furthermore, the EU has adopted a number of crucial international human rights instruments (from the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe), thus encouraging countries to sign, ratify, and consistently implement them, as well as adhere to the commitments they impose. Among these documents are the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1984 Convention against Torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of Children, and the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, etc. By publishing the text of the

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, the EU placed the civil, political, economic and social rights of EU citizens on the same pedestal, while the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, in its Article 6, defined its legal nature and value on an equal stand as that of the Agreements. This Article from the TEU represents a crucial provision regarding the fundamental human rights since it defines the basic common principles on which the Union is founded: freedom, democracy, adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and rule of law. The candidate-countries also have to comply with these principles and demonstrate effective commitment to the protection of the human rights of their citizens in compliance to the Copenhagen criteria.

Within the CFSP, political dialogues and human rights consultations with third countries or regional groups are a key EU instrument in all aspects of its foreign policy. They are being conducted on several levels:

- At the level of human rights activists (with countries with which the EU has either not concluded agreements, or these agreements do not include a human rights clause, such as China or Iran);
- At local levels or within EU agreements;
- Detailed consultations (with African, Caribbean, or Pacific countries in compliance with the Cotonou agreement);
- Regular biannual consultations (with the Russian Federation) as a significant segment of the general relations;
- Regular consultations on the basis of common stands, such as biannual expert meetings, preceding crucial human rights experts meetings at the UN (with the USA, Canada, Japan and New Zealand).

Specific goals of the human rights dialogues vary for different countries - to acquire information regarding the condition of human rights in a specific country, to identify practical activities for the improvement of the real situation (especially through the establishment of cooperation projects and discussions on issues of common interest), to improve the cooperation for promotion of human rights at multinational fora, to identify human rights issues in a timely manner before they trigger conflicts, to encourage governments to comply with EU human rights standards and its policy in this sphere, etc. One key goal of the dialogues is for them to contribute to a concrete improvement of the situation of human rights in practice (Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 2007).

According to the human rights clause included in third countries agreements ever since the mid 1990s, the adherence to human rights and democratic principles is the pillar for all internal and external policies of the parties. In case of their being violated, the EU could undertake certain

restrictive measures, spanning from refusal to grant visas and freezing assets the transgressors own in the EU, to suspending the agreements. The aim is to create a positive basis for the improvement of human rights in third countries through dialogue and persuasion, and their implementation into the society through assessments on the situation, and foreign aid. Since the beginning of 2007, the structure of the foreign aid has been deeply reformed and it includes a number of financing instruments, and thematic programmes established through the instrument of developing cooperation with third countries. Furthermore, since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy has been developed, aiming to disable a potential creation of new lines of division between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, and enable their participation in the activation on the promotion of human rights and freedoms, and strengthening of the democratisation.

Civil society organisations are also listed among the strategic partners of the EU in the implementation of human rights policies. The direct cooperation with them is a priority for the EU since they play a crucial role in the monitoring of adherence to human rights and democratic reforms processes in all parts of the world. Consequently, the Union supports their activities through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which finances projects in this area in third countries, but also supports the efforts of international and regional organisations in the field of promotion and protection of human rights and democratisation of societies.

1. Strategic commitments on human rights and democracy in the foreign policy

The common document of the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU on foreign affairs and security policies – “Human Rights and Democracy at the heart of EU external action – Towards a more effective approach”, which suggests areas for further action, has given a significant contribution towards the development and promotion of human rights via external action compliant to the strategy of the EU on human rights and democracy. The determination for such external action has been demonstrated even in Article 21 of the TEU, and the enforcement of the EU Charter on fundamental rights and the joining of the EU to the European Convention on human rights has further deepened the complete dedication of the EU to the promotion of human rights in all spheres. Within its borders, the EU and its members are under obligation of posing as example in guaranteeing the respect for human rights, and outside the borders – it is their common responsibility. The EU is insistent on protecting human rights in every portion of the world, on providing access to justice and redress to victims, and responsibility and sanctions for transgressors. In this direction, the EU has increased the efforts in all aspects of external action. According to the commitments on external action drafted in the strategic framework and action plan of 2012 (11855/12), the EU:

- Strengthened the capacities and mechanisms for early warning and prevention of crises that might jeopardise human rights;
- Deepened the cooperation with partner-countries, civil society and international organisations, and established new partnerships;

- Persisted in promoting freedom of expression, thought, association, and assembly, freedom of religious conviction and expression;
- Strengthened the campaigns against discrimination in all its forms, especially campaigns on human rights and empowering women, fight against discriminatory laws, gender violence and marginalisation;
- Strengthened the efforts towards promotion of economic, social, and cultural rights, with a palpable focus on poverty and vulnerable groups;
- Strengthened the campaign on abolition of the death penalty world-wide, and on the fights against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment;
- Strengthened the efforts towards promotion of right to due process and equality in the face of the law, as well as respect for international humanitarian law and punishment of serious crime, especially sexual violence in armed conflicts;
- Intensified the political and financial support of human rights activists and civil societies which are the pillar for successful human rights policy;
- Placed human rights in the core of its relations with all third countries, including the strategic partners, designing policies according to the specific circumstances in each country, deepened the dialogue on human rights with these countries, identified areas in need of support of projects on fortifying human rights and comprehensive agendas on locally-led political reforms by focusing on human rights and democracy;
- Highlighted the leading role of the Council of human rights of the UN in the resolution of urgent cases of human rights violations, and is contributing on a large scale to an efficient functioning of the Council;
- Opposes efforts to challenge universality of human rights and underscores the willingness to cooperate with countries from all regions world-wide, but to also utilise the entire array of instruments at its disposal to condemn and sanction those who violate or endanger these instruments;
- Makes a pledge for partnership and greater cooperation with the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and other international and regional organisations, aiming to encourage consolidation of regional mechanisms for human rights.

Striving to implement the human rights and democracy strategy with enough adaptability to respond to any new challenge, the EU has adopted an action plan covering the period until 2015. The plan targets results in the promotion of human rights and democratisation of societies in seven areas of external action by the Union:

1. Human rights and democracy in EU policies, including:
 - Integration of human rights in all significant areas,
 - Partnership with the civil society on all levels, and
 - Regular reports on the strategy's implementation;
2. Promotion of the universality of the human rights, focusing on:
 - Universal support on the application of crucial international and regional agreements on human rights, and
 - Strengthening of the culture of human rights and democracy outside EU borders;
3. Monitoring the coherent policy goals, by:
 - Effective support of democracy,
 - Maintaining a constant capacity of the EU Council for promotion of human rights and democracy,
 - Achieving a greater coherence between home and foreign human rights policies of the EU, and
 - Adherence to economic, social, and cultural rights;
4. Human rights in EU's foreign policy, focusing on:
 - Operations in the direction of rights-based approach in the cooperation for development,
 - Trading in a manner stimulating to human rights,
 - Mirroring human rights in the conflict prevention and crises management activities,
 - Embedding human rights into anti-terrorist activities,
 - Guaranteeing that human rights will be embedded in the external dimension of the

- operations on the area of freedom, security, and justice, and
 - Promotion of human rights in the external dimension of employment and social policy;
1. Implementing EU priorities regarding human rights:
 - Abolition of death punishment,
 - Eradicating torture and other forms of cruel or inhuman punishments,
 - Effective support for human rights activists,
 - Promotion and protection of the rights of children,
 - Protection of the rights of women and protection against gender violence,
 - Evoking international humanitarian law,
 - Protection of the rights of the LGBTQI community,
 - Freedom of religion and belief,
 - Freedom of expression online or offline,
 - Implementation of the UN's leading principles on human rights in business,
 - Law enforcement,
 - Accountability for human rights violations,
 - Promotion of minorities' rights,
 - Fortified policy on issues regarding indigenous communities, and
 - Support for the rights of persons with disabilities;
 2. Working with bilateral partners, including individual approaches, dialogue, and application of external political instruments of the EU regarding human rights and democracy; and
 3. Working with multilateral institutions aspiring to fortify the regional human rights mechanisms, and to share responsibilities effectively (EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 2012).

The EU is elaborating on the advancement and main achievements in the implementation of the Action plan in its annual reports. The Action plan is being implemented by the European Commission and the EU member-states, and it is being closely controlled by the European Parliament and the civil society. In the 2014 Report, it is being underscored that significant progress has been achieved in the implementation of 97 measures determined in the Action plan, especially regarding EU's engagement with third countries and regional organisations.

1. European Parliament's conclusions in the EU Annual report regarding the implementation of the Action plan on human rights and democracy in the world - challenges for the period following 2015

Human rights and democratic principles are a significant part of the operations of the European Parliament, thus they are omnipresent in their public reports and high-level meetings.

In the 2014 Report, the European Parliament acclaimed the adoption of the Strategic framework and the Action Plan on human rights and democracy, defining them as a crucial turning point in the integration of human rights in the EU's foreign policy. However, the Parliament underscored the need for a general consensus and a greater coordination in EU's human rights policies, above all between EU institutions and the member-states, and it also announced the new 2015 Action plan. Furthermore, the Parliament highlighted the role of the EU Special Representative on human rights, pointing to the need for improvement of the coherency, consistency, and efficacy of EU policy on human rights, as well as for an evaluation of the cooperation projects, assessing their influence in the area of human rights. In April 2013, based on that Report, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the influence of the financial and economic crisis on human rights, asking for the creation of a Global Fund for Social Protection and involvement of higher human rights standards in the development agenda for the period following 2015. Regarding the influence of corruption on human rights, in the Report and the resolution (October 2013), the Parliament pointed to their strong correlation and the lack of ambition on the side of the EU in this sphere, calling for the adoption of more ambitious policies on dealing with corruption in the world. Moreover, the Parliament emphasized the urgent need of synchronisation of EU policy with international legal norms concerning human rights during armed conflicts, the urgent need of diverting political discussions regarding human rights on a lower level, and if these are not constructive – to place the emphasis on public diplomacy and démarches.

Pursuant to the Parliament's Human rights resolution, a great challenge for the upcoming period starting in 2015 will be posed by the improvement of the coherency between EU's home and foreign human rights policies and the guarantee of their being respected in significant areas of politics where they are reflected, for instance trade, migration, and relations with strategic partners. Human rights issues are the subject of debate in EU's Foreign Affairs Commission, parliamentary foreign affairs reports, or international agreements containing human rights clauses. The Committee

on civil freedoms, justice, and internal affairs is a key actor with a great responsibility in the external aspects in EU's internal policy (migration and asylum policies, for instance).

In the Report, the Parliament expressed its concern regarding the improvement of the rule of law, the pluralist democracy, and human rights in Russia, confirmed the need for a more extensive dialogue on human rights with China, and expressed its concern due to the condition of human rights and democratisation in its neighbourhood in its South and East. Consequently, it underlined the need for encouraging countries to augment their dedication in the furthering of the values of democracy, rule of law and adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms.

In 2013, the European Parliament debated on the topic of future instruments for foreign financial assistance for the period of 2014 - 2020, coming to the conclusion that one of the crucial determinants in the decision process will be the dedication and progress of partner countries regarding democracy, rule of law and human rights. The new EIDHR ought to provide a greater flexibility, respond to new situations, and include a revision provision, on the basis of which the list of priority areas for financial assistance could be altered, as well as a provision for the activation of urgent measures on human rights protection. The European Neighbourhood Instrument (2014 - 2020) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (2014 - 2020) are mentioned as significant. The latter holds protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms as an indicator on development assessment, and along with the rule of law - as priority areas for financial assistance.

