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SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION AND TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS AMONG MACEDONIAN AND ALBANIAN YOUNG ADULTS¹

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Abstract

This study analyzes the relationship between social dominance orientation and trust in institutions among young adults of Macedonian and Albanian ethnicity. Total number of 133 respondents (78 Macedonians and 55 Albanians), from 20 until 30 years of age, with different levels of education (finished high school, students/graduated and higher), participated in the research. Macedonians are all declared as Orthodox Christians, while Albanians are all declared as Muslims. All participants are from Skopje and currently live in the capital. Findings are mostly in line with the results from other similar studies. It could be plausible that Macedonian young adults are more oriented towards social dominance, since they belong to the majority group. However, those who trust more the education system are less socially dominant. On the other side, regarding *social dominance orientation*, Albanians are less socially dominant and this is probably because they

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represent the minority group. In terms of *trust in institutions*, Albanian young adults are more prone to trust religious institutions, as well as media, EU and health care system. As for Macedonians, they have more trust in the Macedonian Army, although such difference is not very strong. Findings are further discussed and elaborated in terms of their importance and applicability.

Keywords: social dominance orientation, trust in institutions, Macedonians, Albanians, young adults

Апстракт

Во трудот се анализира поврзаноста помеѓу ориентацијата кон социјална доминација и довербата во институциите, кај млади возрасни со Македонска и Албанска етничка припадност. Со истражувањето се опфатени 133 испитаници (78 Македонци и 55 Албанци), на возраст од 20 до 30 години, со различен степен на образование (завршено средно образование, студенти/дипломирани и повисоко). Сите испитаници Македонци се со Православна вероисповест, додека Албанците се декларирани како Муслимани. Потекнуваат од Скопје и во моментот на истражувањето живеат во главниот град. Добиените резултати се согласни со резултатите од други слични истражувања. Македонците покажуваат поголема ориентираност кон социјална доминација со оглед на тоа што припаѓаат на мнозинската група во државата. Сепак, оние кои повеќе им веруваат на образовните институции се помалку ориентирани кон социјална доминација. Што се однесува до Албанците, кај нив е регистрирана пониска ориентација кон социјална доминација, што најверојатно се должи на нивната припадност кон малцинството. Во поглед на довербата во институциите, Албанците значително повеќе им веруваат на религиските институции, медиумите, ЕУ и здравствениот систем. Македонците, пак, повеќе веруваат во Армијата на Р. Македонија, но добиената разлика, иако значајна, не е многу голема. Резултатите понатаму се дискутираат и елаборираат во насока на нивната важност и практична применливост.

Клучни зборови: ориентација кон социјална доминација, доверба во институции, Македонци, Албанци, млади возрасни

Introduction

The concept of **social dominance orientation** is probably one of the most widely used individual differences measure in studying generalized prejudices (Kugler, Cooper, and Nosek, 2010). It is mostly elaborated in Social Dominance Theory, which was initially created to better understand the mechanisms of formation and maintenance of group-based social hierarchy. This theory applies multilevel analysis while describing human societies as systems and focusing on understanding the processes that contribute to emergence and maintenance of prejudices (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006).

Social dominance is perceived as people's tendency to form group-based social hierarchies which are maintained by social policies and practices as well as by cooperative behavior manifested by group members with high- and low-status. This means that those who are more socially dominant have greater benefits such as resources, power, wealth, access to better education, health care and housing etc., compared to others who belong to subordinate groups. According to Social Dominance Theory, there are three distinctive systems of group-based social hierarchy i.e. age, gender and arbitrary-set system, which represent universal trimorphic form of human societies yet variable depending on the characteristics of each society (both internally over time and across different societies). Authors further argue that these three systems differ qualitatively, especially in terms of flexibility, level of violence and focus. This theory also emphasize that group-based social hierarchies are predominantly generated by the complex forms of discrimination both on individual and group levels as well as institutions (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006).

Trust in institutions plays crucial role in every democratic society. It is usually described as the extent to which people expects from institutions to successfully fulfill their expected roles (Rothstein, 2005; Hudson, 2006; according to Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011). Therefore, the more citizens trust in public institutions such as the parliament, the government and so on, the more they will be motivated to be involved in the public life and by that will sustain the democratic processes in the country. Trust in institutions is sometimes called "vertical" and differs from "horizontal" which is defined as interpersonal, emphasizing individual differences in personality. In terms of its relation to social dominance orientation, some studies (ex. Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011) suggest that higher levels of social dominance (as well as authoritarianism) strongly predict the trust in government, political parties and army.

As far as authors of this paper are informed, in R. of Macedonia the research that analyze the relationship between social dominance orientation and trust in institution in young adults from different ethnicities are very scarce. Therefore, the focus in this paper is on correlation and differences between these two variables analyzed separately and in comparison for groups of Macedonians and Albanians. The reason we analyze these particular ethnic groups is because Republic of Macedonia, however young in its independence as a state, invested significant effort in the processes for peace and democracy building, especially after the conflict between Macedonians and Albanians, in 2001. Although democratic participation is guaranteed for every citizen in the country, it does not look like it is always practiced (Fritzhand & Petrovic, 2014). Therefore, it is important to see how high is the level of social dominance and the trust in institutions among young adults in R. of Macedonia, in order to be able to give more precise suggestions for future research and interventions.

Social dominance orientation: theoretical overview and empirical findings

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is defined as “a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” (Pratto et al., 1994, p.742). Some authors (ex. Altemeyer, 1998; according to Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2006), suggest that SDO mostly refers to authoritarian dominance, i.e. some research find positive correlation between authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (ex. Henry, Sidanius, Levin, Pratto, & Nammour, 2003). Other authors (ex. Pratto et al., 1994), state that SDO differ from authoritarianism, as well as from interpersonal dominance and conservatism. It also shows negative correlation with empathy, tolerance, altruism and communality (Pratto et al., 1994).

As mentioned in the introduction, SDO is mostly elaborated in Social Dominance Theory. This theory emphasizes the underlying set of effects of discrimination on individual and group levels. Discrimination can be introduced through institutions (usually those who enhance hierarchy), for example, by providing more benefits and goods to dominant groups than to subordinate groups. On the opposite, institutions that are classified as “hierarchy-attenuating”, promote human and civil rights and liberties, and are oriented towards equality, helping the less fortunate ones, those who are often oppressed and vulnerable. However, discrimination can also be recognized on individual level both in institutions and

outside of them. Here, social structure of the institution, as well as the structure of the whole society, plays an important role. Following this, for example, rich people have more resources to offer to the poor ones (if they are willing to), but also have more power to influence big corporations and important policy makers to make decisions which will correspond to their needs and not the needs of all citizens in the society (including those who belong to the subordinate groups). Another example (and the effect) of discrimination is segregation in the society and gender role differentiation (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006).

According to Morrison & Ybarra (2008), it can be expected that SDO will increase if individuals (especially those who are highly identified with their in-group and are ready to protect it), perceive a realistic threat, or obstacles to the position of their in-group and to the general wellbeing. Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra (2009) also present data according to which perception of intergroup threat among highly identified group members moderates the relation between group status and SDO.

The socialization process and the role models a child is exposed to early in life, have strong influence on how it's ideological points of view will be shaped later when he/she grow up. This is so because the children judge the world through the lenses of cognitively and morally lower stages of development. However, under the parental and peer influence, in the period of adolescence, these ideological perspectives are being formed and positioned in more precise ways. This is how SDO, among other constructs that shape ideological frameworks, is being established and organized (Altemeyer, 1981; according to Heaven, Ciarrochi, & Leeson, 2011). Recent findings about children's social identity, morality and social exclusion reflect on developmental processes that underlie children's capability to both challenge and reinforce prejudices and stereotypes. In other words, if moral judgments are not presented during development of children's social identity, they will justify exclusion of their peers holding on prejudice and discrimination. Nevertheless, if moral values such as fairness, justice, equality etc. are in the basis of their understanding of group dynamics, they will be more willing to reject and challenge prejudicial/stereotypic beliefs and expectations (Killen & Rutland, 2011).

Relevant research on this topic (ex. Ekehammar et al., 2004; McFarland, 1998; Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000; according to Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2006), provide data that those who score higher on SDO are usually characterized with, so called, generalized prejudice and hold more negative attitudes towards different social groups. In particular, it is related to negative attitudes toward socially subordinate groups who have

low power and status (Duckitt, 2006). Furthermore, individuals with higher SDO usually prefer professional roles that enhance hierarchy. On the other side, findings are completely opposite for those with low SDO (Pratto et al., 1994). Similar results report Lalonde et al. (2007), who provide evidence that high SDO is significantly negatively related to hierarchy-attenuating beliefs (ex. attitudes towards interracial dating), and strongly positively related to hierarchy-enhancing beliefs (ex. stereotyping of interracial relationships).

Concerning gender differences, men are more prone to social dominance compared to women (ex. Dambrun, Duarte, & Guimond, 2004; Huang & Liu, 2005; Pratto et al., 1994). In terms of social and political ideologies, there is a proven correlation between SDO and support of group-based hierarchy as well as war, civil rights and other policies that impact intergroup relations in various ways (Pratto et al., 1994). In one recent study conducted in Croatia (Maričić, Franc, & Šakić, 2008) authors found that opposition to equality is higher among males, less religious and right politically oriented people. Results from the same study show that higher group-based dominance orientation is more characteristic for the group of participants with low income and low educational level, as well as for older age and males.

Trust in institutions

Trust in institutions is mostly elaborated in sociological studies and in political science, but there are some important aspects which are analyzed in psychological theory and research as well. When discussing trust in general terms, there is one important distinction between *horizontal* and *vertical* trust – first one being defined as trust in other people and the second as trust in institutions. Thus, sociology is usually oriented towards analyzing the horizontal type of trust when studying social cohesion, while political science mostly focus its research on vertical trust and how much it impacts the society - more specifically, the democracy in the society (Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011).

Concerning the origins of trust in institutions, according to Aleksovska (2014), there are mainly two theoretical frameworks – *cultural theories* and *institutional theories* – which explain the origins of trust starting from competing positions. Basically, cultural theories incorporate bottom-up approach and highlight early socialization process and cultural norms as determinants of trust. Here, there is a strong link between social and institutional trust. Although there are number of studies which support this position, there

are also studies (ex. Newton, 2001; as cited in Aleksovska, 2014) which provide data that such link is mediated by the effectiveness of social and political institutions. On the other side, institutional (or performance) theories are using top-down approach by viewing institutional trust as a result of institutional performance, i.e. individual decide on the amount of trust he/she will give to the political institutions, based on the level of their performance. Nevertheless, whether these theories will or will not have their practical application in different social contexts, depends on the specifics of the context (i.e. the society) itself.

Relevant literature reveals that there are many definitions of trust. Here, we are focusing on trust in institutions that can be conceptualized (this is mostly true for the public institutions), as the "extent to which institutions are expected to carry on their expected role satisfactorily" (Rothstein, 2005; Hudson, 2006; as cited in Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011). How successful these public institutions are in fulfilling their expected roles (especially when it comes to specific public institutions such as the parliament, or the government, or army etc.), is defined through democratic and/or justice principles. However, there are other factors that influence trust in institutions that has to do with how many resources a person poses, the levels of perceived threat and also with personal judgment whether one is competent to face those threats and deal with them (Ross & Mirowsky, 2006; as cited in Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011).

In that sense, the less number of resources someone has, when faced with perceived threat, the less his/her trust in institutions will be, since one perceives himself/herself as less capable of facing and dealing with the threat (Ross & Mirowsky, 2006; as cited in Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011). It is also proved that people evaluate and therefore trust (or do not trust) the institutions holding on their personal set of values and beliefs (Gabriel, 1995; as cited in Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011) acquired during socialization processes (Hardin, 2001; as cited in Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011). Another factor that influence this trust, is the perception of competitiveness and social danger through the experiences of keeping the trust or loosing the trust in social interactions on daily bases (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009; Yamagishi, 2001; as cited in Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011).

Recently, there is an increase of research on trust in institutions due to several reasons. One is that the level of institutional trust in developed Western societies declines over years (Dalton, 2004; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Norris, 1999; as cited in Aleksovska, 2014). The other is that in countries from Central and Eastern Europe which are recognized

as “new democracies” there is generally low trust in institutions (Mishler and Rose, 1997, 2001; Lovell, 2001; Boda and Medve-Balint, 2012; as cited in Aleksovska, 2014). Hence, latest data according to *Edelman Trust Barometer 2016*, indicate that in 2016 (compared to 2015) overall trust in government slightly increases in some countries (ex. Canada, Ireland, USA, Turkey etc.), but decreases in others (ex. Germany, Poland, France, Brazil etc.). Same is true for the trust in media and in NGO's (with some exemptions).

Regarding the trust in institutions in R. of Macedonia data published in the latest issue of *Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 –Macedonia Country Report*, show lower trust in institutions and their democratic capacities among citizens. These data are reported according to the survey done by the Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis” in 2011. More precisely they found lower level of trust in the government (42%), president (39%), parliament (32%) and judiciary (28%) than in police (45%) and the army (56%). Trust in the international community was relatively high (41%) compared to domestic democratic institutions. Democratic scores and regime ratings presented in the *Freedom House Report* for Macedonia for 2015 indicate that in terms of independence of media, national democratic governance, judicial framework and independence and corruption. the climate in the R. of Macedonia is closer to authoritarian than to democratic. Aleksovska (2014), analyze the development of trust in institutions in Macedonia in the timeframe from 1998 until 2013 and report several main findings. First, overall trust in institutions increases significantly after Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001 (especially for ethnic Albanians). Second, the strongest predictor of trust in institutions is support for one of the parties in the leading coalition. Lastly, after 2008 (especially among ethnic Albanians) there is a decline in trust in institutions but positive effects from the Ohrid Framework Agreement remain notable.

Methodology

Present research is part of a bigger project applied in Western Balkan Countries (i.e. in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia). Its main idea is to explore complex social identity of young people who live in this part of the world and see how such identity correlates with a set of variables describing its complexity and inclusiveness. The aim of present research, however, is to analyze how social dominance orientation correlates with the trust in different institutions (separately for Macedonians and for Albanians) as

well as to see how these two groups of participants differ in terms of both mentioned variables.

Total number of 133 respondents (78 Macedonians and 55 Albanians), from 20 until 30 years of age, with different levels of education (finished high school, students/graduated and higher) are included in this research. All Macedonians are declared as Orthodox Christians. Albanians are all declared as Muslims. Participants are from Skopje and currently live in the capital.

Social dominance orientation was measured using Social Dominance Orientation Questionnaire (Pratto, 2014). Participants were asked to rate how much they support or oppose 4 statements about groups in general, on a scale from 1 – Extremely Oppose to 11 – Extremely Favour. **Trust in institutions** was measured using a list of 13 institutions (both domestic and international), where respondents were asked to answer how much they trust each of those institutions. Participants rated each institution on a scale from 1 – None at all, to 5 – Completely. Institutions included in the present research were: religious institutions, army, education system, media, police, Parliament, EU, NATO, UN, health care system, justice system, political parties, and the Government (source European Values Study).

Results

Pearson's coefficients of correlation between *social dominance orientation* and *trust in institutions* were calculated separately for Macedonian and for Albanian participants. The results for Macedonian young adults indicate that there is only one statistically significant correlation (negative), between **social dominance orientation** and **education system**, which means that the more they trust in education system, the less they are oriented towards social dominance (see Table 1). For the Albanians, **social dominance orientation** was significantly and positively correlated with **religious institutions, Army, and the Parliament** (see Table 2). This means that the more they trust in religious institutions, or in the Army, or the Parliament, the more they are oriented towards social dominance.

Table 1. Correlation coefficients between social dominance orientation and trust in institutions in **Macedonian** young adults

	Religious Institut.	Army	Educat. system	Media	Police	Parliament	EU	NATO	UN	Health system	Judiciary	Political parties	Government
Social dominance orientation	,175	,168	-.294**	,056	-,081	,074	,011	,061	-,147	-,094	,034	,110	,126
	,128	,144	,009	,627	,483	,525	,923	,599	,202	,416	,770	,339	,274

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 2. Correlation coefficients between social dominance orientation and trust in institutions in **Albanian** young adults

	Religious Institut.	Army	Educat. System	Media	Police	Parliament	EU	NATO	UN	Health system	Judiciary	Political parties	Government
Social dominance orientation	,284*	,269	,148	,227	,199	*,331	*,121	-,169	,001	,181	,101	,224	,245
	,036	,047	,281	,095	,145	,014	,377	,219	,992	,186	,464	,101	,071

Note: *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Further analyzes revealed that there are also statistically significant differences between Macedonian and Albanian young adults in terms of social dominance orientation and trust in institutions. In terms of *social dominance orientation* Macedonians scored significantly higher ($t_{(111)}=2.69$; $p<0,01$) compared to Albanians. Considering the *trust in institutions* differences were registered for *religious institutions* ($t_{(111)}= -4.43$; $p<0,01$), *army* ($t_{(111)}= 1.98$ $p<0,05$), *media* ($t_{(111)}= -2.74$; $p<0,01$), *EU* ($t_{(111)}=-2.05$; $p<0,05$), and the *health care system* ($t_{(111)}= -2.63$; $p<0,01$). In all comparisons (except for army) Albanians were scoring higher than Macedonians, indicating that they trust these institutions significantly more (see Table 3).

Table 3. Differences between **Macedonian and Albanian** young adults in terms of social dominance orientation and trust in institutions

Ethnicity		N	Mean	Std. Dev.	t-test	p
Religious institutions	MAC	78	2,18	1,155	-4,429	,000
	ALB	55	3,11	1,227		
Army	MAC	78	2,71	1,157	1,976	,050
	ALB	55	2,31	1,169		
Education system	MAC	78	2,68	1,069	-,975	,331
	ALB	55	2,87	1,248		
Media	MAC	78	1,86	,899	-2,743	,007
	ALB	55	2,36	1,223		
Police	MAC	78	2,34	1,046	,244	,807
	ALB	55	2,29	1,133		
Parliament	MAC	78	1,77	,958	-,928	,355
	ALB	55	1,93	1,016		
EU	MAC	78	2,43	1,251	-2,054	,042
	ALB	55	2,87	1,187		
NATO	MAC	78	2,32	1,208	-1,760	,081
	ALB	55	2,69	1,136		

UN	MAC	78	2,43	1,186	-1,439	,153
	ALB	55	2,73	1,162		
Health care system	MAC	78	2,40	1,042	-2,627	,010
	ALB	55	2,91	1,159		
Judiciary	MAC	78	2,08	1,023	-,931	,353
	ALB	55	2,25	1,142		
Political parties	MAC	78	1,71	1,011	-,174	,862
	ALB	55	1,75	1,022		
Government	MAC	78	1,92	1,133	,737	,462
	ALB	55	1,78	,994		
SDO	MAC	78	18,3974	8,70787	2,698	,008
	ALB	55	14,5091	7,37833		

Discussion and conclusion

Results from the present study indicate that there are correlations between studied concepts in each analyzed group of participants but also differences between these groups in terms of two main variables – social dominance orientation and trust in institutions. Previous review of theoretical frameworks and the empirical findings show that our results are mostly in line with the results from other similar studies. Regarding correlations, in Macedonian sample those who have higher trust in education system, are less oriented towards social dominance. This is understandable since the more one is informed and has greater knowledge about the “other”, about how different societies and people living in them could be, the more one is prone to cooperate, to be more open-minded and inclusive – thus, less socially dominant. Having in mind that the age range of participants is 20-30 years, and that many of them are students (or have finished their studies) also contribute to such result. This means that education could be a corner-stone for overcoming segregation and other negative side-effects from high social dominance in the society. In the case of R. of Macedonia, which is multicultural and multiethnic society, mentioned findings recommend further investment in educational system, in order to

promote inclusiveness and to decrease the potential tendency for social dominance among youth.

As for the Albanians, social dominance orientation was significantly correlated with religious institutions, army, and the parliament. This means that the more they trust these institutions, the more they are oriented towards social dominance. Mentioned results are in line with some of the studies presented in the theoretical part of this paper. Some authors (ex. Pratto et al., 1994), emphasize that individuals with higher SDO usually prefer professional roles that enhance hierarchy. In this case all three institutions symbolically represent power and hierarchy, which are usually linked to authoritarian framework. Therefore, the more one trust these institutions and identifies with their symbolism, the more likely is that he/she will be more socially dominant. As shown in other relevant studies (ex. Henry, Sidanius, Levin, Pratto, & Nammour, 2003), there is positive correlation between authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. It is also presented in the *Freedom House Report* for Macedonia for 2015, that the climate in the R. of Macedonia is closer to authoritarian than to democratic, in terms of independence of media, national democratic governance, judicial framework and independence and corruption. Finally, there might be some specific cultural characteristics that support such orientation.

However, if we look into differences between Macedonian and Albanian young adults in terms of social dominance orientation, we will find that Macedonians are scoring significantly higher compared to Albanians on this variable. Mentioned difference could be explained with the fact that young adults from Macedonian ethnicity are more socially dominant due to their position as majority in the society. Same could be considered as an explanation of the results for the Albanians regarding their less socially dominant orientation, since they represent the minority group. Macedonia is a country where ethnic Macedonians represent two-thirds or 64% of population of 2 millions, while ethnic Albanians represent one quarter, or 25% of the total population. In general, there is a connection between ethnicity and religion of Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia. The majority of the ethnic Macedonians are Orthodox Christians, whereas the majority of the ethnic Albanians are mainly Muslims (Pajaziti, 2012).

