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THE INFLUENCE OF SEGREGATED EDUCATION ON SECURITY AND STABILITY IN POST-CONFLICT BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract:

More than 20 years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided geographically, politically and culturally along ethno-national lines. The public education system represents a key arena in which nationalism and ethnic divisions are visible. The phenomenon of “two schools under one roof” is one example of this, whereby students from one ethnic group have little-to-no contact with those from a different one. This paper examines post-conflict education and its influence on the reconciliation process. The prime goal of the paper is to provide added value to our understanding of security and education in post-conflict societies, not only by analysing their education systems, but also by debating how education can be a key factor in creating a cohesive, integrated and safe post-conflict society. Within the empirical section of the paper, the views of Bosnia-Herzegovinian youth on the issues of education, peace & security and reconciliation will be examined.

Keywords: security, education system, Bosnia and Herzegovina, reconciliation, post-conflict societies

Introduction

Although nearly 23 years have passed since the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nationalism and ethnic tensions have continued to be a major facet of society. The three dominant ethnic groups – Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats – still live on the edge of a past they have refused to abandon for years, and this situation will not change for as long as they identify themselves with nationalist parties.¹ Therefore, many researchers, scientists and diplomats have raised questions about the

¹ Put together under the tutelage of international community representatives in the aftermath of the November 2000 general elections, the ten-party coalition known as the Democratic Alliance for Change has governed the larger of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s two entities and led the state-level Council of Ministers since early 2001. With the intention of its sponsors and members to sideline the three nationalist parties that had fought the 1992-95 war and ruled their respective pieces of BiH thereafter, the Alliance was also expected to undertake thoroughgoing reforms and to provide

stability and survival of this post-conflict state (Ashdown and Holbrooke, 2008; McMahon and Western, 2009; Rettman, 2010; Inzko, 2015).

The 2016 elections, according to many observers, reflected deep and irreconcilable divisions at the political level. The illegal, even previously forbidden, referendum in the Republika Srpska and the suspension of voting in the municipality of Stolac (the first such case since elections have been implemented by the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina) illustrate the complexity of the political situation. One of the more recent examples of such observations is the statement of General Michael Rose² in the British House of Lords:

“While it’s obviously clear that the Bosnia war was, in the Balkans war, probably the most violent of all the conflicts that took place at that time, I don’t think it’s still fully appreciated by the international community including, of course, ourselves, that the linkage between that war and the problems that are facing the Western Balkans today are very close indeed, and that many of the problems that exist today were generated by the way that war was ended. If we accept the many reports that we can read, both in, for example, the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs, a recent one they made in May, our own parliamentary inquiries, the European Union stabilisation reports then I think we would all agree that today in Bosnia we see a rising trend of xenophobia, racial tensions, continuing corruption – evidence to meet the standards of good governance required by the European Union – a rising element of radicalization, particularly amongst the Muslim communities and of course the country, because of the reluctance of the Bosnian Serbs to sign up to the dream of Dayton, which was a single nation, the country still is as fragmented I think as ever, and is actually at risk for being a failed state”.³

Violent protests on economic issues that took place in February 2014 show another face of insecurity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In these events, it was disturbing that, for the first time since the war, violence was considered a legitimate way of expressing dissatisfaction with the government. Valentin Inzko, the High Representative of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina, said, in the wake of the protest, that the international community fully understands the frustrations and complaints that demonstrators expressed throughout the country through these protests: “These protests should lead as soon as possible to a constructive dialogue between government and citizens in order to resolve concrete problems that citizens face in order to help the country move forward in the direction of Euro-Atlantic integration.” Inzko also stressed that competent authorities and other leaders should work together to overcome current problems:

proof that implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords might yet produce a viable state. See more at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/bs/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnias-alliance-smallish-change>, visited on November 15, 2017.

² Commander of UNPROFOR from 1994 to 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina

³ See more at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M62yMBXt0wE&app=desktop>, visited on November 15, 2017.

"These protests must not be misused for political purposes to strengthen ethnic divisions in the country. Corruption, high unemployment rate and a lack of economic opportunities are problems that affect all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina."⁴

The situation on the political scene and the division in society shows that, on the other hand, the political leadership did not show readiness and commitment to overcome them. In such a political context, building a society that will be based on European civic values, and in which the rights and obligations of individuals are not shaped by ethnicity, seems an impossible task. Bećirević (2016: 9) also states that for a sensitive Bosnian society, with a history of genocide and mass violence, nonviolent extremism represents a major threat, causing a fear of others and otherwise producing distrust and insecurity among all members of society. Ethnocentric policies greatly contribute to the creation of such an atmosphere, where ideas of absolute division are propagated by the followers of such policies. On the other hand, the Ministry of Security's 2016 Annual Report on the State of Security in Bosnia and Herzegovina – which outlines the most pressing international, regional, and domestic/internal challenges and security risks facing BiH – says that hate crime is on the rise in comparison to previous years.

The State is described as "burdened with internal problems of a political nature, which pose a serious danger to society, politics, and security and general stability in the country."⁵ According to the Hate Monitor⁶ for 2017, the most common prejudice acting as a basis for the committing of a hate crime was nationality or ethnicity, while offensive graffiti and verbal attacks are the most frequent types of incidents. This is supported by a study titled *Kako opažamo druge etničke skupine i njihove članove (How we perceive other ethnic groups and their members)* whose results have shown that pronounced nationalism among members of one ethnic group results in an idealized image of one's own ethnic group and negative stereotypes of and social distancing toward other ethnicities (Puhalo, 2011).

The public education system is one of the key areas in which nationalism and ethnic divisions are highly visible. Ethno-territorial division of the educational system means that one ethnic group dominates most schools, including its curriculum. In some cases, particularly where municipalities are more heterogeneous, the phenomenon of "two schools under one roof" has led to students having little or no contact with those in another group. They learn almost exclusively about the dominant group's narratives, history, culture and religion.

On the other hand, the importance of education for the development of a democratic society is well recognized, because the knowledge that a person acquires during the educational

⁴ See more at: <http://www.ohr.int/?p=31883>, visited on November 15, 2017.

⁵ See more at: <http://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/info2017.pdf>, visited on November 15, 2017.

⁶ The Hate Monitor is a graphic representation of hate crime data collected by the OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, in addition to reported incidents, it also contains information about the reactions of the judiciary, local authorities and civil society to acts of hate crimes. In 2015, according to OSCE data, at least 146 incidents were reported to the police in the state that were initially considered to be motivated by prejudice. The most common type of incidents were offensive graffiti (24 percent), followed by verbal attacks (21 percent), damage to religious buildings / desecration of graveyards (19 percent), highlighting offensive content symbols (18 percent), property damage (14 percent) and physical violence (11 percent). See more at: <https://www.osce.org/hatemonitorbih>, visited on November 18, 2017.

process develops their own character and personality, enables them to think critically, to conclude, analyse, predict, solve their own problems, and the problems of others as well (Gudjons, 1994; Giesecke, 1993; Slatina, 1998; Mougnotte, 1995, etc.). Education should, in fact, strengthen the individual in defence against indoctrination, manipulation or any other type of abuse of humanity in an effort to achieve political, ideological, religious, or other goals. There are many examples of educational and knowledge abuse in the world for purposes that go against the humanization of life, or democratization of societies.

Methodology

The broad aim of this research was to answer the question: What are the consequences of the educational system on security and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina? The answer to this question was found in many domestic and foreign sources. Different qualitative research methods have been used for the purposes of this paper. Within the theoretical part, a content analysis method was used, while focus groups were used for the empirical part.

In November 2017, 30 students took part in research activities, through five focus groups conducted over a five-day period, with six students per group. This research included first year students at the University of Sarajevo who come from different parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their views on the education system, reconciliation and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken into consideration. They were chosen for the very reason that they had just finished high school and that they had no memories or experiences from the previous war. Focus groups were audio recorded with the permission of participants, and then transcribed in full and analysed using content and discourse analysis.

Education in Post-Conflict Societies

Education in post-conflict societies has always been a double-edged sword. It can be a tool in the hands of nationalists who can use it as a means to create inter-ethnic tensions and violence. On the other hand, education can be a potential instrument for promoting inter-ethnic solidarity, respect for the human rights of liberty and tolerance, and thus can contribute to long-term social stability and security (Fischer, 2006; Beckerman and McGlynn, 2007; McGlynn et al., 2009). Such a principle is applied in Rwanda: After the Rwandan Genocide, the Rwandese government placed a heavy emphasis on efforts to reconstruct the nation and create social cohesion to prevent a new outbreak of conflict. Namely, the government aimed at fighting any form of genocidal ideology or the spread of a shared belief, because it was one of the main factors in enabling the genocide. In that sense, education has been seen as a powerful tool that could help in the process of reconciliation and the fight against any division of the Rwandese population (Mafeza, 2013). It is important to note that one of the main factors that led to the genocide in Rwanda was the restriction of access to Tutsi schooling for children and the teaching of a specific historical narrative that celebrated and favoured Hutus (Des Forges, 1999). However, today the Rwandan Peace Education

Programme (RPEP) promotes social cohesion, positive values – including pluralism and personal responsibility, empathy, critical thinking and action to build a more peaceful society. Kamboly (2007) argues that fostering common civic education is the most effective method in preventing future genocide. Post-genocide Rwanda uses education as the main tool for correcting biased perceptions of its socio-political history and providing accurate representations of the causes of genocide (Mafeza, 2013).

Also many countries around the world are becoming acutely aware of the importance of education for national security. For example, the Nigerian Daily Sun (2013) announced that the former Nigerian Minister of Education, Ragayyat Rufai, recognized reform of the education system as a solution to the country's national security threats. Also, the Republic of Croatia's National Security Strategy (2007) states: "Education has one of the most important roles in preserving the Croatian national identity, and the development of a curriculum will adequately deal with Croatian historical, cultural, linguistic, architectural, natural and other heritage. Croatian national and cultural identity will be observed in the context of the European community of nations, languages, history, tradition and identity, which will enable citizens to be equally capable of communicating in such a community. Appropriate efforts will be invested in order to protect the identity of minorities living in the Republic of Croatia."⁷

When it comes to education in a multicultural but divided environment after or during an extended conflict, as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then "the link between education, peace and security is even more pronounced" (Clarke-Habibi, 2005).

It is also important to emphasize that education is one of the vital sectors to be reformed by regional countries, using the Council of Europe's expert knowledge to promote pluralism and to combat persistent ethnic polarization and discrimination (Council of Europe, 2012: 7). Considering the above, in terms of the BiH education system in the context of the peace and security maintaining process in the region, as well as within Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, it is highly justified.

Segregation in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Education System

Education has especially suffered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not just about the physical destruction that occurred during the conflict, but also political, ideological and nationalist pressures and attitudes that emerged subsequent to the end of the conflict. Nationalism⁸ is often

⁷ On the basis of Article 81 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Parliament adopted the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia at its session on July 14, 2017 (See more at: <http://www.uvns.hr/UserDocsImages/dokumenti/nacionalnasigurnost/Strategija%20nacionalne%20sigurnosti%20RH.pdf>, visited on November 18, 2017)

⁸ The essence of nationalism as an ideology is the politicization of culture, that is, its fundamental identity of the collective "we" and the individual self. The concept of nationalism is based on the idea that the individual does not exist without collectivity, which is individually "I" impossible without a collective "we" (Kapo, 2012). Nationalism is a worldview or ideology, according to which in relation to a people of one nation, the attitude towards the nation is more important than any other element of personal or group identity, and from any other relation of loyalty. In addition, they often

manifested through the call for protection of human rights, particularly by invoking the protection of group rights, such as the right of a group to study in their own language, have public support for cultural preservation, the right to cultural autonomy, and protection of the identity of the group. The educational system is the area where these rights can be determined and where groups can seek both cultural and political power in relation to other groups. This is particularly noticeable through attempts to control the facts of the past, curriculums, textbooks, street names, public symbolism, etc. (Low-Beer, 2001; Torsti, 2004, 2009).

When it comes to Bosnia-Herzegovinian society, it must be borne in mind that this is a post-conflict nation and a society devastated by war, and a society that has a continuous inheritance of a permanent ideological tyranny of the ruling structures. Also, a very important fact related to all of the lands of the Former Yugoslavia, and therefore also to Bosnia and Herzegovina, is the fact that every generation has experienced war and suffering in their lifetime.⁹ Due to this fact, the question of nationalism is a rooted ideology, which has left behind a materially and spiritually disorganized society. Most educational institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been reduced, in terms of function, to “units of ideological reproduction” (Madacki & Karamehić, 2012). On the other hand, as previously mentioned, schools transfer culture from one generation to the next, while at the same time being considered “important social control agents that encourage children to learn and adapt to socially-expected norms and values” (Browne, 1992: 310).

The education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by diversity and frequent nationalist conflicts between the three ethnic groups or “Constituent Peoples”. The Dayton Agreement and the position of education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the Federation, make this country somewhat paradoxical: While education around the world is increasingly approaching the concept of communion and centralization, in Bosnia and Herzegovina it remains fragmented and spanned by principles of separation and differentiation (Russo, 2000; Božić, 2006; Nellis, 2006; Clark, 2010, Madacki and Karamehić, 2012); a reflection of the high level of ethnic division within the state and the decentralized political system.

The unusual state structure created by the Dayton Peace Agreement¹⁰ has had several negative effects on education. A recent study states that “from the outset, the Dayton Accord

consider their nation more advanced and more positive than all others (Skoko, 2009).

⁹ The area of the Balkans, taking into account the geographical, ethnic, cultural and historical characteristics, is a very complex multiethnic, multilingual, and multicultural area with a very tubular past and even more complex present (Pašalic-Kreso, 2008). Mesihović (2011) states that “the pre-cursed curse” that followed them never allowed these countries to come to full capacity. Conflicts, riots, suffering, anguish and fighting marked the security of this region, and as the author states, “this is a world filled with internal fears, frustration and complexity, and in which extraordinary effort is required to remain a man, and even greater effort to become a hero. It’s hard to bear, it’s hard to live, but it’s hard to die in the mountains and plains of the Western Balkans.”

¹⁰ The Dayton Peace Agreement, formally ending the war on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was initialled in the Wright-Peterson Airbase in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 and signed in December of the same year in Paris. This agreement establishes the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the political axis of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian, not only state, but also universal, reality. This agreement also ended the process of reintegration and disintegration of the country; society is allegedly totally divided in the framework of forced unity, because the war ended without winners and victors (Kapo, 2012).

created a decentralized, asymmetric and defective education management system that completely ignored the unity of education policy, common goals in education, shared values, positive and patriotic feelings for the country and the state" (Pasalić-Kreso, 2008). The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is an integral part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, namely its Annex IV, defines that education is not the competence of the state.¹¹ The institutional picture of the education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects the state organization and the constitutions of the Entities, Cantons, and the Statute of the Brčko District, based on which educational competences are legally defined. In practice, this means that there are as many as thirteen ministries dealing with the education sector, and that primary and secondary schools work according to three different curriculums.

One of the key objectives for the three ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to preserve their own separate languages and linguistic communities through the education system. The differences between the post-war languages of Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian (all of which were known under the collective term Serbo-Croatian before the war) are very minor (Greenberg, 2008). Linguists estimate that the difference between them, in terms of vocabulary and grammar, is less than 5%, less than the difference between American English and British English (Fischer, 2006: 313). Numerous scientists examined the controversial language policy in post-war Yugoslavia (Pupavac, 2003, 2006; Bugarski and Hawkesworth 2004; Greenberg, 2008). One linguist illustrates the political use of language in this way: "Citizens of these post-conflict societies consider that in the language they speak, they define their place in society and mark their ethnic identity and even their political orientation" (Greenberg, 2008: 159). Scientists have made an explicit link between language rights, specific language identities, and ethnic divisions and conflicts. Language is seen as an essential part of a community's identity and self-esteem, which is, however, considered crucial to ensuring coherent interethnic relations and the prevention of violent conflicts. However, the treatment of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as separate linguistic communities has a tendency to encourage ethnic division and social exclusion¹² (Pupavac 2006: 61).

According to Branković and Arapović (2010), the basic characteristics of the situation in the education sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the key negative trends, can be summarized as follows: (1) A large number of laws regulating the education sector; (2) A high degree of politicization that is present in the education system, both in management and curricula; (3)

¹¹ The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Article III, paragraph 1, defines the competences of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The following matters are under the jurisdiction of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina: (a) Foreign policy; (b) Foreign trade policy; (c) Customs policy; (d) Monetary policy as provided for in Article VII; (e) The funding of institutions and international obligations of Bosnia and Herzegovina; (f) Immigration, refugee and asylum policy, as well as the adoption of regulations on this; (g) Implementation of international and inter-entity criminal law regulations, including relations with Interpol; (h) Installation and operation of common and international communication devices; (i) Adoption of regulations on transport between entities; (j) Air traffic control (See more at: http://www.dei.gov.ba/o_bih/default.aspx?id=49&langTag=en-HR, visited on December 28, 2017)

¹² Social exclusion is treated as a multidimensional and dynamic process in which an individual or groups of people withdraw from social relationships, which leads to the prevention of their full participation in the normal activities of the society in which they live (Silver, 2007).

A high nominal share of education funds to GDP, but also insufficient levels of funds for quality education; (4) Completely ignored scientific research as part of the educational process (there is no legal framework that regulates this important part of the education process); (5) Lack of adequate educational standards; (6) Curriculum and programs not being in line with practices of the countries of the European Union; (7) Obsolete equipment, lack of skilled personnel, etc.

Namely, the problems that arise in Bosnian-Herzegovinian education are multiple. First of all, during the post-war mass return, returnees in many places faced prohibitions in terms of access to their children's schools. The temporary solutions that followed were access to returnee schools housed by the school buildings. However, local authorities blocked attempts to further integrate into a new environment, leading to the formation of organizational units, known as two schools under one roof. However, this type of school is only one of the problem indicators that occur throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Curriculum, school environment and practice, in many or all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, enable the school to largely or exclusively take into account the national group of subjects. In the majority of such cases, parents are forced to choose between the assimilation of their children in local schools or transporting children to a distant school with another major national group. For parents who do not have these opportunities, the introduction of an alternative curriculum and textbook for a national group of subjects was enabled after the signing of the Interim Agreement on the Satisfaction of Special Needs and Rights of Returnee Children in 2002. However, an opportunity to study national subjects is largely only offered in certain places with high numbers of returnees (with the additional exception of Brčko District). Despite an insistence in the Provisional Agreement on finding lasting solutions for all children, educational authorities have so far not consolidated their efforts to fulfil this obligation (OSCE, 2012).

Many international institutions have analysed this issue and made various recommendations (ECRI, OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNDP, etc.). However, the situation has remained unchanged, which is also evidenced by the most recent European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report on the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECRI, 2017).¹³

Regarding the education sector, which should play a fundamental role in overcoming inter-ethnic tensions, the ECRI (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance) noted that none of its 2010 recommendations has been implemented and that the situation remains unchanged in general, with the Brčko District being an exception. Even despite legal obligations, as well as previously undertaken obligations to integrate education, public schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not yet been organized as multicultural, multilingual, open and inclusive institutions for all children. Ethnic segregation, based on a politicized presentation of education in the mother tongue, is still present.

The emergence of "two schools under one roof" is the most obvious form of this problem. Despite prior recommendations of the ECRI to resolve all remaining cases of such schools,

¹³ See more at: https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Bosnia_Herzegovina/BIH-CbC-V-2017-002-ENG.pdf, visited on on December 30, 2017.

and the decision of the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 2014 on the same issue, the authorities informed the ECRI that this practice is still being maintained in several schools (about 10%) in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva Cantons in the Federation (ECRI, 2017). The separation of school children from Bosniak, Croat and Serb classes in mono-ethnic schools is still a common practice throughout the country, both in the RS and in the Federation, and no steps have been taken to end it, despite ECRI's 2010 recommendation on this issue.

Based on the above, it is noteworthy that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, this problem is represented by schools that operate on the "two schools under one roof" principle. On the other, there are problematic mono-ethnic schools that do not provide children and young people with an opportunity to become acquainted with the traditions, religions and cultures of their peers. Also, in most cases, minority populations belonging to any ethnic group face major problems within the education system. The ECRI report is just one in a series of those related to this topic that underline just how critical this problem is. However, the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina pay no attention to such recommendations, and therefore no concrete steps have been taken toward the abolition of such practices.

On the other hand, in a society that has certain continuity of rejecting or refusing to accept "otherness", it is very difficult to change such heavily-ingrained attitudes. The best example is the status of Romani in Bosnia-Herzegovinian education.¹⁴ The Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Law on the Protection of the Rights of Members of National Minorities in 2003. The law states that Bosnia and Herzegovina will protect the position, equality and rights of 17 national minorities present on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Albanians, Montenegrins, Czechs, Italians, Jews, Hungarians, Macedonians, Germans, Poles, Romani, Russian, Rus, Slovak, Slovenian, Turkish and Ukrainian people. The law is a key document for minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it gives them the right to protect their cultural, religious, educational, social, economic and political freedoms, needs and identities. The Roma are the largest national minority and the most marginalized group in Bosnia and Herzegovina in social, economic and political terms. In post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Roma face several difficulties in implementing their fundamental human rights guaranteed by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Particularly worrying are the rights in terms of ownership, access to social protection, education and employment. According to the Ministry of Human Rights (2013), in their Report on the Implementation of the Decade of Romani Inclusion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, key barriers that limit the chances of and access to quality Romani education are extreme poverty, changes in places of residence, and the insufficiency of financial resources at the State level to realize all the measures planned in the Action Plan on Romani Education. Namely, at state level in 2012, as well as in 2013, no funds were allocated to support the realization of any measure of the Revised Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Educational Needs of Roma. While the relevant ministries

¹⁴ According to the OSCE Mission to BiH, as of 2014, there were a total of 35,644 Romani in 7,225 families in our country. Of these, there are 2,837 families lacking adequate accommodation, of which 736 are classed as homeless (Special Report on the Status of Romani in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014).

of education allocate budgetary resources, these are still not sufficient to support the educational enrolment of all Roma children.

Most often, schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a large part or even exclusively, can meet the needs of members of the (local) national majority, both through the curriculum and scholastic environment, as well as through everyday educational practices. This creates a very serious situation for Bosnia and Herzegovina, a post-war state with more people and more faith, where everyone should be equal in terms of educational opportunities. The breaking of barriers between children and the removal of discriminatory action is of great importance for the wellbeing of children and youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as for the foundation of a future in which everyone can attend education and be educated in a friendly and safe environment.

The latest available European Commission Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (2016) on its path to the European Union states that Romani are still the most vulnerable minority in the state and live in a direly disadvantaged situation. The number of school dropouts and unemployed among the Romani is still very high, and access to the labour market remains difficult. Also, the Report states that no progress has been made regarding measures to preserve and improve the Romani language, culture and history. The Romani language was not offered as an elective course, nor is there any alternative for this language, in any school in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In March 2016, the Joint Commission on Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH adopted a resolution proposing 8th April as Day of the Romani People and 5th November as Day of the Romani Language. However, the extent to which such a decision will improve the situation of the Roma in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains to be seen.

Findings

Despite all constitutional and legal obstacles, the possibility of establishing integrated education has been demonstrated in the example of the Autonomous District of Brčko. There are no more divided or mono-ethnic schools in the District; instead, they have turned to joint teaching of children from different ethnic communities. Teachers in Brčko District attend training sessions to enable students and teaching staff to use each of the three official languages. The ECRI in its Report, however, states that in 2014, during discussions with education authorities of Republika Srpska and various Cantons of the Federation, it noticed a strong and politically motivated rejection of the idea that the education system of Brčko District can be seen as a model for future integration. It is fair to say that integration is not the goal of nationalist parties. This has been confirmed by a respondent who stated: "They [local authorities] did not want to abolish the two schools under one roof in Vitez, even after the Supreme Court ruling, because they are divided by divisions. While the divisions exist, the Muslims will vote for the SDA¹⁵ and the Croats for HDZ¹⁶." (Respondent A, Focus group 2, 7th November, 2017).

¹⁵ The Party of Democratic Action (Bosnian: Stranka demokratske akcije or SDA) is a conservative Bosniak political party in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹⁶ The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i

Outside the Brčko District, positive steps taken by some schools, such as the Mostar Gymnasium, are largely limited by the existing legal framework for the education sector that maintains the structure of separate classes in the Federation and RS based on language, as well as ethnicity. The Gymnasium in Mostar has made genuine efforts to improve the situation, not only by means of an administrative merge (one director, a unified teaching staff, one student council and one parent council), but has organized common activities for students, as much as possible, such as art projects, sports, festivities and school trips.

However, the devastating fact is that, instead of separate schools being abolished, the authorities seek to extend discrimination to other schools. This problem was especially expressed in the summer of 2016, when the Government of the Central Bosnia Canton tried to divide students in Jajce.¹⁷ However, the students rebelled. This is the first case in which students raised their voices against division. Ivica Janković, a student at the secondary vocational school in Jajce, stated in an interview with Al Jazeera Balkans: “We do not want to be divided into Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. We want to go together to school.”¹⁸

Post-conflict societies are ones that are faced by various security challenges in the process of transition and reconciliation. Such security challenges are largely and causally related to past warfare. Therefore, it seems very important to respond in a timely manner to all such challenges that can jeopardize the process of reconciliation and peace building.

What is especially worrying and burdening upon the Bosnian-Herzegovinian reality is the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has made minimal progress in terms of post-war and social reconciliation. The consequences of such a situation are major problems associated with power, the rule of law and democratic accountability.¹⁹ On the other hand, in the focus groups conducted in November 2017, the following statements of the students of the University of Sarajevo imply support for the aforementioned:

Hercegovine or HDZ BiH) is the largest political party of Bosnian Croats.

¹⁷ At the beginning of summer 2016, the Government of the Central Bosnia Canton made the decision to build another secondary school in Jajce in order to achieve conditions for the ethnically-segregated education of high school students. Nevertheless, it seems that the pupils defied the elected politicians, and rebelled against the government’s decision, showing that, for once, activism could win in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See more: “Mladi pobijedili sistem: U jajcu neće biti odvojenih škola”, *Dnevni avaz*, 14.8 2016. <http://avaz.ba/vijesti/teme/250153/mladi-pobijedili-sistem-u-jajcu-nee-biti-odvojenih-skola>, visited on January 07, 2018.

¹⁸ See more at: <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/video/srednjoskolci-protiv-novih-podjela-u-jajcu>, visited on January 07, 2018.

¹⁹ In the 2015 OECD Report titled “States of Fragility 2015, Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions”, Bosnia and Herzegovina is included in a group of 50 of the most unstable states in the world. To measure instability, the OECD proposes a model that consists of five measures: violence; access to justice for all; effective, responsible and inclusive institutions; economic inclusion and instability; capacities for prevention; and adaptation to economic, ecological crises and disasters. The report is fully accessible at: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/states-of-fragility-2015-9789264227699-en.htm>, visited on January 26, 2018.