Concerning third countries agreements and including human rights into them, the greatest role is played by the European Parliament - which gives the consent -, the Committee on Foreign affairs, and the Committee on International trade. The Parliament holds it of utmost importance that greater attention be paid to the source of information and communication technologies, which might be used in cases of human rights violations, as well as in the eradication of child and forced labour.

In the 2013 Resolution on transportation and illicit detention of prisoners in European countries by the CIA, the Parliament expresses regrets about the lack of success (of the Council, the Commission, the member-states' governments, the candidate-countries, the NATO, and the US authorities) in the implementation of the 2012 resolution's recommendations, especially regarding serious abuses of fundamental freedoms of victims by the interrogation programmes of the CIA. Therefore, the Parliament stated that it is expecting an investigation about the acts and operations of the US National Security Agency, and is expecting it to create state bodies for monitoring and democratic control of intelligence services in EU countries.

The civil society, having a crucial role in the protection of human rights, is a key partner of the EU in their common endeavour for promotion of human rights. Therefore, the EU is constantly strengthening the interaction with the civil society, judging that a functional democracy is characterised by the fact that its citizens can freely exercise their right to peaceful assembly and association. Unfortunately, at the General Assembly in October of 2013, the EU expressed concern regarding the fact that in many countries the civil society is facing intimidation, maltreatment, even violence. The EU strongly rejected the limitation of the space of the civil society and the obstruction of the work of human rights activists. The civil society is the leading recipient of EU support in the realisation of projects for strengthening of democracy and human rights. In 2013, the EIDHR supported more than 530 such projects in 135 countries on a global scale, investing more than €150 million, with 2500 more projects being in progress. Furthermore, the EIDHR provided support for the formation of the civil society in more than 20 EU partner- states. Regarding the new EU policy towards civil societies, at the start of 2013, the European Council adopted the resolution “Europe’s Engagement with Civil Society in External Relations”, as well as conclusions on the topic of “EU support of implementing reforms in transition societies” where it underscored once again the key role of the civil society in the furthering of human rights and democratic processes.

Conclusion

The EU holds human rights to be universal and indivisible, and is thus actively and dedicatedly working towards their promotion and protection inside and outside its borders. The principles of sustainable peace, development, and prosperity in societies cannot be upheld unless human rights are being adhered to in these societies. This is the founding principle of the EU, on the basis of which it is constantly striving to further human rights, democracy, and rule of law. This commitment is an underlying trait of its home and foreign policies. These principles are an integral part of the founding agreements of the EU, further strengthened by the Charter of fundamental rights, especially after the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, when the Charter became legally binding. Pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, the activities of the EU on the international scene have been inspired by these principles, as well as the principles of the UN Charter and international law. EU agreements signed with third countries also contain clauses unequivocally stating that human rights are an essential element in the relations between parties.

The EU provides full support to individuals and organisations which are working on the promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights across the world and is also actively engaged in multilateral fora, supporting the efforts of regional organisations in the improvement of their human rights agendas. In the direction of assisting the civil society’s growth into an effective force in the protection of human rights and democratic processes, the EU has created the EIDHR which focuses on sensitive political issues, using innovative approaches in the direct collaboration with local civil organisations which ought to preserve their independence from the local authorities. This enables the EIDHR to be flexible and have an increased capacity for response to variable circumstances. It

can intervene without the consent of third countries' governments, and supports the work of individuals or groups in the civil society which protect human rights and democracy, as well as intergovernmental organisations which are implementing international mechanisms for human rights. Thus, it complements other instruments used for the implementation of EU policy on democracy and human rights. The new financial regulation enables EIDHR to finance not only registered organisations, but also physical persons or individual human rights activists. The Multiannual Indicative Programme stipulates financial support from the EIDHR amounting to €1.3 billion in the period of 2014 – 2020.

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MACEDONIA: INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES – A MISMATCH IN THE MACEDONIAN DEFENCE INSTITUTIONS

МАКЕДОНИЈА: ВНАТРЕШНО БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ ПРЕДИЗВИЦИ – НЕСОВПАЃАЊЕ ВО МАКЕДОНСКИТЕ ОДБРАНБЕНИ ИНСТИТУЦИИ

Sasho Kuzmanovski, MA

Ministry of Defense, Republic of Macedonia

E-mail: saso.kuzmanovski@morm.gov.mk

ABSTRACT: It is no longer a question whether we need a defense reform, but rather, who can do it? The Macedonian Government for years has been practicing a so-called functional separation of executive positions among political coalitional partners in the Ministry of Defense and “political intervention” in the army, which brought a period of low cohabitation, and thus dysfunction and low efficiency. The current structure of the defense system in itself is a challenge, if not a risk and threat. Functional degradation of the defense system, i.e. the continuous loss of functional logic and justification, is evident. Therefore, it may be pointless in the new social conditions to repeat repeatedly Buzan’s Defense - Security Dilemma or to compare which security threats – external or internal – are more important and influential for a sustainable defense - security system.

Throughout this context, it seems that the institutional integrity, regardless of the nature of modern challenges and the development of the global civil society, social movements, and media, is one of the key foundations, conditions, and prospects of the defense - security organization.

Hence, it is necessary to question the integrity of the defense institutions, especially the one of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) as a leading institution among them, and whether they can fulfill the needed level of the tasks set in front of them, how they perform the prescribed powers and functions, which factors affect the credibility of the institutions, who shapes the defense policy, and is there a necessity for a defense system.

The participants in the defence system, the MOD employees, as well as the political parties and citizens each in their own way influence the internal defense - security challenges. However, through systemic institutional analysis and methodology of assessment of the segments of func

tional efficiency of the institutions, we will get results that point out a general perception of depreciation and mismatch (discrepancy) in the defense system. The logical conclusion of the derived results would be "ineffective institutions equal dysfunctional defense." As an implication of the survey, this would mean a necessity of a systematic reorganization and a change in the social relations and the relations of the authorities responsible for and about the defense.

Will a critical mass be created in the near future, remains an open question. However, one thing is certain: at best, someone will have to address the issue about what is actually happening in the field of defense in front of the taxpayers; or at worst, someone will have to answer the question when it will become a source of new crisis and the basis for a new internal conflict.

The reality is, after more than 20 years of independence we should again ask ourselves whether and what kind of defense institutions we need, so that they alone do not create an internal security challenge for the country.

Keywords: integrity, credibility, defense institutions, internal challenges.

АБСТРАКТ: Веќе не е прашање дали се потребни реформи во одбраната, туку кој тоа може да го направи. Владата години наназад практикуваше нефункционална поделба на извршните места во МО и „политички интервенции“ во армијата, што донесе период на ниска кохабитација, а со самото тоа и дисфункционалност и ниска ефикасност. Сегашната поставеност на системот за одбрана сама по себе е предизвик ако не и ризик и закана. Функционалната деградација на системот за одбрана, односно континуираното губење на функционалната логичност и оправданост е евидентна. Затоа, можеби е беспредметно во новите општествени прилики да се повторува повторно и повторно одбранбено – безбедносната дилема на Бузан, или е несоодветно да се споредува кое, надворешното или внатрешното безбедносно загрозување е позначајно и повлијателно за одржлив одбранбено – безбедносен систем.

Во целиот тој контекст се чини институционалниот интегритет, без оглед на природата на современите предизвици и развојот на граѓанското глобално општество и социјалните медиуми и движења претставува една од клучните основи, предуслови и перспективи на одбранбено – безбедносното организирање. Оттука неминовно е да се запрашаме за интегритетот на одбранбените институции, посебно Министерството за одбрана (МО) како водечка институција меѓу нив, дали истите се на висина на задачите поставени пред нив, како ги извршуваат пропишаните надлежности и функции, кои фактори влијаат на кредибилитетот на институциите, кој ја креира одбранбената политика и дали воопшто постои потреба од одбранбен систем.

Учесниците во одбраната, вработените во МО, политичките субјекти и граѓаните влијаат секој на свој начин врз внатрешните одбранбено – безбедносни предизвици.

Меѓутоа, преку системска институционална анализа и методологија на проценка на сегментите на функционалната ефикасност на институциите ќе дојдеме до резултати кои оставаат општа перцепција на депрецијација и обезначување на одбраната. Притоа логичка фраза на заклучок од изведените резултати би била: „неефикасни институции се еднакви на нефункционална одбрана“. Ова од своја страна како импликација од спроведеното истражување би значело нужност од системска реорганизација и промена на односите во општеството и односите на надлежните авторитети за и кон одбраната.

Дали за тоа во блиска иднина би се создала критична маса останува отворено прашање. Но едно е сигурно, во најдобар случај некој ќе мора да одговори на прашањето час поскоро пред даночните обврзници што навистина се случува во доменот на одбраната или во најлош случај некој ќе мора да одговори на прашањето откако тоа ќе стане извор на нова криза и основа за нов внатрешен конфликт. Едно е неопходно реално, дека и после повеќе од 20 години самостојност треба да се запрашаме повторно какви и дали воопшто ни се потребни одбранбени институции за да тие сами по себе не претставуваат внатрешен безбедносен предизвик за државата.

Клучни зборови: интегритет, кредибилитет, одбранбени институции, внатрешни предизвици.

Instead of introduction

In the past 20 years, the defense had its good and bad years with peaks and troughs in their development and transformation. In certain periods 1997-98 and 2003-05 was a leading institution and an example for a swift and efficient transformation in Southeast and Central Europe. In that period a first strategic defense, documents were established³³ and their implementation was started. In parallel functions and consistency of the values in defense or professional ethics were settled, opportunities and threats anticipation were calculating, also an analysis and interpretation of developments in the future and the capacity to act. Simply the basics of defensive integrity were realized. In other words, this meant institutionalization of practices, relationships, norms and manners in defense.

However, as time passed, implementation and lifecycle tracking changes or checking and balancing the actual effectiveness appears to have become our genetic developmental problem.

³³ "First Defense Strategy and the Defense White Paper were adopted in 1998, Concept of Defense in 2003 and Strategic Defense Review 2004.

Due to growing complexity, it became more difficult to anticipate, analyze and interpret the future and the threats it brings. Despite that it seems we faced period of prolonged lethargy in defense and erosion of a just established defensive integrity.

Actually, the defense as any other social category is impartial and at permanent exposure to new permanent incremental change (threats) that need to find an answer with the same or less money, or how scholars say, "to do more - with less."

To find her-self (defense) selected as a priority among other social functions it is not necessarily to wage war, but to understand and redefine functional structure according to available resources and capacities, meliorating the both, modern challenges and traditional prejudices. To be successful, it is generally accepted that defense needs indispensable and permanent analysis of the situation, institutional commitment and professionalism³⁴ and unbreakable relationship with the institutional integrity and good governance, which essentially are indicators for the overall development of the country.

However, the reality is bitterly different. Today, the defense functions are reduced, or at least the same as 10 years ago, capacities and capabilities, if subjected to realistic, independent analysis, I believe are even modest, and it seems one could recognize dysfunction from afar, which is reflected in the fact that as the largest internal threat, probably greater than any external contemporary threats, is the lack of institutional capacity although it is estimated that defense is primarily aimed at defending the sovereignty and integrity of the state from an external enemy.