In terms of *trust in institutions* it is obvious that Albanians are more prone to trust religious institutions, as well as media, EU and health care system. As for Macedonians, they have more trust in the Macedonian army, although such difference is rather weak. Findings for Albanian young adults are understandable because religious identity is very strong among them and that is not the case for Macedonians (whose religious identification

is average). Some of the studies conducted in R. of Macedonia (ex. Блажевска-Стоилковска, 2012; Кениг, 2006) indicate that while Albanians are more collectivistic, Macedonians are somewhere in the middle on the collectivism-individualism continuum. Thus, when collectivism was examined among Macedonian young adults, findings showed that higher orientation to collectivism was related to stronger ethnic and religious identification (Кениг, 2003). Furthermore, after the Ohrid Framework Agreement from 2001, Albanians gained more rights and were more included in the society on various levels (Aleksoska, 2014), so that might be the reason why their trust in health care system or the media is higher compared to Macedonians. Concerning EU trust, all Albanian political parties clearly state that one of their goals is entering the EU – a point that probably explains higher trust in EU from the Albanian side in this research. As mentioned previously, Macedonians trust the army slightly more than Albanians probably due to their stronger identification with the state i.e. R. of Macedonia. This finding could also be understood as the result of their perception that the army will keep them safe in case of armed conflict (which might be the consequence from the conflict in 2001). Having in mind that Macedonians are also more oriented towards social dominance than Albanians, it is obvious that such result is in line with some studies (ex. Castillo, Miranda, & Torres, 2011) which suggest that higher levels of social dominance (as well as authoritarianism) strongly predict the trust in government, political parties and army.

There are, of course, certain limitations of this study. First one is related to the sample. Here, we analyze answers of respondents only from Skopje so larger sample, with participants from other cities from Macedonia should be included in future studies. Diversity of the sample is also an issue. Data are collected from young Macedonians and Albanians and we need more diverse population which will consist of representatives of other ethnic groups, in order to be able to generalize our conclusions more firmly. Another limitation is that the target group in this study is young adults, which means that data are valid only for this particular age group. In further analyzes older and younger participants should also be included. Concerning the trust in institutions, it is possible that respondents exaggerated with their level of pessimism that is not in complete accordance with reality. On the other hand, some of them maybe responded in socially desirable way, which could also alter the results. Furthermore, some variables couldn't be controlled, since the respondents were not willing to share the requested information. Finally, there could be possible shortcomings from the instruments that could affect the data we analyze in this study.

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ПРЕДИЗВИЦИТЕ ЗА МЛАДИТЕ ЖЕНИ ВО ТРАНЗИЦИСКИТЕ ОПШТЕСТВА: СЛУЧАЈОТ НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА

THE CHALLENGES FOR YOUNG WOMEN IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Апстракт

Фокусот на трудот се културните вредности и практики на младите жени во Република Македонија изразени низ нивните гледишта за одредени аспекти на животот. Податоците произлегуваат од проектот *Европска студија на вредности*, спроведен во 2008 година во Република Македонија, како дел од меѓународно лонгитудинално истражување. Ставовите на младите жени на возраст од 18 до 31 година беа

анализирани во контекстот на следниве културни вредности и практики: приоритети во животот, автоперцепција на среќата, доверба и социјална дистанца, професионален развој, преферирани активности во слободното време, прифаќање или одбивање на одредени однесувања и животни стилови, ставови кон бракот и семејството и статусот на жените во современите општества. Трудот има за цел да ја прикаже автоперцепцијата на младите жени во поглед на нивното место и улога во македонското општество – општество оптоварено со последиците на продолжената економска и политичка транзиција и, дополнително, неговата меѓуетничка консолидација и евро-атлантска интеграција.

Клучни зборови: вредности, идентитет, младина, Република Македонија, транзиција.

This paper is focused on the cultural values and practices of young women in the Republic of Macedonia expressed through their views on certain aspects of life. The data used derives from the *European Values Study* project conducted in 2008 in the Republic of Macedonia as part of an international longitudinal research. The attitudes of young women aged 18 to 31 were analyzed in the context of the following cultural values and practices: life priorities; self-perception of personal happiness; trust and social distance; professional development; preferred leisure activities; acceptance or rejection of certain behaviors and lifestyles; attitudes towards marriage and family and the status of women in modern society. The paper aims to show the self-perception of young women concerning their place and role in the Macedonian society - a society burdened by the consequences of the prolonged economic and political transition, and furthermore, its inter-ethnic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Keywords: Values, identity, Youth, Republic of Macedonia, transition.

Introduction

The investigation of the attitudes among a particular target group concerning certain values, value orientations or lifestyles entails some diligence in the deliberation of knowledge regarding the general features of a social climate. This diligence includes, among

other things, a sociological distance from the attitudes of young women in the country, even more so if we take into consideration the social consequences of the transition in the Macedonian society and the reevaluation of life priorities, guidelines and models. The state of affairs presented in this paper embodies an overview of the attitudes of a particular target group, namely young women aged 18 to 31, which expressed their views on a number of life practices, values and value orientations (as part of a representative sample of the Macedonian society (consisting of 1500 respondents) within the European Values Study project for the Republic of Macedonia in 2008).

Similar to most societies in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, the Macedonian society has continuously been undergoing processes that challenge and reevaluate all types of social and cultural values. What is obvious is the transformation of models, as well as the search for new cultural forms as frameworks for social action. The sociological research interest in the effects of the transition in the Republic of Macedonia is usually aimed towards the cultural change in the society as a whole, and furthermore, it encompasses the issue of changing value preferences and cultural landmarks at individual level.

In a transitional society, the cultural change, as expected, intensively juxtaposes the moral and overall life doctrines based on traditional values, as well as the values of socialism and the "new" forms of capitalism. At local level – as in this case the Macedonian society - these notions of global social systems can serve as analytical constructs for sociological diagnosis of the conditions, but at an individual level, they often produce value disorientation. In some aspects, this is discernible in the attitudes of young women analyzed in this paper. The data analysis indicated that our young respondents do not readily relate to consistent attitudes or value models on many issues. Thus, this paper will not operate with confirmation of certain value matrices and theoretical paradigms known in sociological theory.

Having in mind the assumption that the conditions and processes of global society signify a continuous process of transformation of capitalism (deriving from the vitality of that system), imposing it as the only possible system in terms of the "rule" of the Western technological and economic civilization and values that it generates, the phenomenon of position and structure of gender identities in this setting implies newly designed models (Giddens, 2009). Again, the differentiation of patterns is related to the disposition of certain socio-cultural contexts, especially when they are in a state of competition with the Western civilization matrices. This study is preoccupied with societies in a marginalized position (political, economic, cultural) whose transformations assume frequent and radical changes

in social conditions (from socialism to capitalism), compared to the civilization discourses that emanate a state of well-being and concentration of power. Consequently, this study presents an analysis of cultural values and practices of young women in the Republic of Macedonia after gaining its independence, expressed through their views on certain aspects of life. It refers to a period in which the Macedonian society is hampered by the consequences of the prolonged economic and political transition, as interethnic consolidation as well as the challenges of the Euro-Atlantic integration. The concept of cultural trauma introduced by Sztompka (2003) is, perhaps, the basic inspiration in this sociological discourse. Namely, we are aiming to define the processes that are expected to have an impact on the self-perception of young women aged 18-31, as well as their place and role in the Macedonian society. The target group belongs to the so-called "transitional generation" which is burdened by the conflict of personal characteristics of gender culture, and mostly influenced by the effects of rapid and controversial changes in the social system overall (Џенапоски, 2007). It is assumed that part of this generation has built its identity during the period of the establishing of new values. On the other hand, they have indirectly (through the experiences of their parents) been introduced to the traditional values (pre-socialist) as well as those principally inherited from the socialist era, and the relationship towards them within the predominant cultural policy of the newly created state.

Methodology

Research methods and instruments

The data used in the analyses, which are presented in this paper, derived from a questionnaire containing 141 items. The questions, usually designed to fit a Likert-type scale, were organized into six broad thematic sections. The survey was conducted in the period from July to September 2008, as part of the international longitudinal project named *European Values Study*.

For the purposes of this paper, the responses that were taken into consideration were related to several issues: the individual values, the attitudes towards work and professional development, the attitudes towards family, and the general trust in people and social distance among young women in the Republic of Macedonia. Participants' attitudes

were differentiated on the basis of some of their socio-demographic characteristics (education, age, religious affiliation, employment status, marital status, etc.).

Research sample

The total number of respondents that participated in the survey was 1500, while the target group, whose responses were analyzed for the purposes of this paper, is 209 women aged 18-31. The comparative approach implied an analysis of the responses of 241 men of the same age as well. The survey was conducted in the eight statistical regions in the Republic of Macedonia (East, Northeast, Pelagonia, Polog, Skopje, Southeast, Southwest and Vardar). Most of the participants in the survey had completed four years of secondary education (67.3%), followed by those who completed university and postgraduate studies (26.1%), 4.4% of the respondents had finished three years of secondary education, 0.5% had completed primary education, and 2% had not obtained any education. In terms of marital status, 27.4% of the respondents were married, 1.4% were in a registered partnership and 71.2% were neither married nor in registered partnership. In terms of employment status, only 25.6% of the respondents were employed (42.9% of working-age women in the general sample declared that they were employed at the time of the survey). In terms of religion, 84.2% Christian and 15.8% Muslim women participated in the survey. Atheists were not included, since the number was statistically not significant.

Results and discussion

One of the questions we believed can identify general trends related to value orientation of young women in the Republic of Macedonia is the one in which they declare the priority attributed to some specified aspects of life, ranking them on a scale 1 to 4 (1 "very important" and 4 "not important at all"), such as work, family, friends and acquaintances, leisure, politics and religion. The results showed that family was the highest priority ($M_f=1.09$), followed by friends and acquaintances ($M_f=1.17$), leisure time ($M_f=1.23$), work ($M_f=1.26$), religion ($M_f=1.80$) and the least important is politics ($M_f=2.70$).

The comparative analysis of male and female respondents aged 18 to 31 showed that male respondents had similar priorities, except in the case of politics, which was more important to them ($M_m=2.44$; $M_f=2.70$; $t=1.293$, $df=463$ $p<0.05$).

The age of the respondents did not prove to be very important differentiating factor for this question. Family, religion and politics were equally important to respondents of all age groups. Work, friends and acquaintances and leisure time were more important to young women, compared to the answers of the group of respondents aged 47-60 (work: $M_{18-31}=1.26$; $M_{61+}=2.05$; $F=27.436$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$; friends and acquaintances: $M_{18-31}=1.17$, $M_{47-60}=1.34$; $p<0.05$; leisure: $M_{18-31}=1.23$, $M_{47-60}=1.43$; $p<0.05$).

The analysis of the responses based on the respondents' religious affiliation (Christian and Muslim) showed that work and religion are equally important for them. However, young Christian women consider family, friends, leisure time and politics more important (family: $M_{ch}=1.02$; $M_{mus}=1.18$; $t=3.900$; $df=192$; $p<0.01$; friends and acquaintances: $M_{ch}=1.24$; $M_{mus}=1.48$; $t=3.015$; $df=193$; $p<0.01$; leisure: $M_{ch}=1.32$; $M_{mus}=1.73$; $t=3.871$; $df=193$; $p<0.01$; politics: $M_{ch}=2.69$; $M_{mus}=2.97$; $t=0.197$; $df=192$; $p<0.05$).

In the context of recognizing the degree of self-realization of young women, we analyzed the responses to questions related to the respondents' perception of personal happiness, freedom of choice and control over their own lives and the satisfaction.

The assessment of the extent of personal happiness is performed on a scale 1 to 4 (where 1 stands for "very happy" and 4 "not happy at all"). The average score of the responses was $M_f=1.89$, indicating that the respondents perceived themselves as "quite happy".

The comparison of the answers of young female respondents with their male peers showed no differences when it comes to the perception of personal happiness.

Regarding the age of the respondents, a statistically significant difference was identified in the responses between young women and those over the age of 61, which declared themselves as less happy ($M_{18-31}=1.89$; $M_{61+}=2.15$; $F=4.654$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$).

The results showed no correlation between the rating of personal happiness and the religious affiliation of the respondents.

In terms of the educational level of the young female respondents a tendency was identified, indicating that women with higher levels of education tend to declare themselves as happier.

An assessment of the possibility of free choice and control over their own life was measured on a scale 1 to 10, 1 representing the lowest level of control and freedom, and 10 the highest level. The general trend indicated that the respondents believed to have significant control over their own lives ($M_f=7.26$). In this case socio-demographic

characteristics such as gender, age, education and religion did not show to be a differentiating factor in the answers of the respondents.

On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 expresses dissatisfaction and 10 life's satisfaction) respondents had the opportunity to evaluate their satisfaction in life. The mean value of the answers is $M_f=6.92$, which indicates a relatively high degree of satisfaction in life among the respondents. In this case, the socio-demographic characteristics had no significant role in the distribution of responses.

Generally speaking, when it comes to the degree of social distance expressed towards certain social groups, the responses of the young women did not differ significantly from the general trends based on the responses of the entire sample. Social distance was measured in terms of acceptance or rejection of certain groups of people as neighbors. The greatest social distance was shown towards: drug addicts ($p_f=79.3\%$); people with a criminal record ($p_f=66.2\%$); heavy drinkers ($p_f=60.4\%$); people who have AIDS ($p_f=57.0\%$); emotionally unstable people ($p_f=47.1\%$); homosexuals ($p_f=46.9\%$).

The comparison of these answers with the ones of their male peers, indicated that the young women showed greater social distance towards drug addicts ($p_m=67.8\%$; $p_f=79.3\%$; $\chi^2=7.717$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $cc\chi^2=7.145$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $\Phi=0.129$).

The analysis of the responses of young Christian and Muslim women showed that the latter express higher social distance towards all mentioned groups. However, among them, statistically significant differences were those related to the following groups: people of a different race, left wing extremists, right wing extremists, people with large families, immigrants/foreign workers, Jews, Gypsies. Data is shown in **Table 1**.

Table 1. Social distance among young Christian and Muslim women

	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Statistically significant difference
People of a different race	15.2%	45.2%	$\chi^2=14.746$; $p<0.01$; $\Phi=0.274$; $cc\chi^2=2.923$, $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $\Phi=0.274$
Left wing extremists	28.5%	50.0%	$\chi^2=5.373$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $cc\chi^2=4.428$; $df=1$; $\Phi=0.169$
Right wing extremists	25.5%	43.3%	$\chi^2=3.954$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $cc\chi^2=3.124$; $df=1$; $p=0.077$; $\Phi=0.145$
People with large families	11.5%	30.0%	$\chi^2=7.053$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $cc\chi^2=5.630$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $\Phi=0.190$
Immigrants/foreign workers	17.0%	33.3%	$\chi^2=4.332$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $cc\chi^2=3.352$; $df=1$; $p=0.067$; $\Phi=0.149$
Jews	12.8%	33.3%	$\chi^2=7.960$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $cc\chi^2=6.505$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $\Phi=0.203$
Gypsies	12.8%	29.0%	$\chi^2=5.274$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $cc\chi^2=4.101$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$; $\Phi=0.164$

The age of female respondents indicated some differentiated attitudes regarding the expression of social distance. Older female respondents showed greater social distance towards people with a criminal record, heavy drinkers and homosexuals (people with a criminal record: $p_{18-31}=66.2\%$; $p_{32-46}=83.7\%$; $p_{47-60}=85.5\%$; $p_{61+}=79.4\%$; $\chi^2=24.716$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$; heavy drinkers: $p_{18-31}=60.4\%$; $p_{32-46}=85.8\%$; $p_{47-60}=79.0\%$; $p_{61+}=77.1\%$; $\chi^2=35.173$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$; homosexuals: $p_{18-31}=46.9\%$; $p_{32-46}=63.3\%$; $p_{47-60}=59.6\%$; $p_{61+}=65.1\%$; $\chi^2=14.819$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$). Young female respondents showed the greatest social distance towards people with large families ($p_{18-31}=13.9\%$; $p_{32-46}=8.3\%$; $p_{47-60}=7.5\%$; $p_{61+}=4.6\%$; $\chi^2=9.016$; $df=3$; $p<0.05$).

The data suggested that the more educated female respondents showed a greater distance towards emotionally unstable people, while female respondents with the highest level of education in their responses show the greatest distance towards drug addicts and Jews (emotionally unstable people: $p_{prim}=7.1\%$; $p_{secon}=50.7\%$; $p_{high}=48.1\%$; $\chi^2=9.713$; $df=2$; $p<0.01$; drug addicts: $p_{prim}=85.7\%$; $p_{secon}=74.5\%$; $p_{high}=90.6\%$; $\chi^2=6.434$; $df=2$; $p<0.05$; Jews: $p_{prim}=0\%$; $p_{secon}=13.1\%$; $p_{high}=25.0\%$; $\chi^2=6.809$; $df=2$; $p<0.05$).

The question of general trust in other people has shown that the majority of young women, 79.3% do trust other people, which follows the general trend in the answers of the total sample. The comparative analysis of the responses in terms of the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents also showed no significant statistical differences.

The analysis of the questions concerning certain job-related aspects (career attitudes, opportunities for self-realization, work environment, expectations), showed no significant differences between the responses of the young female respondents with the ones obtained from the overall sample, as well as from the comparative analysis of responses by their male peers. Young female respondents single out the following aspects as the most important: good pay ($p_f=95.1\%$), pleasant people to work with ($p_f=89.2\%$), workplace safety ($p_f=88.5\%$), learning new skills ($p_f=85.9\%$), people being treated equally at the workplace ($p_f=85.6\%$). On the other hand, these aspects were considered less important to them: generous holidays ($p_f=53.9\%$), an opportunity to demonstrate initiative ($p_f=69.6\%$); also, having a say in important decisions proved to be of a less importance ($p_f=72.6\%$), as well as doing a job that benefits the society ($p_f=72.9\%$), meeting people ($p_f=74.3\%$) etc.

The possibility of taking initiative in the work process was of greater importance to young women, as well as meeting people, in which they agree with women aged 47-60 (meeting people: $p_{18-31}=74.3\%$; $p_{32-46}=69.5\%$; $p_{47-60}=83.5\%$; $p_{61+}=78.3\%$; $\chi^2=8.192$; $df=3$; $p<0.05$; an opportunity to use initiative: $p_{18-31}=69.6\%$; $p_{32-46}=64.1\%$; $p_{47-60}=30.0\%$; $p_{61+}=50.6\%$; $\chi^2=9.038$; $df=3$; $p<0.05$).

Concerning the level of education, a job that allows self-realization was more important to female respondents with a higher level of education ($p_{prim}=53.8\%$; $p_{secon}=82.8\%$; $p_{high}=78.7\%$; $\chi^2=6.110$; $df=2$; $p<0.05$).

To Muslim female respondents, generous holidays in the workplace are much more important than to the Christian female respondents ($p_{ch}=48.2\%$; $p_{mus}=76.7\%$; $\chi^2=8.031$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$).

Free time and contents that young female respondents were offered as opportunities to use it ("meeting nice people", "relaxing", "doing as I want", "learning something new" were evaluated on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is "very important", and 4 "not important at all") proved to be almost equally important for young women, and for young men as well.

Their choice on this issue is not affected by their level of education, either. On the other hand, age does affect the responses of female respondents: as their age increases, it becomes less important for them to do what they want or learn something new (doing as I

want: $M_{18-31}=1.17$; $M_{32-46}=1.25$; $M_{47-60}=1.39$; $M_{61+}=1.34$; $F=5.163$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$; learning something new: $M_{18-31}=1.15$; $M_{32-46}=1.25$; $M_{47-60}=1.33$; $M_{61+}=1.52$; $F=10.610$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$).

The results showed that young female Christians considered as more important with whom and how they spend their free time when compared to Muslim women ($M_{ch}=1.16$; $M_{mus}=1.55$; $t=3.665$; $df=194$; $p<0.01$).

In the context of the issues related to family life and marriage, the question on how much certain life practices are important for a successful marriage was also included. Generally speaking, young female respondents singled out the following as the most important: faithfulness ($p_f=94.0\%$), happy sexual relationship ($p_f=91.8\%$) and having children ($p_f=89.4\%$), and consider less important to be agreement on politics ($p_f=16.8\%$) and being of the same social background ($p_f=31\%$).

The comparison of the data obtained on the basis of the sex of the respondents showed that most of the offered options proved to be more important to the young female respondents, especially when it comes to the following: an adequate income, shared religious beliefs, good housing, being willing to discuss the problems that come up between husband and wife, and having some time for one's own friends and for personal hobbies / activities.

It should be noted that in terms of the age of the female respondents, the younger tend to prefer the following: living apart from the in-laws, quality sex life, the division of housework between partners, free time and friends (living apart from the in-laws: $p_{18-31}=57.5\%$; $p_{32-46}=51.5\%$; $p_{47-60}=47.2\%$; $p_{61+}=29.3\%$; $\chi^2=26.824$; $df=6$; $p<0.01$; happy sexual relationship: $p_{18-31}=91.8\%$; $p_{32-46}=89.5\%$; $p_{47-60}=80.4\%$; $p_{61+}=68.8\%$; $\chi^2=34.861$; $df=6$; $p<0.01$; sharing household chores: $p_{18-31}=72.4\%$; $p_{32-46}=53.0\%$; $p_{47-60}=55.0\%$; $p_{61+}=57.0\%$; $\chi^2=20.043$; $df=6$; $p<0.01$; having some time for one's own friends and for personal hobbies/activities: $p_{18-31}=79.4\%$; $p_{32-46}=59.8\%$; $p_{47-60}=63.8\%$; $p_{61+}=64.4\%$; $\chi^2=21.454$; $df=6$; $p<0.01$). The level of education had no significant impact on the priorities of the young female respondents.

Faithfulness, a decent income, good living conditions, a life apart from parents, a fulfilling sexual relationship, the willingness of partners to talk about problems, and free time are more important to Christian female respondents. Finally, free time and friends are more important to young unmarried female respondents. Data is shown in **Table 2**.

Table 2. Importance of certain life practices for a successful marriage among young Christian and Muslim women.

	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Statistically significant difference
Faithfulness	97.5%	90.3%	$p<0.05$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=6.489$
An adequate income	90.6%	58.1%	$p<0.01$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=24.6$
Good housing	85.5%	48.4%	$p<0.01$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=28.325$
Living apart from your in-laws	62.4%	35.5%	$p<0.01$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=17.108$
Happy sexual relationship	94.9%	75.0%	$p<0.01$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=12.655$
Being willing to discuss the problems that come up between husband and wife	91.8%	74.2%	$p<0.01$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=18.026$
Having some time for one's own friends and for personal hobbies/activities	82.1%	64.5%	$p<0.01$; $df=2$; $\chi^2=17.333$

When asked whether "a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily", 88.8% of the respondents agreed with that reasoning. There were no noticeable differentiations in the answers concerning the conducted comparative analysis according the sex of the young respondents ($p_m=87.7\%$). Furthermore, the level of education of the young female respondents did not show to have an impact on their views on this issue.