"In my school there were not many students from other ethnic groups, and we would somehow find a common language with them." (Respondent B, Focus group 2, November 07, 2017).

"In my school, fights between students were often based on ethnic hatred. Once I witnessed a fight between Bosniak and Croat pupils. After talking with the director, parents and pedagogue, everything calmed down." (Respondent A, Focus group 1, November 06, 2017).

"It has become normal for people to insult on an ethnic or religious basis in our country. If that were not the case, there would have been no conflict. This is what we have become used to and we do not care." (Respondent A, Focus group 3, November 08, 2017).

According to Perry (2015), there are several reasons why the education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been neglected in the challenge of creating thoughtful young people dedicated to Euro-Atlantic values: "(1) The fragmentation of the system grounded in a commitment to maintain the narratives of narrow party and ethno-national group interests; (2) The system largely relying on rote memorization and teaching from the text-book which does not foster intellectual development, analytical thinking skills, critical media literacy and civic citizenship; (3) Ethnicization which promotes an "us" vs. "them" mentality in a post-war region that has experienced little genuine political and social reconciliation; (4) The introduction of religion into school programs, that focused on doctrinal religious instruction, rather than on inclusive, non-dominant approaches and education; (5) External efforts to support reforms have failed to address the root causes and problems in school curricula, particularly in the national identity focused subjects." Several student statements confirmed the above. However, one of the most remarkable comments was:

"I have to speak in terms of "us" and "them", because I do not know otherwise as a result of state dividing us. The school, too. I cannot talk about community when it doesn't exist." (Respondent C, Focus group 2, November 07, 2017).

Also, one of the students coming from a small town in Republika Srpska stated, on the topic of introducing religious education in schools:

"I think that high schools should introduce religious education, but only for our own faith, since only Serbs live in our town, and we only have churches. I think that the population would have a repulsion towards the idea that their children learn about other religions." (Respondent B, Focus group 3, November 08, 2017).

In addition to the school, learning processes in primary social agencies – the family – create a never-ending history for generations that have never experienced this past, nor have memories of it. Images of war, heroic fighting and defence of their territories are projected without any development of critical thinking, without asking questions and demanding answers. Students who

participated in this study were born five or more years after the war ended, but their attitude to the war is almost identical on all three sides. Two of the respondents pointed out:

“My parents forbade my love with a Serb. Especially my father who participated in the defence of Sarajevo. All Serbs are guilty to him.” (Respondent A, Focus group 4, November 09, 2017).

“When I go anywhere in Republika Srpska, I feel strange. Nobody looks at me or touches me, but the feeling is bad.” (Respondent A, Focus group 5, November 10, 2017).

If deeper analyses of previous statements were made, we could begin to talk about a certain level of indoctrination that starts from early childhood and continues through school. This type of ethnic extremism, in an already shattered, post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovinian society, can experience a transformation into violence.

In the analysis of the security risk that the Atlantic Initiative and the Democratization Policy Council conducted during the period of Spring-Autumn 2011, a number of factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina were assessed that influenced the potential for inter-ethnic violence and the resumption of armed conflict (Azinović, Bassuener, & Weber, 2012). In this context, it seems particularly interesting to analyse some of the most important reports on the state of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, considering those that were created by the executive Bosnia-Herzegovinian authorities and those coming from the European Union and the international community, as well as those coming from academia.

The first in a series of reports that directly dealt with the assessment of the potential for the renewal of ethnic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the one mentioned above. Some of the most important areas that can lead to the escalation of ethnic violence and the continuation of the crisis that emerged in the 1990s, are claimed by the author to be as follows: nationalistic political rhetoric and hate speech, both by political elites and by the media; weak capacities of state institutions; the economic crisis and economic polarization of society, which can lead to social unrest; a security sector that lacks uniqueness and coordination across all systems, but especially the police; a judicial system in which political influence has been proven on several occasions; young people who express their frustrations in football matches, as well as through juvenile delinquency, hate speech and hate crimes; a returnee population who realize their rights in rare situations without interfering with the security services; and Islamist radicalization and terrorism. What is lacking in this analysis is that Azinović et al. only referred to Islamist radicalism, while inadvertently neglecting other radical ideologies that undeniably pose a threat to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens.²⁰

²⁰ The gathering of members of the Chetnik Ravnogorski Movement in Višegrad each March is just one of a series of such comparable examples.

The aforementioned Ministry of Security's 2016 Annual Report on the State of Security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other things, underlined the following two challenges for the security of Bosnia-Herzegovinian society:

- High unemployment rate, which contributes to the increase of general poverty and social stratification, which manifests through public protest and other public dissatisfaction events. We should neglect neither the fear nor despair of existential threats, nor do the individual manifestations of violent extremism within the frame work such protests.
- Existence of those types of extremism aimed at endangering territorial integrity Bosnia and Herzegovina, provoking national, racial and religious hatred, strife and intolerance, freedom and rights of man and citizen, citizens' disturbance, and the prevention of return refugees and displaced persons.

Also, an analysis of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 2014 by the International Crisis Group states that: "While the physical scars of the 1992-1995 Bosnia war have healed, political agony and ethnic tension persist. Real peace requires a new constitution and bottom-up political change."²¹

Conclusion

If the current situation in the education system of Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be summarized, it could be concluded that education in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not function toward social integration, but, according to Perry (2015), is instead a mere "continuation of war by other means". The current ethnically determined and segregated education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a consequence of a near past that has been created and guided with the goal of ethnic crystallization and determinism. The famous Bosnian intellectual and writer Ivan Lovrenović claims that politicians in education only see the symbolic value: "In Bosnia and Herzegovina, education is only a means of achieving a certain party and nationalist policy which, as such, has no humanitarian or social values" (Lovrenović, 2005). Although it is an extremely effective tool for human development, education can also promote ideas, attitudes and behaviours that form the basis for the intensification of conflict. The systematic analysis of educational systems from the perspective of security studies is an insufficiently developed field.

Restoration of the education system is a very important element in the reconstruction of society itself following an armed conflict, humanitarian disaster, or political transition. The Education for Reconstruction report (Philips et al., 1998) relies heavily on the experiences of the European reconstruction after the Second World War. It also provides case studies on educational reconstructions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. Within the report, a distinction is drawn between physical reconstruction of school facilities and the ideological reconstruction related to democratization, confidence building and psychological awareness.

²¹ See more at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/bosnia-s-future>, visited on February 15, 2018.

Although only the pessimistic statements of the respondents are presented in the paper, this does not mean that no positive opinions were put forward. Namely, when speaking about the current situation at the University of Sarajevo, the respondents spoke about socializing with members of other groups as something very positive for them and their perceptions. This may be a sign that young people should be given the opportunity to get to know each other and socialize with members of other communities, in order to understand that they have plenty of common interests, regardless of ethnic group affiliation or belonging.

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CONTEMPORARY ASPECTS OF EXTREMISM AND ITS SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Abstract:

With a different violent forms and sorts, extremism continued progress in the 21st century. Regardless sources that encourage it, violent extremism goes beyond national and regional borders and gets global tendencies. Waves of current violent religious extremism, have gained more importance with the spread of terrorism, especially because of the prominent impact on global security. Understanding of modern terrorism is not separated from the violent extremism and radicalization, which are considered as incentives for terrorism. The consistency of these security challenges is confirmed through their presence at all levels, from national and regional, to global security. The fact is that terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization are present in national security policies, as major challenges for security which need to be more efficient opposed. Reflection of the global challenges of spreading violent extremism and radicalization as an incitements for terrorism is quite present in the Western Balkans region. All Western Balkans countries have experienced these challenges, especially during the most dangerous phase of conflicts in Syria and Iraq 2012-2017, due to the participation of Balkan fighters in their battlefields.

Key words: violent extremism, terrorism, radicalization, security.

Introduction

Extremism, which is by default linked with severe security risks, such as terrorism, contributes to shaping global security paradigm in the 21st century. In its various forms and patterns of social expression, such as religious fundamentalism, radicalization, etc., it appears to give raise of a great wave of terrorist violence globally. Security challenges in the 21st century are linked with raise of religious terrorism, but also with the increase of radicalization that induces terrorism. The rise of the militant sanctity in the majority of religion (Apaduraj, 2008:13) has announced a wave of religious fundamentalism, which relies on the doctrine of spreading propaganda and negative attitudes against opponents, which implies insecurity and fear. Undoubtedly, terrorism

and religious extremism have become some of the greatest challenges for security, and they gain global scope and transform into a sort of 'epidemy', which threatens all societies and countries. Global spread and impact of terrorism and religious extremism have been more intensively experienced since 2001, i.e. from 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States.

Terrorist threats are present globally, either directly or indirectly, due to widespread classified networks and support of terrorist activities. A very clear example have been the attacks that occurred in recent years in some developed European countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, England, Sweden and others. For this reason, terrorists are perceived as hidden (internal) enemies because they are most often involved within societies that they want to destroy. Special attention is drawn to the strong impact of Middle East conflicts (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan), on strengthening of terrorist activities, especially through the spread of radical ideas and "foreign fighters" recruitment for the ISIL/Daesh.

According to the International Center for Research of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR), it is estimated that in Syria and Iraq, have been engaged large number of foreign fighters from all parts of the world, in last few years. These aspects of violent extremism, could affect states to decide on policy of isolation, in order to ensure long-term stability in a risky global environment.

Violent Extremism Tendencies and Proportions

Extremism is one of the modern challenges for security, what is indicated by its spread and influence on the global level. It is probably the most complex to understand phenomenon of extremism with radical and violent forms and their roots and causes, which are cause of modern terrorism in the 21st century.

The basic characteristic of extremism is connection with religion or politics, regarding right or left orientations (Nohlen, 2001: 55) as well as relying on a concrete doctrine or tradition of understanding ideological or religious sources.

It is clear from a political point of view; extremism can have multiple meanings, but in this paper it will be analyzed as an incentive for terrorism and other types of extreme political violence. Extremism, by its basic characteristics, cannot be considered as a violent behavior, but we witness increase of violent extremism, which has direct impact on development of contemporary terrorism (Nünlist, 2015:2). There is a disagreement that concepts of violent extremism and terrorism are synonyms, although both are types of political violence. Concept of violent extremism is more intensely a part of the public discourse since 2005, due to the previously politicized usage of the notion of terrorism through the concept "War on Terror" (Nünlist, 2015:2). Regarding tendency and extent of violent extremism, by assesment of the Intenational Center for Study of Radicalisation, it appears with phenomenon of radicalization, as a process of spreading ideas and beliefs that are incentive for terrorism (ICSR, 2015). As some analysis indicate, the term radicalization explains the process through which individuals are transformed and shaped into the violent extremists or terrorists (Nünlist, 2015:2).

Direct link between radicalization and violent extremism have impact on the resilience of the society on phenomenologically caused stigmatization of all those who think differently and belong to nonviolent groups and movements.

Radicalization is directly related to violent religious extremism; whose consequences are widespread globally. With their influence are particularly vulnerable countries and regions, which face the new "fourth wave of terrorism", that have religious roots (Rapoport, 2004:61). This is particularly intensified with conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and contribution of "foreign fighters" in terrorist activities, after which often return to their country of origin.

Conceptual elements of the security challenges extremism and radicalization are connected with basic dimensions of religion. The discourse of understanding terrorism has changed over time, so terms such as Islamic terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and others, are used for explanation of the specific form of terrorism, which is linked to the interpretation of the Islam religion. That approaches have led to the generalization of this complex phenomenon of religious terrorism, therefore in this paper, due to tendency to avoid uncritical generalization, this specific form is defined as "terrorism that refers to Islam"²².

In addition to the other challenges, it is considered that security also could be threatened by the religious fundamentalism, under which Kincler (2002:15) implies various religious actions that strive for change. The increase of religious fundamentalism that refers to Islam is particularly prominent because of the rise of violence, which is carried out under the patronage of the religion or politics (Injac, 2016:89). The existence of these phenomena in societies is a signal of a non-resilience and uncertainty, due to the complex impact of extremism and radicalization on security. However, despite its seriousness and degree of threat, violent extremism and radicalization jeopardizing the security of states and societies, it can be concluded that there is no universally accepted approach for understanding these concepts.

The term radicalization is part of the Western discourse, but it is particularly prominent after the terrorist attacks in the early 2000's in the United States and Europe. Under this term, we understand processes that lead people to extremism. In actual tendency of the violence proliferation reported by the terrorist organization ISIL/Daesh, especially since the intensification of terrorist activities since 2014, violent extremism and radicalization are unavoidable factors their activities globally.

The newest examples of terrorist actions in Europe (Figure 1) give a proof of the extension of insecurity and uncertainty era, which began with the 2000s terrorist attacks, which confirms the idea of the 'risk society' (Mythen, 2004:2).

²² This explanation is used by author of the paper, in addition to avoid generalization and stigmatization of the general principles of the Islam religion.




Figure 1: Terrorist attacks in Europe in 2017²³

Problems with violent extremism, radicalization and terrorism have been present in Europe. Yet, the real expansion of this problem has occurred during the last few decades, with tendency of rise of religious radicalization and recruitment among the younger population (Wilkinson, 2005:33). The study of origin and the causes of radicalization is associated with multiple factors. Problems with radicalization a cause pressure and serious risks in societies, due to several important components characteristic for radicalized persons, such as a strong sense of indignation, defiance, persecution and deny of adjustment (ICSR, 2015). The aim of radicalization spreading is tendency to promote extremist religious ideas and values. As confirmation of presence and support for radicalization in Europe, are facts about large number of those who participated in foreign warfare or joined ISIL/Daesh. It is about 3,000 from Western Europe since the beginning of the conflict in Syria until 2014 (Brigs and Silverman, 2014:6).

Recent data show a trend of the EU citizen's participation in the foreign battlefield and terrorist activities: as it was the case in the period of 2011-2017 when more than 5000 EU citizens

²³ According to data collected of registered terrorist attacks under the CLARION project (Figure 1), it is noted that in 2017, terrorist attacks were committed in nine European countries, and the most of them were in France and England.

were in Syria and Iraq (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 12). It is challenge for the security of the country of origin as well as for the entire region of Europe, since it is believed that upon return, they continue radicalization in their surroundings or support terrorist activities, because they are experienced war veterans. The expansion of violent extremism and radicalization gain global dimensions, although experts point out that there is no universal form of radicalization, but is different from the circumstances and location, ideas and narratives (Brigs and Silverman, 2014:6).

However, that non-existence of unique patterns of radicalization complicates a state's efforts to discover radicalization and to use countermeasures (deradicalization) that is of high priority in countering terrorism. Neumann believes that although there is no standard cause of radicalization, and therefore no confirmed profile of terrorists, that a more reliable assessment can be done by analysis of the factors that repeat (Neumann, 2017:19), such as:

- dissatisfaction - caused by numerous reasons (social tensions, conflicts, feeling injustice, marginalization and exclusion);
- needs - if individual belong to extremist group, his emotional needs are satisfied (group belonging, importance, power, adventure, popularity, etc.), what shown psychological weakness;
- ideas - it is basic incentive, replacement for dissatisfaction and justification for sacrifice;
- people - radicalization is a social process, carried out by authorities, charismatic leaders or influential groups that can gain trust, loyalty and attachment;
- violence - conducting violence is part of the organized and incentive activities that stand behind, and very often are inevitable part of violent conflicts.

Global Dimensions of Violent Extremism and Terrorism

Terrorism, as a form of political violence, has evolved and progressed, especially through the internationalization, i.e. the so-called 'third wave' of terrorism. According to the chronology of the terrorism development given by the British expert David Rapoport (2004: 61), this wave took place during the second half of the 20th century. The specifics of the current 'fourth wave' terrorism indicate that its tendencies are related to sophisticated forms of gaining and winning long-term goals. The emergence of the new form of terrorism, which terrorist organizations associate with religious purposes, and with applying extreme methods of action in the 21st century, have the following characteristics (Kegli, 2003: 9):

- Global proportions - openness of societies and borders have created conditions for global terrorist activities;
- Unlimited violence - non-selectivity of targets and destructiveness in the realization of attacks;
- Civilians are target- victims of attacks are citizens, violence is carried out indiscriminately and indefinitely;
- Modern technologies- modern technologies are available for terrorists;

- Enforced with extremism – obvious example is the most extreme terrorist tactic “suicide bombing”, not just cause mass suffering, but also that tactic is evidence of terrorist readiness to sacrifice life for ideas they believe in;
- Emphasized animosity and extremism - rationality and insensibility of terrorists for victims suffering;
- The uncertainty of new challenges - unpredictability of terrorist attacks, and uncertainty of new terrorist trends, but also connection with other security challenges and extremist action.

Terrorist threats are spread in all regions, and influence phenomenon of the culture of fear, uncertainty and risk. Doubts on existence terrorist cells, which belong to terrorist network Al Qaeda and ISIL/Daesh, few times are confirmed in some European countries, and through evidence have been confirmed extremist activities and readiness on careless destructiveness (Delpech, 2002: 15).

Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the number of victims and others social consequences of violent extremist actions have increased globally. Organizations with global activities, such as Al Qaeda, ISIL and Al- Nusra Front (UN Security Council, 2014), and those that operate in the region Africa (Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al- Shabab in Somalia and Kenya), with violent extremist's action advocate for long-term religious goals. However, Liang (2015: 2) believes that ISIL/ Daesh differs from others terrorist organization because of numerous reasons. The greatest goal of ISIL/ Daesh is a creation of a (pseudo) state or “Islamic Caliphate” at large territory of Middle East and others region, globalist and apocalyptic ambitions, and powerful media influence, that enable ISIL to recruit large number of ‘foreign fighters’.

The impacts of the conflicts in some regions (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) have contributed to the global strengthening of terrorist activities, in particular through the dissemination of extremist ideas and through the radicalization within the societies. It is precisely the characteristic of violent religious extremism that is not only linked to individual terrorist attacks but is a part of the conflicts that involve a big number of victims (Nünlist, 2015: 1). A key component for the global prevalence of this challenge is conditioned by a large number of foreign fighters, who are recruited from all parts of the world. It is estimated that in period 2011-2017, about 43,000 people from 120 countries, participated in Syria and Iraq conflicts, and a very important fact is that 7,900 of them were coming from the Western countries (Azinović and Becirević, 2017: 12). It is not easy to highlight causes, as well as consequences of violent religious extremism. However, the fact is that they are structurally related to one of the following aspects (Nünlist, 2015: 1):

- -unresolved political conflicts,
- -insensitivity on human casualties and carelessness for infrastructure,
- -human rights violations,
- -discrimination and marginalization on religious and ethnic basis,
- -socio-economic vulnerability and inequality,
- -lack of good governance, and non-integration of migrant communities.

After recent terrorist attacks in Europe, it came into focus a question of the size of violent religious extremism and radicalization, especially due to the possible connection with a large flow of migrations into Europe, migrants from the Middle East and Africa. According to Neumann (2017: 27), there is no reliable empirical evidence that migration can encourage terrorism; however, few attacks in Europe in recent years confirm the connection between migrants who have carried out attacks and terrorist organizations ISIL/ Daesha or Al-Qaida. There is no confirmation that these attacks were encouraged by radicalization of migrants in Europe. In that cases, radicalization of such individuals occurred in the countries of their origin and for the realization of terrorist attacks, they used migration flows to enter in European territory.

Approaches in Understanding Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans

The reflection of the new trend of terrorism that refers to Islam, or the so-called 'fourth wave' of terrorism, is also present in the Western Balkan region. Evidently, all countries (BiH, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Kosovo) are facing various aspects of extremism security risks and challenges. In many ways, there is a reflection of radicalization and violent extremism, but three manifestations in this region are especially emphasized: propaganda, support and recruitment for terrorist activities.

This region is recognized as a zone for the transit and recruitment of "foreign fighters" (Azinović and Jusić, 2015: 34), and large number of surveys show different data on the number of individuals and families who at battlefields in Syria and Iraq. Challenges of terrorism and radicalization that the region face are outlined in some of the research conducted by the BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network), which indicates that propaganda activities and the distribution of hate speech, recruitment and the creation of a support network are mostly realized online, through social networks (BIRN, 2017).

Although the challenges which the Western Balkan region is facing are a part of the global trends of terrorism, countries have various experiences. Due to internal circumstances and conditions (e.g. frozen conflicts, political tensions, socio-economic crisis, etc.), some of them are more vulnerable for impact of terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization. In 2016, BIRN prepared qualitative analysis of the Western Balkans (Albania, BiH, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia) experiences with radicalization, recruitment and foreign fighters who participated in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Analysis was prepared from collected data within the project "Balkan Jihadists - Radicalization and Recruitment of Fighters in Syria and Iraq". In addition, recent study about these challenges, published by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), indicates current trends and experiences of the region, as well as the capacities that the countries of the region have. It follows the analysis of the situation in six WB states:

ALBANIA is facing radicalization and other related challenges, especially in the context of the distribution of extremist ideas in certain religious sites, where recruitment problems are also observed, as well as the treatment of returnees from foreign battlefields (BIRN, 2016). According to the data of the State Prosecutor's Office, 107 citizens of Albania for period 2011-2015 participated in foreign fights (BIRN, 2016). In another study, for period 2012-2017 it was 144 persons (79 men, 27 women and 38 children) (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 22). It is believed that this problem in Albania can be controlled if national authorities initiate rehabilitation programs for returnees and improve measures to prevent online radicalization at young population.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA has already been a destination for foreign fighters during the 1990's conflict. Nevertheless, it has been renewed since 2012, due to the departure and return of foreign fighters, which security agencies assess as the biggest security threat in Bosnia (BIRN, 2016: 11). Data from the RCC study indicate that 287 persons from BiH years (172 men, 58 women and 57 children) contributed to Syria and Iraq conflicts in the period 2012-2017. In 2015 in Bosnia and Herzegovina were two terrorist attacks, one committed member of the *Salafi* community who killed a police officer in Zvornik (Republika Srpska), and in second attack are killed two members of the Bosnian Armed Forces in Sarajevo, after which attacker-committed suicide. In addition, BIRN's analysis indicates impact of online radicalization, as well as illegal religious objects, known as "paragemats". Number of these controversial objects in Bosnia and Herzegovina is unknown, because they are out of state control (BIRN, 2016: 13). Concerns also comes from socio-economic conditions (unemployment, poverty, lack of education, etc.), which makes Bosnian society even more vulnerable and favor the spread of radicalization.

MONTENEGRO, like other countries in the region, faces the challenges of radicalization and extremism. The data shows that incomparably smaller number of Montenegro citizens, compared to other countries in the region, were at the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields for the period 2012-2017. In total it was 27 persons (18 men, 5 women and 4 children) (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 22). Radicalization is registered by the security services of Montenegro, and that challenge is particularly present in the Sandžak region, from where persons mostly participate in a foreign battlefield (BIRN, 2016: 33). One of the extremist videos distributed through the social network, referred to addressing from Syrian militia fighter, originally from Montenegro, who called Muslims to join the Holy Caliphate War (BIRN, 2016: 32).

KOSOVO case has more specific characteristics than other countries in the region, due to the pronounced tendencies of citizens to join terrorist activities in Syria and Iraq. Namely, the data show the largest number of Kosovo persons in Syria and Iraq for the period 2012-2017, which is in total 399 persons (255 men, 48 women and 96 children, out of which 37 are believed to be born there) (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 22). For that period, 110 returnees from the battlefield returned to Kosovo. Risk assessment on returnees to Kosovo, indicates that there are two main

dangers- intent to commit terrorist attacks and the spread of radical ideas by returnees and their relatives (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 22).

MACEDONIA - Experience with this challenge did not go beyond this Western Balkan country, from which 154 people (140 men and 14 women) for the period 2012-2017 participated at the battlefields of Syria and Iraq (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 22). This country's specificity, compared to others, is that the problem of ethnic tensions contributes to reducing efficiency in addressing challenges of extremism and radicalization (BIRN, 2016: 25). The reality of this problem in Macedonia depends on several factors, among which the influence of the Islamic population is being carried out through online radicalization or directly in religious facilities, and the rapid expansion is favorable for the existence of interethnic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians.

SERBIA - During the period of more intense conflicts in Syria and Iraq (2011-2017), 59 citizens (37 men, 12 women and 10 children) stayed at the foreign battlefield (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 22). The complexity of this phenomenon in Serbia is associated with strong network of violent extremists and adequate conditions for radicalization (BIRN, 2016: 25), especially in the Sandžak region, because of existing internal problems (poverty, lack of education, limitation of contacts within the social community and detachment) (BIRN, 2016: 42).

It is necessary for Western Balkan countries in a timely manner to develop strategic, institutional and other responses, in addition to adequately approach countering radicalization and violent extremism, and in particular, to avoid current problems with politicization, securitization and bureaucratization of these challenges (Azinović and Bećirević, 2017: 9).

Conclusion

Suppression of terrorism depends on both, willingness of states to counter this security phenomenon, but also on comprehensive approach in preventing spread of ideas, which support terrorism. At the heart of problem of global expansion and terrorism impact on societies, there is an inadequate approach for reduction of extremism. States need to adopt policy for revealing motives of individuals to join extremist and terrorist activities.

Violent extremist movements increase in global level; however, some regions are more vulnerable to the risks of extremism and terrorism. For example, the phenomenon of terrorism and extremism is continuously challenged for Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Yemen and others. According to the Global Index of Terrorism, at these countries happened largest number of suicide bombers terrorist attacks (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017), that is the most destructive form of terrorism. In most of regions, risk of terrorism is encouraged by some of the following facts: ISIL/Daesh actions, vulnerability of the territory and population, "foreign fighters", who are joining ISIL or provide support for radicalization, and more.

The global security paradigm, at the beginning of the 21st century, depended on the activities of the terrorist organization Al Qaeda, but this primacy has been taken over for a few years by other organizations, which are Al Qaeda branches or descendants, as ISIL/Daesh and Al Nusrah Front (UN Security Council, 2014). These organizations use propaganda, violent actions and strategic influence, which contribute to the uncertainty caused by global spread of terrorism. However, the most worrying is the increase of radicalization, which encourages support for terrorism, through indoctrination and recruitment. Radicalization is increasingly prevalent in all parts of the world, what is enabled by internet, as the main means of extremist propaganda and promotion of terrorist ideas. The UN report highlight that extremist propaganda, conducted by ISIL and other organizations, has spread to the Middle East and the rest of the world, by digital way, through the Internet, social networks, videos and other forms for distribution of radicalization material (UN Security Council, 2014).

Challenges that cause extremism and radicalization, as a basis for terrorism are gaining global proportions, and their reflection has spread to the region of the Western Balkans. It is believed that efficiency of dissemination is conditioned by modern technologies for online propaganda. Security implications and challenges of extremism and radicalization are also conditioned by the vulnerability of societies and the lack of institutional responses by states to control and counter the causes and origin of these challenges.