But where does this conclusion. Perhaps you should first compare the situation, to look at the legislation and ways of governing the matter, then in terms of actual implementation and functionality, and in the end in ethics and institutional integrity.

Background and analysis of the situation

Within the first legal solutions, strategic documents and bylaws but also with the initial enthusiasm and commitment the foundations of the functionality and institutional integrity were established. Significant support for building principles in the defense came from NATO and the international community. Republic of Macedonia (RM) in building principles of defensive action progressed extremely well. After all RM didn't have a need of the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) which in 2004 was introduced by NATO for defense democratization of

³⁴ Guide to Governance 01/15, Professionalism and integrity in the public service: A matter of good governance, 2015, Centre for Integrity in the Defense Sector, p.4.

Eastern European countries in transition. Macedonia was capable to solve its challenges alone. Under Article 1 and 2 of the PAP-DIB, "Member States of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), reaffirm their conviction that effective and efficient state defense institutions under civilian and democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and essential for international security cooperation. They agree to establish a Partnership Action Plan to support and sustain further development of such institutions across the Euro-Atlantic area"³⁵

"Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building aims to strengthen the efforts of the EAPC partners to initiate and continue the reform and restructuring of defense institutions to meet their needs and the commitments undertaken in the context of the Framework Document Partnership for Peace and EAPC basic document and the relevant OSCE documents including the code of conduct of the OSCE politico-military aspects of security."³⁶

According to PAP-DIB, the development of effective and democratically accountable defense institutions among other means stipulate: for the democratic control of defense activities, including appropriate legislation and coordination arrangements for determining the legal and operational role and responsibilities of key state institutions, procedures to promote civilian participation in developing defense and security policy.

However, multiyear lethargy in defense and its treatment of less significant institutional branch in Government, have led to drastic changes and loss of vision for building integrity in defense. Consequently, NATO in 2012 introduces a new partnership goal entitled "Building integrity"(BI), which since 2014 has been recommended to Macedonia and in a way, represent a tool for action in those countries that have a low degree of BI in defense to make an effort to advance. Hence, this can only be interpreted as a reality of the situation with BI in defense in Macedonia and left us to wonder whether in present time the derived content that PAP-DIB provides has been accomplished.

Intrastate, defense and Ministry of Defense (MOD), as its institutional representative, although has its own inherent specifics, by its nature falls under the group of administrative civil service or simple, public administration. It shall be lead by established functional criteria and includes several administrative principles of governance which just because of Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations, has historically been harmonized with European ones.

³⁵ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_21014.htm?

³⁶ Ibid.

The main domains of administration that are complementary criteria for good governance of the defense sector are analyzed in the OSCE report for the Western Balkans.³⁷ According to the report, the domains of administration management include: the adoption and implementation of reform programs of the administration, establishment of institutions for administration management at the central level, the establishment of a real system of values of employment, the establishment of mandatory rules of the state administration that stabilize public administration and protect employment, development of professional and depoliticized civil service system, the establishment of a fair and effective system for performance management (performance) of civil servants, the establishment of a predictable and transparent wage system, the establishment of a system that provides a regular and effective training and development of civil servants, establish a management system integrity which provides guidelines for ethical behavior in public administration.

In 2010, Macedonia has adopted Program for Administrative Reform, which is partly in line with European principles of administration. The first laws on administration, has been adopted in 2000, while last amendments were approved earlier this year. According to the report although generally acceptable, laws relating to public administration as usual "suffer from ambiguous and / or inadequate definitions that undermine their capacity to ensure the principles of legal predictability and accountability of public administration."³⁸ Recent developments indicate growing pressure on narrowing the scope of laws on state administration from the top down, especially in the direction to facilitate political appointments to managerial positions in public administration. The report also recommends stronger oversight of amendments to the laws and regulations relating to public administration to prevent the tendency of acting outside the legal framework.

The report stresses and absolute truth, which is that "despite the relatively good formally legal solutions, it is important to recognize that the adoption of the laws on public administration, which include defense, is not sufficient to professionalize it. Also adoptions of the reform programs, as well as the adoption of laws do not go far beyond the stage of declarative and symbolic politics."³⁹ If its try, whether this is also an absolute truth for administration officials working in the Ministry of Defense.

³⁷ Meyer-Sahling, J. (2012), "Civil Service Professionalisation in the Western Balkans", SIGMA Papers, No. 48, OECD Publishing.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

Hence, the establishment of a real system of values (merit) in recruitment for employment, which includes an open competition for entry (based on equal conditions), applying expert exam and provision of independence from political influence in defense despite declaring efforts has a weak implementation in the practice and employment has been characterized with the high degree of informality and favoritism, use and abuse of discretion, and a high degree of protectionism.

Social, political and economic context fails to provide for conditions for the professionalization that neither is present in any employment practices nor it is part of the internal selection system for education and training. It is also the general practice with the selection for mission deployment, promotion, rewarding or providing involvement in projects with financial gains where selection is not under the adequate competencies. On the other hand, Ministry's strategic priorities reputedly are "improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the MOD, and Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) modernization and transformation". If this is a real priority, it is realistic to expect that after so many years, the MOD will produce real progress and finally achieve projected goals. However, for the time being it seems, it will remain the same.

Furthermore, it is true that the protection of public employment should serve to promote the principles of political neutrality and impartiality of public administration, but currently there are no indications that would confirm that these principles are truly present not only in the reform of public administration programs but also in practice.

Pursuant to the exercise of the fundamental domains, the results of the OSCE survey on public administration of the Western Balkan countries are showing "a mixed picture of achievements where weaknesses continue to exist. The main weakness of the system of public administration is the low level of effective governance combined with a low level of sustainability of reforms."⁴⁰

Although it doesn't distinguish her from the rest in negative sense, what should concern the RM is the fact that the prospects for achieving sustainable professionalization of public administration, especially in the field of defense are low. While there has been significant progress in the area of formal legal institutionalization, there is poor quality implementation.

RM trajectory of the reform of public administration in terms of domestic conditions is largely unfavorable for the professionalization while international context can affect the sustainability of reforms, if it stays actively involved.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

If that is the case, a question whether reforms are needed in the defense is no longer current but who can those managed and how can implement foreign experience. For years functional separation of executive positions in MOD and "political intervention" in the army has been practicing, which brought a period of low cohabitation and thereby the dysfunction and low efficiency. The current structure of the defense system in itself is a challenge if not a risk and threat. The continuing loss of functional logic and justification is more than evident.

Therefore, it may be pointless in the new social circumstances to repeat repeatedly Buzan's defense - security dilemma,⁴¹ or to compare which security threats, external or internal are more important and influential for a sustainable defense - security system.

Just when we talk about the functionality, it should be known that the MOD is the first institution in the Republic, which had prepared a functional analysis 2004-05 that complement the Strategic Defense Review (SOP), and comply with the following transformation. The last three to four years, although it was prescribed the MOD recognized the need for a new functional analysis, but as there was inability to such a document to be adopted. According to the legislation on public administration all institutions have a responsibility for producing functional analysis as a condition and requirement for the adoption of new organizational documents so it remains to believe that they managed to draw up a document that at least in a case of the MOD has not been published yet. In the overall context it seems that institutional integrity, regardless the nature of modern challenges and the development of global civil society and social movements and media, is one of the key fundamentals, conditions and perspectives of organizing defense and security.

Hence, it is necessary permanently to pose a question about the integrity of defense institutions, especially in the MOD as a leading institution among them, whether they are up to the tasks accomplishments, whether and how they pursue the prescribed power and functions, which factors affect the credibility of the institutions, and who is shaping defense policy and how.

Participants in defense, the MODs' staff, political parties and citizens, influence on their own way on the internal defense - security challenges. Despite that, it seems that some of them are in certain inertia. Pursuant to opinion polls regarding the "trust in people and institutions"⁴² the ARM which is traditionally perceived as much more respective institution then MOD itself, retains the same high level of relevance.

⁴¹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, London, 1983, p.207-209

⁴² The survey was conducted in 2013 by the Macedonian Center for International Cooperation.

However, according to the results, in fact, it has seen its fall from first place in trust in 2012 to fourth in 2013, given that confidence in other institutions such as educational institutions, health care organizations, and the police has grown significantly.

This course has been partially corrected in the coming years, but it is only a confirmation of variability in the defense segments. Still, a public opinion poll conducted by the Centre for research and implementation of policies - Skopje in 2014, again confirms that armies are the most trusted in the region. In Macedonia, more than 71.5% of respondents gave their support to the ARM.⁴³

Citizens Association "Most" in 2013 also presented the results of the regional project "Using new media in promoting the transparency of governments"⁴⁴, according to which transparency in relation to the defense, MO shares seventh place with four institutions. In this context in relation to employment data, only the Ministry of Information Society and Administration has a link to the Administration Agency on its website. In terms of budget transparency and free access to information, MOD has not released information on the budget for 2013 nor has published information on requests for access to public information. The results with respect to the other areas and indicators are also negative.

If the relationship, given the above presented research results point to say that the state of defense in terms of functionality and internal relations and challenges, is "symptomatic" then what the status in relation of modern threats is. Are there capacity competent authorities to assess which combination of modern threats can be the most vulnerable for RM and whether it will be timely assessed or after being reported?

In this context, RM fits uneasy. Judging according to public information, the provisions of strategic documents, statements by former Ministers of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, modern challenges are similar to those within the region, European and even global one with one specifics that economic conditions, unemployment, and poverty continues to be perceived as the biggest challenges, and have more of relevance then i.e. current crisis with the immigrants which has not being perceived as immediate and real threat that could explode into a new regional disaster.

The latest Euro-barometer survey, whose results were published on 31.07.2015, says that "while immigration is the biggest problem for Europeans, greater than the economic crisis and unemployment, for the people of Macedonia biggest problem is unemployment and the economic situation and the rise in retail prices."

⁴³ The survey results were published in Macedonian media 09.03.2015

⁴⁴ Full survey results can be found on the website <http://otvorenlade.cdtmn.org>

Results also show that Macedonian citizens have much greater confidence in European institutions than in Macedonian one. This perception of internal problems and external challenges, questioned whether the institutions could accurately identify priorities in a slew of global and national challenges.

At the end it seems that systemic institutional analysis by assessing the segments of the functional efficiency of MOD as an institutional defense representative will come to real observations to confirm or reject the general perception of depreciation and depleted credibility. Nevertheless, we should try to assess this statement through the check through the parameters of principal defense representatives.

Basic parameters of the principal defense representatives

The basic parameters of the principal defense representatives (MOD, General Staff (GS) of the ARM and ARM itself) can be evaluated according to financial, transformation, personal, legislative, and if you want functional solutions.

Financial solutions are actually a reflection of the engagement of the budget where over 65% relate to personal costs. The percentage of GDP allocated for defense in 2005 despite the policy projected 2.3 to 2.6% ends up with realistic 2.16%. Ten years later it was reduced by almost 50% at the current level of 1.16%. Within such financial preconditions, defense had to drastically reduce or functionally reorganize. Since 2005, with the formation of the Crisis Management Center, the Protection and Rescue Directorate and the Border Police, the Ministry of Defense has been released of the general obligations for crisis management and protection and rescue on the state level as well as permanent commitments to guard the border line. The same year the Military Academy was abolished and in 2006 the Military Hospital with its larger part were transferred to the public health sector and the Army become fully professional which left MOD to take care only for administration of the military service candidates and voluntary service in the ARM.