The elderly respondents were more likely to agree that children need a home, a father and mother to grow up happily ($p_{18-31}=88.8\%$; $p_{32-46}=95.1\%$; $p_{47-60}=94.3\%$; $p_{61+}=100.0\%$; $\chi^2=15.871$; $df=3$; $p<0.01$). Also, Christian women agreed with this view more than Muslim women ($p_{ch}=93.7\%$; $p_{mus}=74.1\%$; $\chi^2=10.612$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$). Married female respondents agreed more strongly with the presented position than the respondents that have never been married ($p_{mar}=98.2\%$; $p_{sing}=84.7\%$; $\chi^2=7.219$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $cc\chi^2=5.940$; $df=1$; $p<0.05$).

Asked whether they considered that "a woman has to have children to be fulfilled or this is not necessary", most of the young female respondents ($p_f=78.5\%$) supported the view that the feeling of fulfillment among women is related to having offspring. The female respondents were more accepting of this position than male respondents ($p_m=68.0\%$) of the

same age ($df=1$; $\chi^2=5.831$; $p<0.05$). A similar, but more pronounced trend, is observed in the responses of young married female respondents, of which 89.3% expressed agreement with the previous statement ($p_{mar}=89.3\%$; $p_{sing}=74.1\%$; $df=1$; $\chi^2= 5.433$; $p<0.05$). The most adult group of female respondents agreed with the statement that the feeling of fulfillment among women is closely related to having children ($p_{18-31}=78.5\%$; $p_{32-46}=85.7\%$; $p_{47-60}=84.9\%$; $p_{61+}=90.7\%$; $df=3$; $\chi^2= 8.479$; $p<0.05$).

Regardless of age, religion and education, almost all women do not consider marriage to be an outdated institution. In this context, differences are noted among young unmarried women, which show lower level of agreement ($p_{mar}=8.9\%$; $p_{sing}=28.0\%$; $\chi^2=8.269$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$; $cc\chi^2=7.205$; $df=1$; $p<0.01$).

Young male respondents aged 18 to 31 are also inclined towards accepting the view that marriage is not an outdated institution ($p_m=80.2\%$ said that marriage is not an outdated institution).

The concept of being a single mother without a stable relationship with a man was more accepted by young female respondents as compared to young male respondents ($p_m=44.6\%$; $p_f=65.0\%$; $df=2$; $\chi^2= 22.712$; $p<0.01$). Also, this option is more acceptable to youngest female respondents ($p_{18-31}=65.0\%$; $p_{32-46}=50.6\%$; $p_{47-60}=48.4\%$; $p_{61+}=41.1\%$; $df=6$; $\chi^2= 22.682$; $p<0.01$). Women with secondary or higher education were more inclined to accept the possibility of such a choice ($p_{prim}=30.8$; $p_{secon}=70.2\%$; $p_{high}=61.5\%$; $df=4$; $\chi^2= 10.613$; $p<0.05$). The marital status of the respondents did not seem to affect their stance on this issue. Greater propensity for this practice was shown in the responses by Christian women ($p_{ch}=68.8\%$; $p_{mus}=32.1\%$; $df=2$; $\chi^2= 22.193$; $p<0.01$).

The respondents were offered claims related to the attitudes towards certain aspects of marriage and family relationships, measured on a scale of one to five, ranging from full compliance to total rejection. The mean values of their responses showed some inconsistencies in terms of their being open or closed to the acceptance of the offered concepts. Namely, young female respondents agreed most with the claim that "people should decide for themselves whether to have children or not", while at the same time showing no great distance to the assertion that "it is a duty towards society to have children". Also, the attitude towards freedom of choice about producing an offspring was not accepted when it comes to the position of gay couples adopting children, or founding their own family. Although young women showed some degree of tolerance towards the possibility of partners living together without marriage, they did not reject the claim that

marriage or a long-lasting relationship is necessary for happiness (which is consistent with the high degree of acceptance of the claim that marriage is not an outdated institution).

The comparison of responses according to the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents showed differences in terms of gender, age, religion and marital status, while the education level did not appear to be a discriminatory factor.

The analysis of the responses of the participants of different sex showed an obvious tendency for men to agree much more strongly with the claims that: "a marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy" (Mm=2.46; Mf=2.71; df=455; t=2.239; p<0.05) and that "it is a duty towards society to have children" (Mm=2.50; Mf=2.79; df=455; t= 2.837; p<0.01). On the other hand, for young female respondents it was more acceptable that "it is alright for two people to live together without getting married" (Mm=2.49; Mf=2.27; df=462; t= 2.084; p<0.05) and that "people should decide for themselves whether to have children or not" (Mm=1.67; Mf=1.49; df=464; t= 2.707; p<0.01).

The age of the respondents indicated tendencies that could be considered expected if one accepts the stereotype that older women cultivate more traditional views on marriage and the family (as determined in some preliminary views on marriage, family and life in general). For example, young women agreed less with the statement that "a man has to have children in order to be fulfilled" (M18-31=2.20; M47-60=1.84; M61+=1.76; df=3; F= 7.365; p<0.01) and the view that "a marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy" (M18-31=2.71; M32-46=2.31; M47-60=2.35; M61+=2.22; df=3; F=5.843; p<0.01), and that for them it was more acceptable that "it is alright for two people to live together without getting married" (M18-31=2.27; M47-60=2.75; M61+=3.05; df=3; F= 9.968; p<0.01). Older female respondents generally agreed more with the statement that "it is a duty towards society to have children" (M18-31=2.79; M47-60=2.36; M61+=2.23; df=3; F= 7.365; p<0.01). What appeared as a common commitment for almost all age groups was the relatively high degree of disagreement with the possibility for homosexual couples to adopt children (M18-31=3.94; M32-46=4.12; M47-60=4.04; M61+=4.56) .

The concepts of two people living together without getting married (Mch=2.19; Mmus=2.97; df=191; t= 3.742; p<0.01) and for people to decide on their own whether to have children (Mch=1.45; Mmus=1.68; df=194; t= 1.987; p<0.05) was more acceptable for young female Christian respondents. Predictably, for married respondents the view that men must have children to feel fulfilled (Mmar=1.71; Msing=2.39; df=193; t= 4.396; p<0.01) was more acceptable as well as that marriage or a long-term relationship is necessary to be happy (Mmar=2.18; Msing=2.89; df=197; t= 3.681; p<0.01).

One of the questions in the block related to family and marriage provided an opportunity to examine the attitudes of the respondents towards specific contemporary challenges facing the family in the context of professional engagement and the opportunity for self-realization of women and changes in marital roles. Respondents' attitudes were measured on a scale of one to four, from full compliance to absolute rejection of the proposed position. Young female respondents reached greater agreement on the following positions: that "both husband and wife should contribute to household income" ($M_f=1.33$); that "men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children" ($M_f=1.40$); and that "having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person" ($M_f=1.50$).

In this context, the comparative analysis of the responses according to the sex of the respondents showed statistically significant differences. Young female respondents expressed greater agreement than their male peers in terms of the following attitudes: "a working mother can establish just as warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who doesn't work" ($M_m=1.92$; $M_f=1.75$; $df=421$; $t=2.242$; $p<0.05$); "having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person" ($M_m=1.84$; $M_f=1.50$; $df=442$; $t=4.740$; $p<0.01$); and "both husband and wife should contribute to household income" ($M_m=1.56$; $M_f=1.33$; $df=462$; $t=3.764$; $p<0.01$). Young men, on the other hand, expressed greater agreement with the view that "a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" ($M_m=2.50$; $M_f=2.76$; $df=410$; $t=3.147$; $p<0.01$), that "a job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children" ($M_m=2.17$; $M_f=2.36$; $df=382$; $t=2.250$; $p<0.05$) and that "being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay" ($M_m=2.38$; $M_f=2.63$; $df=362$; $t=2.613$; $p<0.01$).

When it comes to the age of the female respondents, differences can be observed in terms of the following attitudes: young female respondents were more inclined to agree that "a working mother can establish just as warm and secure relationship with her children as a mother who doesn't work" ($M_{18-31}=1.75$; $M_{32-46}=2.03$; $M_{47-60}=1.84$; $df=3$; $F=3.729$; $p<0.05$); that "having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person" ($M_{18-31}=1.50$; $M_{47-60}=1.69$; $M_{61+}=1.73$; $df=3$; $F=3.335$; $p<0.05$); that "both husband and wife should contribute to household income" ($M_{18-31}=1.33$; $M_{61+}=1.59$; $df=3$; $F=5.362$; $p<0.01$) and that "in general, fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers" ($M_{18-31}=1.61$; $M_{32-46}=1.94$; $M_{47-60}=1.88$; $df=3$; $F=5.787$; $p<0.01$). What was obvious in the analysis of the responses of the other age clusters (aged over 32), was the tendency to agree more with the view that regardless of work, a woman's highest priority are the home

and the family ($M_{18-31}=2.36$; $M_{32-46}=2.03$; $M_{47-60}=2.02$; $M_{61+}=1.98$; $df=3$; $F=7.575$; $p<0.01$).

The overview of the responses differentiated by the educational level of the young female respondents showed few statistically significant differences. The female respondents with lower levels of education agreed to a greater extent with the following attitudes: that "a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" ($M_{prim}=2.15$; $M_{secon}=2.75$; $M_{high}=2.90$; $df=2$; $F=4.001$; $p<0.50$); that "being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay" ($M_{prim}=2.00$; $M_{secon}=2.63$; $M_{high}=2.86$; $df=2$; $F=5.119$; $p<0.01$); that "both husband and wife should contribute to household income" ($M_{secon}=1.28$; $M_{high}=1.51$; $df=2$; $F=3.574$; $p<0.30$) and that "in general, fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers" ($M_{secon}=1.49$; $M_{high}=1.98$; $df=2$; $F=6.829$; $p<0.01$). It is important to note that the structure of employed young women is dominated by those with the highest education level, which might have had an effect on the responses.

The only difference between Christian and Muslim female respondents is that Christians agreed more that employment was the best way for a woman to feel independent ($M_{ch}=1.45$; $M_{mus}=1.77$; $df=192$; $t=2.410$; $p<0.05$).

Young married respondents agreed more with several attitudes: that children are neglected if the mother is employed ($M_{mar}=2.47$; $M_{sing}=2.88$; $df=186$; $t=2.938$; $p<0.01$); that the house and the children are a priority for most women ($M_{mar}=1.98$; $M_{sing}=2.52$; $df=177$; $t=3.776$; $p<0.01$), and that the status of housewife is as fulfilling to women as employment ($M_{mar}=2.04$; $M_{sing}=2.87$; $df=174$; $t=6.142$; $p<0.01$).

Unemployed young women agreed to a larger extent that employment is the best way for a woman to be independent ($M_{employed}=1.73$; $M_{unemployed}=1.43$; $df=198$; $t=2.667$; $p<0.01$).

The attitude of the female respondents towards freedom of choice was examined with the question under which circumstances would they approved or disapprove of abortion. Out of the overall sample of young women, 70.2% approved of abortion when the woman is not married. More than a half of the same population approved of abortion when the couple does not want to have more children ($p_f = 64.9\%$).

If we compare these answers to those of young men we can conclude that men ($p_m=60.2\%$) approved of abortion less in the case when a woman is not married ($df=1$; $F=0.104$; $p<0.05$).

Young women, when compared to all other age groups of female respondents, demonstrated a greater approval of abortion in both mentioned cases (if the woman is not

married: $p_{18-31}=70.2\%$; $p_{32-46}=59.2\%$; $p_{47-60}=54.7\%$; $p_{61+}=41.1\%$; $df=3$; $\chi^2=22.793$; $p<0.01$; if a married couple does not want to have any more children: $p_{18-31}=64.9\%$; $p_{32-46}=63.1\%$; $p_{47-60}=59.9\%$; $p_{61+}=40.0\%$; $df=3$; $\chi^2=16.499$; $p<0.01$). The level of education did not prove to be a discriminating factor for the attitudes of the young female respondents.

Christian respondents approved of abortion more in both cases (if the woman is not married: $p_{ch}=72.4\%$; $p_{mus}=50\%$; $df=1$; $\chi^2=5.520$; $p<0.05$; if a married couple does not want to have any more children: $p_{ch}=70.2\%$; $p_{mus}=41.4\%$; $df=1$; $\chi^2=8.948$; $p<0.01$).

Young female respondents indicated low level of interest in politics (the level of interest was measured on a scale of four, 1 meaning "very interested", and 4 "not interested at all"). Statistically significant differences were noted only considering the level of education ($M_{prim}=3.43$; $M_{high}=2.65$; $df=2$; $F=4.560$; $p<0.05$) and the sex ($M_m=2.51$; $M_f=2.92$; $df=462$; $t=4.543$; $p<0.01$). However, it is important to note that all respondents in the sample showed relatively low interest in politics.

On a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1 stands for "never" and 10 stands for "always") the respondents were given the opportunity to assess the validity of certain life practices, lifestyles and behaviors. The responses of the young respondents showed that they justified highly the following practices: artificial insemination or in-vitro fertilization ($M_f=7.61$), divorce ($M_f=6.07$) and abortion ($M_f=5.21$). On the other hand, they justified the least the following behaviors: "taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)" ($M_f=1.71$), "claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to" ($M_f=1.78$), "cheating on tax if you have the chance" ($M_f=1.82$) and "avoiding a fare on public transport" ($M_f=1.82$).

When the data obtained was compared in terms of some socio-demographic characteristics we identified some statistically significant differences (**Table 3**):

Table 3. Assessment of the validity of certain life practices, lifestyles and behaviors among male and female respondents aged 18-31

	Males aged 18-31 (M)	Females aged 18-31 (M)	Statistically significant difference
Cheating on tax if you have the chance	2.35	1.82	df=456; t=2.428; p<0.05
Taking the drug marijuana or hashish	2.43	1.88	df=453; t=2.517; p<0.05
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	2.26	1.83	df=458; t=1.985; p<0.05
Having casual sex	5.31	3.95	df=449; t=4.279; p<0.01
Avoiding a fare on public transport	2.59	1.82	df=465; t=3.678; p<0.01
Prostitution	2.92	2.18	df=451; t=2.878; p<0.01
Genetic manipulation of food stuffs	3.08	2.22	df=427; t=3.370; p<0.01

The analysis of the data according to the level of education of the young female respondents indicated that, surprisingly, the educational level is proportional to the justification of genetic manipulation of food products (Mprim=1.31; Msecon=2.02; Mhigh=2.84; df=2; F=3.915; p<0.05).

The results of the data obtained of the compared answers of Christian and Muslim respondents are shown in **Table 4**.

Table 4. Assessment of the validity of certain life practices, lifestyles and behaviors among Christian and Muslim respondents

	Christians (M)	Muslims (M)	Statistically significant difference
Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to	1.48	3.23	df=188; t=5.228; p<0.01
Cheating on tax if you have the chance	1.46	3.65	df=191; t=6.770; p<0.01
Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)	1.45	2.90	df=182; t=4.004; p<0.01
Lying in your own interest	2.74	4.14	df=190; t=2.561; p<0.05
Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties	1.61	2.70	df=190; t=2.982; p<0.01
Abortion	5.35	3.70	df=184; t=2.325; p<0.05
Divorce	6.28	4.57	df=192; t=2.685; p<0.01
Euthanasia (terminating the life of the incurably sick)	3.71	2.29	df=185; t=2.438; p<0.05
Avoiding a fare on public transport	1.59	3.06	df=193; t=4.594; p<0.01
Genetic manipulation of food stuffs	2.05	3.36	df=173; t=2.864; p<0.01
Artificial insemination or in-vitro fertilization	8.12	5.00	df=184; t=4.915; p<0.01

Conclusion

The obtained results did not point to any coherent cultural models concerning the value system of young women in the Republic of Macedonia, but they also did not exclude completely the possibility of discovering some indicators in the process of evaluation of things. These indicators, for example, revealed certain inconsistencies, and on the other hand some stereotypes that are expected in the process of building attitudes and behaviors, especially given the lack of differentiation in comparison to the perceived general trends derived from the analysis of the overall sample. It can be assumed that these conditions

only reflect the general mood of the youth of the transitional generation, especially when it comes to women. The results of the analysis show that young women in the Republic of Macedonia identify themselves as quite happy (although self-perception to greater happiness increases with the increase of the level of education), they feel they have relatively high control over their lives and are relatively satisfied with their lives. On the other hand, the highest priority in their lives holds the family, followed by their friends and acquaintances and leisure time, things generally more related to the private sphere. Less important for them are work, religion and politics - institutions seen as part of the public sphere and belonging to certain collectives (although in modern democratic societies religion is also considered as part of the private sphere). This is probably due to a more traditional approach towards religion which is characteristic of Macedonian society, especially in the context of linking religious and ethnic identity. Considering that the target group of the survey shows a high degree of distrust towards others, as well as social distance towards certain groups of people, it could be assumed again that young women are encapsulated in their private sphere, whereas they see the social sphere as a place in which they do not feel confident. The relationship towards their work, which young respondents recognized as an area of self-fulfillment, and which belongs to the public sphere, and also their relationship to certain family values, no matter how important they may be to them in a more traditional sense (in which they still see themselves as persons with a right to individual choice), induces a possible self-consciousness about the role of women in contemporary Macedonian society.

The critical attitude towards the social practice (public sphere) is obvious, taking in regard the relatively low level of trust in the institutions of the system, a degree of trust that corresponds to the answers of the general sample.

In terms of a more reliable analysis of possible inconsistency in the responses of the participants in the survey, several of their views regarding the acceptance or rejection of models of governance, such as attitudes towards the development of governance in our country, were tested. In the light of these issues the participants showed a tendency to recognize the ideal, typical values of democracy, but also the inconsistent, objective social indicators that democracy generates on a general level in the Macedonian political system (Authors, year of publication).

Certain types of collective identity as the religious affiliation and age, which are related to the experience of the young female respondents or the relation towards experience and various life practices, proved to be a discriminatory factor in many

circumstances (generational gap, distinctiveness of cultural identity). Our expectations that the level of education of young women in Macedonia should be an influential agent in the design of their value preferences have not been confirmed for most of the questions.

Religious affiliation of young women who took part in the survey shows distinction in views, especially when it comes to social distance towards certain categories of people. In this context we can talk about slightly more pronounced xenophobia among young Muslim women. Generally speaking, when it comes to the degree of expressed social distance towards certain social groups, the responses of the young women do not differ significantly from the general trends in terms of the responses of the entire sample. The responses of the young women and men are not very different except on certain issues, given that they are part of a population placed in the same social context. Differences generally relate to matters of marriage and family life, where young men demonstrated more traditional views about these institutions.

These important features of the value profile of the young Macedonian woman only confirms the general picture of the value vacuum in a society that has recently come out of one model of socio-cultural and values system and now tends to build another one. There, the lost sense of value preferences produced coexistence of often incompatible values such as the hardening traditionalism, at the one hand, and a postmodern condition of comfort, but also instability, on the other.

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ENERGY SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE CASPIAN-BLACK SEA REGION

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Abstract

The article will focus on the competition - cooperation continuum in the energy security framework of the Caspian – Black Sea region, arguing on the dual role of oil and natural gas resources and pipeline projects to fuel conflict and at the same time to build stability, in the context of the protracted conflicts in the region. It will debate on the conceptualisation of energy security in the traditional approaches of realism and neoliberalism, while proposing a social constructivist model of analysis that will go beyond the classical, state-centred theoretical streams. The role of the regional patterns of interactions, dynamics and actors in approaching energy security challenges and opportunities will be brought into light. The multiplicity and diversity of factors underpinning the energy security will be emphasised, bringing together insights on the political, economic, social and technological challenges and opportunities in the field on energy in the Caspian – Black Sea region.

Keywords: Caspian – Black Sea region; energy security; natural gas and oil; protracted conflicts; social constructivism

Theorising Energy Security: beyond realist and neoliberalist approaches

The section will attempt an incursion through both the mainstream, as well as through the critical efforts to theorise 'energy security', in the context of a rather scarce effort in the literature to provide more flexible and comprehensive understandings of the concept. The scholarship on energy security is relatively under-conceptualised (Stoddard, 2013) and there has been limited direct application of IR theories to understanding energy, energy-related conflicts and the patterns for competition and cooperation (Dannreuther, 2010). It mainly draws on the divergent interpretations between political realism and neoliberalism, transposed in the form of regarding energy security between geopolitics and market liberalism, both of them placing the inter-state political or economic structures at the core of their analysis (Ciută, 2010; Stoddard 2013).

The concept of energy security is rather a newcomer in the political, economic and academic debates, as it developed mainly after the oil crisis following the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, which led to the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) one year later. In the 1990s, the logic of the energy relations was a predominantly economic one. In the last decades, however, the transition has been made to a political approach which gave rise to a new terminology of 'energy security', 'energy diplomacy', 'energy dependence', 'the geopolitics of energy' (Casier, 2011). The politicisation of the Russian natural gas exports to Europe and the shift from an economic interdependence to a political risk took place only recently, in the last decade, and occurred in the context of the EU's enlargement in 2004 and 2007 (Nies, 2011) and of the gas transit disputes with Ukraine (Terterov, 2010; *see* Sharples, 2013), in 2006, 2009 and 2014.

As such, energy security mainly focuses on the security of supply and on the affordable prices for the consumers, citizens and businesses, having "access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of service" (Barton et al., 2004: 5, *see* Winrow, 2007). Conceptualisation of energy security as a consumer-centric concept (Sharples, 2013), focused on the security of supply, has been feeding the theoretical fields of both political realism, concerned with the conflictual aspects of energy relations, as well as of neoliberalism/neoclassical economics, focused on the cooperative potential of energy relations at legal, economic and institutional level (Stoddard, 2013).

