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"Lethal" Ladies or "Desperate" Housewives:
Agnew's General Strain Theory and Violent Crimes Committed by Women

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Апстракт

Насилството отсекогаш било набљудувано преку призмата на човековиот sвер. Истото било објаснето преку инстинктите, темната, доминантна страна на луѓето, но ретко било објаснувано како резултат на напнатост и фрустрација. И доколку ги додадеме жените на другата страна на равенката на насилното однесување, тогаш добиваме уште потемна, помалку истражувана област од криминалитетот. Жените како потчинетиот пол, во најголемиот број криминолошки истражувања, биле набљудувани како жртви, а не како сторители. Истражувањето опфаќа анализа на судски пресуди (N=41) во период од пет години, преку кои се елаборираат најважните карактеристики на насилното криминално однесување на жените во Република Македонија. Судските пресуди се од областа на Основните судови во Битола (N=11) и Прилеп (N=30). Користејќи ги информациите дадени од жените кои го сториле к.д., во текот на процесот, авторите ќе се обидат да откријат од каде потекнува напнатоста во нивниот живот.

Клучни зборови: Агњу, кривично дело, жени, напнатост, насилство

Abstract

Violence has always been perceived through the prism of human's bestiality. It has been explained by the survival instincts, the dark, dominant side of humans, but rarely had it been discussed as a result of strain and frustration. And if we add women at the side of the equation with violent behavior, then we get even a darker, less researched area of criminality. Women as the dominated gender, in most of the criminological researches have been perceived as the victims, not as the offenders.

The research subsumes analysis of court decisions **(N= 41)** in a period of five years, through which we elaborate the most important patterns of violent criminal behaviour among women in the Republic of Macedonia. The court decisions are from the area of the Basic Courts in Bitola **(N=11)** and Prilep **(N=30).** Using the information given by the women who committed the crimes, during their process, the authors will try to find out which are the origins of the strain in their lives.

Key words: Agnew, crime, females, strain, violence.

Introduction

Defined in its most essential meaning: "violence is the extreme form of aggression which is embodied as illegitimate and unlawful usage of force (physical and psychological)" (Arnaudovski, 2007: 331). It can be manifested as organized, spontaneous, ritual, symbolic, ideological or even as an instrument (Aslimoski, Stanojoska, 2015). It can be result of instrumental aggression or predatory aggression among animals; expressive aggression which is similar to the defensive animal aggression; and aggression in the framework of social contacts, mostly known to humans (Semple, Smith, 2013).

Violent crimes include every criminal activity committed using means of physical or psychological coercion, manifestation of force or threat to use force, injured or put in jeopardy the person's integrity. Every crime from this phenomenon connects offender's aggression towards the victim in different varieties and different intensity (Konstantinovic - Vilic, Nikolic - Ristanovic, Kostic, 2010: 112).

During past times, violent crimes differed in regard to instrumentum operandi and attacked object, thus women mostly attacked other women, and as instruments to commit the crime used their teeth, hands and legs. Weapons were rarely used (Durston, 2013). This period is also characterized by few crimes typical for women, such as infanticide. Unmarried women, very often, were offenders of such crimes, because of their position as priests' lovers or servants in rich families, unmarried women in their early twenties, newly married women and widows. The children were born outside of marriage, they couldn't take care of them, and so the only choice was to kill them. Mostly used modus operandi was drowning, strangulation, suffocation and deprivation. Females rarely used beating, neck breaking, knifing, burning or throwing the baby to the pigs as modus operandi (Spence, 2010).

Women as criminals in the Republic of Macedonia cover a very low level of total crime participation. The ratio between women and men between 1995 and 2015 oscillates between 5.27 in 2001 as the lowest and 10.66 in 2014 as the highest ratio. The average number of convicted women in the 21 year period is 554 women a year, which is around twelve times lower than the one of.

The research is directed towards analysing the connection between patriarchal relations; female position in Macedonian society; frustration and strain as the result of not being able to fulfil the "dream" of "modern" woman.

A short overview of the Agnew's General Strain Theory

The general strain theory from Robert Agnew was developed in a time when previous strain theories began to lose its central position in criminological research and explanations of crime and delinquency. A revised version of strain theories (Merton (1938), A. Cohen (1955) and Cloward and Ohlin (1960)) was much needed. His theory is written on a social-psychological level where the focus is set on the individual and his or her immediate social environment. (Agnew, 1992)

In his first paper regarding the strain theories he tries to explain some of the most criticized points of the previously mentioned theories. According to the original strain theory, crime and delinquency rate should be at its highest level when aspirations are high and expectations are low (Agnew, 1985:152). Another stepping stone for the original strain theory is the link between delinquency and lower classes, and its explanation that members of the lower class are more likely to engage in delinquent behavior because they lack the means to achieve economic success and middle class status, or both (Agnew, 1985:152). The abandonment of crime in late adolescence and the quality of family relationships are two variables that are not included in the original strain theory (Agnew, 1985:152-153).

Agnew broadened the scope of strain theory, where he recognized that several sources of strain exist in someone's life, not just the failure of achieving positively valued goals such as monetary success, but also he includes a wide spectrum of adaptations to strain – cognitive, behavioral and emotional. Also, in his strain theory he takes into consideration the individual's social status, their expectations for the future and the connections with criminal others.

Before we can talk about the different types of strain that both sexes experience, and are more likely to lead to criminal behavior, we have to explain what can be included in the term strain. According to Agnew the term strain refers to "relationships in which others are not treating the individual as he or she would like to be treated" (Agnew 1992: 48). In one of his articles (Agnew, 2001) Agnew gives definitions about what is incorporated in the three types of strain that he identifies in one's life.

✦Objective strains – these types of strain refer to events and conditions that are negatively valued by most members of a given community. So one can experience an objective strain when the event or condition that he or she is experiencing is disliked by the members of his or her group;

✦Subjective strains – these types of strain are connected with the events and conditions that are usually disliked by the people that have experienced or are experiencing them. An individual is experiencing a subjective strain, when he or she dislikes the event or condition that they are experiencing;

✦The emotional response to an event or condition – it is deeply connected to the subjective strain, so the subjective strain is one's perspective and estimation of an event or condition. The emotional reaction about an event or condition may differ or be the same for two individuals. So the same subjective strain can result in different emotional reaction from the perspective of two individuals. One can get really angry, but the other may experience a mild anger.

Agnew also put gender into consideration when he tried to connect the different types of strain and criminal behavior. According to Agnew and Broidy female suffer from a wide range of oppressive conditions that can lead to crime. The general strain theory exceeds the work in prior strain theories, because this theory allows us to better understand and perceive the different types of strain that man and women experience and gives us a better picture of the different factors that influence the emotional reaction to the strain experienced by man and women. The fact that prior to this theory theorists believed that women feel less pressure and consequently to that experience less strain, can be reflected in the next citation of Naffine:

They ignore the evidence when they insist that women are insulated from the pressures of public life, that their role is less demanding then the male role and they thus do not experience pressures causing them to deviate ... Research has since revealed that females are susceptible to frustrations of a more general nature and that these frustrations correlate positively with offending ... At the head of the feminist agenda for strain theory is the investigation of the concerns and goals and the frustrations of criminal and conforming women (Naffine 1987:23).

There are three major types of strain according to general strain theory. They are the failure to achieve positively valued goals, the loss of positive stimuli, and the presentation of negative stimuli. The first type of strain incorporates three subcategories and those are: the failure to achieve aspirations or ideal goals, the failure to achieve expectations and the failure to be treated in a just/fair manner. These types of strain can be connected with the emotional reaction to the strain which may differ from male to female. The strain that an individual is experiencing leads to emotions such as depression, anger and frustration, and one possible response to these emotions is crime. Especially the emotional reactions of anger and frustration are seen as an important factor that can increase the likelihood of a criminal response. For example, the lower rate of female crime can be connected with the fact that females are more likely to respond to strain with depression rather than anger. According to Mirowasky and Ross (1995) "women respond to stressors with somewhat different emotions then man ... man get hostile – women get sad and depressed".

In the next few paragraphs we will explain the types of strain that are experienced by female offenders and are incorporated and explained in the general strain theory from Agnew (Agnew, Broidy, 1997).

The failure to achieve positively valued goals – each and every person during his or her life sets its own aspirations and ideal goals. The failure to achieve these goals may lead to the appearance of different types of strain. So the tests of previous strain theory are focused on the measurement of strain in terms of the disjunction between aspirations and expectations. But this conclusion is seen as unfit to really explain the strain that a person is experiencing. People do not feel serious distress when they fail to achieve their ideal goals or aspirations, but the distress comes to the surface when they experience disjunction between their expectations and their actual achievements. Another source of serious distress is the disjunction between just/fair outcomes and actual outcomes, so people expect to be treated in a just and fair manner and when that is not the case they experience some type of strain. The main goals in a female life are put in two

groups, first female strive to achieve and maintain close interpersonal relationships and have a certain expectation from such relations and in the second group is the achievement of monetary success and security, which is a result of today's cultural changes and new standards regarding female achievement. The achievement of these goals is quite problematic, especially in times where the rates of divorce are really high; the presence of abuse in intimate relationships is more common nowadays, and the failure to achieve these goals is a major source of strain in the lives of female offenders. Also females have difficulties regarding the achievement of financial success and security, in a society where they are de jure equal to male members of society, but de facto they are employed in the same type of jobs as before and the differences between their income is still unequal. Combined together the failure to maintain intimate relationship and the failure to achieve financial independence and security has led to a situation known as "feminization of poverty", and the increase of the number of female that are head of the households and live in poverty. The financial stress inevitably is a source and leads to female crime (Agnew, Broidy, 1997).

The loss of positively valued stimuli – this group is formed from several types of strain that females experience, such as the loss of a close one, family member or a friend, because of their death or relocation. Especially the separation or divorce from a loved one can cause strain that is connected with the loss of positively valued stimuli. Females are often faced with barriers and difficulties about engaging in behaviors that they value the most. These barriers are put in front of them during the adolescent years where they have to switch from "masculine behaviors" that has been approved in preadolescent years, to a more feminine role. During their adulthood female encounter more barriers regarding their way of behaving in work surroundings, among family members and close friends. These barriers affect every aspect of their lives, including appearance, conversation, physical and emotional expression, even their sexual behavior. Females are discouraged from a number of behaviors that they value the most. This kind of restrictions may result in the appearance of strain, which in the end can lead to criminal behavior (Agnew, Broidy, 1997).

The presentation of negative stimuli – the strain that is related to the presentation of negative stimuli its regarding to the various types of abuse by family members and others. Usually the presentation of negative stimuli is referring to the role of housewives, which female find it to be very restrictive, monotonous and demanding, and undervalued from other family members. Females also are confronted with a wide range of strain in their work environment. The work assignments women perform are eventless, also the tasks that they are given are repetitive in which they cannot show their set of skills and talents, where the authority they have is really low and the chances for climbing the leader of success are slim. The strain related to these conditions is not equally present in every woman's life, but when it is present there are higher chances of criminal behavior (Agnew, Broidy, 1997).

Table 1. Sex differences in types of strain (Agnew and Broidy, 1997:278-281)

Females	Males
Concerned with creating and maintaining close bonds and relationships with others – thus lower rates of property and violent crime	Concerned with material success – thus higher rates of property and violent crime
Face negative treatment, such as discrimination, high demands from family, and restricted behavior	Face more conflict with peers and are likely to be the victims of crime
Failure to achieve goals may lead to self-destructive behavior	Failure to achieve goals may lead to property and violent crime

Table 2. Sex differences in emotional response to strain (Agnew and Broidy, 1997:281-283)

Females	Males
More likely to respond with depression and anger	More likely to respond with anger
Anger is accompanied by fear, guilt, and shame	Anger is followed by moral outrage
More likely to blame themselves and worry about the effects of their anger	Quick to blame others and are less concerned about hurting others
Depression and guilt may lead to self-destructive behaviors (i.e. eating disorders)	Moral outrage may lead to property and violent crime

Methodology

The research is quantitative in nature and is based on data gathered by court decision's analysis. The analysis was undertaken by using already prepared questionaries' with every important aspect and variable of women's criminality. During the analysis we marked different characteristics of different crimes. We analysed N=41 court cases with effective judgments in a period of five years (2011 - 2015), from the area of Basic Courts Bitola (11) and Prilep (30). The court cases were regarding violent crimes committed by females. The total number of women who were sentenced as offenders by the two courts was 46.

The main objective of this study is to analyse and describe the patterns of violent crimes and behaviour of females in our country.

Discussion and Results

As we already mentioned, the number of analysed court cases is 41, with 46 women convicted as perpetrators of violent crimes, from which 11 cases (11 women) are from the area of the Basic Court in Bitola and 30 cases (35 women) from the area of the Basic Court in Prilep, in the period between 2011 and 2015.

As we can see from Table n.3, the number of violent crimes in the area of the Basic Court Prilep is higher than the one in the area of the Basic Court in Bitola. Even the total number of crimes committed by women is higher in Prilep, than the one in Bitola.

Table 3. Total number of convicted women for violent crimes in the area of Basic Courts Bitola and Prilep (2011 - 2015)

Year	Total (number of convicted women)	Basic Court Bitola	Basic Court Prilep
2011	11	4	7
2012	13	3	10
2013	11	1	10
2014	7	2	5
2015	4	1	3
Total	46	11	35

Source: Basic Courts Bitola and Prilep

Table 4. Types of violent crimes committed by women in the area of Basic Courts Bitola and Prilep (2011 - 2015)

Crime	Bodily Harm	Grievous bodily harm	Participation in a brawl	Threatening with a dangerous instrument during a brawl or a quarrel
Year				
2011	10	1	/	/
2012	9	/	4	/
2013	10	1	/	/
2014	5	/	/	2
2015	4	/	/	/
Total	38	2	4	2

Source: Basic Courts Bitola and Prilep

Table n.4 shows the different crimes of female violent behavior in our country. It is obvious that in most cases (38), women commit bodily harm, which is the less harmful type of injury. In 2 cases the injury is grievous and the level of danger is higher. There were also 4 cases of Participation in a brawl and 2 cases of Threatening with a dangerous instrument during a brawl or a quarrel. This structure of violent behavior has the expected patterns when females are in the center of research. The crimes are mostly committed in the area of their homes, their victims are family members and the starting point is either family conflict or domestic violence. The crimes committed are in the comfort of their family homes or near them, crimes which have happened after a long history of family conflicts, in some cases even domestic violence. Also, regarding the rural/urban locus operandi, the majority of crimes were committed in rural areas, especially the ones from the area of the Basic Court in Prilep. This is another characteristic connected with female's gender position in rural areas, especially inside Macedonian society.

Table 5. Strain among women offenders and the "dream" of "modern" women

Crime	Age/ Education	Financial status/ Employment	Locus operandi	Victim/s	Motive	Strain	Basic Court
Bodily harm	25/no information	No information	At home (urban area)	Mother in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	39/Secondary school	Unemployed	Outside (rural area)	Sister in Law	Conflicts	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	41/Secondary school	Employed	At home (rural area)	Mother in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	34/Secondary school	No information	At home (rural area)	Mother in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	47/Primary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Daughter in Law	Conflicts	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	21/Primary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Mother in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	29/Secondary school	No information	At home (urban area)	Mother in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep

Bodily harm	47/7th grade	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Daughter in Law	Conflicts	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	22/Primary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Mother in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	47/Secondary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Sister in Law	Conflicts	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	63/Medical school	Retired person	At home (urban area)	Husband	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	42/Secondary school	Employed	Outside (urban area)	Ex-husband	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	57/Secondary school	No information	At home (urban area)	Mother in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	31/Secondary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Mother in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	27/Primary school	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Mother in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	54/No information	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Daughter in Law	Domestic violence	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	50/Self-taught	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	No information	Conflicts	/	Prilep
Bodily harm	28/Secondary school	Employed	At home (urban area)	No information	Conflicts	/	Prilep
Bodily harm	54/Secondary school	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Mother of the daughter in law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep

Bodily harm	35/Faculty diploma	Employed	At home (urban area)	Ex father in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Grievous bodily harm	47/Secondary school	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Daughter in Law	Domestic violence	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	55/no information	Employed	At home (urban area)	Daughter in Law	Domestic violence	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	35/4th grade	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Mother in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	38/6th grade	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Partner of her father in law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Threatening with a dangerous instrument during a brawl or a quarrel	26/Secondary school	Unemployed	Outside (rural area)	Sister of the other accused person	Conflicts	/	Prilep
Bodily harm	29/no information	No information	Outside (urban area)	Son	Domestic violence	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Threatening with a dangerous instrument during a brawl or a quarrel	69/Secondary school	Retired person	Outside (urban area)	Neighbor	Property relations	/	Prilep

| Bodily harm	35/Faculty diploma	Employed	A bus	Fellow travellers	Conflicts	/	Prilep
Bodily harm	29/Secondary school	Employed	Outside (urban area)	Neighbor	Conflicts	/	Prilep
Bodily harm	54/Secondary school	Employed	At home (urban area)	Mother in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Prilep
Bodily harm	36/Secondary school	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Son	Domestic violence	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Prilep
Bodily harm	38/secondary school	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Mother	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Bitola
Bodily harm	No information	No information	At home (urban area)	No relation	Situational	/	Bitola
Bodily harm	46/No information	Employed	At home (urban area)	Husband	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Bitola
Grievous bodily harm	62/Agricultural school	Retired person	At home (urban area)	Friend	Conflicts	/	Bitola
Bodily harm	59/2 years after secondary school	Housewife	At home (urban area)	Father in Law	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Bitola
Partici-pation in a brawl	35/Self - taught	Unemployed	At home (urban area)	Neighbors	Conflicts	/	Bitola
Bodily harm	32/No information	No information	At home (urban area)	Mother	Domestic violence	The presentation of negative stimuli	Bitola
Bodily harm	24/Primary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Friend	Conflicts	/	Bitola

Bodily harm	35/Primary school	Unemployed	At home (rural area)	Sister in Law	Conflicts	The presentation of negative stimuli	Bitola
Bodily harm	73/No information	Retired person	At home (rural area)	Son	Domestic violence	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Bitola
Bodily harm	58/Faculty diploma	Employed	At work (urban area)	Colleague	Conflicts	The failure to achieve positively valued goals	Bitola

Source: Basic Courts Bitola and Prilep

Regarding the strain and their source, in cases when younger women have committed the violent crime and the victim is an older person (mostly mother in law); the strain is a result of the presentation of negative stimuli. This is caused by the permanent conflicts between the offender (mostly daughter in law) and the victim, regarding the place and role a women should have inside a dominantly patriarchal family. The conflicts are connected with the so called wish to fulfill the "dream" of a "modern" woman. Younger women under influence of modern values are starting to pursue life away from the patriarchal values and their role as a mother, good wife and a great housewife. In our cases, the conflicts were daily and the anger inside female offenders is a result of a longer process. The victims had their opinion of how a good wife should live her life and which activities are acceptable inside their communities. And if they get the possibility to work and be employed, the specter of working positions as a result of restricted societies towards women, is a bit narrow and includes monotonous and undervalued activities. Having different opinions, the everyday clash between the "modern" woman and the obedient wife and dominated housewife, result with criminal (violent) activities.

On the other side, in cases where perpetrators are older women and the victims are younger (mostly daughters in law) or sons, the strain is a result of the failure to achieve positively valued goals. In everyday life each and every person sets its own aspirations and ideal goals. The failure to achieve these goals may lead to the appearance of different types of strain. People do not feel serious distress when they fail to achieve their ideal goals or aspirations, but the distress comes to the surface when they experience disjunction between their expectations and their actual achievements. If families are built on strict patriarchal values and everyday obligations in term of the role every person has inside a home, than in these cases, the offenders failed to achieve their goals by not being able to make the victim to accept their set of aspirations and behavioral norms. In the analyzed cases, victims did not accept the ideal goals given by their family members, and did not act in accordance to acceptable female activities in their communities. Such non - obedience elevates frustration which results with strain and criminal (violent) behavior.

Scheme 1. The nexus between different ideals goals
and life expectations among women

Conclusion

Agnew's general strain theory, as one of the social theories explaining criminality by using the development of strain among potential offenders, explains female criminality through the strain development connected with women's position inside a society. Either woman failures to achieve the positive valued goals and develops a strain after she loses or haven't succeed to maintain an intimate relationship or did not succeeded to gain economic independence as a result of the dominated position they have in their family or community.

In the Republic of Macedonia the strain that females feel as a result of the patriarchal relations and their submissive social position, results with different kinds of criminal behavior. The criminal behavior is in most cases connected to family relations, where taking care of the house, the older family members, the children, the financial dependence create tension and strain. Also, every kind of violence inside a family only increases the level of strain among women. That is why mostly the victims of violent crimes are the closest family members.

The new strain theory is concrete and can be used in constellation with today's modern way life of females, and their criminal (violent) behavior.

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VALUE ORIENTATIONS AND ATTITUDES OF THE STUDENTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to determine the dominant value orientations of the students and their attitudes towards certain social circumstances, practices and life experiences in terms of the conditions, possibilities and challenges of the socio-cultural ambiance of the contemporary Macedonian society. The survey included 200 participants which are students at "Ss. Cyril and Methodius" University in Skopje and University "St. Kliment Ohridski" in Bitola. The data derived from a Questionnaire developed within the project "Research on European Values of the Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia". The analyses rely on students' responses to questions relating to: the role and significance of certain social institutions; trust in other people, social groups and institutions; the satisfaction of one's own life; desired goals in life; preferences in the use of leisure time; attitudes towards work, family, religiosity and social engagement; assessment of the living conditions in the country and the possibilities for a change; acceptance of different models of behavior and lifestyles; and their preference of certain ideological orientations. The results show that students in general tend to incline towards more traditional value systems. However, we identified some contradictions which indicate the existence of a clash in their value systems.

Keywords: value orientations, attitudes, practices.

Introduction

The Social and Cultural Characteristics of Contemporary Macedonian Society

The culture of living and the value orientations of the youth in the Republic of Macedonia are influenced by the current states and transformations of contemporary Macedonian society. This is a period marked by the processes of gaining independence, establishing independent sovereignty and statehood of Macedonian society outside the former SFRY under the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia.[1] In the case of Macedonia this also entailed reconstruction of the political system, that is, a transition from socialism into capitalism, expressed through establishing political pluralism, democracy and market economy as the fundamental ideological and political values and practices of the newly formed state entity.

The expected consequences of this social transformation were: the development of new institutions in all segments of social life; individual and group mobility intensification (social stratification), and promotion of the values of civil culture and the 'new' culture of capitalism. The evident re-affirmation of the national, cultural and historical identity and structure of Macedonian society were of particular importance. These processes and tendencies also resulted in new policies in terms of self-positioning and self-reflection of the Macedonian social and state milieu, in the context of the recent conditions in the region, as well as in the context of the global positioning of the Republic of Macedonia.

Expectedly, all these features and states effectuate changes in individual and group social practices, lifestyles and life orientations, in terms of their restructuring on the scale of social mobility, the access to centres of power, and the possibility and preparedness for social action.

The Subject of Research

In recent decades, the worldwide interest in youth, both socially and academically, has been growing continually. There are several important reasons why the discourses related to this particular social group have achieved such significance: the first reason is certainly the interest of contemporary societies into the adequate social integration of youth; the second reason is related to the fact that young people, by adopting social values, are expected to secure the stability of the society, and the third, opposite expectation, is that the rebelliousness, innovativeness and creativity of youth will act as the true corrective of society and instigate social change. The youth are addressed both as a social category that is the fundamental and necessary generator of reproduction, as well as of social development; and, in certain contexts, as the source of problems and the category most affected by the problems in society (Schizerrotto & Gasperini, 2001). The

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[1] Between 1945 and 1991, the Republic of Macedonia was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the referendum of 8 September 1991, Macedonia declared its independence from the Federation and started a process of transition to a parliamentary democracy and market economy.

affirmation of the very interest in youth, at a regional level, is evident in the study *The Youth in a Time of Crisis* (the first research of the Institute of Social Research in Zagreb and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Croatia):

Existing global and local tendencies and processes stimulate social sciences to research a series of phenomena and processes linked to youth which contribute to the understanding of current developments and projections for future development of the society. At the same time, youth population, due to its specific features, is one of the most sensitive seismographs of social change (Ilišin, Boullet, Gvozdanović & Potočnik, 2013: 9).

In the context of generation, the social status of young people is less favourable because their active participation in social processes is limited by the conventional matrices of role attribution to different age groups. This state of affairs is generated by the controversial integration of youth in the life of the society. One of the consequences of this situation is the appearance of various sub-social and sub-cultural groups with their particular value orientations, modes of behaviour and symbolic meanings. Of course, within their own category, the youth are stratified according to various social parameters (age, gender, social status, local, ethnic and religious affiliation, type and level of education). Thus, it is common to assume that the youth's social and cultural capital is more a result of their passive, rather than active role in society, whereby one should once again take into consideration their inner stratification, as well as the different social circumstances that occasionally create an environment of 'the terror of youth' (which includes insisting on their more serious involvement in the social processes and institutions).

It is important to note that, particularly in more recent sociological research and theories, the idea of the generation has been developed, as a phenomenon that is not unambiguously related to one's birth year or the cohorts of age. According to Todor Kuljić (2009), what marks a generation is in fact its ideological unity, that is to say, the notion of class is substituted by generation in the context of the determining factors important to stimulating social development. They constitute a unity because of their unification around certain worldviews and life perspectives. Thus, generations may in fact be defined only from a perspective of an a posteriori comparison of present with future generations. The given social context with its political, historical, cultural, and economic characteristics, in fact, nevertheless creates a common environment for the population of a similar age, which supports the idea of difference only in the context of their social positioning in terms of status.

Mannheim systematically deals with the issue of the generations as 'socially located' individuals, and not classically sociologically defined social groups:

The fact of belonging to the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have this in common, that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific range of potential, experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action (Mannheim, 1952:291).

The research on youth trends in the Republic of Macedonia (2004), conducted over a decade ago, claimed that:

It is more than obvious that children and the youth in the Republic of Macedonia are the most vulnerable population, as in other so-called 'transitional societies' (even though society in principle is constantly developing and changing, but in this case, transitional systems are a euphemism for radical, revolutionary changes, or for a transition from one into another system, regardless of the quality of the change). The conflict of the different value system that Macedonia faces (identified in the youth in other European countries as well, as demonstrated by the results of certain recent research projects, for instance European Youth Trends): the traditional system of values, the socialist (or humanist) system of values and the contemporary (postmodern or post-modern), produces a lack of criteria or orientations in building a consistent social and cultural identity of the youth (Youth and Sports Agency, 2004).

The characteristics of societies facing radical social changes, which appeared to be the reasons for social trauma (Giddens and Sztompka) and cultural trauma (Alexander and Sztompka), were noted in the abovementioned Croatian study on the youth:

Risks which additionally make social integration of youth more difficult are even more numerous and more prominent in transitional societies – compared with the earlier socialist times, and compared to more developed and stable democratic societies. Namely, growing up in post-socialist societies is burdened with a double transition, because young people are passing through a universal transition period from childhood to adulthood in societies which are at the same time undergoing a fundamental transformation. Socialization of young people takes place in unstable conditions, because institutions, processes and social norms which in the past guided the transition into adulthood are also undergoing a more or less radical change. Analyses have so far indicated that young people in transition countries are facing a series of processes which make adequate integration into adult world more difficult (Ilišin, Bouillet, Gvozdanović, & Potočnik, 2013:10-11).

The subject of this paper are the value orientations and attitudes of part of the student population in the Republic of Macedonia placed in the context of certain social conditions. It incorporates data analyses related to several aspects of the lives, practices and values of the participants in the research, such as: the role and the significance of certain social institutions and social practices; the trust in people, social institutions and certain social groups or groups with certain lifestyles; the desired life goals; priorities in organising their free time; their attitudes towards work, family and religion; social engagement; evaluation of the living conditions in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the possible ways to change/improve them; the preferences for certain lifestyles, and the preferences for certain ideological orientations.

The analyses aim to get sociologically postulated findings on possible dominant and differentiated value orientations and lifestyles of the student population in the Republic of Macedonia, seen through the socio-cultural context of contemporary Macedonian society. In this discourse value orientations are seen as a structure, a more or less open system, which includes a collection of views, desired goals, common modes of behaviour and established lifestyles of a certain population, framed in the context of an objective social reality.

This research covers a specific period in the contemporary social processes of the Macedonian (post)transitional society, which is expected to be related to: the clear effects of social and

cultural trauma (mistrust of people and institutions, political apathy, a sense of alienation from the public sphere and retreating into the individual sphere, the illusion of defining the habitus); the assumption of a defined relationship to the values of European civilization (democracy, the rule of law, tolerance/political correctness, freedom of speech, gender, ethnic and religious sensitivity, etc.), or the hybridisation of value systems (conservative with liberal).

Considering the defined subject and goals of this paper, the basic assumption in the analyses is that the generation exposed to the effects of social and cultural trauma develops hybrid value systems, evident in the ambivalent relationship to the values of the European civilization. The constellation of local/national, and simultaneously regional/European and global processes produces contradictory value systems in the youth, who are put in the position of unfair choice between the desired and the achievable values.

Methodological Approach

The analyses in the paper are based on data gathered through a questionnaire, as part of the project *Research on European Values of the Citizens of the Republic of Macedonia,* realised with financial support from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Macedonia and the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje. 22 of a total of 81 questions of the questionnaire were analysed for the purposes of this paper. The general topics of the questions may be defined as follows: preferred life goals of the participants in the research; social distance and trust in other people; cultural and social practice; social activism; attitudes towards marriage and family; religiosity; work ethics, and political and ideological preferences. The research sample was purposive and included 200 students from two public higher educational institutions in the Republic of Macedonia, the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje (the Faculty of Philosophy and the Faculty of Law), and the St. Kliment Ohridski University in Bitola (the Faculty of Law in Bitola, Kičevo and Struga). The research participants were aged 18 to 22 and higher, 33% of which were male and 67% female. The survey was realized in the period between October and December 2013.

Analyses

The participants' orientation towards certain aspects of life was realised with a question which contained several alternatives determining the importance of those things in their lives, such as: work, family, friends and acquaintances, leisure, politics, religion, education, sports and art. The median values of the participants' answers indicate their focus and their encapsulation in the private sphere and the sphere of personal promotion, as opposed to the aspects of the public sphere in several of its manifestations. In that sense, it is important to note that politics was the least important to them. The ranking of the participants' preferences[2] shows that they demonstrate strong affiliation to the family (M=3.96), then to education (M=3.89), work (M=3.68), friends and acquaintances (M=3.64), leisure (M=3.40), sports (M=2.82), religion (M=2.68), art (M=2.57) and politics (M=2.01). The students' self-assessment of their general life satisfaction shows moderate satisfaction lives (M=3.61, on a scale of 1 to 5).

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[2] On a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 is 'It is utterly unimportant,' and 4 'It is very important.'

The preferred life goals allow for the dominant value orientations to be defined.[3] Namely, the participants' relation to the private sphere was confirmed. The highest ranked is the familial/sentimental orientation (M=4.24), utilitarianism/orientation to material values (M=3.90), the egotistic orientation (M=3.70), whereas the least desired are the orientation to religion and tradition (M=2.85), orientation to power (M=2.82) and the desire of popularity (M=2.04). A third of the participants do not engage in volunteering and involvement in civil society associations (which would indicate an interest into certain forms of civic activism). On the other hand, with regards to the type of activism, the most prominent kinds of engagement were those related to education, culture, art, sports, and, as expected, youth organisations. The participants are the least involved in organisations with altruistic profiles.

The participants' average interest in civic engagement may, among other things, result from their high level of mistrust (89.2%), as well as scepticism regarding other people's intentions. Most participants believe that the majority of people would try to take advantage of them (M=4.5).[4] This question is related to the answers of assessing other people's egotism—the median value of the responses is M=3.42.[5] In contrast to this scepticism, the surprising fact is that the participants believe that they have a high level of control over their lives (M=7.77),[6] which may indicate a certain degree of alienation from other people.

The participants' acceptance of a socially and individually responsible relationship to the work process was identified through their preferred views related to certain aspects work and work ethics. Thus, the greatest acceptance[7] is shown towards the stance that 'In order to develop your talent, you need to work hard' (M=4.74), whereas the least, although not a negative identification, is manifested towards the statement that 'Work must always come first, even at the expense of free time' (M=3.04). These orientations indicate the possibility that the young participants have accepted some of the neoliberal values, assumed in the process of social transition from socialism to capitalism. On the other hand, this type of work ethics may be reminiscent of the value system characteristic of their parents' generation, from the socialist period itself.

According to the students' views related to certain aspects of work, one might conclude that most of them recognise the features of the work process that contribute to personal satisfaction, development and indicate a strong sense of sociability within the workplace. The percentage of participants who also grasp the responsibility to society through participating in the process of its reproduction in all spheres of social life is not insignificant. For example, only 30% of the participants show that they consider the hedonist ambience at the workplace important as well ('lavish holiday celebrations').

Digital communication and communication within the private sphere (socialising with friends and relatives) proved to be most preferable practices for the participants within leisure.

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[3] The preference of certain value orientations was measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 stood for 'I would not want at all,' and 5 'I would want the most.'
[4] On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 equals 'Most people will try to take advantage of me,' and 10 'Most people will try to be fair.'
[5] On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 stands for 'Most people care about themselves,' and 10 'Most people help each other.'
[6] On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 expresses the lowest level of control, and 10 the highest.
[7] On a scale of 1 ('I completely disagree') to 5 ('I completely agree').

Thus, rather expectedly for the epoch they are part of, the young research participants use their leisure time to browse the Internet on a daily basis (M=4.88, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 denotes 'Never,' and 5 'Every day'), followed by the media (M=4.74), socialising through online social networks (M=4.54), and socialising with friends and relatives (M=4.53). At least once a week, the youth frequent cafés and other catering facilities (M=3.61). Less frequently they read books (M=3.57), and engage themselves in sports and recreation (M=3.55). At least once a month, the participants engage in: attending entertainment events (M=2.96), further education and skill acquisition (M=2.88), amateur artistic activities or pursuing hobbies (M=2.87), attending religious institutions (M=2.58), and attending cultural events and institutions (M=2.56). The participants most sparsely engage in attending sporting events (M=2.27) and playing games of chance (M=2.23), practiced at least once a year.

Religiosity and spirituality have an important place in the research, and it also appeared to be relevant to the student population as the basic target group. It is important to bear in mind that the Republic of Macedonia as a former socialist country was mainly oriented to atheism, and as a society in transition to the idea of religious freedom. At the same time, it is necessary to point out the strong connection between the ethnical and the religious identity (e.g. Macedonian with the Orthodox, Albanian with the Muslim, etc.). The analysis of the responses showed that 88% of the participants declared themselves as members of a religion (92% of which as Christian, and 5.1% as Muslim). With regards to the degree of religiosity, the participants mainly declared themselves as moderately religious (M=3.52). The median value of the participants' responses on 'the interest in the spiritual, the sacred and the supernatural,' is M=2.77, on a scale of 1, denoting 'I am not interested at all,' to 4, 'I am very interested.' Some fundamental concepts of the monotheistic religions (particularly Christianity, Islam and Judaism), such as God, sin, the afterlife, heaven and hell, were subject to selection as aspects of religiosity. It turned out that 90.6% of participants believe in God, there is a drastically lower percentage of those who declared they believed in sin (67.9%), and even lower percentages of participants believe in the afterlife (47%), in heaven (42.3%), and hell (32.3%).[8]

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[8] The relationship towards religious rituals and religious establishments is another important component in determining the type and the degree of religiosity of the participants, particularly because of their significance for monotheistic religions. Consequently, these issues were included in three questions of the questionnaire. The participants declared that they seldom attend religious services, except on special occasions (baptisms, weddings and funerals), even though over two-thirds of them agree that there should always be religious services performed for births, getting married and deaths. The third question is related to the roles of the religious institutions in Macedonia. The participants were offered multiple choices. A majority of them responded that those institutions provide answers to people's spiritual needs (75.6%), whereas over half of the participants believe that religious institutions do not offer help in solving the individual's moral problems and needs, as well as for the issues related to family life and the social problems one encounters in society. Another question related to practicing religion independently of religious establishments and services is the one concerning the time devoted to prayer. To this question, 46.9% of students replied that they seldom pray, 33.1% declared that they pray every day, whereas 19.9% declared that they pray several times a month.

