Security dialogues

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PALESTINIAN REFUGEES HOSTING SYRIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

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Abstract:

Lebanon is receiving most Syrian refugees per capita of all countries surrounding Syria. The most marginalized within Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees that came to Lebanon in 1948 are also hosting arriving Syrian refugees. This study aims to better understand the interplay and interrelations between hosts and refugees. This study is concerned with the overarching question: What is the relationship between the Palestinians hosting the Syrian refugees, and how do they cope with already increasingly narrow resources they have at their disposal, and how is the social relationships between the two refugee groups in Lebanon? Theoretically this study explores and develops a synthesis of a pluralist society model and the ethno-class model, a new approach that best can describe how interrelations in the refugee context in Lebanon are developing. The refugee camp Wavel outside the city of Baalbek in the north serves as case for this study. Semi-structured interviews and focal group discussions have been made with both Palestinian hosts, as well as Syrian refugees.

Key words: refugees, Lebanon, Palestinian, Syrians, integration, social interrelations

“[T]hey welcomed us. But not any more... Now they see us as taking their jobs, taking their livelihoods... It takes a lot of solidarity if you yourself live below the poverty line,” (excerpts from interviews with Syrian refugees in Palestinian refugee camp)¹

Purpose and Aims

How do the most marginalized groups in society cope with the influx of refugees, and how do the refugees cope with being placed in the marginalized spaces of society? In Lebanon,

most marginalized group since decades, the Palestinian refugees that came to Lebanon in 1948, and are based in refugee camps since then, are hosting Syrian refugees, as the rest of Lebanese society does since 2011.

Lebanon is receiving most Syrian refugees per capita of all countries surrounding Syria. The most marginalized within Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees that came to Lebanon in 1948 are also hosting arriving Syrian refugees since 2011. This study aims to better understand the interplay and interrelations between hosts and refugees. This study is concerned with the overarching question: What is the relationship between the Palestinians hosts and the Syrian refugees, and how do they cope with already increasingly narrow resources they have at their disposal in Lebanon? The article will theoretically explore and develop a synthesis of a pluralist society model and the ethno-class model, a new approach that best can describe how interrelations in the refugee context in Lebanon are advancing. The refugee camp Wavel outside the city of Baalbek in the north of the country has been the locations for this study. Wavel can be seen as a case study of the interrelationship of Palestinian hosts and Syrian incoming refugees.

Since the popular uprising against the Syrian regime began in 2011 (Weyland 2012), Lebanon had to cope with the influx of Syrian refugees, fleeing from the war-torn society. UNCHR estimates that approximately 2 Million Syrians fled to Lebanon, which has around 4.4 Million Lebanese citizens, and additional 450,000 registered Palestinian refugees divided in 12 different camps. In comparison, the Europeans have debated whether the EU societies have reached the roof top for what they believe is what they are able to cope with concerning integration, and claim often that the costs of hosting refugees are too exhaustive for the EU states to handle. Germany and Sweden alone received 64 per cent of Syrian asylum applications in Europe between April 2011 and October 2016 (Amnesty International). At the same time, the larger portion of refugees is hosted by the much economically weaker neighbouring states to Syria, such as Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey. Lebanon is receiving most refugees per capita of all countries, not only in the region, but in the world, and receives continuously Syrian refugees (every fifth is a Syrian refugee in Lebanon. The Palestinian refugees, before the arrival of the Syrians, has been the socio-economically and politically most marginalized non-citizens of Lebanon, and has had large influx of refugees and their host role has become of a more permanent basis. Also, for the Syrian refugees, this new life in the Palestinian camps has with the continuous war in Syria gradually become a long-term life situation. This marginalized life situation between temporary and permanent living conditions, were both hosts and guests are in waiting for a better future situation in their home societies, creates an extraordinary challenging camp life situation.

What are the challenges in this situation for the Palestinians and Syrians living in the Lebanese refugee camps? In what way can Palestinians, located in refugee camps in Lebanon, cope with the immense influx of Syrian refugees? How is it possible to serve as host for Syrian refugees, given the already scarce resources, as well as restrictions in Lebanese society that the Palestinians face in their camp lives (Hanafi et al 2012, Abdulrahim & Khawaja 2011)? Further, how

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2 From UNRWA: https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon (2018-10-15)
do the Syrian refugees perceive the Palestinians as hosts? How do they find a coping way in the already overpopulated camps, and how do they relate to the Palestinians, as well as the Lebanese society outside the refugee camps?

This study deals with these questions in order to better understand the interplay and interrelations between hosts and refugees with scarce resources. Not least, how Palestinians in Lebanon handle potential conflict issues, as well as integration issues, since the stay of the Syrian refugees have become more of a permanent situation. As indicated above, the Palestinian refugees, located in Lebanon since 1948, do also take a great share in hosting Syrian refugees. The Lebanese society is heavily impacted by the Syrian refugee flow, and in comparison, to any of the EU member states, it is much more affected by them.

State-of-the-Art

From previous research on the Syrian migrants in neighbouring countries (Achilli 2015, Ihlamur-Öner 2013), and in particular in Lebanon, we learn that the Syrian migrants are facing severe challenges. Particularly, studies have shown that women and children are the most vulnerable among the refugees. Women are facing risk of sexual assaults, rapes and gender-based violence, particularly when being alone, or not having their husband with them. Further, the increase of early age marriage has also been noted among Syrian women. (Denman 2013)

Out of the more than a million Syrian refugees, more than half of the migrants are children (UNHCR 2015) and the consequences they face are dreadful. Number of studies focus on the children’s humanitarian situation (Jabbar & Zaza 2014, Naufal 2012), the traumas following the severe war influences, and with negative impact on the psychological health (El-Khani et al 2016, Sirin & Rogers-Sirin 2015, Özer 2013), and the human security implications (Berti 2015). Other studies focus on the minors’ experiences as child soldiers in Syria (Sommerfelt & Taylor 2015). However, the vast majority of children have traumatized experiences from having to flee the violent war fields, leave home, and go through severe security challenges before arriving to the new host society. Hence, many have focused on the immediate psychological needs of children.

Several studies have also looked at the educational needs of the children, and the challenges of establishing educational training for them (Sirin & Rogers-Sirin 2015). The Syrian refugee children are risking to loose years of education, and often, when parents face severe economic problems, the dropout rate from education increases dramatically among these children (Charles & Denman 2013). Some have also focused on the problems that follow with the politics of international aid to Palestinian refugee camps, showing that inflows of resources with the aim to improve the refugees’ lives, also has a political underlying objective, i.e. that the Palestinian refugees’ should forget their past (Gabiam 2012).

The complexity of the problem increases with the fact that the very interrelationship between the Palestinian hosts and Syrian refugees is an under-researched area. We have little insights of what the hosts in Lebanon think about the Syrian refugee influx in Lebanon. We practically do not have any study on how Palestinian refugees perceive the influx of Syrians. A
study conducted by the Norwegian Fafo has charted the attitudes of Lebanese citizens towards Syrian refugees, and found that there is a majority that is concerned for the national security situation due to the Syrian refugee inflow, that it will lead to a sectarian violence, and a new civil war also within Lebanon. Lebanese also perceive that the Syrians are taking away the jobs, and housing possibilities from Lebanese, and that the Syrian presence generally has a negative impact on the overall economic situation. Also, a majority of the Lebanese consider that the Syrian unfairly gain support. (Christophersen et al 2013)

Although we have knowledge about the Lebanese host society at large and its interplay with refugees (see for instance Lopez-Rodriguez et al 2014), we have barely nothing on how Palestinian refugees and the Syrian refugees inside the Palestinian camps interplay, and how do they find ways to live together from a long-term perspective. The Palestinians in particular, have a long-term experience of being permanently placed in refugee camps, seen as temporary, and making the dream to return to Palestine part of their life. The way Palestinians cope and interact with the Syrian refugees is an under-researched area.

In sum, despite important insights from above studies on Syrian refugee’s immediate crisis situation in Lebanon, as well as in neighbouring countries, we still lack studies that take a broader, as well as long-term perspective, of the increased permanent living situation of refugees in Lebanon, and in particular inside Palestinian refugee camps. Due to the long-term presence, leading to a permanent living situation for the Syrian refugees, we need to understand how marginalized groups, like the Palestinian refugee’s cope going from immediate crisis management to long-term integration issues due to the increasing permanent presence of Syrians, despite scarce resources. Further, we need to use an intersectional approach, in particular the social categories of gender and age (incl. minors) in order to better understand what the long-term consequences will be for the Syrian refugees that are forced to stay in Lebanon for many years to come. Finally, there are few studies that have a broader, or holistic, approach, with the aim to cover a range of aspects that usually are used in integration research. Below follows a description on how this model for analysing integration has been applied in the case of how long-term refugees host relatively recent arrived refugees.

**Contribution of this study**

Generally, we have little previous research on insights on how marginalized migrant groups are coping between segregation and integration. This study argues that great refugee influx in host societies over a longer period of time, in which the forced migration situation gradually changes to a permanent unwanted away from home, also transforms the integration and societal character of the host society. It becomes both an empirical as well as a theoretical issue to find out what ethnic relations that develop over time, and what kind of integration/segregation we can identify. This study has explored theoretically and developed a synthesis of a pluralist society model and the ethno-class model, a new approach that best can describe how interrelations in the refugee context in Lebanon are developing. The Palestinians and Syrians interrelations in the camp context
Security dialogues are discussed below. While the ethno-class approach predicts further conflict and confrontation between groups in society, the pluralist approach describes these tensions as existing but can also slowly decrease over time. The argument is that refugees that are marginalized, do find ways over time to gradually, although slowly, are finding ways to cope with these extra-ordinary challenges.

Despite their weaker socio-economic and political positions in society, they do invent ways, and are able to build a new (temporary) home.

The project design addresses one important aspect of how socio-economic weaker groups in war-torn societies cope and manage to host refugees. Despite the hardships, the Palestinians share with the Syrian incoming refugees the experience of having to flee the home country, as well as being forced to begin a new life in a host country. Also, the unknown future, if or when a return is possible to the homeland, is also something the Palestinian hosts and Syrian refugees share. Hence, the project will on the one hand give some important insight on how the most marginalized groups in an already overburden society as Lebanon is, manage to cope with conflicts among them, and in particular related to integration issues. It also will show, what particular vulnerable areas and challenges, these marginalized groups face in their attempts to solve the day-to-day living conditions. In addition, it will identify possible stumbling blocks and potential solutions to challenges in terms of distribution of (scarce) resources, education, co-habitation, and integration in times of volatile security context.

Methodological approach

As stated, the main objective of this study was to inquire empirically as well as understand theoretically, in what way the Palestinian refugees cope with the role as hosts of Syrian refugees. Also, the interplay between Syrian refugees and the Palestinian hosts is in focus of the study. The purpose of this study was to come a little bit closer to an understanding of how hosts – being themselves refugees, cope with receiving people who are fleeing from war torn contexts, and how both hosts and refugees reason about the new life situations. Not least in terms of short versus long-term planning, where both Palestinian hosts and the Syrian refugees know that a return to Syria is seemingly not imminent. At the same time, the pressure to cope with the harsh new living conditions cooperation between hosts and refugees around the narrow resources is necessary, but also basis for tensions and conflicts.

The analytical model has previously been developed by Schulz’s study of integration (Schulz 1996), partly inspired by Yinger (1981). In order to analyse the interplay and interaction between the Palestinians and the Syrian refugees four overarching aspects have been examined so as to evaluate how far the integration is taking place, and/or to what extent the two groups remain within their own spheres. These aspects cover the following sub-processes: 1. (Socio-economic integration) the level of integration (structural aspects, i.e. the level of access to various socio-economic arenas, such as health care, education, political decision-making arenas etc.) 2. (Amalgamation) the extent to which new close relations develop (i.e. the extent of inter-group
friendships and marriages); 3. (Acculturation) the extent to which acculturation takes place (cultural aspects, i.e. the extent of adopting new customs within the host society versus preserving the own groups’ customs), and 4. (Identification) the extent of the refugees’ identification with the host society, as well as the readiness of the host society to accept the newcomers (psychological, i.e. ways and extent of identification with the hosts society).

There is an interrelationship between these above-mentioned sub-processes in so far that each affects the strength of the other. The reciprocal process—plural acculturation—is a process whereby intra-societal differences are maintained and created around subcultural groups (Schulz 1996, Yinger 1981). These sub-processes affect the extent of integration-segregation continuum. The concept of integration is usually referred to the extent of how far the process of integration in socio-economic terms (i.e. income, education, living standard, access to the social welfare system etc.) has been reached, or the reverse process of segregation, when the integration has failed and instead slowed down or even reversed. With the Class perspective, the process of integration is rather seen as a ‘false ideology’, which in the Lebanese context is used to either describe how the dominant Lebanese groups position relate hierarchical in relation to the vis- the camp Palestinians, and even further vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees inside the Palestinian camps. It can also be seen as an ideology of the dominant group to maintain control over the subalterns (the Syrian refugees). With a Pluralist approach, similar arguments are put forward, but dominance is seen as gradually decreasing. The limitations with the Class perspective lies in the fact that improvements can not merely be nullified by claiming the attempts of the dominant ethno-class to maintain power. The Pluralist approach emphasizes precisely these differences between ethnic groups but also risks to neglect the possibility for integration of various groups in the camp society, by emphasizing the conflict relations more. Hence, if all four-sub processes are weak, we can speak of an ethno-class camp society, however, if some of the sub-processes increases, we have more of a pluralist society with gradual improvements. However, due to the camps sub-ordinated position within Lebanese society, we cannot speak of any dramatic integration with the larger Lebanese society. At best, we can speak about gradual integration of Syrians into the camp life, but still in a process between integration and segregation.

Data collection

During the period of my stay in Lebanon for a longer period during 2012-2013, several visits were made to the refugee camp Wavel, and have also been followed up at several times since then (the most recent in October 2018). From these experiences, I understood that working with sensitive issues, one must build upon solid knowledge about the specific cultures of the research context. Dealing with sensitive issues such as host-refugee relations requires in-depth knowledge, positions of trust, entry-points, social networks and careful manoeuvres in order to prevent doing any harm to people in the refugee camps, taking also into consideration the overall state/societal context of the country/region in question. Besides the number of years of field research I have had in the Middle East, I have over the last five years also built close relations with people living in
the Palestinian refugee camp Wavel outside Baalbek in the north of Lebanon. Although my main stay in Lebanon 2012-2013 was in the Beirut area, and despite relatively good contacts developed also in the Sabra and Shatila camps in Beirut, I have decided to abstain from doing research in those camps. The reason to this is that it is one of the most over-researched research geographical spots, most likely the most over-researched Palestinian refugee camp in the world. One must be aware that camp residents are not ‘...just passive subjects (or victims) of the practices and interests of outside researchers’ (Sukarieh & Tannock 2012:13). Researchers simply have too much affected the lives of the residents of the Sabra and Shatila camps. As researchers, we rather prefer to be in a camp, where our presence is not seen with critical and sceptical eyes.

Hence, the refugee camp Wavel has been the empirical location for this study. This camp has not been exposed for much research. The Wavel camp has a bit less than 10000 Palestinian refugees, but has since 2011 been exposed to inflows of Syrian refugees. The camp has always been in a relatively poorer socio-economic situation in comparison to other camps in Lebanon. Hence, the few available resources that have to be shared with the incoming Syrian refugees makes the locations as extra-ordinary show case for studying the interplay between hosts and refugees under harsh livelihood conditions.

Data analysis

In order to collect systematic relevant data for the model of analysis, it would have been useful, and more valid, to launch a statistical questionnaire with a larger number of Palestinians and Syrians in the camp. However, due to the security situation in Lebanon, and also in the camp itself, this has so far not been a realistic option. The study has, instead, primarily applied a qualitative approach, and mainly collected data via semi-structured interviews with people living in the camp, in combination with observations. In order to gain some indicative data for the analytical model described above, one had to approach both Palestinians and Syrians and let them describe more freely their thoughts of the socio-economic situation in the camp, the extent and quality of contact with the out-group, the freedom of choice about their way of life, and the way they identify within their own refugee group, as well as in relation to the Palestinian host society. For this purpose, some semi-structured interviews have been made with both Palestinian hosts, as well as Syrian refugees (about equally amount of men and women). Absolute caution was taken with all, and the approach had to be built upon a trust building process, voluntary participation, and consent of each person interviewed or conversed. Due to the fragile security situation, no voice recording was made, but notes were made after the interview, and all are anonymous. Some observations have been made, all in order to observe the ways of lives and interactions between Palestinians and Syrians in the camp, and also participate in religious, festivals, and other events, enabling close range studies.
Findings

Empirically, the initial findings showed that conflicts were more overshadowed by solidarity and trust in 2012, as well as capacities to help each other developed between the Palestinians and Syrians, despite scarce resources. However, with time, and increased influx of refugees, and several years later, indicated that the more permanent living situation in the camp had created increased tension between the two groups. The on-the-ground field-work in the camp allowed to get first-hand information and insight of successful cooperation on the daily lives the host Palestinians and Syrians shared. Despite the lack of many basic resources, as well as high density of people living in the low standard housing options, both hosts and refugees, tried to cope in a cooperative manner. The observations and talks with them gave insights for how people find ways to cope also under severe circumstances, as well as cooperate and help each other. However, these harsh living condition affect the relations over time, and change views and visions between the hosts and the refugees.

Socio-economic integration

The level of the structural integration of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon seems to be low, and reports indicate that they also become poorer and more dependent on international aid (UNCHR3). Further, the report underlines food insecurity as sever, and many are below the poverty line. Recent reports from Human Rights Watch even witness about mass expulsion of Syrians back to Syria (Human Rights Watch report4), which can be a further sign of the increasing crisis between hosts and refugees inside Lebanon. The camp life in Wavel is a further example of this demanding situation, since the Palestinian “host” refugee’s also have a difficult situation, and are relying on UNRWA support. Housing situation in the camp is difficult, and families, not seldom in the size of 6-8 members, have to share very small living areas, often one single room of 8-15 square meters. The life in the camp is particularly harsh in the winter, not least due to limited heating options, and with cold winters. In Wavel, several Syrian families had to walk for 10 minutes in order to reach fresh water stations. The extent the Syrian refugees can participate in the political decision-making arenas is very low. The educational situation is critical, and the camp has two schools with a school aged population that nearly constitute a third of the camp habitants. This also leads to high-drop out rates. Further, the employment opportunities are low, and makes the refugees even more dependent on the UN. Since many of the Syrian refugees, also are including Palestinian refugees from Syrian camps, a certain to acceptance from the Palestinian host society members thus have granted the Syrians free and equal access to the existing educational, professional and institutional arenas. However, the limited sources create tensions, and discussion of how

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the distribution of resources between the two groups - the Palestinians and Syrians, in the host society, best can be made often was on the daily agenda. High extent of grievance was part of the everyday life and occurred so often that it had to be, and had to be handled regularly. The extent of socio-economic gaps and power disparities between the two groups created some form of inequality feeling between them the longer time went.

Amalgamation

The extent of social interaction between various groups in a society may provide a picture of how individuals cope with each other in society. In Wavel, Syrian refugees are aware of their distinct different identity then the Palestinian identity, although both groups do feel commonality in their refuge status. Naturally, the Palestinians refugees coming from Syrian camps, do feel more commonalities with their Palestinian sisters and brothers in Lebanon. However, the Lebanese Palestinians, still often refer to them as “the Syrians”. Although in-group relations are the strongest, and also from a security point of view, the family structures, the extended Hamuleh network, are the primary safety net for all. Friendship relations between Palestinians and Syrians do also develop, despite that they live together separately on the camp. In the interviews, they also gave a few examples of “inter-ethnic” marriages between them.