However, the exporter-states have their own energy security concerns, being preoccupied with securing stable markets, reliable transit partners able to pay the price

(Nies, 2011; Andrei, 2015) and maintaining the "security of demand" for their exports as a generator of revenues for the national economy (Yergin, 2006). Security of transportation routes, mainly of the natural gas terrestrial pipelines, which are vulnerable to numerous risks, is a middle element of security, both for supplier and consumer states. In their turn, transit states see energy security as a two-ended process, dependent both on producer and consumer states, in their struggle to be part of the major transportation projects (Andrei, 2015). Moreover, security of energy for developing countries is related to how changes in energy prices affect their balance of payments (Yergin, 2006).

Traditional approaches on energy security

The *realist / geopolitical approach* regards energy security as closely interlinked with violence and war, with states as main actors concerned about their survival translated into unperturbed access to resources and engaged in a zero-sum game. It argues, for example, that the scene of the future conflicts will be dominated by the struggle for resources, rather than by ideology or the global balance of power (Klare, 2008; *see* Stoddard, 2013). The focus is thus on international politics and energy security is defined mainly in the framework of the geopolitical competition of states over depleting resources, seen as a key ingredient of national power and national interest (Dannreuther, 2010), as a consequence of the combined effect of increasing global demand for energy and increasing concentration of energy supply in a few countries (Stoddard, 2013). Securitization occurs in the context of a threat perception by the consumer states and it contains a military component (Ciută, 2010; Langlois-Bertrand, 2010; Stoddard, 2013; Triantaphyllou, 2007). "Under this logic, energy security is derivative of geopolitics" (Langlois-Bertrand, 2010:11).

In practice, in the energy security debates over the Caspian - Black Sea region, the approach has been translated into the opposing interests of the West, represented by EU and US on one hand, and Russia on the other hand. EU and Russia are depicted as the protagonists of a zero-sum game, in which the gains of one party automatically imply the loss of the other and where by trying to get control over energy production and transmission, states seek to strengthen their relative position in the international system (Casier, 2011). In the realist-geopolitical perspective, oil and natural gas pipelines have strategic functions, engaging various state-level actors in using the transmission facilities

and infrastructure as political advantage. Pipelines projects are being developed in order to create and solidify strategic alliances and their defence entitles military actions.

According to this approach, the military campaigns in Chechnya were perceived as a strategic defence action by the Russian leadership who regarded the North Caucasus republic's claims of independence as a threat to Russian economic interests and strategic hegemony in the Caucasus and at the Caspian Sea. The realist view would further argue that this occurred in the context where the Chechen separatist leader, Dudaev, was in control on one of Russia's major pipelines, Baku-Novorosiisk, passing over 153 kilometres through the Chechen territory and was threatening, at the same time, Russia's gateway to the South Caucasus (Hughes, 2007).

The conflict in Chechnya should not however be reduced to a quest for securing strategic resources and transmission infrastructure, nor should it be limited to the action of the two state-level actors, Russia and Chechnya. The two campaigns have witnessed a high degree of variety of material and non-material factors acting as sources of conflict that were engaged by a diversity of inter-state, intra-state and individual actors. The war in Chechnya must be placed in the broader context of the political, institutional and ideological vacuum in the former Soviet space after the dissolution of USSR that privileged old and new elites to articulate national, religious and economic conflicting interests, on the background of an increased level of poverty and engagement in the shadow economy of both locals and of the Russian militaries, often cooperating and taking part together in military acts against competing, equally diverse, groups. The roots of the Chechen wars can be traced further back during the Soviet period and can be linked to deeper socio-psychological and behavioural aspects that fuel conflicts. In Chechnya, the well-paid jobs in the oil refineries were mainly reserved to the Russian urban workers during the Soviet Union, leaving many Chechens to deal with rural underpaid activities. With the gas and oil industry collapsing during the war, Chechnya became the scene of social unrest for many young people, angered with the unemployment and poverty they were facing, with the small elites who used their position and the political and military power for personal enrichment (Tishkov, 1997). None of the material or non-material factors can be solely held responsible for generating conflict. It is the mixture between realistic sources of conflict, such as material scarcity or access to limited positions and the subjective ones, as the expression of anger, anxiety and shame tied to personal or group level stress or the relative deprivation generating deeper resentments and a sense of inequality (Ho-Won Jeong, 2008).

Further critiques to the importance of the gas and oil resources in the conflicts of the Caucasus have been expressed. Although the competition for the oil resources did play a role on the agenda of the local elites often concealing their pragmatic goals under nationalist or religious discourses, securing the resources fails to explain Russia's military campaigns in Chechnya in contrast to the non-intervention and peaceful settlement with the oil-rich Tatarstan. Similarly, the control over resources does not qualify as a drive behind Georgia's war with Abkhazia, as the only strategic factor that could have worried Tbilisi was the loss of control over the railway linking Russia with Georgia, an import and export artery (Toft, 2003). At the same time, the neighbouring Ajaria did not experience war, although it was more important in terms of resources than Abkhazia, benefitting from the strategic location of the industrial port of Batumi, the Black Sea terminus of the oil pipeline Baku-Batumi (Toft, 2003).

The neoliberal or *market-liberal approach* downplays the role of power and focuses in return on the role of markets, institutions and companies, setting the energy security in the context of ensuring supply and price accessibility to foster win-win games. It argues that interdependence and not competition defines energy markets, thus the goal should be extending the markets and correcting its imperfections (Langlois-Bertrand, 2010; Stoddard, 2013).

Adepts of the neoliberal approach affirm that, despite efforts in the recent years towards diversification of the energy resources and transportation routes, the EU still finds itself in an asymmetric dependency relation to Russia, as a single natural gas supplier. This happens in the context of depletion of its own resources in the North Sea, enlargement of the EU and a growing gas demand and consumption. I argue that interdependence should nevertheless be treated with caution, as, despite absolute numbers, the implications are relative. Thus, diversification of the internal market and the fuel mix in the economy of the consumer states should also be taken into account. As an example, although it appears that Finland has a 100% dependency on the Russian gas, in reality, only 11% of its energy consumption is based on natural gas, nuclear power being the source preferred. Similarly, high dependence does not necessarily translate into a security threat, as it depends on the nature of relations between the supplier and the consumer country. The level of perceived threat and thus securitisation is lower, despite a higher energetic dependence, in the case of a beneficiary state in a friendly relation with the supplier state. The case of the Georgian-Azeri interdependence (Azerbaijan needs Georgia to transport its hydrocarbons, while Georgia needs Azerbaijan to supply them) has also led to a positive pattern of cooperation,

with the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines offering a new role in the region for the two local actors, while also increasing their independence from Russia. Similarly, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have followed increasingly independent foreign policy orientations, challenging Russia's energy leverage over the region (Freire, 2012).

Dannreuther (2010) shifts away from the role of the markets and brings the conflict into the market-liberal perspective, placing within the economic neoliberal theory also the three literature strands on: 'resource curse' (dealing with the failure of the resource-rich states to develop other sectors of the economy and the factors which contribute to this, such as the 'Dutch disease'); on 'rentier state' (emphasising the consolidation of authoritarian, repressive regimes in resource-rich states and the impediments to the development of democratic states); and on 'resource wars' which he also connects to the political economy of 'new wars' literature (debating on the competition among various rival factions at intra-state level to predate natural resources, driven by greed rather than grievance). Cheterian (2008) argues, however, in a critical regard on the 'new wars', that the multinationals and the international financial institutions are not to be held responsible for the conflicts in the Caucasus, a region less exposed to the Western influence. The reasons are to be found rather in the collapse of the state structures and the security dilemma it created. The author argues that the economic and political global actors penetrated the region only at the late stage of the process. The "Deal of the Century", the oil deal between Azerbaijan and a consortium of Western companies, was signed as late as September 1994, after the cease-fire agreement in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, a conflict started during the Soviet rule.

Energy security in a social constructivist view

Attempts have been made in the literature to broaden the conceptualisation of energy, beyond the traditional approaches to include new factors of analysis. Ciută (2010:135) proposes a third dimension of energy security, beyond the ones of war or subsistence, a 'total' security where energy security means "the security of *everything*: resources, production plants, transportation networks, distribution outlets and even consumption patterns; *everywhere*: oilfields, pipelines, power plants, gas stations, homes; against *everything*: resource depletion, global warming, terrorism, them and ourselves".

Yergin brings in a more critical view taking into account the cultural and political aspects of energy security. Thus, the objective of energy security is "to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives" (Yergin, 1988: 112; *see* Couder, 2015). Energy security thus encompasses a broader range of factors that come to interplay through the action of a variety of actors holding different interests and driven by various vulnerabilities. As such, energy security is also fuelled by the threat of terrorism, internal instability in some exporting countries, political turmoil, armed conflict, piracy and natural disasters that can affect the energy production and transmission.

Social constructivism looks into discourses as indicators of values and interests of political actors who define their interests through interaction with other actors (Sharples, 2013). Interests are no longer regarded through the traditional approaches as being objective and static (Snetkov, 2012), but they are being constantly redefined because of a 'process of mutual adjustment' (Wendt, 1999; *see* Sharples, 2013). The actors engage in security actions according to the subjective interpretations of their own interests whereas the conceptualisation and construction of their security needs and threats shape the discourse and security narratives employed for the larger goal of articulating their identity (Sharples, 2013; Snetkov, 2012; Eris, 2011). It can thus be argued that the actors in the Caspian – Black Sea region securitize energy according to their quest for assuming desired identities through the interaction with their neighbours, the larger regional actors, the global players and their own internal energy actors. Russia pursues the identity of a strong state, an indispensable supplier for the regional and the European market, while striving to acquire a more preeminent role on the Asian one as well. Turkey uses pipeline diplomacy in order to be recognised the role of a key regional player and energy hub, while also constructing its identity of an element of balance among various potential conflicting interests of the EU, Russia and Iran, by backing-up both Russian and Western-supported gas and oil pipeline projects. In their own turn, the regional actors along the transmission lines of oil and gas look for the construction and the recognition of their identities as important transit states.

Non-state actors, such as the state-owned and international companies - Gazprom, Socar, British Petroleum, and Lukoil have a strong voice in shaping the energy policies and strategies of the states. Azerbaijan signed the 'Deal of the Century' in 1994 with a consortium of international companies led by British Petroleum and Chevron, forming the Azerbaijan International Operating Consortium (AIOC) in order to develop three major oil

fields at the Caspian Sea. This project clashed with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), led by the Russian giant Lukoil, aspiring to have monopoly on transporting the oil from the Azeri oil fields at the Caspian Sea to Novorosiisk.

For constructivists, security is a “context-specific social construction” (Karakasis, 2015: 9) and it gains meaning through the inter-subjective processes between diverse actors for which threat is constructed in a discursive manner (Buzan and Waever, 1997). Various other interest groups and political factions engage in energy security narratives or use energy-driven interests to conduct political actions under ideological discourses. The ethno-national and religious discourse has been instrumentalised in the region in order to gain and secure access to energy resources and infrastructure. “It is the politicisation of the various clientelistic links between the political class and the new informal economy that provides the basis for mobilisation based on identity” (Kaldor, 2001: 55).

In 1999, the Russian oil company Transneft announced the construction of a bypass pipeline through that would avoid the Chechen territory where Russia had lost control over the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline during the first military campaign in Chechnya. In his discourse over the threat of the separatist forces emerging in Dagestan, Vladimir Putin warned that the Islamists in the republic threaten not only the Russia’s territorial integrity but also its control of the economically vital oil export routes. On the other side, concerned with the loss of the main source of revenues should the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline have been diverted from Chechnya to Dagestan, in August 1999, the Chechen radical leader Shamil Basayev organised the invasion of Dagestan under the discourse of establishing an independent Islamic state in the neighbouring republic. If in the Russian case the public narrative was openly linking the security of the national state with energy, the discourse of the Chechen leaders concealed the pursuit of pragmatic goals under the religious flag.

The competition-cooperation flux in the energy projects of the Caspian-Black Sea region

Energy does not generate security on its own; it is rather located at the intersection of the political, economic, military, cultural and societal factors that shape the interactions among various actors and articulate their interests on the domestic and international scene. Changes in one or more of the fields of interaction impact on the way

energy is securitised or desecuritised. Thus, the oil and the gas pipelines projects in the Caspian-Black Sea region have a dual potential of both fuelling more tensions between the participants and of fostering cooperation in the area leading to its stabilisation. The role of the regional patterns of interactions, dynamics and actors is essential in approaching energy security challenges and opportunities in the wider Caspian-Black Sea region. Within the region, energy projects are closely connected to the frozen conflicts in the area, in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. More recently, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has altered the narratives of all the energy actors in the region, with both EU and Russia pressing for developing competing alternative projects for the transport of natural gas that would bypass Ukraine. EU supported projects with a cross-border component, as part of its broader goal to advance EU strategic energy and trade interests. However, its investments in the Caspian region have been limited by the financial crisis and the competition with Russia (Simão, 2013). More than ever before, a political and military conflict was translated into an energetic threat for Europe and an economic interdependence was appropriated as a dependency risk and political leverage. Previously banned actors were allowed back as potential alternatives in EU's energy discourse, considering its diversification of supply from Turkmenistan and Iran. In its own turn, Russia used Gazprom to redefine its relations with Ukraine while also attempting a rapprochement with Turkey, a traditional partner in Western-backed projects transporting oil and gas from the Caspian to the Black Sea. Turkey itself sought the opportunity to expand its potential participation in both Russian and Western projects and to reassert its quest for a strong regional player identity.

The competition - cooperation continuum in the energy projects of the Caspian - Black Sea region is shaped by the constant interaction between the state and non-state actors involved. Interaction, in its turn, shapes their perception on the self and on each other and leads to the construction of identities of friend or foe, strong or weak, key or secondary player etc. The oil and natural gas pipelines have, therefore, the potential of serving both as peace pipelines in a cooperative framework, as well as to deepen the animosities and tensions when engaged in a competitive pattern of interaction. Although the states cannot be dismissed as key players on the energy scene, the role of the non-state actors is equally important in the process of conceptualising the energy security. The regional energy system is also characterised by a high degree of diversity in the domestic politico-economic structures whose interests are often divergent creating energy perceptions of risks between different energy actors (Stoddard, 2013). Other times, "similar

actors (e.g. governments) can pursue different policies (e.g. energy independence or diversification of supply), and different actors can have similar policy preferences” (Ciută, 2010: 133).

The oscillating relations between Russia and Turkey relevantly illustrate the fluidity of the competition-cooperation patterns of interaction in the realm of energy security. The economic and political competition between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus and in Central Asia in the first decades after the fall of the Soviet Union has witnessed a switch after the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, with new common projects being discussed. In December 2014, president Putin declared that the South Stream pipeline project would be abandoned, mainly due to Bulgaria’s refusal to continue its participation in the project. Simultaneously, the launch of the Turkish Stream, carrying the Russian gas to Turkey and Greece has been announced, in an attempt to bypass Ukraine (Andrei, 2015). However, recent international and domestic events have questioned the future of the project in the light of the tensions between Moscow and Ankara. More important, the negotiations between Russia and Turkey reached a new level of tension and have frozen over Turkey’s refusal to continue the project unless Gazprom agrees on a price cut, which, under Russia’s domestic economic crisis, seems as an unlikely compromise. Moreover, the war in Syria impacts as well on the prospects of cooperation between the two countries, with Moscow hardly willing to compromise on Turkey’s demands after the tensions between the two states escalated on the 24th of November 2015 when a Russian jet fighter undergoing a mission on the Syrian border was shot down by the Turkish authorities.

Despite regional disagreements and tensions, the way forward could be integration, as a platform for developing sustainable inter-regional cooperation mechanisms spreading from energy to the other sectors as well (Freire, 2012) and thus contributing to the stabilisation of the region while also requiring a certain level of stability and reliability from the transit states. However, Turkey’s attempts to assume a key role as a regional player did not succeed to “overcome the obstacles to community-building affecting regional relations, namely the permanence of the regional conflicts and closed borders, and in that sense has been insufficient to reverse the disintegration trend initiated with the end of the Soviet Union” (Simão, 2013:277).

In the context of the frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the US-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was promoted by the *liberal-pluralist approach* as a ‘peace pipeline’, meant to reduce security tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, by benefiting all parties (Karagiannis, 2002; see Andrei, 2015). However, the *realist approach* emphasised

the zero-sum thinking of the two players. On one side, Azerbaijan feared that any route through Armenian-controlled territories would strengthen even more the Russian influence over the oil exports from Azerbaijan. On the other hand, Armenia enjoyed the status quo after the cease fire, being the *de facto* winner and in control over Nagorno-Karabakh, fearing, therefore, that increased revenues generated by the pipeline would shift the balance of power in favour of Azerbaijan (Karagiannis, 2002; *see* Andrei, 2015). In the last years, Azerbaijan used indeed its oil revenues to increase its military capacities and new tensions at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border emerged recently, with local military clashes between the two parties. Moreover, the oil and gas revenues allowed Azerbaijan to express a stronger voice in the region and to pressure for Armenia to be excluded from all the pipeline projects (Badalyan, 2011).

The BTC and BTE pipelines changed the status quo of power relations in the region, offering opportunities for Azerbaijan and Georgia to cooperate and to gain a plus of independence from Russia and to consolidate their role in the region (Li-Chen, 1999), thus to assume a new identity for themselves on the energy scene. Said (2007) argues that Russia perceived the BTC pipeline not only as an economic threat, but also as a geostrategic one, fearing that Chechnya, situated near the pipeline, would thus enter United States' sphere of influence in the region. The conflict in Chechnya posed questions on the security of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which passes through approximately 150 km of former conflict zones.

The pipeline crossing Chechnya could however serve also as an element of peace and stability, co-interesting both Russians and Chechens in maintaining a secure political and economic environment. In the more recent context of general economic slowdown, sanctions imposed by the EU and lack of funding, Russia will rather be interested in preserving the leverage on the internal gas market, while on its own part, Chechnya is interested in maintaining friendly supply and demand relations with Russia as it would be difficult to envisage who else would be willing to supply Chechnya under a liberalized market (Mitrova, 2015; *see* Andrei, 2015).

The factors for stabilisation the oil and gas pipelines can engage in the region are multi-levelled and go beyond the realm of the state actors and the political framework of analysis. Thus, the economic environment can benefit from an increased economic development of the states in the region, long-term contracts securing stable political relations, development of infrastructure and higher employment. Improvement of economic conditions can, in its turn, foster better standards of living, higher incomes, and increased

job security, cooperation that is more inter-ethnic and less incentive for separatism. Technology would be further encouraged to develop and renew, by building adjacent infrastructure (railways), introducing new technologies and looking into alternative energy resources.

Conclusions

Critical approaches of energy security can significantly contribute to broadening and understanding the concept through the interplay of a large spectrum of state and non-state actors coming together in the competition-cooperation flux revolving around the natural gas and oil resources and pipeline projects in the Caspian-Black Sea region. The identity-interests-interpretation nexus can be used as a theoretical framework of understanding the processes of securitising energy and of defining patterns of cooperation or competition in the area. The energy projects can serve both as prospects for fostering stability and cooperation as well as factors maintaining the status quo and contributing to the prolongation of the frozen conflicts of the region.

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
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
APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Fuel mix in the EU economies



Source: IEA 2014 Gas Information, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014

Appendix 3 – Turkey / Russia: Energy Deals and Export Volumes



Source: http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/images/screen%20shot%202015-07-16%20at%205_03_23%20pm.png

CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES IN THE PROCESS OF US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING

КОНЦЕПЦИСКИ ПРИСТАПИ ВО ПРОЦЕСОТ НА ДОНЕСУВАЊЕ НА НАЦИОНАЛНАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСНА ПОЛИТИКА НА САД

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Abstract

The conceptual approach towards the process of adopting foreign policy and national security decisions in the United States is of particular importance for the management of the same process. The access and theories define different approaches and are extremely important for both the US foreign policy, as well as the process of adopting national security policy. Each of the separate theories reflects the process of the US administration in making military and political decisions through the conventional approach and supporting the grand strategy. Contrary to this approach, the unconventional approach tends to be aimed at displaying national security through legislation, despite the unpredictability and the complexity of the fundamental laws of nature. In the political discourse of the United States, however, supporters of conservatism and neo-conservatism, two opposite views and approaches to the foreign policy and national security, further complicate the already complex cohesion of all institutions and government bodies involved in the process.

Keywords: National security, conventional approach, unconventional approach, conservative and neoconservative approach.

Апстракт

Концепцискиот пристап кон процесот на донесувањето на надворешно политичките и националните одлуки за безбедност во САД е од особено значење за менаџирањето на истиот процес. Пристапот и теориите ги дефинираат различните приоди и се, исклучително важни како за американската надворешна политика, така и за самиот процес на донесувањето на политиката за национална безбедност. Секоја од посебните теории го отсликуваат процесот на американската администрација во донесувањето на воени и политички одлуки, преку конвенцијалниот пристап и поддржувањето на големата стратегија. Спротивно на овој пристап неконвенцијалниот пристап има тенденција да биде во насока на прикажување на националната безбедност преку законска регулатива, и покрај непредвидливоста и комплексноста на основните закони на природата. Во политичкиот дискурс на САД пак, приврзаниците на конзерватизмот и неоконзерватизмот, две спротивни мислења и пристапи кон надворешната политика и националната безбедност, дополнително ја усложнуваат и така сложената кохезија на сите институции и владини тела вклучени во процесот.

Клучни зборови: Национална безбедност, конвенционален пристап, неконвенцијален пристап, конзервативен и неоконзервативен пристап.

1. Introduction

The conceptual context and the theories of national security policy are important for understanding the framework of the formation and access to it. In addition, it is necessary to perceive the nature of policies through theories, events and approaches that overlap with the foreign policy. The paper analyses the development of the conceptual framework for understanding and explaining the political events in the world and the need for understanding the major theories. Some supporters of these theories try to unite the literature with the legislation. For example, the classical approaches of (Claude, 2005) are

useful as well as the John's innovations, (John Norton and Moore, 2005), in form of incentive theory.

The conventional approach in the process of adopting the US national security includes several theories where primacy is given to the grand strategy of the United States whereupon the military structure bears the main primacy when making decisions.