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SUICIDE ASSASSINATIONS

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Abstract:

Assassination, as an extreme form of political violence, is documented by historians as occurring ever since the early civilizations. The forms in which it would be applied depended on technological advances, but the perpetrator has always been most exposed to the consequences of such an act. In the second half of the XIX century, with the development of explosives modern forms of suicide attacks come into play - suicide bombers. The use of improvised explosive devices and the manner of work intended to physically eliminate a particular person, politician or other prominent public figure, launched the era of the most destructive forms of assassination - assassination by suicide. This paper clarifies the terms assassination, suicide attack, as well as their product - suicide assassination. Presented are the main features of documented suicide assassinations worldwide, the target of attack, as well as the means of attack. Special emphasis is given to three suicide assassinations of political figures, committed by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). They are examined through the prism of criminal and criminological analysis of the attacks. Finally, the data from the analyzed suicide bombings were summarized and recommendations are provided in regard to the protection of specific persons (VIP), which would be useful for the entities that provide such type of services.

Keywords: assassination, suicide bomber, suicide attack, suicide assassination, protection of specific persons.

Introduction

If anybody really wanted to shoot the President of the United States it's not a very hard job...the day an assassin decides to trade his life for mine I will be a dead man.

- **John Fitzgerald Kennedy, shortly before his assassination** (Shekhar, Kavitha, 1991).

Assassinations as a form of violence against a specific person (usually persons who have political, economic, military or cultural importance in a society), with certain motivation, have been known for a long time now. Perhaps the earliest documented assassinations are the two attempts to assassinate the Chinese emperor Qin Shi Huang, 260-210 BC (Tejvan, 2015). The assassin Jing Ke tried to kill the emperor by a sword, which he managed to hide in the map that was intended to be presented as a gift for the emperor. The assassin failed in his intention and the emperor survived. Later, the second assassination attempt was executed, in which the assassin was a former friend of Jing Ke, a musician, whose name was Gao Jianli. This assassin also failed in his attempt and the emperor's life was again saved.

On the other hand, the first documented case where assassination was performed through a suicide attack is the case of the murder of the Russian tsar Alexander II, on 13.03.1881. The assassination was committed by Ignaty Grinevitsky, member of The People's Will, a left-wing terrorist group (Iain, Henry, 2013). The use of explosives, as *modus operandi*, to carry out the assassination undoubtedly makes the Russian tsar, Alexander II, the first victim of a suicide bomber, while Grinevitsky is the first suicide bomber in the history (Mara, 2016). Current data on suicide attacks by which assassinations are committed on a global level, according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) University of Maryland, show that in the period from 1989 to 2015 there were 224 suicide assassinations recorded. The database does not contain any records of terrorist incidents for the year 1993. In the previous period, from 1970 to 1988, there are no registered suicide assassinations. The situation as regards the registered suicide assassinations is as follows:

(1) In the period from 1989 to 2007 the number of committed acts ranged from 0-8, which is, in this period a total of 37 suicide assassinations were committed, representing 16.51% of the total number of attacks (224). In the next period, from 2008 to 2015, the number of committed acts ranged from 16-36, that is, in this period a total of 187 suicide attacks were performed, which represents 83.48% of the total number of attacks (224).

(2) In a total of 37 cases in the period from 1989 to 2007, targets of attack were mostly government, police and army officials, on which were performed 33 (cases of) suicide assassinations. In the period from 2008 to 2015, in a total of 187 cases, also the targets were mostly government, police and army officials on which were performed 143 (cases of) suicide assassinations.

(3) Most often as a means to carry out the mission, in the period 1989-2007, out of a total of 37 cases, in 36 were used explosives (explosives, bombs, dynamite) or a combination of explosives and firearms, while in one case only firearms were used. In the period 2008-2015, out of a total of 187 cases, in all explosives were used (explosives, bombs, dynamite), while in 15 cases a combination of explosives with firearms was used.

The growing number of committed suicide assassinations in the past period points to the need, and also is in the focus, of research by the authors of this paper, and therefore suicide assassinations will be examined through the prism of criminal and criminological analysis of the attacks (Tasevski, 2014).

Concepts of Suicide Attack and Assassination

The term suicide attack is traditionally defined as an attack whose success is dependent on the death of the perpetrator (Pedahzur, 2006) or "suicide attack is operational method in which the very act of attack is dependent on death the perpetrator - this is a unique situation in which the terrorist is fully aware that if she/he does not kill her/himself, the planned attack will not be considered as implemented, or the perpetrator cannot fulfil his/her mission and at the same time stay alive" (IDC Herzliya-Israel, ICT). Alex Mintz favours a broader definition in which a suicide attack is defined as "any attack where the suicide act of the terrorist was the priority objective of the mission" (Pedahzur, 2006).

Mintz, Chatagnier, and Brule (Pedahzur, 2006) make a distinction regarding the definition of a suicide attack. They speak of a general and an operational definition. The general definition of a suicide attack includes "any attack where the suicide act of the terrorist is the priority objective of the mission", while the operational definition classifies suicide attacks as: (1) instances in which the very act of attack "is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator" (i.e. the narrow definition), or (2) instances in which the attacker commits suicide during the attack, although the very act of attack is not dependent upon his or her death. Still, most analysts of suicide terrorism, Moghadam 2002; Bloom 2005; Gambetta 2005; Hafez 2005 seem to adhere to the narrow definition of suicide attacks (Pedahzur, 2006). The authors of this paper accept the so-called narrow definition, where as suicide attacks are considered all those instances in which the very act of attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator.

The term "atentat" (assassination in English), comes from Latin (atentatum) (Dorevski, 1997) and it was first used in Roman law to signify an unlawful assault, violence, and most often it denoted a premeditated murder or attempted murder of a ruler or other prominent political figure initiated by political motives. In Western literature, particularly in English language, the commonly used term for "atentat" is "assassination", and for the perpetrator "assassin". The genesis of the term is from the Islamic sect - Assassins (Hashshashin), which appeared and acted on the Persian territory from 1092 to 1265. Etymologically, the word "assassin" (Chaliand, Blin, 2009) is of Arabic origin and is closely associated with the name of the sect. The meaning of the word is killing of an individual, politician or other famous figure (Chaliand, Blin, 2009). The two terms, substantially and operationally, have the same meaning, planned murder of politicians or of strategically important persons with special motives, methods and goals. In view of assassination (Tasevski, 2014), as a special kind of murder, the authors of the paper state the following main elements:

- a. Unlawfulness (act of violence)
- b. Function of the victim (ruler, leader)
- c. The motive of the perpetrator (political, ideological).

Suicide attack - Modus Operandi for the Attack Performance

Suicide attack, as modus operandi for performance of assassination, is a fanatical form of physical elimination of a specific target/person. By their nature assassinations have limited objectives - "of destroying an enemy, frustrating a government, or simply eliminating a rival", (South Asia Terrorism Portal. Suicide Killings- An Overview. Institute for Conflict Management). Unlike military operations, death of the perpetrator is certain in a suicide attack. The attacker is fully aware of his/ her impending death, but nevertheless proceeds with the performance of the act. (*South Asia Terrorism Portal*). Or, if we simplify the process, we would say that a suicide attack aimed at committing assassination is known as a *suicide assassination*.

One of the most well-known terrorist organizations possessing operational capacity to carry out suicide assassinations were the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) 1976-2009. The LTTE had suicide bombers integrated into combat units for carrying out operations on land and sea, known as the Karum Puligal-Black Tigers. (South Asia Terrorism Portal). This organization, during its existence, has committed numerous suicide assassinations of prominent political leaders, a total of 47, including the assassinations of the former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and the Presidents of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika Kumaratunga (South Asia Terrorism Portal). The mentioned assassinations will be analyzed in accordance with the criminal and criminological analysis of the attacks.

The assassination of the former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi (1944-1991), took place on 21.05.1991 during an election rally (Indian National Congress) in Sriperumbudur-Tamil Nadu (India), in the afternoon 10:10 pm (Ophir, Henry, 2009). The assassination was committed by a female suicide bomber, Thenmuli Rajaratnam, also known as Gayatri Dhanu, in the form of a suicide attack. The assassin was wearing an explosive belt under her clothes and waited for the moment when the former Prime Minister of India, Gandhi, arrived at a campaign rally near a school where he was welcomed by local residents, and then the assassin approached Gandhi to greet and garland the former Prime Minister. The moment the assassin bowed before Gandhi, that is, found herself in his immediate vicinity, she detonated the explosive (700 grams-RDX). In the explosion, except the assassin Dhanu, were also killed the former Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and 14 other persons, or a total of 16 people (Ophir, Henry, 2009).

Organizers and executors of the assassination are the LTTE (South Asia Terrorism Portal). This incident demonstrates the unique characteristics of the terrorist organization LTTE, including the use of a female suicide bomber, explosive belt or explosive vest, as well as the use of suicide tactics in order to carry out the assassination (Ophir, Henry, 2009). On May 22, 1991, the case was handed over to The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and a Special Investigation Team (SIT) headed by D R Karthikeyan was formed to probe the case and the probe confirmed the role of LTTE in the assassination, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of India (Narasimhan, 2014). The motive for committing the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, according to the ruling of the Supreme Court, was the personal animosity which the leader of the LTTE-Prabhakaran felt towards him (Ophir, Henry, 2009). Probably the reason for this antagonism was the fact that Gandhi (IPKF

were deployed earlier in the period 1987-90 in Sri Lanka, i.e. at the time when Rajiv Gandhi was prime minister of India, 1984-89. In this period a conflict occurred between the IPKF and the Tamils and a number of Tamils were killed by Indian soldiers. Here from arises the desire of the leader of the LTTE for revenge on Gandhi and also the belief that IPKF will be again sent to Sri Lanka (NDTV, 2016), wanted to get involved in the conflict that lasted at that time in Sri Lanka between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. In an interview in 1990, Gandhi said that if he had taken power in India he would have sent the Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) to disarm the members of the LTTE. Although he was repeatedly warned about the threat to his life, given that there was certain information on the preparation of the assassination even back in 1987, Gandhi, did not pay attention to the threats. He was focused on the upcoming election campaign where he was a candidate for prime minister. In the aftermath of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India banned the LTTE, which previously had a privileged position in Tamil Nadu and declared the LTTE leader Prabhakaran and the chief of the intelligence service of the LTTE-Pottu Amman, perpetrators of the assassination (NDTV, 2016). The support for Tamil separatism also disappeared.

The assassination of the President of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe Premadasa (1924-1993), took place on 1.05.1993 in Colombo (Sachi, 2008), Sri Lanka, at a time when the President was performing monitoring of the preparations of the United National Party-UNP (At the time the President Ranasinghe Premadasa was a leader of the UNP) in connection with the rally scheduled for May Day, at the Armour Street-Grand Pass Junction, in the afternoon, 12:45pm (Rajan, 2014) or 12:48pm (Ferdinando, 2012). The assassination was committed by a suicide bomber-Kulaveerasingam Veerakumar (23) alias Babu, from Jaffna (Rajan, 2014) in the form of a suicide attack. According to the statement of Amarasena Rajapakse, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) - Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of Sri Lanka, the assassin Babu arrived with a bike that he left near the vehicle that was carrying the President of Sri Lanka and headed toward him. At that moment three members of the security service of the President tried to stop him, but the person called E.M.P. Mohideen, employed as a personal servant of the President and a person he trusted, signalled the security guards to let Kulaveerasingam Veerakumar alias Babu pass, following which the security guards let him through (Rajan, 2014). This reaction of Mohideen was due to the fact that he, and part of the security guards of the President (25 members), knew very well Kulaveerasingam Veerakumar, who in turn used their weaknesses to liquor and women. In this way Babu became so close to the security personnel that he even travelled with them to at least five locations across the country in the team serving as the advance party of the President. After Babu had approached to a distance of about 2.43 to 3 meters (8 to 10 feet) from the President Ranasinghe Premadasa, he detonated the explosives strapped to his body, 0.907 kg (2 pounds) of plastic explosive (UPI, 1993). In the explosion, except the assassin Babu, were also killed President Ranasinghe Premadasa and more than 20 other people, including E.M.P. Mohideen. Organizers and executors of the assassination are the LTTE (*South Asia Terrorism Portal*). This incident also demonstrates the unique characteristics of the terrorist organization LTTE, including the use of a suicide bomber, explosives placed on the body in the form of explosive belt or explosive vest, and the use of suicide tactics in order to carry out the assassination. Ranasinghe Premadasa was known as a hardliner

who ordered a major military operation against militants belonging to Sinhalese-Janata Vimukti Peramuna, JVP (Sachi 2008), and guerrillas belonging to the Tamil minority in the country, LTTE (Iqbal, 1993). In his four year period as President the following achievements were also attributed to him. First, he managed to make their neighbour, India, withdraw the remaining troops stationed in Sri Lanka before the deadline specified in the peace agreement between India and Sri Lanka in 1987. Then he entered into peace talks with the LTTE, the first after nearly two decades and agreed a ceasefire that lasted nearly 15 months, which represented a local record. And perhaps most importantly, he neutralized the growing threat of the Marxist movement of Sinhalese (JVP), which was the main threat to the Sinhalese society, rather than the LTTE (Bruce, 1993). Nevertheless, Premadasa also had the reputation of a political thug among the elite of Sri Lanka (Bruce, 1993). In the media there is information which shows that the assassination of President Premadasa took place a week after the killing of his main political opponent, Lalith W. Athulathmudali, for whose murder the critics accused President Premadasa (Iqbal, 1993).

Findings about threats to the life of President Premadasa existed in early March, in the same year, when the LTTE were planning to poison the food consumed by President Premadasa. These findings, according to Amarasena Rajapakse (DIG-CID), were shared with the Security Service of the President (UPI 1993), and thus the President never consumed food outside, it was always served by his staff even when travelling by plane (Ferdinando, 2012). Nevertheless, Premadasa did not take seriously the warnings of the services responsible for his protection, about a possible attempt by a suicide attack of the LTTE on his life, and he did not want to give up his routines. He believed that those who were responsible for his safety and protection need to accept the challenge of the LTTE. Even, a week before his assassination, President Premadasa asked that additional police officers should not be deployed during a visit to his property in Ambanpola (Ferdinando, 2012). In the aftermath of the assassination of Premadasa a vacuum was created at the top of the country's political parties, government and opposition, as well as fears that Sri Lanka has lost the capacity for leadership that will end the spiral of violence in this country (Sachi, 2008). After all, the Democratic United National Front (DUNF), whose leader Lalith W. Athulathmudali was a week earlier assassinated, blamed the Sri Lankan government for the assassination of Premadasa (Amarnath, 1993). In addition, the assassination was a blow to the armed forces that were supposed to bring under their control the region controlled by the LTTE, taking into account the statement of Premadasa given in India the previous month, which indicated that there would be no peace talks with the LTTE until they laid down their arms (Amarnath, 1993).

The assassination of the Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga, (first woman president in the history of Sri Lanka) took place on 18.12.1999 during the last rally of the People's Alliance (PA), whose leader Chandrika Kumaratunga was, on the eve of the presidential elections, at 9:15 pm (Dexter, Waruna, 1999). The assassination was committed by a female suicide bomber in the form of a suicide attack. The suicide attack occurred at the moment when President Chandrika Kumaratunga finished her speech before her supporters at the City Hall in Colombo and started walking to the car. At that moment the assassin-suicide bomber tried to jump over the security fence that divided her from her target, but was prevented by the security officers

following which she detonated the explosive device she was carrying strapped to her body (Wije, 1999). In the explosion were killed at least 14 people (Dexter, Waruna, 1999), or according to other sources 36 people (Wije, 1999), but President Chandrika Kumaratunga survived the attack with bodily injuries, losing her sight in the right eye hit by shrapnel. Organizers and executors of the assassination were the LTTE. This incident also demonstrates the unique characteristics of the terrorist organization LTTE, including the use of a female suicide bomber, explosive belt or explosive vest, and the use of suicide tactics in order to carry out the assassination.

President Kumaratunga, in the previous election in 1994, when she won the presidency, had promised talks aimed at putting an end to the war in this country. At the upcoming presidential election, Chandrika Kumaratunga won again and received another six-year mandate. Several months after winning the mandate, the talks began, only quickly to collapse, and the government of PA not only continued the war, but it escalated. New stricter security limitations were introduced, especially against the Tamil population. In her statement following the suicide attack, Kumaratunga practically ruled out any possibility for negotiations with the LTTE and accused them that the only politics they knew was the politics of terrorism (Wije, 1999). Later, she promised that the pressure against the LTTE terrorists would continue, but she would negotiate with the moderate elements of the Tamil population. During that time the fights in the country, between the government and the LTTE, were continued.

Suicide assassinations committed against persons under protection (VIP) - Rajiv Gandhi, Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika Kumaratunga shall be set in the framework of criminal - criminological analysis of the attacks. All three suicide assassinations enter the domain of the attacks that have occurred in public places, because persons under protection (VIP), attended public events or supervised the preparation of upcoming events, more specifically, the very act of suicide assassination took place on the route of movement when the VIP was travelling from a specific point to a particular destination (from point A to point B).

From the aspect of criminal assessment: **1.** According to the place of commission, the suicide assassinations were committed in public places, that is, on the route of movement of the VIP, when they were trying to enter the vehicle by which they travelled (Chandrika Kumaratunga); they were walking to a particular point in order to deliver a speech (Rajiv Gandhi) or were moving along a certain trajectory in order to monitor certain preparations for the upcoming event (Ranasinghe Premadasa). **2.** Assassinations according to the time of commission - all three suicide attacks took place in the afternoon, Ranasinghe Premadasa (12:45 pm or 12:48 pm), Chandrika Kumaratunga (9:15 pm), Rajiv Gandhi (10:10 pm). **3.** Assassinations according to the means of commission - in all three cases, for suicide assassinations are used explosives (improvised explosive device - IED, explosive belt or explosive vest) - Ranasinghe Premadasa (907 grams), Rajiv Gandhi (700 grams), while about Chandrika Kumaratunga there is only information on the use of explosives without indicating the quantity and type; **4.** Position-distance between the perpetrator and the target of the attack. In the case of Rajiv Gandhi the assassin was located directly in front of his feet (at the moment she bowed before him), in the case of Ranasinghe Premadasa the assassin was located at a distance of about 2.43 to 3 meters. Both cases come under the category of short

distances (direct contact with cold weapons, revolvers, pistols, explosives). Concerning the suicide attack on Chandrika Kumaratunga, taking into account that the assassin was thwarted in her decision to get closer to the target, we could say that it was a distance that varies from the category of short distances to a medium distance (up to 25 meters gun distance and explosives). **5.** Analysis by perpetrators of assassinations - in all three suicide attacks, according to the data, the perpetrators belonged to an organization that had designed and implemented the entire process. **6.** Assassinations by the consequences of the assassination - Rajiv Gandhi and Ranasinghe Premadasa fall into the category of injuries with fatal consequences, while Chandrika Kumaratunga into the category of severe injuries, as she lost her sight in her right eye.

From the aspect of criminological assessment: **1.** Conditions for the assassination - all three cases of suicide assassinations are committed in conditions of socio-economic and ethno-national divisions in society. **2.** Reasons for the assassination - all three cases of suicide assassinations are the result of a conflict of interest in the political and social sphere. **3.** Profile of the assassin/s - given that we do not have sufficient information on disposal for personality profiling except that in the cases of Rajiv Gandhi and Chandrika Kumaratunga the assassins were female suicide bombers, whereas in the case of Ranasinghe Premadasa - a male suicide bomber. The general perception of the assassins shows that there is no profile of an assassin, neither of their characteristics can provide for any regularity according to which the assassins would be categorized under certain type of delinquents (Tasevski, 2014). Nevertheless, there are certain findings about the assassins and their behaviour that could also be used in our cases, in general for all three suicide assassins. These are the following (Tasevski, 2014): The assassins commit the assassination of the VIP person rationally, with premeditation, and often their actions and thoughts are observable; The assassins use violence as a means to achieve their goal, or it is a solution to their problem; Individual motives and choice of target are directly connected. **4.** Motives of assassins - Usually the causes of the assassination indicate the motives of the perpetrators - assassins. The social circumstances in all three cases of suicide assassinations suggest layered problems of political and social nature, which played a key role on interpersonal level in the process of making the final decision-suicide assassins. **5.** The most common oversights and mistakes in the provision of security services to certain persons - Here, the fact should be mentioned that the oversights and mistakes in the provision of security of certain persons - VIP, is in correlation with the security culture of the protected person. Securing a VIP in public places is an extremely complex task. It requires comprehensive measures as well as expertise, intelligence and experience of the management team that plans the security measures. In the example of Ranasinghe Premadasa, where the influence of a person from the personal service of the President on the persons responsible for the security of the president and the weaknesses of a part of the security service members and the servants (women, liquor), used by the suicide assassin, had impact on the professional performance of the task - protection of a VIP. Also, regarding the security of Rajiv Gandhi and Chandrika Kumaratunga flaws can be detected in terms of the security measures undertaken, taking into account the exposure of the VIP to the murdering perimeter of the suicide assassins. At this point, the following can be added to the list: The "choke points", (Part of the route through which must

pass a VIP person), are not analyzed and identified as well as the ideal places for the attack that are part of the “choke points.” Appropriate measures or countermeasures are not undertaken as regards the means that can endanger the person. Failure to apply the principle of thoroughness in the carrying out of security measures. The “area of responsibility” is not protected etc. **6.** VIP - As mentioned in the previous point, the omissions and errors in the provision of security of a certain VIP is correlated with the security culture of the protected person. Noticing by the security officers of the threat to the life of Rajiv Gandhi and his ignoring of the danger to his life ended tragically. The case of Ranasinghe Premadasa has the same characteristics - in spite of the security services indicating the threat to his life by certain terrorist organization, the President did not pay enough attention to these warnings. On the contrary, sometimes he even insisted on reduction of the measures for his protection when travelling - the example with the deployment of police officers during his visit to his property in Ambanpola. The protected person cannot be a separate, divided and unrelated element in the daily activities, but rather it must be part of the security system through which the security function is implemented. **7.** Phenomenology of assassination - Every assassination is previously planned and it consists of several phases (Tasevski, 2014): *a.* phase of initial selection of the target - phase in which the inspirers, (As inspirers of assassination appear subjects who feel threatened by the actions of the target, in other words, expect the liquidation of the target to eliminate the threat to their interests.), depending on the goal they want to achieve, select the target (president of state, parliament, government, etc.); *b.* phase of secret observation and gathering of intelligence on the target; *c.* phase of selection of the target - the assassination organizer presents the collected information to the inspirers and based on it, decision is made on the final selection of the target, which mostly corresponds to their goal; *d.* phase of so-called pre-attack of the target - the organizer of the assassination personally, by his/her presence on the ground, checks the reliability of the previously gathered information, and confirms it; *e.* phase of planning of the assassination - based on the analysis of the information, the organizer determines the manner of attack (*modus operandi*); *f.* phase of exercises and testing of the attack - the perpetrators are tactically prepared and the tasks are concretized (depending on the nature of the attack, a test can be performed); *g.* attack of the target; *h.* phase of withdrawal, hiding and exploitation - in all three cases of suicide assassinations that have been presented this phase has not been taken into account, given the nature of the attack; **8.** Post-assassination period, assassination impact - As a consequence of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India banned the LTTE, which had previously have a privileged position in Tamil Nadu and declared the LTTE leader Prabhakaran and the head of LTTE intelligence - Pottu Amman perpetrators/inspirers of the assassination. The support for Tamil separatism also disappeared. As a consequence of the assassination of Ranasinghe Premadasa a vacuum was created at the top of the political parties in the country, government and opposition, as well as fears that Sri Lanka has lost the capacity for leadership that will end the spiral of violence in this country. In addition, the assassination was a blow to the armed forces that were supposed to bring the region controlled by the LTTE under their control, taking into account the Premadasa’s statement, made in India, where he indicated that there would be no peace talks with the LTTE until they laid down their arms. President Chandrika

Kumaratunga, who survived the suicide attack, won the presidential election in Sri Lanka and was given another mandate. At the beginning of her mandate the negotiations with the LTTE collapsed and the war escalated. New stricter security limitations were introduced, especially against the Tamil population. Later, she promised to continue with the pressure against the LTTE terrorists, but would negotiate with the moderate elements of the Tamil population. During that time the fights in the country between the government and the LTTE were continued.

Conclusion

Suicide assassinations, according to our analysis, occurred in certain complex socio-economic and ethno-national conditions in the societies, which created a conflict of interest in the political and social sphere. In such a constellation of conditions, the services in charge of security of senior state officials (VIP) did not stay immune to these circumstances. On the one hand, the security culture of the protected person played a major role in the function of the personal safety of the VIP and the entire team in charge of security. After all, as mentioned before, the protected person cannot be a separate, divided and unrelated element in the everyday activities of the security system. But on the other hand, the presented suicide attacks present an extremely complex matter and a challenge for the services responsible for security of VIP persons in the performance of their activities in the public domain.

The general conclusion (1989-2015 year) is that the use of explosives (IED, explosive belt or explosive vest) is present in almost all cases (223 out of 224) except in one where a firearm was used. The targets of the attacks were mostly government, police and military officials. The situation of the committed suicide assassinations developed in the direction from using a combination of explosives (IED) with a firearm (in 36 of a total of 37 suicide attacks) in the period 1989-2007, with a tendency of reduction of the combination of explosives (IED) - firearms (only 15 cases out of 187) in the period 2008-2015 and constant use of explosives (IED) in the performance of suicide attacks, in all 187 cases (2008 - 2015).

The focus of this paper is exactly on the security services responsible for the protection of VIP persons and the analysis of the presented suicide assassinations (Rajiv Gandhi, Ranasinghe Premadasa, and Chandrika Kumaratunga) conducted through the prism of criminal-criminological method. One common characteristics of the suicide assassinations committed against Rajiv Gandhi, Ranasinghe Premadasa, Chandrika Kumaratunga, is that they were performed in public or on the trajectory of movement (route). Also, all attacks were performed in the afternoon, with the cases of Rajiv Gandhi (10:10 pm) and Chandrika Kumaratunga (9:15 pm) occurring in conditions of reduced visibility (night time). All suicide assassinations were carried out using explosives, or IED, Rajiv Gandhi (700 grams, RDX), Ranasinghe Premadasa (907 grams, plastic explosive), while about Chandrika Kumaratunga there is only information on the use of explosives without indicating the quantity and type. The position-distance between the perpetrator and the target of the attack range from a short distance to a medium distance (Rajiv Gandhi), close proximity of the assassin (Ranasinghe Premadasa) from about 2.43 to 3 meters, while for Chandrika Kumaratunga

the distance varies from the category of short distances to a medium distance (up to 25 meters). All perpetrators of suicide attacks belonged to the same terrorist organization (LTTE). The consequences for the physical integrity of the VIP persons ranged from deadly consequences in the cases of Rajiv Gandhi and Ranasinghe Premadasa to severe injuries in the case of Chandrika Kumaratunga.