Many functions have declined, and after receiving a "delayed" invitation for NATO membership in 2008 we have not increased other functions in terms of capacity building for collective defense and security. In 2005 the overall functions performed fewer than 600 employees with twice bigger budget, and today it is speculated that the new organizational document subsume double number of personal while budget is tight twice. Those circumstances are unavoidable and they cannot lead to a conclusion on quality. Army figure is less built but increased ranks further twist the pyramid and now we have more senior ranks of the needs and those projected with the SDR. To alleviate this situation the Military Academy was restarted which produces extra young officers, and it seems it has been done at the expense of soldiers and combat units that have less and less personnel so the

extension of the contracts of professional soldiers up to 45 years was eminent that from the other side invalidated functioning of the "Lepeza project", intended for the resettlement of soldiers, NCOs and officers personnel.

In the officer corps has elders 10 years eligible for promotion but "by certain circumstances" are not enlisted for higher rank, while others deployed in MOD take the place of public administration civilian colleague. The very same public administration civil servant fully accomplish same duties having a lowest admin rank of junior associates while with interventionist change in the organizational structure the officer obtain a higher rank doing the very same job from lieutenant up to colonel retaining the same job position. Takeovers, new hires or promotions with possible rare exceptions can easily fall under the perception of favoritism, nepotism, patronage, and clientele interventionism.

But it is not our seemingly pressing issue. The Ministry has another interesting phenomenon. It seems distinctiveness of public servants - defense specialists, much easily blurred into "general" administrative civil servants within the public administration. Anyone can operate in defense and in parallel to be an expert on agriculture, and perhaps advisor for education and health etc, etc, but the real defense experts are lost in the generalization of public administration.

But the MOD has other peculiarities too. More than 50% of leading positions of managers or service duty in MOD, a category that the new Law on administration incidentally does not recognize, are filled by military personnel. It undermines civil-democratic control. Curiosity is that there is also concentration of four to five executive positions covered by one person. Although it is legitimate in terms of conducting functions while certain places are vacant, it should not be forgotten that sharing information and responsibilities should ensure avoidance of absolute control over the decisions, while the concentration of power, can be a major risk factor of corruption. For having, a full picture there is a MOD web portal that post information about opportunities for courses, education, training, and selection of candidates. Drawbacks may be that there is a candidate selection sometimes that is selected for two activities which are executed but it is probably due to a technical error.

In addition, despite all the amendments to the basic legislation to the Defense Law, Military Service Law and Law on public administration, systemic inequality between civilian and military personnel in the MOD has been created. One example is long and complex procedure for selection and placement of civilian professionals with years of experience in managerial positions at the expense of the simple procedure of changing the systematization document and exchange between the envisaged administrative officers with an alternative setting for military personnel that does not apply complex procedure.

Another example of inequality is the verification and cash compensation for acquired higher educational title for the officers to be applied automatically, but for civilians to be limited by the need for prescribe a specific position for MA or PhD holder, which with ultimate exceptions almost never happens, no matter whether the person who acquired the title of higher degree was sent for education by the MOD or s/he privately promoted his educational degree.

In GS as an integral part of the MOD and ARM in general, the method of rotational placement as in all armies of three to five years especially for the key positions is well known. However, there are examples after 10 years that, certain positions are still filled by the same officers. Also certain media sometimes expressed objections to the manner of selection of candidates for referral missions and others argue that the mandate of the Army Chief has already expired almost one year before, which is not so terrible if its understand as well-intentioned public control of the situation in defense. It might feel concerned that defense institutions have lost its power in terms of military issues and establishing procedure for selection of candidates for military/ defense representatives abroad according to official responsibilities and bylaws are avoided.

Finally according to the situation in both integral parts (MOD and GS), it is difficult to assume that there is a place for civil-democratic control of defense.

Hence, the MOD and ARM its necessary to reread the Criteria for good governance in the defense sector⁴⁵, where corruption in a wider sense, is the ineffectiveness of the institutions, system failure or hole. According to the criteria, "corruption or unethical behavior is also defined as" institutional practices that compromise the institutional capacity to perform its functions in an unlimited and accountable way."⁴⁶ Someone here might notice why forcing the category of corruption in this context. According to the survey conducted by the State Commission against Corruption and the Rating Agency in 2013, citizens perceived political parties as the most corrupt, followed by ministries and Government and the President and Parliament. According to the information presented, MO is not excluded from the group of ministries. And if this is just a wrong perception, it should be the basis for further analysis and exploration of the ways to overcome this situation.

Conclusion

Ineffective institutions are equivalent to dysfunctional defense. This implies the necessity of a systemic reorganization and changing relationships in society and relations between the competent authorities and to the defense.

⁴⁵ Criteria for good governance in the defense sector: International standards and principles, Centre for Integrity in the Defense Sector, 2015.

⁴⁶ Ibid

Is it possible that a critical mass would be created in the near future, remains an open question? But one thing is certain, at best someone will have to answer the question as soon as taxpayers ask for, what is really happening in the domain of defense, or at worst someone will have to answer the question as it would become the source of a new crisis and a basis for new internal conflict.

Finally, on the question whether reforms are needed in the defense for its greater efficiency, the answer is undoubtedly positive with the emphasis that we should be familiar with the ways in which we want to develop defense, be determined on the basis of comprehensive analysis that will lead us to a future functionally positioned defense. It should understand also a revision of normative acts and their congruent normative harmonization. The existing legal documents are one of the sources of inefficiency, confrontation and resentment. If they undergo the constitutionality and legality before an independent judicial authorities in several dozen cases would show unconstitutionality and illegality, which can be confirmed through the large number of dispute cases conducted before the competent courts. Equally dysfunctional are strategic documents with a multilingual white papers on defense too, which are just a copy of old documents phrases without substantial reflection of the real modernity.

In terms of funding and defense costs, we can say that the principle of stable defense funding, which was based on realistic projections, has long been abandoned. Furthermore if you increase defense institutions staff by 100 to 150% of the projected SDR, while you have less functions and aging of the officer corps like in Belgium and Portugal, then chronic hollow Army units and responsibility for the admission of professional soldiers that their contract has ended, even if you allocate 4% of GDP on defense, those funds will not be sufficient.

The current structure of the defense system in itself is a challenge if not a risk and threat. The continuing loss of functional logic and justification is evident. The limited use of military assistance to civilian authorities, talks to reduce the functions or if you want basic goals and objectives. Its use outside the RM within the operation to maintain peace, as operations to achieve real benefit for RM on economic - political or value - driven motives, have a potentially controversial justification.

Hence, when we talk about reorganization and probably we will again come to the need of BI.

For the BI and ethical leadership as commonly defined, is important not only to focus on the code of conduct, the application of the mechanisms of individual competencies but also the interaction of individual integrity (individual behavior), the institutionalization of norms of integrity (in context operated) and the integrity of the institution (the relationship between the institution, leaders and individuals).⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Eduard Grebe and Minka Woerman, Institutions of integrity and the integrity of institutions: Integrity and ethics in the politics of developmental leadership, Developmental Leadership Program, Research Paper 15, 2011.

To achieve this, redefinition of relations is necessary primarily at the state level, something that will involve drastic reduction of the protectionism that affect public administration in defense and an independent expertise on the conditions and directions of action.

Otherwise, the only reality and necessity, which remains current, after more than 20 years of independence, is again to ask what defense institutions we need, so they do not represent an internal security challenge for the country.

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**NON-STATE ACTORS AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE CREATION OF
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL POLITICS OF STATES**

**НЕДРЖАВНИТЕ АКТЕРИ И НИВНОТО ВЛИЈАНИЕ ВО КРЕИРАЊЕ НА
НАДВОРЕШНАТА И ВНАТРЕШНА ПОЛИТИКА НА ДРЖАВИТЕ**

Dr. Igor Gelev, PhD

Ministry of Defense

E-mail: igelev@yahoo.com

Prof. Stojan Slaveski, PhD

European University R. Macedonia

E-mail: sslaveski@hotmail.com

ABSTRACT: Globalization and democratization of societies have well determined the appearance of actors that as a factor have great influence in the multilateral relations over military diplomatic scene. If in the past states were the only actors that participated in the international relations, today in the era of globalization the mass media the non-of-State actors and what for especially business actors and foundations managed to in large get their input on the insight of the international political scene and well represent important partners of UN but as well as to other multi lateral organizations which some of them even organized their own multilateral associations.

The non-of-State actors have very important role in the creation of the ambient and the creation of politics having bonds to different issues and concerns raised through common life, but also play very important role in the (dis) institutional relationship to other international actors. So the non-state actors are involved in all the domain of multilateral diplomacy, so until it takes that states should address a question to a specific problem from within and go to it its solution break, non-state actors cooperating very flexible, fast and without any institutional delay and restriction all together with the actors devoted to the problematic issues still manage to come up with practical solutions. So according to Shepard Formani and Dreg Seeger talking about global conduct or having unified model on how to rule the states, we need a general, consistent pragmatic and normative

frame that will deliver the right equilibrium among institutional and out of institutional conduct. The non-state actors are those that create the suitable ground for the creation of public opinion inside the states and in this way they influence governmental decisions talking about open issues on external or internal politics.

The text is a try to demystify the role of non-of-State actors in the creation of internal and external politics of states as well as their place in the process of transformation of international system of conduct and rule. At the same time the gap between the state to non-of-State actors in the process of establishing domination is being explained and especially we discuss gaps taking and occupying certain space and time especially around the political-social disputes led because of the creation of a suitable climate to its own evolution.

Key Words: Non-state actors, multilateralism, international politics, soft power.

АПСТРАКТ: Глобализацијата и демократизацијата на општествата ја детерминираа појавата на недржавните актери како фактор кои што имаат влијание во мултилатералните односи на меѓународната дипломатска сцена. Ако во минатото државите беа единствени актери кои учествуваа во меѓународните процеси, денес во ерата на глобализација и мас медиумите недржавните актери особено бизнис-актерите и фондациите се етаблираа на меѓународната политичка сцена и претставуваат значајни партнери на ОН, но исто така и на други мултилатерални организации, па некои од нив дури основаа и сопствени мултилатерални асоцијации.

Недржавните актери имаат значајна улога во создавање на амбиент и креирање на политика за разни прашања од секојдневниот живот, но и во градење на (не)институционален однос со други меѓународни актери. Исто така недржавните актери се вклучени во сите области на мултилатералната дипломатија, па така додека државите да адресираат некој меѓусебен проблем и да пристапат на негово решавање, недржавните актери соработувајќи меѓусебно брзо, флексибилно и без институционални ограничувања со актерите кои се најмногу посветени на проблематиката доаѓаат до практични решенија. Според Шепард Форман и Дерек Сегер кога станува збор за глобално управување или унифициран модел за начин на владеење во државите, потребна е општа усогласена прагматична и нормативна рамка која ќе обезбеди еквилибриум меѓу институционалното и вонинституционалното управување. Недржавните актери се тие кои создаваат клима за креирање на јавното мислење во државите и на тој начин влијаат на владините одлуки по однос на прашања од надворешната или внатрешната политика.

Текстот е обид да се демистифицира улогата на недржавните актери во креирањето на внатрешната и надворешната политика на државите како и нивното место во трансформирање на меѓународниот систем на управување. Истовремено се објаснува и јазот помеѓу државните и недржавните актери во остварување на доминација на одреден простор и време особено околу политичко-општествените судири кои се водат заради креирање на погодна клима за сопствена еволуција.