The unconventional approach involves a series of theories that give a general impression that on the other hand rules out the use of military force and favors the production and trade of goods and services (the economy) that would contribute to the benefits in the entire society.

The complexity of the conservative foreign policy requires careful examination and, as a consequence of the Cold War, the American Conservatives developed a warlike reputation, while military adventurism is not, nor ever was, a conservative value in America.

Unlike the conservative approach, the conviction of Neoconservatives and the use of the US military power are needed and necessary in order to defend the great American values. The neoconservative US foreign policy in the modern politics lately is most noticeable during the George Bush administration and the global war against terrorism.

2. Conventional approach to the national security

According Hart (Hart, 1954), the approach starts with the idea that the theory and the strategy are overlapping in a grand strategy, which can be defined as the integration of military-political and economic resources in order to fulfill the ultimate goal of the states in the international system.³ Each nation usually has explicit or implicit strategy on how to deal with other countries/regions in the world regarding the security and defense issues. However, the grand strategy is usually in the domain of the scientists, (such as Waltz, 1979; Gaddis, 1982; Heymann, 2003; Ikenberry, 2002; Mead, 2004; Nye, 2002) as well as those who elaborate the struggle against the terrorism (Clark, 2003; Frum and Perle, 2003; Kagan, 2003; Brzezinski, 2004; Cronin and Ludes 2004; Etzioni, 2004; Ferguson, 2004; Hart, 2004; Stevenson, 2004; Barnett, 2005). (Metz and Johnson, 2001) done a review of the concepts background through a strategic asymmetry i.e. use of the differences to get an

³ Biddle, Stephen D. (2005) "American Grand Strategy After, 9/11: ANSSESSMENT", USA.
See more on: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub603.pdf>

advantage against the opponent, as well as (Walt, 2005) who presented the realism and states that the war against the global terrorism should be considered by how the other countries perceive it, not only from an American perspective. Walt considers several opportunities, from balancing and asymmetric strategies, through binding approaches of the alliance, the institutions and the norms. Walt emphasize the so-called "offshore balancing" as ideal for the US grand strategy, an approach which is part of the Balance of Power theory.

The isolationism and exceptionalism have always been hidden theories in any foreign policy debate. (Hook and Spanier, 2006) however describe the new American style of foreign policy acquired with the grand strategy feeling, and through the primacy of conducting preventive wars.

For something to qualify as a theory, it can be monitored by the analysis of Moore and Turner which identify six different approaches, as follows:

- Balance of Power approach;
- Collective Security approach;
- World Federalist approach;
- Functionalist approach;
- Democratic Peace approach and
- Incentive approach.

Balance of Power approach

The Balance of Power approach is one of the most effective and popular segments to the national security. The term dates from 1740 when Frederick the Great (1712-1786), introduces for the first time in his book "Anti-Machiavel", as idea that balancing of power is actually parity or stability between the competing forces. This theory supports the idea of "just equilibrium" in the world, a doctrine or an axiom designed to prevent any nation to become strong enough to enable implementation of its will on the rest. The world is reflected as part of rational actors and unification in alliances or coalitions to counter threats. Technically speaking forming these "alliances" (as well as most of the international organizations) are formalized with a long term agreement, while "coalitions" are generally

less formalized and for a shorter period of time to perform specific tasks.⁴ According to (Lansford, 2006) there are three major security alliances in the world, first is NATO, second the Security Treaty between United States and Japan and third is the Commonwealth of Independent States created of twelve countries of the former USSR.

Through the realist tradition in the international relations, the definition of balance of power, according to (Waltz, 1979), who states that nations created and will create weak coalitions in order to fight against the stronger enemy. The balancing can be internal or external-foreign. Internal balancing is when a state is strengthened by mobilizing resources within its borders, and external balance refers to the formation of coalitions and alliances against a common enemy. Historically, the transition caused by the increase in power and the challenge of the great powers often led to new security threats worldwide. Independent states that are not in alliances also persist through balance of power approach but in other forms, such as regional alliances and informal alliances. There is, also, another approach called hegemony. The hegemony is the fastest way to reduce the anarchy, but leads to an increase in military force that can lead to counter effects. Wars should not happen in the theory of balance of power, since each country constantly monitor the security agenda of its friendly or hostile possible alliances or states.

Collective security approach

The term collective security was first mentioned in 1914 during the First World War and represents substitution for the balance of power approach, although historically this idea is attributed to (Kant, 1724-1804). The collective security approach perceives the national security as benefit in the new world order. That is the theoretical basis of the United Nations Organization and the League of Nations.⁵

The theory rejects the possibility of alliances and neutral states to act alone, instead that is replaced with the claim that "an attack against a State is an attack against all States". The basis of this theory states that countries should be free from the burden of providing their own national security because weak nations cannot defend themselves, and

⁴ Steven M. Douglas V. (2001) "Asymmetry and U.S. military, strategy: Definitions, background, and strategic concepts", USA.

More on: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub223.pdf>

⁵ Kent, R. (2004) "Collective security and humanitarian intervention".

More on: www.alnap.org/pool/files/14b%20Kent%20paper.pdf

the stronger nations are often involved in arming race. This theory calls on peaceful collaboration, and as such differentiates from the term "collective defense" as some confuse it. NATO is a classic example of "collective defense", while the UN are classical example of collective security organization. The fundamental collective security approach, according to (Claude, 2005), is that violence should be the last place in seeking changes, instead the peace right should be respected in the international relations. If this peace process does not bring results and proves as dysfunctional, the status quo must be respected in order nations to help themselves in collective security.

World Federalist Approach

The basics of this principle cover ideas and decisions which should not be made at high level in the society, but each individual shall have the right to increase the influence and his own opinion on the politics. Few of these opinions can be found in the Federalist Paper No. 20, noted by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, where the authors address to the citizens of New York with an appeal to accept the federalist approach for the politics following the example of Netherlands.⁶ This approach supports the idea that the sovereignty should be achieved by each individual's effort which should be completed by adopting civil and state establishment i.e. policy or sovereignty, "...from individuals... ends with civil policy".⁷ As a movement, the world federalism draws its inspiration from the globalization and multiculturalism, replacing the international law (referring to states) with a global law which applies to individuals and requires UN reforms in order to increase the role in the social, ecological and human rights, and especially in the minority rights. The most visible achievement of this theory is the Rome Statute from 1998, which lead to establishing the International Criminal Court in 2002.

Functionalist Principle

The Functionalist Principle in the field of global policy aims to establish a stable, predictable growth and development model in the world, by establishing the necessary

⁶ Alexander H. and James M. (1787), FEDERALIST No. 20, (The Insufficiency for the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union), From the New York Packet.

More on: <http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed20.htm>

⁷ More on: <http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm>

organization which will have tasks that ought to be conducted in certain parts and regions of the world in the name of the general welfare. The mutual need of uniting the nations beyond their borders is one of the main postulates of this theory. The functionalist principle, in terms of pluralism, is a principle where the integration between the nations from different races supports the idea of tolerance, mutual respect and cooperation. In such a frame, the nations will constantly seek allegiance to an agency or organization that mostly helps them to enrich their lives, to achieve human dignity or to seek higher values.

Democratic Peace Approach

The democratic peace approach represents a theory of responsible government based on the idea that the democracies worldwide will almost never start a war between themselves, statement expressed by the philosopher (Kant, 1795) in his essay named "Perpetual Peace".⁸ Some theorists (Jack, 1988) support this idea as most closely related to what is called respecting the right of the international relations. Throughout history this proved to be true because, according to (Rummel, 2003) and his analysis, in the period between 1816 and 1991 there were no wars between the democracies in the world, while at the expense of this, there were 155 wars between democracies and non-democracies and 198 wars between non-democratic states.⁹

Incentive Approach

This approach is attributed to (Moore, 2005) who also defined the name - democratic governance, a theory that supports the foreign policy, while its main focus is on the rule of law and trade agreements. Not all non-democracies are considered as threat to the peace, but the democracies usually start a war as defenders rather than as aggressors against dictatorial regimes. As a contribution to this theory also goes the deterrence concept as external stimulus provided against war and terrorism, it plays a key role in this theory, at least in regard to the explanation where the democracies, geographically and strategically, enter into war. Intimidation alone is not a good idea for the overall foreign policy, but due to the failure of other methods as sanctions, diplomatic actions and similar. It is important

⁸ More on: <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm>

⁹ More on: <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/MIRACLE.HTM>

to emphasize that Moore does not support the intimidation idea, in classic terms of the military strategist Sun Tzu ("The Art of War"). It is evident that this approach has positive consideration in connection to the fight against terrorism and the manner in which that war should be included in the foreign policy.

3. Unconventional Approach to the National Security Theory

One of the ways to explain the unconventional theories can be perceived through ideas in academic circles known as cultural studies, which likewise represent a new practice in the second half of the 20th century.

Cultural studies, as their subject of study, take the production and the supply of goods that positively contribute to the society. It is about media presentation, literary texts, psychoanalysis, ideology and political aspects of everyday life. The unconventional approach of national security theories covers the following: Chaos Theory, Game Theory, Globalization Theory, Postcolonialism Theory, Neo-Marxist Theory.

Chaos Theory

The Chaos Theory represents a concept developed in the mid-70s and it refers to extremely sensitive issues related to the national security. This approach also supports the complexity theory which includes studying the complex political systems with an emphasis on foreign policy, where the chaos and the right will constantly be on the edge.¹⁰ Most of the debates on the chaos theory are directed towards how many concepts are based on the accurate mathematics or how many concepts are just literary metaphors (Hayles, 1991). Theoretical development of this theory tends to be in the direction of showing the national security through a legal regulation, besides the unpredictability and complexity of the nature's basic laws.

¹⁰ More on: http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol7_2/Clemens.htm

Game Theory

Lately, the strict supporters of the game theory seem more likely as supporters of a conventional than unconventional approach, because the fact that the relatively recent events indicate to that, for example the "theory of moves" (Brams, 1994), remains the same. In the area of international relations, the game theory cannot remain without critics (Schelling, 1960), who emphasize the lack of trust concept, but since 1983 it is also used with the beginning of the terrorism model (Sandler, 1983). The game theory has also contributed to several models of deterrence, arming race, while the central issue is when an actor or state should rationally decide with whom he is going to cooperate and what are the adverse factors if he does it by himself.

Globalization Theory

This theory is, actually, a process of establishing global institutions which became popular in the 90s, placing themselves as an evolution of the global policy and economy in the post-communism, capitalism and technology. There are many definitions on the globalization and, of course, an open debate in positive and negative terms of the word (Lechner and Boli, 2000).

This theory, for example, states that the internet expansion in the so-called Third World will influence the reduction of nationalist conflicts and that the internet transparency will contribute to the flow of financial services, to the economy and the culture. The globalization theory tends to maintain a constant balance, and also to destroy the gap between rich and poor, the growing monopolization, transnational criminal etc.

Post colonialism Theory

The post colonialism theory represents an ideological learning of the culture's influence on the western colonialism, as part of the consequences that occur or neo-colonialism or the need of new articulation in the policy. Post-colonialism includes a historian version (change) as well, since most of the countries in the world, in order to avoid

the deep experience with colonialism, often change the history, and although it seems paradoxically, it provides them a national identity.¹¹

In order to be better understood, the post-colonialism theory is closely related to the imperialism theory, through the most popular scientist in this field, Edward Said (1978; 1993), and even through the famous historian Frantz Fanon, who says that in the essence, it is an anti-colonialism theory. The Said's book (Said, 1978) "Orientalism" was quite influential in that period, claiming that there is no way for the Asians to be completely exempt from the stereotype of colonialism. The same author also introduces a new theory of identity policy, it is a theory on the social injustice of all kinds of organization of regional resistance movements that occurred or will occur in order to result in "liberating" effect.

Neo-Marxist Theory

Neo-Marxist theory is the fundamental Marxist model that suffered complex changes, and the most striking is the distancing of the classical policy and the acceptance of the Frankfurt School's approaches to the study of fascism and totalitarianism. Other theories have also arisen as a critique of the fascism (the root of evil in the world), and it is a theory of relentless cancellation and opposition (Cutler, 1999). Neo-Marxist research tends not to focus to the power only, which leads to many opened questions regarding the policy of interventions in the name of national security (Robinson, 1996). Neo-Marxism as theory should be developed, because its emphasis on the conflict is completely compatible with the realism or the power of the policy in the international relations.

4. US Conservatism and Foreign Policy

Political discourse of American conservative supporters may be freely categorized as no longer "war minded" when it comes to foreign policy. Considered from different perspectives of individuals and experts in the political culture, the conservatism expanded its spectrum of activity in the US foreign policy.¹² As a consequence of the Cold War, the

¹¹ More on: <http://english.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/Jouvert/>

¹² Wagner, R. (2015), The Decline of Military Adventurism in the Conservative Big Tent: Why Grassroots Conservatives in the United States Are Embracing a More Cautious Foreign Policy, Sage Journals, USA.

American conservatives had developed warlike reputation, while the military adventurism neither is, nor has ever been, a conservative value in the United States. For this very reason, the different approaches on the foreign policy will be examined, viewed within the great conservative module to examine any possible future wars. Some of the intellectuals, the realists in particular, do not have to be identified as “conservatives”, but their influence on the conservative foreign policy must be taken into consideration.¹³

Ever since the time of Reagan, the American conservatives were successful and had the possibility to create “big circle of protection” and this is where the question whether this big circle would refer to the US foreign policy in future is posed. For the conservative interventionism the war does not only mean acquiring political or military goals. Instead, if there is a potential threat for the conservatives in the security domain, they would immediately support any military intervention. Unlike, non-conservatives dominate in the foreign policy by direct or indirect influence on the US military power. According to (Wagner, 2015), the conservatives can be divided in four categories: those who do not support the military intervention, careful realists, warlike realists and neo-conservatives. The first ones, who do not support the military intervention (mostly often with liberal beliefs) are convinced that precisely the enemies were provoked by the United States. As an example, they claim that Al-Qaeda attacked on September 11th, 2001 exclusively because the increased military presence of the United States in the Near and Middle East. This has been confirmed by the Ron Paul’s statement in 2008 during the presidential debate who said, “They do not come here to attack us because we are rich and we are free. They come and they attack us because we’re over there (Ron Paul, presidential candidate)”. Gradually, the supporters of the non-military intervention were removed during the Bush’s administration, as well as during the Republican elections in 2006 and 2008. The second category, i.e. the careful or cautious realists is usually on the same side with the supporters of the non-military policy, but for other reasons. They refuse any idea for military intervention beyond the country’s borders, except in cases when other nations would be in a position to harm the United States. According to (Wagner, 2015), this completely ignores the balance of the large forces’ power, and that is actually the ideology of realists in the foreign policy. However, the cautious realists would usually avoid military intervention of any kind, believing that the military adventurism is unreasonable and without purpose. On

More on: <http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/5/1/2158244015575556>

¹³ Ibid, page.1

the other hand, the cautious realists certainly provide a complete support for a strong national defense, believing that the enemies should not be provoked by the United States.

The third category or the "warlike realists" share an interesting and pragmatic view to the world apart from the other realists. Followers of the military intervention are equally aware of the power policy and are constantly concerned about the balance or the distribution of the large forces' power. They also believe that the occasional interventions, maybe in certain situations, are justified, but still they do not believe that the United States can efficiently make the world safe for full democracy.

The fourth category, or non-conservatives, such as Charles Krauthammer, supports the military interventions in order to establish a whole new global harmony in the world, led by the United States. Non-conservatives during the Cold War, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan had similar views as Krauthammer, such as "American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order" (Kristol and Kagan, 2011).

5. US Neo-conservatism and Foreign Policy

The beginnings of the neo-conservatism in the US policy occurred in late 60s, and its greatest influence was on the George W. Bush's administration policy regarding the events in the period after 9/11 and the war against terrorism.

Neoconservatism, for those who disapprove it, represents special political movement which emphasizes the military power, (Mearsheimer, 2005), while for the supporters it, actually, represents an individual "belief" of each followers of this ideology (Kristol, 1995). In order to better explain this ideology, the fundamental beginnings of the same should be taken into consideration, then by examples to perceive its implementation as well, through the global war against terrorism and the relation between the United States and Israel, and whether the neo-colonialism is present in today's foreign policy.

Neoconservatism became special ideology or belief as a consequence of the university protests and arrests in the United States during the late 60s. A larger group of Jews, belonging to the working class, led by Irving Kristol, stood against the liberalism in US policy for the first time. According to the Kristol's words "the liberal were wrong, liberals are wrong, because they are liberals". The wrong about the liberalism are the liberals themselves - they are blind inheritors of the human and political reality" (Murray, 2005).

For Kristol, the political reality in that time represented an evil. Following the collapse of socialism, a solution has been searched in secondary solutions of the liberal democracy (Murray, 2005). After finding an identity in the domestic political sphere, several postulates of the neoconservatism followed. Kristol describes three pillars: strong idea for patriotism, refusing cooperation with other governments, including UN and NATO, and creating a clear image of who is friend, and who is not (Kristol, 2003). These pillars are fused by the strong idea that the United States is entitled to use power for the world's welfare in general. This has been proved and it could have been clearly seen in the war against terrorism of the Bush's administration, and of the previous administrations of Reagan and Carter also, as (Fukuyama 2006) claimed in his records. According to (Fukuyama, 2006) who said, "If your only tool is a hammer then every problem looks like a nail", confirms exactly the ideology of neoconservatism. In the 21 century, neoconservative beliefs have moral and ideological basics for successful acting in the international relations and that the United States has the only possibility to be part of it. According to (Kagan and Kristol, 2000), "Americans need to understand that their supremacy is equal to strike or disregard of international law".

In the period after the Cold War, the neoconservatism was identified as end of the history (Fukuyama, 1989). It means that the liberal democracy will spread globally in the wake of the triumph of the West in the Cold War. The support to the democratization and spreading the liberal institutions in non-West regions overlaps the idea for cosmopolitanism of Kantian and the thesis for democratic peace of Doyle. In fact, it is considered that the application of this strategy caused massive critics regarding the Bush's foreign policy in the period following 9/11. In 2006, in the war on terror analysis described by him as "mostly shaped by the neoconservatism" (Fukuyama, 2006) he left his neoconservative belief and condemned the moral and ideology of the foreign policy, since, according to him, the United States has no moral credibility in the Middle East anymore as a result of the past and current military actions. The lack of credibility has obviously reduced the American international position and led to suspicion that democratic efforts represent a veil of the imperialism and a manner to control the access to the oil reserves in the Middle East, which also proves the unchanged regional policy since the Cold War. Since the idea of democratization "survived" the neoconservative era of Bush's administration, the legitimacy of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq remains under suspicion.

6. Conclusion

Theory analysis in connection to the formulation of the US national security policy indicates that the same is an extremely complex process. Interagency processes and cooperation in the US administration are of great importance, especially in the period following September 11th. From historical perspective, the eternal "rivals" - Democrats and Republicans - had different approach to the foreign policy and US national security. The theoretical model of the research through theories, regarding the adoption of the US national security, contributed to the adoption of several conclusions, emphasizing the following:

- Conventional theories and their supporters consider that the balance of power is, in essence, parity or stability between the competing forces. This theory supports the idea of just equilibrium in the world, doctrine or axiom that is designed to prevent any nation to become strong enough to allow it to carry out its will on the rest of the world. This approach, also, started with the idea that the theory and strategy overlap in a grand strategy which can be defined as integration of the military and political and economic means in order to complete the final goal of states in the international system. Most remarkable is the balance of power and the collective security theory and approach, where the idea of creating coalitions for securing the world peace is supported in order the same to receive a multinational character versus the unilateralism for which it is deemed to be ended by the Bush administration.

- Unconventional approach to the national security theories in the academic circles is deemed to have started in the second half of 20th century. Most influential is the globalization theory, the post-colonialism and neo-Marxist theory which tends to maintain a constant balance of the forces, to remove the gap between the rich and poor, the growing monopolization and terrorism, but it also poses many questions on the military intervention policy in the name of national security (Robinson, 1996).

- Conservative approach in the foreign policy and the national security policy is categorized in the group of non-military minded supporters, when it comes to the national security. Divided into four groups and influenced by various perspectives of individuals and experts in the political culture, the conservatives expanded their range of action in the US foreign policy. The first group of non-military followers, usually the liberals, is convinced that the enemies were provoked because of the mistakes in the US policy, but, above all, it emphasizes the military excessive presence in the Middle East region. The second group of

so-called cautious realists refuses the military intervention as a solution or primate of the national policy, believing that the US military adventures are unreasonable and purposeless. On the other hand, they provide their support to strong national defense, but the military force should in no case be used to acquire political goals. The third group or the so-called "warlike realists", believes that the occasional military interventions are maybe necessary and justified, however they hold firmly to the attitude that precisely those interventions will not advance the overall peace and spread of the American democracy in the world. The fourth group or the supporters of the neoconservatism supports the military interventions exclusively with the purpose to establish a whole new global hegemony in the world, led by the United States. But also that the "American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order" (Kristol and Kagan, 2000).

- Neoconservative approach and theories appeared in the late 60s as a result of university protests and arrests in the United States, while they had the greatest influence during the George W. Bush's administration with the unilateral approach in the foreign policy and military interventions in the Middle East. Fundamental beginnings, implementation and application of this ideology are actually perceived through the global war on terrorism and the relations between the United States and Israel. One of the greatest supporters of the neoconservative approach in this ideology describes three pillars, such as: strong patriotism, refusal to cooperate with other countries and coalitions (including NATO and UN) and determining who real friend of the United States is and who is not (Kristol, 2003). These pillars are fused through the strong ideology that the United States is entitled to use military force (unilaterally) for the common good in the world "The Unipolar Moment" (Krauthammer, 1990).

It can be concluded that the whole process of adopting a national security policy is additionally complicated between the clusters in the US political system. Several departments in the government, the political influence in media, internal issues, financial crisis and military requirements are part of the system responsible to adopt national policies. There is cohesion only in the war on terrorism, but many think that the president must make decisions along with the government and the public in relation to all US policies and strategies.