With regards to the aspects of religious distance and religious tolerance, the participants mainly showed a tolerant attitude, that is, they were not exclusive in terms of the significance of their own religious affiliation and the religious affiliations of others.

The principle of 'spirituality,' that is, the type of religious consciousness of the participants, may be derived through their responses on: the importance of God in their lives (as the central concept of Judaism, Christianity and Islam); the acceptance of the concept of reincarnation (present in other religions and theosophies), and the belief in lucky charms that are theoretically and conceptually related to superstition or magical thinking (characteristic of pagan religions). Considering the religious affiliation of the research participants, it was to be expected that a large number of them would declare that God was important in their lives. However, as many as 36% of them also believe in reincarnation, and 35.6% in lucky charms.

The participants' answers to the questions related to marriage and family revealed the contradictions of individual value systems (traditional versus modern). The nature of the questions is concerned with several aspects related to participants' acceptance of formal partner relationships, as well as the factors contributing to the success of such relationships, as well as the gender and generational communication within the family. Consequently, as high as 81.5% of students believe that marriage is not an out-of-date institution, which may indicate their orientation to traditional forms of social grouping. On the other hand, in assessing the factors for a successful marriage, priority was given to those factors that are part of the private relationship between the spouses (talking about problems, fidelity, and agreement on child rearing, happy sexual relationship, whether to have children and to have time for friends and acquaintances). They perceive the factors related to existence and traditional relationships (good living conditions, a decent income, sharing household chores, living separately from the parents, sharing the religious and ethnic affiliation) as somewhat less important[9], and the least important were the factors related to the broader social context, that is, the factors concerning the belonging to the same class, ideological and political preferences.

Table 1. Factors of successful marriage

Factors of successful marriage	N	M	Ranking
Faithfulness	199	3.74	2
An adequate income	199	3.14	8
Being of the same social background	200	2.10	13
Shared religious beliefs	195	2,80	11
Same ethnic background	197	2.65	12
Good housing	198	3.38	7

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[9] It should be noted that the importance of living separately from the parents and the financial independence are significant in terms of the long tradition and the frequency of cases of extended families in the period of socialism, but particularly in the period of transition, when many young married couples were forced to live together (with parents, brothers and sisters and their families) on account of their financial dependence on their parents.

Agreement on politics	197	1.58	14
Living apart from your in-laws	199	2.90	10
Happy sexual relationship	199	3.60	4
Sharing household chores	199	2.96	9
Children	198	3.55	5
To agree on the child rearing approach	197	3.66	3
Being willing to discuss the problems that come up between husband and wife	198	3.81	1
Having some time for one's own friends and for personal hobbies/activities	199	3.43	6

The general attitude towards the type of family relationships were mainly identified through the relations between the spouses (gender relations). The participants demonstrated highest level of agreement towards the attitude that spouses should independently decide on having a progeny, to equally share the responsibility for the children and to contribute equally to the family income. There is partial agreement with the attitudes that the father could take just as good care of the children as the mothers, that working mothers are just as good as the stay-at-home mothers, that it is acceptable for a couple to live together without getting married, that for a woman's independence it is important to have a job, that a long-term relationship is necessary for achieving happiness and that the man feels fulfilled when he has children. In terms of the attitude that the woman prioritises the home and the children over work and that housewives are just as fulfilled as working women the participants are rather undecided. Finally, the lowest acceptance is demonstrated towards the position that having children is an obligation to society that the children would suffer if their mother worked and that homosexuals should be allowed to adopt children.

Table 2. Claims about marriage

Claims about marriage	N	M	Ranking
A man has to have children in order to be fulfilled	194	3.53	9
A marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy	199	3.55	8
Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children	197	1.95	14
It is alright for two people to live together without getting married	200	3.80	6

It is a duty towards society to have children	197	2.26	12
People should decide for themselves whether to have children or not	200	4.75	1
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work	199	4.13	5
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works	199	2.19	13
A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children	198	3.43	10
Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay	194	2.76	11
Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person	197	3.73	7
Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income	199	4.62	3
In general, fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers	200	4.31	4
Men should take as much responsibility as women for the home and children	199	4.72	2

Several questions addressing certain liberal or liberal or traditionalist orientations were identified through the participants' attitudes towards gender equality. For example, the respondents were asked whether a woman should have children or if she could feel fulfilled without having children. The majority of research participants (71.3%) agreed with the stance that women should have offspring in order to feel fulfilled. Furthermore, 66.5% of participants approve of the statement that it is acceptable for women to be single mothers.

The respondents were given the opportunity to express their opinion on abortion under different circumstanced. There was an overwhelming tendency to justify abortion in cases when the woman was raped (90.5%). Furthermore, abortion is justified when the pregnancy is endangering the life of the mother (89.8%), and if the woman is carrying a foetus with abnormalities (86%). Moreover, 76% of participants justify abortion when the woman got pregnant against her will. Abortion is much less justified when the married couple does not want any more children (56.2% disapprove) and when the woman is not married (58.3% disapprove). It could assumed that the participants show tendencies of empathy and humaneness related to the woman's physical and psychological health when approving the act of abortion.

The respondents once again had the opportunity to express their views on the values they would like to transmit to their offspring. This issue is of a particular significance considering that it almost explicitly indicates the criteria important to the hierarchisation of the value system of the respondents. Four values were identified as the most important in child rearing: honesty (81%), sense of responsibility (78.2%), tolerance and respect (75.4%) and good manners (75.3%). The second group of values important for child rearing includes: ambition (58.3%), hard work (57.5%), independence (54.4%), and resoluteness and perseverance (57.2%). In the third group, the percentage of expressed importance is lower than 50%, such as in: obedience (41.9%), selflessness (40.8%), or cooperativeness (34.2%). The least important values for child rearing involved: religiosity (29.7%), frugality (28.9%), imaginativeness (23.8%) and curiosity (23.4%).

The views on the nature of the parent-child relationship may particularly be seen through the responses on the questions whether parents should be respected unconditionally (with which 64% of research participants agreed) and the question whether parents should sacrifice for their children (80.5% agree with this claim).

The level of acceptance of certain modes of behaviour of individuals and groups was measured through 18 items, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 marks the lowest level of acceptance or 'absolutely unacceptable,' whereas 10 denotes a complete acceptance of the behaviour as justified. Once again, the aspects of the private/emotional sphere were considered as the most acceptable: in vitro fertilisation (M=7.93), divorce (M=6.59) and casual sex (M=6.34). In relation to abortion (M=5.35), cash payments to avoid taxation (M=5.32) and euthanasia (M=4.54), the participants show a relatively personal attitude to the types of behaviour that have a broader social dimension. A lower level of approval was expressed in relation to capital punishment (M=3.81), homosexuality (M=3.69), using soft drugs (M=3.61), not paying for a ticket on public transportation (M=3.57) and lying (M=3.38). The types of behaviour such as adultery (M=2.85), prostitution (M=2.68), taking money from the state without having the right to (M=2.67), suicide (M=2.67), human embryo experimentation (M=2.38), and the genetic manipulation of food (M=2.37) were identified as highly unacceptable, whereas taking bribes (M=1.84) and tax evasion (M=1.76) were deemed as least acceptable.

Social distance of the respondents was measured through a question in which research participants could declare which social groups or individuals with particular lifestyles or behaviours they would accept as neighbours. The analyses of the responses demonstrated that the participants showed the greatest social distance towards people with deviant behaviour (drug addicts, severe alcoholics, criminals) or towards people that may threaten their physical integrity, their health, or disturb their families' peace and security (mentally ill individuals, people with AIDS, and the like). Apart from the social distance manifested towards Albanians and Romani, the degree of ethnic and religious distance is not high. The low level of distance is also expressed regarding people with a different economic and social status (extremely poor people, people with large families, villagers), and with a different ideological/political orientation. The participants' responses are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Social distance from certain individuals and groups

	I would mind (%)	I would not mind (%)
People with a criminal record	79.9	20.1
Heavy drinkers	81.7	18.3
People with large families	7.7	92.3
Turks	7.7	92.3
Vlachs	6.8	93.2
Macedonians	2.0	98.0
Romani	29.0	71.0
Serbs	7.6	92.4
Albanians	32.3	67.7
People who have just moved from the country	8.2	91.8
People with a physical disability	8.6	91.4
Emotionally unstable people	52.8	47.2
People with AIDS	48.7	51,3
Drug addicts	82.9	17.1
Homosexuals	49.9	53.1
Immigrants	6.0	94.0
Jews	11.8	88.2
Muslims	18.6	81.4
Christians	3.6	96.4
Religious fanatics	49.2	50.8
People of a different ethnicity	9.0	91.0
Individuals with different political orientation	7.7	92.3
Extremely poor people	7.7	92.3

One part of the questionnaire was aimed at determining the political and ideological pref-
erences of the respondents. The forms of political activity or civic activism for which the partici-
pants had the opportunity to take a position indicate a tendency of a relatively high level of
preparedness to participate in legitimate and, above all, legal form of expressing civil dissatisfac-
tion. The results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Approving forms of political activity

	I have participated (%)	I may participate (%)	I would never participate (%)
Signing a petition	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%
Joining in boycotts	25.1%	41.2%	33.7%
Attending lawful demonstrations	37.2%	45.4%	17.3%
Joining unofficial strikes	15.1%	32.3%	52.7%
Occupying buildings or factories	10.3%	30.4%	59.2%

Furthermore, the ideological inclination of the respondents was examined through their responses related to the prioritization of the values of freedom and equality. Freedom as a value is important to 73.1% of participants, and equality only to 26.9% of participants. Their assessment of the state of affairs in the society and the potential ways to change it, showed that only 0.6% of participants believe that no change is necessary; that changes should be radical is confirmed by 23.5% of participants, and as many as 76% believe that society should be changed gradually, through reforms. The participants identified peace and stability (37.7%) as priority goals for the country and accelerated economic development (24.5%) as second most important. The highest percentage of participants responded that our society is dominated by injustice (24.4%) and poverty (23.3%). The percentage of participants believing that the citizens of our country are lazy and idle (23%) is not much different.

Concerning the acceptance of democratic mode of government, there is an obvious tendency among the participants to place a high value on it (M=4.08).[10] This is also evident in the responses to the question that democracy may create problems, but it is better than any other form of governance (M=4.08).[11] However, the assessment of the level of satisfaction with democracy in our country indicates low to moderate satisfaction (M=2.58).[12]

This result is confirmed in the question related to the level of trust expressed towards several national and international institutions. The overall level of trust is M=2.67, on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 denotes 'No trust,' and 5 denotes 'Complete trust.' The highest level of trust was shown in relation to the educational system (M=3.25) and the army (M=3.13), which indicates moderate trust. The lowest level of trust in national institutions is shown in relation to the media

[10] On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 stands for 'Very bad' and 5 for 'Very good.'
[11] On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 stands for 'I completely agree,' and 5 for 'I completely disagree.'
[12] On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 stands for 'I am not satisfied at all,' and 5 for 'I am completely satisfied.'

(M=2.38), the trade unions (M=2.19) and the political parties (M=2.01). Of the international or-ganisations, the highest level of trust is shown towards the UN (M=2.81), and the lowest toward NATO (M=2.63), although the trust in the EU yields a similar result (M=2.65).

These two blocs of questions confirm the assumption of the discrepancy that appears in the youth's views caused by the irreconcilability between their legitimate expectations (consistent with the ideology of liberalism as a globally accepted ideology) and the real social conditions em-anating a series of inconsistencies and traumatic experiences, particularly in the local context (the Republic of Macedonia).

Conclusion

The processes of transformation of the social and state system in the Republic of Mace-donia (establishment of new institutions, acceleration of the social hierarchy, adaptation to new value models, etc.) had repercussions on the identity building (national, cultural, class, gender) of its citizens. In this sense, one should not ignore the processes of establishing the relations of the Republic of Macedonia with the region and the world, and taking a certain position in the new constellation of international relationships. The tumultuous transitional period initiated a national identity crisis, weakening of the social cohesion, increased mistrust in people and institutions, and created a milieu that produced conditions for the youth to be reduced to passive observers rather than active stakeholders in social reality. The sociological analysis showed that there is a gener-ational framework for sharing certain value orientations both in the older and the younger popu-lation (Petkovska, Minoski, Popovski, & Jovanoski, 2012). This situation is consistent from the viewpoint of the sociology of generations (Kuljić, 2009): namely, that akin socio-cultural circum-stances generate similar models of value systems.

Generally speaking, from the insight into most of the students' views, one might note their obvious orientation to the private sphere, as opposed to the public one, from which they seem increasingly distant. Basically, this refers to a specific type of conservatism that stems from the economic, political and cultural past of the country. This type of conservatism indicates a need for collective security, characteristic of conservative and traditionalist tendencies. However, this security is pursued in the sphere of intimacy and individual interest or responsibility.

The frustration with life conditions is evidently affecting the moderate degree of life sat-isfaction identified by the participants. Even the fact that the young respondents expressed to have a high level of control over their lives is indicating aspects of alienation ('I rely on myself, not on other people'). This can be also associated to the students' high level of mistrust and scep-ticism related to other people. The system's institutions are not recognised as places where it is possible to realise personal initiative, ambition, self-identification and self-valorisation. Vertical mobility, which turned out to be important to students, is being questioned, regardless of the in-dividual's personal affinities. Thus, the institutions of the system discourage a legitimate compet-itive atmosphere and generate citizens' mistrust. Mobility is conditioned by the innovative strategy in a Mertonian sense of the word (Merton, 1968), but the participants are reserved in relation to the legitimately provided means to achieve it (hard work, education as value, work as a calling,

sacrificing free time). Consequently, the elements of the familial/sentimental orientation, as those of the utilitarian and the egotistical orientation are the most present in the participants' choices of value systems. The values of honesty, responsibility, tolerance and respect, as well as good manners are things that young people would most gladly transmit to their progeny. Thereby they decide on a way of life that is morally suitable, but also intimately acceptable in the primary groups.

The view on marriage, family and family values, partner relationships, parent-child relationships once again indicate the duality of value systems of the students, which involves a mild orientation to liberal/individual values and preferences, but also an undoubtable latent connection to traditional pro-conservative tendencies, inherent to our culture (Петковска, Поповски, & Јованоски, 2010).

The youth's position on certain aspects of work and work ethics implies an acceptance of neoliberal tendencies assumed in the process of social transition from socialism to capitalism. For instance, they recognise the features of the work process contributing to the personal satisfaction and development and indicate a strong sense of the sociability expected in the workplace. A certain percentage of research participants also show that they have grasped their responsibility to society through responsible participation in the process of social reproduction in all spheres of social life.

The preference for certain practices in the leisure time constitutes another evidence that the students have accepted the contemporary modes of communication (digital communication) and orientation to the Internet, which is a practice shared by their peers at a global level. The traditional attitude towards life outside the work process is manifested in their orientation towards their family and friends.

The high level of declared religiosity and the fact that two-thirds of the young participants find comfort in religion may lead us to contradictory conclusions. One of the reasons for this derives from the recent global tendencies in which one recognises a return to the conservative values of tradition, whose greatest exponent is the revitalisation of religion. On the other hand, the degree of alienation and the constant search for a national and cultural identity is something in which even the young, who are assumed to be more open to the world, find their existential outcome.

Consequently, young respondents manifest higher tolerance of the religious affiliation of the other, but lowest tolerance of atheists/unbelievers. The manner in which the young respondents relate to religious phenomena demonstrates an evident inclination towards traditional type of religiosity (basic rituality, insufficient familiarity with religious concepts, practicing religion within the private sphere—an individualised relationship to the otherworldly, as opposed to the public participation in religious rituals) rather than a syndrome of convinced believers.

The greatest social distance is manifested towards people with deviant behaviours (drug addicts, severe alcoholics, criminals), or towards people who are perceived as a potential threat to someone's physical integrity, the health, peace and safety of their immediate surroundings (mentally ill individuals, people with AIDS, etc.). As mentioned, the degree of religious distance is not high, and the same goes for ethnic distance, except in relation to the Albanians and the Romani

(which could be related to the ethnic tensions in Macedonian society). People with low economic and social status, or with different ideological/political orientation have not been perceived by the respondents as hostile. This kind of manifested empathy towards marginalised groups and the expressed resistance to ideological division that has a negative impact on the cohesive fabric of society is characteristic of contemporary Macedonian society per se.

The acceptance and the assessment of the everyday behaviour of people in once again showed that the young respondents value the aspects of the private/emotional sphere (for example, in vitro fertilisation, divorce and casual sex). The attitudes towards certain practices, such as abortion, cash payments to avoid taxation, as well as euthanasia, indicate a relatively personal relationship to the type of behaviour that has more serious social implications. A similar relationship is demonstrated with regards to some other types of social behaviour (mainly deemed as socially unacceptable), such as: capital punishment, homosexuality, using soft drugs, not paying for a ticket on public transport and lying. The behaviours which are a subject of a traditionally moralising attitude, or those for which, generally, the public shows less understanding, have also been found unacceptable by the young respondents. The participants' views on these issues should certainly be placed in relation to the age of the target group and to the current social ambience. Nevertheless, the identified duality in the attitudes towards certain types of behaviour, expressed in the young respondents' preferences does not correspond to the expected notion that they are largely open to different forms of social life, more than the older generations, who are expected to show attitudes learned during different social circumstances (pragmatism, 'strictness,' political correctness, but also exclusiveness).

If the openness to certain forms of civic activism is an indicator of the potential for agency in this generation, the participants showed a certain readiness to participate in some legal forms of protest. However, their views on the need for a gradual change of society, their mistrust in the system's institutions, as well as in the international institutions, the unpreparedness for unconventional forms of activism may be interpreted as a tendency to distance themselves from the possible repercussions that might results from such proactivity. Freedom and democracy matter to them, but they would practice them through reforms rather than through radical changes.

Fundamentally, the young respondents recognise democracy as a relatively desired model of governing society. However, the manner in which its principles are implemented in the Republic of Macedonia is judged with a mild dose of criticism. Their attitudes towards democracy compared to the level of trust in various institutions, do not indicate a particular determination and consistency in their ideological/political views.

The results of the research confirm the assumption that young people show a tendency for hybrid value system (between traditional and contemporary values), with recognizable elements of both a libertarian and authoritarian ideological point of view. This situation may not be exclusively related to the Republic of Macedonia, and bearing in mind all the processes that emanate a crisis of the system, indicate the existence of a bipolarity in the young people's value orientations that might have a long-term negative effect on their further socialisation. On the other hand, the relatively moderate trust in international institutions (low to moderate) indicates scepticism in

relation to the role of the international community in designing the political system in Macedonia. The value preferences of the young respondents indicate a discrepancy inherent in their views as a result of their inability to reconcile their legitimate expectations (consistent with the ideological premises of liberalism as a globally accepted ideology) and the real social conditions in the internal and external relations of the Republic of Macedonia, which are manifested through a series of paradoxical and traumatic experiences.

The assumption regarding the effects of social and cultural trauma (mistrust in people and institutions, political apathy, alienation) has been confirmed. Moreover, there is evidence of a not clearly defined position towards the values of European civilization (democracy, the rule of law, tolerance/political correctness, freedom of speech, gender, ethnic and religious sensitivity, etc.). Thus, these young representatives of the so-called transitional generations exposed to the effects of traumatic societal experiences have influenced the development of hybrid value systems. Thus, both in terms of domestic and in foreign policy, young people are placed in a position to make an unfair choice between desired and achievable values.

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Suicide terrorist attacks – ideological aspects

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Abstract

The perception of terrorist activities, on a global level, indicates their inconsistency, or oscillations in certain periods of time. Nevertheless, one segment of terrorism, the contemporary suicide terrorist attacks the beginnings of which can be traced back in the 1980s of the last century and continue to this day, is generally on the increase.

A number of scholars point out the organization as a key factor in the recruitment of individuals in their lines and the implementation of the terrorist organization's cause, but, nevertheless, the possibility for individual acting cannot be excluded whatsoever.

The authors of this paper examine the ideological aspects of terrorist organizations in the realization of suicide terrorist operations in the period 1983-2014. The focus of this paper is on the ideology, as a motif of a given terrorist organization or group, and the aims they are attempting to achieve. Current events in the world position religion as an imperative, although organizations or groups of secular character are also present in the field.

The complexity of the issue the ideological aspects of which we are attempting to clarify points out to several segments that have influence in the process of ideological matrix development. They are based on several social processes – conditions, environment and energy.

Keywords: Terrorism, terrorist activities, terrorist organization or group, suicide attack, ideology.

Introduction

The data on terrorist activities on a global level, in the period starting from 1980 and up to 2014, in accordance with the database of the University of Maryland - USA[13] points to a total of 132129 terrorist incidents. Grouped by decades, in the period 1980-1989 there were a total of 31165 terrorist incidents, starting with the year 1980 with 2621 terrorist incidents, reaching the

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[13] GTD, Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ (visited on 27.05.2016)

peak in 1989 with 4317 terrorist incidents, while there were the fewest incidents in 1982 – 2494 terrorist incidents. In the period 1990-99 there occurred a total of 28780 terrorist incidents[14], starting with the year 1990 with 3876 terrorist incidents, reaching the peak in the year 1992 with 5059 terrorist incidents, while the fewest incidents were noted in 1998 - 929 terrorist incidents. In the period 2000-09 there were a total of 24992 terrorist incidents, starting with the year 2000 with 1778 terrorist incidents, reaching the peak in 2008 with 4779 terrorist incidents, while the fewest terrorist incidents were noted in 2004 - 1156 terrorist incidents. The data presented indicates tendency to decrease in terrorist activities worldwide in the period 1980-2009.

In the period starting with the year 2010 and up to the end of 2014 there occurred a total of 47192 terrorist incidents, starting with the year 2010 with 4782 terrorist incidents, reaching the peak in 2014 with 16818 terrorist incidents, and the fewest terrorist incidents were actually noted at the beginning of this interval of time, in 2010 – 4782 incidents. Based on the data presented it can be concluded that in the period 2010-14 there is a rapid increase in the number of terrorist activities, with the same amounting to 35,71% of the total terrorist incidents which took place in the period 1980-2014 on a global level.

On the other hand, the number of performed suicide attacks is on the constant increase worldwide. In the beginning insignificantly, only for later the number to undergo alarming increase from the average of 3 suicide attacks annually during the 1980s of the last century, to more than 10 suicide attacks annually in the 1990s of the last century, 50 suicide attacks annually in the period 2000-2003, and up to 300 suicide attacks in the period 2004-2009.[15] This number is still on the increase, and in the period 2010-2014 the number of suicide attacks reaches 315 on annual level.[16]

The data presented above, based on which it can be concluded that the number of terrorist attacks is continually increasing, imposes the need for further analysis of this situation. In this paper the ideological aspects of the performance of suicide terrorist attacks shall be specifically examined.

Ideology

Views and understandings of certain group of people, translated into certain movement, characterize the direction of social activity and the manner of finding solutions for resolution of the detected, according to them, social anomalies.

The focus of many ideology theorists is on the attempt to understand what motivates suicide bombers. Randy Borum, 2003, for example focuses on the terrorist ideology and the process how these ideas and doctrines develop. He identifies a process of four-stages/phases based on which individuals develop their extremist beliefs. The group or the individuals first identify some

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[14] The database does not contain any records of terrorist incidents for the year 1993 GTD, Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ (visited on 27.05.2016)

[15] Pape, A. R. Feldman, K. J. (2010) Cutting the Fuse: the Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

[16] CPOST, Chicago Project on Security Z Terrorism, University of Chicago
http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php?clear=1 (visited on 28.05.2016)

undesirable state or object, then they formulate the same as an event or state that is unjust, continue with accusations of injustice of the target policy, person or nation, and in the end vilify or demonize a certain group thus making the aggression/attack seem justified. This suffering from adverse conditions does not make them bad or evil but simply victims of injustice, thus enabling the aggression against the villains that did wrong to the group or a member of the group to be more easily psychologically justified.[17] The example of Iran could help explain the influence of ideology in the process of recruitment of volunteers for death. With the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980, Iran compensated its own military inferiority in relation to Iraq, with the large number of population. Saddam Hussein overestimated the efficacy of his military power and expected that Iran, owing to its internal clashes, would make slight resistance. Iranian leadership quickly realizes that the future of Iran is endangered and calls the people to resist the aggressor, that is, the infidels, with all means available. To save Iran, sacrifices were required both on national and personal level. The concept of martyrdom was strengthened, and the death on the battle field would ensure the Iranian soldier his deserved place in heaven. In the beginning of 1980 Iran established the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or *Pasdaran*. Their function, as loyal and independent forces alongside the regular military forces, were to become a "weapon" in the Iran-Iraq war. The supporting volunteer forces of Pasardan, called *Basij-e Mostaz'afin*, had a task to unite both the young and the old in civilian police forces. Basij-e Mostaz'afin means "mobilization of disadvantaged and oppressed masses", which is actually very crafty description taking into account that the organization recruited from the population of poor and desperate people. Thus, thousands of Iranians in the structures of the paramilitary Basiji and the elite troops Pasdaran, consciously and willingly sacrificed their lives in the mass attacks on the Iraqi positions. The face of martyrdom was very lucidly presented in the Iranian boys, who volunteered as "human mine sweepers", during the critical phase of the war with Iraq. There were not any problems in the recruiting of volunteers for what in essence was a suicide attack, and the decisive role in their willing sacrifice had their religious indoctrination. Human waves composed of tens of thousands of Iranian children and youth overflowed the battle field, with horrifying death toll. Only in one assault operation in 1984, more than twenty thousand people were killed in the attack of "human waves", with which no tactical success or advantage was achieved whatsoever. The survival rate at the battle field was 5%, which is statistical data that had never been evidenced in the history of warfare before.[18]

Another consecutive example of terrorist organizations, from the last, religious wave of terrorism, also points to the fact how craftily religious ideology can be used for someone's own benefits. The model of recruitment of suicide bombers that is applied by Al-Qaeda represents a good example of how the whole process of recruitment of "martyrs" is implemented. This process includes four phases and emphasizes the religious character.[19] The phases are implemented in the following order:

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[17] Panchevski, S. (2014) Suicide terrorism and its personification in the new wave of religious terrorism. Skopje: Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Security, Defense and Peace Studies.

[18] Micic, P. (2006) Suicide terrorism: Ideology of revolutionary Islam. Defense, R. Serbia, p. 70.

[19] Schweitzer, Y. and Ferber, G. S. (November, 2005) Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism. Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.

Phase I - Awareness of the contemporary crisis facing Islam;
Phase II - Identification with the distress of the surroundings in which the person lives;
Phase III - "Autosuggestion" – self-persuasion regarding the idea of suicide;
Phase IV - Separation from normal life, assisted by the personal influence of an
al-Qaeda representative.

From this model it can be concluded that the priority role is played by the psychological preparation of the future martyr, that is, the perception of the future performer of suicide attack about his religious values being under threat (phase I). The surroundings in which an individual or a potential martyr functions in the society represents a measure for the required level of religious indoctrination (phase II). Following the first two phases the candidate is already prepared for martyrdom to a certain degree, and the next phase will be the relief of the psychological barrier related to the fear of death. At this point very strong influence have the religious texts that emphasize the need for sacrificing one's own life in the name of higher goals, that is, the need for self-sacrifice for ensuring a place at the pedestal in heaven, which is awaiting the future martyr. In addition, the self-sacrifice represents a positive example for the other recruits, martyrs, for the flawless devotion to God and the correctness of the act itself (phase III). The last phase represents a point of no return, that is, the turning point in the martyrdom process, as in the last moment the candidate can change his mind, unable to overcome the fear of death. That is why the organization isolates him from all outside happenings, including family contacts, in order to minimize the chance for renouncing the martyr's death.

Taking into account that terrorism and terrorist organizations are divided in several categories, there are also different classifications in accordance with the specific criteria that are usually related to the area and specialty of each corresponding category. In our case, the terrorist organizations that perform suicide attacks can be divided into two categories: secular and religious. The secular category includes all terrorist organizations with aims that are: separatist, ethnocentric, national, revolutionary, political and social. In the religious category are included the terrorist organizations that are led by radical religious aims.

In this paper we shall use data from several sources that analyze suicide terrorist attacks. The results achieved shall be used to form a clearer picture of the influence of ideology on the terrorism cause.

The authors Weinberg, L. Pedahzur, A. Canetti, D. N. (2003)[20] in their paper present the following information in relation to the performed suicide attacks on a global level. Kurdish Workers Party-PKK, is a terrorist organization with Marxist ideology, that is, terrorist organization which ever since its establishment has adopted communist ideology, but, nevertheless, is primarily focused on creation of independent Kurdish state in south-east Turkey, Syria and Iraq. PKK periodically takes advantage of the religious feelings of Kurdish people in order to increase its popularity,

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[20] Weinberg, L. Pedahzur, A. Canetti, D. N. (autumn, 2003) "The Social and Religious Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and Their Victims" in: Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 15, No. 3, pp 139-153.

yet, the organization remains predominantly secular.[21] In the period 1983 - 2000 PKK was responsible for 21 suicide terrorist attacks, out of the total of 286 at this period on a global level (Weinberg, L. Pedahzur, A. Canetti, D. N, 2003).[22] From the point of view of the terrorist organization and its ideology, the participation of PKK in the suicide terrorist attacks equals to 7, 34% on a global level. In this period, according to the number of performed suicide terrorist attacks, the leading role is performed by the terrorist organization Tamil Tigers – LTTE, which has similar ideology matrix with PKK, ethnic (Tamil) and national (creation of an independent state), that is, ideology matrix of secular character. Namely, in the period 1983 - 2000 out of a total of 286 suicide attacks, LTTE accounted for 171 attacks.[23] The number of the performed suicide terrorist attacks participates with 59,79% in the total number of performed attacks on a global level, which makes this organization a leader terrorist organization in the performance of suicide terrorist attacks in this time interval.

Taking into consideration the shared goals (national) and the similarities in the ideological aspect (secular) between LTTE and PKK, it can be noticed that these two terrorist organizations together participate with a total of 192 suicide attacks in the period 1983-2000, out of the total of 286 attacks on a global level. Thus, it can be concluded that LTTE and PKK together performed 67% of the total number of performed suicide attacks on a global level in the period 1983-2000, and the same are of secular character.

Table 1

Terrorist organization	Number of attacks / Ideology
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	31/ secular
Hamas	17/ religious
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI)	8/ religious
Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF)	8/ secular
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)	8/ secular
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)	6/ secular
Lebanese Islamic Jihad (Hezbollah)-LIJL	6/ religious
Hezbollah	5/ religious
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	5/ religious
Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party-Lebanon (ASBPL)	4/ secular
Al Qaeda (central)	2/ religious

[21] Australian Government. Australian National Security https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/KurdistanWorkersPartyPKK.aspx (visited on 07.06.2016)
[22] Weinberg, L. Pedahzur, A. Canetti, D. N. (autumn, 2003) "The Social and Religious Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and Their Victims" in: Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 15, No. 3, pp 139-153.
[23] Weinberg, L. Pedahzur, A. Canetti, D. N. (autumn, 2003) "The Social and Religious Characteristics of Suicide Bombers and Their Victims" in: Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 15, No. 3, pp 139-153.

Amal	2/ secular
Islamic Resistance (IR)	2/ religious
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	2/ secular
Arab Egyptian League (AEL)	1/ religious
Babbar Khalsa International (BKI)	1/ secular
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)	1/ religious
Jihad Islami (JI)	1/ religious
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP)	1/ secular
Vanguard of Arab Christians	1/unknown
Unknown group	30
Total	**142**

Source: CPOST, Chicago Project on Security & Terrorism, University of Chicago

     The other sources, that is, databases of performed suicide terrorist attacks in the period 1983-2000 present the following information. The database of performed suicide attacks of the University of Chicago-CPOST[24] in the period 1983-2000, on a global level, as performers of suicide terrorist attacks lists the following terrorist organizations and groups.

     A total of 142 attacks were performed, out of which the responsibility for 30 suicide attacks has not yet been established. The total number of terrorist organizations that are considered accountable for the attacks is 20, and the same performed a total of 112 suicide attacks. From ideological aspect, the ideology matrix has not yet been determined for one terrorist organization (Vanguard of Arab Christians), which is accountable for one suicide attack, and thus as basis for determining the ideology of terrorist organizations shall be used the total number of 111 attacks.

     There are a total of 9 terrorist organizations which have secular ideology. They are held accountable for 63 suicide attacks, which represents 56, 75% of the total number of suicide attacks (111) the responsibility for which was clearly established.

     On the other hand, there are a total of 10 terrorist organizations with religious ideology. They performed 48 suicide attacks, which represents 43, 24% of the total number of suicide attacks (111) the responsibility for which was clearly established.

     In accordance with the database of the University of Maryland (USA), GTD[25] for the performed suicide attacks in the period 1983-2000, on a global level, as performers or suspects are listed the following terrorist organizations or groups.

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[24] CPOST, Chicago Project on Security Z Terrorism, University of Chicago
http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php?clear=1 (visited on 28.05.2016)
[25] GTD, Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ (visited on 27.05.2016)

Table 2

Terrorist organization	Number of attacks / Ideology
Hezbollah	14/ religious
Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF)	4/ secular
Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)	6/ secular
Khalid ibn Walid (suspected)-KiW	1/ religious
Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party (ASBP)	2/ secular
Palestine Liberation Organization (suspected)-PLO	1/ secular
African National Congress (South Africa)-ANC	1/ secular
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	62/ secular
Hamas	14/ religious
Ansar Allah	1/ religious
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	4/ religious
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)	1/ religious
Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)	1/ religious
Al-Jihad	1/ religious
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)	10/ secular
Al-Qaida	4/ religious
Turkish Communist Party/Marxist (TKP-ML)	1/ secular
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	1/ religious
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) -suspected	1/ religious
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) -suspected	1/ religious
Chechen rebels	11/ religious
Unknown	30
Individual (in Philippines)	1
Individual (in Turkey)	2
Individual (in USA)	1
Palestinians (in Israel)	2
Israeli extremist (in Israel)-suspected	2
Afghans (in Pakistan)	1
Other (in Pakistan)	2
Total	183

Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland.

A total of 183 suicide attacks were performed, out of which the responsibility for 30 attacks has not yet been determined, 4 attacks were performed by individuals, 2 attacks are performed by Palestinians in Israel, 2 attacks by Israeli extremists in Israel, 1 by Afghan/-s in Pakistan, and 2 attacks are placed in the category Other, performed in Pakistan, or a total of 41 atacks. For these suicide attacks there is no information whether they are individual cases or they are acts of terrorist organizations. A total of 21 terrorist organizations claim responsibility or are suspected that they are responsible for suicide attacks, with the participation of the same amounting to 142 suicide attacks.

From ideological aspect, there are a total of 8 terrorist organizations with secular ideology. They performed a total of 87 suicide attacks, which represents 61,26% of the total number of suicide attacks (142), suspected to have been performed or performed by terrorist organizations.