Acculturation

The notion of acculturation refers to the extent an individual is adopting host societies ‘new customs’ or ‘keeps’ old customs and values. Do most refugees accept the formal lifestyle of that particular society? From both observations, and in interview situation, one can see that the living styles are very much similar and can thereby to a great extent have individual ‘home’ habits, costumes, values and way of life, without risking to be seen to challenge the broader life in the camp. Syrian refugees, but also Palestinian hosts, in that sense do not feel an urge to transform their ways of living as a result of the arrival of the Syrians. They often share similar customs, dress codes (although smaller variations exist), speak the same language (although with dialectic variations of Arabic), and the same religion (all are Muslims). Instead, were difference exist, they have been open to share and learn experiences from each other. For instance, people listen to each other’s music, and even take up their smaller differences in food traditions. In other words, many similar traditions exist, and rather the Palestinians and Syrians have respect to most of those cultural differences that exist. However, one of the recent more problematic challenges inside and outside the camp camps in Lebanon is related to the many unregistered illegal Syrian refugee families who try to marry away their daughters to locals in order to gain the right to stay. This has increased polygamy, and strengthened the patriarchal structures, and is seen with critical eyes by the Palestinians also in the Wavel camp. Hence, this has caused tensions between the two groups, and the impact on acculturation.
Identification

When asked about the extent Syrians and Palestinians are identifying with their own group identity, and to what extent they feel commonality with the out-group (as refugees and other identities of being marginalized and away from “home”), a mixed picture comes forward. The emotions and sentiments of collective group belonging. Also varies depending on what relation, situation, and context the meetings take place. In other words, the in- and out-group identification is fluid and both Palestinians and Syrians do shift in how close they feel to the “other”. Particularly Palestinian Syrian refugees have a slightly easier, compared to the non-Palestinian Syrians, to receive acceptance from the host society. At the same, the camp Palestinians do also perceive the arrival of Palestinian Syrians as members of a Syrian diaspora. Also, on an overarching level Palestinians and Syrians find common identification around their common experience as being refugees in a host (and often not too welcoming) society. The “us” and “them” dichotomization between camp Palestinians and the Syrians has increased with the increased socio-economic difficulties.

Conclusion

The qualitative data discussed in relation to the analytical indicators of integration (socio-economic integration, amalgamation, acculturation, and identification) has shown that the Syrian refugees can be placed between the pluralist and the ethno-class models. The refugee life in Lebanon is very much a segregated existence, but within the camp we can see that Syrians do have a subaltern position, but relatively, also have gained some increase of the examined four sub-processes (acculturation and identification in particular). With high levels of all four indicators, gives support for an ongoing gradual integration, however, since Syrians do not have citizens status in Lebanon, they jointly with the Palestinians, will have a distinct system within Lebanon (as refugees), and we can thereof at best speak more of a pluralist society. Over time, since the study began (in 2012) we can see an increase of lack of basic socio-economic resources, which also has created more tensions between Palestinians and Syrians. This indicates a decrease of the support of the pluralist approach. Further, it also implied an increase of the ethno-class model. We can see the risk that includes escalated conflicts of scarce resources between the most marginalized groups. This was a qualitative study, that could give us some indications of what the situation in the interrelationship between two marginalized groups in Lebanon can be. When the security situation allows, more systematic quantitative questionnaires could be applied in order to take some more precise measures of the sub-processes, and perhaps contribute to theorize and develop the societal model that seemingly is placed somewhere between the ethno-class and pluralist models, but closer to the segregation side on the integration-segregation continuum.
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doi: 10.1097/WTF.0000000000000118
MEDIA CONSTRUCTION OF MIGRANT CRISIS

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Abstract:

We are living today in the media constructed reality, so the media reporting is of utmost importance for public perceptions of different problems, issues and phenomena. This particularly refers to migrant crisis that European countries are increasingly facing the last few years. The media reporting on migrant crisis that emphasize threats to the national welfare system and culture might increase racism, xenophobia and islamophobia. On the other hand insisting on humanitarian themes might increase solidarity and tolerance. There are significant differences in media reporting on migrant crisis between media in European countries that are influenced by state policy, system of values, traditions, media systems and other factors. There is even no terminological consensus so different terms are used to address the phenomenon. Germany and Sweden, for example, overwhelmingly used the terms ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’, whilst Italy and the United Kingdom press preferred the word ‘migrant’. In Spain, the dominant term was ‘immigrant’. These terms had an important impact on the tenor of each country’s debate. In this review paper a comparative overview on media reporting on migrant crisis in five EU countries, Croatia and Serbia will be given, based on conducted researches, followed by the attempt to explain the differences and construct the models of media reporting on migrant crisis. Media reports and texts often burdened by ignorance, stereotypes and prejudices should be replaced by analytic texts based on ethic norms and standards of journalist profession and basic human values.

Key words: media, migrant crisis, perception, agenda setting, Serbia

1. Introduction

The beginning of the actual migrant and/or refugee crisis can be traced back to 2011, when a large number of people from Libya arrived on the coast of Sicily, while a smaller number arrived from Turkey to Greece. The crisis unfolded with the “Arab spring”, when the real refugees from the wider Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Yemen), North and Central Africa (Libya, Eritrea, Somalia,
Sudan, Nigeria) and central and southern Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh) headed towards Europe in eight directions, one of the more strategically important ones going through the Balkans (“Balkan route”). The “democratic states” were stating that they did not notice a growing problem, although in 2013, the number of refugees in the world reached 214 million, the next year it reached 244 million, and at the end of 2015 it exceeded a quarter billion. Figures from the UNHCR (2015) revealed that in the first six months of 2015 137,000 refugees and migrants attempted to enter the EU, a rise of 83% on the same period in 2014. This increase is largely attributable to the sharp rise in people using the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece, the great bulk of whom are refugees fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the number of refugees in Turkey has risen to more than 2 million. (Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore, 2015) This crisis has also affected Serbia since it is on the Balkan route. Looking for the road to Western Europe in 2015, about 1000 migrants entered the country daily. The complexity of the situation caused by the tendency of Hungary to limit their uncontrolled influx led to the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border, along which barbed wire was placed. Such a procedure has caused negative reactions both in the Serbian public and among European officials. Moving migration flows to Croatia has caused similar problems. The European Union has reached an agreement with Turkey and managed to stop migratory waves towards Europe, but it is not certain for which period.

The causes that led to the explosion of the migrant crisis in 2015 are diametrically different: the escape from war, the search for a better life, the departure from dysfunctional states, and the escape from various forms of extremism and terrorism. Besides a number of factors such as increase in the numbers and visibility of migrants in recent years, economic factors as Global Financial Crisis in 2008 followed by social insecurity, concerns over national security and cultural assimilation, the rising popularity the far right etc., an important role in influencing public and elite political attitudes towards asylum and migration belongs to mass media. They are “gate keepers” and “agenda setters” who are framing the debate. They define our world and main problems, including the problem of migrants, by providing the information which citizens use to make sense of the world and their place within it. (Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore, 2015). In this paper we will present a brief overview of the media reporting in European media, and a more detailed presentation of media coverage of this topic in Serbia.

2. Migrant crisis in European media

The arrival of a large number of refugees and migrants to Europe has posed a great challenge to the media and journalists. Media must pay particular attention when reporting about vulnerable groups, among which are refugees and migrants. When the refugee wave shook Europe, it was necessary to decide for the media how to report on this problem. Worldwide experiences of journalist reporting on migrants vary greatly from country to country, but they have several common points of modeling. The most common trap in which the media can fall relates to
unethical and sensational reporting, hate speech, the oversimplification in which a certain group is stigmatized, incomplete or fictional stories, but also serving to the political propaganda of the ruling elites (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017)

Media across Europe and the world were tracking this crisis, making detailed reports and reportages, but what could be seen in the writing of the media is their bias, oscillations in reporting, such as, for example, the ideological closeness to a certain political party, the display of only one viewpoint of the refugee crisis, giving no media space to refugees and the changing attitudes towards refugees during the development of the crisis (Pelizzoti, 2016)\(^5\).

In the most of media, refugees are presented as a threat. Such portraiture of refugees mostly goes hand in hand with politicians who try to depict refugees as people who are seizing jobs, becoming social cases and living at the burden of the state, and who do not want to adapt to the culture and the way of life of the host country. (Moving Stories, 2015:7)

The Cardiff School of Journalism under the commission of UNHCR explored the drivers of the media coverage of migrant crisis in five different European countries: Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK and Sweden. Researchers combed through thousands of articles written in 2014 and early 2015, revealing a number of important findings for future media advocacy campaigns. Most importantly, they found major differences between countries, in terms of the sources journalists used (domestic politicians, foreign politicians, citizens, or NGOs), the language they employed, the reasons they gave for the rise in refugee flows, and the solutions they suggested. Germany and Sweden, for example, overwhelmingly used the terms ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’, while Italy and the UK press preferred the word ‘migrant’. In Spain, the dominant term was ‘immigrant’\(^6\). These terms had an important impact on the tenor of each country’s debate. Media also differed widely in terms of the predominant themes to their coverage. For instance, humanitarian themes were more common in Italian coverage than in British, German or Spanish press. Threat themes (such as to the welfare system, or cultural threats) were the most prevalent in Italy, Spain and Britain. Overall, the Swedish press was the most positive towards refugees and migrants, while coverage in the United Kingdom was the most negative, and the most polarized. Amongst those countries surveyed, Britain’s right-wing media was uniquely aggressive in its campaigns against refugees and migrants.

\(^5\) However, it would be wrong to give general assessments of media coverage of the refugee crisis as there are significant differences between individual countries, as well as between the media within a particular country. Representations of refugees in media and political discourse in relation to Germany participate in a Gramscian “war of position” over symbols, policies, and, ultimately, social and material resources, with potentially fatal consequences. These representations shift blame from historical, political-economic structures to the displaced people themselves. They demarcate the “deserving” refugee from the “undeserving” migrant and play into fear of cultural, religious, and ethnic difference in the midst of increasing anxiety and precarity for many in Europe. Comparative perspectives suggest that anthropology can play an important role in analyzing these phenomena, highlighting sites of contestation, imagining alternatives, and working toward them (Holmes and Castaneda, 2016).

\(^6\) It is not just about terms. Behind of each of this term there is a very different legal and social position of these people and the systemic measures that the state can and should take, the problems and obligations that politicians, through whose countries they pass and stay in, have to solve.
The key conclusions of this research are:

1. **There are wide variations in how the press in different countries report on asylum and immigration** - Sweden was the country whose press system was the most positive towards refugees and migrants while in contrast, coverage in the United Kingdom was the most negative.

2. **There are significant differences in the level of variation within national press systems** - in Spain, Italy and Sweden the press, regardless of political orientation, reported on asylum and immigration in broadly similar ways (using the same language, report on the same themes and feature the same explanations and responses), whilst in other countries reporting was highly varied.

3. **The European Union’s response to the crisis was widely seen as inadequate, yet it was still defined as the key institution responsible for solving the crisis** - Newspapers in continental Europe agreed that the crisis should be solved collectively, at the EU level, rather than by individual member states. In Italy it was seen as unwilling to share the burden for search and rescue operations, and the reception of refugees and migrants. In Germany and Sweden, there was extensive criticism over the unwillingness of EU states to share the burden of refugee settlement.

4. **The degree to which asylum and immigration is subject to political contestation is a key factor structuring coverage** - there are few parties with explicit pro-refugee and pro-migrant policies. In Sweden, Italy and the UK the challenge to government policy has come from the far-right, and in Germany, besides far-right party also from the left parties and Greens. In Spain the issue is not a significant campaigning issue.

5. **The rise of the far-right has been reflected in uneven media coverage** - In Germany the rise of the far-right has not been reflected in any significant media access, while in Italy the far-right has a prominent voice because of its electoral legitimacy, and in Sweden, the recent electoral success of the Swedish Democrats has opened up their access to the media. In Britain, the rise of UKIP has been reflected in significant source access to all newspapers.

6. **There was a substantial shift from the first sample to the second in relation to how the conflict was explained and what solutions were visible** - whilst the first sample primarily viewed the crisis as stemming from migration flows driven by wars, human rights abuses and repressive regimes, the second sample – particularly in the UK, Italy and Spain – focused much more on the chaos in Libya and the role of people smugglers.

7. **Overall there were few instances where reporting focused on the benefits that asylum seekers and migrants could bring to host countries** – only in in the Swedish and German press.

8. **The local context is vital in shaping how news is reported** – particular national journalistic conventions and political traditions determine the appropriate labels or angles that are taken on stories.
9. There were very few articles which focused on the need to address the push factors driving population flows (Berry, Garcia-Blanco and Moore, 2015)

1. The migrant crisis in Serbian daily press

Journalists from Serbia and former Yugoslav countries have also found themselves in front of dilemmas how to report on migrant crisis. Journalist associations from the region gathered in the regional project MEDIA CIRCLE (including the Partnership for Social Development from Croatia, the journalists association Vesta from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yucom - Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Independent Society of Journalists of Vojvodina from Serbia, Institute for Public Policy from Montenegro and the Center for Research, Communication and Development Public from Macedonia) and appealed to all those who are referring to the refugee crisis in the public space or report to the media to adhere to certain rules. These associations invite the media to avoid politicization, stereotyping, collective hysteria (whether positive or negative) and avoiding any politicization of the refugee issue in the countries of transit and countries of destination. Furthermore, they warned that it is wrong to use any ethnic or religious epithets, such as the Arabs, Muslims, Asians, Afghans and the like, along with the name of the refugees. They recommend referring to refugees from a certain region in the public media, because it is unprofessional, inaccurate, wrong and contrary to the law to qualify them according to a unique ethnicity or belief. They point out that in mass refugee migrations, no stereotyping of the “behavior and culture” of refugees is desirable in public speech, as any such treatment harms refugees in the countries in which they find themselves. They agree that every refugee story in the public space should be addressed individually, by name and surname, taking into account the diversity of each family and the person being reported. In addition, they point out that only in this way will the large majority of refugees be protected from violence, insults, discrimination and everything that follows them on their way and socialization in host societies after their journey ends. They recommend also avoiding the stereotyping of persons, especially officials in transit countries and countries of destination, who interact with refugees. They consider that every good deed has its own name and surname, and that it is important to individualize good deeds in public speech, because only by such approach can the great majority of people be motivated to do the same. The associations also called for respect for the privacy of refugees and for photographing them only if they permit it. It should be kept in mind that these photographs should protect their identities. They point out that by photographing the face of refugees they can endanger their lives or the lives of their loved ones, who were not lucky to avoid a war disaster. In reports on figures, statistics or other indicators accompanying the refugee wave, it is called upon to use only the official reports that were previously verified by the competent national authorities and international organizations. Finally, the associations remind that professional and ethical standards of journalism oblige all journalists and editors to objectively, comprehensively, equitably and in human way report on refugees without hate speech, discrimination or calling for violence (Hnd.hr, 2015)
It can be noted that most of these recommendations have not been fully respected, especially when it comes to tabloids. In the following chapters we will summarize the results of relevant researches of the presentation of migrant crisis in Serbian daily press.

1. The migrant crisis in Serbian daily press – quantitative aspect

There are three important research report on presentation of migrant crisis in Serbian daily newspaper: Aracki, 2016; Jeftić and Bajić, 2016; and Jeftić and Bajić, 2017. Jeftić and Bajić used quantitative and qualitative content analysis in researching typical narratives and forms that were used in representation of the migrant crisis, primarily related to the Balkan route, on the cover pages of Serbian daily newspapers (Politika, Danas, Večernje novosti, Blic, Kurir, Alo and Informer) in 2015.

The migration crisis was in focus of the Serbian press in 2015, when almost 16 percent of the total number of front-page pages were dedicated to this topic, whilst in 2016 the daily newspapers’ interest almost halved (around 8%), with the tendency of the further marginalization of the whole problem (in the first quarter of 2017, slightly more than 4%). This in no way reflects the situation on the ground since the migration crisis has not been resolved and the Balkan route has not been completely closed. A significant drop in attention after 2015, despite the ongoing the migration crisis, means that in practice there has been a silent change in the paradigm. (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017)

Refugees, asylum and migrations since 2015 have become permanent narratives in the press of Serbia, with several themes-dimensions:

• humanism (Serbia is visibly different in comparison with others, especially Croatia and Hungary);
• solidarity and mobilization of citizens to help migrants;
• cosmopolitanism (ideological, political and religious);
• multiculturalism and
• networked collectivism.

However, with the flow of time, the tone was gradually changing, so that the negative attitudes became more salient and frequent, which is especially expressed in tabloids, in order to move into the last phase in positive tone and the need for their longer stay in Serbia. From the beginning of 2016, the emphasis has been put on the voices that spoke to Serbia as the last refugee station, which is a fundamental change in the paradigm. A quiet modeling of the mass begins, but in order to prepare the domestic public, the ideas about the possible retention of migrants were being slowly launched (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017).

7 Discourse in the public space normally does not represent a mapping of reality, but rather an ideological interpretation of real events and processes, aligned with the ideas and orientations of the ruling establishment. (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017)
The research indicates prevailing communicative Manichaeism characterized, on the one hand, with prevalence of sensationalist and xenophobic discourses based on the fear of newcomers; on the other hand, discourses emphasizing the humanity, mostly in treatment of migrants in Serbia, as well as through their individual life stories. As the main results, the research points at the absence of wider role of investigative journalism, deeper analysis of the current problems that Serbia is facing, combined with the fact that sources of dominant attitudes usually come from the ruling political elite. Practice shows that superficial, formatted, sensationalist and spun presentation of migrant crisis in the Serbian daily newspapers provide the soil for spreading the stereotypes about the place of migrants in society, thus making significant obstacles to their integration into the concept of slowly emerging civic community. (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

Graph 1. Intensity of reporting on the European migrant crisis (number of headlines) by quarters in the period January 2015 - March 2017

Source: Jevtović and Bajić, 2017

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8 Tabloids persistently appealed to sensationalism, xenophobia and fear of Islamic radicalism, whilst quality daily newspapers promoted the human aspect of the Migrant crisis.
1.1 The migrant crisis in Serbian daily print – qualitative aspect

At the beginning of the refugee crisis, it was easy to recognize the compassion, curiosity and fear in the media content, because the citizens of Serbia, through their own tormented experience, developed empathy towards the people in trouble who arrived on a daily basis. The serious newspapers determined the dominant tone, following the strategic position of the state authorities, which increased the visibility of the migrant crisis by organizing pseudo-events, press releases, press conferences or giving statements during field visits. Most of the articles have been published in Politika, followed by Danas (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017)

Similar to the worldwide reporting, in the Serbian media there was no terminology agreement on how to call people with small children in arms, bundles of clothes, with some sum of euros or dollars in their pockets: whether they are migrants, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, refugees, immigrants, illegal migrants, emigrants, illegal migrants. In the practice of the Serbian media, the most commonly used term was somewhat impersonal and neutral - migrants. Almost twice less was used the word refugee. (Aracki, 2016)

In reporting on migrant crisis two dominant discourses in Serbian daily press can be observed:

• Xenophobic – centered on a conspiracy theory about the planned migration of Islamic population to the European soil, thereby destroying European cultural identity, with an increased danger of terrorism, and

• Discourse of humanitarian disaster, human solidarity and respect for human rights (Aracki, 2016)

The socio-security paradigm of migrants (migrants as a security threat) and the changes they bring into the everyday environment is based on media narratives as sets of phenomena and events that as a goal have an overview of a particular topic in which more or less we want to believe. In doing so, creating title blocks, choosing facts and arguments, interpreting angles, publishing intensity, and similar attention-generating techniques depend on editorial teams that pack reality into media truth used as a propaganda tool. Hence, the media content is not usually a mapping (reflecting) of reality, but an ideological interpretation of real events, adapted to the demands of the ruling establishment. By a superficial analysis of the Serbian press, we can observe a wide range of circumstances and topics in which the migration crisis, migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are mentioned on the front pages. The attention of readers is drawn to the policy of the European Union and the views of politicians and citizens; the crisis in the region (special themes are the new built wall on Hungarian borders, Croatian blockade, and events on the borders of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Greece), the views of the UNHCR and the Red Cross, and appropriate service information (road passage, lack of food and water). Among the readings are the life stories and tragedies of migrants, “expert” analyzes (whether there are “sleepers” among them?),