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RISK ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS ON SECURITY OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE – THEORETICAL APPROACH

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Абстракт

Процената и анализата на ризиците и заканите врз безбедноста на критичната инфраструктура претставува спој на емпирискиот и теорискиот пристап во научното и прагматичното согледување на безбедносните ризици и закани. Испреплетеноста на теорискиот и прагматичниот пристап се должи на поврзаноста на научната дескрипција на можните ризици и закани врз специфичните објекти или системи поврзани со критичната инфраструктура. Оваа дескрипција влијае и врз проширувањето на процената и анализата на ризиците врз истата во насока на дополнителните загрозувања на безбедноста како последица на загрозувањето на виталната критична инфраструктура од различни видови загрозувања.

Овој труд има за цел да направи краток теориски осврт кон процената и анализата на некои ризици врз критичната инфраструктура како што се загрозеноста од терористички напади и можни природни катастрофи. Токму превентивното делување чија цел е и самата проценка и анализа ги оправдува искуствените научни и прагматични сознанија. Трудот ќе направи осврт кон некои можни теориски пристапи во процената и анализата на ризиците како пристапи и теориски дефинирани поимања на ризикот како појава, притоа нераздвојувајќи го од заканата и предизвиканата штета.

Ключни зборови: ризик, закана, процена и анализа, критична инфраструктура

Abstract

The assessment and analysis of risks and threats to the security of critical infrastructure is a combination of empirical and theoretical approach to scientific and pragmatic understanding of security risks and threats.

Intertwining of theoretical and pragmatic approach because of the connection of the scientific description of the risks and threats to specific facilities or systems related to critical infrastructure. This description affects the expansion of the assessment and risk analysis on the critical infrastructure towards the additional security threats because of disruption of vital critical infrastructure threats of various kinds.

The study aims to make a brief theoretical review of the assessment and analysis of some risk to critical infrastructure such as threats of possible terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Exactly that preventive action whose aim is the assessment and analysis, justifies the experienced scientific and pragmatic knowingness. The study will take into account some possible theoretical approaches to assessment and risk analysis like theoretical approaches as defined notions of risk occurrence, make it to be inseparable from the threat and caused damage.

Keywords: risk, threat assessment and analysis, critical infrastructure

Introduction

Clarifying toward writing a thesis, which concerns the theoretical and empirical understanding of the risks and threats to security, it is necessary to orient to the importance of safety. Besides setting the basic issues in the security paradigm: "security for whom?" and "security from what?" it is necessary to give an answer about the importance of safety through prism of the importance of safety on the epistemological basis. First, getting answers to questions „for whom“and „from what“is the security about, is based on philosophical understanding of the importance of safety, understanding the security paradigm and modern security concept. All of this would be incomplete if in this context we

do not perceive the risks and threats to security as a major accelerator that affects the answer to submitted questions.

Without a doubt, safety is a much-disputed concept, especially in terms of empirical view towards the sources of danger and object of protection. The correlation of the source of danger and the object of protection is imminent, and the set interaction and mutual influence can be essential for the perception of risks and threats to the security of society or its individual elements or areas.

Relations to the sources of endanger and the risks and threats to security are aimed towards their elimination, reduction or neutralization, with the aim to reduce the damages. To the effectiveness of this approach, influences the power that enhances or decreases the positions of the object in terms of security risks and threats.

Starting from the understanding of security and its need is necessary to determine the reference object of security, because without his determination the whole concept of security is meaningless as well as the analysis in which it is necessary to identify the risks and threats in order to have defined what to protect and from whom.

The analysis starts from the determination of whose security is in question. Who should be protected and what is its significance in the macro or microenvironment, and why is it important and what is important for the specified reference objects. Whether is a matter of an analysis of state interests or an object of critical infrastructure, we can determine a tentative model that starts with the determination of the reference object and continues by analyzing the processes of the threat, the degree of the threat and the consequences that could occur not only on the reference object, but also on the broader environment.

There are different types of risks and threats and their sources and we must have in mind that for each specific risk or threat we can use special tools to analyze, evaluate or to construct a model for early warning in accordance with its specificity. Based on this analysis and set prompt detection of risks and threats we can build specific pattern of action, which is based on theoretical knowledge, and empirical impact of previous or similar risks and threats to the reference object or some other similar object.

In this context, we aim at the risks and threats to critical infrastructure and the so far experienced impact of previous threats to specific parts of the critical infrastructure from specific types of threats, as well as assessing the impact that may have on the functioning of society and acceleration of other threats to other reference facilities.

Through this paper, we will try to give a brief overview of the theoretical approach and explanation of the concept of risks and threats within the security concept, and with particular reference to risks and threats to critical infrastructure. We will supplement this approach with the definition of critical infrastructure and empirical observations about the possibility of jeopardizing the critical infrastructure in Republic of Macedonia, and the impact of the theoretical model of analysis and assessment of risks on building a pragmatic approach to critical infrastructure protection in Macedonia.

1.Theoretical determination of the risks and threats

The concept of risks and threats and their scientific treatment requires special elaboration.

When we define the risks, we influence security. Risks and threats are two categories that can be synonymous or not depending on the theoretical model of access.

If you try to give a definition of what represent risks and threats, without intention for deeper elaboration, we can say that the threat primarily refers to unwanted, intentional or unintentional event that can cause damage on a particular subject. According to Lennart Sjoberg, threat concerns the danger to which there is a high probability that they will occur and cause consequences.

In this definition, Sjoberg equates the terms threat and risk reducing them to synonyms, believing that the risk is the expectation of an adverse event such as a social construction¹⁴. The risk can also be described as an expectation in terms of some external event, actor or a structural condition.

The threats are expressed intent of a facility that will inflict damage upon the subject.

They have a double meaning:

1. It is exactly known who sent the threat (if it is a state, group, organization, criminal group, etc.) and
2. towards whom (to the state, a group, individual, etc.). Sojeberg concluded that threats create a sort of elevated threat perception. He called this process assimilation and he considered that if the threat is very likely (direct) it will emphasize risk.

¹⁴ Л.Георгиева, "Менаџирање на ризици", Филозофски факултет, Скопје, 2006, стр.80-81

Although security concept in modern societies is state responsibility such as basic security entity, in the security paradigm stands human security and building a national security policy. Within the national security policy, protection of critical infrastructure is included as an integral security.

Putting it as part and parcel of national security, including looking at through the prism of protecting the security of citizens, security of critical infrastructure as well as general threat to the security of society, can be defined more precisely or to set up within the analysis through the following points:

- Security for whom (reference object / subject);
- Security of what (values);
- Security from what (procedures), from which threats;
- Security with what (meaning) which means¹⁵.

Experience in protecting critical infrastructure and determining the threats to specific objects of protection, affect the establishment of the analysis and assessment of risks and threats, and the means by which we need to achieve maximum protection as well.

The theoretical definition of risks and threats represents a starting point for determining the reference object of protection, why is he protected, what or which means are protected through his protection, by which means and from which threats it is protected. By establishing the theoretical model and defining the risks and threats as a constant social phenomenon, we are opening the possibility for defining critical infrastructure, right through the prism of its threats and need for protection.

2. Critical infrastructure

Swiss military theorist Henry Antuan-Zhomini that highlights the strategic and operational importance to the leadership of the military actions first introduced the term "infrastructure" in XIX century. Later the term infrastructure begins to be used wider like term that partly assesses the development of a country.

According to Moteff *"Infrastructure is the basic physical and organizational structure that is needed for the society, environment, organization or institution to function*

¹⁵ Ibid pp.44

smoothly within itself." He said that *infrastructure is a set of interconnected structural elements that provide related support of overall functioning of the environment*¹⁶

In the last decades of the XX century, world political scene indicates a need for distinctive conceptual determination of terms infrastructure and critical infrastructure. Thus, the term critical infrastructure was originally perceptual directly connected to energy security, not taking into account the telecommunications, energy systems, gas and oil pipelines, the economy, transport, water supply, emergency services and so on. Because critical infrastructure includes resources that are necessary for the functioning of society, such as those might be defined the following:

- o Energy facilities and networks;
- o Communication and Information Technology;
- o Finance;
- o Health;
- o Food;
- o Water;
- o Transportation;
- o Production, storage and transportation of dangerous goods, and
- o Government facilities¹⁷.

In accordance with the above division and definition of critical infrastructure listed in the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) Critical Infrastructure is a system of facilities, services and information systems, which termination defects in the operation or destruction, would have a serious negative impact on the health and safety of the public, the environment, national economy or on the efficient functioning of the state management¹⁸.

The incorporation of critical infrastructure protection in the security policy of each country in order to protect the national, economic and societal security is an inevitable process, whether it is the presence of traditional or asymmetric threats.

¹⁶Moteff J. and Parfomak P., „Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets:Definition and Identification“, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, Wasington D.C., 2004, p.p. 5

¹⁷ Commision of the EU Communities, „Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism“, Brusseles, 2004, p.p.4

¹⁸ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0576en01.pdf

The process of globalization and the fight against international terrorism poses necessity of protecting critical infrastructure. New challenges such as modern terrorism and natural disasters, initiates a number of factors that threaten the various elements of the infrastructure and their effects influence the status of security. They are threatening factors and they can be divided into the following groups:

- Organized actions with harmful intentions:
- events of natural origin:
- Threats of technological nature (caused by human error or technical involvement):

Besides dealing with military risks and hazards and dangers of internal security character, to complete the security triangle, a holistic approach is necessary to incorporate the protection of critical infrastructure in the architecture of the national security system of the country.


This incorporation into the security system of the Republic of Macedonia involves setting a model for risk assessment and analysis, which will influence the creation of a suitable model for early warning of risks and threats to critical infrastructure. The analysis and assessment of the risks is an introduction to the process of making appropriate security and policy decisions for the organization and operation of critical infrastructure protection and the impact of threats overall society.

3. Analysis and assessment of risks - theoretical approach

The analysis and assessment of the risks and threats are related activities, which are generally intertwined in no strictly defined order, because with the analysis, the risk assessment is done and through the assessment, it is necessary to analyze the threat. The need to know that the analysis and assessment of the threat is a process that aims to risk management, namely the establishment of at least minimal control over its development and movement, and especially the impact on the reference object of protection (critical infrastructure) and wider implications.


The beginning of the risk and threat assessment represents a cycle, it begins with identification of risk and changes to the so-called risk management, and it is shown at scheme number 1 in the so-called "traditional cycle" which is a basis for the assessment and risk analysis and threats to the reference object of protection.

Figure 1



The simplest model of risk assessment has two dimensions. It is comprised of direct assessment of the likelihood of threats combined with the assessment of consequences incurred or damage that will be caused. This model is made up of the most obvious and essential elements of the risk assessment and we can see that in the Figure number 2.

Figure 2



In every risk, assessment level of threat and possible harm caused is the base for assessment and analysis. The analysis is a complex process and approach that requires more than simplicity in modeling risk assessment.

Assessment and risk analysis is rational and determined approach and comprehensive solution for identifying occurrence that threatens the security and the problems that will probably cause its determination¹⁹.

It is the same method for estimating expected losses from the environment or some adverse events over which we can or we cannot influence.

The key word is **estimating**, because the risk analysis will never be in the context of an exact science even though will use knowledge and information of exact sciences, we still talk about *probability*.

There is no possibility for detailed risk analysis and there are not always issues with a single security exposure caused by a risk, and it would allow determination and detailing the assessment and risk analysis. There are always additional risks despite the risk or threat to the fundamental object of security. The more information we possess, the more accurate analysis and risk assessment we will be able to create, but it is never possible to create 100% analysis and risk assessment that emerges as a threat to security in any aspect of security.

In process of management, it is a logical way for creating the risk analysis, which is a necessity to achieve some basic purposes like:

1. Identifying the resources necessary for the commencement of protection (money, goods, material and technical resources, industrial process, etc.).
2. Identifying the types of risk (hazard-threats) that may influence the occurrence of adverse social or natural phenomena (kidnappings, extortion, robberies, fires or earthquakes).
3. Determining the possible variants of occurrence of risk. This determination is not only a scientific approach but also art in the design of probability (knowledge of probability theory and game theory in security studies, and knowledge of contemporary security paradigm). It is necessary to know that "Nothing is ever 100% safe."
4. Determination of impacts or effects from risk in equivalent to dollars or Euros, if possible, in case of loss or the surrounding material and financial nature.

¹⁹ J. F. Broder, „Risk Analysis and the security survey“, Second Edition, Elsevier science, Burlington, 2000, pp 93

Based on these findings we assess the risk exposure.

Risk analysis and threat is a combination of theoretical, scientific and pragmatic model that must be adjustable in terms of the types and levels of threats and risks have on the security or specific infrastructure that implies wider implications and security threats.

Determining the security risk is dependent on the identification of threats and vulnerabilities that depend on the probability of threats, vulnerability together, and their influence will determine the means of protection²⁰.

Risk brings uncertainty to the security and reveals the vulnerability of society or institution-critical infrastructure and the possible consequences and the main purpose of the analysis is to reduce the uncertainty (in particular introduction to the threat and risk) and by taking appropriate measures and actions to reduce vulnerability.

There are some conditioners threats and developments affecting the increase or reduction of vulnerability:


- Lack of professionals,
- Possession of knowledge and technical resources
- Changing the security codes to protect the system and infrastructure.

Risk assessment and analysis is a process. This process is determined and modeled, but it can undergo essential changes depending on the urgency of the analysis, the level of threat of overwhelming threat and the degree of risk and potential harm that would be suffered.

The Figure number 3 shows the basic process of risk assessment.

²⁰ D. Landoll, "The Security Risk Assessment Handbook: A Complete Guide for Performing Security Risk Assessments", CRC Press, New York, 2011, pp 365

Figure 3



The process of risk assessment applied a few steps, procedures, but it is especially important to identify the risks and threats, determine vulnerabilities, determine opportunities to protect and identify facilities that are available and identified priorities for action. All this depends on proper analysis and availability of information on the risks and threats that affect the total adoption of appropriate decisions to deal with the threat and risk reduction or avoidance of damage, primarily human losses.

3.1. Assesment and analysis of specific risks to critical infrastructure in the Republic of Macedonia

The core values of a nation, health, economy and security are dependent on the production and distribution of certain goods and services, which in turn have interdependence with the string physical assets, functions, and systems of critical infrastructure (transport of goods and people, communications, banking and finance, supply and distribution of electricity and water, etc.).

Risk assessment on critical infrastructure includes analysis of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences. Dealing with defined risk management involves deciding which safeguards will be taken based on advance procedures and strategies to reduce risk. Models or methodologies for risk management have been developed based on what threats, vulnerabilities and risks are present to then execute the allocation of resources to reduce

those risks. The methodology for risk management on critical infrastructure would include identifying critical infrastructure elements and assess which ones are most critical, characterizing and assessing specific threats to them, identifying the expected effects of these threats and determining ways to prevent or reduce, and defining the measures to reduce the risk based on the applied methodology or strategy.

There are many kinds and types of factors threatening the critical infrastructure that could be divided into the following categories:

Natural disasters:

Meteorological:

- Windstorm, tropical cyclone, Hurricane, tornado
- Thunderstorm
- Snow, ice, hail, sleet storm
- Flood
- Storm surge
- Extreme weather
- Heat wave
- Cold wave
- Drought
- Glacier, iceberg

Geophysical:

- Earthquakes
- Tsunami
- Volcanic eruptions
- Landslide, mudslide, subsidence
- Geomagnetic storm

Fire:

- Forest, wild land
- Urban
- Fire following earthquake

Biological:

- Diseases that affect humans
- Diseases that affect animals
- Diseases that affect plants
- Animal or insect infestation or damage

Attacks:

- Chemical attack
- Biological attack
- Radiological attack
- Nuclear attack
- Explosive attack
- Cyber attack
- Conventional arms attack
- Enemy attack / war
- Electromagnetic pulse
- Sabotage
- Espionage (industrial and otherwise)
- Crimes (e.g., theft, kidnapping, arson, extortion)
- Social unrest (riot, lawful /unlawful protest, disruption)
- Strike or labor disruption

Other intentional actions that can affect critical infrastructure
(Non-malicious):

- o Border closure
- o Regulation change

Accidents or technical hazards:

Accident:

- Transportation accident

- Hazardous material spill or release (explosive, flammable liquid, flammable gas, flammable solid, oxidizer, and poison, biological, radiological)

- Fire

 - o urban fire

 - o Industrial fire

 - o Chemical fire

- Accidental explosion

Failure / Technical

- Technical failure

- Mechanical failure

- Software failure

- Operator error

- Process / procedure failure


- Structural failure (e.g., Bridge collapse, Mine collapse, Dam collapse / failure, Water main failure)

- Dependent CI disruption /failure (i.e. failure in provision of critical services or products in the information & communication technology, finance, energy, food, safety, government, health, manufacturing, transportation or water sectors) ²¹. The above list of types of threatening factors is certainly not permanent and complete. It is always possible to accuse unexpected situations (and the combination of the above) that cause threats to critical infrastructure, and therefore more effectively address risks and threats to critical infrastructure requires the division of critical infrastructure elements into categories or sectors as lepers image No.1. ²²

²¹ Risk Management Guide for Critical Infrastructure Sectors, Public Safety Canada, а согласно ISO 31000 International Standard: "Risk Management – Principles and guidelines on implementation"

²² Risk Management Guide for Critical Infrastructure Sectors, Public Safety Canada, p.36, <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/srv/msg404.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/prg/em/ci/index.aspx>

Image 1



One of the more important documents of the United States in terms of protection of critical infrastructure, which integrates a number of activities designed to enhance the security of critical infrastructure, is the NIPP - National Infrastructure Protection Plan. According to this plan, critical infrastructure is divided into 16 critical infrastructure sectors:

- Chemical sector, which can be divided into five sub-sectors, depending on the final manufactured product:
 - Basic chemicals
 - Specialty chemicals
 - Agricultural chemicals
 - Pharmaceuticals
 - Consumer products
- Communication sector, which is a critical since it provides "enabling functions" on all other sectors, and in particular to:
- The energy sector which allows operation of relay stations, central servers and other important communication devices;
- Sector of Information Technology that provides critical control systems and services as well as Internet infrastructure;
- The financial services sector that relies on communication for transmission of transactions and functioning of financial markets,
- Emergency services.

- Sector for dams, which consists of funds that include projects for dams, hydropower facilities, dikes, dams, barriers to hurricanes, tailings and other industrial waste, and other similar facilities for retention and control of water;
- Emergency Sector, which is a system of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery components, and is the first national line to prevent and mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks, accidents caused by human factors and natural disasters;
- The financial services sector, a vital component of critical infrastructure;
- Government buildings and facilities sector,
- Information Technology sector, which is of paramount importance to the nation's security, economy, and public health and safety,
- Transportation systems sector, which is divided into seven sub-sectors: aviation, highway infrastructure, maritime transport system, mass transit and rail, gas systems, rail freight and postal shipments
- Commercial Building Sector;
- Critical manufacturing sector;
- Defense industrial base sector;
- Energy sector;
- Food and Agriculture sector;
- Healthcare and Public Health Sector
- Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector
- Water and wastewater systems sector²³

The subject of interest and analysis, although last in the list of specified sectors, will be water supply and wastewater. The plan to protect the water supply is specially prepared annex of the Plan for the Protection of National Infrastructure. The three attributes that are crucial for the water users are, getting the required amount of water at any time, water safe to use and the required pressure.

Water supply systems are not independent systems but interdependent with other infrastructure. For example, in order to submit water to the end users we will need electricity, information technology, communications etc. This interdependence gives sufficient degree of critical necessity for taking appropriate preventive measures. There are

²³ National Infrastructure Protection Plan, преземено на 20.07.2015 од <http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors>

several cases where the water supply system was the target. For example, closing the valves of the Lipkovo Lake in 2001 left the city of Kumanovo longer periods without water. In 2014, Ukraine shut valves to North Crimean canal through which the river Dnieper supplies water to the Crimean peninsula. On July 12 this year in Pristina, police closed water supply system because of suspected bioterrorist attack on the lake Badovci (this reservoir provides 40% of drinking water in Pristina). Skopje is supplied with water through Rasche and well system Nerezi-lepenec. Rasche by its location (17 km west of Skopje) and a capacity of four cubic meters per second attracts attention. Therefore, it is first necessary functional theoretical model for the analysis and assessment of risks and the vulnerability of the water supply infrastructure critical element of specific threats.

The first step in analyzing and assessing risks is identifying risks. This step in the assessment of risks should it identify all the threats and dangers that can harm this critical infrastructure element. Initially, we should take into account all the analysis of operational documents, threats from organizational nature, vulnerability and criticality assessment. Based on an analysis it is necessary to draw up a list or register of risks that are possible to occur. From the list of risks provided, it is necessary to identify those with the highest priority on which we will develop further evaluation. This evaluation would include a description of the risks, the source of risk, threat or danger that may cause the risk, area where the water supply would be affected by a particular risk, the causes of risks and their priorities, existing measures and means to deal with specific risks. Besides the above basic procedures, additional analysis can be applied to analysis of existing threat assessments, historical records of natural disasters, accidents or attacks, scientific models or theories, experience and consultations with experts in a specific field, and so on. The evaluation of risks to the water supply system should result in a decision for tolerable and acceptable level of risk (unlikely with minor threats) or prioritization of risk by determining the specific measures to prevent or prepare adequate protocols or standard operating procedures for dealing with threats and ex ante crises occurred.

Conclusion

Theoretical approach to the analysis and assessment of the risks inevitably leads to the establishment of certain more or less successful practical models. The experience of countries, especially those that are more exposed to specific threats against critical

infrastructure are different and strongly influence the dynamics of the creation of the model and its success. In general, we can conclude that the theoretical approach underlying guidelines for successful analysis and risk assessment in relation to all types' threats and reference objects of security aimed at avoiding damage with less resources used. This as a determinant of attitudes toward the practical approach is more or less difficult task. Above all, the intensity of the threats is very different as well as their probability and vulnerability of the object of protection. Especially specific is the threat to critical infrastructure, which could pose a high-level risk with long term and devastating consequences for the whole society.