The general conclusion is that there is no distinctive profile of an assassin, which also applies in our cases. The anomalies of the kind of moral weaknesses, lack of analysis and identification of "choke points", and the ideal locations for attack that are within the "choke points", as in all three cases the assassins were sufficiently close to the target (VIP), ensured that the final epilogue was tragic for the protected person and the security team. The failure to undertake appropriate measures or countermeasures regarding the ways and means which might endanger the person (the use of a suicide bomber as an assassin), would later result in an almost impossible mission to protect the relevant person. These parameters indicate that it is required to have a strict control of a given perimeter around the VIP. The failure to apply the principle of thoroughness in the implementation of the protective measures, the area of responsibility not being protected, as well as other measures and activities which are also observed as deficiencies in all three cases of suicide assassinations. One of the crucial activities which is of vital importance for the detection and prevention of assassinations, especially suicide assassinations is the phenomenology of the assassination, specifically the phases included in every assassination. Here from arise the main directions in terms of equipping a service responsible for providing security to persons under protection (VIP). Skilled and experienced personnel are required. Professional services within the structure of the security service with appropriate material and technical resources, with compulsory distribution of tasks and undertaking of protection measures in a specific order. Monitoring of the situation and developments in the country and abroad as well as constant education concerning the technological innovations aimed at protecting of very important persons. Cooperation with the services in the field of intelligence is extremely important in order to obtain relevant information regarding the possible endangerment of persons under protection.

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OVERVIEW OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: STATUS QUO?

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Abstract:

The research findings presented in this article aim at explaining the framework of crisis management in the financial sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H). This framework is supposed to ensure financial stability even in the circumstances of business failure of institution, which could cause systematic damage. Based on the critical analysis of market conditions and legal and institutional frameworks established in the B&H, and having in mind the supranational nature of the crisis in the financial sector, the authors argue that an adequate mechanism for a resolution of any crisis situation must be founded on the measures that ensure accountability, transparency and integrity of all participants in the financial system. Recent legislative initiatives in the EU financial sector have resulted with an innovative framework of crisis management and tremendously comprehensive integration in the field of financial law. For that reason this research includes also an evaluation of the extent to which elements of this modern European mechanism for dealing with crisis situations in financial sector are included in the legislative implemented in the fragmented legal and institutional framework of B&H.

Keywords: financial sector, financial stability, financial crisis, crisis management in banking

1. Introduction

Despite the noticeable increase of theoretical and practical interest for crisis and crisis management in the last couple of years, it can be generally concluded that only a superficial understanding of the phenomena has been achieved (Bundy et al., 2016:2). This is especially accurate when it comes to the crisis events and their treatment in financial sector. Namely, until the financial crisis in 2007, the crisis management had been hardly known in the context of the financial sector. Wessels (2015) refers to terra incognita, even within the banking sector, which is especially susceptible to crisis events. However, the great extent of the financial crisis' consequences, caught the attention of experts and academics, but also of legislators and tax payers. There was a general consensus that it is necessary to create effective mechanisms for crisis prevention and crisis management in the financial sector. Even though this standpoint was not ground-breaking, but rather a typical result of analyses after the crisis events, which usually occur in this sector regularly and mainly due to same or similar reasons (see: Cho, 2010; Agenor and Azenman, 1999; Singh and LaBrosse, 2012), for the first time coherent studies were developed on the basis of optimal approaches to the crisis events (prevention, management and remediation of the consequences) that cover all three levels of regulative interventions (global, regional and national) (Singh and LaBrosse, 2012).

The latest financial crisis indicated the need for improvement of the traditional apparatus, used so far by the key bodies of the so called financial security networks (such as, prudential regulation by supervisors, central bank interventions, deposit insurance systems, etc.). What was needed was an adoption of new and reliable tools that should be a product of the analysis of the best practices regarding prevention and control of crisis events within the financial sector. Even though the state activities undertaken during the last financial crises (such as: capital injections, guarantees of the assets and liabilities, liquidity support, etc.), achieved their goal - i.e. stabilization of the financial system, they also caused significant stress to the public finances and disturbed the equality of market conditions (COM 2010, 579). Systemic financial institutions, such as banks, were a core problem because they could not continue with normal functioning in state of insolvency, and their removal from the system meant an imminent cause of a significant system damage. The doctrine "too big to fail" (Huertas 2015, 3) proved unsustainable due to the damage caused to public finances, destruction of competition and promotion of risk behavior (COM (2010) 579:2; Huertas, 2015:3), and it was necessary to initiate a reform that would ensure solving of the problem of failed banks, and that will ensure that the entire burden of the negative economic consequences (expenses) caused by failure of the bank be covered by investors, not tax payers (Preamble para. (1); Article 34 of the Directive 2014/59/EU (OJ L 173/90/2014), while on other hand will make it possible for a bank in problem to continue with the performance of its vital functions during the procedure of its resolution. The emphasis in the regulation should be on prevention of risky situations that banks can encounter, and that are generators of a systemic risk, as well as to establish a regime that will reinforce the discipline on financial markets through reduction of implicit protection mechanisms that produce moral risk.

2. Crisis Management Framework in the Financial Sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the financial sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), the effects of the global financial crisis culminated at the end of 2010, when activities of commercial banks were stalled by weakening of domestic demand, and the system level losses were significant (Central bank of B&H, 2011). The wrong assessments of client quality and aggressive politics of lending in pre-crisis period caused increased reservation expenses. Nevertheless, despite the problems within certain banks, the banking sector as a whole, absorbed shocks and continued to perform its functions, while other financial intermediaries (leasing companies and micro crediting organizations) suffered the consequences of unregulated sector with unappropriated business politics, and all of that caused significant loss increase in business activities of those parts of financial sector (Central bank of B&H, 2011). Unlike the prior periods, the effects of reducing activities in the banking sector started in 2011 and spilled into the real and external sector of B&H's economy (Central bank of B&H, 2012). During this period, the credit risk was still dominant in the banking sector and its increase was caused by deterioration of macroeconomic conditions. In order to mitigate the credit risk, banks were undertaking significant activities that stabilized the banking system. However, the long-term effects of these activities were conditioned by the changes of inadequate credit policies of the banks in previous period. According to the Report on Financial Stability for 2011 (Central bank of B&H, 2012), a majority of the banks decided to implement a policy of reprogramming of existing claims and their replacement with new credits with changed terms of repayment, activity that aimed at the improvement of possibility of servicing current debits. Other banks decided to transfer the part of credit portfolio to separate legal entities. From the reports of Central Bank of B&H on financial stability, it is obvious that development of the banking sector and credit activity significantly depend on financing from abroad, which is under influence of strategies that foreign banking groups are applying to its subsidiaries in B&H.

During the latest financial crisis, the financial sector maintained its stability, but the problems remained: increase of internal and external public debt, slow recovery of domestic consumption, continued low indicators of the living standard, and the lack of significant investment cycle in the country, continually represent significant threat for stability of B&H financial sector (Central bank of B&H, 2016; Central bank of B&H, 2017). Furthermore, the risk for financial sustainability is still present, due to expected pressures of external debt repayment in the following years, especially if one takes into consideration the lack of credit arrangements with international financial institutions. Due to the identified fiscal weaknesses and the political situation in the country, B&H rating, according to the assessment of leading rating agencies, is still in the zone of speculative credit standing with high credit risk (Central bank of B&H, 2017).

Prevention and control of risky situations in B&H financial sector represent a complex task, having in mind specifics of its political system where existence of two Entities indicates divide into two financial markets with separate institutional and legislative structure. Restricted apparatuses for dealing with the crisis events, which currently exist in the B&H, also reflects afore mentioned specifics, and its efficiency in maintenance of financial stability is questionable. Namely, Central

bank of B&H lacks functions which institutions of such nature usually have in financial sector. It does not have supervisory role, and it only can coordinate activities of banking agencies in the Entities, which are competent for issuing of banking licenses and conducting supervision of the banks within the Entities (Article 2(3) of the Law on Central bank of B&H). Restriction of B&H's monetary politics by currency board arrangement is manifested in a form of incapability to use basic instruments of monetary policy by the Central bank of B&H; it cannot lend to the state, in order to cover the budget deficit nor it can approve credits to commercial banks in order to protect liquidity of banking system – it does not have the role of the lender of last resort. Furthermore, Central bank does not get involved in any activities on money market, including the securities of any kind (Article 37 of the Law on Central bank of B&H); the only instrument of monetary politics that it has on its disposal are mandatory reserves (Article 36 of the Law on the Central bank of B&H). Therefore, this is institution that cannot be considered as the first line of defense in the case of crisis events (for comparison see Gabilondo 2015, 24).

Another traditional instrument of protection of stability present in financial sector of B&H is deposit guarantee system established on the state level, and managed by Deposit Insurance Agency of B&H („Official Gazette of B&H“ no 20/02,18/05, 100/08, 75/09 and 58/13). It provides coverage to all eligible deposits in member banks (Article 3. of the Law on deposit insurance in banks in B&H). The highest amount of insured deposit, including the accrued interest, to be reimbursed by the Agency per depositor in member bank, is the eligible deposit in amount of BAM 50.000,00 reduced for the legal or contractual debt of depositor toward the member bank (Article. 4(1) of the Law on deposit insurance in banks in B&H). Membership in deposit guarantee system is mandatory for all banks licensed by the supervising banking agencies in the Entities and who fulfill all the membership requirements set by the Agency. This system is operating as so called „pay-box“ and does not have additional monitoring functions. Since the establishment of this system, there have been two insured events in 2015 and 2016 (both occurred in the Entity Republika Srpska), where payment of insured deposits was requested: Bobar Banka and Banke Srpske. According to the information published on the official web page of the Deposit Insurance Agency of B&H, the procedure of payment of insured deposits started on 19 January 2015, in total amount of BAM 86.6 million for 21.400 depositors. On 28 June 2016, the total amount that was reimbursed was BAM 85.4 million (or 98.4% of insured deposits value) and to 14.500 depositors, (68% of total number of depositors). In the case of Banka Srpske, the procedure started on 23 May 2016. On 28 June 2016, the total amount that was reimbursed was BAM 49 million (88% of total amount of insured deposits) and to 8100 depositors (56% of total number of depositors). Since the process of liquidation started, the Agency has collected BAM 67 million in the case of Bobar Banka, and BAM 28 million in the case of Banke Srpske in the liquidation process, that is from the total required amount of BAM 142 million, the Agency collected BAM 95 million.

Having in mind aforementioned, it may be concluded that established system of deposit insurance is able to accomplish its main task, the protection of small depositors from losing their deposits within the banks, at least when it comes to minor banks. System performance proved to depositors that safety net is available, and relatively low level of insured deposit (per depositor)

reduces the possibility of moral hazard. However, exclusive role of the „pay-box“ system does not contribute to better stability of the banks. The research studies showed that banking stability is better in the countries where systems have supervising authorities, as well as competence of intervening in banks that are in problems (Gerhardt and Lanoo, 2011:4).

B&H does not have single supervising and regulatory body and the functions of monitoring and supervision are performed by two agencies at the Entities level (Article 4 of the Law on Banking Agency of FB&H („Official Gazette of FB&H“, no. 9/96, 27/98, 20/00, 45/00, 58/02, 13/03, 19/03, 47/06, 59/06, 48/08, 34/12 and 77/12; and Article 4 of the Law on Banking Agency of Republika Srpska („Official Gazette of RS“, no. 59/13 and 4/17). Both agencies were involved in process of developing new legislation in banking sector during the 2016 and first half of 2017, which should reinforce their supervision functions and establish comprehensive framework for bank restructuring (Central Bank of B&H, 2017). Even though upgrade of regulatory framework was carried out with an intention of modernization and approximation of national legislation with legislation of EU and also improvement of business environment of financial intermediaries (Central bank of B&H, 2017:45), delays and fragmented approach in transposing the relevant *acquis communautaire* reasonably raise doubts in the real fulfillment of the objective of strengthening the stability of banking sector. From the perspective of crisis management, new regulations focused on risk management and bank capital are central. Drafting and adoption of these documents were part of the activities towards upgrading the regulatory framework of the entity banking agencies in accordance with the strategies for adoption of “International agreement on capital measurement and capital standards” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009), and for accomplishing the goal of implementation of Directive 2013/36/EU (OJ L 176/338/2013) and Regulation 575/2013.

New banking legislation addressed the issue of risk management in banks. Regarding the risk management within the bank, importance should be given to the provisions of the new Law on banks in Federation of B&H (FB&H) contained in Articles 79, 80 and 81 and in Articles 89 and 90 of the Law on banks in Republika Srpska (RS). These provisions create specific legal framework for risk management. According to the laws, the banks are obliged to establish and implement risk management system in an efficient and reliable manner, proportional to the type, scope and complexity of business activities that are performed and to the risks inherent to its business model (Article 79 of the Law on banks in FB&H; and Article 89 of the Law on banks in RS). Every bank must establish comprehensive and efficient risk management or at least through its internal documents clearly and accurately define authorizations and responsibilities in risk management for all organizational levels (through strategy, policy and procedures for risk management), and to establish risk management processes and procedures (See Article 80 of the Law on banks in FB&H; and Article 89(1) of the Law on banks in RS). It is also provided that operationalization of these provisions will be achieved through adoption of bylaws focused on prescribing the elements of risk management system, as well as the procedures of internal capital adequacy assessments of the bank, which should cover all the risks in banks business activities (Article 80(5) of the Law on Banks in FB&H; Article 89(5) of the Law on Banks in RS). The risk management system has to be established in a way to cover all risks to which certain bank is exposed or could be exposed during

its business activities. Those risks should be defined in its strategy, policy and procedures for risk management, and at least following risks: credit risk, liquidity risk, market risks (position risk, currency risk, commodity risk and other market risks) operational risks, interest rate risk in banking book, country risk, compliance risk, concertation risk, settlement risk, strategic risk, reputation risk and other risks (Article 81(1) of the Law on banks in FB&H; and Article 90(1) of the Law on banks in RS). Consequently, Agencies adopted decisions on the risks management, which lay out quality requirements that bank is obligatory to apply in risk management, as an integral part of healthy corporative management and it is closely related to implementation of process of internal evaluation of adequacy of bank capital (Central bank of B&H, 2016:60). These decisions prescribe minimum requirements for managing the risks to which bank is exposed or may be exposed in its business and is an integral part of the general rules relating to the establishment and application of internal management system in the bank (Article 1 of the Decision on the risks management in banks of the Banking Agency of Federation of B&H; and Article 1 of the Decision on the risks management in banks of the Banking Agency of RS). Also, they prescribe general standards in risks management and special standards for management of individual categories of defined risks. Banks have obligation to establish and implement comprehensive, reliable and efficient system of internal management, which has to be proportionate to the type, extent and complexity of bank's business i.e. to the bank's risk profile (Article 4(1) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of Federation of B&H; and Article 4(1) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of RS). The internal management system must include: transparent organizational structure with clearly defined and consistent levels of responsibility; effective and efficient processes for determining, measuring/assessing, controlling, monitoring and reporting on risk exposure; adequate internal control mechanisms, which include clear administrative and accounting procedures; remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with assumed risks and which promote stable and efficient risk management; adequate internal capital adequacy assessment process and internal process of liquidity adequacy assessment; and recovery plans (Article 4(2) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of Federation of B&H; and Article 4(2) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of RS). Through adoption of their business strategies the banks have to set goals given its long-term economic interests and liquidity, undertaking and management of risks and amount, type and distribution of capital that is result of internal capital adequacy assessment process and regulatory capital which ensure coverage of bank's risks (Article 5(1) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of Federation of B&H; and Article 5(1) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of RS). On the basis of business strategy and objectives established by it, they also must adopt appropriate policies, procedures and other internal risk management documents. The bank's supervisory board adopts these strategies and policies proposed by banks management board and ensures that they are subject to and independent review by the internal audit. Implementation of these acts at all levels of decision-making and in all business activities of bank is entrusted to the management board (Article 5(3) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of Federation

of B&H; and Article 5(3) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of RS). The process of risk management involves regular and timely identification, measurement or evaluation, control, monitoring and risk control, including the reporting on the risks to which bank is exposed or could be exposed in business (Article 7 of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of Federation of B&H; and Article 7 of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of RS). This includes risks arising from the introduction of new services, products or systems, significant changes in existing services, products or systems, performance in new markets, trading with new instruments, or conducting similar transactions that the bank has not previously executed (Article 7(1) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of Federation of B&H; and Article 7(1) of the Decision on the risks management in bank, Banking Agency of RS). The laws require that bank must provide independent assessment of the functioning of the risk management system by internal and external audit (Article 80(4) of the Law on banks in FB&H; and Article 89(2) of the Law on banks in RS).

Regulatory capital adequacy is concept in the focus of contemporary banking regulation and implies extent to which bank's assets exceed its liabilities (Posner 2014). The laws on banks prescribe obligation of the bank, depending on the risk profile and systemic significance, to ensure at any time amount of capital adequate to the types, scope and complexity of business that preforms and the risks to which it is exposed or could be exposed in its business. Regulatory capital of the bank represents the amount of resources of assets, which bank has to maintain for the purpose of safe and stable operations, that is fulfillment of obligations to creditors. Regulatory capital is a sum of basic and supplementary capital, after regulatory adjustments (Article 3(2) of the Decision on calculation of bank's capital of the Banking Agency of the Federation of B&H; Article 3(2) of the Decision on calculation of bank's capital of the Banking Agency of RS). The bank is obliged to meet at any time the rate of regulatory capital adequacy and at least at the level of 12%. The regulatory capital adequacy rate of the bank represents the ratio of regulatory capital to total amount of exposure to risk. The Banking Agency of FB&H has prescribed the characteristics and types of items that are included in the calculation of regulatory capital; the manner and scope in which the individual items are included in the calculation of individual parts of the regulatory capital; financial leverage rate; protection layers of capital and measures for the protection of capital of banks; and capital requirements and methodology for calculating capital requirements. The bank assesses the capital adequacy in relation to the type and level of risk it is exposed or could be exposed to in its business. Also, the bank is required to establish and implement adequate and comprehensive strategy and procedures for a continuous internal capital adequacy assessment process and is obliged to continually review them in order to ensure that they are comprehensive and consistent with the nature, scope and complexity of the activities it performs.

The process of internal evaluation of adequacy of bank capital is defined by separate legal acts (Decision on the internal process of capital adequacy assessment in the bank of the Banking Agency of the Federation of B&H, "Official Gazette of the Federation of B&H" no 81/17), according to which banks are obliged to assess internal capital requirements for other significant risks in business, which they will determine on the basis of their risk profile (Central bank of B&H, 2016:60).

During the procedure of internal evaluation of capital adequacy, banks must measure the risk using the quantitative methods, and if it is difficult to quantify it, they will evaluate significant risks using methodology and approaches that are the most suitable for bank's organization and business activities. The banks are obliged to adopt a capital strategy whose implementation will ensure an adequate, efficient and comprehensive capital planning that, in addition to the prescribed minimum regulatory capital, covers all other risks the bank is exposed to or may be exposed to in its business as well as continuous valuation procedures and maintenance of capital resulting from the implementation of internal assessment of capital adequacy procedure. In addition to the strategy, banks are obliged to adopt a capital management plan that clearly defines: strategic goals and deadlines for their realization, taking into account the macroeconomic environment and the economic cycle phases; capital planning and accountability procedures; the method of achieving and maintaining an adequate level of capital as a result of planning in the future period, and at least for the period of the next three years; action plan for unexpected situation that will define measures to maintain an adequate level of capital as a result of capital planning (e.g. the way of obtaining additional capital, limiting business activities, etc.); dividend policy, in line with the regulatory requirements for regulating capital and capital maintenance as results of internal assessment of capital adequacy procedure; and policy and practice determinants for determining and paying variable fees to the management and key employees of the bank that significantly influence the risk profile of the bank, with reference to compliance with the regulatory capital requirements. The banks are obliged, on a continuous basis, to establish and implement the appropriate documented procedure for establishing and securing adequate capital levels as a result of the of internal assessment of capital adequacy procedure and corresponding to the nature, scope and complexity of the bank's activities, taking into account the risk profile, risk management system and the techniques used to reduce the risk. When selecting a procedure for determining and securing an adequate level of bank capital resulting from internal procedure of capital adequacy assessment, the bank may also consider other factors such as market position, entry into new markets, capital availability and takeover of other companies, and other strategic goals. The impact of these factors on the amount of estimated capital as a result of the internal procedure of capital adequacy assessment has to be analyzed and documented by the bank.

Since 2016, the banks comply with the regulatory provisions of the decision on capital and capital protection banks (Decision on minimal standards for capital management and capital protection of the Banking Agency of the Federation of B&H ("Official Gazette of the Federation of B&H" no 46/14; Decision on minimal standards for capital management and capital protection of the Banking Agency of the RS, "Official Gazette of the RS" 57/14) in terms of the level and conditions for the recognition of supplementary capital items, as well as the requirements for the protective layers of capital to be fulfilled. Consequently, there have been changes in the structure of regulatory capital, which are reflected in an increase in the share of the base and the reduction of the supplementary capital, thus ensuring the improvement of the quality of regulatory capital (Central bank of B&H, 2017:49).

Although the financial sector in B&H has so far been able to overcome crisis events without significant threat to its stability, the previous brief overview makes it obvious that the established apparatus, which is at disposal of key players of banking sector, is limited even if compared with traditional forms of financial security systems. Financial security network of B&H cannot rely on system of deposit insurance. In order to ensure efficiency of system of deposit insurance, other elements such as strict prudential regulation and monitoring, adequate corporative management, legislation with efficient sanctions that are applied and correct accounting regimes and regimes of disclosure of relevant information, must be established as its support (Clarke, 2015:365). At the same time, all above mentioned elements are prerequisites for introductions of measures that will ensure accountability, transparency and integrity of all players within financial sector. Continued improvements of regulatory framework in both Entities are necessary, especially if we take into consideration the fact that establishment of an adequate framework of crisis management is the next step in the process of obligatory harmonization of national legislation with solutions implemented in European Union (EU) after the financial crisis.

3. EU concept of Crisis Management in the Financial Sector

Financial crisis indicated the problem of absence of appropriate instruments at the EU level that would efficiently solve the problem of unhealthy or failing financial institutions. The response of the European Union to the crisis was formulated through adoption of several quasi-legal and legal instruments. New EU framework focuses on three key areas of crisis operations: crisis prevention, crisis management and reparation of consequences and implied the intervention in a form of transfer of new regulatory and supervisory functions from national level to union level. These activities, at the end, resulted in stronger institutional players (such as European monitoring body for banking sector, European monitoring body for insurance and occupational pension funds and European board for system risk) and new legislations: Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173/149/2014) and Directive 2014/59/EU on bank recovery and resolution (OJ L 173/90/2014). Both legal instruments are tools of minimal harmonization. This means that member countries can pass or keep more strict rules or additional rules in comparison to rules determined by directives or delegated and implementing acts that are passed based on these rules, but the national rules cannot be contrary to the decisions within union acts.

Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes is an upgrade of the system established by Directive 94/19/EZ (OJ L 135/5/1994) that was based on the principle of minimal harmonization, and due to this fact, there are numerous deposit insurance systems that are established within the Union, with very different characteristics (Preamble of the Directive 2014/49/EU, para. 1). In the recent financial crisis, uncoordinated increases in coverage across the Union have in some cases led to depositors transferring money to credit institutions in countries where deposit guarantees were higher. Such uncoordinated increases have drained liquidity from credit institutions in times of stress. The key elements of the framework established by Directive 2014/49/EU are:

- Establishment of coverage level for aggregate deposits of each depositor is EUR 100 000 in the event of deposits being unavailable (Article 6(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU);
- Gradual reduction of payment period during transitional interval until December 31, 2023;
- Better regulated system of financing deposit guarantee scheme. Deposit insurance schemes obtain financial means through contributions made by their members at least annually, with a possibility of financing from other sources (Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU). The Member States shall ensure that, by 3 July 2024, the available financial means of a deposit guarantee scheme shall at least reach a target level of 0,8 % of the amount of the covered deposits of its members (Article 10(2)). Financial means of deposit guarantee scheme can be used for: payment of depositors and financial resolution of credit institutions, according to Directive 2014/59/EU (Article 11(1) and (2) of Directive 2014/49/EU);
- Establishment of possibility of borrowing between deposit guarantee schemes within the Union, on voluntary basis (Article 12 of Directive 2014/49/EU);
- Enhancement of depositors' information. Credit institutions are obligated to make available to actual as well as to potential depositors the information necessary for the identification of the deposit guarantee scheme of which the institution and its branches are members within the Union and shall ensure that credit institutions inform actual and potential depositors of the applicable exclusions from deposit guarantee scheme protection (Article 16(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU). The fact sheet in the annex of Directive, should be submitted to depositor, at least once a year. Official web page of scheme should provide information that depositors need, especially information on provisions related to procedure and requirements of deposit insurance.

Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, sets the rules and procedures relating primarily to subjects which have business establishment within the Union, and in accordance with special conditions, also to the branch offices of institutions with business establishment outside of the Union (Article 1(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU). The key characteristics of the new framework for the recovery and resolution are:

- Establishment of the bodies responsible for crisis management – national resolution authorities that are empowered to apply resolution instruments and exercise resolution powers (Article 3(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU). Directive is strictly stating that this should be public administrative authority/authorities (Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU), such as national central banks, competent ministries of finance or other authorities entrusted with public administrative powers (Article 3(3) of Directive 2014/59/EU) and only in exceptional cases it allows that resolution authorities are competent for supervision.
- Prevention and preparation measures. Institutions are obliged to create and implement their recovery plan with defined measures for restoring their financial position in the case of its significant deterioration (Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU). Reviewing of recovery plans regarding its implantability is performed by competent authority that especially assess fulfilment of the following criteria: whether the implementation of the arrangements

proposed in the plan is reasonably likely to maintain or restore the viability of regular business and financial position of the institution or of the group, given the preparatory measures that the institution has taken or has planned to take; and whether is reasonably likely that the plan and specific options within the plan are implementable quickly and effectively in situations of financial stress while avoiding to the maximum extent possible any significant adverse effect on the financial system, including the scenarios in which would lead other institutions to implement their recovery plans within the same time period (Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/59/EU). When assessing the appropriateness of the recovery plans, the competent authority shall take into consideration the appropriateness of the institution's capital and funding structure to the level of complexity of the organizational structure and the risk profile of the institution. Beside the competent authority, recovery plan is also evaluated by the resolution authority that is attempting to identify any measures or actions in it, which may adversely impact possible resolution of the institution. Resolution authorities are obliged, in consultation with competent authority, to prepare resolution plan for each institution that provides: resolution actions that authority may take if that institution meets the conditions for resolution, important potential impediments to resolvability (and if it is necessary and proportionate, indicates all relevant actions for how those impediments can be addressed), and an analysis of how and when an institution may apply for the use of central bank facilities and identifies assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral. Resolution authority in consultation with the competent authority, assesses the extent to which institution (or a group) is resolvable without assumption of possibility for: extraordinary public financial support, central bank emergency liquidity assistance, or central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralization, tenor and interest rate terms.