On the other hand, there are a total of 13 terrorist organizations with religious ideology. They performed a total of 55 suicide attacks, which represents 38,73% of the total number of suicide attacks (142), suspected to have been performed or performed by terrorist organizations.

In the period 2001-2014, according to CPOST[26] the terrorist organizations or groups that performed suicide attacks, on a global level, are the following.

Table 3

Terrorist organization	Number of attacks / Ideology
Taliban (IEA)	569/ religious
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	119/ religious
Al-Qaeda in Iraq	103/ religious
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	103/ religious
Islamic state (IS)	102/ religious
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)	95/ religious
Hamas	50/ religious
Al Shabab	47/ religious
Jabhat an-Nusrah Li-Ahl Ash Sham	40/ religious
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade	38/ secular
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	32/ religious
Ansar al-Sunna (AS)	27/ religious
Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad	24/ religious
Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb	20/ religious
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	19/ religious
Boko Haram (BH)	17/ religious

[26] CPOST, Chicago Project on Security Z Terrorism, University of Chicago
http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php?clear=1 (visited on 28.05.2016)

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	14/ secular
Lashkar-e Jhangvi Al-almi	14/ religious
Riyadus Salikhiin (RS)	11/ religious
Al-Qaeda Central	9/ religious
Mujahideen Shura Councle	9/ religious
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	9/ secular
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis	8/ religious
Hizb-i-Islami (HI)	7/ religious
Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB)	6/ religious
Caucasus Emirate (CE)	6/ religious
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)	6/ religious
Taliban (Pakistan)	6/ religious
Jaish Ansar al Sunnah	5/ religious
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM)	5/ religious
Movement for the Oneness and Jihad in West Africa	5/ religious
Ansar al-Sharia	4/ religious
Great Eastern Raiders Front (IBDA-C)	4/ religious
Jundullah (Iran)	4/ religious
Jundullah (Pakistan)	3/ religious
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)	3/ religious
Ansar al-Mujahedin	3/ religious
Hizbul Mujahedin (HM)	3/ religious
1920 Revolution Brigade	2/ secular
Islamic Front (Syria)	2/ religious
Islamic Unity Brigades (IUB)	2/ religious
Jamaa Al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya	2/ religious
Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh	2/ religious
Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK)	2/ secular
Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT)	2/ religious
Mujahedi Masr	2/ religious
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front	2/ secular
Aden-Abyan Army	1/ religious

Ahrar ul-Hind	1/ religious
Aisha Umm-al Mouemeneen	1/ religious
Al Madina Regiment	1/ religious
Al-Haramayn Brigades	1/ religious
Al-Qanoon	1/ religious
Ansar al Islam	1/ religious
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1/ religious
Fatah al-Islam	1/ religious
Free Sunni Brigade	1/ religious
Free Syrian Army	1/ secular
Gazotan Murdash group	1/ religious
Hizbal Islam in Somalia	1/ religious
Iraqi Government	1/ unknown
Islambouli Brigades of Al Qaeda	1/ religious
Islamic Jihadist Union	1/ religious
Islamic Pride Brigades in the Land of the Nile (IPBLN)	1/ religious
Jamaat Ansarullah	1/ religious
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar	1/ religious
Jemaah Islamiya	1/ religious
Jund al-Sham	1/ religious
Karawan-e-Naimatullah	1/ religious
Liwa Ahrar al-Sunna	1/ religious
Nusra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria (NJGGS)	1/ religious
Partisans of the Sunni	1/ religious
Popular Resistance Committees	1/ secular
Shumukh al-Islam	1/ unknown
Soldiers of the Prophet's Companions Group	1/ religious
Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)	1/ religious
Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG)	1/ secular
Unknown group	2095
Total	**3692**

Source: CPOST, Chicago Project on Security & Terrorism, University of Chicago

A total of 3692 suicide attacks were performed, out of which the responsibility for 2095 attacks has not yet been determined. There are a total of 77 terrorist organizations that claim responsibility for the performed attacks, the participation of which amounts to 1597 suicide attacks. From ideological aspect, the ideology matrix of two organizations has not yet been established - Shumukh al-Islam, which is accountable for 1 suicide attack, and Iraqi Government, which is also accountable for 1 suicide attack, and thus as basis for determining the ideology of terrorist organizations shall be used the total number of 1595 attacks.

There are a total of 9 terrorist organizations with secular ideology. They performed a total of 70 suicide attacks, which represents 4,38% of the total number of suicide attacks (1595), performed by terrorist organizations.

On the other hand, there are a total of 66 terrorist organizations with religious ideology. They performed a total of 1525 suicide attacks, which represents 95,61% of the total number of suicide attacks (1595), performed by terrorist organizations.

In accordance with the database of the University of Maryland (USA)-GTD[27] for the performed suicide attacks in the period 2001-2014, on a global level, as performers or suspects are listed the following terrorist organizations or groups.

Table 4

Terrorist organization	Number of attacks / Ideology
Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi DHKP/C	6/ secular
Hamas	50/ religious
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)	11/ religious
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)	38/ religious
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)	42/ secular
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)	1/ secular
Taliban (IEA)	479/ religious
Al-Qaida	25/ religious
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)	3/ religious
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	10/ secular
Chechen Rebels	10/ religious
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade-suspected for some attack	43/ secular
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM)	2/ religious
Al Mansoorian-suspected	2/ religious
Haqqani Network-suspected for some attacks	41/ religious

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[27] GTD, Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ (visited on 27.05.2016)

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	129/ religious
Jundallah	9/ religious
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)	32/ religious
Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO)-suspected	1/ religious
Islamic Jihad (Ideological Grouping)	2/ religious
Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)	1/ religious
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)-suspected for some attacks	8/ religious
Jerusalem Groups Hebrew (Qvutzot Yerushalayim)	1/ unknown
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)-suspected	2/ secular
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)-suspected for some attack	2/ religious
Ansar al-Islam-suspected for some attack	3/ religious
Muslim Rebels-suspected	1/ unknown
Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia-suspected for some attacks	5/ religious
Salafia Jihadia-suspected	5/ religious
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestina (DFLP)	1/ secular
Hizbi-i-Islami-suspected for some attack	7/ religious
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	5/ religious
Al-Haramayn Brigades	1/ religious
Tawhid and Jihad	22/ religious
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)-suspected for some attacks	27/ religious
Hizbi al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT)-suspected for some attacks	4/ religious
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG)- suspected	3/ religious
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-suspected for some attacks	10/ religious
Islambouli Brigades of Al-Qaida-suspected for some attacks	5/ religious
Jihad Martyr's Companies in Iraq-suspected	1/ unknown
1920 Revolution Brigades-suspected	1/ secular
Al-Qaida in Iraq-suspected for some attacks	129/ religious

Ansar al-Sunna	5/ religious
Organization of Soldiers of the Levant	1/ unknown
Islamic Army in Iraq-suspected	1/ religious
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)-suspected for some attacks	5/ secular
Secret Organization of Al-Qaida in Europe	4/ religious
Egyptian Tawhid and Jihad	1/ religious
Al-Arifeen	1/ religious
Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB)-suspected for some attacks	6/ religious
Mujahedeen Shura Council	3/ religious
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)-suspected for some attacks	97/ religious
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)	2/ religious
Sunni Supporters	1/ unknown
Colonel Karuna Faction	1/ secular
Jund al-Sham for Tawhid and Jihad-suspected	2/ religious
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)-suspected for some attack	3/ secular
Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)-suspected for some attacks	33/ religious
Taliban (Pakistan)-suspected for some attacks	5/ religious
Mujahideen Youth Movement (MYM)	1/ religious
Al-Qaida in Yemen-suspected for some attacks	4/ religious
Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami	1/ religious
Jaish al-Muslimin	1/ religious
Algerian Islamic Extremists	1/ religious
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)	2/ religious
Islamic Jihad Union (Uzbekistan)	1/ religious
Al-Shabaab-suspected for some attacks	73/ religious
Iraqi Sunni Extremists	1/ unknown
NVF (Russia)	1/ unknown
Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)-suspected	3/ religious
Ahrar Al-Jalil (Free People of Galilee)	1/ unknown

Caucasus Emirate-suspected for some attacks	8/ religious
Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB)	8/ religious
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)-suspected for some attack	3/ religious
Karabulak Gang-suspected	1/ unknown
Jamaat-e-Islami (Bangladesh)-suspected	1/ religious
Army of Islam-suspected	1/ religious
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)-suspected	2/ religious
Arab Socialist Baath Party of Iraq-suspected	1/ secular
Boko Haram-suspected for some attacks	74/ religious
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)	1/ secular
Al-Nusrah Front-suspected for some attacks	56/ religious
Qari Kamran Group	1/ religious
Abu Hafs Katibatul al-Ghurba al-Mujahideen	1/ religious
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)	13/ religious
Mullah Dadullah Front	1/ religious
Free Syrian Army (FSA)	4/ secular
Liwa al-Islam	1/ religious
Hezbollah	1/ religious
Jaish-e-Islam	5/ religious
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem)	12/ religious
Tajamo Ansar al-Islam	1/ religious
Harakat Ansar Iran (HAI)	1/ religious
Ansar al-Dine (Mali)	4/ religious
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)	214/ religious
Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who sign with blood)	3/ religious
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)	1/ religious
Mujahideen Ansar	9/ religious
Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (Muhajireen Army)	1/ religious
Al-Shuda Brigade	2/ religious
Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia)	4/ religious
Unification Army Sons Brigade	1/ unknown

Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)	4/ religious
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent	1/ religious
Greater Damascus Operations Room	1/ religious
Islamic Front (Syria)	2/ religious
Baloch Waja Liberation Army (BWLA)	1/ unknown
Tehrik-e-Khilafat	1/ religious
Uighur Separatists	2/ unknown
Liwa Ahrar al-Sunna	3/ unknown
Jaish Tahkim al-Din	1/ unknown
Palestinian Extremists	2/ unknown
Donetsk Peoples Republic	1/ secular
Libya Sheld Force	2/ unknown
Military Council of the Tribial Revolutionaries (MCTR)	2/ unknown
Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq	1/ religious
Al-Naqshabandiya Army	6/ unknown
Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries	2/ religious
February 17 Martyrs Brigade	1/ religious
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar	1/ religious
Barqa Province of the Islamic State	2/ religious
Other-suspected for some attacks	9
Individual-suspected for some attacks	5
Unaffiliated individual (s)-suspected for some attacks	21
Militants (Iraq)	2/ unknown
Muslim Fundamentalists	5/ religious
Unknown	1658
Total	**3613**

Source: Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland.

A total of 3613 suicide attacks were performed, out of which the responsibility for 1658 attacks has not yet been determined, and 1955 attacks are classified in different categories. In the category *Other,* there are 9 attacks, in the category *Individual* there are 5 attacks performed, and for these suicide attacks there is no information whether they are individual cases or they are acts of terrorist organizations. In the category *Unaffiliated individual*, yet unofficially affiliated

to some terrorist organization or group, there are a total of 21 attack performed. There are a total of 35 suicide attacks performed in these three categories.

Terrorist organizations or groups that claim responsibility or are suspected of performing the suicide attacks are 123 in number, and the participation of the same amounts to 1920 suicide attacks.

From ideological aspect, the ideology matrix has not yet been established for the following terrorist organizations or groups: Jerusalem Groups Hebrew-Qvutzot Yerushalayim (1), Muslim Rebels (1), Jihad Martyr's Companies in Iraq-(1), Organization of Soldiers of the Levant (1), Sunni Supporters (1), Iraqi Sunni Extremists (1), NVF-Russia (1), Ahrar Al-Jalil-Free People of Galilee (1), Karabulak Gang-(1), Unification Army Sons Brigade (1), Baloch Waja Liberation Army-BWLA (1), Uighur Separatists (2), Liwa Ahrar al-Sunna (3), Jaish Tahkim al-Din (1), Palestinian Extremists (2), Libya Shield Force (2), Military Council of the Tribial Revolutionaries MCTR (2), Al-Naqshabandiya Army (6) and Militants-Iraq (2). These are a total of 19 terrorist organizations or groups, with participation of 31 suicide attacks. Thus, as basis for determining the ideology of terrorist organizations will be used the number 1889.

There are a total of 15 terrorist organizations or groups with secular ideology. They performed a total of 122 suicide attacks, which represents 6,45% of the total number of suicide attacks (1889), suspected to have been performed or performed by terrorist organizations.

There are a total of 18 terrorist organizations or groups with religious ideology. They performed a total of 1767 suicide attacks, which represents 93,54% of the total number of suicide attacks (1889), suspected to have been performed or performed by terrorist organizations.

Conclusion

The ideological aspects of certain terrorist organization or group that perform suicide terrorist attacks are product of several social aspects. The postulates of these social occurrences are most frequently found in the form of external and internal factors. External factors include elements of threat and presence of foreign countries or their direct support to the domicile country's system. Internal factors refer to the socio-economic and national differences within the society. The energy generated from the both factors creates a basis for development of radical beliefs. The process begins with the conditions that are dictated by the society, continues with the conditions that are determined by the system for each sphere in the society and in the end it is finalized with accumulated energy – ideology, which is product of the social occurrences.

Suicide terrorist attacks were actualized in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The timeframe of their operating activities points to ever more emphasized forms of destruction. Suicide terrorist attacks were performed by both religious and secular terrorist organizations. Secular terrorist organizations, although fewer in number, in the period 1983-2000, were accountable for more suicide attacks, or in other words, 67% of the total of 286 attacks in this period were performed by LTTE and PKK (Weinberg, L. Pedahzur, A. Canetti, D. N, 2003). According to CPOST, 56,75% of the total number of performed suicide attacks, for which responsibility is claimed, are

performed by terrorist organizations that proclaim secular ideology in the period 1983-2000. According to GTD, 61,26% of the total number of performed suicide attacks, for which responsibility is claimed, are performed by terrorist organizations that proclaim secular ideology in the period 1983-2000. In the period 2001-2014 the situation changes in favour of radical religious ideology both in view of the number of terrorist organizations and in view of the number of performed suicide attacks. According to CPOST, 95,61% of the total number of performed suicide attacks, for which responsibility is claimed, are performed by terrorist organizations that proclaim radical religious ideology. According to GTD, 93,54% of the total number of performed suicide attacks, for which responsibility is claimed, are performed by terrorist organizations that proclaim radical religious ideology.

The ideological devotion to the deed represents a strong drive for the performers of suicide attacks. The road to success of both categories, secular and religious, could be perceived in a form of triangle, the base of which is based on the social processes (accumulated energy), and the two sides (secular and religious) are used for the achievement of the aims, while the apex represents the ultimate aim. It is evident that there is not any specific rule regarding the ideological representation of terrorist organizations or groups that implement suicide attacks, nevertheless, the key moments are the environment that will justify the self-sacrifice and the presence of critical mass that is willing to sacrifice for the ideal.

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Combating Terrorism and Terrorist Financing in the Peak of Refugee Migration and the Human Rights Issue

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Abstract

As the subject of discussion of this paper, the author refers to combating terrorism, and its developing and metamorphosing phenomena. Illegal arms sales, smuggling, and the activities of organised crime, like drug trafficking and prostitution, can generate huge sums that are used to fund illegal terrorist organizations. Embezzlement, insider trading, corruption and computer fraud schemes also produce serious amounts of profit, which then needs to be turned into legal profits, through money laundering. Money laundering is inevitably linked with the finance of terrorism.

In reference to the above, the author speaks of terrorist financing and related crimes, and the impact these crimes have on the integrity and stability of the financial sector and the state's sovereignty, but mostly, this paper analyses sources of funding of terrorist organizations, and speaks with special scope of ISIS as an eminent global threat. Bearing in mind the frightening statistics, the author raises the question of migration as an important vulnerability of combating terrorism and the desolation of human rights.

Key words: financing of terrorism, money laundering, migration, human rights.

Introduction

The most important step in detecting and preventing the outflow of money to terrorist organizations is good understanding of the financial needs of modern terrorist groups. Costs associated with the achievement of the terrorist attacks, but also to the development and maintenance of terrorist organizations, is significant. Funds are needed for promoting militant ideologies, payment for operatives and their families, traveling for the purpose of the organization, training of new members, forging documents, corruption, buying weapons and organizing attacks. They often need a variety of expensive services, including advertising and legitimate social and charitable activities of organization that promote their goals.

Illegal arms sales, smuggling, and the activities of organised crime, like drug trafficking and prostitution, can generate huge sums. Embezzlement, insider trading, corruption and computer fraud schemes also produce serious amounts of profit, which then need to be turned into legal profits, through money laundering. In these circumstances the most logical thing to do is to hide the profits, disguise the source or sources or change the form of the wealth. Sometimes, even moving the money to a place where it is less likely to attract attention or in less cooperative states, i.e. states that are less compliant with the international regulations on bank secrecy etc. It is important to understand the diffrencies between Money laundering as "process by which one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate" (Grabbe, 1995), and the financing of terrorism, which is ina way –a reverse process, using legal or illegal profits and streaming them through legal economic pathways to an illegal end and purpose. Though initially considered an aspect integral to only drug trafficking, that has not been the case in the last 20 years. Organized crime has evolved in many ways, and money laundering represents a necessary step in almost every criminal activity that yields profits.

When we speak of money laundering we need to be precise. The term does seem quite equivocal, since often "money" in itself, is not what is laundered. It can be any kind of property that directly or indirectly represents the proceeds of crime. If property – whether money, arts, properties, derive from the proceeds of someone's criminal activity, then it comes within the scope of what is meant by money laundering. Furthermore, the term "laundering" implies a series of complex events, a multilayered process that turns "dirty" money into legal profits, when really, it may not be so. Money laundering can be very simply done, by putting in circulation money that are gained by illegal activities, in the local department store.

Illegal trade is another, more complicated way to launder "dirty" profits. For example, in the case of illegal trade of nuclear technology, materials etc., some Middle East countries have been known to develop nuclear weapons and then use money laundering in order to sidestep international restrictions and regulations about proliferation of weapons of mass destructuion.

But mostly, the reason why the international community has made the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing a priority, is the imminent terrorist hazard that lurks everywhere and seems to be a perpetual threat to Europe. The consequences of money laundering, terrorist financing, and related crimes can have, both on the integrity and stability of the financial sector and the broader economy, are vast. These activities can undermine the integrity and stability of financial institutions and systems and seriously distort international capital flows. They pose a global threat of serious destabilization to an extent of becoming a state sovereignty issue.

ISIS terrorist groupation grew from the Iraqi "branch" of al-Qaeda, but now it is an organization on its own, a para-governmental and para-military one, at this. They have gained prominent territories in Northern Iraq and Syria. By overtaking these countries whit brutal force and unthinkable violence, this has become their main propaganda. In this sense, the organised movement of Western and Middle Eastern countries against ISIS shows a common perception of the jihadist group as a threat to international security. And this is because this kind of systematic and

brute force is first and foremost a serious breach of human rights. Moreover, it instigates the bigger issue of recruiting: the power of propaganda as a tool of the terrorist groups to radicalize young people and attract foreign fighters to ISIS. The myth of an undefeatable monster is created. So this begs the question if we are fighting to win, why are we helping their propaganda with media coverage? Are we spreding the terror by being scared? This is a war that needs to be fought on two fronts: both the military and the media one.

Regarding the causes of this latently funded terrorism group, that turned into a global threat, one should review the activities of Al Qaeda through the 90's. This terrorist organization had ran dozens of operations in several countries, thereby causing several simultaneous bombings- like those on the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and targeting to targets as the warship U.S.S. Cole. That culminated in 2001 with the famous attack on September 11 in the United States. Then, to diffuse its points, Al-Qaeda started to aim at smaller targets, making them more unpredictable and undetectable than ever. This time with quite the opposite approach, but always with the same bloody purpose and motive, the so called "micro terrorism" reared from the dust and gained its momentum around the world.

Even if we start from a simple comparison of forms and methods of execution of criminal terrorist actions from ten years ago - in view of the current situation, we will easily discern its expansion, new forms, professionalism and even more aggressive deviance and cruelty. The level of expertise is evidently more different and unfortunately, much improved.

Terrorism is declared an international crime in 1970, at the forth United Nations's Office of Drugs and Crime Congress, in Kyoto, Japan. Terrorism, as an individual work of organized crime, has an ideological and political character. This stems from the object of protection of this incrimination, which is the state and its sovereignty, the economic and political system and the values protected by the regulations. In regard to this, it is undisputable that criminal law and its regulations on protecting the state and its safety, always and in all countries, irrespective of their form of governance, have had great importance in combating the prominent dangers of criminal acts aimed at the country and its sovereignty. But today, the importance of the criminal acts incorporated in the Criminal Codes of each state, grows larger than ever. The terrorism that we combat today, this "war on terror", is everywhere. It is at home, it is within our borders, and that is something the international community seems unprepared to deal with.

Financing of Terrorism: sources of funding

Financing of terrorism is also a global issue nowdays. There is serious absence of statistical analysis of its scope, because there are major problems in the disclosure of sources of funding, starting with the fact that terrorists usually hide their activities through money laundering, establishing anonymous business relationships, transience in the established business relationship, concealing actual occupation (often posing as students), frequent change of address, opening accounts for very small amounts so as not to attract attention, etc.

II.1 Charities and Fake Humanitarian Aid

Terrorist networks often use compromised charities, commercial companies or organizations and companies who have agreed to lobby in support of their goals. For example, some groups are related to branches of charitable organizations in the areas of high risk, respectively - underdeveloped parts of the world where social benefits provided by the state are sparse. Having been disguised as aid, the private funds become much easier to funnel in large quantities. For this reason, Saudi Arabia for example, aware that ISIS fund-raisers may masquerade as humanitarian aid organizations, has blanket-banned unauthorized donations destined for any part of Syria. The government of Kuwait was the single largest donor of "uncommitted" aid to Syria—which means the funds between donor and recipient are not guaranteed to reach a specific cause or destination. Until October 22 2011, around $200 million since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011 had been donated to Syria without any official paper trail for the funds, according to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), a global monitoring service managed by the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (*Financial Tracking Service web sourse*). The theoretical estimation of the value of assets under ISIS control, including oil reserves, gas reserves, minerals, cash assets, is estimated at 2,260 billion dollars at the end of 2015, which means that their asset value is up for 11 percent compared to late 2014 ("ISIS Financing", Center for analysis of terrorism, 2016).

II.2 Legitimate Business Companies

Legitimate profit oriented companies can be used as a source of funding that provides material support to terrorist activities. This is an especially risky sector, since the money is legal and it usually goes under the "radar".

II.3 Self-financing

In some cases, terrorist groups are funded from internal sources, including families, in addition to the criminogenic factors. The amount of money required to mount small attacks can be acquired and private finance by the terrorist or the network behind it, which has its own savings. Terrorist organizations can be very decentralized and self-financing practiced by foreign financial intermediary who is not directly involved in the planning or conducting attacks itself. An example for this are the European operatives for AL Quaeda and ISIS, which are conducting separate attacks and are functioning individually.

II.4 Illegal money

In the past, some terrorist groups happened to have financial and other assistance from countries that finance terrorism, but as a result of international pressure, many of these sources of funding are completely extinct (Libya, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan).

In addition, the new decentralized and autonomous cells often have no access to foreign funding as is the case with traditional terrorist groups. Because of their mobility, this type of terrorist activists use alternative sources of funding, including criminal activities such as arms smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, racketeering, and trafficking and smuggling of narcotics. Basically, any lucrative crimes whose primary purpose is to raise funds, which may include a series of minor frauds. Drug trafficking is at the top of this list (FATF Report: Financial flows linked to the production and profiting of Afghan opiates, 2014;).

ISIS, on the other hand, is a complete financial mystery to the rest of the world. On October 23, Washington's point person in the fight against ISIS—the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen—acknowledged in a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington that "[ISIS] has amassed wealth at an unprecedented pace and its revenue sources have a different composition from those of many other terrorist organizations." ISIS doesn't "depend principally on moving money across international borders," he said, but "obtains the vast majority of its revenues from local criminal and terrorist activities." This presents a formidable obstacle for the U.S. Treasury, which is accustomed to pursuing its enemies by pressuring established banks to expose their criminal clients. ISIS's use of middlemen across the Middle East to smuggle cash in and out of its territory, in addition to employing decades-old smugglers' routes, makes the group especially hard to track.

The reach of ISIS's financial portfolio is broad and lucrative. Highly localized and multiple revenue streams feed the terrorist organization's coffers—generating up to $6 million a day, according to Masrour Barzani, head of Kurdish Intelligence and the Kurdistan Regional Security Council.Grossing as much as $40 million or more over the past two years, ISIS has accepted funding from government or private sources in the oil-rich nations of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait—and a large network of private donors, including Persian Gulf royalty, businessmen and wealthy families.Until recently, all three countries had openly given hefty sums to rebels fighting Bashar Assad's Syrian regime, among them ISIS. Only after widespread criticism from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the international community did Saudi Arabia pass legislation in 2013 criminalizing financial support of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra and ISIS. (Di Giovanni, Mcgrath Goodman, Sharkov, 2014)

In August, ISIS was declared "Enemy Number One" by the most senior Islamic cleric in Saudi Arabia, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, and Saudi Arabian bomber and fighter planes joined U.S. airstrikes against ISIS. So far, Qatar and Kuwait have not followed suit (Di Giovanni, Mcgrath Goodman, Sharkov, 2014).

II.5 Propaganda

In addition to calling social activities aimed at civilians, paramilitary organization almost always have activities focused on public relations and media, propagating its terrorist ideology.

Terrorist groups always find a different source for raising money, even through propaganda. Through spreading fear among the citizens of the world with gruesome television footages

or social networking, terrorist organizations have ways of recruiting new members and spreading the message of bloodshed and power disguised as religion, and of course this brings them money, voluntary funds given by their recruits ISIS, in particular, produces the most technologically advanced propaganda yet. Through sophisticated digital means, they have promoted the idea that ISIS has successfully established a caliphate and recruited thousands of new members to join the terrorist organization. ISIS films, which range from minutes to hours long, use Hollywood-style production tricks and special effects to portray ISIS terrorists as heroes and depict fighting for ISIS as akin to playing in a real-life video game. These violent and gruesome depictions are sent out alongside pictures and posts describing romantic, exciting encounters and riches enjoyed by ISIS youth. ISIS propaganda combines the horrifying and tantalizing to deliberately target young adults through social media, portraying life in ISIS territory as glamorous and utopian, and its members as heroic and desirable. Such propaganda fails to disclose the harsh realities of life in ISIS or ISIS-perpetrated atrocities.(Lieberman, 2017;)

II.6 Oil

ISIS's oil empire stretches across a landmass roughly a quarter of a million square miles and contains around 300 oil wells in Iraq alone, according to the latest data from the Iraq Energy Institute in Baghdad. Some of the biggest seizures include wells and production facilities in Hamrin, with at least 41 wells, and Ajil, with 76. At its peak, ISIS operated around 350 oil wells in Iraq, Al-Khatteeb says. After battling with the Kurdish peshmerga and coming under fire from U.S.-led airstrikes, which began August 8, it lost around 45 of them—including in Ain Zala and Butma—and it torched a few fields as it pulled out. In both locations, the *peshmerga* recaptured wells with a total output of around 15,000 barrels a day.(Di Giovanni, Mcgrath Goodman, Sharkov, 2014)

ISIS still controls as much as a third of Syria's oil production, according to estimates, using the oil revenue to finance its self-declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq. However, Syria's oil output is only around 30,000 to 40,000 barrels per day (bpd). Before the start of the Syrian War, oil production in the country was nearly 400,000 bpd.

In Syria, most of ISIS' oil is sold to smaller private refineries (non-ISIS members) in the northeast of the country, though the refined crude is often a lower quality finished product. Refiners then sell it on the black market, usually to either the Syrian government or back to ISIS.

Several reports claim that ISIS makes as much as $3 million a day from its Syrian oil operations. Others dispute that figure, stating that it might be as low as just a few hundred thousand dollars per day. (Daiss, 2016).

III. Migration as a terrorism threat and the human rights issue

Many argue that the migrant/crime association results from a selection process, since criminals are more likely than others to migrate (Newman, Freilich and Howard 2002). Research has also found that more heterogeneous societies have higher crime rates (Howard, Newman and

Freilich 2002a, 2002b). It is contended that specific migrants, akin to the Trojan horse, serve the interests of outside powers and seek to attack the host nation from within. Right-wing political parties and movements in many nations argue that Arabic and Islamic immigrants pose such a threat and should be monitored closely, and ultimately deported to their countries of origin. (Freilich, Newman, Shoham, Addad, 2002)

According to 2016 statistics of the European Pairlament, 87% of Europeans believe the risk of a terrorist attack to be medium to high. They also believe that the top priority to change the situation is to fight against financing of terrorist groups. This means that European citizens are not satisfied with the current steps that are taken for the war on terror to seize.

A third generation of juhadis emerged in 2005, largely unnoticed by the West, when splits within Al Qaeda engendered the emergence of the Islamic State. Europe resulted as its main target. They had new organizational structures and overturned the Al Qaeda's top-down, pyramid-like organizational structure, favouring a bottom-up system, which is also reflected in their modes of financing. As a recent report by news agency Thomson Reuters reveals, the Islamic State's economic system is marked by independence and diversification of funding sources in a post-Al Qaeda world. However, institutions to fight terrorism have not yet moved forward in turn. (Muller, 2017). Not only that they have not made significant steps forward, but they have been faced with a situation where anyone can be terrorist, and anyone can be funding terrorist organisations. The result of the incompetence to take charge of the situation became prominent with the structural migration that hit Europe and is still ongoing.

The refugee crisis in Europe shed a new light to migrants all over the world. Both the Paris and the Nice attacks brought frightening feelings and a vigorous European response to the Syrian refugees: that migration is understood to be a form of barbarian warfare that threatens the European Union (EU). Every refugee and migrant has now explicitly become a potential terrorist – and vice versa.The migrant is a potential terrorist hiding among the crowd of migrants, and the terrorist is a potential migrant ready to move into Europe at any moment. Despite the fact that the attacks in Paris were perpetrated by European citizens, weak border security and migrant 'flooding' are being blamed for the attacks.

"To win their war, fundamentalist terrorists can safely count on the collaboration of their shortsighted enemies" (Bauman, 2015). Suspension of the basic rules of democracy, resentment towards foreigners, the vicious circle between political propaganda and xenophobia, nation-states unable to face a significant phenomenon as migration. The refugee crisis, before and after the attacks in Paris, is the "litmus test" of a global crisis of the West, explains the great sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in tan interview with Open Migration. On sensing the political effects Bauman will say that Political profit is currently derived from popular xenophobia – all over Europe with the sole exception of Spain, Portugal and Finland, all three countries safely off the immigration tide's main route. In the traditionally left-wing Vienna, opinion quiz place the violently xenophobic Freedom Party at the same approval level of the Social Democrats. In the Netherlands, playing the xenophobic tune earned Geert Wilders' party ten more parliamentary seats at the expense of Mark Rutte's ruling liberals.

In Germany it pulled the Eurosceptic Alternative for Germany movement out of its political invisibility. In Italy it tripled the quiz in favour of Matteo Salvini's Lega Nord, in reward for his sweeping under the carpet his autonomic ambitions for Lombardy and focusing solely on barring the entry to immigrants, whereas in Great Britain it offered a second lease of life to Nigel Farage's UKIP after its last year electoral debacle. Bauman explains the static in the European Union, so striken by fear and terror, that it is downgrading its own liberal and democratic principles. A faire cost for an apparent safety.

A research conducted by CATO Institute, "Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis", 2016, concludes that foreign-born terrorism on U.S. soil is a low-probability event that imposes high costs on its victims despite relatively small risks and low costs on Americans as a whole. From 1975 through 2015, the average chance of dying in an attack by a foreign-born terrorist on U.S. soil was 1 in 3,609,709 a year. For 30 of those 41 years, no Americans were killed on U.S. soil in terrorist attacks caused by foreigners or immigrants. Foreign-born terrorism is a hazard to American life, liberty, and private property, but it is manageable given the huge economic benefits of immigration and the small costs of terrorism. The United States government should continue to devote resources to screening immigrants and foreigners for terrorism or other threats, but large policy changes like an immigration or tourist moratorium would impose far greater costs than benefits (Nowrasteh, 2016).

All governments have an important role to play in screening foreigners who cross their borders, and to exclude those who pose a threat to the national security, safety and wellbeing. In time of "war" against terrorism, this proves to be almost impossible, albeit most needed since migrants have human rights and they deserve a much better treatment than what they are receiving. It is a question of cost, above all, what torments me above all. War means no rights whatsoever to the opponent, it means the state has a right to kill in the name of fighting terrorism. It means war casualties in the form of many innocent migrant men, women and children. Putting up walls, is quite the monument for dying human rights in the name of potential terrorist threats. It is not a victory, it is not a mean to an end, it is not a safeguard, and it is most of all, a sad deafening defeat of modern society.

IV. Conclusion

The 2016 Global Peace Index shows that the world became a less peaceful place in the last year. Results also show a growing global inequity in terms of the prevalence of peace, with the most peaceful countries continuing to improve while the least peaceful slide deeper into violence and conflict. The report added that 2015 has been the second bloodiest year although it registered a decline by 10 percent in the number of terrorist attacks compared to 2014. The report pointed out that 29,367 people were killed between 2000 and 2015 due to terror-related incidents. It also found that the average death in terrorist attacks in the world is 1.8 per attack and that there have been terrorist attacks by 103 terrorist groups around the world that did not result in any deaths in 2016.

Economy-wise, according to the report, the economic impact of violence on the global economy in 2015 was 13.6 trillion dollars. This figure represents 13.3 percent of the world's economic activity (gross world product) or 1,876 for every person in the world.

The peace in the world deteriorates as militarization is on the rise. Fighting terrorism has had a vicious cost on all progress of principal. It has somehow made us afraid to be progressive and political –wise it has awakened an up rise of the radical right winged parties.

This new forms of terrorism, where anyone and everyone is a possible enemy, a threat, a demise of our world, where terrorism is funded by people in our own cities, possibly even neighbours, it is understandable to be afraid. Today we build our walls, tomorrow we lock our windows and doors, when does it end? Building walls is actually the easiest way. The harder way is to actually find the terrorists and shut down the sources that fund them.

The Council of Europe has issued a damning report of Europe's "abysmal" treatment of refugee children, who have made up about a third of those seeking asylum on the continent over the last two years. This will increase the danger of their possible future radicalisation and incrimination. Tomáš *Boček*, the Special Representative on Migration and Refugees of *Council of Europe* Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland, has told the Guardian: "What these children are going through will define who they will become. And it will also define, in some respects, our common future. He adds that he has seen children who had become upset and angry, but also apathetic. And that makes them more vulnerable. Perhaps to radicalisation.

Furthermore, the Council of Europe's report, based on visits to detention centres and camps in Greece, Macedonia, Turkey, France and Italy, warns that migrants and refugees are exposed to violence not only at the hands of smugglers and traffickers, but also as a result of state action and inaction., which is certainly not an appropriate response: rather, child protection measures should be put in place. Guardian states, based on the report, that there were also allegations of sexual harassment and abuse of children the even disproportionate use of force by the police.

To conclude, yes, there is an inherent need to fight terrorism, today more than ever. But the war on terrorism is raging and it seems no one is winning. While no one is winning, progress suffers an immense loss. We become more tolerant of violence we ignore grotesque photographs of children by shutting down our devices and moving on with our "privileged" lives. It has become evident, it seems, that freedom and human rights are a geostrategic privilege. Somewhere between developing technologies, we have devolved as people.

We practice to forget that we are all human. We shut our eyes because of fear and because it simply seems improbable of happening to "us". But we are very wrong. We have put up a disgraceful and frightening standard of apathy. We are scared, we are in terror and so, terrorism wins.