In this context, pragmatic approach to critical infrastructure protection requires as possible assessment that is more detailed, analysis, and evaluation of the anticipated standard operating procedures and their success. When it comes to practical application of the assessment and analysis of risks and threats to specific critical infrastructure in the Republic of Macedonia or taken example for the water supply system of the City of Skopje, we must conclude that it is not present. As much as we try not to be too harsh in this conclusion, practical knowledge and investment in modern technology and systems for the protection of this important reference object of security is low. This implies that neither based on theoretical knowledge, nor based on practical experiences of other countries does not exist a special model and specifically structured operational procedures for the protection of critical infrastructure of this kind in the Republic of Macedonia.

The recommendations necessary to apply in order to establish an appropriate practical model for the protection of critical infrastructure in the country, and model which will allow an adequate response to institution at least to several specific threats may be related to several aspects:

1. Physical protection of facilities for water supply
2. Predicting the inclusion of alternative sources of water supply that will provide the minimum required drinking water
3. Use of SCADA systems for managing water (despite continued economic benefit in preventing water loss will allow prevention of mechanical closure of supply and control the entire electronic system)
4. Prediction of operational measures and procedures for rapid response in the event of a threat to the system, i.e. the conservation of the water supply system (this involves the system to function at minimum necessity without the presence of personnel who will control and will also be protected by outside impacts).

All these recommendations actually require extensive and detailed analysis of risks and threats to critical infrastructure, in this case water supply system and powerful predictive analysis of risks and vulnerability of infrastructure under permanent monitoring of threats. The consequences of the threat to critical infrastructure, each type of infrastructure, especially not having any assessment of the risks and threats or provided operating procedures for operation of the institutions and at the slightest threat can end up causing great harm. Thus, it is necessary to bear in mind that the threat of specific infrastructure facility or institution will necessarily have a negative effect on others, which of course in the complex social system are interconnected. This connection only increases the vulnerability of society and citizens, which in base of contemporary security paradigm is a key reference object of protection, and in this context, it is necessary to assess the vulnerability of a particular risk and threat.

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MISTREATMENT OF CHILDREN IN THE ARMED CONFLICTS

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Abstract

Through the history, in many countries with different cultures, the children have been abused and have been forced to engage in a conflict because of the poverty, or their parents have sold them in ability to feed them, but most of them are either kidnapped or manipulated in order to join the terrorists. In the previous century, a great number of international conventions became effective in order to restrict the children's involvement into the armed conflicts. The most important convention is the Geneva Convention, a convention adopted on August 12 1949. It clearly states that both sides in conflict must take all measures of not recruiting children who have not turned 15 years of age and must not be involved directly in the conflict. In this paper, we will analyze and see if these conventions are respected and how are implemented.

Key words: children-warriors, armed conflicts, poverty, rehabilitation.

Introduction

The word, war" usually refers to an armed conflict between two countries. The term, armed conflict "is more general and it refers to inner conflict such as the civil war. In this written paper, both of the terms are used. It is clear that in the wars and armed conflicts, great horrors occur, a lot of human casualties and great harm, as well. These are military

terms for the civil casualties, or for destroying non-military objects during military actions. Consequences occurred with random circumstances and not as prime objective.

However, it seems the greatest collateral victims are children. During the history of wars and armed conflicts, millions of children have been murdered, seriously handicapped or injured, displaced, sexually abused or they are being used as children – warriors (children – soldiers). Not to mention that, many of them are left orphans or education is being forbidden. (...“the images are burned into our minds: a young boy dressed in tee shirt, shorts, flip-flops, holding an AK-47, a cap pulled down over too-old eyes; a child with sticks of dynamite strapped to his chest; a tough-talking twelve-year old in camouflage. The images disturb us because they confound two fundamental and unquestioned assumptions of modern society: war is evil and should be ended; children are innocent and should be protected. Therefore, our emotional logic tells us, something is clearly and profoundly wrong when children are soldiers. Throughout the world, humanitarian organizations are using the power of these images to drive forward the argument that children should not bear arms and that the adults who recruit them should be held accountable and should be prosecuted for war crimes. The humanitarian case, which in one facet of the general effort to abolish war, rests on three basic assumptions: that modern warfare is especially aberrant and cruel; that the worldwide glut of light- weight weapons makes it easier than in the past for children to bear arms; and that venerable children become soldiers because they are manipulated by unscrupulous adults. In making this case against child soldiers, humanitarian organizations paint the picture of a new phenomenon that has become a crisis of epidemic proportions”).²⁴

Historic review

Throughout history, in many cultures, children were intensively abused as children – warriors (soldiers) in war campaigns. Proofs of that can be found in an ancient Greek mythology, philosophy and literature, later in old Roman legions, young boys at the age of sixteen were recruited.

²⁴ David M. Rosen, “Armies of the young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism”- Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London 1989, p. 1

-In Central Europe, even in 1212, thousands of children at age between 12 and 17 were used for war purposes.

- Napoleon Bonaparte, in 1834, used many teenagers in his army.²⁵

- Children were used on the battle ships of the British Royal Navy, during the ruling of the Russian tsar Nikolai the first in 1827, and in the Civil War in America. The Civil War in the United States was a war of boy soldiers. Throughout the Civil War, youngsters followed brothers, fathers, and teachers into war. Some lied about their age; others looked older than their age. They were sometimes recruited at school, and many were brought to the recruiting by their parents. They often had support roles but quickly graduated into combat roles. When necessary, they used weapons that were cut down and adapted for use by young people. Numerous examples abound.²⁶

- During the First World I, young boys continued to enlist, despite official age restrictions on recruitment. Private James Martin, the youngest Australian to die in World War I, enlisted in Melbourne in 1915 at age fourteen and died a few months later near Gallipoli. Anthony Hill memorializes his story in the book "Soldier boy". Albert Cohen of Memphis, Tennessee, is reputed to be the youngest U.S. soldier to see combat in World War I. He enlisted at age thirteen and died at age fifteen. However, youngest and most famous soldier was Momcilo Gavric, who joined the sixth artillery division with only 8 years of age on his behalf. Right after, the Austro - Hungarian army in August 1914, murdered his parents and relatives. Alongside Momcilo, many other children took part in the bloodiest battles of the war.²⁷

- In the World War II, the youngest member of the USA army was Calvin Graham. He lied about his age, but he was discovered when he was wounded.²⁸

- Adolf Hitler, even before the war, through psychological training, indoctrinated young people with Nazi ideology called, "Hitler's youth ". Later on, from that organization, he (Adolf) recruited officers for the national army. At the beginning of 1945, many children were taken from schools and sent to the fronts to fight. It is also known that in the first

²⁵ Michael Leggiere, "The fall of Napoleon: the allied Invasion of France 1813-1814", pg. 99-100

²⁶ David M. Rosen, "Armies of the young: Child Soldiers in War and Terrorism"- Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, New Jersey, and London 1989, p. 5

²⁷ "Momcilo Gavric-the youngest soldier in the World War-One"- Vecernje novelty, 13 august 2013

²⁸ "Interesting Facts About World War II", Armed forces History Museum, Retrieved on 10 April 2015

Battalion, around 65 % of the soldiers were at the age of 18. In addition, in the Panzer Tank division, there were over 10 000 young boys.²⁹

- Japanese armed forces trained young teenagers to fight the enemy. Some Japanese children were trained to be kamikazes – suicide pilot bombers.³⁰

- Great number of children – warriors was recruited in the red army of the Soviet Union.³¹ In Great Britain, children under age of 17 were involved in the preparations against the German invasion, as, the last line of defense “in 1940.”³²

- In the partisan history and in the literature of the Yugoslavian people, there are examples where, children were involved in combat against the fascists. One of the most famous examples is Bosko Buha, his unit known as; Partisan artillery “was composed of a lot of children and young people. Bosko buha was also known, for destroying the enemy bunkers with hand grenades, he died at age of 17. After the war, he was proclaimed a National Hero!

The International Law

In order to protect the children from all these sufferings, right after the First World War, the League of Nations, adopted Geneva Declaration on the Rights of Children in 1924. According to this document, children around the world must be protected from any form of exploitation. The next Geneva Convention is declared in 1949 on 12 of August. It clearly states: both conflicted sides must take every measures not to recruit children less than 15 years of age. They (children) must not, directly, take part in the conflict.

From the seventies of the previous century until now, great number of international conventions came into power, these are additional declarations and protocols, trying to limit and reduce the involvement of children in armed – military conflicts.

- In the Article 77 of the additional Protocol (of the Geneva Convention) from 1977, says that the sides involved in the conflict must take every possible measures, to prevent

²⁹ Hitler Youth “The History Place, Retried on 14 April 2015

³⁰ Eigen Louis D. “Child soldiers are unfortunately nothing new’, Scriptamus.worldpress.com, Retied on 26 April 2015

³¹ Simkin John, “The red Army”, Imperial war Museum, Retried on 22 April 2015

³² IVM Sraff, “The real Dad’s Army”, Imperial war Museum, Retrieved on 22 April 2015

children under 15 years of age to take directly part in the hostilities, and are especially bound, to restrain themselves from recruitment of children in their armed forces.

- In the Convention on the Rights of Children, from 1989, a definition is given, in which: A Child is every person, younger than 18 years, unless if in some countries adulthood is being gained earlier, but in the article 38, the lower limit for recruitment of children for hostile activities, is 15 years.

- Roman statute of the International Crime Court (ICC) that was declared in 1998, but came to power in 2002,³³ says that: the recruitment of children younger than 15 years, and their active involvement in hostile activities, defines it as Crime of War.³⁴

- On 12 of February 2002, the Optional Protocol came to power, as continuation of the Convention on the Rights of Children, which refers to involvement of children in armed conflicts.³⁵ With this Protocol, all countries around the World are obligated to prevent young people under 18 years of age, to be part of the armed forces of a certain country taking directly part in hostile activities. Furthermore, armed groups that are not part of the official armed forces of a certain country, must not under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostile activities, persons younger than 18 years. Until now, this protocol has been signed by 150 countries, and ever since, every year on 12 of February, the Red Hand Day, has been celebrated. In other words, on that day, in many countries in the World, we are being reminded, with red prints on our palm, about the children who were forced to wear weapons.

- United Nations Security Council in 1999 adopted the Resolution 1261. By this Resolution, the Council can call sessions, discuss and produce decisions about the abuse of the children in the World, under the title „The Children in Armed Conflicts “. ³⁶

- In 2005, the council adopts the 1612 Resolution, where the Council demands, the Action Plan adopted by the Secretary General of the United Nations for establishing monitoring, reporting and mechanism of harmonization to be implemented without further

³³ Rome statute of the International Criminal Court Article 8- War crimes

³⁴ According the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Congo War dictator Thomas Lubanga has been sentenced on 14 years of prison for recruitment and use of children-soldiers in his rebel army in 2002-2003- "Utrinski vesnik", 10.07.2012

³⁵ UNICEF: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Child. Unicef, 30 November 2005

³⁶ United Nation Security Council Verbatim report 5936. S/PV/5936

ado. In the same Resolution, says that: every child murdered, forced to kill or is an eye – witness of the brutality of the war in conflict, is considered, a victim.³⁷

- Republic of Macedonia, too, prevents the use of children in armed conflicts, with a Law. Therefore, the Law itself, within article 12, paragraph five, states: In Macedonia is forbidden, involvement of the children in armed conflicts and their recruitment in units performing military activities".³⁸

The situation today

Despite all adopted conventions , declarations and protocols with which the use of children in armed conflicts is forbidden, the situation on terrain, not only, has not improved, but we can easily say that, today, the situation is even worse. The director of UNICEF, Anthony Lake, stated: Never in recent history, have so many children been exposed to such brutality".³⁹ Here are several examples from some countries:

-According to federal ministry for combat issues, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, around 2000 children were involved in the battles during the war from 1992 until 1995. However, the exact number of children involved in the conflict has never been found out. In 2001, United Nations sources state that, that number is somewhere around 3000 and 4000.⁴⁰

-During the crisis in Kosovo, which lasted from 1998 to 1999, Para-military and armed groups were reported to have recruited children within their ranks. In October 2000, approximately 10 per cent of the 16,024 registered soldiers with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were reportedly children, the majority of whom were between the ages of 16 and 17. Journalistic sources offer anecdotal evidence those children as young as 14 were associated with the KLA.

³⁷ There are divided opinions in the world, if the children soldiers should be prosecuted, or not. Some think that they should be prosecuted, and some think should not be and third party thinks, they should be, but their age should come strongly under a consideration.

³⁸ Law on Child Protection- official Journal of Republic of Macedonia, num.23, 14.02.2013

³⁹ UNICEF: "In 2014 over 15 million of children were victims of violence in the World", "Utrinski vesnik", 08.12.2014

⁴⁰ Children warriors from Bosnia, abounded by foreign countries, Balkan Insight, 21 may 2014

-Children under the age of 18, and as young as 12, have reportedly been recruited into opposition separatist forces in the Chechen Republic and other parts of the north Caucasus. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (2004) has indicated that Chechen Boys have participated in a number of armed political groups including the main Chechen armed opposition, Islamist groups and village-based defense units. Boys are also believed to be involved in criminal gangs of under- 18s, which were often attached to local fighters seeking to profit from the war economy.⁴¹

- Palestine is one of the leading countries in the Word that actively uses children – warriors in all forms. The children have mostly been used as couriers for organizations such as Fatah, Hamas and Islamic jihad , but unofficially the children have been also abused like suicide bombers, known with the Palestinian people as „ Martyrs of Palestine “.

- In the past 15 years in Uganda, have been recruited around 10 000 children – warriors. After the psychological handling, the children executed the greatest crimes – without asking. UNICEF in its reports states that Ugandan army has interests in 8 years old of age children but there have been cases where the army kidnapped children at 5 years of age.

- In Congo and Sudan, in order to, break” the children, psychology-wise, while practice; children were forced to kill their closest friend.

- The Civil War in Sierra Leone is among the most brutal conflicts in the last years in the world. Its horrible specific is, forcing the children to execute war – crimes in the name of the, Revolutionary interests “. For women and girls in the RUF, the provision of sexual services to the men and boys in the group was, perversely, included as part of their expected “duties”. Indeed, all but two girls interviewed reported being subjected to repeated sexual violence, and gang and individual rape were common. The rampant nature of sexual violence accords with other research conducted on girl soldiers in Africa.⁴² It is claimed

⁴¹ Myriam Denov, “Child Soldiers- Sierra Leones Revolutionary United Front”- Cambridge University Press- 2010, p.28-29

⁴² One of the girls remembered: “We were used as sex slaves. Whenever they wanted to have sexual intercourse with as, they took as away forcefully and brought us back when they finished with us. Sometimes, other officers took us up as soon as we were being finished with and subsequent ones were particularly painful.....I don’t even know who might have been the father of my child. Same, p.109

that, around 6000 children, boys and girls kidnapped during the Civil War, were forced to take a part in the rebel formations, like soldiers.⁴³

- In Liberia, during the ruling of Charles Taylor from 1989 to 2003, thousands of children, at age of 10 to 12, were kidnapped from the conquered villages. These children were trained to handle a firearm and machetes, after that, they were drugged and sent in a combat. These children have committed the most terrible massacres in the most recent World history.

- Terrorist groups, in Pakistan, load the children with bombs and sent them into attacks. This dreadful reality was discovered by the Pakistani police in 2013. The police arrested 11 children, at the age of 8 to 15 used as terrorists. Police officials stated that all children came from poor families. The terrorist groups paid the families 20 to 25 dollars for a single child.⁴⁴

- In March 2015, the extremist group Boko Haram kidnapped more than 400 young women and children in Nigeria. More than 50 of them killed on sight and the other girls used for sexual services for the, esteemed "warriors of Boko Haram."⁴⁵

- The Islamic group, Islamic State "recruits children for the so called, Cubs of the Caliphate"⁴⁶. Children were recruited in the homes, schools and mosques in parts of Syria and Iraq, where local population was killed and brutally punished. Children – warriors have been used for protecting the checkpoints, gathering intelligence from the areas that are not controlled by, Islamic State ", even for execution of prisoners or for suicide bomb attacks. At the beginning of March 2015, Islamic State "released an internet – video where a Palestinian hostage has been killed by a child, with a gun.

Consequences

Children, who took part in armed conflicts, suffer from post-traumatic stress – disorder. They have depression, nightmares, lack of concentration, no trust in other people, and sometimes they find it difficult to control their actions and emotions. They often

⁴³ "Soldiers smaller than a rifle: abducted childhood", Vreme num. 563, 18.10.2001

⁴⁴ "Children like a cannon fodder on the Fronts", "Dnevnik", 22.03.2013

⁴⁵ "Boko Haram reportedly kidnapped more than 400 woman and children in Damask"- Reuters, 03/24/2015

⁴⁶ "Islamic state has Recruited at least 400 Children in Syria since January, Reuters, 3/25/2015

become drug addicts. A lot of them commit suicide. The others can't run a normal life. They, very often, from victims become offenders and abuse their own children.⁴⁷

„ And, when they realize that, they are not in a position to live a normal life, many of them head back committing war activities. It is especially hard for the girls who, as, children – soldiers, were raped and got pregnant.⁴⁸ In addition, when they go back to the village, simply no one wants them. They are condemned to life in solitude and poverty - says German, trauma doctor and therapist, Elisabeth Kaiser.⁴⁹

Rehabilitation

Previously in this text, we have elaborated the use of children in armed conflicts and are still an ongoing problem. However, the solution is in not only the liberating and demobilizing of these children. The problem is significantly more complex, and its resolving depends on the preparedness of the community to provide them a return in their natural surroundings. The wealth and power of the culture and the tradition of the nations, who, faced such a terrible experience is a factor, very important factor, for success of this

⁴⁷ Narratives of former boy soldiers are suffused with expressions of their feelings... Fear was the most pervasive of these feelings. Child soldiers expressed fear of being taken to the battlefield to fight, fear of being killed, and fear of their commanders. The relationship between boy soldiers and older commanders was founded in terror. "Any wrong move, however slight, could result in death, possible not only in combat but also in the camps where soldiers were kept under constant surveillance."- Sonja C. Grover- " Child Soldier Victims of Genocidal Forcible Transfer- Exonerating Child Soldiers Charged With Grave Conflict- related International Crimes- Springer 20012, p. 91

⁴⁸ Evidence from several conflicts suggested that stigma against girls and women is so great that many who are eligible to go through DDR still choose not to go through formal or even informal (e.g. NGO arranged) reintegration programmes, hoping to avoid further marginalization. Yet, young women and girls who return from armed groups with children face stigmatization and marginalization from communities, whether they go through reintegration programmes or return independently.... Young mothers are often viewed by the community as having violated community norms by having children outside the recognized societal marriage norms... They are frequently labeled as sexually promiscuous and can be regarded as "spiritually polluted"... In addition, these young mothers have often developed attitudes or habits during their time in the armed groups that are considered culturally inappropriate.- Same, p.225

⁴⁹ "Children-soldiers-both, victims and offenders"/Politika/DW.COM/12.02.2013

complicated process. It is very important, to help this community in its military reconstruction.

Under UNICEF's patronage, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and other humanitarian organizations, as well, a lot of programs, have been realized, in order to help in demobilizing and disarmament of underage juvenile soldiers, and sending them back to their families. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, (the DDR process) is implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and other countries!

The Help and Reintegration program for children – soldiers, is very complex. It covers the period of their leaving of the unit, then, taking the children to transit-centers and bringing them back to their homes, eventually. Many different activities have been organized in the transit centers, where children psychologically recover. They again learn the behavior typical for normal children. There, they also study. They study basic literacy and mathematical operations. It is also very important, children to be taught on forgotten child games.

Later, after they go back to their families, the humanitarian organizations help the children to rebuild their ruined houses, to cultivate the forgotten fields, to restore the herd of cattle, or even to learn some craft.

(Carolyn Anyango, twenty-five, left the LRA near Kitgum, during a cease-fire, and was released along with four others. She relished her return to a normal life, living again with parents and going to school. She enjoyed math and science and hoped to become a scientist. However, the memories haunted her. "Sometimes (I) can still recall" life in the bush, she said with a shudder.

Was she also angry about what happened?

"I was," she said. "I feel anger because my future was wasted."

Was it possible to forgive and forget?

"It is not easy," she said.

Was she forced to commit atrocities?

No, she says, but she witnessed the murder of one young boy. "He was cut and beaten to death."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Peter Eichstaedt, "First Kill Your Family- Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army- Lawrence Hill Books- 2009, p. 67

Of course, the marks in their souls are big and their return to a normal life is a long and a complex process. The burden they carry will remain inside their memories and souls and it will last for the rest of their lifetime.

Conclusion

From the above mentioned in this text, the following can be concluded:

1. We will never find out the exact number of children killed, injured, raped or children who took part in armed conflicts as children – soldiers, in the world.

2. All adopted Conventions, Declarations, Protocols and Laws by the International Organizations, International Criminal Courts and Governments of the countries, have no impact and influence to reduce or completely stop the abuse of children in armed conflicts. Many examples of children abused in conflicts, around the World, show that! Therefore, the only way to reduce or stop the abuse of the children is to reduce armed conflicts or stop the armed conflicts from ever happening!

3. The thing the International Organizations, Non – government Organizations and Government of the countries around the World (not all of them) can do, is to help with the Rehabilitation of the children – soldiers, in order to restore in full capacity their normal life's as much as possible .

In addition, at the end, we will speak a little bit more about the term, COLLATERAL VICTIM/DAMAGE! As stated in the introduction, this term for the first time was used by the US army in the Vietnam War. But there is a saying in the Macedonian language, old several hundreds of years, with a same or similar meaning as the term, Collateral Victim/Damage, and it goes like this: „ Покрај сувото, гори и сировото “(Pokraj suvoto, gori i surovoto) or literary translated in English: „ With the dry material , burns⁵¹ the raw⁵² material , as well “. That means that, in a fire, can and will burn the, thing” that shouldn't be burning. The, thing” that shouldn't be burning, is, the Collateral Victim/Damage. So, in an armed conflict, the, thing” (the raw material) that shouldn't be burning, are the Children!