- Early intervention. In the case when institution violates or will possibly violate, in near future, requirements stipulated in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/26/EU, the competent authority has on its disposal several measures of early intervention: implementation of one or more arrangements or measures from the recovery plan; analysis of the situation, problem identification and establishment of specific measures for overcoming those problems, and development of action program to overcome problems; convening of shareholders assembly; dismissal or replacement of one more members of management, if it is determined that those individuals are not capable of performing their duties; development of plan for negotiation of debt restructuring with certain or all creditors in accordance with recovery plan; modification of business strategy of the institution; change to the legal or operational structure of the institution; collection of all necessary information that will be forwarded to resolution body in order to update resolution plan and prepare institution for possible resolution of institution and for evaluation of assets and liabilities of the institution. In situation when there is significant deterioration in the financial situation of institution or where there are serious infringements of law and regulations or of statutes of institution, or serious administrative irregularities, and when

previously mentioned measures of early intervention are not sufficient to reverse that deterioration, the competent authority can request replacement of senior management or management body of institution (entire body or individual members), as well as to appoint one or more temporary administrators of the institution.

- Measures and tools of resolution. Resolution tools are: the sale of business tool; the bridge institution tool; the asset separation tool; and the bail-in tool. State tools of financial stabilization in comparison to resolution tools have subsidiary significance, and they may be used as a last resort. Tools of financial stabilization cover: public equity support tools and temporary public ownership tool. Wide range of powers of resolution authorities encompasses: the power to require provision of any information from any person, which are necessary for making decision and preparation of resolution action; the power to take control of an institution under resolution, and exercise all the rights and powers conferred to the shareholders, other owners and management body of institution under resolution; the power to transfer shares or other instruments of ownership issued by institution under resolution; the power to transfer rights, assets or liabilities of institution under resolution to another entity, with consent of that entity; the power to reduce, including to reduce to zero, the principal amount of or outstanding amount due in respect of eligible liabilities, of an institution under resolution; the power to convert eligible liabilities of an institution under resolution into ordinary shares or other instruments of ownership of that institution or relevant parent institution or a bridge institution to which assets, rights or liabilities of the institution are transferred; the power to cancel debt instruments issued by an institution under resolution except for secured liabilities; the power to reduce, including to reduce to zero, the nominal amount of shares or other instruments of ownership of an institution under resolution and to cancel such shares or other instruments of ownership; the power to require an institution under resolution or a relevant parent institution to issue new shares or other instruments of ownership or other capital instruments, including preference shares and contingent convertible instruments; the power to amend or alter the maturity of debt instruments and other eligible liabilities issued by an institution under resolution or amend the amount of interest payable under such instruments and other eligible liabilities, or the date on which the interest becomes payable, including by suspending payment for a temporary period, except for secured liabilities subject to Article 44(2); the power to close out and terminate financial contracts or derivatives contracts for the purposes of applying Article 49; the power to remove or replace the management body and senior management of an institution under resolution; the power to require the competent authority to assess the buyer of a qualifying holding in a timely manner by way of derogation from the time-limits laid down in Directive 2013/36/EU and 2014/65/EU.
- Establishment of European system of financing arrangements which consists of: national financing arrangements; the borrowing between national financing arrangements; and the mutualisation of national financing arrangements in the case of a group resolution.

4. Implementation of EU Solutions in the Legal and Institutional Framework of B&H

Evaluation of the extent to which elements of modern EU mechanism for dealing with crisis situations in financial sector are included in the legislative solutions implemented in the fragmented legal and institutional framework of B&H requires detailed analysis that surpasses the acceptable scope of this paper and therefore only general conclusions will be presented hereinafter.

As indicated, B&H deposit insurance system established at state level in 2002 has not been modified for the last past five years and therefore no approximation with new EU framework established by Directive 2014/49/EU is undertaken. New solutions focused on financial stability such as: uniform level of coverage of insured deposits, gradual reduction of payment periods, detailed regulation of financing of the deposit insurance system and improvement of information mechanism of depositors have yet to be implemented in legal framework of B&H.

Recent legislative activities in banking sector conducted with, inter alia, intention of harmonization of entities' banking legislation with EU legislation, have resulted with adoption of new legal framework but adopted laws do not transpose Directive 2014/59/EU and only partial approximation through implementation of certain solutions has been achieved. New legislation provides specific provisions on recovery plans, measures of early intervention, measures and instruments of resolution. Funds for financing resolution of banks may be provided from Deposit insurance fund in accordance with legislation regulating insurance of deposits in banks in B&H. Additional financing may be provided from other sources such as loans and other eligible forms of support from banks and third parties (Law on banks in FB&H). However, these funds may be used only if shareholders and other creditors participate in coverage of losses and capital increase by reducing the value, conversion and in other manner in amount of at least 4%. Funds of extraordinary public financial support may be used only if previously mentioned funds are insufficient or if they couldn't be timely secured.

5. Conclusion

Currently, B&H does not have established contemporary mechanism of crisis management in financial sector, therefore the next step in improvement of financial safety network should be creation of legal framework, which will be based on measures that guarantee responsibility, transparency and integrity of all participants within the financial sector. The emphasis in the future regulatory activities should be on prevention and control of risky situations that primarily banks can encounter, and not on resolution of consequences of the crisis events. Afore mentioned requires establishment of regime that will improve supervision, discipline and transparency on financial markets. B&H has yet to implement solutions from EU legislation that governs the area of crisis management, and due to complexity of country's organization, it can be assumed that the process will be slow and long lasting.

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THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATIONS AND EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

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Abstract:

Detecting and locating physical evidence during crime scene investigation requires special expertise and experience which should contribute to proper assessment, access, organization and coordination of the investigative activities. Securing the scene of the investigation is very important and, perhaps, it is one of the key activities on which all further processes depend. As a logical and intellectual act, the inspection, above all, represents a mental reconstruction of the dynamics of the criminal act that happened, with two objectives: the first objective refers to being able to understand the chronology of the activities i.e. the analysis of the logical layout of the physical evidence; and the second one, consequently to the first, refers to predicting the places where the latent physical changes could have happened. Trace evidence which is detected during the crime scene should represent logical consequence of a criminal act i.e. they should be in causal relation with the actions undertaken by the perpetrator or perpetrators. For these reasons recovering evidence does not mean simply collecting and packing it up, but implementation of appropriate strategy as a starting point for investigating the crime scene, which presents an organized, methodical, systematic and logical process.

Key words: crime scene investigation, evidence, fingerprints, evaluation.

Introduction:

Detecting and locating physical evidence during crime scene investigation requires special expertise and experience which should contribute to proper assessment, access, organization and coordination of the investigative activities. Securing the scene of the crime is very important and perhaps, it is one of the key activities on which all further processes depend. As a logical and intellectual act, the inspection, above all, represents a mental reconstruction of the dynamics of the criminal act that happened, with two objectives: the first objective refers to being able to

understand the chronology of the activities i.e. the analysis of the logical layout of the visible physical evidence i.e. macro traces; and the second one, consequently to the first, refers to predicting the places where the latent physical changes or micro traces could have happened. This means that the crime scene, as a matrix of all activities, is the core where all the evidence is recovered. The logic i.e. or the way of their occurrence is, perhaps, crucial for the system of proving the crime. In this context we can state the legal definition of Inspection from the Official gazette No. 150 from 18 November 2010, Article 233 which states that: "(1) Any crime scene investigation shall be conducted by the public prosecutor and with his or her authorization, also by the judicial police, if an immediate observation is required in order to establish or clarify some important fact in the procedure". For example, the Slovenian Criminal procedure code ZKP-NPB29 has a very similar approach where in Article 245 it is stated that "An inspection is carried out when determination or explanation of an important fact for the proceedings calls for immediate observation".

It may be noted that laws provide general and even superficial approach in defining this investigative activity. By means of intensive interpretation, we may conclude that the clarification, determination or explanation of an important fact is made by inspection, analysis and appropriate forensic expertise of physical evidence, i.e. directly or indirectly, other facts are proven to be in correlation with the core of the criminal act. Vodinelic (1985) defines crime scene investigation as an investigative court activity whose content is examined through direct sensory perception, verification and clarification of certain facts and circumstances relevant to the criminal proceedings. The sensory observation for example listening, watching or smelling are no longer one of the most important factors during the crime scene investigation. It becomes an often practice, during the inspection, to recover latent and micro evidence that has strong evidential significance, and at the same time have no great connection with the senses of the investigators at the crime scene. Henry Lee (2001) argues that the inspection is more than processing or documenting at the crime scene, or just collecting and packing up physical traces. In the basis of any crime scene investigation is the ability of the investigator to recognize the important and potential physical evidence. Finally, an appropriate investigation is a starting point in establishing what has happened, in other words, it is an initiative for reconstruction of the crime scene, which presents an organized, methodical, systematic and logical process.

Trace evidence which is detected during the crime scene investigation should represent logical consequence of a criminal act i.e. they should be in causal relation with the actions undertaken by the perpetrator or perpetrators. For these reasons providing evidence does not mean simply collecting and packing it up, but it also means doing a situational analysis during which you have to ask and perhaps answer the following questions:

- What is the condition of the evidence which are collected?
- The way the evidence occurred and if the place where it was found is logical;
- Whether the position of the evidence where it was found is original or the evidence was moved (intentionally / unintentionally);
- Whether the collected item is a carrier of other micro or latent traces;

- Whether the evidence 'speaks' or can help about the mental reconstruction of the crime scene;
- What kind of forensic expertise it can be exposed to i.e. why it is collected;
- Whether it is worth collecting some evidence or the forensic scientist is just trying to show some activity.

Taking into account the complex mental process which is part of the process of collecting evidence we will try to define it as follows: "physical evidence is any material change caused intentionally or unintentionally, visible or invisible to the naked eye, which is in the causal link with the criminal act or any other event whose clarification is connected to the forensics." (Radojica, 2000).

As a logical consequence to the overall forensic analysis is the process of proving, during which certain actions are taken in order for the court to form an opinion based on the existence of legally relevant facts, which are highly relevant in reaching the right verdict in the criminal proceeding. Theoretically, the value of separate physical evidence that determines or reveals legally relevant facts upon which, directly or indirectly, a certain person is considered to have committed a crime is, undoubtedly, of particular importance. In this context, understanding the core of the criminal act that has happened is a necessary prerequisite in order to apply appropriate methodology of analysis and expertise of trace evidence.

What transforms the trace into evidence is the possibility, with a forensic, criminal and logical interpretation, to prove someone's presence at the crime scene in an interval when the criminal act has occurred. This will define the evidence as criminal relevant information which is contained in the people and objects obtained in legal process with the use of planned process (Vodinelic, 1985). Its evaluation should not be an arbitrary act, but a procedure with a use of objective criteria, such as the laws of logic, the rules of general human experience, common sense and substantial knowledge in field of criminalistics. The evidence contains evidential basis which is already known, established fact which is used to confirm the validity of any other fact, which is to be determined in this particular case and is a subject to prove (Matovski, 2003). In foreign references, there is a different approach to the definition of physical evidence, which may be defined as any trace of different size through which with a scientific analysis and investigation can be proved that a certain criminal act has happened (Eckert, 1995). Furthermore, according to these authors, evidence in criminal investigations may be used as follows:

1. To define the elements of the criminal act- evidence that prove the criminal is committed;
2. To lead the investigation - for example the type of vehicle in an accident with fatal consequences when the driver left the scene;
3. To connect the crime scene or the victim with the suspect - this connection may be established by analyzing different types of traces such as papillary lines, blood, hair, etc.;
4. To confirm or deny the alibi of the suspect;
5. To identify the suspect - identification using fingerprints, palm prints or foot prints and DNA profile;

6. To be able to confirm the confession of the suspect;
7. To be able to acquit the suspect, and
8. To provide expert testimony in front of the judicial authorities. (Eckert, 1992)

According to Jack V. Matson (2004) physical evidence is relevant information presented to the court in order to support or reject the case in criminal proceedings. Formal logic shows that in order to determine legally relevant facts, when using direct or indirect evidence, a process of logical conclusion is used, and the process itself goes through certain phases before the conclusion is made. In other words, the process of logical conclusion is not distinctive only for the process of indirect conclusion, but for the direct one as well (Krapac, 1982). What characterizes the evidence is its cognitive or evidential value which means the ability to establish the facts which, directly or indirectly, point to the perpetrator.

In the modern theory of Criminal Procedure Law, the principle of free evaluation of evidence is widely accepted. In the Macedonian Criminal Procedure Code (Official Gazette no. 150, 18 November 2010), Article 16 stipulates the principle of free evaluation of evidence as follows: "(1) The right of the court and any state authorities which participate in the criminal procedure to evaluate the existence or non-existence of facts shall not be bound nor limited by any special formal rules of evidence." Therefore, there is a free judicial conviction when the judge evaluates the presented evidence for existence of facts, subjecting them to its own logical and psychological analysis while not being bound by any statutory rules for the evaluation of the evidence. The Slovenian Law on Criminal Procedure ZKP-NPB29 is very similar, where in Article 18 is stated that: "(1) The right of the court and of state bodies participating in criminal proceedings to evaluate the facts presented shall not be bound or limited by any specific formal rules of evidence". Contrary to the free judicial conviction in the American criminal justice system, as early as 1923, it is required satisfying Frye standard, where the court must decide whether the questioned procedure, technique, or principle is "generally accepted" by a meaningful segment of the relevant scientific community. In practice, this approach required the proponent of a scientific test to present to the court a collection of experts who could testify that the scientific issue before the court is generally accepted by the relevant members of the scientific community (Saferstein, 2006). Specifically, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with the admissibility of expert testimony: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

In continuation of the paper we will provide theoretical reference to proving and processing of fingerprints as one of the oldest known and recognized scientific evidence. The evaluation of the evidential and cognitive value of fingermarks in the form of direct evidence, on the one hand, includes the value of the content of the evidence, and on the other hand includes the evaluation

of the legitimacy of the item on which the papillary traces are developed. The logical value of the direct evidence gives us a categorical conclusion, which directly proves certain facts, such as if a certain person is really the committer of the crime or if the evidence occurred during and because of the criminal act. This means that in the process of establishing the facts, the validity of the final conclusion is not put into question, unless we challenge the legitimacy of the evidence holder. In this case, the surface or the object on which the traces are visualized plays an important role in several aspects:

- Fingermarks are visualized on the surface of an object which was used in the criminal act (gun, knife)
- Fingermarks are visualized on the surface of an object which is obtained with a criminal act (money or other items)
- Fingermarks are visualized on the surface of an object which is used for overcoming obstacles (tools, drills, pliers)
- Fingermarks are visualized on the surface of an object because of which the criminal act is committed (drug packaging)
- Fingermarks are visualized on the surface of objects which are removed as obstacles in order to reach the desired primary purpose, i.e. they are primarily deposited by the owner and then moved by the perpetrator.
- Fingermarks are visualized on a surface which is not a public place or in a private apartment where the perpetrator could not be present in normal conditions.

The contaminant containing developed latent prints is a key component in the process of identifying the suspect as well. The contents determination of the dactyloscopic evidence defines the material and formal aspects of its occurrence, which means that the basic role of the judge is not only to determine whether these fingermarks occurred during the criminal act, but to determine the dynamics of their occurrence i.e. touching, grasping, pushing, catching the object or surface on which the traces are visualized.

The expert may only confirm if the object was touched in a certain case, i.e. if the disputed and undisputed samples are identical when the creation of the dactyloscopic evidence actually begins. Vodinelic (1985) argues that dactyloscopic evidence, regarding the guilt of committing a certain crime, is consisted of four levels of proving, such as:

- The first evidence shows that the provided fingermarks are not planted at the crime scene. This negative evidence has eliminative value and besides proving the identity of a certain person and his presence at the crime scene, it should undoubtedly guarantee the actual situation of the crime scene as well. This equally applies to movable objects *res mobiles* and fixed objects.
- Another piece of evidence shows that the fixed fingermarks at the crime scene really comes from the suspect. This view comprises two aspects namely: whether the suspect was known before the traces were identified, so with the dactyloscopic expertise the indications made upon other facts are confirmed, or the suspect was revealed only after traces were identified. This is the basis upon which a story can be recreated and it shows whether

that presence is marked during committing the criminal act, and as such, if it becomes an indication for being a participant in the act.

- The third piece of evidence is that the obtained trace at the crime scene occurred during committing the criminal act. This becomes an indication for being a part of that criminal act and even more likely that this person is actually the perpetrator of the crime.
- The fourth piece of evidence is that not only the fixed trace occurred during committing the criminal act at the crime scene, but it has also occurred because of committing the crime.

There is always one question to be asked. What does it mean to be present at the crime scene? Does that mean that the person from whom the traces originate undoubtedly committed the crime?

The fingerprints on their own do not prove that a certain person has committed a certain crime. They only prove that the suspect on one occasion was at the crime scene, which it does not solve the question if he is the perpetrator of the crime. Before we even start the process of identification and individualization of the traces of papillary lines, it's crucial that they are processed at the crime scene first. This is an essential process that both from criminal and normative aspect should provide legitimacy of material evidence. On the one hand, the legitimacy should ensure the legality of the procedure in which they are provided and processed, and on the other hand the legitimacy should ensure the inviolability of the traces in terms of those facts which are used to prove them. Dactyloscopic analysis of fingerprints, scientifically, should ensure objectivity, validity, systematicity and methodology of procedures and expertise. To sum up, processing of fingerprints several aspects, as follows:

1. Mental reconstruction of the dynamics of the illegal action at the crime scene, where the criminalists get familiar thoroughly with the material changes which can be seen visually at the crime scene;
2. Detection and visualization of fingerprints or using appropriate forensic techniques during the crime scene investigations;
3. Marking, sketching and photographing of the traces respectively, as well as their location and relation to other traces at the crime scene; and
4. Obtaining in terms of collecting, packing up and delivering of the traces in the forensic laboratory for further analysis.

Mental reconstruction is a necessity for proper criminal (forensic) processing at the crime scene, and proper detection of fingerprints which is directly related to the dynamics of the illegal action undertaken by the perpetrator, the type of criminal act which was committed and the contact of the perpetrator with the crime scene. Basically this is an initial approach which is primarily directed towards achieving the main objectives of the contact theory written by prof. Edmond Locard.

taking bribe	0,37%
rape	1,11%
murder	1,11%
drug trafficking	2,22%
terrorism	1,48%
robbery	2,22%
motor vehicle theft	3,70%
Illicit arms trafficking	5,18%
robbery	82,50%

Table 1: Percentage of fingermarks in individual criminal acts on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2001-2005, which are solved on the basis of dactyloscopic evidence.

From the attached statistical analysis of table 1, for the period 2001-2005, we can see the percentages of fingermarks in individual criminal acts which are solved based on dactyloscopic evidence. Certainly, there is a reason for this percentage ratio and it depends on several factors (Oklevski 2009):

- The space where the criminal act is committed. It may be open or closed, clean or previously contaminated with waste or other materials,
- The types of surfaces and materials present at the crime scene,
- Is there is a need to go in or how to go in the space, whether to be broken into or simply there are no obstacles,
- The use of appropriate tools or means with which the criminal act is done or the space is broken into,
- The contact of the perpetrator with the interior of the crime scene,
- The contact the perpetrator with the crime victim, i.e. if the victim is robbed, beaten, raped, etc.
- If the dactyloscopic evidence proves the presence of the perpetrator at the crime scene, the contact with the weapon with which the crime was committed or the contact with the victim.

Conclusions

Although the second part of the paper is focused on the fingerprints, our goal was to discuss universal theories that evidence should complement or increase criminalistic logic in the process

of proving the crime. In this context we say in conclusion that there are two aspects of analysis of physical evidence: material and formal. The both aspects should ensure the inviolability of the evidentiary importance of the evidence. The **formal aspect** refers to detection and interpretation of material changes which reflect the dynamics of the action committed as a result of the activity of the perpetrator. Such an approach towards the material changes that happened at the crime scene refers primarily to their recognition i.e. detection and to the information they can provide. From this moment on, the creation of material evidence begins, and it must be highlighted that its interpretation is always versus the causal course (s) of the criminal act. The material aspect in the interpretation of evidence covers the presence of qualitative and quantitative characteristics that are sufficient to perform identification and individualization of the sample in order to create important facts for criminal proceedings.

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TACTICAL USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR TERRORIST GOALS

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Abstract:

The bioterrorist attacks are very efficient and deadly because for a short period of time they cause massive civilian casualties, and achieve psychological fear and anxiety among the general population. In order to achieve their goals, some terrorist structures have members who possess good theoretical and practical knowledge as well as technical information from various scientific fields with regard to the most important features of the production and use of biological agents. The use of biological weapons in various deadly attacks committed by terrorist organizations for fulfilling their goals is the main subject of this paper. Firstly, we consider the characteristics of biological agents, including bacteria, viruses and toxins that can be converted into biological weapons suitable for use in terrorist activities, and then we specifically pay attention to the tactical ways of their usage. A detailed research of their properties and tactics of storage, transportation and use for terrorist purposes is necessary to evaluate the current established measures for anti and counter terrorism and propose more effective strategies to prevent future attacks using biological weapons.

Key words: biological weapons, virus, tactics, terrorism, terrorist act.

Introduction

The biological weapons, given their characteristics and properties, are classified in the group of weapons of mass destruction. The groups of agents that can be used as a biological

weapons include viruses, bacteria, ricketts, Chlamydia, fungi and toxins from living organisms. Some of them (Anthrax and Ebola) can be genetically modified causing major problems in their detection, identification, diagnosis and treatment itself. The choice of the bio warfare agent (Riedel, 2004) depends on the economic, technical, and financial capabilities of a state or an organization. Smallpox, Ebola, and Marburg virus might be chosen because of their reputation for causing most horrifying effects. Images of doctors, nurses, and law enforcement personnel in full protective gear is likely to cause widespread public distraction and anxiety.

According to some intelligence information, in addition to the great world powers, at least twelve other countries in the world are intensively working on biological weapons development programs. The justification they use usually refers to the alleged defensive purposes of today's biological weapons, i.e. as one of the methods for deterrent from the potential aggressor. The second argument is that they develop methods for protection against the possible use of this type of weapon. The UN inspections - carried out just in 1993 - found that biological weapons had been developed in Iraq since 1985, and in a relatively short period of time, Iraq produced around 8,500 liters of anthrax, approximately 20,000 liters of botulinum toxin-A and over 2,000 liters myth toxins. All these agents were stored and ready for use (Jovanovic and Micevic, 2005: 22). According to the previously obtained data, it is believed that today it is very likely that (in addition to USA, Russia, China) programs for the biological weapons development exist also in North Korea, Taiwan, Iran, India, Egypt, Israel, Cuba, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, etc.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) or Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), opened for signature in 1972 entered into force in 1975. The Convention effectively prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons. It is seen as a key element of the international community's efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning an entire category of weapons, as States Parties to the BWC undertook "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; and weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."

The rapid development of biotechnology enables easier laboratory creation of deadly viruses and bacteria that could easily be abused in a terrorist attack. Their effects could be worse than those of an atomic bomb. The bioengineering is progressing at a rapid pace, and there are many laboratories in the world, which local governments are incapable of regulating and controlling. If in 2002 it took five years to create a genetic sequence of Polio virus, today in a well-equipped laboratory the whole procedure can be completed in just three days. At the same time, with the decrease of the prices of equipment and materials, as a consequence of the global

economic crisis, hundreds of legal and illegal laboratories emerge around the world. The economic factor stimulates scientists to compete in the production of commercial products that could be placed in the pharmaceutical or food industry. But the lack of control over these laboratories can easily turn them into biological and chemical weapons production facilities.

The use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (Mazzone, 2013: 25) poses a great threat to the international security. So far their use by terrorist groups and/or individuals has not caused mass destruction, but they have had considerable effect on the societies against which they were used. In fact, one of the main motivations behind the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons is precisely the psychological effects on the populations they target. Furthering this point, one may argue that the effect of terrorist use of these weapons is a force multiplier.

The general aim of this article is to illustrate the danger of the possession and use of biological weapons by terrorist organizations in pursuing their ideological goals. For this purpose we briefly explain the characteristics of biological agents, including bacteria, viruses and toxins, which can be converted into biological weapons suitable for use in terrorist activities. Studying the tactics of keeping, transporting and using them for terrorist purposes is necessary for assessing the current anti-counter terrorism measures and proposing more successful strategies for preventing future attacks with biological weapons.

Characteristics of the Biological Weapons

The types of biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction and disabling people, fauna and flora have some general properties and special features for certain types of agents. Jovic and Savic (2004: 125-132) list the following properties that make them insidious weapons:

- Spaciousness and mass destruction, as well as disabling people, plants and animals on the affected territory, but also on a wider and even on intercontinental scale, the spread of an epidemic or a pandemic of dangerous infectious diseases;
- Explosiveness and durability of the spread of infectious diseases or the destruction of plant crops and the maintenance of the consequences in the form of endemic hotspots of infectious diseases;
- A strong psychological effect such as fear, panic and disorientation of the population, due to the emergence and rapid spread of epidemics of infectious diseases with a high mortality rate, as well as because of disabling of the living force for resistance against the aggressor;
- The durability of the atmospheric bio-contamination, the water, the food passing through the source and the direction for the spread of epidemics of infectious diseases;
- The existence of an invisible period of incubation of several days or months, from the onset of the spread of the disease to the occurrence of the signs of the disease, by which the type of the disease would be identified. Incubation (Panovski et al., 2009) is a period with no symptoms of the disease that begins from the moment of entry - the infection of

the microbes in the human body - until the onset of the first symptoms. This is a period in which the disease spreads but is not recognized and, as a rule, it is always delayed by taking protective measures.

The biological weapons can be used secretly or covertly, because they are invisible, colorless, odorless and tasteless, which is unnoticeable for human senses and is very difficult to detect and use with instruments, do not cause destruction and can be used from a distance. The discovery of a biological attack is usually possible only after the emergence of the characteristic symptoms within days, weeks or months of the attack. This means that biological agents do not cause immediate (direct, immediate) effects, as is the case with conventional weapons. In this case, the effects are delayed as measured in days (when using microorganisms), and very rarely in hours (when toxins are used). As living matter, biological agents are the only weapon that has the ability to reproduce during and after the attack, and at the same time it spontaneously spreads beyond the primary target. This weapon is spread through contaminated media, water, air, food and soil, but also through infected individuals who transmit microorganisms to disease-causing healthy people, whether they are reconvalescents, microbial carriers or corpses.

According to the international conventions, biological weapons are microorganisms and other biological agents and toxins, regardless of their origin or mode of production and whose possession is not intended for a prophylactic, preventive or other peaceful purpose, as well as weapons and equipment and other means and ways of disseminating agents because of hostile intentions or use in military conflicts. Biological weapons (Riedel, 2004) are unique in their invisibility and their delayed effects. These factors allow those who use them to inculcate fear and cause confusion among their victims and to escape undetected. A bio warfare attack would not only cause sickness and death in a large number but would also aim to create fear, panic, and paralyzing uncertainty. Its goal is disruption of social and economic activity, the breakdown of government authority, and the impairment of military responses.