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Female terrorist from the Western Balkans as a security threat

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Abstract:
Women have been involved in political violence for more than a century, but the academic focus on women terrorists is relatively recent dated. As terrorism is transforming, the role of women is evolving from secular to Islamic religious settings. The Western Balkans is a region that is particularly vulnerable to the appearance of the female terrorist. The number of women from the Western Balkans involved in terrorist activity and leaving from this region to "Islamic State"-held territory is growing, which makes phenomenon of female terrorist become more visible in media coverage, scholarly work and counterterrorist official activity.

The paper explores phenomenon of women from the Western Balkans that are involved in terroristic activities in the "Islamic State". The first part of the paper explores motivation of women from the Western Balkans to support and participate in terrorism. The second part of the paper looks at the ways of their recruitment. The third part analyzes the different roles that women plays in terrorist organizations. The last segment of the work focuses on the response of the state and society to this security threat through legislation and the process of de-radicalization.

Key words: female terrorist, terrorism, Western Balkans, terrorist organization, "Islamic State"

1. Introduction

Studies have shown that women have had an extensive history of participating in terrorist activities. It has been proven in modern terrorism that female involvement began in the nineteenth century with the Russian People's Will, with the onward appearance of Chechen Black Widows and the Tamil Tiger's Birds of Paradise, and other terrorist organizations, which this paper is dedicated to mention. Women's political violence has most frequently been associated with left-wing movements, and with attempt to resolve fundamental problems in the political and social institutions of society. They have been taking participation within nationalist, often violent conflict. Today, it is especially important to notice evolution of women's political violence from secular to Islamic religious settings.

In contemporary terrorist groups men are generally in charge, but women play a substantial role in terrorist activity. They participate in combat operations, and also have vital supporting roles. The question that undeniably arises should there be vivid distinction of male and female members of terrorist organizations? There is a increasing number of women that have joined to the terrorist organization, especially the "Islamic state". Also, the role of women in terrorist organizations is altering and growing, which creates the need for a detailed examination of female terrorist phenomena.

Western Balkan, due to its historical and cultural components, and because of its specific geopolitical position, couldn't remain immune on changes that happen in the Middle East. The Wahhabi movement in this region is gaining strength, and since 2011 there is a increasing number of people who went to Syria and Iraq. Those people joined to "Islamic State", and have taken active roles in combat operation (Dragišić, Ćurčić, 2016:146). As the result of those happenings, the constellation of threats to the security of Western Balkans has been changed.

However, although there is a lot of researches on the security of the Western Balkans in the context of terrorist threats, one topic has been often neglected. That is a question of activity of female terrorist from this region. Women from Western Balkans have being recruited by „Islamic State", and migrating to Syria and Iraq. So it is important to recognize this security challenge and to put a gender-based perspective on counterterrorism policy.

There are differences in reason that attract men and women to join the "Islamic state", and also the roles of women in the Islamic State and the messaging the group uses to lure women to migrate to Syria and Iraq are sufficiently different. In order to understand reasons that pull and push women from this region to become terrorists, we need to explore the specifics of participation women in terrorism. Hence, we should explore their motivations, ways of their recruitment, what are advantages and disadvantages of engaging women in terrorism and which roles they can play in terrorism organization. Then, this knowledge should be applied in research the phenomena of female terrorist from Western Balkan. Also, we should research what states and society should do in order to prevent female involvement in terrorist activity, or which are ways of react on those who had already become members.

2. Motivation of women to support terrorism

In analysis of female involvement in terrorism, one of the first question that arise is what motivate women to take participation in terrorist activity? It is important to comprehend that each individual is motivated for a different reason, and that a multitude of reasons may also be combined to influence women to take action in an extreme manner. Some scholars believe that there are differences between men and women in motivation to support terrorism: men are politicized and women are acting out of passion. Society is quick to judge these women as irrational actors. This scenario is not always the case, so it is essential to recognize reasons that motivate women to support terrorism and carry out a terrorist attack.

According to Bloom, women's involvement in terrorism can be motivated by four R's: Revenge, Redemption, Relationship and Respect. Bloom argues that revenge for the death of close

family member is most often cited as the key factor for women's involvement. Some women are trying to redeem themselves by a willing act of martyrdom. For them, making terrorism is better alternative than facing an honor code that will hold them culpable for past misdeeds. Under the relationship factor, Bloom considers the importance of situation when woman is related to a known insurgent or Jihadi. Finally, although usually in conjunction with other motives, women have sought the respect of their community. By engaging in violence they can demonstrate that they are just as dedicated and committed to the cause as the men of the society (Bloom, 2011:12-13). This attempt to seek a deeper understanding of female motivation phenomenon is worth of attention. But, analyzing Bloom's 4 R categorization, we can notice that it is to general, and as the result some of important factors are neglected. Also, relationship with some other member of terrorist group is way of recruitment, rather than motivation factor.

At the most general level of analysis, the motivation of women to participate in terrorist activities arises from a specific combination of religious, ideological, political and personal reasons. The forthcoming classification provides a broad analytical framework for understanding female motivation to support terrorist activity, because it is applicable on Muslim women, Western women that convert into Islam and join terrorist group, but also on women that participate in secular terrorist group.

2. 1. Commitment to an Ideological Cause
Political reasons, religious and ethnic beliefs are often a touchstone for the motivation and commitment of females involved in terrorism (Zedails, 2008:52). They have a desire to make significant changes to the current environment and to contribute to a cause that they believe in. In many cases, women are more dedicated to the cause and act more decisively than men because the female gender as a whole has more to gain from significant social changes that may occur from the terrorist movement.

2.2. Grief or Revenge for Loss
Grief is a significant motivation that draws wives, mothers, or daughters into extremist organizations. The loss of a dominant male figure in their lives has a tremendous emotional, physical and financial impact. Many female terrorists want to seek revenge on those who have humiliated them in the past; or for family members or on their male counterparts which have oppressed.

2.3. Financial Problems
The death of a husband, father or son for females that live inside conflict zones can lead to a loss of economic support for an entire family. Women are often involved in terrorist activities in order to support their families financially and to provide basic subsistence requirements. Many women are sacrificed themselves and became suicide bombers in order to ensure that their family receives a generous amount of money, and on that way enable the rest of family to survive.

2.4. Desire to Improve Social Status

There are many different reasons that can be classified under the desire to improve social status. When government institutions are able to provide gender equity and opportunities for women in economic, political, and social arenas, it would certainly reduce terrorist movements that appeal to women, and thus, diffusing the infrastructure of such movements (Gonzalez-Perez, 2008:131). Human rights abuse, discrimination and lack of opportunities for women are factors that can generate discontent among women and provide potential mobilization for political violence against the state. Some woman choose to partake in acts of terrorism to bring respect to their status and with involvement in the terrorist group they bring pride to their family and children, and have found eternal paradise for themselves. Also, gaining equality with their male counterparts is a strong motivation to participate in terrorist activities.

2.5. Personal or Family Shame

Females will often join terrorist organizations as a way to reinvent themselves or to become pure again after a sexual assault or after been forcibly raped. This shame is not only focused on the individual, but also directed at the entire family. Often women will seek to become suicide bombers to cleanse the indiscretions that they have been accused of, regardless of who is to blame (Sutten, 2009:25). Suicide bombers are considered martyrs and discretions in their past are forgiven and their family honor is restored when they give their life for an ideological cause.

2.6. Protection of Itself or Family

In conflict zones, terrorist organizations often provide the basic security mechanism for local towns and villages. Sometimes women turn to support terrorists because they either receive protection from criminals, or other rogue elements, or are afraid of possible retaliation if they do not provide support. The protection provided by terrorist organizations can be more destructive to the local populace since security or military forces see this support as disloyal to the government, and will crack down on supporters (Sutten, 2009:26). This creates a destructive cycle, where women need to choose lesser of two evils.

2.7. Adventure and romance

Desires to experience adventure or romance are also factors that attract women to join terrorist organizations, especially women from non-conflict zones, in example, women from Western Europe. Faced with the unexciting and unchallenging environment at home, and seduced with the romance story between the female migrant and the jihadist, they may decide to experience this alluring different way of living. The sense of adventure in leaving home to travel to new places is influential particularly for the younger women. It is worth remembering that a large number of Western women joining ISIS are very young (Saltman and Smith, 2015:16).

It is important to comprehend that motivation factors that influence on women are not only be combined, but also can be changed or transformed over time. Someone who was initially motivated primarily by one set of factors may thereafter gradually change his or her thinking

based on experience (Persin, 2015:25). All these circumstances indicate the complexity of research-ing phenomenon of female motivation to participate in terrorist activities. Understanding the mo-tivational factors behind why women get involved in violent acts, may give us an idea of what challenges a society is facing, and in turn the factors that engender conditions in which terrorist organizations are able to recruit and win support.

We presented factors that can motivate women to join terrorist organization in general, and now we should implement that classification to the particular situation in order to understand which factors motivate women from Western Balkans to become terrorist. At first, we need to no-tice that there isn't active secular terrorist group in this region, and women who participate in terrorist activity are connected to the "Islamic state". Those are Muslim women, or women con-verted into Islam. They, like a women in any other part of world, can respond to the call made by "Islamic State" leader al-Bagdadi that all Sunni Muslim believers have a "religious duty" to migrate to "Islamic State". Also, women can join to "Islamic State" as a react of well-spread islamophobia, or they can find a sense of purpose in believing that they are part of the founding generation to establish a pure Islamic utopia based on Shari'a law. Hence, as one of motivation factors we can recognize commitment to an ideological cause. If some family members have been killed in Syria or Iraq, it may appear desire for revenge at their mother's, wives, or daughters, so grief or revenge for loss can't be fully excluded as potential motivation factor. High unemployment and the lack of meaningful opportunities for both women and men, particularly in rural areas, are significant con-tributing factors to the region's radicalization problem. Youth unemployment is even more urgent an issue, as no country in the Western Balkans currently has a youth unemployment rate under 30 percent (Mietz, 2016:7). So, financial problem is one of key motivating factors that drag women into terrorism. If Muslim women from Western Balkans countries believe that they are oppressed in some way or anyhow prevented in practicing their religion, they can choose to partake in acts of terrorism to bring respect to their status. As Western Balkans is non-conflict zone, there isn't necessary for women to join to terrorist organization in order to provide protection of itself or family. Also, there is low level probability that they join to terrorist group in order to reinvent themselves after they have been assaulted, or raped. But, it is necessary to pay full attention on two related factors, desire to experience adventure and romance. This situation is especially dan-gerous to young women from Western Balkan rural area, which offer limited employment oppor-tunities. Due to the growing sense of boredom of youth and discontent with their future outlooks, traveling to the Islamic State offers them a chance for adventure. Also women can be seduced with promises to feel real love with jihadist.

3. Recruitment of women for terrorist activity

Studies into terrorism have traditionally focused on men, due to belief that women have assumed passive, inherently less interesting roles in extremist groups. As violent extremism and terrorist radicalization are still often considered a male issue, the question of women terrorist radicalization is characterized by bias and misconceptions. In situations of conflict and violence, women are often seen as passive, victims, helpless, subordinate and maternal. Such assumptions

reinforce gender stereotypes. As a result, women are neither considered to be potential terrorists, nor perceived to be as dangerous as their male counterparts if they were to be involved in terrorism (OSCE Final Report, 2013:3). Terrorist organization produce a large amount of violent extremist propaganda and recruitment strategies directed at women, so it is fundamental to increase awareness of the existence of and potential for women terrorist radicalization and recruitment strategies directed at women.

Analyzing 54 publications on female terrorism, Jacques and Taylor concluded existence of two forms of recruitment: some of them appear to join terrorist groups voluntarily, whereas others appear to join as a result of recruitment drives by the terrorist group. Principal among these are peer pressure and group conformity, which has been documented as occurring in or through university networks and on-line chat rooms and discussion boards. Women have also been influenced by the men that they are close to and often join terrorist organizations alongside or shortly after their boyfriends, partners, or lovers. Women may also be forced to join extremist groups (Jacques and Taylor, 2009:507).

In Western Balkans we recognize two categories of women that are important for this analysis: Muslim women that began to practice radical Islam and non-Muslim women that converted to radical Islam. Some of this women are radicalized and went to Syria and Iraq, and others are meant to recruit other women. There is no single profile of the typical female recruit, however two distinct groups are evident: young women (as young as 15) who travel to ISIS territory to marry a jihadist and women who are already married and travel with their husband. For young women still living with their parents, evidence from the Western Balkans and elsewhere shows that parents had little to no prior indication that their daughters were being radicalized or had the intention of departing for Islamic State-held territory (Mietz, 2016:5). The ways of radicalization of this women are similar to the ways that are used in rest of Western Europe. In conservative communities, which we can find in some parts of Western Balkans, women can be dictated to by their family members-who they can see, talk to and even marry. For this reason, a large role in the recruitment of women is played by the Internet and by the personal relationships with members of family and female friends that are involved with a terrorist group. Also, Internet plays an immense role when it comes to the recruitment of non-Muslim women and in their conversion to Islam. Through the Internet they can be introduced with the radical Islam, or get in contact with jihadists who will continue their radicalization.

3.1. Internet Campaigns

The Internet serves as a critical link between those seeking to participate in terrorism, and those seeking support or recruits for their organizations. It is a growing resource for terrorist organizations to recruit females to extremist activities, because it is used for disseminating terrorist propaganda and instructions to women that might not otherwise have direct contact with group recruiters or supporters. The Internet is accessible, anonymous, low-cost and it offers terrorists a variety of mediums not only to communicate and prepare for operations, but also to disseminate messages and provides connections to women. Not less important, the Internet equally

approaches the recruitment of Muslim as it approaches the recruitment of non-Muslim women.

Social networks have vital roles in the recruitment of women in terrorism. Effective social-media campaigns that promise devout jihadist husbands, a home in a true Islamic state and the opportunity to devote their lives to their religion, are the dangerous weapon used for recruitment. Western women inspired by fighters' postings can find women that have beliefs that they have in common among the followers, and build a community. They easily find the Twitter pages and Tumblr accounts of women who have already made it to Syria (*muhajirat* - female migrants) and feel a sense of intimacy towards these women as if they were close friends. In addition to encouragement, *muhajirat* provide practical advice to those wishing to travel and, as such, are the key to ensuring that ever more women travel to join „Islamic State". This can include advice on how to overcome the objections and roadblocks raised by family, what clothes to bring, where to attempt a crossing and what to expect on arrival. Although the more general pieces of advice are often contained in blog posts or on public responses on sites such as ask.fm, many of the *muhajirat* encourage those thinking of travelling to get in touch with them directly through closed messaging apps and direct message (Hoyle et all., 2015:33,34).

Websites provide a more information about terrorist group, their goals, but also may enable education for woman about how they can become more involved in ideological causes and insure support to those already involved in terrorism. These websites can assign to women specific instructions on providing medical care to wounded mujahedeen in twelve specific areas including resuscitation, applying a tourniquet, handling broken bones and treating gunshot wounds (Bakier, 2006). While a large portion of radical online material promotes the role of women as backers of terrorist by supporting and encouraging their husbands, brothers, and male children to take up arms, they are also pressed to indoctrinate their children to radical interpretations of Islam. Furthermore, there are numerous websites that reveal love stories of the women and their loving jihadist, stories of the wonderful life in the Caliphate and many other alluring stories.

3.2. Personal Relationships

One of the main reasons that significantly influences the decision of women to join the terrorist organization is the fact that people that are close to these women are already engaged in these organizations. If any family member (father, brother or husband), is already in a terrorist organization, the women are usually harassed to join the organization, or at least to be a sympathizer of one. These women usually come from a highly patriarchal society which expects them to obey men and never question their judgment. This oppressive control makes it very easy for females to be recruited into terrorist organizations since they must follow the decisions made by male family members. (Sutten, 2009:37). Family and social ties plays a significant role in the growth of terrorist organizations: al-Qaeda relied on this method heavily, and "Islamic State" encourage all families to join them promising better life for all.

Numerous cases of women from the West are those who left alone, or with their husbands or partners to join the holy war in Syria. These women usually are very lonely, and in desperate need of a lucid identity. The differences of the Western culture where individuality and independ-

ence is promoted and praised, does in fact fire back, in the sense that some women feel alienated and therefore are more venerable to manipulation. One of the largest pull factors for some women is the sense of belonging and sisterhood. Search for meaning, sisterhood, and identity is a primary driving factor for many women to travel to Syria (Saltman and Smith, 2015:15). In order to find place where they belong, to sense the feeling of belonging, of unity and community, those women are even ready to become a terrorist. This situation can be completely mapped to the Western Balkans female terrorist.

3.3. Appeal to Ideology

A call to action against a perceived injustice has the same draw to women as it does on men. Some claim women are often more interested in causing change since they have the most to gain from sweeping reforms to the political or ideological environment (Sutten, 2009:33). Even in the Islamist terrorist organizations, where the women were initially intended for a secondary role, now it more present than ever the message to all that Jihad is not just a male obligation and responsibility. Women must provide active support and take part in the Holy war. The real need for the involvement of women and the media attention women attract had the influence of making a redefinition of the methods used. Clearly, an appeal to fight for Islam is primarily addressed to Muslim women, but there are responses from non-Muslims who think that Muslims are experiencing injustice and are persecuted.

4. Roles for Female Terrorists

Levels of participation by women in terrorism are determined by the goals of the organization as a whole, and the group's opponent. Given that terrorist groups are male dominated, which roles females are allowed to play are decided upon by the men. In many groups, including al-Qaeda and "Islamic State" women were initially blocked from active combat roles, although in others-such as the FARC, the PKK and the Tamil Tigers females were welcomed, and even at times forced, to join as guerilla fighters (Speckhard, 2015:7).

At the beginning, "Islamic State" actively discouraged women from joining. Members active on social media urged their female followers to support Jihad with fundraising and by asking their men folk to join the fight. But as the group came closer to its goal of establishing an Islamic State, exceptions were made. Nowadays, the situation has significantly changed, whereas the women are recruited more often who are looked upon by other women who wish to join them.

The most general classification of women's involvement in terrorism is given by Hearne: direct involvement in terrorist acts; enabling of others to commit such acts; and facilitating the disengagement of others from violent or extremist groups (Hearne, 2009). Hearne concluded that that women are well-placed to both take part in terrorist violence (through direct participation in attacks or in facilitating terrorists), and reduce its impact (by preventing others from participating or by helping those who do join to disengage from violence). This classification is very important and represent start point in researches on women's involvement in terrorism because it recognize the importance of women not only in terrorism, but also in counterterrorist efforts.

Sue Mahan and Pamela Griset have conducted an extensive research on gender and terrorism, and have placed the role of women into the four major categories. These categories include sympathizers, spies, warriors, and dominant forces (Sutten, 2009:28). A brief description of each category is included in the Table 1.

Sympathizers	Spies
Basic logistics support Money Time Food Safe haven Sex with males terrorist	Running messages Gathering intelligence Serving as decoys
Warriors	**Dominant Forces**
Execute terrorist acts Weapons Bomb making Execute terrorist events	Play a prominent role Leadership Establish policy

Table 1: Role of women In: Sutten, M. (2009). *The Rising Importance of Women in Terrorism and the Need to Reform Counterterrorism Strategy*. Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, pp28.

If we assume that women can play several roles simultaneously, this methodology represents a good attempt of demarcation of different roles women. However, there are some weaknesses, primarily in the fact that it ignores the role of women as a recruiter and her contribution as a jihadist wife. Those roles of women are most common in "Islamic State".

Historically, tasks that women performed in terrorist organizations had varied substantially, often based on political and religious considerations. A the result of this, there is the wide spectrum of roles that women can played in terrorist organization, from women as intelligence gatherers, translators, recruiters, doctors, to suicide bombers and leaders. With evolution of women's involvement in terrorism from secular to Islamic religious settings, some roles become dominant, an others are controversial and challenging, but with much potential for action of great magnitude. So, it is important to examine which are a dominant role in "Islamic Sate" that women can take. That role are also available to the women from this region.

4.1. Wives of Jihad

Most women have a role of being a jihadist wife, where her duty is to provide the moral and every other form of support. In this way she indirectly supports the fight. Also, these women will raise their children according to the militant Islamic ideology and also help maintain the "freedom fighter myth" through which insurgents are glorified as heroes. The largest numbers of women

coming to Syria and Iraq from Western Balkans have played this exact role. Although they would go through some form of military training, they would not necessarily take an active role in combat. This type of training is done with the aim of training for self-defense.

4.2. Recruiting daughters for the Caliphate

One of the crucial role that women have in the terrorist organizations is to recruit new women to terrorist organizations. Recruitment is done primarily through social networks. When it comes to the recruiting of women from the West, it is necessary to get in touch with them, encourage them to change their religion if they are not Muslims, to convince them to go to "Islamic Sate" and connect them with the parties that will enable them logistic support for arrival.

4.3. Suicide operative

The advantages of suicide bombings seem clear. They are relatively cheap ways to kill large numbers of people. The would-be suicide either on foot or in a vehicle can move from place-to-place in order to detonate herself/himself where they will cause the most damage. When the operations are successful the sponsoring group does not have to worry about the perpetrators falling into enemy hands. And they have a shock value for the public few other forms of terrorist attack can match. What are the roles for women in these attacks? Women have obvious advantages in carrying out suicide attacks, at least those where the bomber is on foot. They may appear to be pregnant, which has a double benefit. Security personnel are often reluctant to search women who appear pregnant and this permits the would-be suicide bomber to conceal more lethal weapons. And, more generally, women arouse less suspicion than men under identical circumstances. It often permits women to get closer to their targets than their male counterparts. As a result of these benefits, on average, women suicide bombers kill more people per event than their male counterparts. Also, an attack where women commit suicide, a greater media attention is attracted.

4.4. Controversial roles: leaders and executors

Throughout the history of modern terrorism, females have been among the leaders roles in many terrorist organization. Women have had leadership roles in the Baader-Meinhof gang (Germany), the Red Brigades (Italy), Front Line (Prima linea) (Italy), the ETA (Basque separatist movement in Spain and France), the Japanese Red Army, the People's Liberation Front for Palestine, the Chechen resistance movement, and the Weather Underground (United States) (Gentry and Sjoberg, 2011:59).

Although the women in "Islamic State" were intended roles separately from combat operations, it is necessary to analyze the possibility that women take more leader-based roles. An example of a member of "al-Khansaa brigade" shows a remarkable degree of cruelty and commitment to the execution of goals.

The ability of women to carry out an execution is another issue that needs attention. Examples where women are committing murder within the frames of "Islamic State" are rare, and

are usually linked to the situation where woman kill other woman who attempt to escape from this organization. In this way, it is an effective way to intimidate women who may have planned to escape. Women could be murderers, and if a change of their position within the "Islamic State" occurred, the world will be faced with new challenges. Although there is no evidence of the participation of women from Western Balkans in this form of activity, it is necessary to be careful because such circumstances would mean an increased risk to the Western Balkans security on which we don't have an adequate response.

5. Response of the state and society

In the analysis of female terrorist from the Western Balkan as a security threat the start point can be establishing the exact number of those who have joined to the „Islamic Sate". At the moment it is impossible to estimate that number, especially because the source that we can consult aren't reliable. For example, Mietz gave estimates number of foreign fighters and migrants from Western Balkan countries, in which he divides number of men and women. But, in below, when he explain the methodology of collecting the data, he wrote "The data represent the ranges currenty found in a variety of media sources, analytical reports and government data"(Mietez, 2016:4). We can find a numerous similar papers in which authors quote figures that are collected by the NGOs, or they analyze media announcements, which gives a lot of place for manipulation of numbers. Also, we don't have reliable information on whether there are women who had regretted that gone to "Islamic Sate", and fled back to Western Balkan countries. These women could play a key role in the deradicalization of other women, because they may convey the true situation from jihadist camps.

Threats to the security of Western Balkan region by women terrorists are real, and they are reflected in at least three ways:

1. existence of women who actively recruit other women;

2. opportunities that the radicalized and trained women from the region, who were in Syria or Iraq, returned to Western Balkan countries and continue their operation, or to become "sleepers"

3. opportunities that women with no previous connection to this area is sent to carry out a terrorist attack.

An answer on how to face with this challenging situation we should try to find in developing an infrastructure for prevention of violent extremist radicalization, and in process of deradicalisation, held by Governments, civil society and NGOs. **Prevention work**, in its most basic sense, aims to stop processes of radicalisation that lead individuals towards violent extremism. In legal terms for most government's this concern is primarily to do with stopping individuals from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism (Saltman, Smith, 2015:52). On a regional level, very little attention has been put on preventive measures from the state institutions as well as the civil society.

Beyond the criminal and judicial system, no action has been taken by any of the concerned states to deradicalize or to rehabilitate fighters who return, nor is there sufficient attention being

paid to counter violent extremism (CVE) policies and gender. Governments of all countries in the region (with the current exception of Croatia) passed legislation in 2014 or 2015 criminalizing recruitment, participation, incitement, or material support of foreign paramilitary groups by their citizens. Punishments for these criminal offenses generally range from 6 months to 15 years in prison (Mietez, 2016:16). Although the criminalization of this act is good start point, the trend for legal sanctioning only doesn't give solution on the long term. Criminalizing involvement with the "Islamic State" doesn't fully address the migration problem. As Mietez noticed, the solution shows that the government is taking immediate action to punish participants in violent extremism, yet does not address the underlying causes to prevent other individuals from radicalizing and migrating. Second, there is insufficient evidence that police and the courts have the know-how to address women in extremist groups and terrorism in general. Third, prison sentences offer no opportunity for women or men who become disillusioned with the "Islamic State" and who comprehend the seriousness of their actions to reject violent extremism or extremist ideological beliefs altogether. Finally, while the major advantage of criminal legislation serves as a deterrent for potential recruits, the threat of a prison sentence also discourages women who want to escape the Islamic State and return to their home country (Mietez, 2016:14). Also, there are more questions that arises: the specialization of the courts from the region in conducting trials connected with events in Syria, than gathering the evidence and using it afterwards in the courts. For those reasons we can conclude that the implementation of current legislation is challenging on many levels.

More active engagement with local communities in parallel with the criminalization of the foreign fighters could potentially bring better long term outcomes. Engaging communities could be done through direct communication of state authorities and the community or through civil society groups (Bogdanovski, 2014:6). **Deradicalisation** usually refers to activity aimed at a person who supports terrorism and in some cases has engaged in terrorist related activity, which is intended to effect cognitive and/or behavioural change leading to a new outlook on terrorism and/or disengagement from it (Prevent Strategy, Annex A, 2011). Process of deradicalisation is dominantly administered through government or civil society programs. The objective of these programs: to discourage violent extremist ideologies and to provide participants with opportunities for social inclusion (Saltman, Smith, 2015:58). Promotion of process of deradicalisation with gender perspective, although is challenging, represents priorities on this point. At first, every country should recognize a deradicalisation as important part in struggle against terrorism. Then, it is necessary to produce deradicalisation strategies that are gender sensitive, and implement them through programs. So, it is important to build good infrastructure and capacity within deradicalisation programs handling returnees from Syria and Iraq. Finding an adequate response implies alerting the whole society to this danger and finding partners. In that way he interested parties receive support in order to build civil society capabilities in providing an answer to extremism (Dragišić, Ćurčić, 2016: 159). Such help may be reflected in support of those organizations leading the campaign against the spread of the Internet material that promotes extremism. There is a great need for developing counter-narratives that are aimed at females. Also, tremendous role can play women-defectors because they can give the real picture of living under the "Islamic State".

6. Conclusion

Terrorism is social phenomenon that is constantly transforming and terrorist are seeking new ways to fulfill their goals. Women are traditionally associated with weakness and non-violence, and therefore exploiting this stereotypes terrorist groups may count on greater shock value on attacks, which strive for to amplify coverage, and, consequently, to terrorize and instil widespread fear. Women's involvement in terrorism is historical constant, but at same time remains a complex phenomenon with no one pathway into involvement and no one catalyst that can explain all women in all movements.

The number of women involved in terrorist activity is growing, including women from Western Balkan, and we can expect that trend will continue in future. And not only has women's involvement grown but it has become more visible in media coverage and scholarly work. Those women aren't just Mothers of next generation of jihadist, but they play multiple roles in terrorist group, and future transformation of terrorism will certainly affect and produce new role for female terrorist. As Western Balkan is a part of Europe, but with its own characteristic, the necessity of researching involvement of women from Western Balkan in terrorist activity is real. In researching of this issue we can consult studies on participation women from Western Europe in terrorism, in order to investigate good and bad experience in this area. After that, we can create a broad profile of females at risk of radicalization based on age, location, ethnicity, family relations or religious background.

Terrorist groups will seek to exploit the advantages of female over male terrorists, so we can expect more frequent terrorist attacks made by women. Those attacks will be accompanied by great media attention, so the ability of the media to be neutral report will become crucial. There will be no place of any glorification of female terrorist by media, otherwise there is possibility that many women find a new role-model and become a member of terrorist organization.

Counterterrorism strategies tend to ignore gender as a relevant factor, and in doing so exclusively focus on male imposed threats. Approaching counterterrorism strategy with a perspective on the female gender as well as the male gender will have a positive impact on the ability of combat terrorism. In establishing mechanism of deradicalization, an emphasis on women is one the best solution and a good basis for counterterrorist strategy. There is a particular lack of infrastructure and understanding around gender dynamics within deradicalisation that would benefit from further development.

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COMMUNITY-BASED CRIME PREVENTION: PROSPECTS AND THREATS

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Abstract

Community-based prevention is one of the approaches to crime prevention that incorporates situational and social elements and it has theoretical background in several theories of crime. It arises due to the fact that the state can not cope and prevent crime alone without help, support and active participation of the community. In addition, because crime occurs in a community, it became local problem, whose social causes are also rooted in the community. That means that community has responsibility to prevent crime and to secure safety of its citizens. However, until this approach touches the real concerns of citizens and tries to explain and understand crime in a wider social context, we can not expect some positive results. Otherwise, certain situational prevention measures which are often criticized that are inconsistent with certain human rights (eg the right to free movement or the right to privacy) initiate the debate for the effectiveness and treats of that approach That means that despite the idea to create social order through the mechanisms of situational control, (which can be effective), we cannot ignore the important ethical questions about the methods used for crime prevention as the ultimate goal.

Taking into account the previous, this article open up questions related to the prospects and threats of community-based crime prevention, emphasizes its roots, theoretical backgrounds and current models and interventions.

Key words: crime prevention, community, safety, social prevention, situational prevention

1. Introduction: objectives and limits of community-based prevention

Many different interpretations and understandings within expert and scientific community can be found regarding the scopes of acting of community-based crime prevention approach. Therefore, in order to determine the essence of that approach, we will go through the questions: what are the goals of community-based prevention, what are the main activities and interventions and who are the stakeholders of such activities?

Community based Prevention endeavour to create safe places to live and to change the conditions in neighbourhoods that produce crimes and disorders, victimization and insecurity. The aim is to increase the social connection between the citizens and to remove and mitigate criminal factors in the community. According to the subject and focus of interest, it can be directed to certain situational factors i.e. the place (as physical space) and to the citizens. In the first case, the focus is to improve the control and surveillance, to reduce the opportunities for committing crimes, and to increase public confidence in its capacities, while in the second case, the preventive measures are directed to promote active citizenship, to provide assistance and support to vulnerable groups, and to improve social connections with other factors of socialization in the community, such as school, leisure, neighbourhood etc. This is in line with the concept of *"sustainable communities"* which means to be properly designed, sensitive to the needs and problems of citizens and to enhance their facilities and resources necessary for quality of life of citizens (Johnstone, 2007: 158).

Community-based Prevention covers all criminal and risk factors that exist in the community, whether related to the citizens, the general local conditions (economic, political, educational and cultural) or to the physical space (it's urban and architectural design). In that sense, there are a number of preventive measures, such as: activities designed to develop local capacities,[28] monitoring programs in the neighbourhood (neighbourhood watch programs), multi-agency cooperation and partnerships, urban planning and physical design activities, programs for reintegration of young offenders, community policing concept and so on. The listed activities include elements based on both, situational approach, as well as social approach. The former entails elements aimed at reducing the risk and other social factors that generate antisocial and criminal behaviour.

In regards with the stakeholders who are entitled to undertake preventive measures, common feature is that the appearance and the essence of community-based prevention is related to activities undertaken by citizens, schools, businesses, civil society organizations in partnership with local authorities and the police. It covers practices, not only from the public, but also from the civil society and the private sector, as well. If we consider the main approaches to the prevention of crime (developmental prevention, situational prevention and rehabilitative programs for crime offenders), than, we can recognize that the community-based prevention encompasses all of them with main focus on active citizenship and active participation of other local actors.

2. Why community-based crime prevention?

Increased crime, the failure of the rehabilitation model and the crisis in the criminal justice system in the 70's produce new considerations for responding to crime. The state realizes that cannot be responsible for crime prevention alone and it introduces new strategies for extension of responsibility (Kemshall, 2008: 132). These strategies involve delegation of preventive func-

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[28] When we talk about capacities of the community, we encompass its infrastructure, housing, education, leisure, children protection, environment maintenance, transport and development of civil society organizations (Richardson and Mumford, 2009: 263).

tions from the state level to the private sector and civil society, and especially to the local community. So, the policy of crime control in the 80s and 90s go beyond the criminal justice system and builds a new criminal policy based on partnership and cooperation between the state, private and civil sector. Thus, the state is gradually withdrawing from the responsibility for the prevention and sets new goal: improving the quality of life in communities which means identifying their needs, problems and priorities. To achieve that goal, multiagency partnerships and the pluralisation within the local policing are seen as the most effective means in the system of crime control (Hughes & Edwards, 2005: 20). Their tasks are to build internal mechanism for control within the communities in order to deal with the local problems and to spread responsibility for crime prevention outside of the criminal justice system. In fact, the expansion of prevention from a narrow focus only on crime occurrence and criminal opportunities is a reflection of the wider framework and social context in which crime is located. In this regard, in most European countries, crime prevention has been replaced with alternative terms such as *community safety, urban security* and the like. Crucial for institutionalization of such new policies are forming local partnerships or local security networks (Crawford, 2013). They lower the crime control from central to lower local levels (but still under the state control). Thus, the new social control includes measures to increase the safety of communities, with special focus on high-risk and problem areas.

Some of the reasons for development of local policies are located within (1) the local nature of the crime, (2) the gradual breakdown of community values, and (3) in the process of its reactivation. An additional contribution has the activities of the international community, primarily through the United Nations Congresses on crime prevention and the treatment of offenders.

Regarding the *local nature of crime*, we can note that the crime problem is complex and the crime control, if concentrates only at the offender and his responsibility exert partial and limited results in crime reduction. Namely, crime does not produce just harm to particular victim. It creates a sense of insecurity, fear, and disrupts social order and harmony. Crime gets extended and local dimension and is considered as a local problem that threatens the security of citizens. Therefore, prevention involves removal and mitigation of the causes and risk factors which are rooted in the community. For example, one of the risk factor is the socio-economic and demographic structure of the local citizens, because their individual characteristics, such as age, family, work and material status, previous convictions and a propensity for antisocial behaviours may increase risk of crime. Also, due to the cultural diversity in the community, some citizens who have not equal opportunities to participate in cultural, economic or social life may create opposite cultures that lead to sub-cultural deviant and other negative behaviours. Other negative factors are the existence of certain places in the community with high risk of crime and with frequent violations of law and order, which reduce the informal social control, on the other side (Sherman, 1997).