Клучни зборови: Недржавни актери, мултилатерализам, меѓународна политика, мека моќ .

INTRODUCTION

The choice of the subject for this text is determined by different dynamics of contemporary multilateralism connected to global issues, global conduct and global institutions. Multilateralism as (dis) institutional phenomena is chained under influences from the process of globalization, the fall and the rise of civil society, the appearance of economic and political climate and the new peace upon threats and safety as well.

Through this research we prove the before set hypothesis of the issues concerned of whether non-of-State actors could influence over the creation of external and internal politics of the state and that would be in both political economical and ,military sense. In other words we deal with the fact whether (dis) influence of non-of-State actors will have the overall impact over the political scene within the state and beyond.

For this purpose there is this quality in character research by applying analytical-synthetic method of scientific exploration , by separate analyze of data and systematizations of the facts gathered in a logical sequence. The facts deriving from this inductive-deduction and hypothetical method and syllogism as a check up procedure to hypothesis given and governing or having intake and conclusion to the before given hypothesis over the issues whether non-state actors have the right influence on the external and internal politics of the states, whether they have influence in multi-lateral diplomacy or in other words what is their overall impact over international political scene.

So by analyzing medium content where we may track down official information of legitimate institutions, we may well recognize the variables and the indicators of pervious attitude of different non-state actors that had their reflection touch imposed over politics of governments or international institutions. Analog to this we may claim the numerous non-state actors in the states such as NGO, citizen associations, citizen movements (plenum) have influence in the external but also internal politics of the state. The Research has the general purpose to show that non-state actors with all their activities well influence in the creation of political system of the state and at the same time set preconditions to produce new centers of power that will ground their own power in the civil society netting. They can act independently or together with other non-state actors, cooperating

with states and their institution or just confronting them ,however still representing crucial actors of contemporary and global conduct and rule. (Mukdoon, Aviel, Reitano & Sullivan, 2011a:153)

NON-STATE ACTORS

Because of the globalizations of actors, the issues and the problems, contemporary international system cannot be justly understood without taking into consideration the non-state actors. The term "non-state actor" covers vast variable of different appearances, including individuals too, institutes that perform research activities, epistemological associations, terrorist groups, criminal networks, religious groups, multinational companies, societal movements, transactional networking, transactional networking and coalitions or foundations of NGO. (Mukdoon, et. al. 2011b:151)

Types of non-state actors

If we make a retrospective of the near past we will notice that contemporary societies have lived up to a great change in the discourse of multilateral communication to important subjects, open panel discussions, but most importantly of all the promotion of non-state actors that represent the most important achievement in contemporary societal structures.

In the literature we can come across the term non-state or sovereign entity. Traditional societies and governments of those societies in the seventies of the century before have unjustly set aside the non-state actors. The state has the lawful legitimacy to political communication on the international scene, but other non-state actors are also credible to influence and interact on the international political scene. Therefore, each entity that has influence in international communication could be called non-state actor. (Graham & Newnham, 1991a:6)

But this is not a general definition that has been marked as incomplete by other authors that research this problematic because today more and more certain individuals have equivalent influence of a level of a state influence.⁴⁸

According to so far data affordable from the research and technical literature from this area there are these types of non-state actors: Sub-state and international actors, religious(confessional) actors, terrorist or rebel uprising groups, multinational corporations, non-governmental corporations and individuals. The influence of these actors is so vast that the same has been researched by governmental agencies of great forces and has been determined that that the same take important place in the creation of external politics of states but also in the process of designing the international political scene.

⁴⁸ Example over this are different negotiators, mediators or those that ease the political discourse agenda representing their own states or international institutions and still manage to endorse and guide the political process within the states or among the states in times of political crisis.

The initial classification of non-state actors is the distinction between two types of international organizations: international governmental organizations IGOs (International Government Organizations) and international non-governmental organizations INGOs (International Nongovernment Organizations). This division reflects the two largest categories of non-state actors that have participants from more states. (Jacobson, 1996a:824-833)

IGO is defined structure from more sovereign states because of establishment of political relations, especially among states that have political unsolved questions. The most important international governmental organization is the United Nations (in the context below UN) but also NATO and WTO. (Jacobson, 1996b:824-833)

The difference between international governmental and non-governmental organizations is questionable especially by the fact that categorization allows be represented even by certain set of questions and paradigms, and allows itself to be represented and taken as both governmental and non-governmental organization. (Clive, 2001a:37-45)

This is of significance for those organizations that are in the domain of energetic transport and telecommunications. According to OH, IGOs are defined as international organizations that are formed with intergovernmental contract. (Clive, 2001b:35)

Transnational organizations (also TNO), is a separate category of non-state actors where according to Samuel Huntington are big on the pecking order well-structured organizations with a strictly centralized platform of act. According to him such one organization is the Central Bank, IMF, General Motors and even WTO. (Bas, Nortman, & Rain, 2002a)

What is common for the authors of TNO, is that here is the case of governmental and non-governmental international organizations involved but also profitable governed organizations too. When we talk about transnational organizations we distinct three types of transactional organizations – governmental transnational organizations (TGO's) transnational organizations cooperative organizations (TCOs) and transnational organizations non-cooperative organizations (TNCOs). (Nye & Keohan, 1971)

Governmental transnational organizations (TGOs) are organizations that are organized by the system support from government that are non-governmental subject but are direct result of governmental intercourse and mutual communication on international agenda. Transnational cooperative organizations by nature are nongovernmental or have their own budget and establish profit through their acting, and such are for example IBM or General Motors.(Graham & Newnham, 1991b:249)

Their influence is vast because they have their own profit, whereas their investments support economic benefit for sovereign governments and from here the possibility for their influence to all national governments.

Transnational non-cooperative organizations (TNCO) have the features of international non-governmental organizations but differ because they are a sort of independent organizations in a mutual harness of many other associations, and yet are the goal and mission in certain host states connecting all. Such are for example the transnational political movements, international trade representatives, international just subjects, churches, religious movements, or transnational terrorist netting. So there are generally two types of international nongovernmental organizations, one is original or elementary INGO and the other is a hybrid INGOs.(Bas, et. al.2002b:97-104)

The first or the (GINGO) is composed of only nongovernmental members counting (International Olympic Committee or the Central Church council), and the other (HINGO) is a combination of governmental and nongovernmental subjects, such as International organization of labor where we have trading organizations added too, than governmental subjects and labor organizations. Sub state and international actors are usually actors that play a role depending on the problematic issues concern. Usually the methodology of their commitment is well standardized and very often they are corrective of governments in accordance to positive international and legitimate normative. At the same time these international or sub state actors could be of temporary character when it comes to solving certain bitter questions and the same serve to create conditions for functioning of national or international systems.(Clive, 2001c:115-147)

Religious (confessional) actors

In this category, we count actors that use religious antagonism to create and design different political safety situations. Using religious difference the gap between The West and The Arab world has been created, or in other words, in consequence military conflict direct result of religious set back. Today, religious actors are incorporated part of the international public diplomacy especially in the part of culture diplomacy all with the purpose to easily implement it on actual grounds, where cultural differences do not allow diplomacy practicing.

Terrorists or rebels?

Terrorists or rebels as non-state actors take their cultural place on the throne of (dis)civilization. On the other hand, just seen from different perspective, these actors could be identified as terrorists or rebels depending on their "sponsorship". Without any doubt, they are product of the double game pack of great forces and even the international communion.

So while the one side and the other do crime against humanity killing civilians, the one are called terrorist or murderers and the other revolutionaries and liberators of countries from its own burden?! The equilibrium of international justice is depending on the (dis)balance of great forces and their vision about the future of the involved sides of the conflict.

Multinational companies

Multinational companies are important actor on the international political scene. Today, great deal of these corporations is richer than some states. Logically their power is so vast that the same can directly influence some social and socio-political streams in states. This well signifies that these actors can directly or indirectly support the choice of some governments or in other cases just opposes them. Also these actors have vast influence over external or internal politics of the states and also in the act of deliverance of many laws that can only be found supportive to international corporations.

It is far from clear that the role of the multinational companies should be looked upon not only from a negative aspect but the same has also absolute positive role especially around the stimulus over the harness with the nongovernmental organizations because of introducing citizen society with priority of providing business and economic activities of multinational corporations, and in this way many regional and latent conflicts have been successfully avoided.⁴⁹

Nongovernment organizations

Nongovernment organizations are precursors of the creation of inter and intra social relations of states and generally speaking on the international scene. It is not just for no reason that transition states instigate the work of NGO sectors as a proof for their democratic discourse, although in a certain measure for their own promotion too. The work of the nongovernment organizations has its positive and negative features. The work of the NGO sector is based on the development of citizenship concept within societies up to a level of state without borders, freedom and equality. It is far from clear that it is an apparent case that could (should be well) decentralized in relation with governmental structure and as such be acceptable for common citizenship, with the promotion of western liberal values (they at the moment accepted as universal goods, which all by itself remains vague).

Nongovernment organizations have different access in different civilization surroundings, and starting from here we determine the development and progress of the citizenship concept. First we need to come one step closer (impose) the different attitude of things that is being different from traditional one, and then gradually accept (usually tempting things) positive change.

⁴⁹ Industrial capacities on the border between North and South Korea where we find common workers at work p[art of the two separate societies well represents a model of making two opposing countries coming together seen from economic perspective.

Nongovernment organizations have numerous worthiness in the part for demobilization of children soldiers in African states, signing the Convention for obstruction of usage of anti-infantry mines in Ottawa (1997), the creation of International court of justice, numerous decisions and resolutions of the UN as well as many other positive good aspects associated. The negative part of their job is that some of them are an open door to different spy and terrorist created networks, (non) democratic changes in the newly composed states coming from the torn apart socialism, their role in the creation and the functioning of international business (exploiting) organizations, part of which are fully controlled (or controlled and financed) by major forces even terrorist or rebel organizations.⁵⁰

Glorious individuals

The individuals are also very important actors. There are two types of individuals that are involved in the creation of internal and external politics of states. Common citizens, well-renounced or famous individuals. Talking about famous people it means that they or some other people are taking advantage of their fame in order to establish dominance or impose influence in politics. So, many politicians remedy their image even anonymous reputation being in company with popular actors, musicians, or artists. The creation of public opinion in conditions of political elections and vote is apparent in contemporary politics. Using their benchmark, they compensate their own handicap. Also hard decisions that come to opposition to publicity are shock absorbed in this way, by following the route of the non-state actors. The other type of individuals that come from the ranks of common people and had great influence over public masses, were the anonymous who by believe in their own ideals or promoting societal values have ranked themselves in the world of important doers of our time.⁵¹

INFORMATIVE INFLUENCE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

The history of informative influence

In the past because of the military superiority on the battlefield, the army had come up with a system to achieve goals by using combinations of both military and nonmilitary nature.

At first sight according to Joint Publication Doctrine 3-13 (Anon, 2012), it is a case of psychological operations and INFO operations because of providing support over operations in the domain that they are performed.

⁵⁰ However, some NGO sectors in their positive work have revealed deeds of " democratic states" that they do and are not in the spirit of democracy. Such is the example of the most liberal and democratic based country Netherlands when in 2004 the state planned quiet force out (by imposing on numerous economic preset terms) of 26.000 migrants. After revealing the information, the Dutch government withdrew the decision of forcing new economic taxation on the migrants.