The main feature of the biological weapons is that it cannot be used for defense purposes (Jovanovic and Micevic, 2005: 19-21). Its production is much cheaper than the production of conventional or nuclear weapons. For example, according to some US sources for achieving lethal effects of an unprotected human population per square kilometer for conventional weapons, it is necessary to invest around \$ 2,000, for a nuclear roughly \$ 800, for chemical (classic poisoning) \$ 600, while for biological weapons it is necessary only invested \$ 1 per square kilometer. The US Centre for Disease Control categorizes the following as Category A agents, posing a risk to national security:

- Tularemia or "rabbit fever" – Highly infectious and life-threatening,
- Anthrax – Non-contagious disease. Notably used by persons unknown in a series of mail attacks in 2001,
- Smallpox – Currently only existing in laboratory cultures, but would be a deadly weapon if released once again,
- Botulinum toxin – A highly toxic substance that is readily available, due to its use in "botox" cosmetic procedures,

- Bubonic plague – The disease that caused the Black Death in Medieval Europe and with a long history of use as a biological warfare agent,
- Viral hemorrhagic fevers – Such as Ebola.

The biological agents are produced in dedicated military, but also in very cheap laboratories that often resemble pharmaceutical, chemical, medical or food facilities. In addition, such facilities (as well as the micro-organisms) may often have a dual purpose. For instance, vaccines, numerous antibiotics and other pharmaceutical preparations can be legally produced. These laboratories are well masked and secured by the eventual finding and identifying their true production. A good example is the Sudanese pharmaceutical industry “Shifa”, which was located in the northern suburb of Khartoum. There, with the help of scientists from Iraq and the financial support of Osama Bin Laden, there was a major program based on the production of biological and chemical agents for the needs of the ex-Islamic organizations, above all al Qaeda. The initial components for the production of biological and chemical agents according to the same source were purchased on the “black market” in the former USSR. Assessing the potential danger from the Shifa pharmaceutical facilities, President Clinton ordered destruction of the complex on August 20, 1998. According to US sources, al-Qaeda had two more facilities for production of biologically and possibly chemical agents located near Kust and Jalalabad in Afghanistan.

Another very important feature of biological weapons is their hidden mode of preparation, especially if its bioterrorist actions are at stake. Namely, the bioterrorism activity is very difficult to establish and prove if there is no convincing epidemiological or material evidence. Therefore, a well-trained individual or group that knows the toxicological, epidemiological and environmental characteristics of a region can cause diseases of smaller or larger proportions that are difficult to distinguish from naturally occurring epidemics.

The key factors (Eitzen, 1997: 438) that make a biological pathogen or toxin suitable for a large-scale bio warfare attack include: (a) availability or ease of production in sufficient quantity; (b) the ability to cause either lethal or incapacitating effects in humans at doses that are achievable and deliverable; (c) appropriate particle size in aerosol; (d) ease of dissemination; (e) stability (while maintaining virulence) after production in storage, weapons, and the environment; and (f) susceptibility of intended victims with nonsusceptibility of friendly forces.

During the past 20 years, we have witnessed revolutionary breakthroughs at the molecular level, above all in the field of genetic engineering, which allows identification and decoding of certain segments in the DNA chain. By applying the molecular biological technique, it is possible to manipulate the segments, that is, the sequences of the DNA molecules, thus obtaining organisms that have altered characteristics. According to the analysis of many analysts, the danger is that with the application of genetic engineering, a completely new generation of biological agents will be obtained. With manipulations in genetic engineering, many biological agents can increase the vitality, toxicity, and more than 100 times the resistance of external influences such as heating and UV radiation will increase. The biotech revolution (Jovanovic and Micevic, 2005: 25-30) has also allowed for greater stability in toxins, making it easier to spread them in a form of aerosols; also it is easier to produce so called “Himeric toxins”, which are a combination of two

completely different molecules of toxins, Ricine and Diphtheria toxin. Such combinations have great penetrating power in the organisms and a great killer force. By biotechnological procedures, the antigenic composition of a large array of microorganisms can be successfully altered, and thus existing vaccines (anthrax vaccines) become ineffective. In 1984, the Soviet Union began developing a secret program (project Camp fire) in the field of genetic engineering, in order to obtain bacteria from plague and anthrax that will be resistant to many well-known antibiotics and vaccines. Sergey Popov has been one of the top biological weapons experts in the former USSR for more than twenty years, and in the early 1990s he immigrated to the US (www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/bioterror). According to him, the former USSR developed several important programs related to the application of biotechnological methods (genetic engineering method) with the intention of modifying a large number of biological agents. Popov was engaged in the method of artificial synthesis in highly pathogenic viruses and bacteria which in natural form do not exist in the external environment. One of Popov's activities was the genetic modification of the Legionella species bacteria in order to obtain a bacterial species that causes severe diseases in the nervous system, most often with a fatal end, followed by symptoms that are very similar to the symptoms of multiple sclerosis. These symptoms of the disease appeared several days after the "complete healing" of bacterial Legionella infection. Explaining the super-secret project called Hunter, Popov presents the possibility of forming completely new hybrid viruses from already existing and known. Within the Hunter project, there have been several successful attempts at hybrid combinations between bacteria and viruses. According to Popov's allegations, the best results were achieved in the combination of bacteria from the plague and the encephalomyelitis virus, major measles and Ebola. With genetic manipulation, a complete virus was inserted into the bacteria of the plague, whereby the virus was stationary. When there is an infection in humans from a bacterial plague, symptoms of plague disease occur. The patients are treated with antibiotic therapy, which usually yields good results. At the moment when the bacteria is destroyed the virus that is immune to antibiotics arises in the organism, so the effect of the encephalomyelitis, measles and Ebola virus on living organisms is most often fatal (deadly).

Despite the numerous advantages of using biological weapons for terrorist purposes, there are certain limitations and weaknesses that make terrorist organizations not to use them very often. According to Eitzen (1997: 443) these are:

- The danger that biological agents can also affect the health of the aggressor forces,
- The dependence on prevailing winds and other weather conditions on effective dispersion,
- The effects of temperature, sunlight, and desiccation on the survivability of some infectious organisms,
- The environmental persistence of some agents, such as spore-forming anthrax bacteria, which can make an area uninhabitable for long periods,
- The possibility that secondary aerosols of the agent will be generated as the aggressor moves through an area already attacked,
- The unpredictability of morbidity secondary to a biological attack, since casualties (including civilians) will be related to the quantity and the manner of exposure,

- The relatively long incubation period for many agents, a factor that may limit their tactical usefulness,
- The public's aversion to the use of biological warfare agents.

Tactics of Conducting Bio-Terrorist Attacks

Intimately linked to the threat-value of these weapons is the view, somewhat widespread, that terrorists may seek chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons because traditional methods may no longer be psychologically "effective" (Center for Counter Proliferation Research, 2002: 6). While it may seem obvious that different terrorist groups may seek to attack different targets based upon their underlying ideologies or beliefs, this is an important point with respect to the desire to propagate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. Since target selection varies, and since particular technologies and expertise may be more available, groups may opt to purchase or develop one weapon type over another. For example, chemical weapons will generally have less of an effect on physical targets, such as buildings, than a nuclear device. Similarly, a contagious biological agent that targets agriculture could in theory impose a greater economic cost than a chemical attack. Target selection is a key variable: a group may not seek to acquire simply what is the easiest to acquire, but rather what they assess would be most effective against a specific target or target set.

The use of biological weapons in terrorist attacks has tremendous advantages over the other types of weapons, because it is simple to operate, easily produced and is much cheaper than other types of weapons. There are also huge opportunities for spreading toxins on large surfaces and very difficult to detect (no color, taste, smell). When used, a large number of patients appear in a short period of time and the most important advantage is the panic that appears among the population when it becomes known that infectious diseases are released.

However, despite these advantages and good toxicological and infectious characteristics in order for biological agents to be used as weapons, it is necessary to fulfill certain conditions. The ability of biological agents to cross into aerosols is certainly the most important requirement that each agent must satisfy to be used as a biological or terrorist weapon (Saulic, 1966: 44). The aerosols are actually solid or liquid particles in the form of dust or mist that float in the air or can be carried by the flow of various types of inspectors. It is well known that poisoning through the respiratory organs is the most effective way of poisoning.

The agent that pretends to be used as a weapon must be soluble in liquids, especially in water, in order to contaminate water and other drinks. The biological agent should be without color, odor and taste. These are very important conditions that must be met when contaminating foodstuffs intended for humans and animals. The production of agents should be cheap and in many cases this condition is met. Namely, for their industrial and poly-industrial production, expensive means and devices of modern technology do not require. Terrorist structures or countries that support them can produce in improvised laboratories or in the production facilities of the food and pharmaceutical industry. The substances used in the production of agents are widely used

in these industries and would not cause any suspicious warnings or caution to the competent structures. Detailed information on the method of production of agents can be easily found in open and all available literature, on search engines, etc. Literary information is often so detailed and illustrative that some anti-terrorist experts call it a true guide to bioterrorism actions.

Possession of nuclear, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons equals use (Center for Counter proliferation Research, 2002: 6). The issue of deterring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism is closely linked to group motivations. It is a near-universal opinion that deterring the use of these weapons by terrorist who have acquired it will be extremely difficult. Most conclude that acquisition of such weapons generally will lead to attempted use. A more recent, and oft-cited supposition is that had al-Qaeda had such weapons at its disposal, they would have sought to employ them. And with what many view as the most dangerous terrorist groups in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear context "religious/millenarian groups that seek to inflict mass casualties on their enemies" preventing acquisition may be equally problematic.

The tactics of bioterrorism include the ways in which biological weapons are used, its characteristics, specificities, modes of use in bioterrorist attacks, but also the means of defense against such weapons. With the exception of the delayed action of some war poisons, from the moment of action to the first symptoms, this weapon has a delayed effect (incubation time), and bioterrorism can be said to be one of the most quiet forms of terrorism, at least in the moments of the terrorist act. The tactic of use (Milic, 2005: 15) requires familiarity with the characteristics of the weapon, such as pathogenicity, path of transmission, resistance to antibiotics, resistance to environmental factors, etc.

According to Wiener and Barrett (1986: 508-509), the indications of a possible bio warfare attack are the following:

- A disease entity that is unusual or that does not occur naturally in a given geographic area, or combinations of unusual disease entities in the same patient populations,
- Multiple disease entities in the same patients, indicating that mixed agents have been used in the attack,
- Large numbers of both military and civilian casualties when such populations inhabit the same area,
- Data suggesting a massive point-source outbreak,
- Apparent aerosol route of infection,
- High morbidity and mortality relative to the number of personnel at risk,
- Illness limited to fairly localized or circumscribed geographical areas,
- Low attack rates in personnel who work in areas with filtered air supplies or closed ventilation systems,
- Sentinel dead animals of multiple species,
- Absence of a competent natural vector in the area of outbreak (for a biological agent that is vector-borne in nature).

The success and the result of the attack depends on the area in which the attack is carried out - whether it is closed or open space and from the meteorological parameters (temperature,

humidity, etc.). The equipment and accessories for the use of biological agents are widely available and so diverse that it is difficult to specify or define the possibilities for use. To a large extent, the choice of equipment and means of using biological weapons depends on the imagination of the terrorist minds. The equipment and accessories can only be divided according to the manner of use of biological agents (Jovanovic and Micevic, 2005: 51-52):

- Biological weapons - ammunition,
- Equipment for contamination of water and food,
- Equipment for the examination of agents,
- Offensive agents for the use of biological agents - devices,
- Equipment for the use of agents against individuals or smaller groups.

The biological weapons are usually in the form of containers or tape and they can be launched or placed in place and activated at a specific time, only munitions with a strong heat or explosion are not used, because the agents are sensitive to high temperatures.

From a terrorist point of view, the most interesting places to attack are underground railways, underground passages, closed sports and cultural facilities with ventilation, large shopping centers, large buildings with special ventilation, etc. (Jovic and Savic, 2004: 215). Underground railways are particularly suitable for contamination, because there is a semi-closed system and because there is increased airflow that is in favor of improving dissemination (so-called clipped way of inquiring). Such amenities also apply to closed-type objects in terms of air circulation, especially in those objects where it is not possible to open windows, and thus represent an excellent target for bioterrorists. A major problem is the inability to predict which new pathogen could be used by terrorists, and it is therefore of particular importance to coordinate the readiness to react to a bioterrorist attack with the surveillance of contagious diseases and activities for an effective response to the attack.

The diversity of biological weapons and the problems of forecasting the way this weapon would be used set the basic problems in detecting, diagnosing and responding to terrorist threats (Milic, 2005: 17). This weapon is especially dangerous because it can be used in undercover attacks. Secret release of agents in public places due to the incubation period has delayed the action of humans. For example, the first victims may be identified only by medical teams outside the scene of the attack. The first symptoms in the victims refer to a particular type of disease, and the gradual manifestation of other symptoms leads to the establishment of an accurate diagnosis that indicates a certain infection. And during that time, medical teams should specify that an attack has been carried out, to detect the agent, and to prevent new victims. The problem of rapid and proper diagnosis is particularly pronounced when agents are transmitted from person to person. The contamination of water and food (Jovanovic and Micevic, 2005: 60-63) can be carried out with liquid or solid biological agents. The equipment used for this type of contamination does not have to meet any specific conditions. Here one can use glass or plastic packaging for chemicals such as small bottles, ampoules or other dishes. Such packages can simply be opened and the contents to be poured into water or food, and may also be equipped with a time starter. Certain types of biological agents may be in the form of tablets, capsules or microcapsules.

There are great opportunities in the use of biological agents for testing. By inquiring, the air, water, land, people and all the equipment they use can be contaminated. Various pumps, sprinklers, airborne pressure or gas dispensers and all kinds of sprayers used in agriculture and other industries can be used as equipment, and there are quite a lot of them. Especially dangerous spraying is offered by sports jets on small sports airports and are very often used, and they have very poor security control and supervision. The offensive agents for the use of biological weapons can be made from any container in which the agent can be placed and can be easily opened and interrogated in the air and on the ground. In modern conditions, attempts to use biological weapons should be anticipated from assets that do not attract any attention to detecting and border control services. In terms of contamination of individual or small groups, the most commonly used is the contamination of food and water or the contamination of objects that the victim would use. Containing missiles in the form of small arrows, injections, needles (Bulgarian umbrella) and other means that can penetrate the body of the victim and which can carry on themselves biological agents and toxins can be used from equipment.

It is also necessary to point out an alternative method of contamination or the so-called Vector transmission. Biological agents can also be spread through insects, rodents, birds and other animal organisms called vectors. This kind of organisms - vectors can transmit a large number of serious infectious diseases in humans without having consequences for the perpetrator. Assumptions suggest that this kind of contamination could be used by fundamentalist terrorist groups. The latest scientific knowledge suggests that a man could play the role of a vector very well. Suicide action by extreme Islamists in the future instead of explosives could be performed with a suicide bomber who would be voluntarily infected with a highly virulent agent. Such people with their "normal" physiological activities (coughing, spitting, etc.) in a place where there is a greater presence of people, shopping centers, gyms, public transport, etc. can cause large-scale infections.

Biological weapons may, in fact, be much more effective if used against unsuspecting, unprotected, and nonimmune civilian populations than against a fast-moving military organization (Zilinskas, 1990). This was certainly true when the Japanese attempted to use biological weapons against Chinese and Soviet troops in World War II. The objectives of a terrorist group may not be typical military objectives; therefore, biological weapons may be better suited to their purposes.

Countering Bioterrorism

The varying goals and objectives of terrorist organizations throughout the world require different means of mitigation and response to terrorist attacks (Mazzone, 2013: 29). We must continue to evaluate the causes of and responses to terrorist attacks in order to more fully develop the means to respond effectively. The international community must work together to expand its resources to address the threat of terrorism. Predicting and successfully mitigating terrorist attacks is not always possible. As such, legal sanctions against states and groups that sponsor terrorism will certainly assist in this effort.

Despite a variety of threats that is overwhelming with regards to the number of microbes with pathogenic potential current biodefence efforts remain focused on a tiny proportion of biological threats. In fact, governments have responded to the threat of bioterrorism by the creation of lists that aim to protect society by restricting access to certain microbes and toxins and creating legal tools for the prosecution of individuals on the basis of possession alone (Casadevall and Relman, 2010). Furthermore, such lists have been used to prioritize the development of countermeasures such as increased vigilance, detection devices, diagnostics, vaccines, drugs and therapeutic immunoglobulins. In general, microbial threat lists have been designed by creating algorithms that attempt to identify the most dangerous types of microbes. Although such algorithms are not in the public domain some hint of the types of considerations taken into account in the generation of such lists can be found in an article authored by scientists from the Center of Diseases of Control (Atlanta, GA) (Rotz and Associates, 2002), the institution responsible for the administering the Select Agent and toxins regulations. It is noteworthy that their risk matrix analysis for assessing the public health impact of potential biological terrorism agents included such diverse criteria as mortality, need for hospitalization, likelihood for dissemination, availability of countermeasures and public perception. The last parameter is interesting since public recognition of a known danger such as anthrax spores is far more likely to cause panic and societal disruption than less well-known threats (Casadevall, 2012). The US Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (BTA) identifies the most dangerous biological assets that can be used as weapons and instructed the Ministry of National Defence to take additional security measures in laboratories that process this program. This act also predicted the United States to provide technical assistance to countries that want to increase the level of security in laboratories in their state or public institutions, which is a challenge and a need for any country.

The threat of bioterrorism across all countries in the world is real and rising. The first argument concerns the low cost of production and the proliferation of biological weapons, which in the future will be increasingly cheaper and more accessible. The second argument is based on the effectiveness of this type of weapon against other hand-made explosive devices. The third is that bioterrorists encounter fewer difficulties than those who want to use nuclear weapons. On the basis of such arguments, cooperation at the local and national level is urgent, as well as the creation of national strategies to combat bioterrorism.

The counterterrorism experts have long warned that global terrorist structures might use some kind of virus and other dangerous infectious diseases in the eventual biological weapons attack. In 2001, after the invasion of Afghanistan, US soldiers in al-Qaeda training camps found biological weapons manuals. In 2005, however, the French Interpol branch in Lyon opened an office through which police and health experts would exchange information on possible attacks. Interpol also launched a training program for special police forces in 2006 that should prevent possible biological weapons attacks and from there point out that many countries in the world still do not have any legal legislation that would allow the authorities to control the transport of substances and biological agents from which biological weapons could be created. Such activities must be classified as crimes without prejudice to the development of science, but those who wish

to abuse scientific achievements must be prevented.

In 2010 UK Office for Security and Counter Terrorism in the Home Office has published the Strategy for Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism. Its objectives cover issues relating primarily to three of the key work streams: Pursue, Protect and Prepare:

1. Objective: stop terrorists from carrying out an attack (Pursue),
2. Objective: deny terrorist access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials (Protect),
3. Objective: respond promptly and effectively to a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack and recover as quickly as possible from its impact (Prepare).

According to the Strategy, significant progress has been made in developing capabilities to deal with terrorist-related incidents involving these kinds of materials but challenges remain. Given the complexity of the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat and its probable evolution we need a shared understanding of future objectives and priorities; we also need to create a broad community, in and outside Government, in every country in the world, to ensure those objectives can be met.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War contributed to a significant reduction in political and military tensions between the two largest military blocks that until then had extensively competed in the creation of all sophisticated weapons. But finishing their match did not mean the end of the creation of new types of weapons. Since that moment, more frequent regional, national and religious conflicts have started, which require a large amount of weapons. This situation, among other things, has affected the increased production, procurement and possession of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons in many countries.

The great progress in bacteriology and genetics offers great potential and benefits for medicine, but at the same time poses a danger to humanity. In order to achieve a goal or ideal of the terrorists, it is theirs whether people and members of the security forces will be killed or disabled, for them the priority is to be full and comprehensive, to cause fear, unrest and chaos. This does not require extensive destruction and the use of traditional explosives and so on. The new danger facing the world is bioterrorism. In terms of other types of armament, biological weapons have significant advantages because it is invisible to the naked eye, very quietly, its use does not contribute to material devastation, and in most cases the consequences are extremely deadly. Given its efficiency, it is absolutely unnecessary to produce, maintain, and store in large quantities biological agents, which makes them convenient, easier and more efficient for hiding.

Nowadays the possibility of biological weapons being used in open international conflicts is relatively small. However, the use of this weapon for terrorist purposes by individuals, religious sects, and extremist groups represents a real and growing danger. The risk of using biological agents as terrorist assets has increased dramatically because there are many institutional and non-institutional laboratories and in whose work there is no good insight and control by the

competent authorized and expert institutions of the system, the relatively easy production of many biological agents which is a privilege for terrorist entities, as well as free access to scientific information via the Internet and expert open literature.

It can be concluded that a new phase in the development of biological weapons begins, which will be recognizable by two characteristics: Abuses in the legal scientific research sector, in order to obtain large financial incomes, regardless of which would be misused the scientific capacities, and strengthening the defense capabilities against weapons of mass destruction, above all, of the great powers, for reasons that already have an image of the potential danger that they are lurking and their environment.

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INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE BALKANS

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Abstract:

The paper analyzes the complexities of the nexus between intercultural communication and sustainable peace agenda in the Balkans. In the first section, the article elaborates the theoretical aspects of this nexus, while the main focus of the second section is on the development and improvement of the effective communication and cooperation as tools for a sustainable peace in the Balkans. The article analyzes the Balkan intercultural communication development in past two decades as well as its barriers and challenges. On other hand, it elaborates the sustainable peace approach through the prism of initiatives based upon long-term developmental, political, economic, societal and social objectives. The basic premise is that an improved and effective intercultural communication will provide for easier achieving of these objectives.

Key words: Intercultural communication, sustainable peace, cooperation, the Balkans

Introduction

Intercultural tolerance may be the most difficult trial for any society, especially in the modern times. To accept issue we are unfamiliar with, something which deviates from our tradition, customs and habits, is indeed a challenge. If there is no tolerance, there will be no coexistence. In order to be able to understand devotees of other cultures, it is necessary to understand both their and one's own worldviews, especially if the main goal is living together.

Generally, cultural diversity creates both obstacles and opportunities for peaceful coexistence. Therefore, communication between people as well as between the states with different national cultures, or so-called intercultural communication, is the main instrument that enables their mutual connection, understanding, respect and functioning in the every-day life. Exactly these are the basic aspects of peacebuilding and sustainable peace process among peoples and the states. Intercultural communication shapes and is shaped by the beliefs we hold about the nature

and the prospect for peace in general. For instance, the skills of effective and ethical intercultural communication contribute substantially to peaceful outcomes across a variety of intercultural contexts, where divisive conflict and numbing indifference often prevail. It is especially important for regions (such as the Balkans) inhabited by people with different cultures. Moreover, having in mind that various forms of political, societal and economic instability and conflicts in the Balkans, especially in so-called Western Balkans, have made communication and cooperation impossible at the end of the 20th century. As a response to those circumstances various forms of regional initiatives were promoted in the past two decades in order to foster conciliation and rapprochement. Therefore, the paper analyzes the characteristics of these regional initiatives and their influence and relations with intercultural communication as well.

Theorizing about Intercultural Communication

Despite its increasingly common use in a range of diverse contexts, there is a lack of common understanding about the definition of intercultural communication. Hence, intercultural communication is usually conceptualized as communication between people with different national cultures, and many scholars limit it to face-to-face communication. Consequently, it could be seen as a type of intergroup communication which includes numerous and various types of communication that may not be included in the category of intercultural communication, such as: communication between members of different social classes, interracial/interethnic communication, etc.

Theoretically, there is no a universal definition on intercultural communication. Depending of the theoretical focus, one may identify a few theoretical approaches. These are generally based on objectivist and subjectivist view of intercultural communication. For instance, objectivists see a real world external to individuals, look for regularities in behavior and see communication as determined by situations and environments. Subjectivists, in contrast, contend that there is no real world external to individuals, try to understand individual communicators' perspectives, and view communication as a function of free will. Still, it should be noted that extreme objectivist or subjectivist perspectives are not defensible. They are both necessary for understanding intercultural communication.

Kincaid, a cultural convergence representative, defines communication as a process in which two or more individuals or groups share information in order to reach "a mutual understanding of each other and the world in which they live" (1988: 32). He summarizes the theory in several hypotheses, such as: 1) in relatively closed social system in which communication among members is unrestricted, the system as a whole will tend to converge over time toward a state of greater cultural uniformity; 2) the system will tend to diverge toward diversity when communication is restricted. On the other hand, Gudykunst (1993:33) assumes that individuals' communication is influenced by their cultures and group memberships, but they also can choose how they communicate when they are mindful. Additionally, he argues that there are basic causes of effective communication. Therefore, he contends that anxiety and uncertainty management

are the basic causes of effective communication and the effect of other variables (e.g. ability to empathize, attraction to strangers) on effective communication is mediated through anxiety and uncertainty management. The extent to which individuals are mindful of their behavior moderates the influence of their anxiety and uncertainty management on their communication effectiveness. Actually, this is the essential aspect of anxiety/uncertainty management theory.

According to Ellsworth (1983) all communication involves some degree of cultural variability. He suggests that explaining intercultural communication needs to start from interpersonal communication and cultural factors need to be incorporated as well. Starting from this point of view, he suggests several propositions that functionally adapting communication. Actually, first of all nonfunctional adaptive communication leads to invocation of cultural differences and slowing task completion. In other hand, using persuasive strategies leads to adapting communication, as well as when the situation favors one communicator or when one communicator has more power, than the other communicator has the burden to adapt. The more adaptive behavior in which communicators engage, the more their cultural beliefs will change.

Orbe (1998) tries to explain intercultural communication through the prism of co-cultural theory. He speaks about co-cultural communication which refers to interactions among underrepresented and dominant group members. He points out that co-cultural group members generally have one of three goals for their interactions with dominant group members: 1) assimilation (e.g. to become part of the mainstream culture), 2) accommodation (e.g. try to get the dominant group members to accept co-cultural group members), or 3) separation (e.g. rejecting the possibility of common bonds with dominant group members). Other factors that influence co-cultural group communication are: field of experience (e.g., past experiences); abilities (e.g., individuals' abilities to enact different practices); the situational context (e.g., where are they communicating with dominant group members); communication approach (i.e., being aggressive, assertive, or nonassertive).

Cupach and Imahori (1993: 113) have developed an identity management theory which is based in interpersonal communication competence. They view identity as providing "an interpretative frame for experience". Identities provide expectations for behavior and motivate individuals' behavior. Individuals have multiple identities, but Cupach and Imahori points out to cultural and relation identities as central to identity management. An interpersonal communication competence in their theoretical approach includes the ability of an individual for successfully negotiation and interaction in different environment identities. Moreover, they argue that because individuals often don't know much about others cultures, an intercultural dimension is being perceived by using stereotypes. Stereotyping, however, is not acceptable because it is based on externally imposed identities.