So, in addition to dealing with the consequences of crime, a significant approach in understanding the crime is turning to his micro-social factors that are complex and need to be analyzed, both nationally and locally. Parental neglect, limited educational opportunities and lack of support from the community, in conjunction with other risk factors cause social disorganization, which is the basis for development of crime. Hence, prevention must include interventions designed

to change social conditions, institutions and relationships and to improve the mechanisms of informal social control.

In a wider social context, it is connected with the urban safety, because in a 21st century, most of the population lives in cities. We can say that 21st century is the century of cities, urban life and fast, heavy traffic, migration and mass communications. Inevitable social processes of industrialization, urbanization and migration increase the density of the population and thus narrow the space for movement. In parallel are running processes of decay and redefinition of the social values of community and connectedness of citizens. So, we raise the question: *can we talk about community, unity, solidarity and social justice in the 21st century?* Basically, the new style of life, displacement of working hours and absence from home, weak the informal social control and produce disintegration of communities in the sense of alienation of citizens, loss of sense of community, breaking the traditional ties and segregation. It causes feelings of fear and insecurity among citizens and gated communities. As it comes to breakdown of informal social networks and loss of control by social institutions, so it comes to escalation of antisocial behaviour. Strong signs of neglect of the physical environment, underdeveloped local economy and closed homes have contributed to demoralisation and isolation among people (Richardson and Mumford, 2009: 269).

Such negative and pessimistic conditions open up debate and alarm to return the old features of the communities: to care and to solve local problems by its own capacities, to increase citizen participation and to accept and reintegrate offenders and victims of crime. The reactivation of community means a change of awareness among citizens that security and solving local problems are a common concern and responsibility. It stems from the assumption that increased social cohesion and closer relations between citizens, reduce the possibility *to turn on a wrong road* and to enter a, so called, *criminal circle*. Also, the findings show that police and criminal justice system cannot reduce and prevent crime and its causes and consequences as they have limited knowledge, competencies, capacities and resources. Therefore, control of crime move down from the centre to lower local level and develops other principles such as extended responsibility in crime prevention and privatization of criminal justice response. So, the crime prevention gets local focus and it promotes the experiences, attitudes and priorities of all citizens living in a community (Hancock & Matthews, 2001: 10). These reforms receive increasing expression because the community has a responsibility to provide security to its citizens, to protect the victim from secondary victimization and offender from revenge, to create appropriate conditions for their reintegration and to provide public education on peaceful conflict resolution (McCold, 1996: 92-93).

2.1. Theoretical background of community-based prevention

Community-based prevention is based on several criminological theories of crime: theory of social control, theory of social disorganization, early ecological theories and theory of broken windows.

According to *Social control theory* (Hirshi, 1969) four mechanisms should be accomplished for effective interaction between the individual and his social environment. They are: *attachment*

and *commitment* to the family and to the community, *participation* in social life within the community and *faith* in the social values promoted and accepted within the community. If these factors (attachment, commitment, involvement and belief) are less developed among individuals, then, the possibility for development and manifestation of delinquent behaviour is increasing. Therefore, the preventive strategy for crime reduction should be directed to re-establish ties and relations between the individual and his community (referred to Krivokapic, 2002).

Theory of criminal embeddedness has resulted as a product of street crime research (Hagan, 1991) in the nineties of the last century in the United States. According to the data, street crime is a product of the limited opportunities for minorities in America (mainly Afro-Americans) for their legitimate inclusion in the labour market (limited jobs for these categories of citizens), which increase the process of residential segregation (territorial separation and formation of special locations and areas which are predominantly inhabited by groups of particular ethnic or national origin). Second negative feature for minorities are limited educational opportunities that cannot meet the growing need and demand for higher education. Therefore, those who live in marginalized communities are involved in deviant drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling or other illegal activities that are available at the black labour market. In fact, according to the theory of criminal embeddedness, changes in the economy and social structure in the community are related and affect the life cycles of individuals who, due to a number of factors are brought into a state of criminal confinement.

Broken window theory was developed by Wilson and Kelling in 1982, which was later accepted as a key part of policing strategies on crime prevention in the United States. This concept means that when a broken window has been left to fix, it is a sign that no one cares about it and causes opportunities for more broken windows in the surrounding area. In other words, small damages (such as broken window) lead to more serious damages if nobody takes care of the previous ones. So, physical disruption of neighbourhood and social disorder on the streets increases the fear of crime and draws citizens from the streets. This situation reduces the informal social control, which creates opportunities for committing serious crimes. For example, a study of fear of crime conducted in Portland, Oregon indicates that ¾ of the respondents cross to the other side of the street when they see a group of violent juveniles or do not go to places where young people gather, listen to loud music and drink alcohol. Those findings suggest that often, fear of crime is higher in areas and places where there are frequent disruptions of order and deviant behaviours. Namely, the fear reduces free movement on the street i.e. people fear to leave their homes that weakens social connections among them. Therefore, the basic thesis is that social disorganization and marginalization of the community problems attract a more serious crime. Those places that are not monitored and are deserted become *suitable opportunities* for drug trafficking, prostitution, car theft, violence, vandalism, graffiti and similar deviant behaviours.

2.2. Crime prevention and urban safety

In addition to community safety, due to the stronger growth of cities and the increase in

urban crime, in the last decade of 20th century, the issue of urban safety is increasingly considered. In fact, it is the same concept, but greater emphasis is placed on the city, urban living and urban crime that produce greater insecurity. So we can talk about a city (urban areas) as a set, not only of several territorial communities, but also as a unity of different social groups whose members are from same ethnic, national or cultural background. As highlighted at the 10 UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders, held in Vienna in 2000, the 21st century is the century of the city with the rapid growth of mega cities. The estimate is that the global urban population is larger than the entire world population in 1960. Not only the majority of the population in the 21st century lives in cities, but the number of mega cities with a population of over 10 million is increasing.[29]

The growth of cities, migration and urbanization have caused serious problems: problems with population density, pollution, reduction of informal social control, the increase of fear and insecurity among citizens, restrictions of educational opportunities for certain groups, cultural conflict, processes of exclusion and segregation. They hamper the harmonious development of cities and especially endanger public spaces in cities as public good that can be used equally and unlimited by all citizens. In the cities, commercial and private spaces are growing and, as a result of their occupation, the public spaces free for use are limited, which encourage divisions, social exclusion and polarization among citizens. Private spaces remain reserved for a group of users, while public spaces for ordinary citizens who cannot pay the services of private recreational and other sports and entertainment centres. Therefore the question: *why some cities are safer than others*? is not easy to answer because the answer depends on detailed analysis of the socio-economic and political situation, the environment and the mentality of the citizens. Common problems such as poverty, unemployment, large social differences in cities, the military situation in certain regions, the general dissatisfaction of citizens in society and alienation in large cities create conditions for insecurity. Besides these, the everyday routine activities of citizens in urban environment represent also sources and reasons related to the safety of other users in the area (Danilovik-Hristic, 2014: 20). In such conditions, crime and victimization is increased, and urban security, which receives, international dimension, becomes a priority topic of many international and political debates. As part of those debates, great emphasises is put on *city development approach* which distinguishes the role of local authorities and the involvement of citizens and other civil organizations in specific preventive actions.

2.3. Approaches and programmes in crime prevention

Community-based prevention has focus on both, physical environment safety and citizen's safety (to improve relations in the neighbourhood, to reduce risk factors associated with the citizens and to encourage their participation in preventive activities). It can be achieved though ac-

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[29] United Nations, Tenth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Vienna, 10-17 April 2000, Effective crime prevention: keeping pace with new developments, working paper prepared by the Secretariat (A/conf.187/7).

tivities designed to change certain physical features of the environment in order to remove barriers for natural surveillance and to reduce opportunities for committing criminal acts. Besides physical design, crime prevention means an increase of informal social control through neighbourhood watch programs, and mobilization of community resources and local capacity for recreation, sports, education etc.

Developing partnerships in crime prevention

Many programs for community crime prevention are based on partnership, which means building collaboration between several organizations. They are mostly created as a collective response to specific problems identified in the community. While in the 70s and 80s, we have talked about multi-agency, cross-agency and coordinated or collective approach to crime prevention, in the 90s the term *partnership in prevention* has become a key term in the areas of public safety and in the field of urban policy (Gilling, 1999). They reflect a new dispersed and pluralistic nature of crime control, and although there is no single definition, partnerships represent cooperative relationship between two or more organizations (Rosenbaum, 2002: 172). So, in the 80s new schemes for surveillance in the neighbourhood have begun to establish, altogether with advisory councils to local authorities, inter-agency committees and other local councils. With their foundation, the state has extended the responsibility for crime prevention and has reallocated on a lower community level.

Approach and objectives of the local partnership in crime prevention

Mainly, the development of partnerships is a result of the thesis that strategies for crime prevention depend more on informal rather than on the formal social control. This means that the main aim of the partnership should be the strengthening of informal control (Homel, 1994, Kemshall, 2008). They have the potential to create stronger and more participatory civil society and are seen as a solution to the failure of the state control and its monopoly to deal with crime. Therefore, instead of crime control to be the responsibility only of the criminal justice system, a new vision for an expanded and pluralistic nature of criminal policy emerges (Garland, 2001 stated in Hughes & McLauglin, 2003: 5). The need for such an approach lies first in the fact that the information related to crime can be obtained from many sources and secondly, because the criminal justice system has limited capacity and resources, and neither can address community problems alone, nor can offer unique solutions for them.

So, the main concern in the 70s related to crime control, was that there is not enough cooperation between the criminal justice system and agencies of informal social control, on a local level. Therefore, preventive partnerships shift the crime control from the state to the community (Kemshall, 2008: 127), and it becomes the responsibility of individuals, communities and commercial institutions. They are oriented towards solving problems and, according to the nature of the problem, offer certain situational measures or social responses to crime. Thus, partnerships have

a greater understanding of local problems (Crawford, 2007) and acknowledge that, as the causes are multifactor, the response needs multi-agency approach which requires enhanced and expanded responsibility. Additionally, their significance lays in the fact that they address the causes of the problems and may encourage cooperation between the criminal justice system and public institutions and civil society. In this regard, the police are often part of the partnerships and their participation is growing considering the new innovative community policing approach. Some of them are, for example, educational programs aimed at reducing drug abuse in schools, such as: Drug Resistance Education Program (DARE) or Community responses to Drug Abuse Program (CRDA), Comprehensive Communities Programs and etc. (Rosenbaum, 2002: 181-182).

Programs for Surveillance and monitoring

Monitoring programs are widespread in the US and in England and Wales and they are based on common interests and needs for maintaining security in the neighbourhood. Their primary goal is natural and informal supervision and control of the behaviour of people at risk, of outsiders and of undesirable people in a certain areas. They include several activities: public education, citizen patrols, measures to identify ownership, environmental protection etc. in order to strengthen the communication between neighbours and to reduce their fear and sense of insecurity.

In terms of crime, studies about effectiveness of certain programs show positive results in property offenses reduction in the community, but not for violent crimes since they often occur between people who know each other. In such cases the offenders are not seen as outsiders and undesirable persons in the neighbourhood. The experience of the implemented programs also shows that if the offenders see that the community is well organized and takes preventive activities for community safety, then, they displace their planned criminal activities in communities that lack or have limited mechanisms of informal control.

In terms of the forms of surveillance and monitoring in the communities, most recognizable are Neigbrhood watch schemes. These schemes result from the movement for greater citizen involvement in crime prevention in the US in the 60s and 70s. First Monitoring Programme was established in 1973 in a small area in Seattle, while in England and Wales in 1982. A report by the British Crime Survey in 2000 found that about six million households are involved in approximately 155,000 programs (schemes) for observation, while in the US, about 41% of citizens live in communities that implement such programs. In fact, the citizens of the community carry out patrol activities or observe space and if notice any suspicions or other illegal behaviour or activities; they can report them to the competent authorities. Therefore, their contribution to the prevention of crime is based on several assumptions: on *visible observation,* by patrolling or by placing signs of ownership which can threaten and deter potential offenders to commit a crime (Bennett, Holloway, 2008: 10) and on *easier and faster flow of information* (which are associated with deviant and criminal phenomena in the community) by citizens to the police. Although monitoring programs seek to increase the ability of the community to control crime, to create greater connectivity be-

tween citizens and life free from fear, however stated objectives are contradictory in nature. Namely, both, the control and the mistrust of people, which are essential elements of the above programs, instead to bring citizens more familiar, they make bigger distance among them.

3. Threats and challenges to community based prevention

There are several remarks and threats in terms of effectiveness and positive impact of community-based prevention. Mainly, they refer to the (1) problem of understanding of the concept and boundaries of the community, (2) the increased emphasis on situational approach, (3) motivation of citizens to participate in preventive activities, (4) inefficient functioning of the partnerships and (5) the increased fears of citizens resulting from the application of certain prevention programs.

One of the biggest challenges of community-based prevention is problem of understanding what we understand under community, because communities in the 21st century are so deterritorialized that the feeling of belonging, interaction and joint neighbourhood are fading which, in turn reinforce alienation and separation among citizens. Now, citizens instead of building long-term and strong friendships, establish short-term relationships based on momentary interests. In such circumstances of division and fragmentation of communities, prevention is difficult to sustain. It is possible, but only in community understood perfectly, when the spirit of unity, social cohesion and social integration of citizens flourish, when citizens first think about their communities, and then for them and when, if someone broke and deviate from the road, the community immediately initiate mechanisms of informal social control. However, in the 21st century, we ask the question: whether the community can be defined as a social group of any size whose members reside in one location, share one government and has a common cultural and historical heritage (McCold, 1996). In modern, urban, pluralistic societies, the community is often a problem and cause of crime, not a solution (Persak, 2009: 112-113).

Another remark of community-based prevention is placing greater emphasis on situational versus social approach to problems response. Its primary objective is to cause visible changes in the physical environment than significant social improvements and changes in the social living conditions. Such priorities instead to "release" the root causes of disorder and crime, they can cause even greater "suppression" of disorganized communities. This means that measures of surveillance and control put aside the real problems and deal only with physical protection and decrease of the sense of fear that is often a result of external influences and threats. Such marginalization of the problems and putting aside (under the carpet), on the one and increasing security, on the other side, are contradictory goals, because instead to decrease, they increase the fear. For example, placing stickers or signs at homes and certain objects that signify that the area around them is under surveillance or that crime is a problem in that area can increase the feeling of insecurity among the citizens. To support this, the survey of 14 cities in England and Wales (2005) shows that the cameras do not improve the feeling of security among the people, except when they know that a certain area is under video surveillance. Other research shows that

those who are aware of the existence of video cameras are more concerned about crime situation. So, situational and security measures, although aim to reduce crime and to increase safety, often fail to realize that goal (Whattam, 2011: 37).

In terms of the partnerships, main comment is that the concept is contradictory and ambiguous. On the one hand, they put a priority on cooperation and on the other hand, their focus is limited and is about reducing crime and breaches of public order, which does not tackle the other social problems of common interest (Crawford, stated in Edwards & Hughes, 2009: 67). Also, partnerships are faced with the problem of un–representativeness of the most groups within the wider community (Crawford, 1994: 509). For example, the views of the representatives who are part of partnerships may have no connection with the views of the majority of citizens who do not participate in decision making processes. Such division and favouring one versus other opinions can lead to exclusion of certain groups and to marginalization of their needs and problems. Therefore, we need strategies for greater integration of young people at risk, for mobilization of families, schools and other civil and public organizations in the community. Through their participation and expression of opinions and needs, we can touch more closely the causes of crime which seek appropriate social responses and solutions (Gilling, 1999: 140-141). So, if they expect to address causes of local problems, then, on the agenda of joint partnerships should be frequently raised questions about such themes.

Related to citizens' participation, the practice shows that citizens are not very motivated to participate in preventive activities. The main obstacles can be found in cultural and language barriers, fear of revenge, the sense of hopelessness and distrust of the criminal justice system. These obstacles are particularly emphasized in communities that have a high crime rate. In addition, those who participate do not represent the whole community, because the community, the characteristics of the population, are increasingly heterogeneous rather than homogeneous (Rosenbaum, 2002: 189). For example, in many urban areas with high crime live people from different ethnic, social, religious, cultural and ethnic groups (Crawford, 1998: 245). Because of such social and other divisions of the population in certain areas, there is no cohesion between members and, as a result there is no requirements and need for certain preventive activities. One example which shows that community-based prevention does not touch the real problems is the fact that many security measures and surveillance are applied in areas with low crime rates and where risks to jeopardize the security are minimal. This means that prevention activities are often undertaken in areas with homogeneous composition of the population and with no real need for protection. Therefore, the main problem associated with prevention at the local level is the difficulty to mobilize and activate citizens unmotivated and to establish strategies for reducing crime in high risk areas (Hancock & Matthews, 2001: 15).

Prevention of crime through forms of intervention and control of behaviour is often directed to defend the community from the actions of the offenders, who are seen primarily as outsiders, not as neighbours or members of certain communities. They are "the others" that endanger the security and, thus the security becomes a target and object of attack from outside. In this sense, the importance of the role of citizens in preventive activities is seen as making control and

maintaining the public order. By doing so, it reinforces the responsibility of those who can control and exclude others (Guilling, 2007: 195). Because of such understanding of the problems, community safety often fails to address the forms of crime that involve family relationships, child abuse, abuse of work, abuse of power and other violent crimes (Crawford, 1998: 245). Although preventive programs based on community are aimed at reducing fear and increasing social connections among people, however, increased monitoring, supervision and control of behaviour increases rather than reduce fear and isolation.

4. Conclusions

Community-based prevention is an approach to crime prevention that incorporates situational and social elements and it has theoretical background in several theories of crime. It arises due to the fact that the state alone can not cope and prevent crime without help, support and active participation of the community. In addition, because crime is occurring in a community, it became local problem, whose social causes are also rooted in the community. That means that community has responsibility to prevent crime and to secure safety of its citizens. However, until this approach touches the real concerns of citizens and tries to explain and understand crime in a wider social context, we can expect some positive results. Otherwise, certain situational prevention measures which are often criticized that are inconsistent with certain human rights (eg the right to free movement or the right to privacy) initiate the debate for its effectiveness and treats. That means that despite the idea to create order through the mechanisms of situational control, which can be effective, cannot be ignored the important ethical questions about the methods used for crime prevention as the ultimate goal (Tilley, 2005: 5). While these methods can reduce crime, they create other negative consequences for citizens, at the same time: increased concern for personal safety, separation, closed societies, increased suspicion of potential perpetrators and limited access to certain locations that are subject to massive property. Such system represents a system of controlled living (Shapland, 2000).

Although the community safety is the most important value and human need, more important is how it is protected. Community safety does not need to increase xenophobia and intolerance. It cannot even accept the opinion that in order to prevent crime and in the efforts to increase security, we should balance between individual freedom, autonomy and human rights, on one and the values of security, on the other hand. Therefore, it should not be allowed balance and compromises on detriment of freedom and basic human rights (Persak, 2009: 116). Similarly Garland, argues that the new penal policies have no strategy for progressive social change and do not care to overcome social divisions. They are policies who ménage with dangerousness and risks and which strive to shift the burden of social control to individuals, organizations and surveillance measures that do not have enough resources to achieve those goals (Lea, 2002: 164).

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РЕЛИГИЈАТА И НАЦИЈАТА: СЛУЧАЈОТ НА РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА
RELIGION AND NATION: THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract:

Historically to ensure unity in a country where religion played a significant role, it was required that the country have only one religion i.e., "the sovereign of the country determines its religion." This politicization of religion led to religious wars within and among the nations of Europe; hence the principle was replaced by one of secularity, i.e. separation of religion from the state. So, today western liberal democratic societies are secular, or in other words, religion is set apart from the state. However, the beginning of the 21st century has seen a re-politicizing o the religion. This trend has been particularly noticeable in the period since the end of the Cold War.

The Republic of Macedonia is no exception to this international trend. Under the constitution, the state is a secular one and religion is segregated. This means that the state has no right to interfere in religious matters, nor may religious communities involve themselves in matters of state. In practice, however, this strict division of labor is not achieved in any secular society. In this paper, we shall investigate the interlocking relationships that have come to exist between politics and religious communities in the Republic of Macedonia in the building of the contemporary Macedonian nation. In the paper authors concluded that the process of building the modern nation should continue to occur within the existing cultural matrix, which in itself articulates the values of two civilizations - Muslim and Orthodox. Religious groups, in essence, are calling for peace, tolerance and respect for the "other", which can contribute to building a multicultural society. On the other hand, disrespect and manipulation of religious particularity can adversely affect the building of the sense of a single nation. In a society such as Macedonia's, inter-religious co-

operation is very important. Only this concept carries any promise for the future of the contemporary Macedonian nation.

Keywords: politics, religious communities, nation, fundamentalism, secularism

Introduction

Until the mid 17th century and beginning of the formation of the modern (secular) international system of states, religion was the key ideology that often provoked political conflict between social groups within countries and between countries. But after the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the development of the modern nation-state, first in Western Europe and then in the European colonies and the rest of the world, at both the intrastate and international level, the political importance of religion declined significantly.[30]

However, at the beginning of the 21st century, religion is once again politicized. This trend has been particularly noticeable in the period since the end of the Cold War. And this is especially true of the so-called "world religions" (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Confucianism). Many analysts point to the Iranian Revolution (1978-79) as the moment when there was a "re-awakening of religion", in this case of Shia Islam. For many years, Iran, like Turkey, whit its Sunni Muslim majority, had been an example of a secular state patterned on the Western liberal model. Moreover, many other parts of the world witnessed the emergence of states where religion played an increasingly important role. Europe was partly an exception to this trend, because most of its countries emphasize their secularity having displaced religion from the public into the private sphere.

Religious fundamentalism

The concept of popular religious interpretation, including religious fundamentalism, is not new. There have always been opponents of the prevailing religious interpretation. What is new, however, is that whereas in the past, manifestations of popular religion occurred within the framework – and under the control of the main religion, in a modern society, it is no longer possible to keep under control all religious tendencies within a traditional organizational framework. This is primarily a result of two actors. First, it is due to the process of modernization and secularization. And secondly, it's part of the process of shifting religion from the public to the private sphere.

Contemporary manifestations of religious fundamentalism are only one aspect of the global "re-awakening of religion". It is interesting to note that the various manifestations of contemporary religious fundamentalism constitute a kind of reaction, often in militant form, to what its adherents perceive as the western liberal trend of secularization which leads to the public and political marginalization and the privatization of religion.

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[30] See more: Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), London and New York, 2009.

Many observers in defining religious fundamentalism attribute it to it a social and political conservatism. From a social point of view religious fundamentalism is seen as backward, not modern, and inherently opposed to change. However, it should be noted that if this is the case, it is very difficult to satisfactorily explain the sometimes revolutionary political demands and programs of some fundamentalist religious leaders and activists. For example, some religious fundamentalists, particularly Islamists in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general, want to replace regimes that they consider anti-Islamic, with ones that will have more authentically Islamic governments.

Overall, the nature and impact of fundamentalist doctrines form part of a moral and social concern about the relationship between state and society. In some cases, the basic defensiveness of the religious fundamentalists comes from the belief that they are threatened by modernization and secularization and/or the arrival of hostile groups with different ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds. Sometimes, in an effort to change the situation on the ground, this security develops into wider social and political with attacks on the established political and religious leadership for their weakness and inadequate response. In their quest for a response to current political issues religious fundamentalists turn to basic religious texts such as the Koran and the Bible in order to find the "opinion" of God on various social and political issues. Usually this is done through the use of selected paragraphs from the holy books that can later for the basis for the creation of reform programs.[31]

It is often said that the modern religious fundamentalism is rooted in the unfulfilled expectations of modernity, especially in the disappearance of moral values or the perception that the role of the family as a social institution has been devalued. For many religious fundamentalists, God is threatened with a loss of meaning, due to fast-moving global social changes. All over the world, especially since the end of World War II, the pace of socio-economic change has been so great as to gravely threatened traditional mores, beliefs and cultures and societies are under strong and unrelenting pressure to adapt to modernization. In a material world, the value of the individual is measured against secular standards of wealth and status. So it seems that religion is being ignored and devalued and even its existence threatened. Hence, many religious fundamentalists are hostile towards social, cultural and economic changes seeing them as a toxic cocktail that is responsible for religious, moral and social decay.[32]

The general characteristics of the religious fundamentalists are as follows: They are afraid that their preferred religious way of life is under threat from unwelcomed secular influences and hostile groups. Their goal is to create a traditionally-oriented, less modernized society. As a result, many of them support campaigns to change laws, morals and social norms in ways that they believe to be in the interests of their particular religious groups. In some cases, the target of the change is the domestic and/or international political configuration. Many religious fundamentalists are willing to mount a range of political challenges to the ruling regime if they consider that its

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[31] See more in: Jeffrey Haynes, "Religious fundamentalism", in Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), London and New York, 2009, pp. 159-174.
[32] Ibid.

policies on education, relationships between sexes, and employment lack the required degree of moral "purity" for a domain that they hold to be integral part of their vision of a proper religious society. They may also denounce those members of their own religious group that they think are not performing their religious obligation. Likewise they may confront rival or opposing religious groups that they consider to be infidels and a threat to their own religious group.

This is especially true for "Abraham" religions - Christianity, Islam and Judaism- which refer to the holy "book": Fundamentalists belonging to these religions take their defining dogmas from the holy books in which they are written. In other words, the sacred books are the basis of these three religions when they refer to the will of God. Sometimes Abraham fundamentalists manifest themselves as conservative (African Christian fundamentalists), sometimes as political reformers or even revolutionists (some Islamic groups) and sometimes as xenophobic, racist and reactionary (some Jewish fundamentalist groups).

In short, religious fundamentalism can be defined as a religious stance that requires strict adherence to religious beliefs. It often results in intolerance not just towards other religions and believers but also towards those followers of their own religion that do not adhere to these fundamental values. Hence, Protestant fundamentalists despise Protestants who fail to see the threat of Catholicism. Jewish fundamentalists attack Jews who are inclined to secularism. Finally Muslim fundamentalists believe they have a sacred duty to protect Islam from any form of cultural modernization. The political implications of such fundamentalist tendencies can sometimes result in terrorism, as it is the case with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Religion and Nation

Unlike in European countries, the role of religion in the United States is quite prominent. More than half of Americans say they regularly attend religious services, which is three to four times more than European norms. Even on the American currency, the dollar, the words "In God we trust" are written. The importance of religion in public life in the United States is partly explained by the fact that it is an element of the cultural heritage of the 17th and 18th-century settlers, many of whom were Anglo-Protestants. This is an important cultural factor that is present in the daily lives of Americans, and even in the formation of the American multi-ethnic yet civil nation.

Hence, no one can deny that religion is an important resource that can be used in the building of a nation. According to Mike Pierce, "it is not possible to build a complete and well-functioning society in which religion is completely absent. "[33]There are two approaches to the utilization of religion in nation building, organic and voluntaristic.

When it comes to identity, religion sometimes bulks larger than ethnicity. Religion is one of the earliest and most general expressions of humanity that connects people. Hence, many politicians have used it in the creation of their nation-states. Religion has a special place in the organic

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[33] Interview with Mike Pierce with the weekly Citizen, no. 29, 17 November 2012, p. 17 (*Граѓански*, бр. 29, 17 ноември, 2012, стр. 17).

approach to building a nation.

The problem occurs when there is more than one religion in the country: The political elite cannot use the religion of the majority community as a means of homogenizing the society, because it creates a feeling of inferiority among other religious communities. In such cases, the "ethics and morals" that are basic tenets of each religion need to be brought into play. However, sometimes, due to different interests, religions cannot act together to accomplish the goals of the national state. That's the cue for the secularists to make their entrance, "to limit them (the religious groups) in that impulsive rejection of each other". This is the essence of the voluntary approach in building the nation. As a positive example of how different religions can live together, Pierce cites the Ottoman and the Hapsburg Empires.[34]

Religion and Politics in the Republic of Macedonia

Multi-religious societies are a defining feature of life in the Balkans.[35] In today's Republic of Macedonia, along with the ethnic Macedonians, who are predominantly Christians, there are ethnic Albanians, who are mostly Muslims.[36] During the Ottoman Empire, which was an Islamic theocracy the so-called "millet" system was established for non-Muslim communities. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed certain advantages over non-Muslims. On the other hand, the "millet" system of faith-religious self-government gave a degree of autonomy to the Christian population, for whom religious affiliation had much greater importance than ethnicity. In other words, ethnic identity was closely tied to religious affiliation.

The end of the XVIIIth and the beginning of the XIXth century saw the beginning of the process of forming autocephalous national churches, which marked the end of the ecumenical community of Balkan Orthodoxy. The newly established national churches had the task of assisting in building the nation and the state. On the one hand, these national churches were a promoter of the state, and on the other, they were a means of assimilating the enslaved peoples. The pop-

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[34] Ibid, page. 17.

[35] H. Poulton and S. Taji-Farouki, (ed.), *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State,* Hurst, London, 1997.

[36] Albanians are divided into two major cultural groups, Ghegs and Tosca. Ghegs in the XIX century inhabited the higher areas of Kosovo, the western part of today's Republic of Macedonia and the northern Albania today. While Tosca were living in southern Albania, around Prespa Lake and in northwestern Greece, Ghegs tribes were organized, disobedient and rebellious. Unlike them Tosca, who lived in more urban environments were less inclined to war. During the Ottoman Empire, the majority of Ghegs have given up the Christian religion to become Sunni Muslims. The majority Tosca also converted to Islam while a fraction remained Christians - Catholic or Orthodox. But unlike their northern compatriots they belong to less traditional Bektashi sect. Overall, these cultural and dialect groups haven't had developed an Albanian national consciousness until the beginning of the XX century. Until then, Muslim Albanians considered themselves Turks, but also members of a particular clan who have a specific regional identity. On the other hand, for the Christian Albanians, religion and place of residence had a great role in their identification. Unlike Ghegs for Tosca tribal affiliation had much more meaning. See Duncan Perry, "Conflicting ambitions and shared destinies: Past, present and future of Albanians and Macedonians", in Victor Rudometof of Macedonian Question/Issue, Euro-Balkan Press, Skopje, 2003, p. 367th (Виктор Рудометоф, *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 367.)

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ulation in Macedonia was the target of assimilation by the autocephalous churches of the new nation states (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia). Particularly fierce was the fight between the Greek Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate over the Christian population in Macedonia.[37] Wars in the Balkans and the division of Macedonia only complicated the process "because of the more acute awareness among some people that they were not Bulgarian, Greek or Serb, but Macedonian"[38].

Thus at the beginning of the XXth century, the primary role in the development of the Macedonian ethnic identity was played by church affiliation, while for the Albanians the Muslim religion, besides "language and culture"[39], had a decisive influence on the definition of their ethnic identity.[40] After the First World War, with the establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, first called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in this country found themselves in an environment in which they had an inferior status. This was an additional incentive for both groups to work on their projects for ethnic homogenization.[41] In this period the Macedonians and Albanians "coexisted peacefully", but rarely mixed with each other.[42]

The Macedonian state has always been aware of the role played by religion in nation building, hence the requisite attention has been devoted to the issue right from the creation of the state up until today. Since the 1944 decisions of the Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) and the establishment of the modern Macedonian state, the state has maintained a wide-ranging interest in relations between itself and its religious communities. To this end, a number of regulatory acts were adopted. In all of these legal measures, the

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[37] Анастасија Каракасиду, „Трансформирање на идентитетот, создавање на свеста: Принуда и хомогеност во Северозападна Грција", во Виктор Рудометоф и др., *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан-Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 83.

[38] Лоринг М. Денфорт, „Црковниот национализам и македонското прашање во австралиската дијаспора", во Виктор Рудометоф и др., *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан-Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 42.

[39] According to Duncan Perry, using the language and culture as links to create national awareness, Albanian leaders have succeeded in efforts to unite Gheg from Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania with their Northern brethren Toscs from southern Albania. See Duncan Perry, "Conflicting ambitions and shared destinies: Past, present and future of Albanians and Macedonians", in Victor Rudometof , Macedonian Question/Issue, Euro-Balkan Press, Skopje, 2003, p. 378. Данкан Пери, „Конфликтни амбиции и заеднички судбини: Минатото, сегашноста и иднината на Албанците и Македонците", во Виктор Рудометоф, *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 378.

[40] Данкан Пери, „Конфликтни амбиции и заеднички судбини: Минатото, сегашноста и иднината на Албанците и Македонците", во Виктор Рудометоф, *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 373.

[41] Ibid. 380.

[42] Although they had a common enemy, the two groups "never united forces." During the Second World War most of the ethnic Macedonians joined the Yugoslav Partisan movement which guaranteed it would recognize their distinct national identity. On the other hand, ethnic Albanians from the territory of Macedonia in great portion joined the "Bali Kombetar", an anti-communist movement, which fought to create a Greater Albania which will include Kosovo and Western Macedonia. The other part of the Albanians joined Albanian partisan movement. But relations between the Albanian and Yugoslav partisans were often strained so that mistrust and hostility between Macedonians and Albanians have grown. In the postwar period in the newly created Republic of Macedonian although religious tolerance has been practiced there has been one veiled hostility because of the conflicting goals of the groups, creating a Macedonian state and nation against the unification of Albanian territories into a single country.

emphasis is placed on freedom of conscience and religion as a private matter; separation of religious communities from the state and freedom in the exercise of religious activities and religious rituals; prohibition of abuse of religion for political purposes; equality of citizens in rights and obligations regardless of religious, racial and national origin etc.[43] All believers are guaranteed the right of free expression of religious feelings, but the use of religion for anti-state objectives is not permitted. In other words, the voluntary approach to building the nation allows religion as a significant social resource to contribute to the development of the nation, but prohibits any abuse of religion.

In the period of cohabitation in the Yugoslav federation, the political leadership of federal Macedonia supported the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC), as the largest religious community in the country, in its bid to win ecclesiastical independence from the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), the secular leadership seeing this as a way to strengthen the independence of the Macedonian nation and its identity. These efforts culminated in the decision by the Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967 to proclaim itself autocephalous. However, the move was not accepted by the Serbian Orthodox Church. The rationale for the SOC's opposition was that one country could not have two autocephalous Orthodox churches.[44] The status of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) as a federal unit within the former Yugoslavia was an argument for SOC to oppose autocephaly for the Macedonian church. SOC treated SRM as "an administrative federal unit" hence it would only recognize the autonomous status of MOC. For this reason, the MOC was reproved for "attempting to destroy the brotherhood and unity" of the former state. [45] In other words, MOC was impairing the affirmation of the "Yugoslav political nation". However, according to Keith Brown, the Macedonian political elite, aware of the importance of the Church for the construction of the Macedonian ethno-nation, [46]…"orchestrated the creation of the autocephalous Macedonian Church and for the most part accepted the modernist vision of statehood".[47] This vision was generally supported by the Yugoslav federal authorities. On the other hand, in this period measures were taken in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia to abolish certain traditional Muslim customs[48], such as the wearing of the veil by women. These moves were aimed at "modernizing" the population,

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[43] See the official website of the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups: http://www.kovz.gov.mk

[44] At that time there was no Montenegrin Orthodox Church.

[45] Interview with protodeacon Slave P. Projkovski for the weekly Civic. (Civil, no. 27, November 3, 2012, p. 36), (*Граѓански*, бр. 27, 3 ноември, 2012, стр. 36)

[46] The issue of autonomy of MOC has not been resolved yet. From time to time among the Macedonian public there are allegations for a "union" to be a way of resolving the dispute with the SOC and the isolation which is imposed by other Orthodox churches. It is very sensitive and conditioned solution. First, because it is difficult to guess what will be the reaction of believers to this move of the church and second, this decision needs to be approved from the Vatican. Given the stronger position of the SOC regarding MOC not only in the Orthodoxy but in the entire Christian world then the answer could be perceived.