Similar narratives could be observed in the media in Croatia (Mešanović, 2017; Pelizzoti, 2016)
Security

dialogues

trafficking in migrants, criminal acts like smuggling and issuing false documents, blocking borders or connecting with the fate of refugees from the former SFRY. (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

Ever since 2015, the European Union policy and the views of local politicians and citizens towards this policy have been in focus, while in 2016, in the public space migrants were also used as “bartering goods” in international relations, primarily between the European Union and Turkey. The focus of the critic was on the European Union, in particular Croatia and Hungary, as the first Serbian neighbors and EU frontiers gatekeepers and their attitude towards migrants. For example, Politika on April 7th writes: “Bugari žicom brane Evropu od izbeglica” – “Bulgarians defend Europe from refugees with a wire”, and two weeks later this daily paper is even sharper: “Mediteran guta imigrante i savest Evrope” - “The Mediterranean is swallowing immigrants and the conscience of Europe”. When Blic on Avgust 22nd writes: “The wave of migrants turns into a humanitarian crisis - Others beat them”, it aims at the incredible ability of the press to rapidly arouse a mass audience. Warm and human stories about unusual fates and personalities, complications and happy outcomes are the easiest way to attract the audience. Attention is rapidly conquered when the press turns to the heart, and not to the intellect, combining the text with the photo and using emotional language. A dashing photo of a Serbian policeman holding the Syrian boy in his arms touched the whole world, sending a message about a different and better Serbia. Tabloids first spotted this event, and Alo on September 10 and 11 under the title “This is Serbia!” publishes the image of policeman Rexhep Arifi who says “I would cuddle my own son this way if I had son.” Emotional agitation is the favorite technique of any propagandist, so it is not surprising that other newspapers give significant space to this topic, some of whom use this event to teach the lesson to others. For example, Blic, on September 11th, is noting that “the whole world praises Serbia” in the first plan highlights “Touching images of the state and citizen’s attitude towards the refugees” that “break down the negative prejudices about us created since the 1990s”, but at the same time publishes a photo with a signature: “Shame: Hungarians welcome migrants with masks”. In the shadow of the big stories with much less attention, the photo was made by a BBC journalist (Politika, September 11) (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

We see a new phenomenon: a transferred worldview - the hidden intent of a newsmaker and informative content based on the unnecessary production of stereotypes and prejudices that are rooted deep into the mental tissue of the auditorium. In that sense, the tabloids are ahead. Informer on 16 September thoroughly claims that it is on the pier: Humanitarian catastrophe - that “Serbia is the victim of EU fascism”, whereby “Hungarians return migrants, Croats threat with minefield”! A newspaper close to the official policy of the government argues that “Brussels silently supports a policy that will turn out Serbia into a refugee camp for hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East” which aroused fears among its readers. The day after the briefing continued with the headline titles: “The end of the great migrant crisis cannot be seen – Shame on Europe” with the information that “Hungarians captured even the five days old baby « whereas “Croats arrest all migrants», further complicating the heated atmosphere. On the other hand, the media were constructing a paradigm according to which Serbia has been the only
country in the SEE that has a consistently human relationship and approach towards refugees. (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

Conspiracy theories are used to increase the circulation. Therefore Kurir on August 24 with a large headline block raised the auditorium temperature: “The Hell of a Plan - Greece and Macedonia: Forward all migrants to Serbia!” The rhetoric of tabloid media in a specific way hyperbolizes the overall situation, and terms such as “drama”, “breakthrough”, “threat”, “invasion”, “disaster”, “chaos” and alike raise tensions and atmosphere of conflict, although in reality the situation is under control. Reports and headlines announce the disasters, characterized by strong words, sensationalism, mentioning the suspicious persons labeled as terrorist crossing the border, which exacerbates mistrust towards migrants. Thus, Informer on June 22 writes about the „Invasion of Migrants“, Blic warned on August 11: “All Syria will blow through Serbia, whilst the Kurir announces on August 26th: „The Bloody Scenario in Serbia - The Right wing extremists are preparing to Lynch the migrants“. (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

Daily Newspaper Danas introduces a religious factor in the public space and the titles “Christian Viktor Orban again “defends Europe” (September 4th) or „Orban sent „crusaders“ to the border“(September 5) encourage other media to point the religious issue to the forefront. On the front page of the Politika on September 9 appeared the text “Christian welcome, there is no place for Muslims”, noting that “clergy do not listen to the superiors, nor read the Bible, but defend Europe from Islam.” The threat of a new crusade is part of a massive panic that intimidates the audience, so it is not surprising that the title: “Will the Islamic State turn Europe against Refugees” (November 16th) to conclude that “Islamists will welcome a conflict between Christians and Muslims in Europe” (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

In addition to reporting on the refugee crisis for the analysis of media discourse, the category of absence is also very important. It refers to the issues that were not in the media or were only sporadically represented. For example, during the period when migrants were the most talked about, the negotiations were taking place in Brussels between Belgrade and Pristina, and four agreements were signed with the representatives of the self-proclaimed state of Kosovo, the issue of new elections was launched, while in the public leaked the recording of the meetings of the current Foreign Minister and a compromised person with a criminal record. Thus, in a certain sense, the refugee crisis was used to divert public attention from other important socio-political topics and events, in accordance with the interests of the ruling actors. (Jeftić and Bajić, 2016).

It can be noted that reporting on migrants in the Serbian daily press was mainly balanced, but also that it was in the function of the political marketing of the ruling establishment. The instrumentalization of media content is difficult to see, because the news are cunningly turning to the benefit of one side (usually those in power), and by overstating the importance of events, appearances or persons, the media create dominant value patterns. There has been a lack of

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10 It should be mentioned the narrative about Serbia as a victim of a non-unified European policy in the function of the cohesion of the domestic population, which should not be overly concerned because it has its own political leadership that is firmly in control of the situation.
discussion in the public sphere, so that the change of citizens’ awareness takes place inadmissibly slowly and depending on the opinions of the ruling structures. (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017)

2. Citizens attitudes towards migrant crisis

Recent researches have shown that Serbian citizens have a neutral attitude towards migrants but with the intensification of the refugee crisis, the number of the indifferent ones decreased, and the differentiation towards those with predominantly positive and negative attitude became stronger.

Graph 2: Comparative review of the UNDP Survey from 2016 (Galup) and UNHCR from 2014 (Cesid)

Source: Vuletić et al., 2016:7

In Serbian public the humanitarian approach dominates. Three quarters of the population (75%) shows strong or very strong humanitarian attitude towards migrants, while on the other hand slightly more than half (52.9%) of respondents have a very or very strong security attitude towards migrants. Citizens of Serbia have largely formed their attitudes towards migrants and their views on migrant crisis under the influence of the mass media and the ways in which they reported on this phenomenon (54.1%).
3. Conclusion

At its peak in 2015 the migrant crisis has become one of the most important stories in the printed and electronic media both worldwide and in Serbia. The media, in synergy with the holders of political and economic power, defined and framed this phenomenon and influenced the way in which it was perceived by the public. Media narratives varied, depending on the interests and positions of individual states and their media, as well as the values and ideological orientation of individual media. The dichotomy between the tabloid and serious press is very present, and the bulk of it uses a sensationalist and xenophobic discourse based on the fear of the newcomers and theses about the planned islamization of Europe, whereas the counter-narrative forces the humanitarian dimension of disaster, concern for the others and respect for human rights.

The mismatch of views on the migrant issue, including the varying terminology, the sensationalistic reporting and the lack of analytical approach, caused considerable confusion over the whole issue of the migrant crisis.

Particular topics raised more attention in some countries, and their attitudes towards this crisis and the way in which it has been dealt with, as well as the degree of criticism towards the EU policy on this issue, were conditioned by the position of each country, depending on whether it is a country that is the first acceptance of migrants (like Italy) or the country of their final destination (like Sweden and Germany). Reporting methods and sudden shifts of tones and
discourses were also affected by certain events that received great media attention, such as the image of the drowned Syrian boy Alan Kurdi on the Turkish coast who woke up pity and directed the discourse in the direction of humanitarian issue, to terrorist attacks directing the media approach to Islamophobia and security threat.

In the Serbian media there has also been a terminological confusion regarding migrants as well as a dichotomy of humanitarian and xenophobic discourse. Also, the tone and the framing of individual problems changes with the change of the manifestation of the humanitarian crisis. At the very beginning, Serbia was exclusively a transit country, and during the time when neighboring countries closed the borders, Serbia became a country in which migrants stayed longer, due to which the topics and approaches in the media changed accordingly. Media are insisting on the human image of Serbia, its citizens and its authorities in contrast with the behavior of certain neighboring countries, and fears of the future development of this crisis and the potential position in which Serbia could be found.

It is necessary for the media and journalists to abide by ethical norms and professional standards in reporting on refugees and not to be subject to the hysteria of xenophobia and Islamophobia, but, on the other hand, not to neglect the potential security problems of the migrant crisis and to report about them in a professional and responsible manner, avoiding sensationalism. The same goes for the humanitarian aspects of this crisis in which the media must have the necessary dose of empathy, but at the same time they should avoid the position of the “crying mother” and not use the human troubles in a sensational way to increase the circulation.

Analyzing geopolitical processes, climate change, energy conflicts and military-security conflicts, it is possible to foresee more permanent retention and integration of migrants in European territories, which in long-term plans include Serbia, although this is not discussed in Serbian public. (Jevtović and Bajić, 2017) In a certain way, the European Union is in front of the crossroads, because it is necessary to quickly align several different multi-dimensional platforms on migration: such as a coherent migration policy acceptable to all MS; absorption of opportunities for acceptance of migrants and sustainability of social cohesion within European countries; the concept of multiculturalism; respect and protection of human rights, etc. A particular challenge is the integration of migrants and their acceptance of the values that exist in the environments in which they come. In this case, the media may have a special role, since they must be open to both the domestic population and the newcomers (Aracki, 2016).

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EFFECTS OF AWARENESS RAISING ACTIVITIES ON REDUCTION OF PREJUDICE AGAINST REFUGEES

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Abstract:

The study was built upon the assumption that people’s inclination to fear from and discriminate against refugees stems from the prejudices imposed by the society that are easily nurtured when people lack adequate knowledge about refugees, either because they are not informed about the real situation or because they are misinformed about it. It presents results of an empirical research that is based on pretest-posttest evaluation design conducted as part of a Project supported by the UNHCR office in Skopje and conducted by the Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution during 2016-2017. The Project intended to raise young people’s awareness about causes of the recent refugee flee and its consequences on refugees through participation of 124 young people (unemployed youth, university students and high-school student) in two-day workshops. Each workshop involved participants in interactive activities that dealt with the issues of forced migration, cultural diversity, stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination, and human rights in general, and in relation to refugees in particular. A questionnaire containing two sets of measures of the participants’ level of prejudice towards refugees were first administered before the workshop started (pretest condition) and repeated after the workshop ended (posttest condition). Both sets of measures contained items on Likert scale (range 1-5): one set of 12 items measured negative attitude towards refugees while the other set of 6 items measured social distance. The statistical analysis (t-test) indicated significant differences between means obtained in the two conditions (pretest/posttest) for each of the two sets of measures as well as for each individual item in both sets. This finding, together with the fact that all workshop participants engaged willingly in social/humanitarian actions related to refugees, allowed for the conclusion that working with young people on raising their awareness about refugees’ needs and rights is a powerful tool for combating prejudices against refugees.

Keywords: refugees, prejudice, awareness raising,
Introduction

According to the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, among 65.6 million forcibly displaced people, 22.5 million are refugees – people that have been forced to flee their country because of persecution (for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group), war, or violence (UNHCR, 2018). Many of these people appear as migrants in other countries and face negative consequences of the prejudices towards them developed by the people in many host countries. Research has demonstrated that the negative public attitudes towards migrants are group-specific and depend on migrants’ cultural similarity, educational background, level of work skills, age, gender and race/ethnicity, economic contribution and religion (Crawley, 2005; Verkuyten, Mepham & Kros, 2017). Research participants who express negative attitudes towards refugees are mostly concerned about maintaining current welfare conditions and community cohesiveness and maximizing economic and health resources for in-group members (Schweitzer, Perkoulidis, Krome & Ludlow, 2005). Despite the evidence that contradicts the widely spread belief that the incoming refugees are the cause of intensified violence in the host countries (Karasapan, 2017) in eight of the ten European countries, half or more of the surveyed citizens believe that the refugees increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country (Wike, Stokes & Simmons, 2016). The results of the same survey (Wike et al., 2016) indicate that at least half of the citizens of five European countries included claim that refugees will take away jobs and social benefits, while in all ten countries, “people who have a more negative view of Muslims are also much more concerned about the threat of refugees”. According to Bullard (2015) research conducted in Slovenia (Lobnikar, Pagon, Mesko & Umek, 2002), the United Kingdom (Lynn and Lea 2003), Australia (McKay, Thomas, and Kneebone 2011; Pedersen, Watt, and Hansen 2006), and across multiple nations (Mayda 2006) has demonstrated that people with many false beliefs about refugees (beliefs that refugees are dangerous terrorists or economic exploiters) generally hold negative attitudes toward refugees.

The latest results of the Gallup world poll (Esipova, Fleming & Ray, 2017) place Macedonia as the least accepting country for migrants (with acceptance index of 1.47 out of a possible 9.0). It might be closely connected to the research evidence revealing that negative public attitudes towards migrants and refugees are influenced by the context in which attitudes are formed, including dominant political and media discourses (Crawley, 2005), since category labels associated with forced migrants and refugees have been found to make a significant difference to people’s subsequent evaluations of the social category in question. Research has provided evidence that respondents report more prejudicial attitudes, greater perceived threats to economic interest, social status or welfare of the in-group, and greater intergroup anxiety when responding to questions about unauthorized compared with authorized migrants. (Murray & Marx, 2013). Research participants tend to be more favorably disposed towards those recognized as refugees than they are towards asylum-seekers and/or other migrants (Augoustinos & Quinn, 2003; Hatton, 2016; Dempster & Hargrave, 2017) Research has also indicated that significantly higher levels of anger, fear, threat, and prejudice is associated with asylum seekers compared to
resettled refugees (Hartley, & Pedersen, 2015). In general, a profile of involuntary migrants (e.g. “real refugee”) is typically defined as deserving of sympathy and support, whereas the one that is assigned to voluntary migrants (e.g. “bogus refugees”) is presented as a threat to the country’s hospitality and, as such, an understandable target of feelings of anger and resentment (Verkuyten et al., 2017).

Research has provided evidence that negative public attitudes towards migrants and refugees are influenced by the knowledge of asylum and migration issues (Crawley, 2005). Polls reveal that the public’s understanding of refugees is shaped by the negative media debate which spreads misinformation and presents very limited positive information about refugees (Griffith & Chan-Kam, 2002). Based on extensive overview of the existing literature, Dempster & Hargrave (2017) emphasize that it is sometimes assumed that negative attitudes towards refugees and migrants are based only on inadequate information about migration flows and their consequences and that people need only to learn the facts in order to be discouraged from cherishing anti-immigration beliefs. In fact, the authors question the effectiveness of such ‘myth-busting’ strategies, arguing that public attitudes rely on real world concerns, in particular those connected to the economy, culture and security, and are based on complex emotions and values. While it is important to ensure that public opinion is not being shaped by misinformation or exaggeration (Griffith & Chan-Kam, 2002), engaging effectively with public attitudes towards refugees and migrants requires understanding the real world concerns, emotions and values around which attitudes are formed (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017). The Tent Tracker – a multi-country survey assessing public opinion in relation to the refugee crisis – has revealed that people who had been exposed to information about refugees’ sufferings (through photos/videos or news reports) and encouraged to imagine being in their situation became more sympathetic towards refugees (TENT, 2017). It is consistent with the findings that refugees, compared to other migrants, are considered more deserving of empathy that is based on identification with their unfortunate situation and perception that their neediness is beyond their control (Verkuyten et al., 2017).

Current study was built upon the assumption that people’s inclination to fear from and discriminate against refugees stems from the prejudices imposed by the society that are easily nurtured when people lack adequate knowledge about refugees, either because they are not informed about the real situation or because they are misinformed about it. Therefore, it is expected that raising awareness about refugees’ needs and rights will affect people’s values and emotions and eventually lead to reduction of their prejudices towards refugees.
Method

Awareness raising activities

The project *Refugee now – always human* was conducted in 2016 (from October to December) and 2017 (from June to December) with an overall goal to raise young people’s awareness about causes of the recent refugee flee and its consequences on refugees. Project participants, divided in small groups, went through two kinds of awareness raising activities: (1) workshops and (2) follow up activities. The two-day awareness raising workshops involved participants in interactive activities that dealt with the issues of forced migration, cultural diversity, stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination, and human rights in general, and in relation to refugees in particular. Within a period of 3 to 12 weeks after the workshop, participants engaged in different kinds of follow-up public awareness raising activities. High-school students involved in planning and implementation of various advocacy actions in their school and wider community, all in favor of refugees (e.g. humanitarian actions for raising donations in clothes, school supplies and money, exhibitions with drawings done by refugee children and children form a local kindergarten, graffiti drawing, public screening of documentaries about refugees, distribution of awareness raising materials, like informative posters, cookies with messages about refugees, badges and bookmarks, all developed by students-participants, etc.). University students were engaged either in producing illustrated books about the refugees’ lives, struggles and hopes, inspired by true stories, or in preparation and delivering of an awareness raising presentation to their colleagues and developing other awareness raising products intended for primary and secondary school students (flash cards, quiz wheel and board game, all related to refugees). Unemployed youth were assigned to participate in the public space installations featuring information on the current refugee crisis through publicly displayed (on squares and/or other frequent pedestrian zones in several towns) image boards and pavement stickers. Their role was to interact with the visitors, provide them with information about refugees, distribute brochures and administer surveys to those that were interested in sharing their thoughts and feelings incited by the installation content.

The design of the awareness raising activities was based on the notion that prejudices are negative attitudes (Allport, 1954) and therefore, it tackled all three components of attitudes: cognitive, affective and behavioral (Breckler, 1984). The awareness raising workshops faced participants with accurate information on causes and consequences of the refugee crises in order to combat stereotypes and misinformation that foster the cognitive component of the prejudices towards refugees. During the workshop, participants saw video material and engaged in discussion about the sufferings and violations of human rights that refugees are exposed to in order to evoke sympathy and induce empathy in an attempt to influence the affective component of

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11 The data used in this study was collected for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the awareness raising activities of the project *Refugee now – always human* supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office in Skopje and conducted by the Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in partnership with the Research, Education and Development (RED) Center, both from Skopje.
their prejudices. The behavioral component was addressed through the follow-up activities that involved participants in humanitarian and/or advocacy actions that included their immediate surrounding.

**Measures and procedure**

The effects of the project activities on project participants were measured by using a questionnaire designed to assess participants’ knowledge, attitudes and behavior regarding refugees. Two sets of measures of the participants’ level of prejudice towards refugees were extracted from the original questionnaire and used in this study as indicators of: *negative attitude towards refugees* (12 items) and *social distance* (6 items). Both sets of measures contain items on Likert scale, asking participants to express their level of agreement (from fully agree to fully disagree) either on a five-point scale consisting of statements that reflect attitudes towards refugees or on a four-point Bogardus type social distance scale. Higher scores on both sets of measures indicate higher presence of prejudices among participants. The content of the items is presented in the Results section of this paper, together with the obtained data.

Both sets of measures were administered twice – once, before the participants’ engagement in the project activities (at the very begging of the training workshop) to obtain the pretest measures and again, after their engagement in the project activities ended, to obtain the posttest measures. The time distance between pretest and posttest varied from one group of participants to the other, but most of them it was within an interval of 3 to 12 weeks. On both occasions, the questionnaire was administered in printed, pen and paper version, but in several cases, absent participants filled out the same questionnaire using an online platform.

**Participants**

The research was carried out on two groups (Group PRE and Group POST) and each of the two groups consisted of 124 participants that voluntarily enrolled in the awareness raising program. The structure of both groups with reference to the participants’ sex and their participating status is presented in Table 1. The data in the table shows that almost half of the participants in both groups are high-school students (49.2%), and among the rest of the participants there are university students (12.9%) and unemployed youth (37.9%). Majority of the participants (69.4%) are females – males were minority in all participating categories.