Intercultural Communication Competence

Intercultural communication competence is the ability to communicate effectively and appropriately in various cultural contexts. Actually, intercultural communication competence

involves knowledge, motivation and skills to interact effectively and appropriately with members of different cultures. The knowledge component includes what the people know about the culture that informs and guides their choices of what to think, say, and do in a particular situation. Listening to people who are different from us is a key component of developing self-knowledge. This may be uncomfortable, because we may realize that people think of our identities differently than we thought. Ignorance of a culture norms, rules, symbols and expressions can lead to missteps and misunderstandings. Therefore, a knowledgeable communicator needs information about the people, the communication rules, the context and the normative expectations governing the interaction with the member of other culture. Without this information the communicator will invariably make misattributions, choose incorrect communication strategies, and violate rules or etiquette as well. Furthermore, the unknowing communicator may not be able to correctly ascribe the reasons for the errors or be able to remedy them.

Motivation refers to the set of feelings, intentions, needs and drives associated with the anticipation of or actual engagement in intercultural communication. Factors such as anxiety, perceived social distance, attraction, ethnocentrism and prejudice can influence an individual's decision to communicate with another. Actually, if fears, dislikes and anxieties predominate people affect toward the other, then they will have negative motivation and they will be likely to avoid the interaction, even they have the requisite knowledge and skills to perform. In other hand, if people confidence, interests, likes and good intentions predominate the affect toward the other, they will have positive motivation and will seek out and engage in interaction with other. Moreover, members of dominant groups are often less motivated, intrinsically and extrinsically, toward intercultural communication than members of non-dominant groups, because they don't see the incentives for doing so. Having more power in communication encounters can create an unbalanced situation where the individual from the non-dominant group is expected to exhibit competence, or the ability to adapt to the communication behaviors and attitudes of the other. However, motivation alone cannot create intercultural communication competence.

Actually, knowledge and motivation are not enough for effective intercultural communication. Even the most informed and well-intentioned person needs certain skills to achieve high levels of intercultural communication competence. Some of the skills that are very important in developing intercultural communication competence, are: the ability to empathize, accumulate cultural information, listen and resolve conflict. Skills refer to the actual performance of the behaviors felt to be affective and appropriate in the communication context. For example, if a person accidentally produces a behavior that is perceived as competent, that wouldn't be adequate, because the person may not be able to replicate the same behavior with the same effect. No sensible discussion of communication competence is possible without considering these three components. These three components are equally applicative for official communication between different countries as well.

Regarding to the global values of intercultural interactions, this paper argues that peace is the fundamental human value. The use of peace applies not only to relationships among countries, but to the right of all people to live at peace with themselves and their surroundings. From

this fundamental value, Kale (1997: 450) developed four ethical principles to guide intercultural interactions:

- Ethical communicators address people of other cultures with the same respect that they would like to receive themselves. Intercultural communicators should not demean or belittle the cultural identity of others through verbal or nonverbal communication.
- Ethical communicators seek to describe the world as they perceive it as accurately as possible. What is perceived to be the truth may vary from one culture to another-truth is socially constructed. This principle means that ethical communicators do not deliberately mislead or deceive.
- Ethical communicators encourage people of other cultures to express themselves in their uniqueness. This principle respects the right of people to expression regardless of how popular or unpopular their ideas may be.
- Ethical communicators strive for identification with people of other cultures. Intercultural communicators should emphasize the commonalities of cultural beliefs and values rather than their differences.

These ethical principles emphasize the complexity of the intercultural communication process. Therefore, developing ethical principles for guiding intercultural interactions is a difficult task and these principles might be more acceptable in some cultures than in others. Ethical communication is fundamental to responsible thinking, decision making and the development relationships and communities within and across contexts and cultures. Moreover, ethical communication enhances human worth and dignity by fostering truthfulness, fairness, responsibility, personal integrity and respect for self and others. Therefore, people and states as well, should fostering and enhancing intercultural ethical communication.

Sustainable Peace Approach

In peacebuilding literature, there are two basic categories of peace: positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace simply means that there is no overt expression of large-scale physical violence (Galtung, 1969). Negative peace relies on the threat of or potential for violence; expressed in western societies at the hands of the state in the police, national guards, and criminal justice system. Whereas positive peace refers to the conditions chosen by people, in relationship with one another, at any level in society from local to national, who are actively working together to generate conditions of peacefulness. It is more than just the absence of violence but the intentional creation of conditions of peace and well-being for the whole group.

The objective for positive peace is to resolve deeply rooted causes of conflict so that conditions for violent conflict are removed or resolved (Sandole, 2003). Actually the establishment of a strong, long-term, durable, positive peace requires the cooperation of number of stakeholders attending to a wide range of variables on a number of levels, depending on how complex or entrenched the conflict situation is or might become.

Sustainable peace is where the values of positive peace are featured which necessitate finding different solutions to conflict than ones which are found in structures of pacification, or negative peace. Sustainable, positive peace does not use violence in any form – whether structural, cultural, economic, legal or physical – to resolve conflict. Expressions of violence, although they may halt a particular instance of conflict and restore the semblance of order, affect the ongoing quality of a relationship between different parties.

If no violence is used in the handling of a particular instance of conflict, the quality of the relationship between the parties may in fact improve through processes of conflict transformation where both parties learn to view one another and the contested issue or item in a different light. In this transformational space, new solutions can be devised between the parties which have a greater likelihood of benefitting all concerned. Actually, non-violent conflict transformation is a durable solution that contributes to sustainable peace.

In general, it could be noted that the most important steps towards a sustainable peace are those which foster and strengthen local and national capacity for dealing with the past, engaging with the present, and shaping the future in ways which don't exclude, oppress, or divide. Therefore, creating the conditions for sustainable peace means deconstructing structures, situations and relationships that cause conflict while building structures, situations and relationships that support peace.

Sustainable peace frames the development of constructive personal, group, and political relationships across ethnic, religious, class, national, and racial boundaries. It aims to resolve injustice in nonviolent ways and to transform the structural conditions that generate deadly conflict. Therefore, sustainable peace becomes strategic when it works over the long run and at all levels of society or region to establish and sustain relationships among people locally, regionally and globally. Sustainable peace connects people and groups "on the ground" (community and religious groups, grassroots organizations, etc.) with policymakers and powerbrokers (governments, the United Nations, corporations, banks, etc.). It aims not only to resolve conflicts, but to build societies, institutions, policies, and relationships that are more able to sustain peace and justice. Therefore, sustainable peace address issues of human rights, economic prosperity and environmental sustainability as well as violence.

Nexus between Intercultural Communication and Sustainable Peace

Starting from the hypothesis that intercultural communication can build more productive and peaceful communities, this paper argues that any communication between people as well as among the countries of different cultures is better than no communication between them. As mentioned above, sustainable peace approach is multilayered and wide in scope, encompassing work at all levels of society, from international and regional partnerships to personal friendships.

Interactions with people of other cultures offer opportunities along to road to more peaceful communities. Actually intercultural communication competence gives the needed tools for building bridges over the cultural divides. According to Allport (1954), interracial contact does

not automatically or always reduce prejudice, but will under four conditions: 1) equal status among group members; 2) group members working toward a common goal; 3) cooperative interaction among group members; and 4) clear institutional forms of support for intergroup contact. Although his work concentrated initially on race relations, intergroup contact theory has widened over the years to include prejudice based on ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality and even professional associations. It is no doubt that in all of these sphere, his conditions are identified as necessary instead to enhance the positive effects of contact on prejudice.

Actually, one way that contact reduces prejudice is by increasing knowledge about other cultural groups. The more people interact with persons from of other cultures, they will more learn about them as representatives of various cultural groups. This knowledge includes ways in which other cultures are similar to and different from people own culture, making it possible to find a common ground while also appreciating cultural differences. Another way that contact reduces prejudice is by facilitating empathy and perspective taking. Intergroup contact, especially when it fosters close personal relationships, makes easier taking and understanding perspective of outgroup members, share their emotional experiences and empathize with their concerns, thereby improving intergroup attitudes.

It should also be noted that our contact with people from other cultures equips us with greater knowledge, empathy and perspective taking and makes us fell less threatened and anxious about our intercultural communication. On other hand, as mentioned above, sustainable peace could be perceived as an effort for constructing new living conditions. In that context, peacebuilding includes taking concrete measures and cooperative projects that link two or more countries with the final goal of achieving their economic and social development as well as increasing mutual trust as the basis peace component. Therefore, intercultural communication is the main instrument that provides connection between different people and countries.

Intercultural Communication, Cooperation and Sustainable Peace in the Balkans

The Balkan Peninsula is a place where different cultures and religions meet: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Interestingly, despite the fact that all these cultures and religions are essentially similar to one another, being derived from a common ancient basis in Judaism and all preaching peace as an ideal, the Balkans have always been considered among the most conflicting regions in the world.

Various forms of political, societal and economic instability and conflicts in the Balkans, have made communication and cooperation impossible since the end of the 20th century. As a response to those circumstances various forms of regional initiatives were promoted in the past two decades in order to foster conciliation and rapprochement. From this point of view, the regional communication and cooperation in the Balkans could be analyzed from two points of view.

First, in the last two decades, the regional cooperation and communication as well, has been mainly initiated by the International community. Actually, in spite of the numerous problems that are part of the historical "baggage" of the region, the promise of EU accession, has had a

transformative effect and has stimulated the beginning of the regional recovery and stabilization. Hence a major factor affecting all communications in the Balkans region is the EU integration process, which is currently perceived as the future settlement in a space where administrative and political divisions are no more significant neither have substantial influence, above all communications and exchanges give a totally different meaning to all differences including the cultural aspect. This means that intercultural dialogue in the Balkans is the logical consequence of the reflection about European integration. Actually, EU is perceived as a leading promoter of intercultural dialogue, by involving governments and civil society actors as well as by ensuring that human rights are accorded a central place, in the building of a new and inclusive Balkan region.

Second, the objective of regional cooperation has been aimed at establishing mutual trust, as well as at rebuilding relations in previous un-security region. As mentioned above, a mutual trust is exactly one of the main goal of intercultural communication. Therefore, it can be perceived as an instrument for reducing or eliminating the possibilities of violence resurgence as well as an instrument for producing development and prosperity conditions in the region. Actually, this aspect draws the link among communication and sustainable peace in the Balkans. The impact of communication and sustainable peace can be analyzed through the prism of two components: 1) the number of cooperation initiatives and states participating in them, and 2) the realization level of initiative objectives. The first one illustrates how Balkans countries is being prepared for communication and cooperation, while the second one, illustrates their real commitment about communication and cooperation. Related to this, it can be pointed out that almost all initiatives for regional cooperation have been signed and accepted by all countries in the Balkans. This is significant because it expresses a clear intention and readiness of countries for common action in the context of peaceful resolution of outstanding issues as well as in the context of ensuring a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.

Regarding to the second component - the objectives of regional cooperation initiatives - it should be noted that all previous initiatives have been aimed at promoting regional communication and cooperation as a factor for regional peace, security, stability and prosperity. From today's perspective, it is undoubted that these initiatives have had a significant contribution in the strengthening of mutual trust and thus in the strengthening of regional peace and stability. Actually, all of them have initiated a new, positive social behavior in the region.

The positive impact in the political sphere is based on renewed and enhanced political dialogue as well as on the strengthening of mutual trust, mutual understanding and convergence among the Balkan countries. Hence, in terms of sustainable peace, declarations of good neighborly relations, cooperation, peace and stability adopted by separate initiatives, have crucial importance. Such are: Sofia Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans (1996); the Charter of Good Neighbourly Relations in South-Eastern Europe (2000); the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe (2000); Declaration on Intercultural dialogue and conflict prevention (2003). Moreover, communication

and cooperation in the political sphere based on respecting the established principles by the UN Charter, the Helsinki Document and the Paris Charter for a New Europe, is also an important component that positively affects peacebuilding and sustainable peace in the Balkans.

On other hand, intercultural communication also takes place through the educations, building of roads, opening of markets, and the creation of physical spaces etc. Therefore, in the economic sphere, communication and cooperation in Balkans has been based on economic regeneration as well as on the creation of conditions for its prosperity and development. Actually, the activities in the economic sphere were directly aimed at promoting economic growth, attracting investment and establishing acceptable welfare level in the region. Obviously, these goals could be related to the objectives of sustainable peace. There is no doubt that economic growth and maintaining an acceptable welfare level will positively affect the regional peace and stability.

There is no doubt that this interconnection trend among the Balkans countries should continue in the future, moreover because of:

- objective depending and direction of neighbors to each other, especially considering the relative narrowness of national markets;
- a need for better use of one or more shared resources which is in correlation with reducing of the economic incoherence of the region;
- a need for a common response to the contemporary security risks and threats;
- existence of positive examples related to the regionalism effects in many European regions, such as: Nordic, Benelux, Baltic regions.

Generally, it could be noted that political initiatives for regional cooperation have main influence in developing and fostering intercultural communication in the Balkans in past two decades. These initiatives have promoted strengthening of mutual trust and mutual understanding among the Balkan countries. Still this is so-called top-down approach. Therefore, the Balkan countries must stay more focused on the civil society initiatives in the next period. The representatives of academic, business, sport and cultural sphere, should have a crucial role in intercultural communication development and enhancement. Mutual learning and mutual trust are of vital importance to Balkans future. Therefore, the need for education promoting intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity and human dignity is crucial.

Conclusion

Intercultural communication involves the exchange of meaningful messages between individuals of different cultural groups. Having in mind the new security risks and threats which usually involves and cultural aspects, especially in multicultural regions such is Balkans, there is no dilemma that intercultural dialogue could has a vital role in securing global and regional peace as well. Actually, this dialogue can defuse tensions and keep situations from escalating. It can also promote reconciliation in the aftermath of conflict. Almost all of major theories of intercultural communication emphasize its power to use communication to bring together the different.

Intercultural communication could be perceived as a particular process that occurs between a groups of people and state as well, which are talking together, communicating to understand each other and developing mutual respect on which community can be built, sustained or repaired.

The article argues that intercultural communication has had a positive impact on peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans in the past two decades. More precisely, an intensive communication as well as cooperation in various fields has produced a particular political energy that is aimed more towards mutual respect and integration of the region. Still, the intercultural communications in the Balkans has dominant (external) political impact. Therefore, it couldn't be talk about authentic intercultural dialogue in the Balkans today. The Balkan countries should be more focused on civil society dimension of intercultural communication in the next period. They also should continue to combine their efforts on building and promoting a new identity and image of a region that, is (slowly) on its way to becoming an area of stability and peace.

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THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ART OF WARFARE AND CONDUCTING MILITARY ACTIONS: THE WARS OF THE FUTURE

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Abstract:

The civilizational developments has had its effect on the development of the military science that has always aimed to develop technology that would enable supremacy and easier winning. On one hand, it has evidently changed the way and tactics of conducting war, while on the other, it has erased the once clearly set boundary of the frontline. Wars are more often conducted in urban centres where the size of military power is not the factor of domination, but the availability of modern technology and superior equipment and weapons. Every revolutionary discovery in science has almost always found its use in the military sphere, which has significantly contributed to the change of warfare. Concerning the preparation, i.e. use of combat strategies and tactics, today's multidisciplinary character of warfare understands besides directly involved parties inclusion of one or more indirect participants that usually favour one of the parties in the conflict. Cyber warfare is especially characteristic and is used in preparation phase, a started or an already ended conflict. As a result, the international community, and the UN in particular, has a problem to regulate conflicts that are out of the framework of the generally acknowledged international (Geneva) conventions of warfare. The wars of the future is likely to include less people and more technology; thus this paper argues that the traditional warfare will become obsolete. Superior participants in the conflict will be the ones with technologically advanced devices and systems, as well as educated and trained personnel for their management and operation.

Key words: technology, cyber warfare, weapons, strategy, armed forces

Introduction

There is no period in the human history that is not marked by warfare. The first recorded and fragmentary described war, was going on four thousand five hundred years ago in Mesopotamia (now Iraq) between the armies of the city-states Lagash and Uma (Grant; R.G. 2015, 20). It is well

known that the war and the use of weapons have always been, still are, and will be destructive - but it is also true that the end of every war has meant progression of human civilization both culturally and technologically. Certainly, not claiming that this is an absolute causality, one could say that the war and warfare have always given a specific contribution to the development of science and humanity. Actually, until gunpowder was discovered, main factors in creating military strategy were the size, motivation, art of warfare and strengths of the troops along with the meteorological and geographical features of the land. Moreover, emergence and development of the firearms had a drastic impact which changed the approach and strategy of warfare. Hence, it redefined the nature of the hostilities. Certainly, this process has not changed the conditions on the battlefield, but as the warfare became expensive, the impact extended to areas such as politics, economy, science and medicine.

Maybe from today's prospective it doesn't seem so, but technological achievements are mostly due to the innovative solutions for better efficiency in combat actions. In fact, a significant number of technologies created and implemented within the military, have later found a more appropriate application in the civilian sector. In addition, the world as we know it is largely a product of the wars that took place all over the globe. Demographic changes, birth and the death of nations and states, civilization progress, discovering new worlds, including globalization, have a proper, direct or indirect, connection with the wars and warfare. Also, if considering the race for armaments and investing in development of new weapons, combat means and systems, one can conclude that the development of military technology directly stimulates construction of infrastructure facilities, stock exchanges, trade and the development of the monetary economy.

That is, if one can say, the good side of the war. The bad one certainly stems from the very nature of the warfare and the unaccountability of human behaviour in conditions that cannot be foreseen but are main features of warfare. The martial art is based on exercising decisions aimed at neutralizing enemy's strategy, to the extent as to prevent its tactical actions. In fact, combat actions have always had a destructive impact not as much on the nature, but more on what is called culture and civilization of the mankind. In addition, development of the technology and modernization of the military technology is also increasing the negative effects of the war. Hence, the morbid historical examples of genocide, mass murders, the Holocaust and the use of newly developed technologies for military purposes, like the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Moreover, one can say that technologies developed for strictly scientific purposes was later easily integrated into the armies of the powerful states for military objectives. Such processes were characteristic during the Cold War, when first conflicts to conquer the space began. This certainly has impact on the development of armaments, but also the development of technology for fast military transport and improvement of their communication and navigation means.

From this point of view, one can say that the strive for victory on the battlefield, has significantly prompted innovation efforts to design new types of weapons, and to a certain respect influenced the achievement of scientific and sociological benefits. From historical point of view,

and strategic military aspect in only one century it evolved from frontal fight during World War II into supremacy warfare for the space and the virtual cyberspace.

The Impact of Technology over the Art of Warfare and Combat Actions

Since the very beginning, warring parties have always aspired to create weapons in order to defeat the opponent. Such a trend is still present. So, in parallel with the development of the world, new weapons are being developed whose use implied change of strategies for use of armies. As an example, one can mention the emergence of artillery, risen from the need to overcome the walls of the well-established cities that was not possible to be conquered just by pushing the infantry. Emergence of long range cannons has reduced the need for bulky horsemen and infantry combat troops, enabling losses among the enemy from a safe distance. The best example is the siege of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmed II, where the use of long range cannons destroyed until then unconquerable walls. After that, the city was conquered. By efficiency improvement and first of all due to the strategy of Napoleon Bonaparte who discerned the role of the artillery in an attack and stressed the need for its mobility and change of tactical operations. So, instead of the previously imposed strategy, artillery to be in support and protection of the infantry they started introducing engagement of infantry units in protection to the artillery batteries (McLynn 2009, 283). Finally, by recognizing the artillery power on the battlefield during World War II, military strategists have initiated the need for mobilizing large cannons, for their own deployment from one position to another. That, combined with the development of the automobile industry resulted in the development of tanks and self-propelled howitzers, which contributed to the significant dynamics of the combat actions on a wider front.

Despite the size and equipment of the army, the navy has always played a key role in developing military strategies during a military conquest. The siege of Tire in 332 BC by Alexander III of Macedonia is just one example. Had not been able to conquer the city because of the size and equipment of the fleet of Tire, Alexander built a causeway so that the phalanx could conquer the city by land. However, considering that even after a seven-month siege, conquering the city was impossible until Thirsk ships rule the sea, he engages eighty Phoenician, 120 Cyprus and numerous ships of the Macedonian fleet, after which, over a month, suffering unexpected losses he manages to conquer the city (Komesarović 2016, 5-8).

Substantial conquests and contacts between civilizations until early XX century took place by sea. Then, military naval troops had a key role. From that period until the travels of Marco Polo, the discovery of the American continent by Christopher Columbus in 1492, the sinking of the Spanish Armada by the English Royal fleet in XVI century, the decisive role of the Navy in the Civil War in the United States, the emergence of submarines and their importance in World war II, nuclear tensions in the Bay of pigs in Cuba and today's strategic deployments in the world's waters, the Navy has an essential role in the progress and implementation of combat plans and actions. Today's global situation imposes the need for global navies (of course, this is all about

military predominant superpowers like the US and Russia, but also countries such Australia, UK and Japan, whose defence largely depends on the strength and ability of the Navy), ready to meet the need, as the rapid deployment of combat potential to all destinations related to the world's oceans, but also for enabling free trade traffic, as it was the involvement of part of the Navy and some of the EU Member States, to provide security to the Gulf of Aden.

The construction of the first aircraft by which in 1903, the Wright brothers managed to fly, announced the revolution of innovation that followed. Military strategists immediately saw the advantage not only to act against the enemy and its installations, but also to monitor and gather information on the movements and formations from a safe distance. During World War I the process of the massive use of aircraft began. The success of armies increasingly becomes dependent not only on the rule on the ground, but by the rule of the airspace. Hence, again there was a change in the strategic planning of military operations and their tactical implementation, because the combat power of the warring parties and the battles fought in the geographical territory, mostly depended on the ability to control the sky above. Since the beginning of World War II onwards, and especially after the attack on Pearl Harbour by Japanese Air Force in 1941, the air force totally changed the approach to the warfare. Moreover, it is due to the fact that the aviation and navy are increasingly acting as a common component. At the same time, the need for rapid deployment of troops for their deployment from one place to another, imposed the need to find solutions for simple and secure solution in that respect, which resulted in modelling aircrafts able to take off and land on aircraft carriers, and the significantly shorter runs than usual. Thus, combat strategy of the commanders of the armies of the great powers, was a complex operation that involved planning and preparation of operations for the action of all three types of army. Nowadays, however, there is a massive use of combat aircrafts of various types that are not only for military purposes but also in addition to the civilian structures during natural or other disasters of large scale (mainly for rescue and evacuation of people and material goods).

Finally, the successful management and command to enable coordinated and synchronized actions of military units at the front, would not be possible without quick and timely transmission of commanding strategic thinking. Invention of the telegraph in the middle of XIX century, not only completely transformed the overall relations in the world, but, like many other technological breakthroughs before, it was immediately accepted, applied and developed in the military sphere. Unsteadiness, but above all, delays and uncertainties of the signal and courier relationship was often one of the main reasons for failure in strategic manoeuvres. Therefore, telegraph and telephone lines were immediately accepted and incorporated in the managerial-command system. With the advancement of technology, improvement has also been achieved in the means for operational and technical communications in combat actions, to such extent that without these means fighting a wider front cannot generally be imagined. The best example for this has been the capturing and decoding of the communications system of the Wehrmacht called "Enigma". It helped in decoding the intercepted messages, thus in creating the strategy of the Allied forces to counter the enemy. Today, the modern systems for satellite communication and positioning are the basis for successful warfare and conducting operations. This is confirmed

by the fact that in the modern warfare, initiated by the application of NATO's military campaign in the FRY, aims to destroy or disable the static satellite-antenna systems and the stationary communication facilities by which the enemy to a great extent is disabled to coordinate the combat actions.

Briefly, neither command can be successful without quality nor timely means for communication, nor communications can be successful without effective command. In fact, it is the area of communications that is the battleground of today, to which the military and political authorities devote extreme attention.

Media Technology at a Battlefield

Communication as the process of sending and receiving messages between people, is an exchange of information. Information, when accurate and timely, is the foundation of success on the battlefield. As defined by the American sociologist Harold D. Lasswell, the act of communication is responding to the five questions: who says, what tells, in which channel, to whom and with what effect. But, the questions should in sequence agree with the following five aspects: communicator, message, medium, receiver and accomplished effects. Simply, communication is the most important single factor that has a strong impact on the people and their relationship with the environment. In this case communication is reviewed in terms of its importance in the warfare, because communication is actually the weapons of today.

Every spoken word of the political leaders may start or stops hostilities because modern wars are transmitted in live through the media. Even worse, depending on the strategy, the media share the truth that strictly targets specific audience. Then it is extremely difficult to determine the difference between the real information and manipulation that is often used as a strategy in this kind of warfare. The simple method of communication between a small numbers of subjects is a history. The development of technology and the Internet, as well as opportunities imposed by the globalization opened up space in the process for simultaneous participation of extremely large number of subjects. It transferred primacy of the verbal and written communication to video and digital form.

In times of war, especially at the front line, the information transferred/transmitted by the media, may be a key strategy for the success of combat actions, especially in terms of motivating the public to support any of the parties involved in the war. Example for this is the start of the 2003 military campaign in Iraq, and the latest 59 strategic missiles launched on Syria, in April 2017, by the US armed forces. Certainly, it is incomparable to the military engagement of the US military action in Syria. But in both cases, media reports on the production of nuclear weapons or use of chemical weapon used as trigger to carry out military operations. With no claims of favouritism or refutation of justification for attacks based on media transmitted information, it is important to know that this is not the first time to use or abuse the undeniable power of media to transform the events in a form suitable for justifying the warring parties.

At the same time, media serves as a weapon to intimidate and deter the enemy. Most recent example of the human history of wars is the combat activity of the irregular units of the so called Islamic state. They extensively used the media to show brutal scenes of executions, killings and demolition, with the sole purpose to intimidate and demoralize potential opponents. This approach falls into the area of special war which, with today's level of technology, ensures absolute availability to every individual on the planet. However, it is difficult to make the necessary difference in what is information and what is misinformation in times of war.

These examples clearly show how communication can cause but also affect the combat actions. What is particularly characteristic is the fact that despite their basic function, media have the potential to cause negative safety impact not only on the military but also the civilian sector, the difference being that the civil sector has significantly less ability for protection. Military sector has sufficient historical experience for implementation of a successful strategy for protection of this type of war because regardless of the method of communication, army has always had extensive intelligence activities and wide-scale-use of electronics from its very appearance to date. On the other hand, traditional army with encryption, disrupting radar and electronic surveillance, are not synonymous for today's way of using the means of global communication. A major reason for that is the cyberspace, which can not be penetrated with the listed assets. It requires use of brand new technologies and combined intensive surveillance of the military along with the civilian structures. The main difference is in the context and the objective since the global electronic connectivity exposes to threat security of overall civilian infrastructure (Tafoya 2011), which is the subject of protection of the army.

Technology as a Main Weapon to Conquer Cyberspace

In today's digital era, the issue of cyber security is not an issue which concerns only computer scientists. Cyber security has become an essential issue that touches both fields such as business, politics and the army, and every citizen individually. Current level of information and communications technology opens up a whole new space whose conquest commenced the battle that becomes a real war without disturbing territorial integrity and physical security and defence potential of the country. Actually, it is cyberspace and the war being waged for dominance and is developed with the same dynamic with the technology. In this war it is possible to carry out activities which threaten national security, where such activities will be fully independent of territory and extensiveness of physical security resources of the state.