[47] Interview with Keith Brown with the weekly Citizen entitled "Clever Peter late for the start," Citizen, no. 26, 27.10.2012, p. 46th(„Итар Пејо задоцни на стартот", *Граѓански*, бр. 26, 27.10.2012, стр. 46).

[48] Gyorgy Lederer, "Islam in East Europe", *Central Asian Survey* (2001), 20(1), 5–32, Downloaded By: [EBSCO Host EJS Content Distribution] At: 10:06 21 May 2008, pp. 17-19.

and reducing the influence of Islam, and they caused a revolt by ethnic Albanians against the Macedonian state.[49]

"Church nationalism" in the Balkans, according to Loring M. Denfort is an attempt by "Balkan nation-states to use the Orthodox churches in order to incorporate in the nation people living outside the country's borders"[50]. This applies especially to the ethnic Macedonians and the Macedonian state.[51] The state on the one hand is trying to establish links between Macedonian ethnic identity and the Christian religion, while on the other hand it seeks to integrate into the Macedonian ethno-nation Macedonians living abroad. Consequently an attack on the religious identity of the Macedonian ethnic community is seen by many Macedonians as an attack on the nation.

With the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, the conditions were created for according complete freedom of action and equality to religious communities in the country.[52] However, Article 19 of the 1991 Constitution, which distinguishes the Macedonian Orthodox Church from the other religious communities in the country, was a source of friction between Macedonians and Albanians in the first years of Macedonian independence. So, smaller religious communities and religious groups in the country wanted to limit the power and influence of the MOC stemming from the Constitution.[53]

The framework agreement envisaged that in addition to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Constitution would include the Islamic Religious Community [54] on an equal basis. But after strong opposition from the MOC, which argued that it was still unrecognized by other Orthodox churches and would lose its primacy in the state, a compromise was reached: After the reference to the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the word "and" was inserted, followed by a list other churches or religious communities in the country: the Islamic Religious Community (IRC/IVZ), the Catholic

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[49] Данкан Пери, „Конфликтни амбиции и заеднички судбини: Минатото, сегашноста и иднината на Албанците и Македонците", во Виктор Рудометоф, *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 385.
[50] Лоринг М. Денфорт, „Црковниот национализам и македонското прашање во австралиската дијаспора", во Виктор Рудометоф и др., *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан-Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 38.
[51] With the establishment of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church and the independence of the Republic of Macedonia, many immigrants from Macedonia to Australia who previously had Greek or Bulgarian national identity embraced the Macedonian ethnic identity. See: M. Loring Denfort "Ecclesiastical nationalism and the Macedonian issue in the Australian Diaspora", in Victor Rudometof etc.., Macedonian Question/Issue, Euro-Balkan Press, Skopje, 2003, p. 68: Лоринг М. Денфорт, „Црковниот национализам и македонското прашање во австралиската дијаспора", во Виктор Рудометоф и др., *Македонското прашање*, Евро-Балкан-Пресс, Скопје, 2003, стр. 68.
[52] It should be noted that there was an unsuccessful attempt a cleric (the head of the Orthodox Church, at that time Bishop Mihail) to be elected the first President of the Republic Macedonia. This solution certainly would have had negative consequences for the secular state and inter-religious coexistence, as in R. Macedonia there are other religions besides Orthodox-Christian. Namely, in R. Macedonia despite Orthodox Christian (about 67% of the total population) there is a Muslim religion (30%) and Christian-Catholic etc. The majority of Macedonians are Orthodox Christians. The ethnic Albanian minority is predominantly Muslim-Sunni.
[53] Stojanovska, G. (2001). "Macedonia: Church rage Over Political Reforms". *Institute for War and Peace Reporting, BCR* 292, 31 October 2001, http://www.iwpr.net, accessed on 5.11.2001.
[54] Characteristic of Islam as a religion "supranational inspiration and direction" which does not mean "the abolition of national differences."

Church (CC), the United Methodist Church (UMC), and the Jewish community (JC/EC).[55] All churches, religious communities and religious groups are separated from the state and are equal before the law. This clearly shows that the Republic of Macedonia has no state religion and as such it cannot act as the exclusive builder of the nation. This is essentially a voluntaristic approach to building the nation.

Under the constitution, the state is secular and religion is separated from it. This means that the state does not have the right to interfere in religious matters[56], nor should religious communities interfere in state affairs. But this strict division of labor is not realized in practice in any secular society. Consequently, politics and religious communities are linked in a complex web of relationships. According to Slavejko Sasajkovski, the political engagement of religious communities could be defiined as "efforts to build status as an institution... which, rising above day-to-day political divisions, consistently and selflessly works to restore the lost unity of society and state...."[57]. For that reason, he advocates the inclusion of the MOC in discussions "on topics related to national identity".[58] According to Sasajkovski, in the first years of independence, the Macedonian Orthodox Church and the IRC essentially didn't have the status of "relevant social and political entity." But the ruling conservative political elite now gives greater space and support to the MOC in the everyday life of society. For its part, the IRC uses current conditions to become more visible and influential in daily political developments.

Relations between religious communities and the communities and the state are governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, the Law on State Administration and the Law on church, religious communities and religious groups. Today in the Republic of Macedonia there is a Commission for Relations with Religious Communities and Religious Groups whose mandate is to oversee the legal status of religious communities and religious groups and the relations between the state and religious communities and religious groups. Given the nature of multi confessional nature of Macedonian society an Inter-Religious Council (IRC) has been established,[59] its activities aimed at fostering cooperation among the religious communities.

Given that Macedonian society is a multi-religious one, with five of the numerous religions accorded constitutional status, we cannot talk about the exclusive role that religion might have played in the creation of contemporary Macedonian nation. The largest religious groups in the country are Orthodox Christianity (to which most ethnic Macedonians belong) and Islam (which is followed by most Albanians). Although historically these two largest religious groups have suc-

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[55] In R. Macedonia 15 churches, 7 religious communities and 8 religious groups have been registered.

[56] In this paper under the term religious community we mean institutional form of organization of religious life.

[57] Славејко Сасајковски, „Ревитализација на верските заедници како политички субјекти", во Панде Лазаревски и др., *Аспекти на националната безбедност на Република Македонија*, ИСППИ, Скопје, 2001, стр. 429.

[58] Ibid, page. 436.

[59] This body was established by the five religious communities which are mentioned in the Constitution (MOC, IRC, CC, EMC and JC). Representatives in this body are appointed by the religious communities themselves. Management body is rotating with a period of one year.

cessfully co-existed, still, due to the experiences they underwent in the former Yugoslavia, we can say that there is a danger of their confrontation.[60]

So far, that danger is minimal; moreover there exists an element that bridges the ethno-religious divide: Albanians who are Christians, and Macedonians who are Muslims. These small religious groups can be a connecting element between the two religions. In addition, religious communities can be a cohesive factor in ethno-political life, when it is divided by the ideological platforms of the political parties; thus religion can play a part in strengthening the ethnic identity of the communities in the state. Therefore, there needs to be a combination of organic and voluntary discourse in the use of religion as a social resource in building the modern Macedonian nation.

Conclusion

The process of building the contemporary Macedonian nation should continue to occur within the existing cultural matrix, which in itself articulates the values of two civilizations - Muslim and Orthodox. Religious groups, in essence, are calling for peace, tolerance and respect for the "other", which can contribute to building a multicultural society. On the other hand, disrespect and manipulation of religious particularity can adversely affect the building of the sense of a single nation. In a society such as Macedonia's, inter-religious cooperation is very important. Only this concept carries any promise for the future of the contemporary Macedonian nation.

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[60] The population in Macedonia, regardless of their religious affiliation, co-existed for centuries, and religion, that until the emergence of ethnic nationalism had cultural dimension now received and ethnic dimension.

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Chaplaincy service in the Army of Republic of Macedonia - requirement, importance and justification

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Abstract

Along with self-knowledge, human beings developed awareness of safety and the phenomena that are surrounding them. The awareness of security based on the efforts to survive, resulted in adapting to various tools and their use for individual and collective protection and there are the beginnings of the need for arming and organizing military formations that are part of the base of human civilization. Phenomena that are surroundding, including birth, life and death, contributed to developing awareness that there may be a supernatural or divine force that manages them. Therefore the basic human right to freedom of thought, expression and religion is complementary with the right to freedom and security. Right here, as in the long history of warfares 'in the name of God' lays the relationship between military and religion, regardless of which confession it is. This interdependence of the army with the religion can also be considered absurd and inclusive. Absurd, because the base of every religion is encouraging love and understanding, and the armies and their weapons are used for killing and destruction. It is Inclusive because religious members of the armed forces have need of spiritual justification of the call they chose as professional determination.

The biggest challenge of this paper is the observation of the decisions on this issue in countries that have a long tradition of involvement of clergy within the armed forces, the armies of countries transiting from one ideological system to another, as well as possible solutions for introducing clerical service in countries whose armed forces are made up of members of several confessions. In this context will be considered the need and justification for introducing chaplaincy service in the Army of Republic of Macedonia.

Keywords: religion, faith, armed forces, religious identity, chaplaincy service, spiritual support.

Introduction

The historic stamp on military and war is next to the symbol of admiration of the supernatural in the encyclopedia of ever known human civilization. The legends and myths of alive and disappeared nations abound with descriptions of gods or divinities with alien force, so therefore, the cult is considered as a precondition for success and victory on the battlefield. At this point

the characteristic symbols engraved for combative events of the known civilizations on several continents. Moreover, these symbols are considered as one of the oldest documented data on the relationship between God and armies.

Identical is the case with written content, whether it comes to religious works such as the Bible and the Koran, or literary works as Homer's Iliad, where armies and wars are in direct proportion to a particular God or divinity. Unlike existing data for Crusades (in XI and XII century), where warfare is in explicit relationship with the religious determination of the warring parties (Smail R.C, 1995), the historical contents of the new era based on clearly indicated facts, the military and war put in tight, but not in a completely direct constellation with faith or religion.

A significant part of the soldiers, as part of the written human history with bloody wars, except the belief in personal military skills and strength of the army, while leaving in the battle, before or during combative actions they felt themselves in need of spiritual help and protection of a particular supreme force. Supernatural assistance and protection are considered for support especially in the difficult times of facing death, also represents hope for survival and victory over the enemy. This act is primarily a spiritual instinct of the inner being that in critical moments is stronger than logic. Realizing the need of spiritual support for the soldiers, tribal leaders placed people for performing the rituals with spiritual symbolism. Clerics have been present since ancient armies, and with the development of civilization was transferred the ratio of spirituality with the military, which persists today.

In many modern armies where is practiced clerical service (further named as chaplaincy service), the prescribed articles are prohibiting clergyman in uniform to carry or use weapons. After all, the relationship of the army with the priesthood today is based on the legal regulation in which the country regulates the relationship with religious communities. But the need for chaplaincy service in the armed forces in many ways is different to their role in public life. The simple reason is that the army duty often implies involvement in a stressful environment, and a tendency to be away from the family for long time. In such an environment where is increased the possibility of facing death, the religious soldiers needs spiritual support. In fact, the military statement: 'In military trenches there are not atheists" comes from the experience and close contact with death during the wars.

Today is easy to doubt in faith or to deny the existence of God, disputing the scientific data on the origin and evolution of life on the planet Earth. But this paper has no intention of favoring theological opposed Darwin's theory on the origin of the world, but to determine whether there is a need for spiritual support among religious oriented army personnel and therefore, to see the justification for introducing (or not introducing) the chaplaincy service among the armed forces of the Republic of Macedonia.

The relationship of religion and faith with the country and the armed forces

According theological learning man is created by God according to his character and opportunity. The terms 'figure' and 'shape' are considered from different aspects. One of the aspects

believes that 'figure' refers to the body and appearance of God, and that 'shape' refers to soul. The different access points that 'figure' marks the nature of man, while 'shape' is a description of the supernatural in man, but both aspects emphasize the close relationship of man with God. This doctrine is of supreme importance for theology because according to herrepose human character and his relationship with God.

Otherwise said, the figure of God in man is the essence that makes it different from other animals and beings. (Berkof L, 1996). It is important to note that this theological approach is valid mostly in the Christian, Jewish and Islamic religion. In other religions (Hinduism, Shintoism, etc.) the theological approach is basically different because of the existing polytheism, while Buddhism and Chinese religious tradition is considered more a philosophy and way of life than a religion.

At the same time, nowadays there is a widespread agreement that Darwin's theory on the origin of species and natural selection has a significant impact on people's understanding of their own identity and the place he has in the universe. Namely, despite the established belief that ruled until the middle of XIX century, that God is the Creator of the earth and everything that is on it, the theory of Charles Darwin (1809 - 1882) is based on evolution as main reason for the creation of the world and life on it.

Regardless of the origination approach, the man was put in the center in the ancient and modern world. This approach leads to the appearance of anthropology, whose primary interest isman as a human being that has a body, soul and spirit. Therefore, according to anthropologists (who in the past cultivated sense of moral, intellectual, cultural and military superiority), the man is physically, mentally and spiritual being, that the spiritual awareness separates him from wildlife (Barrett.S.R. 2009). Exactly the spirituality is a dimension that owns each person, whether it is religious or atheistic person. Max Scheler believes that 'body and soul does not reflect the current contradiction in man, but the contradictions that lie in man are deeper, considering the physical and spiritual life.' (M.Scheler, 1987).

Religion is closely related to man, for the simple reason that almost there is no culture in which there was no particular religion. Almost all aspects of life, more or less rely on the spirituality, although basically the concept of religion is very different according to its flexibility and spiritual connections to the individual or group. Anthropology indicates that the religion is a product of human tendencies, desires and ideals.

According to some authors, the attempt to define religion is equal to the attempt to define love, because religion as well as love has different meaning for each person separately, and its understanding is mystery (Hill B.R.; Knitter P.F.; Madges W, 1997). Basically, religion is a set of dogmas and regulations that require a defined code of behavior towards that cult, or a system of belief and ritual ceremonies by which a person or community are made according to the supernatural. In fact, religion is an external manifestation of the spirituality as deep inner need of man to be part of the absolute and eternal. As an external expression of faith, the religion is the only way to God, or a way of communicating with the Almighty, and the way and manner of communication can not and must not be more important than God (Есад Бајтал, 2005).

Phenomenon itself is a multitude of religions, which are developed under the influence

of geographical factors and historical moments, depending on the success of the demonstration and the imposition of a particular way of approximation to the divine. Certainly, influence has the different social order, lifestyle, or different culture. Also fenomoen is the success of religion in a particular historical moment to unify such diversity. Because there are many religions, whose approach to satisfy human spirituality is different, to the religion should be seen as a multilayered question. A cautious approach is required mostly because of the danger of manipulating with the existing religious differences that are easily transformed into cultural and ethno-national divisions. These divisions may rise to the level that can completely capture the free consciousness. Also, this is one of the aspectswhy Karl Marx considers religion as 'opium'which puts man in a state of lack of sensitivity, allowing his manipulation (Rott M.O, 2007).

Ironically,ly, тhe religion in certain historical periods is trying to deny or relative scientifically proven knowledges,[61] because science contributes to the country to be almost completely released from the influence of religion. However although today, global world is more secular than ever before, religion succeeds to keep its place in it through the role of merging and separating of civilizations. Namely, if the global culture and global society are perceived as secular, it would mean a misinterpretation of current world history. In this context, P.Bejer and L.G.Biman suggest that 'religious views and religious people can not understand eachother, without previously understanding of the religious character of world culture and societies in it' (Beyer P.; Beaman L.G, 2007). In addition, the superiority of science, economy and secularism over religion in the modern world, are not obstruct for the appearance of 'new' religions, indicating that man is not requiring only scientific and logical interpretation of phenomena and events that surround him.

The faith, unlike religion is unique capacity of man. As being characterized by a deep individual dedication to personal determination for belief, the faith in one person can be on several levels: intellectual, emotional, physical or imaginary. The human faith does not include only the knowledge, but also feelings, decisions and actions.

In fact, faith is energy and driving force that inspires human life, representing a sense which perceives the need for intensive search of the ideal of truth (Hill B.R.; Knittrer P.F.; Madgtes V, 1997). Therefore, religion is a human tendency for approximation to absolute happiness and release from all kinds of suffering and should be distinguished from religion and religiosity that is often empathed. But the science and economics of the modern world, despite religious, more narrow the spiritual space. Percepting this point, J. Ratzinger(former superior of the Catholic Church), believes that there is a large gap between the world of faith and the world of science, whose bridging is becoming less possible (Ratzinger J.; (Pope Benedict XVI, 2009).

The faith seen as a base of religion is a psychological fact, but it is not deprived from philosophical elements. But the contradictions between Christian faith and scientific knowledge are deepening because religion and science tend to completely different purposes. The Christian faith has its own subject that is the area of the spirit, revealing the truth about the situations and states appropriate to the human soul (Archbishop Anthony).

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[61] When in 1633 the Inquisition forces Galileo Galilei to give up the heliocentric theory of Nicolaus Copernicus.

Considering the stated aspects, can be indicated that the religion is an intimate human category, i.e. internal spiritual instance looking for truth which is not always a synonym for religiosity. Unlike the religious dogma or scientific laws, religion as an individual category is free and does not aim to prove. Therefore, religion can be represented as a border of the scientific and religious differences.

- The relationship between religion and state

State and religion have always been in appropriate correlation that dimensioned depending on the historical period. Description of this relationship give the gospels from the New Testament, where it is pointed out that the empire belongs to the king, and divine of God (Gospel of Matthew). Of course, this is too much simplified categorization of the relatively complex relationship between religion and country. Namely, religion as one of the oldest organized civilization forms has always had a significant impact on public authorities, occupying adequate space on the political scene. Therefore, religion has had a significant contribution in the creation of national countries in the world.

However, in the late 40s and early 50s of last century, the influence of religion in policy creation in the states appreciably weakened. The most characteristic example were (are) states built on socialist ideology. As one of the more interesting, can serve the example with NR.Albania, where in the preamble of the constitution of 1976, it is stated that: 'the period of religious ghastliness is finished, and the consciousness of the working people is modeled according to the ideology of the proletariat.' This constitution did not accept any religion and prohibited any kind of religious organization. With these constitutional provisions, the former NR Albania is considered as first atheist country in the world (Ferrari S.; Durham W.C. Jr.; Sewell E.A, 2003).

These factors set the specifics for editing the relationship with religion in any of the post-communist countries separately, as is evident the different degree of its involvement in cultural, social and political events of the country. But, the regulation of relationships between the country and religion is not characteristic only for countries that transited from one to another form of organization. Namely, there are as many different approaches to the management of the relationship with religion, as there are countries. (Ferrari S., Cristofori R, 2010).

In some countries, the religious orientation of majority of the population has received status of a state religion, and the religion enjoys special privileges, while other countries have established a clear legal distinction between the country and religion. In truth, today states are characterized as multiethnic and multi-confessional, as well as there is more evident tendency of some countries to put the religion on the margins of the society.[62] This situation mainly arises from the trend of globalization, which imposed conditions that are challenge to the states, putting on further examination the religion's ability to adapt to the new culture of life. In modern countries,

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[62] As an example can serve the decision of the administration of USA, in which in the field of human rights, the right of LGBTminorities is stated before the freedom of religion.

religious communities don't have influence on the design or implementation of national policy or vice versa.[63]

The relation state-religion in Republic of Macedonia is formally regulated by constitutional provision and separate legal regulation. Namely, the highest legal act of Republic of Macedonia guarantees freedom of religion and freedom to publicly, individually or in a community with other, expressing the faith. It further states that religions, religious communities and groups are separated from the state and are equal in front of the law (Official Journal of Republic of Macedonia; 2003).

Detailed presentation of the relationship between the state and religion is specified with the law for legal status of church, religious community and religious group, applicable from 01.05.2008 (Official Journal of Republic of Macedonia, No. 35/97). Legal provisions emphasize the secularity of Republic of Macedonia, which means that religion is separated from the state. It involves noninterference of state in religious activities nor of religion in public activities.

Also, the legal regulation establishes legal person responsible for mediating in the regulation of the relationship between the country and the religion, and is presented to the commission for relations with religious communities and religious groups (Official Journal of Republic of Macedonia", 2000). In the description of the legal authorizations and responsibilities of thislegal person, it is stated mediating in cooperation of the country with the religious subjects, as it is pointed out the cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and other institutional subjects. Valuable for note is that during job descriptions and responsibilitiescommission does not state cooperation with Ministry of Defence or the Army of Republic of Macedonia.

- The armed forces and their relationship with religion

Armed forces are well organized, politically and socially conscious ethnicity, which together with other social groups is an actor in the socialpolitical arena. They are trained for eventual use of force when there is need to protect the nation from external aggression or internal violence. The military is subordinated to state institutions and should be distanced from the areas of political decision-making, although as a social subject, represents an instrument of politics. Specifically, the political subordination of the military doesn't mean its loyalty to a particular mode or politic party and ideology, but submission to constitution and the law (Vankovska, 1997). However, can be said that soldiers have always felt the need of blessing for selecting its call, especially when leaving in war (excluding warfares stimulated by ideological motives).

The relationship of religion with AF (Armed Forces) today is based on legislation according which are defined the relationships with the state, stating that it is an indirect relationship, except when it is a question of the armed forces of the Vatican as the smallest official army in the world.

Social development has imposed the need for distribution of power in the countries (legislative, executive and judicial), from which arose the need of normative regulation of the rela-

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[63] This does not refer to countries like Vatican and Iran, they are based on religious fundus.

tionship of the country with its subjects, including religion. Therefore, gradually was editing the relationship of religious communities with the armed forces, which was defined depending on the way that chose the state. In principle, the part that regulates the relationship between AF and religious communities in a country, is contained in the law for defense, or the law for armed forces, where are given details about the relationship of armed forces and religion.Most countries in the world have precisely defined relation of its armed forces with the dominant religious communities, balanced with appropriate primary and secondary legislation. This regulated relationship allows practicing confessional commitment of military personnel, as well as the presence of religious communities in the ranks of the army.

As it was already mentioned, Republic of Macedonia has no standardized relationship between religion and army.

Chaplaincy service in the armed forces

The regulation of chaplaincy service in the armed forces gets legitimacy from the national constitution and is in accordance the applicable legislation of a country. This means that according to various constitutional and legislative solutions, there are various examples in the approach to this issue. Examples are countries with professional armies and countries where serving in the military is a regular civil obligation. Particularly interesting is the case with regulation of chaplaincy service in the armies consisting of members from several confessional groups.

Wearing military uniform certainly does not reduce the need for spiritual support, regardless of whether it is needed in peacetime or in conditions of war. The approach to this issue in the armed forces of the countries at the international level is different, as is different the concept according to which chaplaincy services are part of the defense and military structure. Namely, while in some countries (Germany, Slovakia, Bosnia, etc.), chaplaincy service is incorporated as part of the organizational and formational structure of army units, in others (Austria, Hungary, Italy, etc.) these services are a separate part.

As has already been mentioned, in general chaplaincy service in the armed forces is regulated in a manner consistent with the Constitution and the valid legislation, but certainly should be considered the military tradition, and current political, social and cultural conditions in society. When is mentioned the Constitution, it should be emphasized that most countries that have normative regulation of chaplaincy service in the armed forces are declared as secular societies. It means that the chaplaincy service in the defense and military have no other function than to care for the spiritual support of religious army members observing their guaranteed right to freedom of religion.

At the same time, should be noted that according to military priests, regulations of most armies around the world prohibit these persons to carry or handle weapons, even when they are present on the battlefield. On the other side they must meet certain additional criteria that are not required for priests who serve in the civilian part of the society.

Requirement and opportunities for introducing chaplaincy service in the armed forces of Republic of Macedonia - results of conducted research

Macedonian constitution guarantees freedom of religion, public individual or group expression of religious determination. Also, the same provision of the highest constitutive act emphasizes that all religious communities and groups are separate from the state and equal in front of the law (Constitution of Republic of Macedonia, Article 19).

The most common religions in Republic of Macedonia are Orthodox Christianity and Islam. According to the official data from the last completely conducted census in Republic of Macedonia, as Orthodox Christians have been declared 1,310,184 out of 2,022,547 inhabitants, that is approximately 65% of the total population, for Muslims have been declared 674,015 people, or approximately 33%. As Catholics have been declared 7.008, or 0.34%, while as Protestants have been declared 520 people. The number of citizens, who identified themselves as members of other religions or atheists, was 30.820 people, or approximately 1.5% of the total population (State institution for statistics).

According to the projected national strategy, the Army of Republic of Macedonia (ARM) has approved 8133 active military personnel with maintenance of minimum complementing of 90% (7320 members). Also, the military complementing in June 2012 was 6.952 persons (85.5% complementing), while the complementing in the Ministry of Defence in the same period was 976 persons (of which 197 military personnel) (White Book on defense, 2012). Currently there are not reliable data with valid percentage of religious orientation of the active members of Army of Republic of Macedonia (ARM).

The chaplaincy serviceis not included in the army because of the lack of tradition for mutual respect between religious institutions and the armed forces inthis country, which is mostly a result of the postwar ideological and historical heritage of this region. Namely, during the NLW (National Liberation War of Macedonia) active participation in Macedonian partisan formations in NLM (National Liberation Movement) had a number of clergymen. One of them was the priest Kiril Stojanovski who with the involvement in NLM (National Liberation Movement), became brigade-clergyman in the First Macedonian NLB (National Liberation Brigade), and a member of thereligious Committee in the headquarter of NLW (National Liberation War)and also was participant of first assembly of AANLM (Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia). Another example has the character of priest Metodi Gogov who had an active role in helping the Macedonian liberation movement and was also a member of AANLM (Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia). Also, priest Gogov, later called Archbishop Michael, was the first superior of Macedonian Orthodox Church in independent Republic of Macedonia. However, since its independence, in Republic of Macedonia has not been taken any concrete steps in the regulation of normative framework that will more closely determine this area.

The initiating attempts to introduce the priest service in ARM as practice(that is already applicable in most NATO armies),havenot concrete efforts to regulate the normative framework in this sphere, and there is not adequate result. At this moment, as opposed to other republics in

the former SFR Yugoslavia, only Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro have legally regulated relations between the armed forces and religious communities.

In order to see whether there is a need to implement the chaplaincy service in the armed forces of Republic of Macedonia it is conducted an anonymous survey among the active composition of ARM, covering several groups of participants.

Results of the survey

According to the results of the anonymous survey questionnaire designed for the needs of the labor 'Chaplaincy service in the armed forces of Republic of Macedonia - requirement, importance and justification ' can be stated the following:

The total number of respondents is 58. The questionnaires are in Macedonian and Albanian language, also is performed certain determination of interviewees in two sub samples. First with a total number of 38 respondents (questionnaires in Macedonian language) and second with a total number of 18 respondents (questionnaires in Albanian language)

Survey question no. 1 (Figure No. 1), according to which is determined ethnicity. According to statements given by the frequencies of respondents, the most are Macedonians 67% (38), Albanians 31% (18) and Serbian 2% (1).

Figure no. 1

Survey question no.4 gives information for the religiosity of respondents. From the total number of respondents can be concluded that 95% (53)are religious and only 5% (3) are not religious. Therefore, from the total number of respondents of the Christian faith 35 (92%) expressed that are religious, while only 3 (8%) of respondents gave a statement that they are not religious. Respondents of the Muslim religion on this question of religiosity gave 100% religious statement.

According to the values of **chi - square** test (Table 1) between the expected statements with thestatement frequencies of the respondents, can be concluded that there are statistically

significant differences, it cen be noticeably from the calculated values of (1, n=56) = 7504, p = 0.006 (Sig.= .006).

Table no. 1

VAR00001				Test Statistics	
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual		VAR00001
No	3	11.2	-8.2	Chi-Square(a)	7.504
Yes	53	44.8	8.2	df	1
Total	56			Asymp. Sig.	0.006

The survey question no. 6 (Table 2.) gives information about the place that religion has in life, according to the calculated values of **chi - square** test was concluded that **there are** statistically significant differences in the frequencies of the statements of participants, it is noticeably from the calculated values of (3, n = 56) = 21.143, p = 0.000 (Sig. = .000). The majority of respondents 43% (24) reported that religion occupies a very important place in life, and only 3.5% (2) consider religion as unimportant.

Table no. 2

VAR00001				Test Statistics	
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual		VAR00001
Very important	24	14	10	Chi-Square(a)	21.143
A bit important	20	14	6		
Important	10	14	-4	df	3
Insignificance	2	14	-12		
Total	56			Asymp. Sig.	0.000

Survey question no. 8 (Table no.3) gives answer to the question'What kind of believer do you think you are?' According to the received values on **chi - square** test was concluded that **there are** statistically significant differences in the frequencies on the statements of participants, it is noticeablyfrom the calculated values of (4, n = 53) = 43.132, p = 0.000 (Sig. = .000). On the eighth survey question statements gave 53 respondents according to which mostly, 53% (28) have expressed that they believe in what their religion preaches. On the statement that there is no God or supernatural force did not respond any respondent, and on the statement 'I have not determined' responded one respondent or 2% of the total number.

Table no. 3

VAR00001				Test Statistics	
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual		VAR00001
1	28	10.6	17.4	Chi-Square(a)	43.132
2	13	10.6	2.4		
3	4	10.6	-6.6	df	4
5	1	10.6	-9.6		
6	7	10.6	-3.6		
Total	53			Asymp. Sig.	0.000

1 - I believe in everything that my religionpreaches
2 - I believe in some of what my religion preaches
3 - I believe in God and the supernatural forces but do not believe in any religion
4 - I think there is no God or supernatural forces
5 - I am undecided
6 - I do not consider myself as a dedicated believer

Survey question no. 12 (Table no.4), gives information for the need for introducing clerical service in the army. According to the received values on **chi - square** test was concluded that **there are** statistically significant differences in the frequencies of the statements of participants, it is noticeably from the calculated values of (3, n=53) = 9.566, p=0.023 (Sig.=.023). From the total number of respondents to this question answered 53 respondents. According to the statements 42% (22) are for introducing ofclerical service in the army against 26% (14) who think that there is no need.

Table 4

VAR00001				Test Statistics	
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual		VAR00001
Yes	22	13.25	8.75	Chi-Square(a)	9.566
No	14	13.25	0.75		
Maybe	7	13.25	-6.25	df	3
Don't have opinion	10	13.25	-3.25		
Total	53			Asymp. Sig.	0.023

Survey question no. 15 (Table no. 5), for the help of clerical services in support of army command staff in determining the religious needs of the believers in the army ranks, as well as giving spiritual support in case of severe injuring, disease or death of military personnel (or close person to them). According to the received values of **chi - square** test was concluded that **there are** statistically significant differences in the frequencies of the statements of participants, it is noticeably from the calculated values of (3, n=53) =12.736, p=0.005 (Sig. = .005). Of the respondents that answered this question the majority or 43% have opinion that the clerical services may be useful for the military command personnel and for providing spiritual support.

Table no. 5

VAR00001   Test Statistics

	Observed N	Expected N	Residual		VAR00001
				Chi-Square(a)	12.736
Yes	23	13.25	9.75		
No	15	13.25	1.75		
Don't have opinion	6	13.25	-7.25	df	3
Don't know	9	13.25	-4.25		
Total	53			Asymp. Sig.	0.005

CONCLUSION

According to the results of the survey we can perceive several conclusions. First, from the received statements of the respondents in the survey can be concluded that army members are religious and the family has the biggest impact on religious beliefs. The received indicators indicate that many respondents in the presence of religious services would find spiritual support. The opinions and attitudes of respondents for the need of introducing clerical service in the army are different, but in a significant number of respondents agree that such an incorporation of service in the army would be useful. Also, according to the results of respondents the clerical services can be useful for the military command personnel.

According to the received indications of the applied system survey questions, can be concluded that the respondents from the Christian and Muslim religion in certain opinions and statements about the requirement, importance and justification of introducing clerical service in the armed forces of Republic of Macedonia are unique in high percentage.

From the presentedcan be concluded that the analysis of processeded indicators of the answers, respondents give a positive signal for the justification of the introduction of clerical service in the armed forces of Republic of Macedonia. Also indicator for that is the expression of the

members for the religiosity. This very high percentage of religiosity among military members (92% Christian religion and Muslim 100%), may constitute sufficient base to devote adequate treatment of the indicated area. Particularly, if we take into account the long-term engagement of the army personnel in missions outside the borders of Republic of Macedonia and the stressful conditions they are facing there.

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THE INJUSTICE OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
AND ITS' LINKS TO REGIONAL SECURITY
OF THE BALKANS

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ABSTRACT

Balkan region which due to its history is significantly multiethnic, multicultural and multi-religious is consisted of post-conflict and post-transitional countries that are on a varying degree of socioeconomic and democratic development and accordingly at different stages of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The region, mainly the West Balkan, is also characterized with wide spread poverty and inequality within the countries as well as between the countries, which makes it the least developed region in Europe. Therefore, this paper attempts to assess the influence of poverty and inequality (economic, social, political and cultural) on national and consequently on regional security. For that reason, on one hand are identified the horizontal inequalities between the Balkan countries, and on the other is analyzed their impact upon security.

The fundamental question this paper seeks to address is how poverty and inequality are affecting the peace and security specifically in the Balkan region? It is argued that the very high poverty and inequality have serious security implications i.e. they may lead to tensions (ethnical, social, political, etc.) due to the perception of injustice, undermining the trust into democracy and eventually destabilizing already fragile region.

The research results are based on the application of content analysis of numerus sources, secondary analysis of statistical data and comparative analysis. The results will show that the region is characterized with very high human insecurity due to very high poverty and inequality both on national and regional level. Since both poverty and inequality are structural challenges to security, the regional stability depends from countries' capabilities to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities through completion of necessary structural adjustments, regional cooperation and European integration.

Keywords: Poverty, horizontal inequalities, injustice, security, democracy

1. INTRODUCTION

Once again the situation in the Balkans is in the focus of academic and European Union (EU) debates as well as of local and international media. There are numerus articles and analysis referring to increased tensions in the region, calling Europe to pay more attention for its stabilization since it is crucial for European stability and security as well. The region today, as it was during the 1990s, is exposed to serious old and new threats and challenges to its stability and security, primarily deriving from underdevelopment and poor socioeconomic performances; the undermined democratic system; and enlargement fatigue both in the EU and the Western Balkans' (WB) countries. Traditional geopolitical issues concerning territory, borders, arms race, resources and ethnical and cultural differences are still major threats to security in the region, but they are additionally strengthened by the negative effects of global economic and social processes that are having serious security implications. In this regard, poverty and inequality in the region, particularly the WB are chronic challenges that combined with the acute threats such as the refugee crisis (2015) and other national (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) and bilateral disputes (Croatia-Serbia; Serbia-Kosovo; Macedonia-Greece) can lead to new tensions, fragmentation and eventually to regional destabilization. At the same time the democratization of the WB countries is brought into question due to ever increasing problems with authoritarian regimes, widespread populism, poor neighborly relations, democratic deficits, absence of the rule of law, weak institutions, incomplete reforms, corruption, organized crime and etc.