⁵¹ The example of Nelson Mandela, Gandhi or Martin Luther has led to significant social changes and new political streams.

But because of terminology rigidness it was necessary the term INFO operations to be substituted, so as a syntactical term the term informative influence is being taken instead. Informative influence represents a conglomerate of both hard and soft power in order to achieve the goal ahead. It has the target to identify the crucial elements responsible for the creation of climate in order to achieve the goal of those that start it over.

We should take into consideration the fact that because of the complexity and the large domain of goal achievement, it represents a system that is in demand for a great majority of people, time and resources. The results from informative influence are long term results with huge impact effects on the scene operating theatre.

Components of informative influence - hard and soft power

According to Joseph Nye (Nye, 1991a), soft power is a skill of convincing, whereas hard power contrary gradually has the aggressive or even the military component in order to achieve a goal. In comparison with the hard power, soft power does not make any tries to force, and does not involve repressive measures (at least not directly imposed).

Joseph Nye (Nye, 1991b) in his deeds discusses the modest start of the process of globalization and the new world order. He minimizes the role of war and at the same time identifies hard power in the process of achieving goals set ahead, and also what is more takes out the advantage of negotiation, diplomacy, and the skill to offer common interest, identifying all of these as soft power gain methods.

Seen from the paradigm of time, the usage of violent methods or any other kind of repressive measures leaves with short-term results achieved, however the same later would even become minimized up to a scale that they almost vanish indeed. While the usage of other forms of soft power surely step ahead safely provide successful results in order to achieve successful results and sustain preset terms to achieve long-range results with negative outcome, or talking about peace as a category, the usage of hard power provides negative peace or lack of war whereas soft power means positive peace or long-range success. (Nye, 2013c)

Soft power as an idea is a term inspired by the ideology over world's society, or establishment of universal human and societal values of all levels. So if the own culture, political ideals and the way of life is close and luring for the whole of the group so is more effective than the usage of the soft power. Or, if in case we impose the idea to live on a global level that economic prosperity would flourish too, which on one hand is so much inviting for those groups that do not belong to the open community. Such one is the example of EU as a communion tempting for post-communist states, or the appearance of democracy incline societies (the oxymoron of China although communism is on the bedrock of societal constitution, the market normative on the other hand are in accordance with western standards, so consequently China is in decades as a result of economic progress).

Also goals of soft power should be in accordance with the international laws, not to be able to come into collision with the lawful normative in the state that is target of soft power, and at the same time to encircle multilateralism instead of unilateralism and by all means should have its economical side. (Gallarotti, 2011:57)

Soft power and the determination to get what it is supposed to be made achievable are via methods of attraction instead of force or targeting. That is determined by the attractiveness of the culture of non-state actors (the actor that exports soft power), political ideals and the acceptance of its external politics. (Nye, 2004d/2013,e:6&9)

In case politics of the actor that exports soft power is seen as legitimate to others, under such circumstances his soft power is a growing one to all other potential receptors. In simple words soft power is far more attractive to state and non-state actors that is being designed for. To be more practical, a skill influences over the behavior of others in order to get the desired results. Understanding the soft power influence in the external politics of the USA, the same has been commercialized through the film industry, television, media as well as the process of assimilation of habits and routine of life and the hobby practiced by the young population.

Just to be able to illustrate as a pan dam of Hollywood is Bollywood in India with over 800 movies a year compared to Hollywood that comes with the average of 500-600 movies a year which is a result of the unique of the Asian (dis) tolerance over western movie standards.⁵² The impact that television has over each subject or this double side effect is what actually creates the target acceptance per subject, but at the same time, it also brings about the idea of rejection the things considered inappropriate. The media has a collective impact over societal conduct of large communities, which is exceptionally important for the creation and the design of favorable climate for "strange foreign opinion".

Soft power can be easily transformed into hard power depending on the hurdles on its way of deliverance. The transformation from soft to hard power is applied only when the goal is not achieved by using soft power. Talking about classical type of transformation of soft into hard power is the apparent example when nongovernmental organizations take over violent factors in order achieving force of authorities into throwing out agenda of political or societal issues. (Riordan, 2003:1)

As a conclusion of soft power is the fact that it represents a way of deliverance goals of the actors or the actor alone (state or non-state) that use diplomacy of influence towards another subject especially with the case of democracy based countries, even in the states with less little democracy or no democracy at all. This due to the fact that the methods of usage soft power represent or involve actors that are integrated into societal system of the country towards which such methods

⁵² During the Cold War, USA promoted the movie "Mission to Moscow" (1943), which was supposed to overcome the dispute with the Soviet union during the Cold War, or in other words their common ground of fighting against Nazism , as well as to promote democracy and the free social system of the USA in front of the Russian citizens.

are being exported, and the same have credibility for its dispersion and dissemination up to the final target users.

Informational influence as a methodology to influence state actors

In the development and the need to dominate in a society there is the necessity to commercialize the citizen model of conduct and reign and for that purpose PR of non-state actors evolves in three concepts.

First that would be the propaganda, or the transmission of ideas and values for a specific goal designed to serve the needs of the one applying them. (Welch, 2013a)

It is far from reason not to expect imposing or convincing over something but instead promoting or making more appropriate a certain need of value that is unusual up to the moment of promotion of the same, addressed to a specific group.

Talking about informative influence in terms of the first concept we need to mention that there is a distinction between societal collaboration and propaganda. In other words, propaganda seen in a time lapse has "longer intellectual pedigree" compared to informative influence. Propaganda evolved through all of its forms from the past up to today, leaving traces on field of security, media, diplomacy economy, and politics and so on.

(Welch, 2013b:78-88) Informative influence on the other hand is a useful managing with data in a positive connotation and creation of pre terms to find solution or systematic useful products. (Holbrooke, 2001)

The second concept of this type of influence of non-state actors is national branding that although represents national rebranding, or rigidly erasing of national identification code, or homogeneity of nation process with a higher brand. Example for this is the EU which purpose is not erasing national identification instead of nation attributing some certain type of civilization that has its own advantages especially around prevention certain chronic regional conflicts.

The third concept is the cultural relations and it implies promotion of the rights of humanity, respect among cultural differences and promotion of democracy. This concept is also called generational since the concept promotes its own (or rebranded theirs) values as widely acceptable to younger population, and will be acceptable when the same will have determining power and rain authority. The methods of this concept are determined by the long time span which is different from the analog variable to customs and culture development of the whole assembly. One could draw the conclusion that informative influence is a certain type of phenomena in the development of non-state actors but also a new prologue in the restructure of international relation at states with diametrical contra opposing ways of social commandment in a time of globalization and intercon

nection. In other words "diplomacy" is guided alone by the non-state actors and it is not a skill of leading diplomacy, but the same represents part of a cloth or pattern from the world global political agenda of evolution towards the last stage of diplomacy (external and internal).

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE CREATION OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL POLITICS OF STATES

Although nation-states are still main actors in the home and international politics, the stadium in which the actual multilateral diplomacy is going on is much wider, and analog to this the actors in the whole set of the process may vary upon. Almost in all questions that are part of the external or internal politics are modulated (at least partially) through activism and analysis of non-state actors, which mission overlaps national borders.

Non-state actors are actively involved almost in all areas starting from peace talks, economic development and trading politics, all the way to climatic change. Since 40 years ago Joseph Nye and Rober Keohane have determined new basis in their book "Transnational relation and international politics" by substitution of the model of world politics where basic model is the state counting transactional actors. The book threw new shred of light on the role and the meaning of non-state actors that promote activities and values outside national borders. (Mukdoon, et. al. 2011c:155)

The evolution of NGO and the non-state actors and the restriction of their influence in multilateral diplomacy

and the creation of public opinion.

Non-state actors could have direct or indirect influence on the multilateral diplomatic processes through enlargement of their specific abilities. They directly influence on the way that certain questions are transferred in the media or in the creation of public opinion talking about public opinion relating these questions. In order to put this to practice non-state actors use different strategies starting from meetings with the creators of political scene, using the medium space and exposing people responsible for proclaiming decisions that are or are not in the sphere of interest of societies (or international) community, putting the accent to social (in)justice and similar. However, despite the vast influence of the non-state actors in the home theatre but international politics as well, still their influence is highly restricted and that is determined from the democracy ongoing processes in states.⁵³

⁵³ The latest of news say that in Russia there is an act of prohibition of up to 15 nongovernmental organizations ,and what is more some acts of warning have also been sent to 5 citizen associations because of activities that can lead to endangerment of national interest of the state. As an apparent example we can list out the example that almost all mayor NGO are dependent from sponsorship and other additional sources of finance that are generally in dispute with the national governments (at least talking about larger states), and in case their agenda is found problematic on the national course of the leaders of the states, the same could be thrown out from the finance program. For example the American president Bush stopped the cooperation with the humanitarian NGO and that commitment was declared to the American military.

Whatever this could turn to appear, and despite restrictions non-state actors have gained large political influence. They can effectively contribute in the multilateral diplomacy especially around the quality and the results from this type of diplomacy.

Multilateral institutions and the diplomatic processes more and more recognize the value of civil society, so they need to support the creation of a space occupying and in this way instigate favorable climate where the NGO voice and the voice of the groups of society could be heard. The use of Aria the formula given by the Council of safety is a good example for the way in which space could be available and represent a moving force to gain the primate of civil society. (Mukdoon, et. al. 2011f:167)

CONCLUSION

The appearance of non-state actors is considered to be mass-effect of geopolitics, simply because the same is accepted by all scientific workers as a phenomena in the world when in a situation of lack of internal communication, non-state actors have the power and the balance to create climate suitable for solution of certain problems but also contribute for a change of a new political discourse of states.

Global civilian society represents a constrictive and complex dynamic system of intercepted subjects with different targeting, goals and activities which multiplied effects are reflected in all four corners of the world. The subjects and the actors of global civil society could be advanced or regressive forms, democratic or non-democratic, elite or poor creation in the process of globalization. Whatever the case global civil society today represents a dominant actor on the global scene with a tendency to take the primate in societies that are immune over the globalization process.

The benchmark of non-state actors (seen as part of global society) is in the power to instigate or catalyze crucial political process that (will) have the overall impact on the wholesome economy. Seen from the paradigm of society the role of non-state actors on longer term will have the purpose to create a model of mayor territory decline and internationalization on separate world goods as well as homogeneity over economic ideology and creation of universal religious, philosophical and citizen values.

Taking into consideration the current situation that occurs in the region especially having to do with the external and internal political crisis in Macedonia, it is inevitable to impose the question of who would be the upcoming political discourse of Republic of Macedonia within geopolitical surrounding. The ethno national contamination of the social tissue is present in the whole region and for its decontamination, we need involvement of all state and non-state actors.

For this reason we need to cultivate the global civil society as a corrective of social anomaly and put on practice on the inside politics based on principles of social govern of positive lawful normative. Also what is more the research has shown that although we need sort of creation of healthy climate in order to make a civil society operate properly , we also may need the involvement of the civil actors on questions that reflect external politics of the state but also bringing help in at the point dealing with geo location on the international political scene, as well as lending some support for the non-state actors seen as correctors of social anomaly over the internal politics of the state, because thanks to the non-state actors the capability of the smaller actors to be able to bring out and raise questions of the interest of the global debate will surely be in incline, and at the same time the great actors will have their power demised.