All of the participants took part in the *Awareness raising project* that normally requires the same group of participants to be included in both conditions (in the pretest and posttest). Two reasons prevented that from happening. First, in the original sample, the number of participants in the pretest situation (a total of 149) was larger than the number of participants in the posttest situation (a total of 130) due to the difference in the number of those that participated in the training workshop and those that persuaded with the follow up activities and were also available to fill out the questionnaire after those activities ended. Second, it was impossible to simply exclude the missing participants in the posttest condition because the identification for a big
portion of them was not possible (due to the time interval between the two testing conditions, the self-assigned codes for identification did not overlap in many cases). Therefore, an additional strategy had to be employed to assure as much inter-group overlap between research participants as possible.

Table 1. Structure of the Group PRE/Group POST (in numbers and percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>females</th>
<th>males</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>high-school students</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>university students</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed youth</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the selection of the research participants went through two phases. In the first phase, participants in the posttest condition with missing answers to the items of concern (either those that belong to the measures of prejudice, or those that indicate participant’s sex or his/her participating status in the project) were excluded and the POST group ended up with 124 research participants that belong to the categories presented in Table 1. In the second phase, the matching group of research participants for Group PRE was extracted from the initial group of participants in the pretest condition, based on two criteria: (a) the participants’ sex and participating status; and (b) their opinion about refugees who enter the country expressed on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). In order to prevent bias due to the difference in the initial opinion about refugees between Group PRE and Group POST, the comparative Group POST consisting of 124 research participants was established by excluding from each of the previously determined categories those that expressed the most negative opinion about refugees. After the selection was done, the Group PRE’s opinion about refugees was close to neutral (M=3.17, and 60% chose either positive or negative as their answer). The expectations are that most of the participants that belong to Group POST belong to Group PRE as well.

**Results**

Mean averages and accompanying standard deviations were calculated for each item in the two sets of measures of prejudices, as well as for all items that are included in each set. These means indicate the level of negative prejudices – higher means indicate higher presence of prejudices. Significance of difference between each pair of means obtained in the pretest and posttest condition is analyzed by using independent t-test (for the reasons explained in the section Method: Participants).
Table 2. Results on the participants’ negative attitudes towards refugees in the PREtest and POSTtest situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>items</th>
<th>PRE</th>
<th>POST</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall measure of NEGATIVE ATTITUDES</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that results obtained for the set of 12 items assigned to measure negative attitudes on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1=most positive; 5=most negative). Figure 1 displays the content of the items and points to the four items (labeled with Asterix *) that are scored in reversed order – while in all other eight items, agreeing with the statement indicates negative attitude towards refugees (fully agree=most negative attitude), for these four items, disagreeing with the statement indicates negative attitude (fully disagree=most negative attitude).

The overview of the overall measures, as displayed in Table 2, signifies that, on the average, the participants entered the activities with neither negative nor positive attitudes towards refugees (the overall \( M_{\text{pre}} =2.63 \) is even less than 3, which is the median point on the 1-5 scale). However, the comparative mean for the posttest situation is significantly lower (\( M_{\text{post}} =1.93 \), indicating decrease in the participants’ negative attitudes that have transformed into rather positive ones. Results of the t-test performed on each item show decrease in the negative attitudes measured by each individual indicator in the set (\( p<0.01 \)).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>PRE</th>
<th>POST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Refugees have no other choice but to leave their country which is at war.*</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Refugees of today are not in such a bad situation as refugees of the past.</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Refugees are vulnerable and need special protection.*</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. International documents give more rights to the refugees than to the citizens of the country they come to.</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. We should all advocate for refugee rights.*</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Dangerous people hide among the refugees.</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>3.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Refugees bring various dangers for the countries through which they pass.</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>3.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Refugees are a burden to the countries they come to because they increase expenses.</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. When I hear of the refugees’ sufferings I wonder if anyone is concerned with my problems.</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. When I hear of the refugees’ sufferings I want to do something to help them.*</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. The citizens should work on their own problems, rather than deal with helping refugees.</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Refugees should be helped mainly by international organizations, not other countries and their citizens.</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall measure of NEGATIVE ATTITUDES: PRE 1.92, POST 2.63

Figure 1. Comparative presentation of the means for the participants’ negative attitudes towards refugees obtained in the PREtest and POSTtest situation (* denotes reversed items)
Figure 1 presents, in a more illustrative manner, the mean differences for the individual items as well as for the overall set of items that compare the negative attitudes in the pretest and posttest situation. Having in mind that all visible differences in the means are statistically significant (Table 2), it is worth notifying that the item stating that Dangerous people hide among the refugees indicated the most negative attitude that was closest to the maximum point of 5 in the pretest situation \( M_{\text{pre}} = 4.34 \) remained the most negative one as well as the only one that remains over the middle point of 3 \( M_{\text{post}} = 3.47 \). The answers to all other items with pretest means above the medium point (Refugees bring various dangers for the countries through which they pass; Refugees of today are not in such a bad situation as refugees of the past; Refugees are a burden to the countries they come to because they increase expenses) have transformed (dropped for more than 0.75 scale points) indicating less negative attitudes (or attitudes that are closer to the positive end of the five-point scale). At the same time, even the most positive attitudes in the pretest situation (with \( M < 2.0 \)) that referred to Refugees have no other choice but to leave their country which is at war and When I hear of the refugees’ sufferings I want to do something to help them were further improved in the posttest situation (for 0.59 / 0.61 scale points). According to the obtained results, the answers to items that refer to security issues (Dangerous people hide among the refugees and Refugees bring various dangers for the countries through which they pass) and economic issues (Refugees are a burden to the countries they come to because they increase expenses) have remained to reflect the highest concerns even though the comparison between the pretest and the posttest measures indicates the greatest decrease in the negative attitude.

Table 3. Results on the participants’ social distance from refugees in the PREtest and POSTtest situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>items</th>
<th>PRE</th>
<th>POST</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall measure of SOCIAL DISTANCE</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 contains that results attained for the set of six items that invite participants to state the degree to which they are accepting of refugees. Each item on this Bogardus-type social distance scale was scored to reflect the level of social distance, from 1 as a measure of...
no social distance to 4, measuring maximize social distance in the scale. The comparison of the overall measures obtained in the pretest and posttest situation implies that, on the average, the participants entered the activities with lower level of acceptance of refugees (the overall $M_{pre}=3.13$ is much over 2.5 which is the meddle point on the 1-4 scale) but left with improved acceptance that is right in between distance and acceptance ($M_{post}=2.54$). Results of the t-test applied on each item show decrease in displayed distance from the pretest to the posttest situation ($p<0.01$), but the level of achieved acceptance vary from one item to the other.

Figure 2 presents the content of all items on the social distance scale and illustrates the mean differences for the individual items as well as for the overall set of items obtained in the pretest and posttest situation. Although the differences between the compared means for all items were found significant (Table 3), indicating improvement in the social acceptance of refugees, it is visible (though not unexpected) that the distance remains the highest when it comes to marrying a refugee and the lowest when it refers to accepting refugees to settle in the country and consequently, having a refugee as a friend or a colleague, while there is an obvious hesitation about acceptance of refugees as neighbors or teachers to one's own children.

Figure 2. Comparative presentation of the means for the participants’ social distance from refugees obtained in the PREtest and POSTtest situation
Conclusion

Participants entered the awareness raising program with knowledge that refugees are forced to leave their home country and with readiness to do something to help them. Furthermore, they held rather neutral attitudes towards refugees and felt socially distant from refugees. Regardless of that, both measures of prejudice against refugees appeared lower after implementation of the awareness raising activities than they had been before that. In other words, results from the statistical analysis have confirmed that participants in the awareness raising activities express higher social acceptance and more positive attitudes towards refugees after taking part in the awareness raising workshop and engaging in the follow-up activities.

The success of the overall awareness raising program can be ascribed to its design which incorporated recommendations that emerged from practical efforts employed for prejudice reduction in previous occasions. Since prejudice of all kinds is driven by ignorance (Griffith & Chan-Kam, 2002), the actual activities faced participants with facts and figures which ensured that their opinion about refugees was no longer influenced by misinformation or exaggeration. The implemented awareness raising program was also in line with the evidence which has implied that emotive and value-driven arguments may be more powerful than facts and evidence in combating prejudices towards refugees. (Dempster & Hargrave, 2017) and followed the reason that increasing awareness of the complexities of the situations in refugees' home countries and about refugees' sufferings could positively impact public sympathy (TENT, 2017). Going along with the argument that campaigns aimed at combating prejudices through modifying individuals' behavior must address common values (Crawley, 2009), the program confronted participants with violations of human rights as common values with broad societal consent. The awareness raising activities also responded to the findings that behavior change strategies are more effective when linked with on-the-ground community action that make the social environment more supportive of the desired results (Crawley, 2009).

Finally, the design of the awareness raising program took into account the recommendation that prejudice reduction activities will be more successful if based on a theory of change that defines objectives clearly and sends strong messages tailored to the targeted groups (Crawley, 2009). In fact, the program was developed to meet the outcomes of the following theory of change: If people are exposed to accurate information about refugees which address sufferings and violation of human rights and are engaged in social action that employ various means to transmit these information to their community, their prejudice towards refugees will be reduced. At the end, the intervention identified as awareness raising program managed to prove the assumptions brought by the initial theory of change.

The following participants' statements that illustrate their transformative experience regarding their preceding attitudes and feeling about refugees can serve as the best summary of the awareness raising program accomplishments:

- After the first few session of the workshop, during the break, we [students of psychology] discussed that it was not possible to expect change of the attitudes just because of the training,
but by the end of the workshop we realized that we experienced actual changes and we actively started to fight our stereotypes. [Psychology student]

- *It was very sad yesterday. Lot of us followed the sessions with tears in our eyes, because we realized where they [the refugees] came from and how incorrect our perceptions about them were, and that even we had held such perceptions.* [Comparative Literature student]

- *When I came home from the training, I started asking my mother how she would like to see people in a foreign country act towards me if I were a refugee and separated from her. At the beginning, she refused to talk about refugees, but when she realized that I was insisting to get her answer, she said that I had apparently learned useful things during the training.* [high-school student]

- *Through this project, I got a new and clear picture about who the refugees are and why exactly they need help. Looking at the displayed photos, they incited in me a feeling of sadness, compassion and a kind of solidarity, and I wanted to transfer the same feelings and impressions to the rest of the citizens.* [unemployed young person]

**References**


RISK FACTORS INCREASING VULNERABILITY OF MIGRANT CHILDREN

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Abstract:

This article analyzes and highlights the major risk factors answerable for the exposure of migrant and refugee children to physical, psychological, and sexual violence and exploitation in the context of the ongoing migrant humanitarian crisis. This paper looks specifically at vulnerability to trafficking, abuse and exploitation, and the ways that particular migration contexts associated with irregular migration across the Western Balkan Route can affect risk and protective factors.

Precisely, we draw attention to the lengthy asylum process, long wait times, inadequate accommodation facilities for vulnerable children, inhumane living conditions, lack of security, ineffective humanitarian and insufficiently resourced child protection systems.

Key words: risk factors, migration, vulnerability, children, violence.

1. Introduction

In recent years, the flow of migrants and refugees children into Europe has significantly increased. This has primarily involved a dramatic influx of Syrian, Iraqi and Afghani migrants/refugees who have moved through the Balkans (often referred to as “the Balkan route”12 (Bechev,

12 The “Balkan route” is the path stretching from the Middle East to the European Union through Turkey and South East Europe, via the well-documented and sometimes deadly journeys by sea from Turkey to Greece, on to Macedonia and onward to the European Union, either via Serbia and Hungary or Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.
2016) in their attempt to reach and resettle in northern Europe. Along the way and at various stages of their journeys and flights, many of these migrants and refugees children are exposed to different risks, vulnerabilities and exploitation, including, in some cases, human trafficking. And yet, to date, there has been limited empirical evidence of when, why and how vulnerability to human trafficking arises in mass movements of migrants and refugees and how new patterns of vulnerability and exploitation challenge established procedures for identification of and assistance to trafficking victims. More knowledge and evidence of these risk and vulnerability factors for migrant children are essential to better inform improved policy and programmatic responses in the fields of migration, asylum and human trafficking.

2. The use of terms and definitions

_Migrant and refugee._ A refugee is defined in the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees)\(^{13}\) as any person who: owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (Article 1.A.2)

According to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by its 1967 Protocol (the Refugee Convention), a refugee is a person who is: outside their own country and has a well-founded fear of persecution due to his/ her race, religion, nationality, member of a particular social group or political opinion, and is unable or unwilling to return (UNHCR).

There is no universally accepted definition of _migrant_ and disparate descriptions abound. Migrants may be defined by foreign birth, by foreign citizenship or by their movement into a new country to stay temporarily (sometimes for as little as a year) or to settle for the long-term. In addition, migrant is sometimes distinguished from, and sometimes includes, foreign nationals who are seeking asylum (Anderson and Blinder, 2017).

Recognising this complexity, in this paper we have used the combination term “migrant/refugee”, in an attempt to acknowledge and relate to both positions and the importance of problematizing these concepts and categories in an evolving social, political and economic context.

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\(^{13}\) The Convention entered into force on 22 April 1954 and it has been subject to only one amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographic and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention. The 1951 Convention, as a post-Second World War instrument, was originally limited in scope to persons fleeing events occurring before 1 January 1951 and within Europe. The 1967 Protocol removed these limitations and thus gave the Convention universal coverage.
The meaning of **vulnerability** depends heavily on the context in which it is being used, and it is an “imprecise and contested concept” (Peroni and Timmer, 2013). For example, “vulnerable populations” are often referred to as specific groups, such as immigrants, refugees or the homeless (Ruof, 2004).

In the context of migration, IOM defines vulnerability as “the diminished capacity of an individual or group to have their rights respected, or to cope with, resist or recover from exploitation, or abuse” (IOM, 2016). It is characterized by “the presence or absence of factors or circumstances that increase the risk or exposure to, or protect against, exploitation, or abuse.” The definition encompasses both individuals and groups, regardless of migration status. Immigration status can also have an impact on an individual’s vulnerability or lack thereof, and undocumented persons are often found as susceptible to “multiple dimensions” of vulnerability (Hilfinger et al., 2015). In including the potential absence of risk factors, the definition makes room for the concept of protective factors. Just as there are certain factors that can contribute to making an individual more vulnerable, there are certain protective factors that can potentially contribute to reducing harm, exploitation and abuse. Understanding protective elements is important in order to go beyond a disempowering definition of vulnerability that denies an individual’s agency to address his/her own vulnerabilities. Furthermore, such an understanding helps elucidate the ways in which individuals can be more or less vulnerable regardless of their membership of a particular group; women, children or refugees, for example.

Migrants highlighting conflict as a reason for moving and migrants who have departed from a country in conflict according to an international classification are more likely to be vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation during their journey (Galos et al., 2017).

Migrants can be vulnerable to violence, exploitation and trafficking, by virtue of moving through situations where these types of practices are prevalent. The prevalence, in turn, being explained by the fact that there are not sufficient protective factors on the journey to ensure migrants’ safety and that pre-existing risk factors may become more important.

### 3. Profile of vulnerability

In 2017, over 171,300 people, including some 32,000 children and at least 17,500 unaccompanied and separated children (UASC), arrived in Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. This is almost two thirds less than in 2016, mainly as a result of reinforced border control and agreements between Libya and European countries aimed at stemming human smuggling and dangerous migrant crossings, particularly on the Central Mediterranean Route. Following the pattern from 2016, the majority of children arriving on the Eastern Mediterranean Route primarily to Greece were from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, while those on the move through the Central

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14 Children, as defined in Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so.
Migrant children travel in a range of configurations. They may accompany family members, they may travel completely alone (so called “unaccompanied”15 child migrants) or they may be in the company of unrelated adults (so called “separated”16 child migrants). Some children embark on their migration accompanied but become unaccompanied or separated in the course of the journey.

Unaccompanied migrant children travelling towards Europe are reported to have reached an unprecedented number in 2016. Protection issues related to children on the migration routes or in reception and detention centres in the Balkans and Europe are increasingly reported by media and humanitarian organizations (see for example the recent: UNHCR, UNICEF and IOM, 2017).

The majority of recorded child migrant arrivals originate from three countries, Syria (27%), Afghanistan (27%), and Pakistan (24%). The remaining 22 percent come from Iraq, Bangladesh, Algeria, Morocco, Iran, Palestine, and several other countries (EKKA, 2016). Actual figures of unaccompanied child migrant arrivals are likely to be considerably higher than those reported, as many unaccompanied children present themselves as adults or as accompanied during registration in order to avoid delaying their onward journey (Bhabha et al, 2016).

The time spent on the journey is a strong predictor of the probability to respond positively: the longer the journey, the more vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation a child becomes. Moreover, children travelling alone are more likely than those travelling with a group of non-family people to report incidents.

Having a family member in the intended country of destination appears to be a protective factor for migrant children who travel without their families.

The findings related to the initial reasons for moving and to the level of conflict in the departure country are mixed. Results show that children are more vulnerable to human trafficking or exploitation on their journey if they left their countries of origin because of conflict/war or natural disasters. On the other hand, children who departed from a country in conflict according the UCPD/Prio classification, and travelling without family members, appear less vulnerable than children who left more stable countries.

The most vulnerable children travelling without their family members in terms of nationality follow the same pattern observed for the combined sample, with one important difference: Afghan children appear more vulnerable to human trafficking/exploitation than the rest of Afghans interviewed. Differences between children of different nationalities might be due to unobserved characteristics that relate to the environment of origin or other circumstances prior to departure.

15 Adapted from the General Comment No. 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside Their Country of Origin.
16 Note: In the context of migration, children separated from both parents and other caregivers are generally referred to as unaccompanied and separated children.
which are captured by the estimated country-level effects. Differences may also be due to how well children of certain nationalities are perceived and treated by host communities, communities they encounter in transit, as well as smugglers and those facilitating the journey (Eliza Galos at all, 2017).

The vulnerability associated with travelling completely alone and with travelling along the Western Balkan route clearly points to serious protection concerns for the increasing number of migrant children that arrived in Europe in 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNICEF and Partners Response</th>
<th>UNICEF RESULTS WITH PARTNERS (EXTRACTS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of at-risk children (incl. UASC) identified through screening by outreach teams and child protection support centres*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of children aged 6-17 including adolescents participating in structured education activities**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of frontline workers trained on child protection standards/child protection in emergencies***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targets 2017</td>
<td>10,350</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Results 2017</td>
<td>17,917</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,850</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10,152</td>
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<td>3,975</td>
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<td>6,353</td>
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*Combines results in Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia and Italy
** Combines results in Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia
*** Combines results for Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Serbia and Macedonia

In 2017, a total of 280 children, including 85 unaccompanied and separated children, benefitted from psychosocial support and referral in UNICEF-supported Child and Family Support Hubs (Blue Dots) in Gevgelija and Tabanovce. In addition, 207 school-age children attended UNICEF-supported structured non-formal education activities and 305 young children and their mothers received early and young child feeding assistance in UNICEF mother-and-baby corners. A total of 541 children in the transit and asylum centres, as well as children on the move, received season-appropriate clothes and other essential items. UNICEF also trained 164 social workers on topics related to child protection and work with adolescents in emergencies, thus ensuring preparedness and sustainability of services for similar future situations.