Having in mind that the region is quite heterogeneous as per territorial distribution of population, characterized with extremely high unemployment, contributing to already enormous poverty and inequality it is necessary to investigate whether poverty and inequality can influence democratic development and security of the region. After the global economic crisis that was felt in 2009 and which was followed by social and political tensions, many researchers attempted to answer whether the socioeconomic and political consequences of the crisis will influence regional peace and stability. Their conclusion is that development inequalities and imbalances between the countries or ethnic communities will bring permanent instability in the future (Jeleva, 2012) and that any further delay in Euro and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region may disrupt its fragile peace and undermine its security (Bartlet, 2010). Despite the fact that Balkan region today is stabilized and quite consolidated it is still characterized with high degree of human insecurity, which varies from one to another country depending on their economic and democratic development and which may create grievances leading to tensions that may become violent and seriously undermine regional peace, stability and security. Overcoming the economic crisis and balancing the socioeconomic development of the Balkans' countries will facilitate the integration of the entire region into the EU, regardless of the regional context and accordingly will contribute to regional peace and stability (Orovcanec, 2016).

This research that builds on previous one investigates the link between development, democracy and security in order is to explain how poverty and inequality affect human security in its three main dimensions: freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity as well as their inter-relationships from theoretical and practical perspective. The results will con-

firm that very high poverty and inequality in the Balkans have serious security implications such as tensions due to injustice and violation of human rights; reduced trust in democracy; and regional destabilization. In continuation it will be necessary first to identify poverty and horizontal inequalities in the region, and then within the theoretical framework consisted of human security concept and the grievance based theories of conflict i.e. relative deprivation[64] and horizontal inequality[65] to assess their influence upon human and consequently upon national and regional security.

The concept of human security acknowledges the interlinkages between security, development and human rights and considers these to be the building blocks of human and, therefore, national security (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2001). The term implies protection of basic human rights and freedoms and protection from various security threats. Paragraph 143 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1) underlines "the right of all people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair" and recognizes that "all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential". The causal mechanism through which poverty and inequality might trigger socioeconomic grievances that may initiate collective violence will be explained through the prism of Grievance theories of conflict. Central idea of these theories is that relative and not absolute position of the people is the most common cause of conflict.

2. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY AS SOURCE OF VULNERABILITY
After the end of the Cold war, Balkans' countries joined the implementation of structural adjustments on the basis of neoliberal doctrine in order to integrate into the global economy thus reducing its harmful effects. These structural reforms understood as comprehensive transformation of the overall society i.e. economic transition from regulated and centrally planned economy to free market economy and political transition from one party political system to multilateral liberal democracy, didn't bring the expected living standard and democratic progress particularly in the WB countries, thus causing grievances and tensions, while at the same time deepening the already deep structural problems. Increased inequality, poverty and conflict have been inter-linked phenomena during the transition processes (Spoor, 2005). Moreover, the global financial and economic crisis set back the achievements and brought in question foundations of the neoliberal capitalism and the trust into democracy. Notwithstanding the socioeconomic and democratic progress during the transition, poverty remains widespread across the region and horizontal inequalities within and between Balkan countries are continuous and serious. The slow economic growth compared

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[64] Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation as actors' perception of the discrepancy between their expected values and their possible values. Reference point for peoples' expectations may be some referent group, standards articulated by the leaders, abstract model, past situation etc.
[65] Unlike vertical inequalities defined as income inequalities between individuals, Stewart (2002) defines horizontal inequalities as "serious inequalities between culturally defined or identity groups" usually defined according to characteristics such as class, ethnicity, geographic origin or religion and which are result of an unequal allocation of resources among them. Most obvious and formally organized identity groups are the national states.

with increasing inequality affects the political developments by rise of populism that is not only regional, but global phenomena as well.

Economic horizontal inequalities that refer to unequal access, utilization and ownership of resources, uneven income level and employment opportunities will be identified through regional comparison of countries' economic capacity (annual GDP), performance (annual GDP growth rate), well-being (GDP per capita) and unemployment rate.

Table 1: Economic horizontal inequalities in the Balkans'

Country	GDP(current us$) (million)	GDP growth rate (% annual)	GDP per capita (current us$)	Unemployment (%)
ALB	11.398,39	2.8	3.945,2	16.1
BIH	16.191,72	3.0	4.249,3	27.9
BGR	50.199,12	3.6	6.993,5	11.6
HRV	48.732,00	1.6	11.535,8	16.7
GRC	194.851,32	-0.2	18.002,2	26.3
KSV	6.400,69	3.9	3.561,6	30.9
MKD	10.086.02	3.7	4.852,7	27.9
MNE	3.987,06	3.2	6.406,1	19.1
ROU	177.954,49	3.7	8.972,9	7.0
SRB	37.160,33	0.8	5.235,1	22.2
SVN	42.774,77	2.3	20.762,5	9.5

Source: The World Bank National Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Files (2016)

Presented data show that Balkans' countries differ a lot regarding their economic capacity expressed by the annual GDP. Greece as region's oldest EU member country has the biggest economic capacity despite the current economic crisis, followed by Romania and Bulgaria. The average growth rate in the region for 2016 amounts to 2,5% which is not enough to solve the most serious economic and social problems. Highest economic growth is registered in the poorest Balkans' countries i.e. Kosovo, Macedonia and Bulgaria, while at the same time the lowest growth is noted in Greece, Serbia and Croatia. There are significant differences regarding the GDP per capita among the Balkan countries. Highest GDP per capita is in Slovenia and it is almost six times higher than the lowest in Kosovo or five times than the one in Albania. Still, biggest problem of the regional economic model is extremely high unemployment throughout the whole transition period which indicates insufficient utilization of human resources. The average unemployment in the region is about 20 %. Highest unemployment, higher than 20% is registered in Kosovo, Macedonia, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, whereas the lowest unemployment is in Romania and Slovenia.

Social horizontal inequalities imply unequal access to wide range of public services such as education, health protection and housing as well as different results from education and health services for different groups. They will be determined through regional comparison of human development indicator's (HDI) components and poverty rates.

Table 2: Social horizontal inequalities in the Balkans'

Country	Rang (of 188)	HDI	LEB	MYS	EYS	GNI p.c.	Gini
SVN	25	0.880	80.4	11.9	16.8	27.852	24.9
GRC	29	0.865	80.9	10.3	17.6	24.524	34.7
HRV	47	0.818	77.3	11.0	14.8	19.409	33.6
MNE	49	0.802	76.2	11.2	15.2	14.558	30.6
ROU	52	0.793	74.7	10.8	14.2	18.108	27.3
BGR	59	0.782	74.2	10.6	14.4	15.596	34.3
SRB	66	0.771	74.9	10.5	14.4	12.190	29.7
MKD	81	0.747	75.4	9.3	13.4	11.780	44.2
ALB	85	0.733	77.8	9.3	11.8	9.943	29.0
BIH	85	0.733	7605	8.3	13.6	9.638	33.0
KSV	-	0.714	71.0	-	-	3.344	-

Source: Human Development Report, 2016

According to HDI value, most of the countries in the region are with high human development, except Slovenia, Greece, Croatia and Montenegro that are with very high human development. It is evident that the countries with higher HDI value also have greater life expectancy at birth (LEB), greater mean years of schooling (MES) and higher living standard i.e. gross national income (GNI) per capita. This shows that higher human development implies better access to health protection and education as well as better living standard. Therefore, "human development contributes to human security by tackling the long term structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner" (Cilliers, cited in Hong Hai 2007: 9-10). According to Gini coefficient that measures the income inequality among individuals, greatest inequality exists in Macedonian society which is almost broken in half, then follow Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro. Gini coefficient can be understood as index of relative deprivation, because very high inequality within a society may indicate hidden relative poverty[66]. Generally countries with high levels of inequality are also likely to have high levels of poverty.

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[66] Relative poverty is when some people's way of life and income is much worse than the general standard of living in the country or region in which they live.

Table 3: Population living below international and national poverty lines

Country	Population	MPI (%)	1,9 $/day (%)		3,10 $/day (%)		Nat. poverty line	
			2002	2013	2002	2013	%	Survey (year)
ALB	3.029.278	1.2	2.22	1.02	15.85	6.37	14.3	2011
BIH	3.867.055	1.7	0.25	0.07	0.76	0.40	17.2	2011
BGR	7.186.893	-	1.30	2.03	5.42	4.78	21.8	2014
HRV	4.464.844	-	0.07	0.92	0.15	2.37	19.5	2014
GRC	10.775.643	-	-	-	-	-	36.0	2014
KSV	1.870.981	-	1.28	-	12.66	-	30.0	2013
MKD	2.096.015	1.7	1.31	2.19	6.21	9.27	30.4	2011
MNE	647.073	0.5	0.25	1.04	0.78	2.53	8.6	2013
ROU	21.666.350	-	5.40	0	22.24	4.05	22.4	2012
SRB	7.176.794	0.4	0.34	0.19	1.10	1.33	9.2	2013
SVN	1.983.412	-	0	0.03	0.05	0.05	13.5	2012

Source: World Bank's PovcalNet, UNDP and the World Factbook, CIA

In table 3 poverty is presented as absolute poverty[67] or a percentage of population living below international poverty lines of 1,9$ and 3,10$ per day and national poverty lines set by each country separately. Extreme poverty exists in the whole region with exception of Romania. Highest extreme poverty is registered in Macedonia, Bulgaria and Montenegro; while lowest is in Slovenia. Analysis of poverty below national poverty line shows that around one third of population in Greece, Kosovo and Macedonia lives in poverty. National poverty line vary from country to country, depending on the standard of living enjoyed by the majority. Multidimensional poverty index identifies the multiple deprivations at individual level in regard to health, education and living standard i.e. in the three basic dimensions of human development, thus reflecting the intensity of deprivation. Population that lives in multidimensional poverty is registered only in the WB countries, where it is highest in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Political horizontal inequalities consider unequal political power distribution and peoples' ability to participate in the politics, so in that way to express their needs. Since in the focus of this research is the regional dimension of horizontal inequalities, the political ones will be recognized by comparing the level of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which are national strategic goals of Balkans' countries establishing their international position.

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[67] Absolute or extreme poverty is when people lack one or more basic necessities for survival (for instance food, clean water, clothing and housing) during a longer period of time.

Table 4: Political horizontal inequalities in the Balkans'

Country	NATO status	EU status
ALB	Member country	Candidate country
MKD	Aspirant country	
MNE	Aspirant country	Negotiating status
SRB	Individual Partnership Action Plan	
BIH	Aspirant country	Potential candidate
KSV	Aspiring partnership for peace members	
HRV	Member country	Member country
BUG	Member country	
ROU	Member country	
SVN	Member country	
GRC	Member country	

Source: European Commission, 2017

It is clear that WB countries are marginalized concerning the wider enlargement and development process, which is contributing to the overall grievance and disappointment in the specific region. Cultural horizontal inequalities, which indicate inequalities in cultural recognition and unequal cultural status of different cultural groups are also present in the region, preventing its' further development, cooperation and integration. The case of Macedonia, where different elements of Macedonian identity are denied by some of its neighbors, is the most revealing example. Growing gap between WB and EU, as well as the rest of the Balkans may lead to continued human suffering, social unrest and resumption of conflicts.

The results indicate that there are significant socioeconomic, political and cultural horizontal inequalities in the region. Their simultaneous and enduring existence is increasing the group grievance and facilitating the political mobilization, thus increasing the risk of collective violence and violent conflicts. Even so, inequality by itself and even the relative poverty don't automatically lead to conflict, unless there are other intermediary factors deriving from political and economic processes and social and inter-ethnical relations. The multicultural character of the region by itself may be source of instability due to the perception of injustice of various ethnicities that the others are wealthier, more privileged and alike. In the case of Balkans, ethnic communities that are exceeding the national borders may stimulate regional grievances and even violence, thus leading to regional support or resistance to such extended groups through financing, arming, propaganda, political maneuvering etc. At the same time the region is exposed to continuous internal as well as external influences that are additionally stressing internal security dynamic.

Poverty and inequality as source of vulnerability violate people's fundamental "freedom from want" by directly affecting their survival, well-being and quality of life. Eradication of poverty

in order to achieve "freedom from want" has been emphasized by the UN in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the common Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (International Federation of Social Workers, 2017). In order to achieve and protect this freedom it is necessary to eradicate poverty and provide equality through sustainable economic and human development and inclusive and equitable growth.

3. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY AS SOURCE OF INJUSTICE

All human rights provided by the UN Treaties such as the right to work, fair and just working conditions, social security, adequate food, housing and clothing, health and education are crucial to enable people to live in dignity, thus eradicating poverty is also significant in achieving the "freedom to live in dignity". "In the light of the International Bill of Rights, poverty may be defined as a human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights" (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights , 2001).

Issues of poverty and inequality are human rights issues and they represent injustice which appears to be a source of insecurity. In many developing countries that underwent the process of neoliberal structural adjustments, such as the Balkans' countries, the poor are victims of structural injustice, with unequal access to assets and marginalized opportunities for human development (Crockett, 2011). Violations of human rights, particularly the rights of subordinate groups may cause serious injustice and for that reason group or collective rights are as important for democratic development as they ensure an equitable distribution, equality and equity. Violations of human rights drive and deepen poverty and social exclusion because people that live in poverty have difficulties accessing power, court system and legal services, food, clean water, education, health care etc. Unlike human rights human security is not state's obligation, but it is ensured when human rights are protected consistently with the international human rights law (Hong Hai, 2007: 7-8).

Democracies should be able to go beyond the electoral politics and process to enabling human rights, physical well-being and human development, which are the building blocks of human security. In the regions, like the Balkans, characterized by inequality and poverty where important sectors of the population live in poverty, there is a demand that democracy should deliver and be effective in social and economic terms. "Only when the poor see that democracy translates into actual benefits in terms of better economic and social conditions will they value democracy over charismatic leadership and revolutionary promises". The reasons for declined trust in democracy are due to the way of implementation of democratic governance, the design of post-conflict and post–socialistic transition and liberalization reforms which caused inequalities and suppressed the welfare state. Frustration with democratic governments that are not capable of solving these most severe and pressing problems in the region may extend to democracy itself, which is evident from increasing population support of authoritarian regimes in the region. Hence, the importance

of the improvement of democratic delivery in poverty and inequality reduction. (Large & Sisk, 2006: 120)

"One of the most serious threats to our common security emerges from human desperation in societies which lack in respect for human rights and democracy" because democracy is driving force for a development and security. Democracy should be recognized as a political power able to transform the unjust socioeconomic structures (Large & Sisk, 2006, p. 119). 70% of the countries which experienced democratic backtracking over the past 20 years faced periods of economic stagnancy before backsliding (Halperin, et al., 2005). In that regard the lack of progress in socioeconomic development has also contributed to a backlash against democracy due to poor economic performance; high levels of socioeconomic inequality; large gap between rich and poor; and disappointment, social frustration and at time rebellion and violence.

Bertelsmann Stiftung's transformation index (BTI) which is assessing the overall economic and political transformation was used in order to evaluate the democratic progress and the overall state of development of the Balkans' countries. The results presented in table 5 show that Slovenia is the only highly advanced country in the region with consolidated democracy and developed market economy. Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria are advanced countries with democracy in consolidation and functioning market economy. Montenegro and Serbia are also advanced countries regarding their transformation status, with functioning market economy, but defective democracy. Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are with limited transformation, defective democracy and market economy with functional flows, except Macedonia that is with functioning market economy.

Table 5: Transformation index of Balkans' Countries

Country	BTI		Political Transformation		Economic Transformation		
	rank	score[1]	rank	value	rank	value	Level of socioeconomic development
Slovenia	7	9,01	7	9,20	7	8,82	10
Romania	14	8,06	17	8,15	15	7,96	7
Croatia	15	7,93	14	8,40	20	7,46	8
Bulgaria	16	7,91	17	8,15	18	7,68	7
Montenegro	20	7,48	21	7,85	27	7,11	7
Serbia	21	7,43	21	7,85	30	7,00	6
Macedonia	31	6,86	44	6,65	28	7,07	6
Albania	33	6,71	36	6,95	37	6,46	5
Bosnia	42	6,38	54	6,30	37	6,46	6
Kosovo	44	6,33	44	6,65	49	6,00	5

Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016

In accordance with the Freedom House's Nations in transition Report of 2016, there is a decline of average democratic score in the Balkans 6 years in a raw, after substantial progress from 2004 to 2010. Today region's average democratic score is the same as it was in 2004. All the regions' EU candidate and potential candidate countries are declining with exception of Albania, while the largest score decline was registered in Macedonia. From EU member countries Slovenia is the only consolidated democracy in the region, while Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia together with Serbia and Montenegro are semi consolidated democracies. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia are transitional governments or hybrid regimes, while Kosovo is semi consolidated authoritarian regime.

It is evident that despite the democratic continuity during the last 25 years and a certain economic growth and trade liberalization, the model of structural reforms did not respond to specific regions' social deficits perceived as deficits of democracy (Large & Sisk, 2006: 118). Therefore the process of euro-integration and achieving EU basic values of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights is contributing to reduction of human injustice by enabling people to live life in dignity. Strengthening democracy by ensuring the rule of law and independent and effective justice system is and will stay priority for the Balkans' countries, because they are crucial to economic and social stability.

4. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY AS SOURCE OF INSECURITY

Poverty, inequality and perceived sense of injustice they create may lead to increasing vulnerability, instability and radicalization. Sources to insecurity lie in exclusion and lack of access to power and resources of subordinate groups and people living in poverty (Large & Sisk, 2006). With the purpose of investigating their influence upon the regional peace, stability and security, in this chapter will be analyzed some of the most relevant structural indexes for Balkans' countries.

Fragile State Index (FSI) of the Fund for Peace measures the risk of destabilization of the states and the pressure that might push them into failure. The FSI is very important in identifying the excessive pressure to which the states are exposed to and which may be crucial for their success or failure. The index is consisted of 12 indicators divided into three groups i.e. social, economic and political-military. According to the index value[69], 178 countries are ranked as per their stability level in a way that enables country comparison.

Table 7: Fragile State Index for the Balkans' countries

Country	Rank	Value	Stability level
BIH	88	74.2	Elevated warning
SRB	98	72.0	
MKD	111	67.0	Warning
ALB	124	61.2	
GRC	130	55.9	

[69] FSI's value varies from 0 (very stable) to 115 (very unstable).
 Стајић Љ. Гилановић Ч. (1994) "*Основи безбедности*", Полициска академија у Београду, Београд

MNE	131	55.2	
BUG	132	53.7	Stable
ROU	134	52.9	
HRV	136	52.4	
SVN	160	33.9	Very Stable

Source: Fund for Peace, 2016

According to the data presented in the table, all stable countries in the region (out of which Slovenia is very stable) are EU members' states, with exception of Montenegro which is in most progressed stage of EU integration. The WB countries are in warned category i.e. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have elevated warning, while Albania and Macedonia are warned countries. Thorough indicators' analysis shows that biggest pressure in the region is coming from poverty, group grievances, factionalized elites and refugees.

"Negative peace" means absence of hostilities usually by confrontational means such as the threat or actual use of force by police and military forces (Sandole, 2007). Therefore, negative peace may be defined as absence of violence or fear from violence which corresponds to human security's "freedom from fear". Negative peace is being measured by the Global Peace Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace and it is composed of 23 indicators divided into two main domains, internal and external peace.

Table 8: Global Peace Index (GPI) for the Balkans' countries

Country	Global rank (out of 162)	Regional rank (out of 36)	Value[2]	Militarization	Society and Security	Ongoing domestic and international conflict
SVN	10	7	1.408	1.3	1.4	1.5
HRV	26	19	1.633	1.7	1.9	1.3
BUG	29	20	1.646	1.6	2.1	1.1
ROU	31	21	1.649	1.9	1.9	1.1
SRB	48	28	1.834	1.7	2.1	1.6
ALB	54	29	1.867	1.8	2.4	1.3
MNE	57	30	1.884	1.6	2.3	1.5
BIH	60	31	1.915	1.6	2.1	1.1
KSV	77	33	2.022	1.5	2.5	0.8
GRC	82	34	2.044	2.1	2.3	1.7
MKD	94	35	2.092	1.9	2.4	1.9

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016

According to 2016 GPI, Europe is still the most peaceful geographical region in the world. Regionally Macedonia and Greece are at the bottom of the list meaning that they are the list peaceful countries in the region. Greece dropped four places globally and regionally it lies ahead only of Republic of Macedonia, which had the biggest drop in the global ranking as a European country, followed by Kosovo. Internal peace and the societal safety and security domain, globally and regionally, declined every year for the last 8 years which to a certain degree is related to the consequences of the global economic crisis. According to the GPI scores since 2008 the world has become less peaceful. (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016)

"Positive peace" may assume the achievements of negative peace, but in any case moves beyond it to deal with the underlying conflict causes and conditions, through the use of collaborative means to eliminate the structural causes for violence (Sandole, 2007: 41-42). Therefore positive peace means "attitudes, institutions and structures that are creating and maintaining peaceful societies" (Institute for Economic and Peace, 2015). Positive peace is being measured by the Positive Peace Index which is composed of 24 indicators organized in 8 domains, also known as pillars of peace.

Table 9: Positive Peace Index for the Balkan countries

Country	Rank	Overall score[3]	Well-functioning government	Low levels of corruption	Sound Business Environ.	Equitable distribution of resources	Acceptance of the rights of others	Free flow of information	High levels of human capital	Good relations with neighbors
SVN	22	1,921	2,474	2,265	2,463	1,799	1,554	2,186	1,320	1,158
GRC	34	2,214	2,687	2,932	2,626	1,207	2,279	2,735	1,453	1,402
HRV	36	2,268	2,667	2,922	2,824	1,634	2,261	2,550	1,544	1,402
BGR	43	2,495	3,008	3,213	2,754	1,903	2,332	2,422	2,620	1,268
MNE	45	2,558	2,863	3,343	2,773	1,546	2,519	2,362	2,774	1,763
KSV	46	2,564	2,180	3,791	3,116	1,463	2,658	2,639	1,517	2,665
ROU	49	2,678	2,927	3,176	2,760	2,246	2,861	2,527	2,634	1,983
MKD	54	2,734	2,829	3,320	2,770	1,547	2,614	2,945	2,888	2,587
SRB	59	2,783	3,078	3,583	3,280	2,115	2,835	2,439	2,251	2,226
ALB	62	2,837	3,216	3,580	3,075	2,070	2,352	2,729	3,371	1,855
BIH	68	2,955	2,799	3,687	3,452	1,916	2,971	2,787	2,956	2,627

Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016

It is clear that weakest peace pillar in the Balkans is the "low level of corruption" followed by "sound business environment", "well-functioning government" and "high levels in human capital". Greece and Slovenia are among European countries that saw the greatest deterioration in positive peace, but even so Slovenia is with highest level of positive peace in the Balkans followed by Greece, Croatia and Bulgaria. Lowest levels of positive peace are registered in Western Balkan countries, specifically in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Albania, Serbia and Macedonia.

5. CONCLUSION

The transition process that started in 1990s along with the global economic crisis that reached the Balkans in 2009, brought sudden insecurities and deprivations, thus increasing the human insecurity throughout the whole region. Unfortunately, WB countries still haven't completed their transition to democracy and liberal market economy, so like in many similar cases their democracy is often referred to as illiberal, captured, partial or alike, while poverty and inequality are still major structural challenge to security. They directly affect people's survival, well-being and quality of life, which are values that are to be protected within the expanded concept of human security. By applying grievance theories of conflict, the research showed how increased poverty and inequality within and between countries, generate conditions within which grievances can lead to growing tensions that might affect stability and security of the Balkans. The results have shown that there are significant and continuous socioeconomic, political and cultural horizontal inequalities in the region, which are undermining democracy and at the same time are increasing the risk of regional destabilization.

The results showed that at individual level poverty and inequality may generate dissatisfaction, grievances and desperation that might cause frustration which may trigger mobilization of discontent that is crucial for aggression and violence. At national level group mobilization can initiate social unrests, ethnical tensions, organized violence, political conflicts and even civil war, thus affecting human as well as national security, mainly when the states are very weak. At regional level, if such developments become violent, they can seriously disturb peace, stability and security of the entire region and lead to intra-national as well as to inter-national tensions and conflicts, particularly if there is overlapping of national and regional discontent of certain ethnic group.

Poverty and inequality as subtle threats to human security are serious source of vulnerability, injustice and insecurity affecting people's fundamental freedoms. Failure of a large part of population to satisfy its vital and biological needs as well as people's perception that their present situation is much worse than expected or compared to others within the society or the region, is creating grievances and makes those people vulnerable to internal and external influences. Therefore, poverty and inequality as source of vulnerability seriously violate people's fundamental "freedom from want". As source of injustice they represent violation of basic human rights as they are provided by the international treaties; and since one of democracy's basic roles is to protect and advance human rights and freedoms, this situation undermines the trust into democracy and violates people's "freedom to live in dignity". Finally, violation of these two freedoms is affecting in-

dividual safety and security of the people, because it may be a reason for violent conflicts that are directly affecting people's "freedom from fear".

In order to overcome these challenges at national and regional level it will be necessary to gradually reduce and eventually eradicate poverty and horizontal inequalities. At national level WB countries have to complete comprehensive structural reforms, harmonize national with most significant European standards and principles as integral part of the integration process and adopt public policies directed towards poverty and inequality reduction. On the other hand, at regional level this task is becoming much more difficult because in order to reach regional agreement aimed at poverty eradication and reduction of inequalities between the countries, it is necessary to establish substantial and not only formal regional cooperation, which will enable regional and subsequently European integration.

Research findings point out that there is a development - democracy – security link. Economic growth without democracy leads to greater degrees of inequality. That is why democratic governance and economic development are necessary for stabilization and not the other way around. For greater resilience against the current threats to Balkans' security and stability, it is necessary to strengthen security by enhancing countries' economic resilience through sustainable development, inclusive growth, social welfare and even distribution of income and resources; and to consolidate the political resilience through protection and advancement of human rights, rule of law and improved democratic governance.

Increased human insecurity due to poverty and inequality may weaken the national security because their relationship is complementary. Violations of human security manifested as poverty and inequality can easily result in conflicts, displacements and human suffering. Human insecurity weakens human development and worsen human rights thus contributing to the decline of democracy and rise of populism in the region. Therefore, democratization through reduction of poverty and inequality and advancement of human rights and freedoms may contribute to greater human security and stability of the Balkans'.

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Prevention and suppression of organized crime – a condition for security in the Balkan countries

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Abstract:

This paper attempts to give overview of the asymmetrical threat – the organized crime, with special emphasis on prevention and its suppression as one of the preconditions for security in the Balkan countries.

In all the Balkan countries, regardless of their state governance or regardless whether they are EU member states or not, without exception the activities of the organized crime are present. This because these countries are on the crossroad East-West and North-South, through which the so called "Balkan road" passes, with its "spokes" through which the whole trade and transport of illegal and illicit goods and people is conducted. Having in mind the fact of the rising demand of illicit consumer goods, with suspicious quality, and the illicit goods, primarily drugs for domestic consumers and consumers from the Western European countries, also the increased number of migration processes for numerous reasons, especially the increased number of migrants from the Middle East in the last year, the Balkan countries will be main transit points also in the future. Moreover, they will also be "consumer - countries" of the goods that are illegally traded, because of the low prices available to the increasingly poor citizens of this region. The new migration trend complicates the security of the Balkan countries because of the great number of members of the so called Islamic state, through the channels controlled by the organized crime groups for migrants smuggling, which pass through the Balkan, shifting from the Middle East to the Western European countries with main goal of carrying out terrorist attacks with numerous civilian casualties.

The state as a social category is a guarantor and a guardian of the community, which performs a series of necessary functions through the application of various regulatory tools. The security as a function is its inherent attribute and its purpose is to protect its citizens and the state values from all forms of endangerment. Thus, this paper gives a brief overview of the impact of organized crime on the safety of the citizens and the countries, and a overview of its negative implications on security and a overview the ways and measures for its prevention and suppression.

Prevention as a major form of crime prevention, and thus from organized crime, is necessary to achieve its goals, which are primarily reducing crime and increasing the level of security of the citizens and their property, protection of values and occurrences that countries consider of vital meaning, increasing of the ability and capacity of the subjects responsible for crime prevention, as well as development of narrow cooperation between governmental and non governmental institutions responsible for crime prevention. All countries from the Balkan region must establish a degree of values for a zero crime tolerance, not only by declaration, and the strong interstate and regional cooperation to represent one of the key instruments for successful combating of organized crime.

The successful prevention of the organized crime presupposes taking on a series of measures and activities by the countries arising from the National security strategies.

According to this, the strategic interest of the Republic of Macedonia should be strengthening of the capacities to combat organized crime at national and regional level.

Key words: *Balkan, organized crime, security, prevention, national strategy*

1. Introduction

Security is one of the phenomena of the civil society in all its developmental phases. Whether it comes to security of the individual, the states, or more state, or the international community in general, it always comes to the intention to ensure the values and conditions that are considered vital. The main objective of each national policy is the survival of the state and its society, and the requirement for that survival depends on its security. Thus, the goal for an action of all state institutions should be directed toward achieving and maintaining its security. This represents security policy frame, which should provide conditions for achieving internal and external security of the state.

The security of each state is based on the elements of its national power. This encompasses the economical power of the state, the geo-strategic position, natural resources, the dependence on the international market, technical – technological capacities, the national character of the state, the efficiency of the current government to operationalize its decisions, the educational level of the population, reproductive capacity of the population, the moral values, as well as the size of the internal reserves.

The security of the state, as a referent object, but also as a subject of the international community, and its vital interests can be threatened by many external and internal factors driven by different motives. The countries define their vital values and interests as priorities towards which all security activities for their protection are directed. These vital values are determined by the character of the socio – economic relations, by the developmental level of the production forces, by the relationship between the social classes and the legal and political upgrade. Special attention is devoted to their protection, development and protection, because with their survival,

the countries realize their own survival and development. Contrary, every endangerment of those values, individual or group, means endangerment of the state, its stability and sovereignty.[72]

The political developments in the Balkan countries imposed the need for creating new security policy as a precondition for establishment of stability in this region. The question for creation of security policy is of an essence because it is part of the process of transition of some of these countries and an indicator of the direction, the pace and scope of reforms.

Organized crime is not the only problem of the Balkan countries, it is a large problem which can be an obstacle for stabilization, maintaining of security and development of the countries in this whole region. It represents non-military, so called non-traditional or soft security threat for the countries and whole regions, which differs from traditional security threats, war or other armed conflicts. Organized crime endangers the fundamental values of contemporary state and negates all principles of its democratic and legal order, it destabilizes the governments, undermines parlametarisam, destroys citizens confidence in state institutions, negates the legislative and social moral, and by that makes the country's citizens feel unsafe. The largest social threat from organized crime comes from its characteristics, high degree of organization of its members, the great thirst for money and power and its international character. Its last characteristic is one of the main reasons why contemporary countries repudiate the dogma for national identity and accept the necessity of international cooperation and establishment of international protection institutions for mutual response which means military, police and judiciary cooperation between countries. It represents serious threat for the national security. However, it is clear that it represent a threat for the political stability, for their social and economic development, and negatively influences their foreign policy. On national level, organized crime endangers the internal stability of the countries through the influence over its key political subjects, which because of their inability to recognize and to effectively oppose the activities and the carriers of organized crime, also because of their active participation in certain criminal activities, are motivated by the desire for profiting. At international level organized crime endangers rules, standards and institutions over which the international system is established and functions. The countries that are in transition phase, countries weakened by political, ethnical and religious clashes, as the Balkan countries, became countries where organized crime easily penetrated and controlled certain territory rather than the state in whose jurisdiction it is. These weak countries with governments with no capacity, credibility, without necessary tools and methods to combat organized crime, represent countries with dysfunctional political and economic relations, with parallel economy and with citizens that have habits of working outside the law or legal framework.

Organized crime's intention is not to tear down the current state system, but to embed in it, in all its pores, that will question the system of political decision making. The central blow from organized crime is suffered by the economy, finances and the bank institutions, because it creates parallel so called grey economy next to the legal one, preventing the developmental strategies of the countries. It abuses the benefits of globalization expressed through the global financial

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[72] Стајић Љ. Гилановић Ч. (1994) "Основи безбедности", Полициска академија у Београду, Београд

and commercial system, the modern types of transport and communication, the information – technological achievements, the flow of information, services, people and goods, in order to carry out illicit activities by legalizing the criminally obtained profit. The activities of organized crime today are more complex, more sophisticated, market oriented and adjusted to local and global circumstances.

The security function of each state has two forms of intervention: preventive form, in situations where a state with its existence and on time action represents an instrument for deterring from all types of threats and repressive form, by removing the causes of threat and eliminating their holders through the use of force on legally permissible way.[73]

Prevention as a basic form of crime prevention is a set of measures, activities and actors who by mutual action work on realization of the objectives in this area. It is needed in order to achieve the objectives, which are reflected through crime reduction and increasing the level of security of the citizens and their property, increasing the ability of entities in charge of crime prevention and the development of close cooperation between governmental and non-governmental institutions responsible for crime prevention.

2. Status of organized crime – case study Macedonia

One of the conditions that foretold the emergence and development of organized crime in the Balkan region, and consequently in Macedonia as its integral part, was the process of privatization. Namely, in 1991 in the Republic of Macedonia there was lack of fresh and clean capital that the structures of organized crime successfully used for investing of their capital mainly in cash. Great part of the members of the old ruling structure so called "red bourgeoisie", in the named period infiltrated the newly created state institutions, and managed to keep their high and key management positions in the new government. A consequence to this was that part of the old business elite in conjunction with the newly elected democratic government managed to keep the privileges that they enjoyed in the economy, by blocking the new social flows more or less. Shortly, the inherited economic and non – economic stare infrastructure moved into the hands of the so called newly created social elite, which at the same time inherited the unstable and unproductive economy, the lack of foreign investments and the great degree of unemployment, a picture that unfortunately has not been changed even today.

Another reason that contributed to the occurrence and the fast development of organized crime was that after 1991 Macedonia was completely deserted and cut from all of its traditional trade partners from the former Yugoslav countries. The war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina closed the markets for Macedonian products, and in 1992 the UN imposed sanctions on Serbia, which was one of the largest trade partners of Macedonia.

The third reason was that in 1994 Greece, due to the familiar name dispute with Macedonia, officially imposed unilateral embargo, although it actually functioned from 1992, which prevented the access to the port of Thessaloniki, which was vital for the Macedonian economy. This

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[73] Kotovchevski M. – (2011) *"National security"*, Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje

imposed situation for Macedonia in that period produced a lost from around 60 million dollars a month. Faced with these problems, Macedonia had to look for new markets and trade roads and transport. Bulgaria on the east and Albania on the west were alternative trade roads and transport for Macedonian products. However, the poor road infrastructure on the East – West corridor and the increased length of the road caused increase of the total costs by 400% per route. Due to these reasons many businesses collapsed, many factories and companies had to reduce or stop production and close down their manufacturing facilities and many workers lost their jobs. This resulted in the creation of very bad socio-economic situation in the state, the unemployment rose, the population impoverished, foreign investment was lacking, which in turn led to the emergence and development of the so called "gray economy" and "the black market". From the stated above, than and today, for a great part of the population in Macedonia, illegal trafficking represents "legitimate" way for earning and dealing with the bad economic and social state.

Because Macedonia geographically takes the central place of the route of the so called "Balkan route", it represents state whose territory is used for transit and conducting of activities of all known types of illegal traffic. The high level of unemployment and poverty contributed for the structures of organized crime, domestic and international, to recruit young unemployed people for carrying out part of the criminal activities.

The visa liberalization by the European Union for the Macedonian citizens provided for large number of young people to seek livelihood and escape from poverty in the Western European countries. This way, part of them became easy prey for poachers from the criminal structures, mostly with ethnic character, for carrying out illegal activities especially in the area of illegal drug trafficking, stolen motor vehicles trafficking, illegal consumer goods trafficking, especially branded apparel and footwear, as well as intermediation for prostitution.