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DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT, SITUATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES IN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**УПРАВУВАЊЕ СО РИЗИЦИ ОД КАТАСТРОФИ, СОСТОЈБИ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ВО РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА**

Stevko Stefanoski, PhD

Crisis Management Center of Republic of Macedonia

Email: stevko.stefanoski@cuk.gov.mk

Апстракт: Денешниот живот се карактеризира со голема динамика и изразена глобализација во комуникацијата и движењето на луѓето низ целиот свет. Брзиот техничко-технолошки развој и примената на високите научни достигнувања, исклучително позитивно влијаеа на квалитетот на животниот стандард во поголемиот дел од светот. Но, во исто време, како никогаш порано, современата цивилизација се соочува и со голем број на закани и ризици по безбедноста, кои сè почесто го загрозуваат животот и здравјето на луѓето и предизвикуваат огромни последици по животната средина и природните богатства. Глобалните безбедносни заедници (ООН, ОБСЕ, ЕУ, НАТО), како и државите поединечно, остваруваат интензивна соработка заради идентификување на глобалните ризици и преземаат голем број на заеднички иницијативи и активности за нивно превенирање и намалување, со единствена цел, да се избегнат големи катастрофи и страдања на современата човечка цивилизација.

Живееме во период (Нуого 2005-2015 и Рамката од Сендаи за намалување на ризици од катастрофи 2015-2030) кој ООН, како најмасовна светска организација го посветуваат на јакнење на отпорноста на нациите и заедниците наспроти се почестите појави на различни несреќи и катастрофи. Република Македонија во континуитет ги следи овие иницијативи и ги превзема сите потребни активности за воспоставување и одржување на организиран и институционално воден систем за следење, проценување и управување со сите актуелни и потенцијални ризици по нејзината безбедност и безбедноста на своите граѓани.

Клучни зборови: безбедност, ризик, управување со ризик, криза, управување со ризик од катастрофа.

Abstract: Today's life is characterized by large dynamics and expressed globalization in communication and worldwide movement of people. Rapid technological development and application of highly technical achievements, positively impact the quality of life in most part of the world. But, at the same time, like never before, modern civilization faces a number of threats and security risks that increasingly threaten the lives and health of people and cause huge consequences for the environment and natural resources. The global security community (UN, EU, NATO, OSCE) and the states individually, undertake intensive cooperation for identifying global risks and raises a number of joint initiatives and activities for their prevention and mitigation, with the unique purpose to avoid major disasters and suffering of modern human civilization.

We live at the period (Hyogo 2005-2015 and Sendai Framework for DRR 2015-2030) that the United Nations, as the most massive worldwide organization devoted to strengthening the resilience of nations and communities against increasingly frequent occurrences of various disasters. Republic of Macedonia continuously monitor these initiatives and takes all necessary actions to establish and maintain an organized and institutionally based system for monitoring and management of all current and potential risks for their safety and the safety of its citizens.

Keywords: security, risk, risk management, disaster, disaster risk management.

Introduction

Republic of Macedonia with its geographical and other features has its own specifics that determining influence of its natural susceptibility to certain risks that are associated with relief, climate, hydrographic, vegetation and other features inherent in its territory. Of course, these features represent only part of the "country risk profile" which in a different correlation with global influences and everyday human activities generate certain situations and conditions that pose a risk to human life, material, natural and cultural goods and can grow into disaster risk for a part or for the whole country territory.

For the purpose of systematic organizing and managing all risks Republic of Macedonia since the beginning of its independence, establish and maintain their own system and implementing the necessary measures and activities for prevention and operative management of potential risks, and building adequate capacity. Throughout that period continuously implemented some reforms and restructuring of the national defense and security system and bringing its closer to the standards of NATO and the EU as a national long-term commitment.

The legal, organizational and institutional framework of Risk management and Disaster risk reduction mechanisms in the country formally has been strengthened by establishing a Protection and rescue system and Crisis management system, and by establishment of two independent governmental institutions, the Protection and Rescue Directorate, in 2004 and the Crisis Management Center, in 2005.

Within much broader national system for Disaster Risk Management, certainly are involved and other state institutions that have different responsibilities, scientific and academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, national Red Cross organization, business sector, media and other sectors related to the disaster risk reduction. While internationally, there is fully cooperation within UNISDR- system and other systems for collective security collaboration.

This approach enables the construction of an integrated, efficient and effective national system for prevention, early warning, management and overcoming the consequences of natural and man-caused disasters and catastrophes, while ensuring functional unity of the state and local government and all stakeholders in the process the of disaster risk management.

This involves developing an adequate system structure (a network of institutions) and functional relationships that will ensure timely, systematic and coordinated response of all stakeholders involved in the National Disaster Risk Management System, which should be fully compatible and interoperable with international systems, ranging from terminology, functional and operating aspects.

The concept of “Risk”, “Disaster Risk”, and “Disaster Risk Management”

The conditions and circumstances that make people constantly exposed and vulnerable to various dangerous situations or have a sense of uncertainty, many contributed several theorists in the field of security and beyond, to undertake research of the term “risk”, its defining and framing into the concept of security.

The general explanation of the term “risk” is that it is a possibility/probability of injury, causing damage or loss ... (given by Webster Dictionary),⁵⁴ where most likelihood and consequences associated with physical, technological or natural processes, according to whether and how they can be objectively determined (measured) through the process of risk assessment. Risk specifies something prospective and imaginary, and thus implies uncertainty.

In determining the term “risk”, there are evident trends to understand it exclusively as a technical term, or as expected and calculated/estimated result of an adverse event. This view, from the perspective of social science, is considered as a unacceptable, since it is essentially risk is subjective, i.e. subjectively experienced as part of the social sphere, and as such cannot be the only objective measure that will be expressed through quantitative indicators (number of deaths, destroyed or damaged buildings and other physical damage). According to Sjoberg,⁵⁵ the risk is pending a side event where is mostly a social construction.

⁵⁴ <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/risk>.

⁵⁵ Sjoberg L.: Understanding the process and Consequences of risk perception, in Mosleh & R.A. Rari, 4th Conference on Probabilistic safety assessment and management, New York, 1984.

The perception of risk is considered as an important factor in determining the meaning of risk. In this sense, the theory developed two routes that are trying to answer the questions of risk, it is Psychometric model and Theory of culture. Under the first model, the risk is a subjective experience of the individual who is affected by a multitude of psychological, social and institutional factors. But the underlying problem that dominates in this model is how to measure the impact of these factors on the individual's perception. While through the "theory of culture", seeks to understand the impact of culture, habits, customs, or certain norms and values that are unique to a group or community, and the impact of all this on the individual / group perceptions of risk (Slovic).⁵⁶

When it comes to that the perception of risk influences the way of its determination and conceptualizing, we should mention the so-called "public perception" and "realistic perception." Public perception is related to the understanding and perception of risk by the public (individuals, groups, etc.) and it's closer to informally understanding of risk. The real perception of the risks coming from the expert community, which sets out its views on scientific and methodological research set. Explaining the "real risks" is supported by the principles of objectivity, analytically and comprehensiveness This approach is more relevant for the Disasters Risks Management concept.

Broad analyzes and discussions that intense within the security studies from the end of last and the beginning of this century suggest that the concept of "threats and endangering" slowly disappears and loses its significance and increasingly being replaced by the term of "risk". This trend is associated with the expansion and deepening of the concept of security and the dominance of the so-called soft security which is related to non-classical threats, arising from the political, economic, social, environmental and related fields, and major natural disasters occurring around world.

When it comes to the terminological distinction between the meaning of the terms "threat" and "risk", both terms represent synonymous with insecurity. Taking into account some of the definitions indicating that "the threat is clearly expressed intent of injury, damage, etc." And risk "associated with the probability or possibility of consequences" can be concluded that their distinction should be require the dose or amount of uncertainty that occurs as a result.

This finding opens the question of how to measure this dose or amount of uncertainty! The concept of risk, viewed from two aspects, as technical and social category gives much greater opportunities for measuring or estimating the amount of uncertainty, through detailed analysis and evaluation of individual components or risk elements such as: hazard, vulnerability, exposure, capacity/resistance), and then, by the synthesis, to obtain an aggregate rating of the risk level, and dose of uncertainty which is associated with the particular risk.

In general, this approach understands risk as a function of hazard, vulnerability, exposure, and resilience:

⁵⁶ Slovic P.: The Perception of Risk, Earthscan, London 2000.

Risk = f (hazard, vulnerability, exposure, resilience)

Same determination as a “Disaster Risk” has been promoted by the global initiatives of the UN, within the framework of the International Strategy for Disaster Risks Reducing (ISDR)⁵⁷. The same approach was presented in the conceptual framework of Davidson in 1997, later adopted by Bollin and Associates in 2003, where risk is seen as a set of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and measures related to capacity. The new element to be recorded refer to measures associated with capacity, which would later evolve the concept of resistance. The hazard is recognized with probability and severity of the hazard, the elements of exposure associated with the physical and built environment, economy, vulnerability including physical, socia, economic, environmental and the capacity and measures relating to urban planning, governance, social and economic capacity (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for Disaster Risk Management, (Source: Davidson, 1997; Bollin and Associates, 2003.

⁵⁷ <http://www.unisdr.org/>

By incorporating all these elements, the risk is placed on a broad basis, thus expanding its essential arising from a purely technical basis, and the concept of risk are striving to understand more complex. The basic assumption arising from complex concept of risk suggests that any activity in society is not immune to the risk, or that the risk can be fully eliminated. The risk can only be reduced to an acceptable level, which is defined in the security scale of the individuals, group, society, country, etc..

The complex understanding of risk refers to the need to manage it as a fundamental precondition for reducing uncertainty and avoiding unwanted losses of human lives and other goods. Comprehensive risk management is the foundation for an effective Disaster risk management and Crisis management system.

Disaster Risk Management

Influenced by global initiatives during the past years, there were changes in access of “disaster response and elimination of consequences” to access the “risk management and risk reduction.” Changes in perception were mainly related to the change of approach that focused on hazard as the main cause of the risk only by the physical protection of hazard. Later, risk management, gives greater attention to the vulnerability of communities and individuals, preparedness and early warning capacities, increase awareness and build strategies for disaster risk management.

General imperative the risk management concept that develops and promotes within the global initiative through a “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015” focuses on “building resilience”, individual and collective/social. This does not mean ignoring the reasons (risks), but rather providing increased awareness of them and taking comprehensive preparatory actions. In the most general framework, activities that is undertaken within the risk management concept, is applied through the following stages:

- *Risk Identification*: is the first step in risk management. Risks associated with potential events and situations that occur and cause certain unwanted, consequences and problems. Therefore risk identification usually starts from the source of the problem (hazard);
- *Analysis of the source*: source of risk for a particular element at risk (system, individual, community, organization, facility, etc.) can be external or internal. The first one is related to the environment (risk environment), or present hazards; the second are internal characteristics of the exposed element (vulnerability and resilience);
- *Problem analysis*: includes process by which is generalized the potential problem that may occur as a result of the identified risks and its source;
- *Risk assessment*: when the hazard/danger is identified, further step is to assess the probability of their occurrence and predict the severity of the consequences of its occurrence. The first moment, the probability for some risks that occur more frequently can be determined, but the less likely risks (eg earthquake risk) it is difficult, but the assessment of the seriousness of the consequences or damages (expected) is more easily enforceable, if there is sufficient quantified data for exposed environment near the source of danger;
- *Risk Treatment*: through the established risk management system (local, national, international) are implemented appropriate policies and strategies for the treatment of identified risk. The most commonly used strategies for this purpose are: risk transfer strategy, risk avoidance strategy, risk mitigation strategy, strategy for acceptable risk and others measures and activities.