To address the pressing mental health issues experienced by refugee and migrant children and families stranded for extended periods of time in the Transit Centres, UNICEF prioritised mental health in its programming in 2017. For the most vulnerable cases this translated into early interventions, conducted by experienced psychologists identified in collaboration with the Macedonian Chamber of Psychologists. A first of its kind national manual for promoting the mental health of children, which can be adapted to all emergency settings, was also developed (UNICEF, 2018).
The visibility (and invisibility) of trafficking vulnerability is also influenced by the capacity as well as perceptions, assumptions and biases of those frontline responders who are responsible for victim identification. Unaccompanied minors are, in theory, a visible group with obvious risks and vulnerability to exploitation due to their age/maturity and unaccompanied status. But, as one service provider noted of her work with vulnerable children, some older children and youth may not be easily recognizable as children and their vulnerabilities and risk of trafficking exploitation may be overlooked. By virtue of what they have endured as migrants/refugees, they may appear older than they are and perceived as adults, rendering invisible their vulnerability and the many risks they have and may encounter. This is but one example of trafficking risk that may currently be invisible and more attention is needed as to how to make visible the range of trafficking vulnerabilities within this migrant/refugee population.

4. Risk factors

Specific risk factors increasing migrant children’s vulnerability were identified in the studied geographic areas. These factors directly and detrimentally impact the physical and psychological well-being of migrant children by disrupting their habitual protective environments and by generating challenging new family dynamics (Save the Children).

The paper highlights the following major risk factors:

Lack of capacity/Insufficient number of specialized facilities for children

The circumstances faced by migrant children largely depend on the facility where they are housed. However, although third-line facilities are the most suitable and beneficial settings for migrant children, these facilities have a severely limited capacity. Consequently, many migrant children are held in prolonged detention or among a larger adult migrant population, in contexts that aggravate their exposure to perilous living conditions and violence. Lack of proper shelter, poor protection standards and limited reception capacity remain critical issues, particularly in Italy, Greece and Spain, where both accompanied and unaccompanied children are kept for extensively long periods in hotspots and first reception centres, often in detention-like conditions (UNICEF, 2018).

While accompanied children, traveling under the protection of caregivers, may appear to be at a lower risk for becoming victims of violence in the camps, the hardships created by the deplorable living conditions can increase their levels of risk (ECPAT, 2006).

Risky living conditions

Since the onset of the humanitarian crisis, migrant living conditions have been characterized as deficient and precarious, failing to meet minimum health and safety standards and subjecting migrants to inhumane treatment (Carvalho and Pierigh, 2016). Some camps offer
protected living areas for families; however, since space is severely constrained, many families are forced to live in tents among the general adult population without any protection or separation. Inside the protected areas, families are forced to share their living space with unfamiliar families. Other camps offer unaccompanied children separate living areas with more protective tents or structures. However, according to an NGO worker in Athens, “These places are open and accessible to everyone, especially during the night.” According to another NGO worker, “Some camps have ‘Safe Spaces’ for children that are supervised 24 hours a day by members of NGOs (Digidiki, Bhabha, 2017). However, it depends on the camp you are in. Some children are lucky and some are not.” Structural factors, such as a lack of night lighting in camps, increase the risk of violence against women and children (Emmanouilidou, et al, 2017). However, despite recent efforts to improve living conditions and to provide fundamental services, camps continue to struggle to meet migrants’ basic needs.

**Weak and insufficiently resourced child protection systems**

Frequently migrants are unaware of their rights, opportunities and legal options, and are left to fend for themselves in centres without information or legal support. This has led to serious threats to their mental health, increased likelihood of absconding from the formal reception system, and risky behaviours and negative coping strategies (including transactional sex). Access to services such as education, health, and other social services remain challenging in many locations, thus hampering children’s development and delaying their social inclusion. This is particularly true for children with or without families in first reception facilities, children from so called ‘safe third countries’ (e.g. in the Western Balkans) or countries with low asylum recognition rate. (UNICEF, 2018).

This has become starkly relevant in the context of the massive migration and refugee flow that has unfolded in the Balkan region over the past two years (Brunovskis and Rebecca Surtees, 2017). And in these emergent and specific circumstances, human trafficking does not necessarily follow the same patterns as it has previously, nor even follow commonly understood vulnerabilities in general trafficking discourse. Vulnerability and risk take different forms and mean different things for people who are on the move and indeed in flight as compared with people who are vulnerable within their own communities and in countries where they have legal status and access to rights and protections. Human trafficking within a context of the massive and rapid movement of migrants and refugees and widespread human smuggling may not be easily recognisable as human trafficking. This is both because it may “look” different from “typical” forms of trafficking and because the circumstances of mass migration/flight (i.e. swift passage through a country, mixed nationalities, lack of a common language, lack of trust in authorities) make it difficult for frontline responders to gain an immediate and thorough knowledge of each individual’s circumstances and vulnerabilities, including when these rise to the level of human trafficking.

Furthermore, the boundaries between human trafficking and human smuggling are already challenging to implement in practice on the frontlines of identification and intervention (Skilbrei
& Tveit, 2008) and may become less clear in cases where migrants/refugees have been subjected to violence and/or extortion by smugglers, which may or may not meet the criteria for trafficking.

*Exposure to violence*

The forced cohabitation of hundreds of migrants of different cultural backgrounds, genders, and ages in inhumane conditions while facing an uncertain future and potential deportation has predictably generated anger, frustration, and hostility—sentiments that often spill over into acts of violence. Because of inadequate protective systems, women and children, who make up almost a half of the migrant population, face a particularly high risk of such violence.

**Delays in the asylum and relocation process—trigger for physical violence**

Young children and adolescents witness these acts of violence or, when caught in the crossfire, become its victims; some imitate violent acts themselves by participating in the riots. These incidents of violence have a severe psychological impact on children, reviving in them adverse experiences of violence from their past. This has an immediate impact on their physical and mental health,” reports a psychologist working in one of the camps (Digidiki, Bhabha, 2017).

Children with disabilities and children who have experienced trauma and abuse often lack vital specialised services. Unaccompanied and separated children, who are close to adulthood, also face numerous barriers and challenges in accessing education (language and vocation training) and protection due to their adolescent age, slow asylum procedures or overstretched social welfare and guardianship systems. Return and repatriation of refugees and migrants is also high on the European political agenda, and it is the responsibility of governments to adopt and/or improve safeguards for children and carry out a full best interest’s determination during the assessment of decisions to return children to their country of origin. (UNICEF, 2018).

“Violent episodes were triggered when migrants learned that their asylum claims had been rejected. Their despair led many immigrants to try and hurt themselves; some hit their heads against the walls or tried to rip their hair out or cut their veins. They exhibit violent behavior towards their children also by pushing them and kicking them when they’re on the floor” (EEDD, 2016).

*Sexual violence*

Weak or non-existent protective and legal structures inside camps exacerbate the risk of violence among migrants. Children’s inherent vulnerability and dependency on others, places them at a heightened risk for sexual violence. Unaccompanied children are at a heightened risk, as they can be victimized by adults and, for those held in detention facilities, by other unaccompanied children. The coexistence of dozens of children of various ages from different cultures and ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds creates significant power differentials. Research on sexual violence has shown that violence is a commonly used method to assert power and dominance in a social setting (Warburton, 2016).
Having endured the risks of sexual violence or having experienced sexual violence during their journey, migrant children suffer from the fear of sexual abuse in a place that should have guaranteed them safety and protection. This fear generates mistrust in the protection systems and legal paths to migration and may eventually force migrants to seek new and dangerous paths to a safer destination (UNICEF, 2016).

**Psychological violence**

Physical and sexual violence are often accompanied by psychological violence. Many participants noted that migrant children routinely fall victim to the influence of migrants engaged in criminal activities and gangs. “They [mafia gangs] take humiliating photos of children and then threaten the children with sending the photos to their families back home. This could be even worse than a violent act itself. Even if children survive physical or sexual abuse at their hands, the prospect of having their families know about this is even more devastating,” notes a research participant working in a camp. Another psychologist highlights the fact that blackmail is very common inside the camps, affecting both adult and child migrant populations. “They try to accept the situation and hide it from their families and then someone threatens to humiliate them back home, in one or another way. How can they overcome this threat? They have to obey them [the perpetrators] to reduce the risk of blackmail. But this never stops. It is a vicious cycle.” This kind of violence damages the already fragile mental health of children, turning them into easy prey for further physical and sexual violence and exploitation (Digidiki, Bhabha, 2017).

5. **Reflections**

Risks are increasingly complex and interrelated. Failure to understand these linkages can deepen and widen humanitarian crises as well as ensure that development remains unsustainable.

The 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflect a growing international awareness of the impact and importance of current global migratory movements, and mark the first inclusion of migration in the global development framework. The goals reflect a consensus regarding the need to pay more attention to the risks encountered by all types of migrants moving along dangerous routes, often irregularly, and to the measures needed to manage these movements. The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey also reflected this growing global awareness of the dynamics between migration, displacement and crisis situations. The need to address displacement and the vulnerabilities of migrants formed part of its five core responsibilities (WHS, 2016), and the SDGs also recognize the negative impact of forced displacement and humanitarian emergencies on the development of countries and their citizens.

Along with the focus on “safe migration” and “well-managed migration policies”, three other goals potentially relate to “unsafe migration”, particularly with regard to trafficking in persons (TiP), exploitation and abuse of migrants:

SDG 5.2: Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation.
SDG 8.7: Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.

SDG 16.2: End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children.

Our findings complement earlier research on sexual violence and exploitation during humanitarian crises.

We disclose the durable impact of exploitation and abuse on the psychological health of migrant children, and show how these result in a cascade of socio-psychological symptoms with profoundly deleterious impacts on children's resilience, self-esteem and long-term well-being.

As the migrant and refugee situation in the Balkans carry on to develop, vulnerability and risk possibly will modify and evolve, converting into another forms of human trafficking. The dynamic nature of forced and voluntary migration requires that reactions to vulnerability and need amongst migrants and refugees must be flexible and rapidly adjust to new and changing circumstances, including as they relate to other dynamic issues like human trafficking.

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MILITARY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

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Abstract:

The paper aims at a study of the recent trend of increased militarization of border security in the face of mass migratory influx. The theoretical framework of analysis draws on the findings of the theory of civil-military relations, particularly with regard to the concept of ‘core military missions’. The basic premise is that the failure of the liberal interventionism and export of democracy (often by military means or by stirring internal opposition movements towards regime change) has led to catastrophic consequences, which in return hit as a boomerang not only the world interventionist powers but also many other (transitory) states. Among other concerns, the dilemma of militarization of border control has become an issue of special significance both for the international and national security. The renewed military mission of safeguarding the borders from the migrant flaws calls for urgent theoretical deliberations and practical solutions.

Key words: refugees, international migration, core military missions, border control, militarization.

Introduction

After years of neglecting the ongoing humanitarian catastrophes and a mass of people fleeing from devastated states in South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, a mass exodus of immigrants has occurred. They were mainly traveling across the Mediterranean, and later the Aegean Sea. It was only when these refugees and migrant flows struck the Balkan and other European states that the alarm was turned on: by the end of 2015, migration into Europe was widely understood to be both a European Union and global problem (Tinker 2016, 395). The assessment of the situation on the ground as well as the overview of the plans developed by the European states
confirm that the crisis of such a scope was neither expected nor properly managed (Garb 2018, 2). The EU member states as well as the EU as such failed in so many ways in crisis management but mostly in terms of the efforts coordination, solidarity and responsibility. In each state, and particularly in those that were on the transit route or a final destination a number of governmental and non-governmental actors were activated.

When it comes to the military involvement, it is worth noting that the European Agenda on Migration of the European Commission (European Commission 2015) mentions the military only once (in the context of the surveillance issue) and possible common security, while defence policy operations/missions are mentioned three times. Obviously, dealing with the refugees and migrants in European states and under European laws has been seen mostly as police and not military/defence matter. However, as the crisis has been escalating and the institutional incapacity has been displayed, almost all affected countries have started deploying their armed forces on the borders. Also, in February 2016 NATO sent warships to the Aegean Sea. Their mission was left deliberately murky: NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told the media that “this is not about stopping or pushing back refugee boats.” NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, Gen. Philip Breedlove said that deploying the ships was a political decision and defining their mission remains part of the ‘military work’ yet to be done. (Albert 2016). Furthermore, a specific type of international military cooperation and assistance has become a permanent characteristic of border management. The European (as well as the Balkan) militaries have faced a relatively new challenge: they have been enforced to take over a new (sic!) military mission of responding to international migration and refugee crisis.

This paper gives an overview of the development of the ‘core military missions’ from the perspective of the theory of civil-military relations, with a particular aim to determine if the military is the right institution to deal with the migrant/refugee crises. The question could be rephrased also in the following way: how does dealing with the migrant/refugee crisis affect the military as an institution? The starting premise is that the issue of ‘core military missions’, or rephrased - the question what are armed forces for - is still relevant, dynamic and perplexing. In this occasion we put the main focus on a number of questions related to the current challenges for the armed forces. Is coping with migrant/refugee crisis is a new or maybe just a renewed military mission, which had always been there? In the light of ongoing global/regional tendencies, is the military supposed to be better trained and prepared? How does this military mission reconcile with humanitarianism? There are just a few of a vast repertoire of relevant issues that call for elaborated answers both on a theoretical and empirical level.

The paper is structured in three sections: first, we offer an overview of theoretical debate over the core military missions. In the second section, the focus is on the historical experiences of the military forces engaged in dealing with mass migration and refugee influxes. The third section examines how states characterize rising migration rates as a national security threat. The final part of this paper offers some conclusions on the basic question about the effects of the militarization of European borders.
Core Military Missions in Perspective

Having analysed the European armed forces, Edmunds (2006, 1059) has argued that they are undergoing a profound series of shifts in their core roles, which are increasingly challenging long-held assumptions about what armed forces are for and how they should be structured and organized. He emphasizes four main trends: a decline in the significance of the defence of national territory as a core organizing principle for regular armed forces; the increasing dominance of a model of military professionalization that equates ‘modern’ armed forces with smaller, highly skilled, flexible force structures able to project power abroad, whether for war-fighting or peacekeeping operations; the emergence of a number of ‘new’ security challenges, such as terrorism, drug smuggling and illegal migration, which refocuses military roles on internal security issues, and the continuing salience of a wider domestic social and political role for armed forces.

The theoretical debate over ‘core military missions’ is but an examination of the military’s functional imperative (Huntington 1957). Bearing in mind that the theory of civil-military relations was developed at the beginning of the Cold War, one should keep in mind that these deliberations were very much related to the realist school of thought. Not surprisingly, the main functional imperative for any military was the defence of a country from external threats, or in other words - guaranteeing its survival in an anarchical world. Edmonds (1988, 29) put it quite clearly, claiming that “the principal, and frequently the sole, state agency responsible for the security of all citizens and national territory against external physical threats; other responsibilities, either external or internal, are purely contingent.” Having been aware that this premise could not apply on all armies and states, especially on the ones in the so-called second and/or the Third world, most scholars of civil–military relations recognized that a purely externally orientated definition of the functional imperative is too narrow, because in many countries armed forces had often been employed primarily in internal security roles (protection from internal enemies). Furthermore, due to the bipolar world order, and especially the danger of a global nuclear clash, the core military mission transformed from military victory toward deterrent and war avoidance. Garnett (1991, 79) described this change in the following way: “One of the changes that has occurred since the Second World War is the increasing sophistication with which military power is exploited without military force being used. This is the age of brinkmanship, crisis management, and deterrence. These phenomena support the thesis that modern military force tends to be threatened and manipulated in peacetime rather than used in war”.

The aftermath of the Cold War was expected to bring a dramatic, or better a positive change in the international arena. The (alleged) ‘end of history’ was about to bring new role of military under democracy, along with a unification of core military missions in all nations that embraced liberal political order and market economy. The dominant (neo)liberal school of thought *inter alia* affected the theoretical assumptions in the field of civil-military relations. It was believed that the perception of military as the principal state agency responsible for the security of the citizens and national territory against external physical threats had become outdated; what had been considered to be ‘purely contingent’ responsibilities *de facto* took the lead. The post-Cold
War (new?) security agenda spelled out a number of non-military functions such as peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, disaster management and humanitarian intervention. It was believed that the post-modern (predominantly intra-state and ethnic) conflicts and other non-military risks had replaced the classical ‘enemy’. All these involved many tasks for which the conventional military was ill-prepared (Vankovska 1999). The optimists argued - or better, hoped - that the major challenge for military will be shifting away from training for war toward prevention of war, i.e. conflict prevention. The leading theoreticians of civil-military relations were arguing that the military was facing another transition period with regard to its raison d’être and organization. Moskos and Burk (1994) believed that modern mass army, characteristic for the age of nationalism, had gradually begun its transition toward post-modern armed force. The new military was supposed to adapt to the post-Wesphalian international system, in which classical state sovereignty principle stepped backward before the international organizations and institutions. Numerous scholars argued that war has fundamentally changed its characteristics, and that Clausewitzian trinity (state - military - people) had become obsolete. Post-modern society was expected to find appropriate responses to post-modern wars and challenges (Mueller, 1996), as conventional military was ill-prepared for the ‘new wars’ and ‘wars of third kind’, to use Kaldor’s terms (2013). The military, prepared to face classic large-scale armed conflict, had an ambivalent attitude towards new reality, which was best described by Van Creveld (1991, 3): “a ghost is stalking the corridors of general staffs and defence departments all over the ‘developed’ world - the fear of military impotence, even irrelevance”. On the new security agenda, it seemed that the military aspects of security had lost primacy, at the expense of three other dimensions of security - i.e. economic, political, societal and environmental. It was exactly when the top brass in the developed countries got worried over its relevance, the controversial concept of so-called military humanitarianism came in rescue. Especially, NATO took advantage of the situation in former Yugoslavia (first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, including the involvement in the consequent refugee crisis) in order to strengthen its legitimacy and to justify budgetary demands. The dramatic events of 9/11 also helped military finds so necessary enemy. Global ‘war on terror’ asked for development of expeditionary capabilities at the expense of other military missions. This is visible particularly in the NATO accession region, where states have invested significant efforts in developing forces that can be deployed wherever necessary. The Macedonian case is quite illustrative in this regard, with an extremely high ratio of deployed military forces in Afghanistan (and Iraq for some years) and the willingness to deploy more troops upon Western allies’ demand. The era of liberal interventionism has additionally given raison d’être to the militaries in the developed world but also in their partner countries. The long list of military myths (Eide and Thee, 1980) has been enriched by additional engagement in spreading democracy, responsibility to protect, regime change, etc. The long list of military interventions (many of which had no UN authorization) has had a boomerang effect, so the ‘democratized’ and ‘liberated’ countries, such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc. have become devastated areas that produce terrorism and mass migration.
In much of the civil–military relations literature it is argued that the changes of the armed forces’ functional imperative do not occur in response to an objective, functional reassessment of the nature of threat, but rather as a consequence of domestic and international socio-political influences that shape states’ perceptions of what their armed forces should look like and the purposes they should serve (Edmunds 2006). Actually, there are two dominant positions over the factors that primarily determine military missions, originating from Huntington’s theoretical framework. Although it is a matter of mutual and dialectic influence, the everlasting question reads: what comes first, functional or societal imperative? Edmunds seems to argue that the socio-political factors (political culture, public opinion, public expectations and system of values) have taken the lead ahead of risk and threat assessment and adequate responses by the military. In era of globalization, or at least, the narrative of a global world, one should take into account the developments and narratives about humanitarianism, solidarity, empathy, etc., which affect all components of the societal imperative. Having in mind that the power to shape public opinion and even ‘reality’ lies in the power centres, the military simply follows the suit, or better do what politicians have decided. The variety, ambiguity and changeability of security threats makes is difficult for military leadership to determine rationally and objectively the functional imperative. On the other hand, the political class supported by the corporate media, business lobby and academia is able far more easily to point out what should current priorities and main missions of the military be. At the end of the day, the principle of civilian supremacy makes it look normal and acceptable. For example, it is now well known that Iraq and Libya interventions were launched on false pretences but the political leaderships of intervening countries managed to convince the public that it was necessary to respond militarily in order to safeguard national security or to safe civilians’ lives.

However, the failure of interventionism is the best illustrated by today’s migrant and refugee crisis. Not so long ago, some Western militaries that were willing to invest in expeditionary capabilities in fighting terrorism or international conflict management, but now they face a peculiar situation to use their capacities more frequently for internal security provision, such as policing and safeguarding sport and other events, guarding airports, border control - and managing migrant/refugee crisis. If at the beginning of the demise of the Cold War architecture it looked that the military was a victim of its own success (so many non-traditional missions were transferred to it), from today’s perspective it seems that they have fallen a victim of their failures in external (expeditionary) missions, mostly because of the wrong political decisions made elsewhere.