⁵¹ The word “burn” (“гори”) here, has meaning of suffering.

⁵² The word “raw” (“сировото”) here, has meaning wet material.

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**ПРЕДИЗВИЦИТЕ ЗА ЧОВЕКОВАТА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ ВО РЕПУБЛИКА
МАКЕДОНИЈА: НИЗ ПРИЗМА НА СОЦИО-ЕКОНОМСКАТА И
ПОЛИТИЧКАТА КОМПОНЕНТА
HUMAN SECURITY IN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: THROUGH THE
PRISM OF SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COMPONENT**

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Апстракт

Република Македонија и по 25 години од осамостојувањето и почетокот на процесот на транзиција се уште се карактеризира со висок степен на човекова несигурност. Главните безбедносни закани во Република Македонија, како и во останатите земји во развој потекнуваат во рамките на националните граници и се изразени во економската ранливост и слабата држава. Имајќи го во предвид широкиот опсег на прашања кои ги покрива концептот на човекова безбедност, овој научен труд ги истражува и анализира предизвиците на човековата безбедност во земјата со посебен осврт на социо-економската и политичката компонента. Целта е да се идентификуваат клучните предизвици за човековата безбедност со кои се соочуваат македонските граѓани и во таа насока да се предложат релевантни јавни политики кои ќе овозможат зајакнување на слабата држава, воспоставување на државата како снабдувач на човекова безбедност и нејзино интегрирање во европските и евроатланските структури.

Резултатите од истражувањето се добиени со примена на анализа на содржина на стручна литература, научни трудови, извештаи и списанија, како и со анализа на официјални статистички податоци преземени од релевантни меѓународни институции. Тие ќе покажат дека процесот на транзиција се уште не е завршен поради комплексната политичка и економска ситуација што не наведува на заклучокот дека целите на

транзицијата, а тоа се економски просперитет и стабилна демократија се уште не се постигнати. Основната претпоставка на овој труд е дека предизвиците на човековата безбедност се потенцијален безбедносен ризик кој може да биде веројатна причина за обновување на конфликтите и дестабилизација на земјата главно поради неправдата. Претпоставката се заснова на фактот дека слабите демократски институции, оспорениот идентитет и бавниот економски раст се безбедносен предизвик за земјата.

Клучни зборови: човекова безбедност, Република Македонија, невработеност, сиромаштија

Abstract

Republic of Macedonia even 25 years after its independence and the beginning of the transition process is still characterized by high level of human insecurity. In developing countries such as Macedonia, primary threats to security are coming from within the national borders, expressed in economic vulnerability and weak state. Taking into consideration wide scope of issues covered by the human security concept, this research paper explores and analyses human security challenges in the country with particular reference to socio - economic and political component. With the aim to identify the key security challenges the country is facing and in view of that to propose relevant public policies that would enable strengthening of the weak state, establishing the state as a provider of human security and integrating it into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

The research results are based on the application of content analysis of specialized literature, academic papers, penoprc and media as well as analysis of official statistical data undertaken from relevant international institutions. They will show that the transition process is still unfinished due to complex political and economic situation, implying that economic prosperity and stable democracy are still not achieved. Main assumption of this paper is that human security challenges are potential security risks and might be probable cause for renewing conflicts and destabilizing the country due to injustice. The assumption is because weak democratic institutions, contested identity and slow economic growth are security challenge for the country.

Keywords: human security, Republic of Macedonia, unemployment, poverty

Introduction

Balkan Peninsula as one geographical unit is separate, peripheral part of Europe, which is at the same time it is poorest, most undeveloped and marginalized region. This region is specific according to its historical, demographic, cultural, socio-economic and political characteristics. The end of the cold war that coincides with the beginning of the globalization era was followed by many shocks that created new global socio-economic environment (Kaldor 2007, 131). At that period, Balkans was facing yet another war that followed the disintegration of former mutual federation of Yugoslavia. These wars (1991 in Slovenia, 1991-92 in Croatia, 1992-95 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1999 in Kosovo and in 2001 in Macedonia) left big trauma to the peoples of the Balkans and they are still feeling fear and insecurity (128). Today military forces from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) are still present in the West Balkans (in Bosna, Herzegovina, and Kosovo) in order to guarantee the regional peace and stability.

Today after long period of war and conflicts in the Balkans, a wider range of non-military is gradually replacing the dominant military security threats and challenges once. Prolonged transition that was strongly influenced by EU, United States of America (USA) and international financial institutions had serious impact upon the economy and consequently upon the social welfare, politics and the society as whole. In that way were created weak and permanently unstable states that are characterized with continuous tensions, weak political institutions, wide spread corruption, inefficient judiciary, political irresponsibility, entanglement of politics with organized crime, undeveloped civil sector and political passiveness of the people.

Transition process in Republic of Macedonia, understood as both political and economic transition, is still unfinished due to the complex political and economic situation. The country is characterized by a widening gap between the rich and the poor and delayed improvement of living standard implying that the transition goals, being economic growth that would provide economic prosperity and stable democracy that would lead to political stability, are still not achieved. The transition process emphasized the importance of human security issues. Human dimension of the security challenges in the country and the region as well could be the most probable reason for renewing the conflicts, thus the human security dimension remains to be potential security risk.

Therefore, in continuation, the research will be presented in three parts and that is description of human security paradigm, exploration and analysis of human security threats in the country and directions for concept implementation.

Human Security Concept

Security is flexible and multidimensional concept that can be understood in many ways. Within the social sciences there is no consensus regarding the meaning of the security concept. The current debate is concentrated on expanding and deepening of the security concept, but there is no consensus regarding its definition. Dominant public notion is that security refers to the state and the military forces, but actually security deals with much wider scope of issues such as political issues, human rights, minority rights, poverty, environment and other social topics. According to the most cited definition of security, proposed by Arnold Wolfers (1962) "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".

After the cold war numerous definitions have attempted to answer "what" the term security means in accordance with the ideologies of those defining it and even more important "how" that security is to be achieved (Iglesias 2011). In academic journal article Buzan (1991) explains that security has essential meaning for human life since the base of the security concept is survival, which implies concern for existential conditions. He defines security as "pursuit of freedom from threats and the ability of states and the societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile" (432).

Human security concept started being developed since 1994 when the term "human security" was used for the first time in the Human Development Report (HDR) prepared by United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Within the report, human security is defined as "safety from chronic threats as repression, oppression, hunger, disease and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" (1994). In a way UNDP stressed the need of expanding the traditional security concept that refers to the "territorial security from external aggression, protection of national interests within the international relations and global security from nuclear threat" (UNDP 1994).

UN Resolution (A/RES/66/290) adopted in 2012 describes human security as “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair”. Today human security is the broadest and the deepest concept of security, which is dominating the debate in security theory and policy (Mesjasz 2004). According to the expanded definition of human security, the scope of human security threats i.e. the reasons for human insecurity are widened as well (Jolly and Ray 2006). Therefore, human security implies economic security, food security, health security, ecological security, personal security, societal security and political security. Many internal challenges to human security such as ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, famines, terrorism, pollution and drug trafficking are part of the global environment.

Human security concept provides a base for new way of thinking regarding the security relevant for the 21st century (Helsinki Plus: Towards a Human Security Architecture for Europe 2010). This paradigm offers new perspective to the security issues, because it is based on most progressive ideas and concepts of humanity and the innovation that offers could be found within the changed existential conditions of an individual. (Mitrevska 2012) The main idea integrated within the concept is that the security of an individual, the state and the society are closely interrelated (Jackson-Preece 2011). In many countries, this concept is still relatively new and it is only partly understood.

Human security paradigm is about the need for greater human security of all people and particularly of the most vulnerable category of people, most often expressed by notion “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. In this regard, human security is public good that belongs to all and cannot be exclusive. “Human security is an empirical and analytic concept that relates to policy issues. As such, human security is concerned with the causal understanding of human conditions. In other words, it is looking at hypothetical relations between causes and effects, and eventually policy measures that should work in real life” (Tanaka 2015). Even so, its defining and implementation are still debatable.

Human security is closely linked to human development and human rights. This concept through protection of basic human freedoms and protection from various non-military threats, recognizes the inter dependence between the development, security and human rights. While human development in the HDR (1994) is defined as a process, which expands the scope of the human choice, the human security means that people can make their choice freely and safely. Contrary to that, limited human development or even absence of human development leads towards general human impoverishment i.e. poverty, famine,

diseases, permanent disparities among individuals, groups, ethnic communities or even different regions thus seriously endangering the human security.

Human security challenges in Republic of Macedonia

Human security issues in Republic of Macedonia, just like in other Balkan countries, are related to some processes, which started right at the end of the cold war when Republic of Macedonia through referendum gained its independence. At that time, the country was faced with two major challenges and those are the transition process that followed and the globalization process. Even though Republic of Macedonia gained its independence peacefully and without any violence, the fear of spilling over the armed conflicts (interethnic conflicts, civil war, NATO bombings) from the neighboring countries was endangering the security of its citizens due to the possibility of potential armed conflict, refugees (mostly from Kosovo), displaced people, illegal weapons, crime, corruption and environment degradation (Георгиева 2008).

Many problems and difficulties such as economic stagnation even economic backwardness, raising unemployment, poverty, inequality, widely spread crime and corruption emerged during the transition process. All these issues seriously threatened the human security of the people. The neoliberal transition model exacerbated already bad socio-economic conditions and created new problems on the top of the existing ones. The absence of a social component necessary to achieve social justice and common good (Bojicic-Dzelilovic и Kostovicova 2006), chosen privatization model and other reforms led to disappearance of the social state and to destruction of the social fabric of the society, thus widening the gap between the rich minority and the poor majority. Unfortunately, the transition process in Republic of Macedonia is still unfinished, which is evident through the lack of stable democracy, fragmented society, reckoning of the past, crime, corruption, high unemployment, strong national concepts, the rights of minorities and lack of political culture.

The armed conflict of 2001, which ended with Ohrid Frame Agreement, initiated the debate regarding the human rights, minority and ethnic rights as well as education in mother tongue in search of answers for reconciliation between the two major ethnic communities in Macedonia (Георгиева 2008). Some authors are on the opinion that the conflict of 2001 is actually result of organized crime i.e. criminal – extremist groups that

were involved in it and are still profiting from it (Tomovska 2008). Macedonian society as multiethnic, multicultural and multi-religious might be potential security issue due to intolerance and fragile interethnic relations that indicate high degree of human insecurity.

Although armed conflicts like the one in 2001 are considered main source for human insecurity because they bring victims, suffering and material damages the National HDR on Human security in Macedonia (2001) according to its findings suggests, "The strongest source of insecurity among Macedonians is unemployment followed by low incomes from work". Other insecurities are fear of crime, impeded access to health care and education and political exclusion. The report concludes that a comprehensive engagement in practicing sustainable development may respond to the acute insecurities felt by the population.

Surviving on the margins

Findings from the Survey of Macedonian public opinion conducted on behalf of International Republican Institute by Brima market research group as of June 2015 will be used in order to determine the major reasons for concern of Macedonian citizens. According to the findings the biggest concerns of Macedonian citizens at present are unemployment 53%, poverty/low standard of living 31%, general political situation 20%, economic and financial crisis 17%, low/non-payment of salary or pension 15% and then follow corruption, high prices, poor government performance, security, name of the country etc. Data presented in table 1 are collected from more surveys of public opinion in the country during the period from 2009 to 2015. They show that major problems for Macedonian citizens are unchanged through this period.

Table 1: Most serious concerns of Macedonian citizen (Source: IRI, 2014; IRI, 2015)

CONCERN	Sep. 2009	Sep. 2010	Nov. 2012	Sep. 2014	Jun 2015
Unemployment	46%	40%	42%	44%	53%
Economic issues	15%	17%	17%	6%	17%
Low standard of living/poverty	13%	14%	13%	15%	31%
Name of the country	6%	8%	4%	6%	5%
Low/Non-payment of salary or pension	4%	4%	4%	4%	15%
General political situation	1%	2%	2%	2%	20%
Social issues	4%	2%	3%	1%	-
Corruption	2%	3%	2%	2%	8%

This indicates that the governments of Republic of Macedonia throughout its independence did not succeed to solve the problems of unemployment, poverty and low standard of living as major and long lasting problems for its citizens, which are at the same time most serious threats to human security. It is also evident that the constitutional name of the country, which is subject of negotiations within the UN, is another reason for concern of Macedonians throughout the years. This unsolved dispute with Macedonian south neighbor is creating feeling of insecurity because it is not just technical, but rather identity issue. Macedonians rightfully feel that they have been denied of their basic right of self-determination. Unfortunately, it is not only Greece that has contested the Macedonian identity. After its independence when Macedonia was, struggling for international recognition each neighbor contested some element of Macedonian identity. This sensitive problem is creating serious concerns regarding the survival of the country and has to be properly addressed in due time.

UNDP in its annual HDR has introduced Human Development Index (HDI), which measures the human development rather than economic development, in its three basic dimensions by combining three composite factors and those are life expectancy at birth (access to health), average years of schooling (access to education) and incomes (decent living standard).

Table 2: HDI for R. Macedonia and its components (Source: UNDP, 2014)

HDI rank 2013	84
HDI value 2013	0,732
Life expectancy at birth 2013 (years)	75,2
Mean years of schooling 2012 (years)	8,2
Expected years of schooling 2012 (years)	13,3
GNI per capita (2011 PPP \$) 2013	11,745
HDI value 2012	0,730
Change in rank 2012-2013	1

Table 3: HDI trends in R. Macedonia for a period 1980-2013 (Source: UNDP, 2014)

HDI rank		HDI value									HDI rank change ('08-'13)
2012	2013	'80	'90	'00	'05	'08	'10	'11	'12	'13	
85	84	-	-	-	0,699	0,724	0,728	0,730	0,730	0,732	-3

Table two and three show that Republic of Macedonia with HDI value of 0,732 has high human development, which ranks the country on the 84th position out of 187 countries. Even though there is an improvement in HDI value for 2013, the trend for the country in a period 2008 to 2013 shows negative number which means decrease in ranks (which is not obvious due to certain methodological changes).

Other useful tools within HDR are Gini Coefficient that indicates the discrepancies in the income distribution i.e. inequality and recently introduced multidimensional poverty index that identifies numerous deprivations of the households about education, health and living standard. Tables four and 6 show that Macedonian citizens are justly concerned about the unemployment, which is unacceptably high over too long period, particularly among the young people. Another worrying data is coming from the value of Gini coefficient which is 43, 6 (where zero indicates absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality) and shows high degree of inequality in Macedonian society being highest in the region. Multidimensional poverty in Macedonia shows that one, 71% of its population lives in and two, 4% are near multidimensional poverty. Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line for the period 2002-2011 presented in Table 5 shows that the trend is increasing. For 2011 the ratio indicates that 27, 1% of Macedonian population is living under the poverty line.

Table 4: Human Development Indicators for the West Balkan Countries
(Source: UNDP, 2014)

Country	HDI Rank	HDI value	Gini Coefficient	Unemployment (%)		Multi-dimensional Poverty (%)	GDP per capita (2011PPP\$)
				Total	Youth		
Macedonia	84	0,732	43,56	31	53,9	1,71	11.707,98
Albania	95	0,716	34,51	13,8	22,5	1,20	9.243,37
Serbia	77	0,745	29,62	23,9	51,1	0,26	11.586,78
Montenegro	51	0,789	28,58	19,7	41,1	3,00	14.039,78
Kosovo	-	0,786	-	30,9	55,3	-	(2005 ppp \$) 9.446,00
B and H	86	0,731	36,21	28	62,8	1,70	9.183,52

Table 5: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (Source: World Bank, 2015)

Date	2002	2004	2005	2006	2010	2011
Value (% of population)	19,1	18,5	20,4	19,0	27,1	27,1

Table 6: Unemployment (Source: World Bank, 2015)

Date	1991	1995	2000	2005	2010	2013
Value (% of total labor force)	30,1	32,0	32,2	37,3	32,0	29,0

Table 7: GDP growth (Source: World Bank, 2015)

Date	1991	1995	2000	2005	2010	2014
Value (annual %)	-6,2	-1,1	4,5	4,7	3,4	3,8

All these data, specifically high unemployment at around 30%, slow economic growth (table 7) and average monthly salary of 300 Euros i.e. low income, can explain to some extent the massive brain drain from the country, which is potential security issue and shows high human insecurity. Unfortunately, reliable empirical evidence about the extent and the intensity of the brain drain does not exist. European statistics agency EUROSTAT in

its Report on migration said that in a time period from 1998 to 2011 about 230.000 people have left the country, which is more than 10% of its total population of 2,1 million (Marusic 2013).

European Commission's Progress Reports for Macedonia (2014) was opened with the note that EU accession process for Macedonia is impasse. This is explained with the failure of the Council to open accession negotiations from one side and the failure of the Government to make the necessary reforms even backsliding in some areas, from another side. Even though Commission estimated that the political criteria continue to be sufficiently met, the report points out some serious concerns. Namely, it is noted that increasing politicization of public administration and state institutions combined with government control over the media led to blurring of the state and the governing party thus progressively eroded trust in state institutions. In addition, it is stressed that under the conditions of selective justice, deterioration of media freedoms, absence of public political debate and political dialog in the parliament and divisive political culture there is a renewed political crisis between the government and the opposition. The crisis worsens since February 9, 2015 when the opposition started publishing illegally intercepted communications, which revealed or confirmed systematic problems. Upon European Commission's request, a group of independent senior rule of law experts prepared a rapid analysis of the situation and provided recommendations to address the significant shortcoming identified in the following five areas: the interception of communications, judiciary and prosecution services, external oversight by independent bodies, elections and media (Senior Experts' Group on systemic Rule of Law issues 2015).

About inter-ethnic situation, which is still estimated as fragile since Ohrid Frame Agreement did not manage to overcome the lack of trust between the dominant ethnic communities, the report suggests that it should be improved by promoting inclusive multiethnic society. In relation to human rights it is stated that there is a need for effective implementation of the existing framework for protection of fundamental rights, mostly regarding the prejudice and discrimination of Roma population and intersex (LGBTI) persons (European Commission 2014). Weak rule of law and insufficient institutional capacities are seriously endangering the human security and are creating other forms of human insecurity such as corruption, personal insecurity, uncontrolled pollution, health insecurity, food insecurity and underdevelopment (Plavsin 2012).

Directions for implementation

The application of the human security concept in Republic of Macedonia will enable the identification of the key security challenges for the country, the reform efficiency assessment and will offer policy proposals for overcoming the most serious and persistent human security problems, which are also interdependent. Key challenges for adoption of human security concept is to develop procedures and institutional capacities, policies and instruments responsible for human security. Another way of achieving human security is to invest in people i.e. in their health, education and capabilities, respect of human rights and disarmament.

Human security approach should be framework for developing a set of public policies that address specific insecurities (such as democratic governance, transnational crime, human rights, poverty and basic needs); and provide protection of people (from external regional conflicts, socio-economic exploitation, and civil unrest stemming from ethnic identities, poverty and public health issues) thus promote security in politics, economy and social environment (Commission on Human Security 2003).

There are two types of possible instruments to cope with a human security threats, those that address the underlying causes of human security threats so that their occurrences and existence can be prevented and reduced; and those that reduce and minimize the damages caused by human security threats once they emerge (Tanaka 2015).

Special report commissioned by UNDP "Human security in South-East Europe" (1999) suggests that human insecurity in the region and therefore in Macedonia too is result of long-term process, which can be explained and confronted in term of "weak state". A weak state is defined "not merely as one with inefficient institutions, but one that is unable or unwilling to enforce rules or to implement consistent policies". Those states as a result are unable to deliver the rule of law, public goods and services. Therefore, one of the consequences is creation of illiberal democracies, which have been used to fuel nationalism and ethnic hatred. These weak states and illiberal democracies are major threat to human security because they are unable to solve social and ethnic problems. For that reason, it is necessary to strengthen the weak state and liberate the democracy, so it will be able to provide human security.

Another important aspect for providing greater human security in the country and the region as well is by introducing European values and harmonizing the domestic standards with the most important European ones within the field of security and

development thus strengthening the state capacity. EU has accepted the human security as a new European security doctrine i.e. security strategy for Europe in the report on the European security capacities, known as Barcelona Report (2004). In that direction, as explained in the report it is necessary to develop institutions and human capital and to introduce an element of civic education to help forge political culture. Improvements in economic security require policies that support productivity, employment creation, enterprise and human resources development. For that purpose, technological innovations are key to entrepreneurship and growth as well as development and modernization of the existing infrastructure (Human Security Agenda for the Balkans 2006).

The state is major agent in providing human security over the areas of its jurisdiction affected by human insecurity, because sovereignty is responsibility to protect its citizens and provide public, social and national security. Considering the transnational character of many human security threats and different capacity of various states in dealing with human security it is necessary to stress the important role of international community (Tanaka 2015). Therefore, the responsibility for human security and its implementation is of the national authorities and international community.

Conclusion

Consequences from the unfavorable economic performance are reflected in the social sphere as unemployment, poverty, inequality and ethnic tensions. They create the socio-economic dimension of human security and if they persist on a long run, which is happening in Republic of Macedonia, they could initiate negative processes, which might lead to a destabilization and further impoverishment of its people.

Regional threats are similar if viewed through the prism of human security. Human security concerns primarily high unemployment and poverty in the region are common. Most countries in the West Balkans are having low or lowest economic, social and development performance in Europe. Taking into consideration the new security parameters, we may conclude that human security concept is relevant and significant for the country and the region.

Since the security concept is dominantly political in its connotation the state, as a primarily political institution must form a referent point for any security paradigm that is to be accepted. (Ayoob 2005). Republic of Macedonia based upon its key strategic documents

has accepted the expanded approach to security. Accepting human security as a paradigm will require a change in attitude towards the state and strengthening of its capacity so the state will be provider of human security.

Human security concept offers an alternative approach for solving these complex problems and reducing the interdependent security threats the country is facing. Weak democratic institutions, contested identity, slow economic growth and prolonged political crisis are serious source of insecurity and threat to both human security and human development. Human security should be underlying principle for development of the country.

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