The negligence in operation and the illegal acquisition of property through corruption was, and due to influence and violence still is one of the most exploited ways of action of the structures of organized crime in the Republic of Macedonia. Organized crime in Macedonia is in close conjunction with the businesses in order to implement their activities of non-transparent and somewhere criminal privatization, criminalization of the public procurement procedures, public tenders, illegal financing of political parties, money laundering, tax evasion, corruption of public officials with high ranks etc. The corruption as a system and a method of operation of the structures of organized crime is priority during illegal activity realization, on account of violence as a method which was characteristic for the beginnings of the phenomenon of organized crime. In several conducted researches for corruption in the Republic of Macedonia, it was proven that the conscience of the population for its existence and destructive effect is on a very high level[74].

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[74] Despite its practicing by the members of the business structure that corrupt the officials in the public administration in order to meet their requests and needs, it is practiced by common citizens in order to get competent and secure services in short period of time, which became a normal way of proceedings. Certain criminal structures in order to cover the crime, the perpetrators either delay the court procedures until obsolesce, corrupt members from the security structures and the judiciary. The corruption in the Republic of Macedonia influences the deterring of direct foreign investments necessary for economic growth of the state, reviving the industry and creating new jobs.

In Macedonia the structures of organized crime conduct its activities throughout the several of its appearing forms[75]:

a) "Money laundering". The methods used by the criminal structures for committing this crime are: abuse of non-resident bank accounts, abuse of the system for remittance, abuse of the system for fast money transfer, trading with real estate and stocks, dealing with companies with registered office in the "off-shore" countries, abuse of the export – import operations, setting-up company with one employee so called "one-man-company", for placing or covering up of physical transfer of cash over the borders etc.

b) Violent crime. Violent crimes, especially armed robberies, in the Republic of Macedonia are committed by the structures of organized crime using firearms, within its territory and on its borders. Most common objects of attack are: post offices, postal transport of money, banks, exchange offices, gas stations, and apartments etc., where despite firearms excessive force is used.

c) Illegal trafficking.

1. Illegal drug trafficking. It represents the most common form of organized crime and is in constant raise, where the cooperation between the organized crime groups can be detected.[76] Certain scientific analysis of this type of organized crime shows that it is very profitable[77] and escalates each day by increasing the degree of social and state endangerment. The social endangerment of this type can be perceived through the negative implications in the economic, social, individual or national security, as well as in the politics.

2. Trafficking in human beings. Republic of Macedonia as relatively peaceful territory, in the beginning of the collapse of Yugoslavia that caused wars in these countries, was suitable destination to exodus from all former Yugoslav republics. Firstly, it experienced the Bosnian, and later the Kosovo exodus, where large amount of refugees arrived, among which large number of women and children, later victims of human trafficking. Namely, in that period a number of humanitarian and non-governmental organizations appeared and operated, and in their background hidden were the criminal structures, which used the open and unsecured borders for carrying out their criminal activities of illegal human trafficking. "The inside trade" is characterized by recruiting young women and girls mostly from the rural areas and cities from the east part of Macedonia, to "work" in catering facilities and night clubs in the western part of the country. Here we will mention the phenomenon "mail order bride", an illegal trafficking in young women and girls from Macedonia in the western European countries, by obtaining consent from deceived parents, believing that there their children will actually conclude the marriage. Mostly this phenomenon is present among the members of the Roma ethnic community.

3. Smuggling of migrants. Favorable geostrategic position of the Republic Macedonia also enabled rapid development of migrant smuggling. The migrants are mostly with origin from the countries in the Middle and Far East, that transiting through Macedonia, move to the western

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[75] Mitikj K. (2013) "Organized crime – non – military threat to Southeast Europe", Skopje
[76] Шикман М. (2011) "*Организовани криминалитет*", "БИНА", Бања Лука
[77] The estimation for annual income on global level from illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs is between 300 to 500 billion American dollars.

European countries. This is especially expressed in the last year and a half with the beginning of the so called migrant crisis.

4. Illicit trafficking in cultural heritage. The Republic of Macedonia for centuries had a significant cultural and historical heritage, which has been a characteristic of having a strong and healthy culture and civilization in this region with a special symbol of the peoples who lived and worked on this territory. Because of all this, the country's cultural heritage was of interest for appropriation by individuals and countries who illegally tried to approach it. With respect to this organizational form of organized crime, Kotovchevski talks about the practice of some of our neighbors, who without exception have a dismissive attitude towards our history, culture and tradition, towards our roots, identity and existence. Through continuous plundering of our cultural heritage they attempted to destroy all historical and cultural material evidence for our existence.[78] This way, part of the history and the reality for the existence of the Macedonian people throughout history is outflowing.

d) Environmental crime. The activities of environmental crimes in Macedonia are recognized through the unplanned and uncontrolled logging by the population, because of the high prices of other fuels they use for heating, through the uncontrolled and unprofessional collecting medicinal herbs, by performing illegal excavation of sand from river beds and in their vicinity, through illegal collection of minerals, illegal exports of native, rare and protected animals etc. The structures of organized crime engaged the population, for small wages, to carry out these illicit activities, sometimes unaware that it represents a criminal act.

e) Cyber crime. As one of the modern forms of organized crime in the Republic Macedonia mostly is manifested through hacker intrusions into computer systems, computer fraud as well as abuses of credit and other payment cards.

However, the structures of organized crime in the Republic Macedonia could not achieve their goals without support, or in cooperation with high-ranking public administration officials, mostly employed in the security and financial structures, courts, prosecutor offices, prominent businessmen and influential politicians

For more effective prevention of organized crime an effective harmonization of national legislation with the EU legislation is required, which is a strategic interest for the country. This interest coincides with the clear commitment of the European Union that were expressed at the London Conference (2002) and the Thessaloniki Summit (2003), supported with specific programs for implementation[79].

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[78] Kotovchevski M. – (2011) *"National security",* Faculty of Philosophy, Skopje

[79] United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, together with the protocols relating to human trafficking and the fight against smuggling of migrants (2000), the Convention on money laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of criminal funds (2000), the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002). UN Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1993), the European Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (1999), the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1999), the European Convention on Extradition (1999) Penitentiary law Convention on corruption (1999) and Civil law Convention on corruption of the Council of Europe (2002).

So far, there were significant amendments in some laws and new agencies were established for combating organized crime. With the latest amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia, the penal policy was strengthened regarding the perpetrators of criminal acts of organized crime, and new provisions and incriminations were introduced in order to ease the discovery and proving of these crimes. However, the most important thing is the abiding and without any retention enforcement of these laws.

3. Similarities and differences in the actions of organized crime in the Balkan countries.

Characteristically for the countries with fragile democracy and the transition countries, where changes in the political and economic systems occurred, which were or are still are part of the Balkan countries, is the existence of a legal vacuum. The political elites in harness with the economic one deliberately kept this legal vacuum in order to create so called "business oligarchy" for concentration of capital in a small circle of people. The creation and maintenance of this unhealthy climate in the so called transition countries in the Balkans several important factors were of favor. Firstly, the non existence of independent state institutions, which will be under social, not party control, whose job is to prevent, detect and adjudicate the perpetrators of crimes in the area of organized crime. The second factor is recognized through the unfinished and the lack of legal framework, the lack of legal definition of the crimes within the area of organized crime and the improperly constructed criminal procedure. The lack of legally formulated and regulated national strategy for hindering the activities of organized crime and the vast discretionary powers of the state institution officers creates real preconditions for occurrence and development of corruption. The corruption endangers their economic, political and social bases, and at the same time allowes economic power to the members of organized crime. The lack of transparency, or favoritism of certain subjects in the processes of privatization, public procurement, lack of transparency in financing of political parties, nepotism, existence of bureaucratic brakes during issuing different licenses for import or export of raw materials or final products etc., represented a factor for creation of unhealthy social climate in the Balkan countries.

The great influence of the political parties over the public official within the security structures through degradation in service, layoffs of the "unfit" or the opponents of the current political elite and filling up the vacancies with unqualified, unfit party members, justifying it as making the necessary reforms of the security structures, is one of the most significant factors that organized crime gains from. The low income of these public officials, their lack of protection from the arbitrariness of the political or criminal authorities, directed towards one another in part of these countries, their weak material and technical equipment as well as the low level of education for the methods and ways of recognition, prevention and suppression of the forms of organized crime, represents yet another factor that contributes to the survival and continuous operation of organized crime. Namely, in a situation like this where chaos, lawfulness, erosion of moral rules, and where there is lack of system of values in part of the countries in the region, the structures of organized crime see their chance of success.

The geostrategic position of the newly formed countries from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the change in their constitutional order, as well as the change in the constitutional order in Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, and the transition from socialistic into pluralistic democracy, created similar interests and strategy or operation of the criminal structures, not excluding organized crime structures from Greece, as the oldest democratic state on the Balkans. The criminal structures in this region slowly build and strengthen themselves, starting as small partners of already built and strong internationally organized criminal structures, becoming respectable members of the crime world in regional and world measures. With the new social constellations and the development of the information technology, more and more criminal structures conduct their illegal activities by using new information technology in order to establish faster and more secure flow of goods and money, also for creating conditions for bigger self protection.

Characteristic for the criminal structures in the region is that for successful realization of their activities they engaged in close cooperation regardless of their ethnic background, despite the current politics in their countries.

The social danger in these countries from sociological and moral aspect is manifested when after a successfully conducting the activities of money laundering gained with illegal activities, the members of the criminal structures or individuals which by close cooperation and earnings obtained great wealth, is the fact that they managed to "launder" their own biographies. These criminals, now being sole or dominant owners of once great and successful companies or sport clubs, became significant "sponsors" of cultural, sport and other type of manifestations and became a part of the "social elite" deeply established within the government. Especialy dangerous is that these structures are influential in the politics thanks to the funds invested in some of the political parties or in influential persons in the countries. Because smaller part of the countries still haven't precisely defined organized crime and each of them differently titles the daily political needs, also the fact that their security structures do not have the necessary capacity for detection, prevention and suppression of its activities, they must consistently implement the harmonized legislation, to take on measures for improvement and creation of genuine interstate and regional cooperation, and to join the newly formed international organizations and associations, in order to undertake measures and activities on global plan for suppression of the international organized crime.

4. Prevention and suppression of organized crime, a condition for stability and security in the Balkan countries

The new security structure in the Balkans is constituted on basis of the modified nature of the threats over the security, were primary threats are the non-military threats, organized crime in the first place. In the years after the Cold war, years of instability, organized crime slowly but surely progressed and developed with ambition to deeply embed in the high governmental structures. Since then, its criminal structures became richer, more influential and more capable to stand the blows coming from the security structures manifested in occasional arrests and seizures of goods subject to illegal trafficking.

In the 90s of the last century in the Balkan countries the number of security structures members lead by material motives in the first place were included in the processes of criminal privatization and other beneficial criminal activities. By this, the notion of civil rights and liberties coming from the belonging to a certain social and political community were seriously threatened. This threat represents the main source of insecurity in the region that determines the way of thinking and political behavior of citizen for an extended period. This way of political behavior naturally and systematically will influence the future election results and the processes through which the state institutions are established and maintained in the Balkan countries. It can very easily happen for the fear to become dominant social motive for political behavior, and societies controlled by fear can progress very hard and cannot secure a climate of stability and security necessary for their citizens to have authentic, healthy and uncorrupt government.

Prevention as basic form of preventing crime, and by that organized crime, for years was subject to a review of large number of scientists of almost all scientific areas. It is a set of measures, activities, actors, who by acting together work towards realization of the established goals. The goals needed to be realizes are lowering of crime rate and increasing the degree of security for the citizens and their property, increasing the ability and capacities of the subjects in charge of crime prevention, as well as development of narrow cooperation between the governmental and nongovernmental institutions in prevention.

Prevention is implemented through three levels: primary level, secondary and tertiary. On a primary level the prevention is carried out through the education and information system, through the institutions for social protection or through the nongovernmental sector. The secondary level is characterized through carrying out specific programs directed towards the occurrence, the individuals and groups. The tertiary level of prevention aims at prevention of recidivism in situations where crime already exists, and towards serious crimes. According to that, prevention is directed towards the situation or environment, towards social surroundings, towards potential perpetrators, possible victims, as well as towards building of cooperation with the citizens in order for better reaction when crime occurs.[80]

The protection from organized crime contains carrying out several types of measures for prevention, control over the public officials in the first place, eradicating corruption, and raising awareness for the necessity of inclusion of all state institutions, media, and the complete public and relevant political stakeholders in its combating.

Biggest attention should be paid to the uncompromising seizure of property and other property gain that are acquired with the illegal activities of organized crime. Property gain is commonly expressed in profits through property and money and is one of the main targets of organized crime, and therefore its "Achilles heel." If there is lack of that gain, or it is seized from the criminals, organized crime will not exist.[81]

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[80] Република Србија, Министарство унутрашњих послова *(2009) "Полазни оквир Националне стратегије превенције криминала"* Београд
[81] Grubać M. (2009) *"Organizovani kriminal u Srbiji"*, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god.46,4/2009

The criminal intelligence in the last period has been very successful method in prevention from organized crime activities. For that purpose, the countries from the region, in order to successfully suppress organized crime created specialized agencies, whose main activity is collecting criminal intelligence information. They do not act in response to already committed crime, but follow the trends and actions of the structures of organized crime, collect useful information for these criminal structures and strive to predict the possible directions for development of the threats over the security of the countries and citizen, coming from the activities of organized crime.

5. Strategy for suppression of organized crime in the Republic of Macedonia

Why the Republic of Macedonia has many partial strategies and not one national strategy for suppression of organized crime? The answer is simple: because the Republic of Macedonia still has not prepared "National strategy for suppression of organized crime" as a main document in which the commitment, goals, directions, ways and institutions in charge of implementation of the activities of the state in prevention, recognition and suppression of this negative phenomenon will be specified.

Namely, this strategy should include the possible trends in development of organized crime, and the possibilities of Macedonia to develop the national capacities and potentials for efficiency in suppressing organized crime. To accomplish the aligned in the strategy, the need of establishment national consensus of all relevant state stakeholders is required, in order to determine the directions for recognition, prevention and repression of organized crime. The delivery and implementation of "The National Strategy for suppression of organized crime" should represent priority for the Republic of Macedonia, among other things, because it represents important step in the process of integration in the European Union and the NATO structures. This strategy should represent a main document that must be in strong conceptual and functional relation with the already delivered strategies in Macedonia, as: Strategy for integral border management[82], Strategy for suppression of money laundering and financing of terrorism[83], Strategy for suppression of traf-

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[82] http://www.igu.gov.mk/.../nacionalna/nacionalna _strategija
[83] http://www.usppft.gov.mk/.../..
　　　This advisory body is responsible for following and coordinating the activities of the institutions in charge of implementation of this strategy in order for achieving the set goals, improvement of the functioning of the system and proposing of activities for increasing of its efficiency. This body is responsible for successful realization of this strategy, as well as for control over several segments of the system and the system in whole. The realization of the set measures and activities will secure directions or creation of national policy for cooperation and coordination against money laundering and financing of terrorism. Members of this advisory body are representatives from the Ministry of interior, Ministry of justice, the Public prosecutor office, the Customs Administration office, the Public revenue office, the financial police, the National bank of the Republic of Macedonia, the Commission for securities and exchange, the Notary chamber and the Attorney chamber. The members of this advisory body and their substitutes are appointed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, and the director of the Public revenue office is the head of this body.

ficking in human beings and illegal migration[84], as well as the Strategy for drug handling[85]. This strategy must include several measures and activities that include cooperation of the countries from the region in suppression of the activities of organized crime. "The National Strategy for suppression of organized crime" would represent a public document, which will be regularly updated according to the conducted activities determined with the strategy measures. For successful management and coordinated implementation of the activities determined in the strategy, for making analysis of the findings, for delivering conclusions and giving recommendations based on those analyses, there is a need for preparation of action plans and establishment of national committee or commission.

6. Conclusion

In order for successful suppression of organized crime what is needed is professionalization, not partisanship of the employees in the institutions in charge of prevention and suppression of organized crime, which was the case the last several years, their material and technical equipping, electronic connection and building of sole data bases of the security institutions, as well as development of the criminal intelligence and risk analysis, which are important elements in that direction.

By strengthening the measures for suppression of organized crime special accent should be put on strengthening the institutional support, especially of the special units for this purpose. Namely, the security structures by themselves or separated from other state systems, the citizens and society, cannot effectively oppose crime.

The strategic interest of the Republic of Macedonia is the strengthening of state capacities for prevention and suppression of organized crime on national and regional level. The reforms in the judiciary, the close cooperation with the local self-government, with the civil sector, the private sector and the media, are also part of the priority tasks. Strengthening of international cooperation at all levels, as well as conducting joint police operations on regional level are of great importance. By implementing all these elements Macedonia should give great contribution in recognizing, prevention and suppression of organized crime, and contribution in improvement of the national, regional and international security.

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[84] The Decision is published in the Official Gazette of RM no. 19/2001, 26/2002
The National Commission monitors and analyses the state with trafficking in human beings and illegal migration and coordinates the activities of the institutions, international and nongovernmental organizations involved in problem solving in this area. The Secretariat is a body that works within the National Commission, and the secretary implements the decision of the Commissions and represents this body, composed of members from the international nongovernmental organizations and experts from governmental institutions. Within the National commission, a subgroup against trafficking in children is established.

[85] Ministry of health – (2007) *"National drug strategy of the Republic of Macedonia"* (2006-2012), Skopje

Almost all strategies of the Balkan countries are with same goals, same measures, directions and guidance, because the activities of organized crime in the region are manifested through similar or identical forms of appearance, the criminals work by identical methodology, on a small space with the same goal, that being profit and power. These strategies help the development and implementation of the policies for strengthening of the institutional capacities against organized crime on national, regional and international level.

The Republic of Macedonia still has not prepared "National strategy against organized crime", as a main document where the endowments, goals, directions, ways and institutions that are in charge of implementing the activities of the state in a manner of prevention, recognition and suppression of this negative phenomena. This strategy should envisage the possible trends and directions of development of organized crime, and hence the possibilities for Macedonia to develop national capacities and potentials for efficiency in prevention from organized crime. In order to achieve what is outlined in this strategy, the need to establish national consensus of all relevant stakeholders in the country is required, aimed at determining the directions for recognition, prevention and repression of organized crime. The delivery and implementation of "The National Strategy for prevention of organized crime" should represent a priority for the Republic of Macedonia, among other reasons that it is an important step in the process of integration in the European Union and NATO.

If the development of organized crime is not immediately prevented by using all means available to the Balkan courtiers, organized crime physically will eliminate its opponents and the opponents within the political and governmental structures, will elect and appoint head figures on cultural, health, educational and sport institutions, as well as at the top of the clergy and other religious associations. All Balkan countries, in the future, should establish system of values in which there will be zero tolerance of crime, while the strong interstate and regional cooperation will represent one of the key instruments for successful prevention of organized crime.

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THE REFUGEE AND MIGRANT CRISIS IN MACEDONIA ASSOCIATED WITH DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT

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Abstract:

Refugee and migrant crisis is a global problem not only for the Republic of Macedonia and the Balkans, but the whole Europe. The Republic of Macedonia is one of the key points of the Balkans route of movement, mainly from the Middle East, Arab states and North Africa to countries in Western Europe. During the first half of 2015, the country was faced with a mass influx of refugees and migrants who entered from neighboring Greece. This situation caused a disruption of public order and security in the cities, especially in the southern and northern parts. Therefore it was needed to undertake coordinated and organized action and the Government on 19.8.2015 adopted a Decision declaring the crisis situation in the southern and northern borders. Two temporary reception and transit centers near Gevgelija and Kumanovo (Tabanovce) were established for organized transit through Macedonia. Approximately 888,500 refugees and migrants transited through the territory of the country in the past period. They were provided with maximum support in their reception, temporary accommodation, organized transportation, food, clothing, medical assistance and other services.

On their way to Europe, they are subject to numerous risks and dangers, including natural disasters and accidents. Likewise, the composition of arriving mixed migration flows encompass a wide range of vulnerable migrants, refugees, unaccompanied and separated children and others, with the majority facing serious protection concerns. Experience in managing this crisis imposes the need for their increased awareness about the risks that deriving from local environment (e.g. natural disasters, meteorological hazards, technical - technological hazards and risks of epidemics and infectious diseases). On 14 March 2016 in proximity to the Transit Centre in Gevgelija, amid heavy rain and flash flooding form "Suva Reka" river, during mass movement of a large group of refugees and migrants, 3 persons drowned. In addition, during the pre-crisis period more than

20 casualties were registered during their irregular movement along the railway tracks or from other incidents. There is an evident risk of health character from infectious diseases that they carry to the territory of Macedonia and beyond.

Because of the comprehensive management processes of migrant and refugee crisis within the Crisis management system of the Republic of Macedonia there is an inevitable need of mainstreaming measures and activities associated with disasters risks reducing.

Keywords: refugees, migrants, crisis management, risk, distress risk management.

1. BACKGROUND

The year of 2015 was a specific one with unprecedented humanitarian and security crisis in the recent history. Huge number of people on move resulted in millions of people arriving in Europe and knocked-outing the security systems of the countries in the routes. More than a half of them were escaping from the war thorn Syria, whether the others were starting their journeys in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan and in cases of economic migrants from Southeast Asia or Africa. All of them have had only one destination in their minds – Western Europe for securing their security and financial existence.

These movements were characterized with unusual dynamics and patterns. Firstly, waves of movement of groups of men reached the Europe's shores ensuring the "passability" of the routes and over the year more and more families and women with children started to arrive. With this the vulnerability of the refugees and migrants drastically changed, as well as needs for provision of different humanitarian services.

The Republic of Macedonia is a landlocked country in the Balkan Peninsula, in South East Europe. Its specific location and closeness to the Aegean Sea, placed it as an important point in the so called "Balkan Route" for movements of refugees and migrants from Asia, Middle East and Northern Africa. The main artery was flowing from Turkey, through Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary to Austria and Western Europe. Once the borders of Hungary were "sealed" during the summer of 2015, the flow of refugees and migrants was diverted through Croatia and Slovenia.

2. THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA IN THE CONTEXT OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS' PROCESSES

The refugees and migrants' crisis is a global problem which are considering not only the Republic of Macedonia and the region of Western Balkan, but broadly the whole European Continent. During the last decades, there were minor movements of refugees and migrants from different parts to Europe and through the Republic of Macedonia, but the summer of 2015 was a specific one where on a daily basis huge thousands of them have arriving on the southern border with Greece. These movements were the largest ones that Europe witnessed for decades. Approximately 1.1 million of refugees and migrants arrived on the European shores, whether 687,000

people arrived at the Southern border of Macedonia with Greece during the period June – December 2015. Originally 79 per cent of people arriving were men, but from June onwards the number of women and children increased. (UNICEF, 2016).

With drastic growth of number of refugees and migrants that were entering and transiting the country daily, also the security and humanitarian issues were increased. There were number of cases of illegal trafficking in people, illegal transportation of refugees and migrants through the territory of the country, their illegal accommodation in so called "transit spots" by organized crime groups etc. On the other side, there were 25 cases of deaths and many injuries based on the railway accidents, since the refugees and migrants mainly followed the railway tracks in order not to be noticed by the Police, as well as other incidents with death or injuries during their hiding from national and local authorities.

Accordingly, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia modified the Law on Asylum and temporary protection allowing them a free transit for period of 72 hours. This action led to slight decrease of the criminal acts related to illegal trafficking in persons, as well as tragic accidents. However, intensified movements in the region led to more and more refugees and migrants that would have arrived at the border. Increased presence of the refugees and migrants and their contacts with the local population led to specific attitude to be developed by the local population towards them. It ranged from humanitarian support to not friendly attitude and insecurity of the local population. Especially during the summer period (July – August) increased number of refugees and migrants resulted in breaking of the public security and endangered the security condition in the cities and villages alongside the Southern bored, especially on the territory of the Municipality of Gevgelija. There were many cases of attacks and damages on private property, degradation of the environment and breaking of public security. These events and staggering number of refugees and migrants led to a point when the country could not react with conventional resources to the increased number of refugees and migrants and to provide them with the adequate protection as per the international conventions. There was a need to implement coordinated and organized measures for tackling this situation.

Accordingly, on the proposal of the Assessment Group and the Steering Committee within the framework of the Crisis Management System, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia on its session on 19 August 2015 declared a crisis situation on the part of the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, on its Southern and Northern border on the territories of the municipalities of Gevgelija and Kumanovo. In accordance with the decision, the Crisis Management Centre took over the national coordination for management of the crisis and developed an "Action Plan for prevention and management of entry and exit of refugees and migrants through the territory of the Republic of Macedonia". With this Action Plan following aspects were regulated: modality of participation and activities of all relevant national and local institutions, as well as the international community and civil societies in providing support to the efforts of the national capacities.

Per the Law on Crises Management, the Government adopts the decision on the existence of a crisis, it determines the area affected by the crisis and it accordingly activates the mechanisms for resolving the crisis. The Government decides on the use of resources of the state bodies, mu-

nicipalities and the City of Skopje, as well as managing them in case of crisis. In the event of a crisis, the resources of public enterprises, establishments and service providers, and trade associations are of importance for working in critical conditions. In these cases, at the request of the Government, based on the agreement concluded with the Crises Management Centre or voluntarily, the resources of private citizens and legal entities can be used to help resolve the crisis. The proclamation of the crisis situation invoked the involvement of the Crises Management Centre. Due to early warning, i.e. monitoring the situation, timely identification of phenomena and processes that pose risks and threats to the security of the state, which may lead to a crisis situation, the Crisis Management Centre informs and alerts the participants in the Crises Management System and the public. Moreover, the Crisis Management Centre has already developed capacities which required adjustment and improvement in regards to the specifics of this crisis situation.

The Crisis Management System is organized and conducted for prevention, early warning and crisis management that pose a risk to property, health and life of humans and animals caused by natural disasters, epidemics or other risks and dangers that directly threaten the constitutional order and security of Macedonia. This system includes gathering information, assessment, analyses of the situation, establishing goals and objectives, developing and implementing the necessary actions for prevention, early warning and crisis management. The Crises Management Centre performs activities related to ensuring continuity in the inter-departmental and international cooperation, consultations and coordination in crisis management; preparation and updating of a unified assessment of risks and threats to the security of the state; proposing measures and activities for resolving crises and performs other duties prescribed by law.

For the purposes of implementation of organized transit through the territory of the Republic of Macedonia and in cooperation with relevant international organizations (United Nations High Commission on Refugees - UNHCR and others) and civil society organizations, two temporary transit centers were established on the southern border near Gevgelija – "Vinojug" and on the northern border near Kumanovo – "Tabanovce". They served as entry and exit points for acceptance, evidence, registration, issuance of certifications for declared intention of asylum, preparation of the refugees and migrants for transit through the territory of the country and for support of the exit of the country to Serbia. During the past period from the beginning of the refugee and migrants' crisis until now, approximately 800,000 registered refugees and migrants transited the territory of the country. They were provided with maximum support during their acceptance, temporary accommodation, organized transportation, food, clothes, health support and other services.

Due to the continuity of the refugee and migrants' crisis as well as the risk for additional inflow of refugees and migrants, the crisis situation was extended for two additional periods, until 31 December 2016, and until 30 June 2017.

Experiences from the management of the refugees and migrant's crisis impose the need for increasing the awareness of the refugees and migrants on the local environment (risks form natural disaster, meteorological hazards, technical-technological hazards and risks from epidemics

and infectious diseases) while they are transiting through the country. Considering this it is good to state two examples of mentioned relation. On 14 March 2016, in the vicinity of the Transit Center "Vinojug" near Gevgelija, in the event of torrential rain and flash flooding from the local "Suva Reka" River, during the mass movement of the bigger group of refugees, three people were drowned (one male and two females), whether 23 people from the group were rescued by the Police and rescuing forces. In addition, during the pre-crisis period more than 20 casualties were registered during their irregular movement along the railway tracks or from other incidents. There is an evident risk of health character from infectious diseases that they carry to the territory of Macedonia and beyond. Based on reports by the World Health Organization, the most frequent health problems of arrived refugees and migrants to Europe include accidental injuries, hypothermia, burns, gastrointestinal illnesses, cardiovascular events, pregnancy- and delivery-related complications, diabetes and hypertension. Vulnerable individuals, especially children, are prone to respiratory infections and gastrointestinal illnesses because of poor living conditions, suboptimal hygiene and deprivation during migration, and they require access to proper health care. Poor hygienic conditions can also lead to skin infections. Migrants often come from communities affected by war, conflict or economic crisis and undertake long, exhausting journeys that increase their risks for diseases that include communicable diseases, particularly measles, and food- and waterborne diseases. As reported by IOM mobile teams and Macedonian Red Cross in their daily data capture and interventions, the most common illnesses are respiratory diseases, gastrointestinal and locomotor disorders, dermatitis/ wounds. Red Cross analyzed a 9-day period during the second half of October 2015. The number of interventions during this period was 6.800 (approximately 755 per day) and the statistics were the following: respiratory diseases – 42,7%, gastrointestinal diseases – 13%, wounds – 8,4%, dermatitis – 7,9%, locomotor – 7,9%, etc.

2. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION CONTEXT OF THE REFUGES AND MIGRANTS CRISIS

All these statements mentioned above, re-confirms the need the crisis management system to provide an adequate information to the refugees and migrants for the hazards that are present on the territories in which they are temporary present or transiting, especially the municipalities of Gevgelija and Kumanovo, as well as through the transit corridor to the Northern border. This information shall be provided in an organized and tehcnically supported modality.

Vice versa, presence of the refugees and migrants on the territoryy of the country and the municipalities, presents additional element of risk based on their exposure and vulnerability to natural and human – made disasters. Therefore, this is needed to be taken into consideration during the analysis and evaluation of possible risks. In general, the issue of correlation between the refugees and migrants and the disaster risk reduction is not being researched thoroughly. Aspects of forced migration induced by disasters were considered and analyzed.

However, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction points to the mobility as a potential element of risk – both the people on move, and for the environment in which they are moving. Migrants are understood to be the key elements of the modern society and they are men-

tioned in the document in three aspects: governments should engage with relevant stakeholders, including […] migrants […] in the design and implementation of policies, plans and standards; empowering local level authorities to coordinate with migrants on local level disaster risk management and using the knowledge and skills of the migrants to contribute to resilience building. (UNISDR, 2015).

2.1 Disaster Risk Management in the Republic of Macedonia

The Crisis Management Centre has a normative competence for preparation and update of the Assessment of the endangerment of the territories of the municipalities and the Republic of Macedonia from all risks and hazards. During the period 2011 – 2015, activities for establishment of integrated multi – hazard, multi – risk and multi – sector assessment were implemented with support of the United Nations Development Programme. Accordingly, based on the accepted methodological framework for risk and hazard assessment, risk and hazard assessment documents were prepared for all municipalities in the Republic of Macedonia (80 municipalities + the City of Skopje). Also, the draft version of the National Assessment from all risks and hazards was prepared. The process of preparation of the assessments is completely IT supported one, through the modern web platform "E-Assessment". This platform is connecting all available data basis for existing hazard or hazard profiles of the municipalities, exposure and vulnerability of infrastructure, facilities and population, as well as data on the available resources of the crisis management system.

Municipalities of Gevgelija and Kumanovo have one thing in common, and that is their strategic geographical position on the Southern and Northern parts of the country and that are practically the entry and exit points on the "Balkan Route". This is important aspect of defining their environment and exposure to different hazard.

Based on the analysis of the historical events, as well as impact of the hazards, profiling was done for both municipalities. In Gevgelija hazard profile is consisted of fires, floods, earthquakes, and other hazards, predominantly weather related events (drought, snow falls, storm winds etc.). In Kumanovo, the profiling is the same but with different ranking.

Not all the hazards have same impact on the refugees and migrants that are on the territory on the country or that are transiting through it. Therefore, it is necessary to implement one more layer of assessment and to include them as a part of the environment and element of the risk. They can be most affected by the meteorological hazards having in mind their mobility. At the present situation, earthquakes can do almost no harm, since the existing capacities for temporary accommodation are built from light construction materials or are tents. However, the risk of fires on open places are still present, whether the weather-related events can do most of the harm to them.

Having in mind that they have almost no knowledge of the local environment, local contexts or the local built environment, the level of their vulnerability is being significantly increased. This is multiplied with the characteristics of the refugees and migrants themselves – being women, children or elderly.

Therefore, it is necessary to design and develop procedures for their inclusion in the process of risk and hazard assessment, as well as to create tools for basic information sharing on the existing hazards and characteristics of the local environment.

Though, at this phases no inclusion of refugees and migrants are being done on local level risk and hazard assessment neither through profiling nor through planning of information purposes. However, the good example of inclusion of refugees and migrants in disaster risk reduction is the case of the national risk and hazard assessment.

2.2. National Assessment of all risks and hazards and the issues of refugees and migrants.

The National Assessment of all risks and hazards is in process of preparation with the draft version of the text being adopted in December 2015. As a document, it is of highest importance for the country, since it is presenting the characteristics of the country and the built environment and population, defining the national hazard profile, as well as assessing and evaluating the possible risks, presenting the available resources and recommending responsive planning.

Based on the approach to profile and prioritize hazards on the territory of the country, refugee and migrants' crisis is elaborated amongst the top ten hazards. This is because of the paramount pressure on the national and local resources as well as possible effects on the national and local security.

Based on the positive experiences from the refugee and migrants' crisis, as well as detected possible threats to the security of the country, there is a separate chapter in the assessment. The refugees and migrants are being considered both in the terms of the general security, but also in the terms of the risk analysis as one of the elements of the risk.

This approach is one of the innovative ones in analyzing the context of the refugees and migrants' crisis in the context of the crisis management and disaster risk reduction. There are recommendations to be incorporated and their inclusiveness in the risk reduction activities is recommended.

CONCLUSION

Experiences gained from the management of the refugee and migrant crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, raised the need for detection of adequate mechanisms and procedures for integration of these processes in the comprehensive activities for disaster risk management within the framework of the National Crisis Management System. Namely, based on the Law on Crisis Management, the Crisis Management Centre has the competence for preparation and update of the unique assessment of all risks and hazard that can endangered life and health of people, natural and material resources, as well as the general security. This assessment, in terms of its territorial scope, is relevant for the municipalities, the City of Skopje and the Republic of Macedonia.

Based on this aspect, and within the context of this research, three key segments can be defined. The first one is related to the assessments of the municipalities of Gevgelija and Ku-

manovo, as primarily affected municipalities with refugees and migrants' processes and part of the territory where the crisis situation was declared. The existing assessments prepared by the Regional offices of the Crisis Management Centre and adopted by the municipal councils do not incorporate or recognize the risks of mass movements and massive influx or transit of refugees and migrants from other countries. The second segment is based on the approach that in existing assessments for the two municipalities, all existing risks related to natural and meteorological hazard and technical – technological accidents are assessed and evaluated. However, the specifics of the refugees and migrants as vulnerable category and separate elements of the risk were not translated into the risk assessment process. Furthermore, during the whole process of management of the refugee and migrants' crisis measures and activities for information of refugees and migrants that were entering and transiting the country on the risk environment were not provided.

The third segment is the positive experience regarding the mainstreaming the refugee and migrants' crisis. Based on the existing crisis situation and the experience from 2015, the draft version of the National Assessment from all risks and hazards do recognize the refugees and migrants as another element of risk and elaborates them in the context of the risk evaluation and security of the country.

As a conclusion, this is imposing the need for additional synergy and mainstreaming of the existing documents (assessments, plans etc.) and update and application in the existing and newly originated processes and their correlation for ensuring comprehensive, inclusive and effective crisis management and disaster risk management systems.

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