**International Migration as a Post-Cold War Security Concern**

International migrations are nothing new in the human history. What has been changing is the very treatment of the phenomenon, which varies between a security and humanitarian concern and measures, or a mix of both. Millions of individuals, spurred by poverty are crossing borders to search for employment or simply a better life. Millions of others are forced involuntarily
from their homes/countries by war, conflict, famine, environmental degradation, etc. According to IOM’s data, today more than 244 million people around the world can be classified as international migrants (3.3% of world population). Global displacement is at a record high, with the number of internally displaced at over 40 million and the number of refugees more than 22 million (IOM 2018). Governments around the world have responded to the crisis in diverse and often contradictory ways. Few of them have welcomed legal immigrants and refugees, while the majority have demonstrated unwillingness to accept an influx of illegal or undocumented immigrants who have arrived either individually or in small groups, or as a part of mass movements. The influx has evoked xenophobia and dramatic legal and other responses. Many countries have enacted restrictive laws and regulations designed both to deter illegal entrants and to reassert border control. Some have reinforced civilian border patrol agencies with extra personnel and advanced detection equipment, while a number of governments have started building fences or formidable walls along their borders (Smith 1999).

Historically speaking, the military was used to protect the state borders not only from armed invasions but also from unarmed illegal migrants by ground, air and naval forces. In some cases (such as the countries in Eastern Europe or USSR) the military was used to deter not only illegal immigration but also emigration. The end of the Cold War caused a wave of migrations westwards. For instance, Austria stationed military troops (as assistance to regular border guards in their patrols) along the Austro-Hungarian border to prevent illegal emigration from Hungary and other Eastern European countries in the early 1990s. In 1994 Greece transferred troops to the border to stop illegal emigration from Albania, with an explanation that the move was not meant to threaten its neighbour. More recently, Greece again deployed army patrols, now along its border with Turkey. In 1995, when Italy faced an influx of illegal immigrants from Albania, it also deployed an army contingent. Four years later, the Italian government stated that it would consider a “full-scale military intervention” to stop migrant trafficking if the Albanian government requested it. Consequently, some countries, notably Australia, deploy naval force units to track or intercept international migrants. In some rare cases, countries have deployed aviation units to detect illegal immigrants. In early 1997, Japan’s Air Self-Defence Force dispatched several units to search for illegal Chinese immigrants who were allegedly en route to Japan aboard human smuggling ships.

Reliance on military when it comes to migrant flows is nothing new, in spite of the recent debate on militarization of borders that claims the opposite. Fences and guns have been used since long ago in many parts of the world (USA being just one notorious example), but the dominant narrative in ‘united Europe’ has differed a lot until recently. In the post-Cold War era, the Western state-building efforts - particularly in the context of security sector reform - focused on an introduction of a new model of integrated border management. The basic idea of this model rests on the premise military should not deal with border protection (as it usually did in the ancient regime), and instead civilian border police and/or similar agencies should be responsible for managing border security, including migration or refugee movements. This concept was particularly promoted as a significant element of security sector reform in the post-socialist and post-conflict countries that were trying to join European and Euro-Atlantic integrations.
It seems as if things have changed since 2015/2016 when an increasing number of EU and non-EU (Balkan) states have begun relying on military force to accomplish border security and manage mass migrant flows. In some cases military troops are deployed on the borders to patrol for illegal immigrants, while in others military forces are engaged to help manage or house large numbers of migrants and refugees. Also many EU countries are increasingly inclined to deploy police or military forces for international migration missions far away from the homeland. It raises the question of militarization of border protection high on the public and expert agenda. The scale of international migration has grown, so many countries have begun to characterize the phenomenon of migration as a serious security concern. The question then arises: Why is international migration seen as a security threat and, moreover, is this perception justified? Weiner (1995) has suggested at least five scenarios that may prompt governments to characterize international migration as a security concern. First, host governments may view immigrants as an internal political risk. It is the case when a government and/or the society believes immigrants and refugees threaten the host country's cultural identity. Local residents may fear that large numbers of immigrants might overwhelm them demographically and undermine their political and cultural dominance as well as threaten their national identity. In Western Europe, fears about the cultural and political impact of immigration have helped fuel the rise of rightist, xenophobic political parties. Second, governments may perceive migrants or refugees as a social or economic burden because of their alleged criminality or welfare dependency. Third factor that causes international migration to be viewed as a security concern has been the role of media coverage (the so-called “CNN effect”). Characterizing illegal immigration or mass migration as a national security concern also helps pave the way for military involvement in immigration matters in the future.

The first challenges to the EU appeared in early 90-ies. Later on, the wave of ‘fake asylum seekers’ (mostly from the Balkans) got far more attention (although military responses were not anticipated). The 2015/2016 refugee crisis has been a real turning point, since the Fortress Europe proved to be both unwilling to live up to its liberal appearance and unable to cope with such a mass movement. According to Nessel (2009) even prior to this peak, the EU, like USA, has cast a wide net in its multifaceted approach to deterring migrants and refugees alike from reaching its land borders. It no longer waits for refugees to seek protection at their borders. Rather, the EU proactively sends its forces directly into refugee-sending nations (whether by stationing officers at airports or ships in the sending-nation’s waters) in order to prevent their citizens from fleeing to its mainland.

Coming through the Balkans almost 764 000 migrants reached the EU member-states, such as Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia in 2015 (Frontex 2016, 16). As soon as the governments of these countries realized that their police forces and civilian capabilities were not sufficient to handle the situation, they deployed their armed forces. According to Nemeth (2018a), almost 7 000 troops with significant amount of equipment and numerous vehicles were sent by Austria (1 600 troops), Bulgaria (140 troops), Hungary (4 500 troops) and Slovenia (700 troops) to their respective borders in order to help to manage the migration crisis in 2015-2016. Ever since their troops have been participating in patrolling the affected borders, supporting civilian authorities
Security dialogues

and building border fences (500 km by Hungary; 200 km by Slovenia; 150 km by Bulgaria, 4 km by Austria). Thus border control has become one of the core tasks of the armed forces. Other states, such as Czech Republic and Slovakia, although not affected directly by the migrant crisis, they conducted exercises, where hundreds of military and civilian personnel prepared together for a possible migration wave, and also offered military and civilian capacities for the neighbouring countries to tackle the migration crisis. Individual EU member states also negotiate agreements with refugee-producing nations, so that any refugees actually landing on EU soil can quickly be sent south again. In addition, they provide funding for southern border states to build detention centres.

Obviously, these developments have changed the dynamics of regional defence cooperation. For instance, Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) has become the most relevant Central European platform for defence collaboration against irregular migration. Since 2016 the defence ministers of the CEDC countries have been regularly discussing ways to enhance military cooperation with regard to irregular migration, and they also invite their counterparts from Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro to these meetings. The first ever CEDC military exercise was conducted in September 2017, where altogether 2360 CEDC troops made preparations for a possible new migration crisis. Many European armed forces are undergoing a profound series of shifts in their core roles again, and have been increasingly rediscovering their traditional territorial defence, internal security and nation building roles. Nemeth (2018b) names that militarisation of border management without giving it any negative connotation.

**Militarization of Migration**

The term military humanitarianism has been coined especially in the height of the 1999 NATO campaign. It is now a widely-used oxymoron for an engagement in coercive international interventions under humanitarian pretext. For instance, NATO air forces were bombing military and civilian targets in FR Yugoslavia, but also assisting refugees in the camps in Albania and Macedonia.

In the context of the current refugee crisis a similar rhetoric has been used but in a rather altered manner. One way governments try to skirt the political controversy of immigration operations is to label them as humanitarian operations. The humanitarian label often conveys some degree of benevolence or altruism on the part of the acting nation and, in some cases, can help that government muster political support - both domestically and internationally - for its actions. But the label ‘humanitarian’ should not obscure the fact that humanitarian motives are sometimes co-mingled with anti-immigration or immigration enforcement objectives in these types of operations. The problematic relationship between humanitarianism and politics was described by James Orbinski of Médecins Sans Frontières, on the occasion of his Nobel Lecture: “Humanitarianism is not a tool to end war or to create peace. It is a citizen’s response to political failure. It is an immediate, short term act that cannot erase the long term necessity of political responsibility.” (Orbinski 1999). While Orbinski was criticising those interventions called ‘military-
humanitarian’, nowadays are intentionally framing the migration management with use of military means as a humanitarian emergency. For instance, in March 2016, in his address to the European parliament, Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees did not mention to what extent, in recent years, the militarisation of migration and border controls has been explicitly bound with notions of humanitarianism. Logics of ‘securitization and humanitarianism’ that highlight a ‘symbiotic relationship’ between ‘care and control’, that is, between ‘the humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military (the hand that strikes)’ (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 59).

The moral discourses typically associated with the humanitarian aid organisations are today gaining importance in the context of border control, which makes clear what types of political and epistemological implications this discursive dislocation has. Also the legitimacy of the military-humanitarian operation depends on how it is described and explained through media. Public discourse on migration has been characterized by an increasing politicization, i.e. a steady rise in importance of the migration question, until it becomes a central part of the political agenda (Krzyzanowsk & Wodak, 2009). It did not take long to securitize the problem of migration both in the public and political domain, as Colombo (2017) rightly claims. She suggests that understanding the discourses on the recent 2014–2015 refugee crisis, one should take into account Bigo’s concept of an “internal security field” and Walters’ concept of “domopolitics”. According to Bigo, a “security continuum” stretches from terrorism to regulation of asylum rights, including immigration, and migratory flows. Within this continuum, which is organized on a transnational basis, questions of asylum and migration become “security” much more than human rights or citizenship questions (Bigo 2000). This process can be regarded as strictly connected to the concept of domopolitics, which refers “to the government of the state (but, crucially, other political spaces as well) as a home” (Walters 2004, 241). Domopolitics implies a reconfiguring of the relations between citizenship, state, and territory. At its heart is a fateful conjunction of home, land, and security. It rationalizes a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home ... it has powerful affinities with family, intimacy, place ... the home as our place, where we belong naturally, and where, by definition, others do not” (ibid.).

Almost simultaneously, border control is redefined within a moral imagination that puts emphasis on human vulnerability. The soldiers’ activities are depicted as similar to the recurring type of imagery of aid delivery, with just rescued, grateful migrants receiving food and water. Within the media and other propaganda materials it is usually done outside of any historical or political framework, as shows Musaro’s analysis (2016) of Mare Nostrum operation. In his view, the issue of migration flows is here construed as a journey without destination, as a tragic game of fate. As protagonists of a crisis that comes from nowhere, migrants are depicted at the same time as subjects who are forced to put themselves in danger – departing on unsafe boats – and as subjects at risk (of death and trafficking) who need to be saved. To sum up, speaking the language of combatting human smuggling and potential terrorists, while rescuing lives and protecting migrants’ human rights, Mare Nostrum performs the spectacle of the ‘humanitarian battlefield’. On 15 October 2015, during his visit to the Italian Parliament, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon,
paid homage ‘to the Italian soldiers who saved thousands of human lives in the Mediterranean’, and thanked ‘the Italian population for the efforts made to welcome and assist migrants.’ The Italian Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, referred to Italy as a country of the Italian officers who became nurses to deliver babies in the ships. It is an Italy we are proud,” he concluded. As Musaro puts it rightly, “the bio-political imperative of managing lives is expressed through an aesthetics of trauma, where war (on migrants) is represented both as an intimate experience of sorrow and a public act of peace-making’ (ibid). However, it did not take long for the military to clash migrants on the streets of some Italian cities.

Traditional military planners are less than enthusiastic at the prospect of military troops being used in the quasi-police or civilian humanitarian roles that immigration operations entail. Moreover, for many military leaders, the use of military assets to counter illegal immigration or large-scale refugee flows is inconsistent with the military’s traditional fighting role. Lange (1998, 106) has observed that the sentiment held among most U.S. military officers is that “the purpose of the U.S. military is to fight and win the nation’s wars. Military officers trained to have that mind-set will inevitably find humanitarian operations to be a secondary activity.” After the 1994-1995 Cuban refugee crisis, Pentagon drew up plans to relieve military troops from refugee care by hiring civilians instead. One reason some military professionals oppose the use of the armed forces in immigration control is the potentially negative impact such missions might have on the military’s traditional war-fighting ability. Military leaders generally place a great deal of emphasis on preparedness or readiness, and non-war fighting missions are often viewed as distractions that do little to promote soldiering skills. Moreover, these missions can be financially burdensome, particularly during times, as in recent years, when military budgets are facing austerity pressures. In particular, refugee care missions involving the establishment and maintenance of “tent cities” can be particularly costly due to the extensive and unique logistical demands that these missions require. Another reason why military leaders resist the idea of using troops in immigration operations is the possibility that such operations could provoke political controversy and potential backlash against the military. In most countries, immigration questions and policies are controversial and often emotional. Military professionals often would prefer to stay out of - or above politics. But once an issue has been securitized, i.e. related to the state/nation’s existence, the military becomes the most important institutions. The practice of the recent migrant crisis proves that when security is about risk management, it becomes a matter of long-term security governance (Vezovnik 2017, 14).

According to some scholars (Nessel 2009), there are a number of advantages from relying on the military in border management: first, large-scale refugee movements call for an adequate logistical response in order to prevent possible violence and chaos. Military possesses all organizational and other capabilities that are often unmatched by other government agencies, even those agencies that work with immigrants directly. Second, military units are capable of establishing a controlled and organized response to an emergency within a matter of days or hours. Third, professional military forces have their own medical, legal and social services personnel accustomed to handling chaotic and unpredictable situations. Fourth, they may have linguists to
provide language translation services and who can assist immigration authorities in completing refugee screenings. Fifth, military forces can be effective in interdiction operations, which in some respects parallel combat patrols for which soldiers are often trained. Finally, military forces are often proficient in the use of advanced detection equipment that is frequently used in migration operations.

The case in support of military involvement in migration issues asserts that the presence of military forces in such emergencies has helped prevent or mitigate violence and, in some situations, has saved lives. Additionally, military forces are often better equipped to handle or control riots that may erupt in refugee or migrant camps. When migrants who live in the camps perceive that they have little chance of gaining political asylum in their desired destination country, their mood can become desperate, especially if they remain in these camps for an extended period of time.

Some experts from the ground, especially the members of the aid community, point out a number of disadvantages, based on practical experiences in refugee crises in different parts of the world. For instance, Fiona Terry (2001) from Médecins Sans Frontières argues that although many aid/humanitarian organizations have welcomed military engagement in logistical support during refugee crisis, the appropriateness of an increased military presence beside humanitarian organisations in the field remains questionable. In more detail, she claims that the motivation of the military is different from that of humanitarian organisations, even if the intervention is couched in “humanitarian” terms. Namely, humanitarian action is premised on the equal worth of all human beings, while military interventions have been selectively undertaken by governments with direct national interests. Also, outside military forces are rarely perceived as impartial in conflicts, compromising the image, and hence the effectiveness of aid organisations that associate with them. Third, the military lacks the technical competence to respond to the needs of refugee populations. Military forces are trained and equipped to provide medical care and facilities to a predominately male, adult, healthy population. Finally, according to Terry (2001, 1431), the most serious shortcoming of military involvements in relief operations of the past decade does not concern what they do, but what they do not do. Protection from violence is the most vital need of refugee and displaced populations today, and is a task that humanitarian organisations are unable to assume. Yet most military forces have been deployed with a humanitarian mandate aimed at providing or protecting relief supplies. This mandate gives governments an image of doing something.

When a government decides to involve its military in immigration matters, it often sets up the military for criticism from immigration and refugee advocacy groups. For instance, the US society usually faces a dilemma of betraying its values and its ideals (as immigrant-made society) if it resorted to a military response to its long tradition of welcoming immigrants and refugees. Yet this value - like many others - has already been sacrificed for the sake of national interest. When Italy chose to deploy its army along its Adriatic coastline, some immigrant associations and other political groups strongly condemned the move. (Pina, 1995). Another factor contributing to the political sensitivities of using military forces in international migration operations is the risk of unplanned or misdirected violence. In general, military troops, in contrast to police agents or
border guards, are trained for violent combat or combat-support tasks. Few military academies, schools and basic training regimens around the world provide adequate training on how to deal with the unique problems associated with migration and refugee flows. Thus when young, zealous soldiers who have been trained for traditional warfare suddenly confront an influx of would-be immigrants, a major concern is that they may act in accordance with their military training and, perhaps, respond too aggressively.

**Conclusion**

The increased use of military force to deal with migrants marks a dramatic shift in how many countries view the challenge of international migration, treating it less as a political problem and rather as a security and military concern. There is an ongoing shift of understanding the (migrant) crisis as a concept concerned with protection, stability, security and self-survival. Therefore, the use of all means at the disposal becomes a necessity. It creates a ground for legitimation of the new military mission of many armies in the countries affected by mass migration.

As the scale of international migration grows around the world - driven by such factors as population growth, unemployment in source countries and rising economic disparities between nations - many governments are likely to continue classifying migration as a national security concern and deploying military forces in both interdiction and repatriation operations. The fact that military forces generally can provide a quick and efficient response to situations that can often be logistically challenging partially explains this growing trend. The increased reliance on military force indicates a fundamental change in ways the armed forces will be used in the decades ahead.

From a legal and moral perspective, the apparently inexorable trend of increasing involvement of military forces in international migration events leaves certain troubling questions unanswered: has international migration become so serious as to necessitate a military response? Is military force an appropriate means by which nations can respond to migration and refugee flows?

**References**


CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE AND ITS SECURITY REPERCUSSIONS

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Abstract:

Migration movements have been occurring during the entire history of mankind, while the main reason for abandoning national country or ethnic community was quest for better life and/or rescue from persecutions and violent conflicts. Unlike legal migration, that takes place according to the laws of the migrants’ country of origin and destination country, there is illegal migration that reflects special circumstances and that is defined as each movement of the population from one country to another that does not take place under the laws of those countries, including illegal stay of foreigners in a given country. Recently, European countries and, in particular, the Member States of the European Union and the Western Balkan States (states in transition), are facing migrant and refugee crisis, caused by uncontrollable and outrageous volume of migrants’ arrival. The causes of the current migrant crisis in Europe are different, but also very similar to previous: escape from the war suffering, extremism and terrorism, the search for better life, abandonment of failed and non-functional governments, etc. The major migration flows from The Near, the Middle East and Africa are directed towards highly developed countries and areas, whereby the Member States of the European Union are the most desirable, and most easily attainable destination. Mass illegal migration to Europe after 2014, regardless of the security measures taken and introduced legal restrictions, have heavily threatened border control and surveillance and border security, while migrant crisis in some EU Member States have adversely affected interior security, thus political and economic situation of those countries. Obviously, the institutions of the European Union have failed to recognize security risks of uncontrolled migration, while partial boost in border control on the eastern border of the Union has not reached the expected outcomes. Aggravating circumstance in solving current refugee crisis was and still...
is the lack of common procedures, the absence of solidarity, and conflicting political views on the issue by the EU countries.

**Keywords:** migrant and refugee crisis, the European Union, the Western Balkans, security risks.

**Introduction**

The European migrant-refugee crisis is an umbrella term for a series of events and incidents related to the mass arrival of refugees and migrants from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East during 2015 and 2016; mass of people seeking the asylum in the countries of the European Union. In the years before, the crisis had been mainly manifested on the Mediterranean coast of Italy, where number of illegal migrants were coming by ships and boats, in a series of cases, unsuccessfully, and what has led to mass deaths (Townsend, 2015). After 2014, the most massive influx of refugees and migrants is noted in the Balkans, which is a transit route from Turkey towards the developed countries of the European Union.