But first things first. Disclosure of "Wikileaks" affair revealed in late 2006 is often considered as the beginning of the cyber war. Since then, Internet had been a field of operations in which war for supremacy in cyberspace erupted later. Opening salvo in the broad front of the cyber war was "fired" by "STIKSET" – the worm virus that acted with a crippling attack in the cyberspace. This level of development of actions was early anticipated by the military and political authorities in developed countries. Seeing the threats of the virtual that can easily move into the real world, substantial resources to defending national cyberspace were invested. Consequently, military

commands of developed countries formed units and command centres for cyber and information space (such military structures, alongside the United States and Russia are also introduced by other countries among which prominent members of NATO, such as for example the German Bundeswehr) In fact, fuelled by escalating cyber-attacks and understanding the real threat of virtual front the NATO command indicated that it changes the focus of the traditional defence warfare to warfare in cyberspace even in 2010. Earlier, the Alliance in 2006 proposed and in 2008 established a joint defence center against cyber threats (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence-NCCDCE) which became fully operational in 2010. Seriousness of the approach to military actions of the Alliance is shown by the fact that the mentioned centre, not only has established cooperation with the military cyber units of the Member States but also with all partner armies and institutions. Moreover, they have incorporated this new military segment (as in the the Defense Institute of Sweden).

It is worth mentioning that these military structures, because of their nature and goals, are introduced as separate kind of branches, such as the army, navy or air force. To clarify the engagements of these forces one must point out that their main task is defence of the military software systems from cyber-attacks, but also monitoring of threats and assessment of opportunities of potential attacks against total national capacities.

Among other things, the new army trend indicates that from the real front in the theatre, armed forces are regrouping and deploying to one relatively unknown and undiscovered virtual space where it is really hard to predict enemy's strategy, based on which to create offensive and defensive tactical actions. It confirms the statement of US General Michael Hayden, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, who said that it is not entirely clear what strategy to choose, for reasons that, in the long term, there is not a clear picture about the legal and political implications of the decisions to fight in cyberspace (Singer and Friedman 2014, 4). This conclusion is due to the fact that cyber-attacks are unpredictable and it is difficult to define real target of the attack. Such targets can be important civilian institutions and facilities, like airports or national treasury of one country but also capacities closely related to defense such as plants for the production of ammunition, weapons and military equipment. An additional problem is the thin line between the cyber war and cybercrime. Finally, one of the key disadvantages of the new, viral front is that the number of enemy does not play any role, but it is the technological equipment and the ability to control the conduct of the conflict. Also, the problem is the virtual space with still uncertain boundaries for action. In fact, the potential of cybercrime is transformed into potential cyber warfare. The established methods of virtual crime are basis for new strategies for warfare in the cyberspace. Good side of this war is that it takes place without apparent casualties and destruction, because the ultimate goal is to block, impair or destroy the enemy information systems through controlled missile, navigation and communication systems of the enemy.

Finally, before the start of any war, cyber warfare intelligence (spy) activities are also taking place. Later, after the war has already begun, they intensify which depends on the developments on the battlefield. Hence, the advantage for the timely collection of high-quality and reliable

information about the enemy, goes to the party that invests in the development of new technology and trains personnel who will operate it. Ultimate goal like in the warfare in the real space and time, is achieving supremacy in terms of the enemy or the potential enemy.

Given that cyber warfare is already a reality followed by rapid technological development, objectively, the question related to what will be the next level of confrontation, or even more, whether it would be possible to determine the limits of the combat zone comes to the fore. Certainly, that the response cannot give an accurate projection of the development and size of future actions. However, it is an assumed fact that at this front, the armies will attack the opposing installations from its territory in an attempt to influence the policy, the important political and economic results and certainly, the military power of the opponent, which will be their target.

This possibility, combined with media and their great power to create public opinion, are the advantages of cyber warfare because without specific engagement of the armed forces, by spending a relatively low financial resources, and in particular, for at this point, theoretical opportunities for victims and destruction, desired goals that preceded the war can be better achieved. Preparations for the supremacy of cyber Front have already started. It is confirmed by the international cyber defense exercise organized by the NATO Center of Defense Against Cyber Attacks (NCCDCE) which in the month of April 2017 was held in Tallinn, Estonia, where the headquarters of centre are located. The importance of investing in new technology and personnel for successful cyber warfare, confirms the engagements of the 25 states and their active participation in the above mentioned exercise, but also the countries that finance and sponsor this project, including the US, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece Czech Republic, Slovakia, Turkey, United Kingdom and other as well as Sweden, which is not a resident member of the NATO alliance.

Finally, research in the field of nano-technology, which has already been successfully implemented by the Israeli armed forces leads to the conclusion that war and its practice may take a completely new dimension that will extend the so far acquired and applied military knowledge and skills. This technology allows producing devices with micro size, extremely difficult to detect. If considering that the fundamentals of the military doctrine have available information about the enemy, in order to discern and discover enemy's intentions, it becomes clear that introducing nano technology, combined with the total computerization and digitization, fundamentally changes the military strategy as we know it today.

What Can be Expected?

So far the progress in technology development clearly indicates the impact of technology on the development of new military skills and the manner of conducting combat actions. In addition, it is more than clear that there is a need for reform of the armed forces and their equipping and training for the period ahead. Of course, it should be clear that the army was, is and will remain the basic political entity for the implementation of a policy, i.e. as emphasized by von Clausewitz, the war is continuation of politics by other means or by other means. For enforcement of this policy, there should be specially formatted institutional entity such as the military. As such, "military

should be well organized, politically and socially conscious ethnicity that along with other social groups is a social actor in the political arena. It is trained for a possible use of force when the need arises to protect the nation from external aggression or internal violence (Vankovska 1995, 49-50). In fact, advances in technology will certainly not lead to a situation of war to be led from offices and with the use of keyboards, but as years ago, it will require use of brutal force for the specific realization of political intentions. After all, evidence in itself is the conquest of the Crimea by Russia, military campaigns of the US and NATO in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere, which are still current military situation in Syria.

Hence, the launch of the so called hybrid wars, which requires planning and setting a new strategic approach to warfare, positions the army and its command structures as one of the primary entity in demonstrating the power of the state. This in turn implies greater involvement of civilian structures in the implementation of strategic-tactical operations. And that is so, because hostilities are increasingly taking place through indirect contact, such as retrieving information, using satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones – for the time being are not considered military targets or attacking assets) for collecting data classified as IMINT, greater use of intelligent military equipment (using guided missiles from a safe distance to targets located by using satellite) instead of sending ground troops, performing foray into political and diplomatic communication or blocking it and so on. This kind of warfare was rated as successful during the so-called Arab spring and later in Ukraine.

Although there is still no exact definition of the modern way of warfare, there is a general assessment of the modern warfare as a multidimensional phenomenon which includes a wide range of activities and actions, directly or indirectly targeted against the enemy. Stated range of activities and actions includes conducting political-economic and media warfare, use of legal but much greater use of illegal methods to gather information on the overall situation on the enemy side and finally performing classic military operation in accordance with the strategic goal, which depending on its successful implementation, can pass without sending ground troops to the enemy territory.

It will not be exaggerated if we say that the development of military means and weapons have influenced the development of human civilization despite all the inhuman load of the wars. Certainly, this is not a justification for war and devastation it brings with it, but it is a fact that research and innovation to reach weapons and equipment to gain advantage at the front, are making a significant contribution not only to change the physiognomy of the war, but also to change the overall human development, nature and the environment in which it exists. In fact, since the invention of gunpowder and its use for military purposes, the mode of warfare has constantly been changing. Changing the mode of warfare is taking place in all spheres. Introduction of guns, tanks and use of missile systems that have significantly changed military strategy employed on the grounds have got a new shape after the appearance of aerial drones and submarines. Encompassing all perspectives, military strategy finally improved with the new dimension imposed by the motives of the great powers to conquer the cosmos, and the opening of the virtual space.

Hence, it is much certain that the laboratories for innovation technology and weapons that will be used in the future, will further strengthen its influence on the development of military skills and warfare as a final political act. Given the infinity the science seeks, the frames of the future fronts will be easier to be set with more precision. However, real running hostilities in years to come will not accurately be perceived, even less the development of the art of warfare in the increasingly expanding space. Finally, with the development of robotics, programming and creating artificial intelligence, conduct of future wars without direct participation of the people in the battles becomes a realistic possibility.

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PERSPECTIVES OF POST-CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT AS AN ESSENTIAL MECHANISM FOR GLOBAL PEACE

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Abstract:

The post-conflict engagement to secure stable and lasting peace is not a new concept, as historically the hostilities almost never ceased with the end of the war. However, the changing role of international community, the development of human rights, international laws, enhanced by the effects of globalization changed the nature of post-conflict engagement. Today we witness tremendous efforts from the international community to build, sustain, and sometimes even enforce peace throughout the world. There is a growing trend of international responsibility for global security, which initiated the concept of the global response to prevent escalation of violence in the war-torn societies. The post-conflict operations are becoming a doctrinal trend and the future mechanism to guarantee regional and global stability. Their essence is to tackle the roots of the conflict, not its symptoms. If properly applied, such tool is essential for ensuring global reconciliation and stable world peace. Being far from unmistakable in their decisions and actions, the Western democracies have so far demonstrated leadership in pursuing the idea of global peace through post-conflict engagement.

Keywords: war, post-conflict, international community, intervention, peace enforcement.

Introduction

Many historical examples have proven that achieving military objectives does not necessarily mean achieving a political end state. In the 19th century, Carl von Clausewitz defined war as a continuation of politics by other means, which is still a relevant notion in the contemporary global battlefield. Even when the military actions are finished, the politics never stops (Jackson, 2013:96), and the military power remains to embody the latent danger for enforcing policies with deliberate violent means.

The concept of post-conflict operations is directly linked to causality between war and politics because they take place in the transition period in the conflict aftermath when there is a significant shift in choosing the types of ways and means necessary to achieve the ends. When the

politics exhausts all efforts to achieve the desired ends peacefully, policymakers may decide to apply a military force that will use armed violence to impose the will on the opponent (Clausewitz, 1976:75). Once the opponent submits to the will of the initiating force, the politics again will take over and proceed with other, nonviolent ways and means.

However, it is a historical fact that the end of the war rarely means permanent termination of hostilities (Pillar, 1983:30-39). After the end of the war is declared, the conflict enters the post-conflict phase in which political ways and means take over. The role of the military force is to remain vigilant and ready to use violence if required, in order to secure the implementation of post-war policies. Today, the post-conflict operations have become a trend of modern warfare and a tool for securing permanent regional and global peace.

The roots of violence are usually the globalization forces and the new demands of the economic liberalization, not ethnicity and religion. The weakening of the financial and political capabilities of the fragile states is the cause of social crises and the imbalance of the ethnically heterogeneous societies that have previously been relatively stable (Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998). This makes the shift of power to be perceived as ethnic or religious discrimination. In post-conflict management and transition in peace, it is necessary to apply appropriate security policies not only to restore society in a normal course but also to prevent a further escalation. This is why the core of post-conflict operations is strengthening institutions as pillars of the society. Providing security, social and economic essentials for the population are crucial to achieving lasting peace.

Historical Overview of the Concept

Some forms of post-conflict engagements could be traced deep into military history, probably because of guerrilla warfare. Unlike the conventional conflicts in which the war would have ended after one or several decisive battles, in the conflicts where insurgencies were involved, the hostilities rarely ended permanently. In many cases, peace was unstable and the use of military force was necessary to prevent rebellions. For example, most of the time inside the borders of the Roman Empire there was some sort of post-conflict operations to maintain the peace. Except during the period known as *Pax Romana*, the people in the conquered territories continued to resist. For centuries, the Roman military was constantly engaged in suppressing rebellions and control of the population. Similar to this, the European colonial powers constantly had to quell rebel movements during the colonial period because uprising and rebellions almost never stopped (Adolf, 2009:143-150). This is the main argument why larger countries in particular, have more experience in post-conflict engagements. It was acquired for centuries throughout many regions around the world and it is deeply embedded in their military culture.

This means that the use of military force or the threat of using the military force, once the war is over, is not a new concept (Rotermund, 1999:1-6). The novelty today comes from the structure of modern society, international law, human rights and the civilized achievements in general, where there is a much greater responsibility of the states for the global security. Today's post-conflict operations have completely different character as they aim at peace enforcement

with minimal necessary force, and they are primarily designed to apply a wide range of non-violent means and methods (Marten, 2004:61).

The first time when a genuine collective responsibility was applied in the international relations was after the Second World War. Although Germany was defeated in the First World War, its aggressive policies resurrected for a reason. The conditions under which Germany was punished with the Treaty of Versailles triggered the German nationalism and fascism (Bendersky, 2007:33). Germany was cornered in a humiliating situation, which consequently turned the country from a victim to a predator, making the nationalists pursue the so-called German "living space" (Lebensraum) (Gonen, 2000:99-105). Therefore, after the Second World War, the allies led by the United States (US) decided to take serious steps forward in preventing Germany to end again in a humble and hopeless position. That could have created conditions that would force the Germans to seek revenge in the next war. The implementation of the Marshall Plan to assist the economies in Western Europe including Germany is considered as the beginning of a modern post-conflict concept in which permanent peace was achieved through reconstruction of the whole society (Hogan, 1987:26-53).

The US was the key actor that initiated the reconstruction of Germany from the ashes and helping it reintegrate with dignity. As opposed to the Treaty of Versailles, the idea was not to blame the entire population for the war. Although since 1945 the mission significantly changed, there is still a US military presence in Germany (and Japan). However, the main characteristic of this type of post-conflict presence is that it took place in countries where foreign forces have been accepted and there was no further resistance against them.

In contrast, there are other types of post-conflict operations when hostilities continue in some other form, from passive resistance to open rebellion. In such an operational environment, it is preferable that the foreign forces deployed for the purpose of peacebuilding, first cease hostilities and then proceed with the reconstruction. The contemporary post-conflict operations as in Afghanistan demonstrate that this could be done simultaneously. While the military forces are primarily used to suppress the Taliban, wide range of other policies are implemented to strengthen the society necessary to achieve lasting peace. These activities include necessary investments to reconstruct and build institutions, infrastructure, and public services.

After the Second World War, the United Nations (UN) was established to replace the ineffective League of Nations. Since then, the UN recognized and sponsored the concept of post-conflict engagements as a tool to terminate the war. The UN became an important organization for the global projection of peace with a mandate to use various kinetic and non-kinetic ways and means for the purpose of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The UN forces, the so-called "blue helmets", is probably one of the strongest mechanism of the international community to mitigate the consequences of war, helping countries involved in a conflict and guaranteeing peace after the conflict ends.

An Era of Post-Conflict Operations

The wars or conflicts end at the negotiating table with a peace agreement. Only in rare cases, there is no need for the international community to intervene, control or guarantee the implementation of such agreement. After the Second World War, due to the changing role of the international relations and the establishment of the UN, the international community became actively involved in a reconciliation of the post-conflict regions (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001:4).

The peacekeeping is one of the main policies that the international community is implementing in the post-conflict situations in order to ensure or control the achieved peace agreement (Sheeran, 2015:102). There are many tools to enforce the peacekeeping policies, like financial support of the war-torn society, building institutions, organizing elections, helping governments in governance, social development, education, humanitarian aid, etc., but also an actual presence of military forces under the flag of the UN or other international coalition or alliance, to keep the peace with force if necessary.

The first type of UN peacekeeping mission was a monitoring role approved in 1948 in the Middle East to supervise the termination of the hostilities after the first Arab-Israeli war (Chandra, 2006:1-6). After the Second Arab-Israeli war, during the so-called Suez crisis, the idea of UN peacekeeping military force was conceived (the deployment of first "blue helmets"). The intervention of France, United Kingdom, and Israel after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, prompted discussion in the international community to deploy military forces from other countries with the UN resolution and mission, in order to guarantee the achieved peace agreement (un.org, 2017a). Until today, the UN organized 69 peacekeeping operations, 56 of which since 1988 (un.org, 2017b). This means that the interest and influence of the international community to prevent escalation of conflicts around the world after reaching a peace agreement increased significantly in the post-Cold War period (Thakur and Schnabel, 2001:3).

An especially important mission for the development of peacekeeping was the engagement of blue helmets in the Balkans after the breakup of Yugoslavia. This was due to the fact that four decades after the end of the Second World War, Europe again faced bloody conflict with enormous destruction and casualties that was marked with serious human rights violations, like ethnic cleansing and genocide. The commitment of the international community was tested on several occasions because of numerous controversies over jurisdiction of the UN forces to prevent violence against civilians, often becoming the target of attacks themselves.

A moral dilemma emerged whether it is possible to conduct effective peacekeeping without using raw military force. After NATO took its role seriously in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994, the peacekeeping operation turned into a peace enforcement operation (Hendrickson, 2006:61). At first, a no-fly zone was declared over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then the mission expanded including the use of force against the Bosnian Serbs. Such a decisive action imposed the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Arguably, this was significant because it demonstrated that in desperate cases it is necessary to use violence to achieve peace. The failure of the UN peacekeeping force justified the use of NATO military force, creating new role

and purpose for the existence of the alliance after the collapse of the USSR (Moore, 2007:28-29).

The peace enforcement, as opposed to peacekeeping, requires a much larger military force to make one, both or all sides in the conflict to accept and implement the peace agreement. Compared with the peacekeeping mission that could stretch for decades, the duration of peace enforcement is relatively short and more decisive because of the actual application of raw force. The UN Security Council may approve the peace enforcement operations, but sometimes it could be unilateral or a coalition-led by a stronger actor. This is often a controversial topic in the international law since it overlaps with the concept of military intervention to terminate a war only after a military victory is achieved. For the intervening force to impose peace, the opponent must be militarily defeated to accept some kind of peace agreement or conditional ceasefire. This means that not all countries have capabilities to enforce peace and such concept remains in the hands of several stronger international actors. However, in order to obtain legitimacy of such action, they will always aspire to gain international support and a resolution from the UN.

Currently, there are 14 UN missions around the world (un.org, 2018c). Although in some of those countries it is peaceful for decades, the UN presence remains because of insufficient conditions to ensure lasting peace. This proves not only the post-conflict phases could stretch for a longer period, but also there is a necessity for the external, international intervention. This is the main reason why the post-conflict operations have become an elementary part of the military doctrines worldwide and a trend of the modern warfare. The dilemma is who should take a lead as a global peacemaker in a world that returned to bipolarity with signs of multipolarity. Not every large actor has capabilities and responsibilities in acting as a “world police”, thus it is preferable that democracies enforce peace. So far, the western countries demonstrated the strongest dedication to invest in global peace through intervention in post-conflict regions.

Stability Operations as a More Decisive Concept for the Post-Conflict Engagement

While peacekeeping and peacebuilding are traditionally UN-led activities, the peace enforcement may be either an UN-led or coalition based. In both cases, it takes at least one strong actor as a leading nation that actually has physical force to impose peace. The explanation why the US and its NATO allies agreed on the concept of peace enforcement through intervention is the perception of inert and indecisive action of the UN-led operations.

In the early 90s, the US augmented the post-conflict engagements designed as peace operations (keeping, making, and building) with the concept of peace enforcement. This was developed at first as “military operations other than war”. After the intervention in Iraq in 2003, the terminology changed to “stability and support operations”. The concept later evolved as peace support operations and today the doctrinal term is “stability operations”. The US military introduced this doctrine to deter war through intervention, resolve conflict, promote peace, and support civil authorities in response to domestic crises. It was meant to include many tasks that are non-violent but use the threat of force to achieve the goals. The more recent update defines “stability” a combination of both military and nonmilitary efforts and coordination of all instruments of

national power, to “address drivers of conflict, foster host-nation resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security” (Pub, 2016:IX) and “maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (Pub, 2016: I). Peace enforcement is the typical tool that these operations use to tackle violence, usually by use or threat to use force. It demonstrates the US capabilities when diplomatic means are not sufficient to resolve the crisis. As described in the US Joint Doctrine, these low intensity military operations cover all peace operations, protection of shipping, enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, arms control, support to civil authorities, nation assistance, and evacuation operations (Pub, 1995:IX). Such post-conflict activities usually start with military involvement and end with civilian dominance. As soon as the intervention forces eliminate the threat of violence, they shift on activities such as rebuilding civil infrastructure and institutions, a transition to domestic authorities, reestablish a government and support truce and negotiations (Pub, 1995:IV-12). An important task in stability operations is to prevent civilians, especially in ethno-religious conflicts, to interfere the operations. An example of failure to prevent this was the escalation of the ethno-sectarian strife in Iraq in 2006 between Sunni and Shia.

The US as a global actor influence stability in regions through overseas demonstration of commitment and support to civil authorities of allies before, during and after a crisis occurs. The preferable way to avoid the use of force is deterrence. If this fails, the US doctrine justifies the use of force to “compel compliance in the form of strikes, raids, peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, and evacuation of noncombatants” (Pub, 1995: VIII). The stability operations are the most decisive form of post-conflict engagement because they include both kinetic and non-kinetic methods across the spectrum of conflict. A critique of this concept is that the term “stability” is a euphemism for operations that are still primarily military in nature, and such interventions in the opposite of UN missions, may occur without a full consensus of the international community, or the UN Security Council.

Challenges and Future Development

Due to globalization and interdependent international relations, ethno-religious clashes in particular, are considered the most serious threat to regional and global stability. One of the biggest challenges in the post-conflict societies is the national reconciliation among conflicted parties. As today’s conflicts are mostly ethno-religious, these two categories are also the most difficult to reconcile (Fox, 2002:143). They dig deep into the identity, the historical background and the collective memory of the people. The ethno-religious conflicts are far bloodier than ideologically motivated conflicts, inevitably accompanied by serious human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, massacres and population displacement (Cordell and Wolff, 2010). As a rule, the greater the damage was, it takes more time to achieve reconciliation.

An example for this was the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina where violence between the conflicting parties reached a critical point after which it took longer time for reconciliation. Twenty-two years later, there was still ongoing trial at The Hague International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. While simultaneously the mechanism for bringing all the accused war criminals to justice was necessary, stretching the trials indirectly contributed to prolonging the point of reconciliation because it keeps feeding the collective memories of the victims. Realistically, it will take a longer time to pass after all crimes are being sanctioned to reach the point of lasting reconciliation. This is the reason the international community should intervene before ethnic strife reaches the point of crossing the lines.

There are many cases when the international community is either passive due to the inconsistency of the interests of the global actors, or it is unable to act. An example of this is the post-conflict phase in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh where there is a virtually frozen conflict for more than twenty years. The international community is a passive observer, without taking any steps to solve the conflict and the status of internally displaced refugees in Azerbaijan. This is partially due to the influence of Russia in the region, but also because of lack of interest on the list of priorities. Some conflicts in the Third World are simply not of a high importance for the Western countries. Unlike in Rwanda where the international community failed to stop the genocide of 800.000 people (Melvern, 2004:252; Cohen, 2007:5), it reacted far more decisively in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo simply because they are on European soil.

In post-conflict societies, there might be an absence of war, but not the conditions for lasting peace. This implies there are many factors that could lead to disruption of balance established with the peace agreement, or disruption of economic and social conditions may contribute to reducing hostilities. The function of the post-conflict operations is to predict and prevent these elements that lead to the previous stage of armed violence. This requires the establishment of viable, lasting institutions that will ensure stable civil services and long-term security in the war-torn society. The UN primarily leads the post-conflict efforts today (un.org, 2017) because in most cases an international consensus is necessary to implement legal and sustainable policies. Besides military ways and means, this also includes various political, economic and informational efforts to strengthen the national power of the country once peace was achieved. The international community facilitates the conditions for permanent peace to overcome the possible conflicting scenarios by building lasting and sustainable capabilities through multiple mechanisms. Peacebuilding in the post-conflict societies requires great commitment and allocation of resources to implement a wide range of policies such as reintegration of fighters of conflicting parties, the return of refugees, organizing elections, assisting the establishing of state institutions, and avoiding political disputes, which may lead to a reinstatement of violence, ect.

In the future, it is expected that the western democracies will continue with the practice to intervene in post-conflict scenarios. In such engagements, NATO or US-led coalition forces would influence the operational environment with the decisive use of military force, if necessary. The main purpose of these engagements will be securing stable peace through aiming at specified illegal activities, deter or defeat hostilities, maintain or restore order in restless areas, facilitate

diplomacy, enforce agreements and policies and support weak governments (Global security org.). This will most likely include various activities to provide security, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilization and building infrastructure, deliver rule of law and governance to civilian authorities of the host nation (Pub, 2016:xii).

The reason the international community (predominantly the Western democracies) is actively involved in post-conflict operations are the effects of the globalization or the view that instability, crises, and wars in some regions inevitably will affect the global peace and security. Whenever conflicts were left alone it turned out to generate harmful consequences that were felt beyond the crisis regions. Without international support, the conflicts would be far more dangerous with a tendency to spread, so the concept of post-conflict engagement is actually the international community's preventive strategy to achieve global peace and security.

Conclusion

The history is overwhelmed with examples that after wars formally ended hostilities remained. The winning side still had to use force to prevent de-escalation, especially during the colonial era in many counterinsurgency campaigns. The fact that hardly anyone was able truly to defeat the insurgencies, suggest the improper approach of the winning side in the post-conflict phase of the war. Even the greatest empires succumbed to grueling counterinsurgency campaigns. It took a long time to realize that it is necessary to change the operational approach in a post-conflict phase of the war.

The modern concept of building stable peace comes from the postwar construction of Western Europe. In order to ensure lasting peace, the western democracies determined that it is necessary to invest in building societies to improve the quality of living as the main reason for people's discontent after the war. This approach to creating conditions to support reconciliation especially becomes a trend after the establishment of the UN and its involvement in many post-conflict situations. The new paradigm in global security appeared with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Balkan ethnic wars when the UN blue helmets were put on a test. Due to the lack of decisiveness and much controversy over jurisdiction, a security gap was created and the belligerents ignored the UN efforts. In 1994, NATO took the lead with a military intervention to enforce the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After signing the peace agreement, the international community remained in the country for peacekeeping and peacebuilding for years. The lessons from the Second World War to invest in lasting peace were successfully applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This was the beginning of a trend that in the post-conflict regions it is required to maintain the military presence and if necessary to use it to secure the peace. The responsibility lies with the international community and the global actors that have capabilities for the expensive peacebuilding. While the UN remains the primary organization currently present in 14 post-conflict missions, the practice shows that NATO as the representative of the Western democracies also assumes an important role to project global peace. In the Western military doctrines, stability

operations became the new concept for post-conflict engagement to reconcile and prevent hostilities to escalate. Until a better solution is found, the application of force through intervention will remain the preferred tool to secure global peace. Although being far from unmistakable in their decisions and actions, the Western democracies remain as leaders in providing this.

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