The aforementioned elements inherent in risk management are fully applicable when it comes to disaster risks management. The term "disaster" refers to major events and accidents that drastically disturb the life course and disturb the social, economic and security stability in a wider territorial unit on the local, national or international level.

Within the concept of disaster management and disaster risk management, they are reviewed and studied by several aspects, such as:

- *In terms of the source*, i.e. the risk, where it comes to disasters caused by natural phenomena, from technological accidents, man-caused disaster etc.;
- *In terms of consequences*: victims, degree of other loss, damage, duration, etc. (catastrophic, cataclysmic, etc.);
- *In terms of the development* of the disaster and the possibility of its multiplication (which needs interventions from different systems, services and capacities);
- *In terms of the level of risk*, the intensity and the affected area (disaster from local, regional, national scale).

Broadly acceptable determination of disaster risk is given in the definition of United Nations International Strategy for disasters risks reduction (UNISDR) as “serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society involving human, economic, material losses and impacts, which exceed the ability of fragile community or society to cope using its own resources “. In a commentary on this definition states that “disasters are often described as the result of a combination of: exposure to particular hazard, present conditions of vulnerability, and sufficient of capacity or measures to reduce or cope with potential negative consequences”⁵⁸.

Legal, organizational and institutional framework of Disaster Risk Management in the Republic of Macedonia

Formal legal, organizational and institutional framework for disasters risks management in the Republic of Macedonia are implement by establishment of the Crisis management system that is managed through government management bodies, such as the Assessment Group and Steering Committee. While the law on crisis management and the law on protection and rescue establish two separate government agencies that have responsibilities in this segment. Crisis management as an activity of high public interest is established for prevention, early warning and deal with any risks that may cause crisis and crisis situation in the country and to acquire dimensions of disasters.

⁵⁸ UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR Geneva, Switzerland 2009, pg. 9.

The starting basis for the regulation of this area is located in the National Concept for Security and Defense, which present views and provides the basic recommendations on how should functioning the crisis management in Republic Macedonia and the Law on Crisis Management is the basis for a complete implementation of the crisis management system.

Legal framework (*Crisis Management Law*)

With the continuation of reforms in the defense and security system, in 2005 was adopted a Crisis management law,⁵⁹ that is basis for regulation the crisis management system in the country. This law opens the possibility of declaring a “crisis situation in the country” as a new category, despite constitutional categories of war and emergency situation. Full legislative powers and mechanisms of action in case of crisis situation declared, this law give to the government. “Crisis situation” in the law is defined as a condition caused by risks and hazards that can threaten property, health and life of humans and animals and the safety of the country, for its prevention and/or handling is required to use a larger volume of resources.

Article 21 of the Crisis Management Law provides the basic legal responsibilities of the Crisis Management Center. Regarding the topic of this text, special importance has responsibility for “preparation and updating of a unique assessment of all risks and hazards to the security of the Republic of Macedonia”. Further regulation of the manner and process of risk assessment preparation is provided by the Decree on “Methodology for risk assessment preparation”⁶⁰.

This Decree terminologically and structurally meets all standards for monitoring and risk assessment in accordance with the norms and standards which directs UNISDR and international standards in this field, and as such is the basis for introducing the concept of Disasters Risk Management through existing mechanisms of Crisis management system in the country.

This approach provides Risk Assessment process that will contain integrated observations, conclusions and recommendations for all risks and hazards covered by the law (multirisk approach), which will be taken by the competent authorities in a coordinated process of inter-ministerial communication and cooperation (multisectoral approach). The composition of the government bodies that manage the Crisis Management system (Steering Committee and Assessment Group) also provides complete participatory and inclusive approach by the participation of key state institutions in the process of proposing and adopting the assessment relating to the full range of risks and dangers.

⁵⁹ UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR Geneva, Switzerland 2009, pg. 9.

⁶⁰ Official Gazette of the Republic Macedonia, No.13/2011.

With this organizational and institutional structure of bodies and organs within the national crisis management system, in the country is created conditions and opportunities for the implementation of "Integrated Risk Management" concept, which bases on the principles of organizational set system for inter-institutional communication, coordination and exchange of information, regarding to actual and potential risk.

Organizational and functional framework of Disaster Risk Management

In the context of this text, organizational and operational framework for the disasters risks management in the country will be presented by the existing model for crisis management. The model of crisis management in the country, normatively, organizational and functional is established as a system, which indicates that it is a complex structure of bodies that undertake the necessary measures and activities in different situations and conditions (emergency, crisis, disaster situations).

Due to the smooth functioning of the crisis management in the country, propose decisions and provide continuous consultations, coordination, time reaction, efficiency and appropriate use of available resources in the event of a crisis, according to the Crisis Management Law, the following bodies are established: Governmental bodies (Steering Committee and Assessment Group), Crisis Management Center, Regional crisis management centers, Headquarters and Regional headquarters.

- **Steering Committee:** The Steering Committee is the highest body of the Government to which the Law entrusts management of the crisis management system and coordination between the entities of the system. It consists of the ministers of ministries for: Interior, Health, Transport and communication, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Assessment Group. In the work of the steering committee, the legislator envisaged the participation of a representative of the Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security and a representative of the State President.

- **Assessment Group:** Assessment Group is also a body of government which continuously assessing risks and threats to the country security and proposes measures and activities for their prevention, early warning and crisis management situation. Assessment Group is composed by the heads of the Public Security Bureau, the Directorate for Security and Counter-Intelligence Agency, directors and deputy directors of the Crisis Management Center and the Directorate for Protection and Rescue, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, head of the Security and Intelligence from Ministry of Defence. If necessary in the work of the Assessment Group calling and other representatives of the state bodies, municipalities and the City of Skopje and experts in the given field.

- **Crisis Management Center**⁶¹ : On crisis management law basis within the crisis management system has been established an independent state body, as a legal entity, with position of Directorate. The name of this is Crisis Management Center, which is responsible for providing the necessary administrative, organizational and expert support to the bodies and entities in the crisis management system. Its main responsibilities are set out in Article 21 of the law:

- Ensuring continuity of inter-departmental and international cooperation, consultation and coordination in crisis management;
- Preparation and updating of a unique assessment of all risks and hazard to the security of the Republic of Macedonia;
- Proposing measures and activities for resolving the crisis situation, and Perform other duties prescribed by law.

The Crisis Management law provides establishment of the Headquarters at the Crisis Management Centre, as operational and expert body which manages the activities of prevention and management of crisis situations, Regional crisis management centers (RCMC - Total 35) and Regional Headquarters, as their operational bodies. The organizational and functional structure of the Crisis management system in Republic of Macedonia, is presented on the Figure 2:

⁶¹ <http://cuk.gov.mk/mk/>.




Figure 2: Organizational and functional structure of the Crisis management system in Republic of Macedonia (Source: Crisis Management Center)

National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction

In the spirit of the International Strategy for disasters risks reduction of the United Nations (UN ISDR)⁶², the general Guidelines of the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015) and the new Framework of Sendai (2015-2030), the Crisis Management Center in cooperation with relevant state and other entities, starting from 2007 onwards, implemented the necessary actions to establish a National platform for disaster risk reduction (NP for DRR).

National Platform in the Republic of Macedonia is not established as a separate system for disaster risk reduction, but is established as support to existing legal systems for crisis management and protection and rescue. In that sense NP is a broad framework of enhanced inter-ministerial co-operation and consultation forum for the exchange of information and experiences among all stakeholders in the country, aimed at preventing and reducing the risks and represents a multisectoral mechanism that provides and advice on issues in this area .

The expected benefits of the National platform establishment, as a concept for disaster risks reduction, by investing in a systematic effort to analyze and manage the causes of them, refer to:

1. Reduce exposure to disaster risks, by reducing vulnerability of individuals and communities, responsible management of spatial planning and environment, improved preparedness for possible accidents etc.;
2. Incorporating an effective approach for disaster risk reduction policies, plans and programs for sustainable development at all levels;
3. Development and strengthening of institutions mechanisms and capacities, especially local for communities that can provide systematic contribution to building resilience to disasters.

Through the mechanisms of the National Platform is expected to strengthen the functional unity of the state government, local government, NGOs, academia and the business community aimed at providing advice and recommendations on appropriate measures to reduce the risks of disasters in the country. The activities of the National Platform are managed by existing management structures and bodies within the Crisis management system (Steering Committee and Assessment Group).

⁶² <http://www.unisdr.org>

Conclusion

The Republic of Macedonia since its independence and onwards continuously take the necessary legal, organizational and institutional measures and activities in order to build and maintain a respectable and effective national system for managing existing and potential risks that can cause serious consequences for the lives of its citizens and cause material, economic, environmental and other damage.

With the implementation of major reforms in the defense and security sector in the period 2004-2005 was established new systems (crisis management and protection and rescue) and established new institutions (Crisis Management Center and the Directorate for Protection and Rescue) which make a significant step forward in building national capacities specialized for risk management and protection of the population, material, natural and cultural goods from damaging impacts of natural, technical and technological, man-made and other disasters.

Also continuously are implement the guidelines and recommendations of international organizations and institutions in the field of crisis management, civil protection and disasters risk management, in order to provide the required level of interoperability and compatibility in the case of joint activities and operations.

In perspective are evident the needs for further harmonization of certain legal, organizational and functional segments to improve the capacities and capabilities of the national system and the maintenance of the trend with international organizations where the Republic of Macedonia intends to fully integrate (EU and NATO).

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LIST OF REVIEWERS

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- Sase GERASIMOSKI, PhD, University St. Kliment Ohridski, Bitola, Faculty of Security, Republic of Macedonia.
- Stojan Slaveski, PhD, EURM European University-Republic of Macedonia.
- Toni MILESKI, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.
- Vancho Kenkov, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.
- Vesna Dimitrova, PhD, Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering Ss. Cyril and Methodius University –Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.
- Vanja Rokvic, PhD, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Serbia.
- Žarko PUHOVSKI, PhD, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences – Department of Philosophy, Croatia.

- Želimir KEŠETOVIĆ, PhD, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Serbia.
- Zoran Matevski, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of sociology, Republic of Macedonia.
- Zoran NACEV, PhD, University Ss. Cyril and Methodius, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of security, defence and peace, Republic of Macedonia.
- Zoran Kekovic, PhD, Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, Serbia.
- Yu-Chin, CHENG, PhD, Charles University in Prague, Institute of Political Studies, Czech Republic.

BO OBOJ BPOJ: NIKOLINA KENIG
BILJANABLAŽEVSKA-STOILKOVSKA
ZLATKO KUZMANOV
MIRKO BILANDŽIĆ, DANIJELA LUCIĆ
MILAN DANIČIĆ, MILAN MILOSEVIC
ZORICA SALTIROVSKA
SASHO KUZMANOVSKI
IGOR GELEV, STOJAN SLAVESKI
STEVKO STEFANOVSKI