The European population is among the oldest populations in the world. In fact, the average age of the population of the European Union in 2010 was 39.8 years, where among the Member States of the Union, the highest average age was in Germany (44.2). Total average of the population 65 years older was 16%, while the population 80 and over was 4.1% (European Commission, 2014). The continuous increase in the contingent of the old population on one side and a decline in working-age population on other side, imposes a series of economic and social challenges to European societies (Arsenović and Solarević, 2016). Looking from this perspective; could the large number of refugees and migrants, mostly younger population, it be turned into advantage when it comes to demographic challenges regarding the population aging? However, we should bear in mind several cultural and social differences that must be overcome in order to integrate immigrated population in new social, economic, and political settings.

Specific religious and cultural customs of immigrants are unacceptable for the environment they are coming to, and they are, too, challenging the legal systems of European countries. In such situations, enforcement of current applicable laws means endangering fundamental rights and freedoms arising from cultural and religious heritage of migrants. If migrants and refugees conflict the applicable legal system in the European Union, this can only be resolved if both sides are willing to compromise: either in terms of respect the positive laws or loosening up on immigrants’ habits and customs. Both cases violate current principle of security. In the first case, it is about the disruption of the legal system, and in the last instance, the security situation in general, and in the other case it is about the breach of the human rights of immigrants.

The European political establishment was initially benevolent towards refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but soon afterwards, there was a xenophobic reaction of politicians in EU Member States. Attitudes towards migrants have become a subject of sharp disputes between
certain Member States, notably between Germany on the one side, and Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland on the other (Stevović and Crnobrnja, 2015).

In the last few years, the migrant crisis raised two conflicting conceptions of European multiculturalism. According to one concept, the essence of the multiculturalism of the old continent is its openness for returning of postcolonial non-European religious and cultural experiences. Another concept calls for inner-European ideal of multiculturalism and multinationalism. By this notion, Europe is inside an open society which historic formed identity and the roots of the character should be kept from mechanical disruption, as well as from an invasive demographic inflow from other continents and non-Christian religions, particularly Islam. This notion assumes that Europe has a notable Christian identity.

When it comes to the Republic of Serbia, and the Balkans in general, there are traditionally different problems concerning illegal and forced migration; its extent and intensity, as well as the impact on the vulnerability of human rights of refugees and migrants. It has always depended on the number and structure of persons seeking asylum or transit pass, reasons for request, country of origin, their racial, national, or religious affiliations, as well as on national legal framework, and economic, social, and political circumstances.

Causes of the European Migrant Crisis

Migrant and refugee crisis, which, in the last few years, has caused serious crisis in relations within the European Union, primarily is caused by the wars and upheavals in the Mediterranean and the Middle East Arab countries, but also by unclear interventions of the West in throwing down the dictatorial regimes during so-called The Arab Spring. Protests against Arab authoritarian regimes have initially been greeted with sympathy in Europe, but without clear interest of the European Union and the recognition of possible adverse outcomes of these processes. Good example is Libya, where the opposing armed formations received NATO air support, particularly by France, to combat the armed forces of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. However, after throwing down the regime, there was no sufficient support from the EU in building up a post-authoritarian society, and Libya, ended in clashes between armed Islamist factions, became a space for invasion of an ISIL jihadists and a key point of instability in North Africa. Similar happened in Egypt, and especially later in Syria (Tadić and Associates, 2016).

On March 15, 2011, in the Syrian cities, Damascus and Aleppo, mass anti-government demonstrations took place, the first armed conflict broke out a few days later in the southern Syrian town, Daraa, where the snipers shot the police, medical personnel and civilians (Anderson, 2017). In restoring the order in Daraa, Syrian army has joined, cordonning off the city. Only first few months of fight claimed the lives of more than 80 Syrian soldiers (Narwani, 2014). This has marked the beginning of the civil war that devastated the country and killed more than 400,000 people. Over the past seven years, the parts of Damascus, Aleppo, and Palmyra one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, have vanished. In the fighting, Daraa, Deir al-Zour, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Maaloula, Eastern Ghouta and other cities were destroyed, (Bartlett, 2016).
Before the war conflict, Syria had population of about 23 million. During the war more than half were displaced. It was expected that the Syrian civilians will run away from areas under control of terrorist groups - jihadists who made harsh public executions and declared war on religious minorities and other “nonbelievers”. About a million and a half of Syrian refugees escaped to Turkey, and half a million in Jordan and Lebanon. In 2015, hundreds of thousands of Syrians managed to reach EU via Balkan route. Nevertheless, during the war, the vast majority of refugees still remained in Syria in the areas under control of the Syria Government. On December 31, 2016, UNHCR estimated the number of Syrian refugees to 4.8 million, and the number of internally displaced persons in Syria to 6.6 million (IDMC, 2016).

Otherwise, after the American invasion of Iraq, Syria has accepted about two million Iraqi refugees. UNHCR survey conducted at the end of 2010 has shown that a significant number of these refugees did not want to return to Iraq. Syrian Arab Red Crescent estimates that in mid-2014 there was still 450,000 Iraqi refugees in Syria. Even five years after the war expansion, thousands of Iraqi refugees were still occasionally escaping to the “relative safety” of Syria, especially in the province of Hasakah (Hassan and Alazroni 2016).

In the spring of 2015, the north of Syria was invaded by forces of Jaysh al Fateh, Jabhat al Nusra Alliance and “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) financed by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The Islamist militias have then taken a greater part of the Idlib and Hama, expelling many people to the south, to Homs and Damascus, and to the west, toward the Syrian Mediterranean coast, and to the north, toward Turkey. In May 2015, ISIL jihadists occupied Palmyra, and in the same year, from July to September, Turkish forces have carried out a series of attacks on the Kurds in the border region with Syria. After beginning of Russian air operations in 2015 against Islamist forces, the situation on the ground has changed, and ISIL jihadists are brought to the brink of military collapse and were almost expelled from Syria. However, fighting between the Syrian Army loyal to President Assad and the remains of various rebel structures supported by the United States have continued (Anderson, 2016). We should bear in mind that share in responsibility for the conflicts, displacement of population from Middle East, and European migrant crisis have USA, as well as EU, which supported the war operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria (Nevradakis 2016).

Widespread notion, particularly propagated by the USA, is that on the wave of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 peaceful national protests in Syria took place, and after several months of repression by the regime of Bashar al-Assad, protesters had no other choice but to rise up arms and stand against the forces of the Syrian Government in order to defend themselves. However, some independent observers questioned the credibility of such a statement. Namely, in Syria in early 2011 there were large protesting gatherings, some of which were against the Government and some in support of al-Assad. Most participants in these groups had not planned an armed uprising. Saudi Arabia’s official, Anwar Al-Eshki, admitted in 2012, that his country has equipped with weaponries radical Islamists in Syria (Al-Eshki, 2012). Some of the Western governments and media have supported jihad’s version depicting Syria’s conflict as libertarian revolution. Saudi support of Islamists in Syria, and the U.S. goal for regime change in Damascus are not unrelated phenomena. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice yet in 2006
announced plans for a “new Middle East”, to be achieved through “creative destruction” (Levine, 2006). The US intelligence community was aware that behind the escalation of violence in Syria are standing Islamic extremists, but in 2014, it was concluded that the creation of “an announced or unannounced Salafist Caliphate in eastern Syria... is what is needed in order to isolate the Syrian regime” (DIA 2012).

Due to abuse of Resolution 1973 of UN Security Council from 2011 (request to protect civilians in Libya, which NATO used as a cover to overthrow Libyan regime), the Russian Federation and China have refused to support similar resolution of UN regarding Syria. The event for the adoption of such a resolution were accusations of alleged chemical weapon attacks on East Ghouta in August 2013, when the jihadists Jabhat al Nusre (Al Qaeda) and Jaysh al-Islam, at the time controlling the eastern suburban areas of Damascus, accused government forces. The New York Times then supported Washington’s claims that the “only forces able to conduct such an act were Syrian Government forces” (Gladstone and Chivers, 2013). Several US intelligence leaders, however, said that for the attack, organization Jabhat al Nusre, should be held responsible, which members earlier had certain amount of gas sarin when they were captured in Turkey (Hersh, 2013). There is a remaining claim that nerve agent sarin was used in Eastern Ghouta, but without fixed number of casualties, and unproven charges against Syrian army. This clam leads to conclusion that the incident was one in a series of provocations launched by the Islamists, to garner support from the West.

During 2014 USA has changed its agenda in Syria, abandoning the strategy of “humanitarian intervention” in favor of “protective interventions”. The administration of Barack Obama, who earlier announced that administration is helping the groups of “moderate opposition” in Syria, has proclaimed that it will provide support to the forces on the ground ready to fight against the extreme jihadists Jabhat al Nusre and ISIL. After that, answering to the calls from Iraqi Government, the US renewed its presence in Iraq, with the mission to plan operation in Syria from there (Rothman 2014).

**Migration Crisis and European Union**

The population of the European Union has faced one of the largest migrant crisis in 2015 and 2016, whereby more than a million people have been seeking the asylum in European countries. The largest number of asylum applicants came from Syria, then Afghanistan, and Iraq. One of the basic demographic challenges caused by refugee crisis is related to the fact that the majority of migrant population are young people. Most of them men, one half declaring single status and second half stated married status (Reach, 2015).

UNHCR analysis from September 2015 indicates seven major reasons for directing the refugee wave from Syria to the European Union. First was the loss of hope that the situation will change for the better in their country or that any solution to the war conflict is in sight. In second place is increasing poverty of Syrian refugees who have found shelter in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan and then got in a situation where they couldn’t obtain even the simplest necessities. The
third is a realistic lack of employment opportunities for refugees from Syria in Arab countries. The fourth reason for the mass departure to Europe is lack of assistance and health care. The fifth were obstacles to the update of refugee status in Lebanon and Jordan. The sixth reason for migration was limited opportunities for education. Finally, movement of the refugee wave towards Europe occurred due to the instability in Syria's surroundings, or fear of the war escalation in these areas and negative reaction of the local population (Tadić and Associates, 2016:21-22).

There are also allegations that refugee wave towards the European Union was not spontaneous, and that the idea of great migrations to Europe has already existed. Supporters of this statement are pointing to the article in Brussels magazine Europe's World, where William Lacy Swing, the Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Michael Diedring, Secretary of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) are talking about the vision of migration as a process that should be controlled, thus, not a problem to be solved (Maystadt, 2017). According to these allegations, if promoted humanely, through security, order and dignity, migration has a number of advantages, as it provides many opportunities, increase incomes and living standards and allows people to educate themselves and pursue their ambitions. In this context it was highlighted that migration has reduced or even changed aging trend in many of the European countries and stopped unbearable relation between working and aided population. (Stefanov, 2017). Such notions then pulled series of actions and statements by German officials and certain number of non-government organizations that were actively supporting war refugees and economic immigrants towards the European Union.

According to some theories, behind the last wave of migration from the Middle East stands the strategic project of depopulation of Syria, the country that should be left without an educated and working population. On the other hand, some left-oriented theorists believe that migrants are creating a labor army reserve of the EU, always needed to employers to lower the wage and labor rights in general. Finally, there are authors who see a long-term strategy of Europe Islamisation.

**Migrant Routes to Europe**

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), after the biggest wave in 2015, when around 1.2 million migrants came to the borders of the Union, by the end of 2016, additional 400,000 refugees arrived in the European Union. Most of them came through Greece and the Western Balkans, or by sea to Italy. IOM indicates that 2016 was the most dangerous for migrants and refugees, considering that in 2016 more migrants have sunk in the Mediterranean Sea than in 2015— 4,220 compare to 3,780 (IOM, 2017).

In 2017, on the main migration route through Greece, it was recorded a decrease in number of migrants by almost 80% from 2016, mainly due to increased security measures by Turkish authorities. According to the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) during 2017, about 205,000 illegal migrants entered the territory of the European Union, which is about 60% less comparing to 2016. However, this number is still much higher than the average number in the years before the migrant crisis (around 100,000 illegal migrants annually). The UNHCR report
from February 2018 notes drastically degraded conditions in overcrowded migrant camps in Greece, which at night time are off limits for women and children becoming so called “no-go areas”.

Frontex data indicate that during 2017, near 119,000 people from African countries tried to get illegally to Italy from the shores of Libya by ships and boats. An effort to get another migration route Turkey-Greece, 42,000 African immigrants were discovered and another 23,000 tried to reach the borders of Spain from the territory of Algeria and Morocco. While the number of illegal immigrants from Africa to Italy is declining, on the migrant route to Spain is twice as bigger then in 2016 (EURACTIV, 2018).

From November 2017 to February 2018, UNHCR evacuated around 1,000 the most vulnerable African migrants, 300 of them to Italy. The others were transferred to Niger to wait for permanent transfer location (most likely in Europe). This UNHCR mission was not well accepted in Italy, where increased anti-migrant attitude and leaders of some of the major political parties, such is Lega Nord, threatened with mass migrant’s deportation (Lyman, 2018).

The European Union Reaction to Migration Crisis

Some Member States of the European Union, such as Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark, have, at the highest of the migrant crisis in 2015, tried to resolve the problem, with temporary border controls, that could also, remain permanent.

In September 2015 the European Stability Initiative (ESI) has worked out a plan according to which Germany needs to commit to settle 500,000 refugees from Turkey annually, along with other EU Member States on a voluntary basis. At the same time, Turkey should again accept everyone who comes to the Greek Islands, on the basis of the concept of safe third country. In accordance with this concept, the refugees who arrive to Greece are interviewed if they want asylum, and if they answer affirmative, the Greek authorities must examine a request for asylum and decide whether Turkey is a safe place for a particular asylum applicant. If it is determined that Turkey is a safe country, asylum seeker can be returned (Alkousaa and Associates, 2016).

In March 2016, the EU signed an agreement with Turkey on returning migrants on the path to developed countries of the EU to Turkey; all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. The Agreement was followed by the EU loan approval to Turkey worth three billion euros, with the notation that such credit tranches will repeat in the future. Under the Agreement, Turkey pledged to take back all irregular migrants who have crossed into Greece, including persons fled from Syria, with the closure of the Balkan route, if the Member States of the Union allow the submission of asylum applications of the portion of Syrian refugees. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, meanwhile, continued to blackmail the European Union, demanding no-visa status for Turkey and threatening with new refugee waves to Europe (Skinner, 2016). Turkey, at that moment, had already on its territory a “reservoir” of over 2.2 million refugees (Bajekal, 2015).

Announcement of measures stated in the Agreement with Turkey faced opposing notion by the countries of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) that refused
admission of migrants based on distribution share. We should consider that these countries, as well as other countries of Central Europe, in the past were not colonial powers and have traditional resistance to immigration from non-European countries (Wintour, 2017).

When it comes to Germany, there are two important political implications of the refugee crisis. The first concerns the period when there was welcoming climate for refugees. In the meantime the situation has changed in the direction of increased skepticism and fear, supported by two extreme right-oriented movements PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), which organized a number of anti-migrant demonstrations in different cities of Germany, and populist party AFD (Alternative for Germany), which became the third political force in the country on a wave of xenophobia and Islamophobia (Mansfield and Pallenberg, 2016).

In February 2018, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Italian right-wing and populist party of Lega Nord and coalition partner of Forza Italia, led by former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, announced that in case of winning the upcoming parliamentary elections, during the next five years term, as many as 500,000 migrants and refugees will be deported from Italy, as a part of comprehensive measures in the field of control, regulation, and restrictions on immigration in the country. Currently, there are about 180,000 persons in Italy seeking asylum, most of whom reside in the greater area of Rome. Despite criticism expressed by human rights groups, the French Government proposed legislation changes in late February 2018 in the field of immigration and asylum which would, among other things, allow the extension of detention of illegal migrants up to 90 days (currently 45), shorten the deadline for the asylum application, while illegal border crossing would be considered as a crime sentenced up to a year of imprisonment and deportation from the country. Additionally, in 2017 there were close to 100,000 persons seeking the asylum in France. Moreover, there are allegations that Sweden has become the European base of the international Islamic terrorist networks, i.e. hundreds of immigrants in this country were linked to ISIL in a variety of ways. Under the supervision of the ISIL new radical Islamists, mostly in the so-called “no-go zones”, in the suburbs of Malmö and Stockholm are recruited (Tomlinson, 2018). As a confirmation of these theses, an example of Uzbek Rakhmata Akhilova, is used. On April 7, 2017, in Stockholm square he ran with his truck over a crowd of people and activated improvised explosive device, killing five and injuring 10 people. Akhilov, who supported the establishment of the Islamic Khalifate, arrived in Sweden in 2014 while his request for asylum was rejected in 2016. The leaders of the right-wing party, Swedish Democrats, made the claim that the budget expenditures of that country for refugees and asylum seekers in 2018 will be around 5 billion euros (6.6 billion euros, is the annual budget for Defense). This, as well as the risk of importing terrorism, according to them, requires abandoning the current policies toward immigrants (“a humanitarian superpower”), and a drastic tightening of the legal requirements for the entry and residence permit in Sweden. Nevertheless, in 2015 at the peak of the migrant crisis in Europe, about 163,000 persons requested asylum in this country. According to the Czech expert for security, Lucas Visingra, Europe is going to face more ruthless terrorist attacks by the new generation of Islamic terrorists, made up of the defeated and escaped members of the ISIL. The main problem, according to him, is that the
political elite in Europe do not realize the volume of danger threatening European countries (Visingr, 2018).

Migrant crisis provided great opportunity to the extreme right oriented and populist parties in many European countries to benefit in politics, playing on endangered identity card. At the same time the party of the political center have seen the crisis as if it is a natural disaster – believing that it will pass and not elaborating a strategy to integrate more than a million people who have found themselves on the territory of the European Union.

**Migration Crisis and the Western Balkans**

We can talk about several “triggers” of European migration crisis started in 2015. First, the Macedonian authorities made the decision to permit transit of refugees, opening so called “the Balkan route”, which is shorter and less dangerous than the Mediterranean route. Second important aspect was the perception of migrants, based on statements made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that the refugees from Syria will not be returned back.

Faced with rapid growth in the number of illegal migrants and a refugee crisis, Hungary has built a fence on the borders with Serbia and Croatia in order to physically secure and prevent the entry of migrants to its territory. Simultaneously, with strengthening of the refugee wave on Balkan route, the Hungarian Army and police sent its forces at the border applying repressive measures towards illegal migrants. Additionally, Hungary adopted legislation suspending certain European regulations, defining normative basis for more repressive approach to illegal migration, including punishment for illegal border crossing, authorizing the army to conduct so-called non-lethal force. Justification for these measures was the need of Hungarian citizens for protection of state borders and country defend policy, and that the refugee wave from the Middle East threatens European Christian heritage (Tatalović and Malnar, 2015).

In the late 2015, Austrian and German governments have aligned “secret plan for the Balkans” aiming to stop the wave of migrants before the migrants reach their borders and the retention of refugees in further south, preferably in Greece. In compensation for the migrants’ management, Greece would have gained a significant financial support, with the possibility of part of the debt forgiveness. In case of failure of this option, Germany and Austria have expressed willingness to provide financial assistance to all the countries on the Balkan route for immigrant selection; allowing pass to the Western Europe only to eligible immigrants, those who meet requirements for asylum, and returning everyone else back to the country of origin. However, the decrease in migrant waves from the Middle East have already put the program in mid-2016 ad acta.

The European Union was unable to offer a comprehensive approach to existing situation, primarily because of the substantial differences among Member States. Namely, the priority of the countries on the Balkan route was to accelerate the passage of refugees and migrants through their territories, and any attempt to limit this process provoked loud diplomatic reactions of neighboring countries. Relations between Croatia and Serbia, as well as Croatia and Hungary, have
Security dialogues aggravated the circumstances of secret transfer of groups of migrants across the border line. On the other hand, certain EU Member States (Hungary, Slovenia, and Austria) have decided to build a fence on the border to stop the flow of migrants (Žara, 2016).

Characteristics of Migration Waves across Serbia

During 2015, near 600,000 non-EU refugees and migrants have entered the Republic of Serbia. Several factors affected this refugee wave: the dynamics of the flow of migrants into Greece from Turkey, the situation in Macedonia with the occasional closing of the borders, rigid policies of Hungary towards the refugees, as well as the views of the European Union and EU Member States on acceptable modalities for resolving the migrant crisis. Situation on the field has changed frequently, in terms of number of newly arrived migrants and refugees, their movement route, borders (im) permeability, and efficiency of the authorized government institutions. The vast majority of migrants have seen the Republic of Serbia only as a transit country.

Balkan migrant route across Serbian territory has changed its paths during 2015 and 2016. The sole constant was the main entry point – border with Macedonia, while entries from Bulgaria began to be recorded during the summer of 2015. Also, there have been significant changes in terms of exit points – the first months of migrant wave is solely recorded in the direction towards Hungary, while over the last months, predominantly towards the borders of the Republic of Croatia (Jelačić, 2016).

In addition to the existing asylum centers in Serbia, along with increasing numbers of migrants several other so-called acceptance-transit centers are opened: in Preševo, including checkpoint for emergency admission in Miratovca, Kanjiža (active until September 15, 2015), Subotica, Šid (near the railway station, so-called “Grey House”, Adaševci, and Principovac) and in Dimitrovgrad. Certain potential sites for opening additional centers in the event of an increase in the number of migrants and refugees were selected. Belgrade has long been a major point on a movement map, although in Belgrade was never formally established an acceptance center, despite the fact that until September 2015, 100 up to 1,000 migrants and refugees wandered daily, out in the open space.

In situation of complete closure of Hungarian border and the proclamation of the Republic of Serbia as a safe third country, with the UNHCR’s decision on Macedonia as a unsafe third country, Serbia faced the challenge of deciding on asylum requests, i.e. the provision of international protection of the number of persons that is beyond its capacity. A big shift was the Decision on issuance of certificates of entry into the territory of the Republic of Serbia for migrants who come from countries where their lives were in danger (a transit certificate) adopted by the Serbian Government in September 2015 which came into force in early 2016.

After signing the Joint Statement of the Chief of police in Zagreb in February 18, 2016, Serbian authorities dismissed the practice of issuing transit certificate. The Joint Statement called for the issuance of a single refugee registration form, issued in Macedonia, that when in transit is stamped by all the countries - parties of the agreement.
From the moment of criteria alignment among the states of Balkan route, made by states’ police departments, the number of those who have been denied entry into the Republic of Croatia and the continuation of the journey have increased. Government authorities allowed them to either apply for asylum, or to be returned over Preševo to Macedonia to obtain the proper documentation for entry into EU States, or to be returned to Bulgaria, if Bulgaria was the enter point to Serbia. Due to such a practice, number of individuals with unregulated status were recorded on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. A problem of accommodation and the provision of assistance to this category of migrants has occurred, given that they haven’t shown a willingness to get into process of asylum, thus the right for accommodation in one of the existing asylum centers.

During the migrant crisis, Serbia was trying to follow the policy of the EU, when it was clear and unequivocal, but when it wasn’t like that, Serbia first followed the suggestions of Germany, who advocated for allowing refugees, than Austria, which supported the closing of the West Balkans route. Searching for a solution in the climate of a lack of unique European policies, Serbia has followed differently articulated policies of individual Member States of the EU, facing the problems which were not well understood in Brussels (Lutovac, 2016).

Conclusion

Conflicts over the past decade in failing countries of the North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia (Libya, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan), forced millions of people to flee their homes. In 2015 in Europe there has been a massive and complex migration wave across “Balkan route” and by Mediterranean Sea, not seen since 1945. This wave put together refugees fleeing from the war-torn Syria and northern Iraq and economic migrants.

The European Union, too, has indirectly encouraged those processes. On the one hand, the economic situation in the Arab countries of the Mediterranean significantly deteriorated after 2008 because of the economic stagnation and crisis within the EU, and above all, because of decrease in exports to the Union market, which was and remained their main market. On the other hand, the situation in Arab countries was further disadvantaged by the requirements of the European Union for the implementation of reforms of European standards, according to the principle “more for more”, which means more reform for more trade with the Union. In addition, liberalization measures on the internal market, on the basis of signed agreements with the European Union (FTA), followed by reduction in social measures, has made the situation in the countries of the East and South of the Mediterranean more difficult. Previous practice of state subsidies in food and fuel in the Arab countries has become a difficult to sustain after 2008, which was one of the main triggers of the protest, along with rooted corruption and incompetence of the ruling elite to deal with economic problems.

“Arab spring”, which culminated in 2011, disabled appropriate response against Islamic terrorism. In fact, demolition of authoritarian regimes in Iraq, Libya and Egypt did not lead to the establishment of democratic systems in these countries, in contrast it has led to instability and opened a space for the expansion of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. The most tragic
consequences were in Syria, where authoritarian regime have not been taken down, while bloody civil war has started. Use of jihadist organizations for throwing down Syrian regime, which initially was supported by USA and its Middle East allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, had a boomerang effect, causing regional instability.

Considering that 80% of refugees which found themselves at borders of the EU in 2015 arrived by sea from Turkey, it was evident that the main problem related to their aid and support is in the Turkey. The Agreement between the European Union and Turkey from March 2016, contributed to shutdown of the “Balkan route”, which showed that the Turkish authorities have mechanisms to manipulate; reducing or increasing the transit of migrants and refugees to Europe. There is no direct connection between the involvement of the Russian Federation military forces in Syrian war and the influx of refugees and migrants to Europe. Contrary, one can speak of a negative correlation, because from then on, there was an increasing trend of returning internally displaced persons to their homes in Syria, given the upturn of the war progress and the victorious advancement of the Syrian Government’s forces in the liberation of territories that were previously controlled by jihadists.

Reactive and successive closing of the state borders of Member States of the European Union that were on the path of migration movement was contradicting to the principles of the Schengen Agreement on visa-free regime and no-borders policy in the European Union. Migrant crisis highlighted the failure of the internalization of the European values within the European Union. In fact, political discourse, behavior, and activities of some of the EU Member States have to a large extent violated the rights and freedoms that the generation of European citizens were proud about.

The Republic of Serbia, as a state surrounded by four Member States of the European Union, and that poses as the guardian of the Schengen border system in Europe, at the same time, is the transit country for many citizens of Afro-Asian countries, which are escaping poverty, conflicts and suppression, trying to get to the developed European countries. For these reasons, Serbia is in a delicate position in two ways. As a country in the EU accession process, Serbia is required to protect its southern borders from illegal immigrants and potential terrorists, and on the other hand Serbia was demanded to carry out border policy that has elements of racism and that threaten some of the universal human rights.

References


PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP IN THE SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT

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Abstract:

In situations of increased risks from security threats, the need to provide a common response to the illegal migration and human trafficking increases the responsibility for successful migration management and control, which goes beyond the usual actors – i.e. the state authorities. Such situations call for more direct inclusion of the private sector. The central research issue proposed here is focused on the analysis whether the private security sector is interested at all to engage in such partnerships. Usually, there are short term expenditures and security risks, and that is why it is important to take into consideration how will they be stimulated and encouraged to ‘invest’ in security in such a way. That is why distinct regulations, defined interactions, clearly expressed will for cooperation and making efforts in order to explain how the improved security is a mutual priority and challenge both for public and private security, are necessary. These partnerships and other forms of cooperation have another dimension too. It refers to the expected decrease of expenditures for providing security, which is especially important for both sectors. The cooperation and the partnership in the paper are analyzed through the prism of the role which both sectors have in the provision of security, whereas security will not be perceived as an expense, but rather a joint contribution for the protection of the security of the community.

Key words: security, public security, private security, cooperation, partnership, public-private dichotomy

1. Introduction

In terms of structural changes which occurred as a result of the political processes and global security threats, the private security sector has imposed as a significant factor and a main actor for support and assistance of the state apparatus and the citizens as a necessary partner in
the combat against crime, terrorism etc. With that, this subject has partly took responsibility which traditionally belonged to the police as the most visible manifestation of power in enforcement of security, and referred to the exclusive right to provide security for the citizens and their assets.

The achieved level of development and cooperation between the public and the private security sector in a certain social – political system depends from numerous factors, among which: the place they take in society, the manner of decision making for the position and the role of these sectors in the country, their contribution and real significance, the mode for financing of these sectors, the nature of the relations between the security recipients and the providers of it, the professional status of the providers’ employees for certain recipients, etc. (Ahić 2009).

The comparison of the public and the private security, as well as the explication of the nature of cooperation between those two sectors, expressed through the current public-private partnerships shows that there is a space for rapprochement of these two segments and that the need for their cohabitation is clear in order to achieve the common goals.

In general, the police and the private security are predestined to cooperate jointly because of the complementarity of the tasks. Although the private and the state security sector do not have an identical interest and approach in the fight against crime, their interests are complementary. While private security owes loyalty to clients and employees, the police works comprehensively for the country. But still, both the police and the private security have a common purpose – protection and security for the whole society. On one hand, the employees of the private security sector could be a great assistance for the police providing with articulate and precise reports for certain incidents, and on the other hand the police can give suggestions for certain investigations conduct. The services of the state and the private sector could be combined in order to decrease crime, and increase security (Dempsey 2011).

2. Public-Private Dichotomy

The public-private dichotomy was a subject of interest for a longer period in retrospective. Numerous analysts endeavored to determine the verge and the factors which distinguish the private security sector from the public security sector. In some academic debates prevail the opinions that the difference indicators are in the level of accessibility: the extent to which something (a good or a service) impacts the whole society. The second analysis point out that the indicators of difference are in the manner of definition (public or private), the nature of the interaction between the service provider and the service recipient, the employee status and the mode of financing. Third analysis are made on the basis of coverage. In that direction the main indicator of difference is the extent of coverage, respectfully, what is covered by the public security and what by the private security. Fourth analysis depict that it is more appropriate to discuss the field for which they are made, rather than the extent of the coverage, having in consideration the numerous grey areas which exist.

The dichotomy is exceptionally important for the interactions between the public and the private security and it refers to the elaboration in context of the development of the security. It
is evident that most often used formulation of the public-private dichotomy refers to everything which is more familiar as public and/or private sector. Such conceptualized categorization of the dichotomy contradicts the public or government sector with the “private” or the market sector. This is due to the fact that the government in the first case ensures the services and they are financed according to the laws in which are defined the taxes, while in the second case, the recipients purchase the services from the firms, whose motivation is profit. The second segment of the dichotomy, respectfully the logical division of “public-private”, refers to the difference between what is “opened” and public, contrary to “hidden” or restrained. Actually, this is what essentially designates the difference between the public and the private space. Simply put, the basic meaning of the public space is its openness and accessibility for everyone, everywhere and in any time, and in contrast to this interpretation, the private spaces are those in which the access is restricted, and in which those who actually “own” that space are in control and have the right to define and restrain its publicity to a certain degree (Ahić 2009). So, the basic question which needs to be addressed reads: “Where does the boundary between the private and the public sector lie?” In general, there is no simple boundary for division, rather it is a network of private and public organizations which are engaged in maintaining order (Button and George 2004, 115).

3. Public-Private Partnerships and Cooperation in Security

In liberal-democratic societies, the market economy allows public-private partnerships. Unlike the totalitarian systems, the realization of the security is under exclusive authority to the state where there are no records for certain forms of coexistence with the private security sector (The Chatham House 2017).

It is considered that the public-private partnerships PPP (PPP–Public Private Partnerships) enable a clear specification of the goals, the rights and responsibilities of a legally binding form. Besides that, the long-term and expensive efforts of the PPP could lead to the achievement of better distribution of risks between the government and the private security performers. In the past, the government was the designer, supervisor and provider of services. Through the “public-private partnerships for security” the field is equalized and both the government and the private security companies work together on each level, such as: from recruitment to training to military deployment, with which the partnerships for security enable military and security activities throughout the developed world. Due to the lesser defense budgets, the Western allies of the USA may apply the principles for public-private partnership especially thoroughly, in order to decrease the expenditure through sharing the financial risks with the private sector providers. In exchange, the corporations gained a rather permanent basis in the management of the monopoly of force through partial ownership of the defense and security infrastructure or their functioning or support (Ortiz 2010).

From a historical aspect the interaction between the public and the private security sector was not always at its best. Sometimes the police underestimated the private security, which sensed that the police has no interest for its domain of action. However, in today’s time it is thrived
toward the accomplishment in these partnerships, whose primary purpose is the progress and development of the public and the private security sector (Dempsey 2011, 360).

Hence, the most frequent activities of the partnerships and cooperation include:

- Establishing business contacts, including business lunch;
- Information sharing, such as local criminal tendencies, modus operandi (work methods), incident information, e-mail addresses, web pages and information bulletins;
- Crime prevention programs, joint participation in the security field, developing common methods for crime prevention and joining forces for achieving the general interests in dealing with video piracy, graffiti, false alerts and neighborhood surveillance programs;
- Resource sharing respectfully, lending technical and linguistic expertise, lending computer equipment, “buying money”, lending security tools and preparation of contact notebook and other information;
- Training, for example hosting special experts and orators;
- Providing legal framework which includes support and draft laws;
- Common action, such as, investigation of complex financial frauds or computer felonies; carrying a common security plan for natural disasters protection, school shootings and violence as well as work place violence, and joint operations for offenses, for example, street theft;
- Research and creation of guidelines for preparation and review of: investigations and protocols concerning false alerts, work place drug related crimes, work place violence, CCTV (closed circuit television) information, etc. (Dempsey 2011, 360-362).

Beside these types of cooperation it has to be pointed out that the public-private partnerships, especially after the September 11th attacks intensified the cooperation in protection of these sectors as well: critical infrastructure protection, cyber security, port security, terrorism prevention, etc.

4. The Need for Cooperation and Partnership in Global Migrant Crisis

The term partnership unifies several concepts: regarding the mutual goals, the calling for joining efforts for achieving the goals and the sense for shared responsibility regarding the desired outcome. Partnership does not presuppose complete consensus for all the issues all the time. Also, partnership with which certain common goals are achieved does not imply to subsequent partnership for solving problems and issues in other areas (OECD 2017).

It should be emphasized that partnership is more than coordination and cooperation and presupposes a consolidation mechanism of the traditional mandates for management and mobilization of the efforts of several parties in which the common goals are intersected in the mandates of more organizations/sides (UNCHR 2018).

This type of dynamic partnerships emanate from the real need with which the security and the protection role are seen through a comprehensive prism and within incorporate several fulfilment preconditions, such as:
• Addressing the fundamental reasons which cause the migrant crisis;
• Human rights respect monitoring;
• Enhancing the response capacities;
• Early warning systems;
• Peace keeping and building;
• Ensuring a transition process from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development. (Brandt 2016).

Basically, the public-private partnerships are consisted in the efforts of the governments to overcome the barriers in dealing with certain situations, in which political solutions are not enough for managing certain social and security occurrences, such as the case with the international migrant crisis. In this context, the public-private partnerships are established rapidly and efficiently, and due to that fact they are promoted as an instrument for coping with the migrant crisis situations, and by some calculations, they cost less than the current EU operations (Prince 2017).

It means, that the increased need for illegal migration prevention and the emergence of violent extremism, human trafficking and terrorism elements on the migrant routes and in the migrant camps redistributes and expanses the responsibility for migration management and control outside the central actor—the country.

The mechanisms applied by the countries regarding the migrant crisis control from the aspect of maintaining the security on a local, regional, national and international level covers a wide range of strategies which include actors from the private, from the local and international sector and are put in function of “guardians of the borders” (Lahav 2016). In this context, it is important to emphasize that a proper dimension has the assessment of the impacts and the consequences from the unfolding events which arise from the migrant crisis and refugees by the governments and the private sector actors as an opportunity for adequate management (PwC Global Crisis Centre 2017). Most often, as the concrete experiences and examples show, according to the responsibilities and restraints which emanate from the international agreements, these actors are incorporated by the countries or are hired with a concluded contract. The stimulations for this kind of cooperation are economic; while restrictions are sanctions and penalties. This way, through previous training investments, the private entities and agencies are able to take participation in the increased migration control and management (EPP 2016). Through government cooperation, the private sector gains a possibility for exchange and trade, profit, etc.¹⁷

¹⁷ For illustration, one of the private gigantic firms hired by the UNHCR is the multinational furniture factory IKEA. This company aided collecting 34 million dollars in order to provide renewable energy and lighting for the refugee camps in Africa. See more at: News Deeply: Analysis: How the Private Sector Can Help Tackle the Refugee Crisis: https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2016/10/03/analysis-how-the-private-sector-can-help-tackle-the-refugee-crisis, 03.10.2016, accessed 27/3/2018.
4.1. Public-Private Partnerships in Security in Coping with the Migrant Crisis

Basically, the challenges for the political establishments in the countries affected by the migrant crisis, go hand in hand with the possibilities. Thereby, beside that it is beneficially viewed from a macro economic plan, for some it counterpoises a threat for the national security, for the access to working positions, and for social harmony and culture. This fact is visible also in the increased number of unrests and tensions by the local communities during the migrant flows, as well as the emergence of anti-migrant propaganda contents and media platform which shares such kinds of contents (EP 2016).

Due to the complexity of the migrant crisis problem and the lack of capacities by the governments and organizations from numerous sectors for an effective and long term management with it, in order to find commonly acceptable solutions, a space for entrepreneurship is opened on one hand. On the other hand, because of the complexity of the migrant crisis management and the hosting and registration of persons which are part of the migrant routes a real pressure over the governments and the government agencies is created in order to provide the fundamental services. In these cases, the business community could play a crucial role in the continuous process of migrant crisis and provide assistance through financing or engagement in public-private partnerships with relevant government bodies. As shown by the practice, the business community, respectfully, the private sector counterpoises a supplement for the government and the non-governmental sector in developing independent decisions and sustainable solutions (World Economic Forum 2017).

So it means, the global migration and migrant crisis generate a variety of opportunities for the businesses, which are stimulated with government support. As the migrant crisis and the mass migrant flows which are most frequently improperly managed are expanding and evolving, many governments on a global scale make efforts to deal with the refugees’ gust, economic migrants and asylum seekers.

The need for humanitarian assistance in the short term solutions as well as long term institutional changes had illuminated the limitations in the capacities and the weaknesses on an organizational level, whereupon the private sector is perceived as an auxiliary actor which can have a facilitator role based upon two basic principles: interagency coordination and strategic planning and internal agency organization and program management. Additionally, as part of the social dimension and responsibilities of the companies and corporations, and finding sustainable solutions for the migrant crisis imposes a need for engagement of organizations from the public and the private sector.

As a response to the actual migrant crisis, worldwide the companies undertake numerous activities which contribute toward alleviating the impacts of this social phenomena and conduce for the realization and sustainment of security in the following manner:

- Financial donations for support of the humanitarian partners in immediate migrants aid
- Utilization of capacities from the private sector for donation of products and services (delivery and logistics of products, access to internet etc., for the migrants and the personnel working with them)
Security dialogues

- Expanding private assistance for organizations working pro bono
- Society integration support through programs, trainings and events with cultural, sport, etc. character.
- Access to information with a public character. (OECD 2010)

Regarding the classical security operations which are applied as an option in dealing with the migrant crisis, activating private security and military companies presupposes designating surveillance bases for countering smuggling routes and deploying border forces along the borders of the Middle East and African countries, as well as the external borders of the EU (Middle East Institute 2016).

From an idealistic perspective, the migrant crisis management presupposes addressing the fundamental reasons for which it occurred and people were forced out to displace, including political repressions and the civil wars in that region since 2011 and the Arab spring, which contributed for the emergence of famine, devastated infrastructure, diseases, violent extremism, terrorism and lack of vital resources, absence of economic prosperity and employment, low living standard etc. (Population Reference Bureau 2008).

At the end, it should be emphasized that beside the security dimension, another dimension would be the political implications. The political implications which stem from this phenomena counterpoise a variety of opportunities for the governments – migrations could be utilized as demographic solutions for aging populations, strengthen growth, as well as to promote greater cooperation between the countries and the regions in order to address this actual issues (Sherwell 2015). Also, migrations could enable economic beneficial aspects, through achieving demographic diversity and increase of competitiveness and through increase of expenditure, in terms of a certain degree of integration ensured by the country.

4.2. The European Union and the Migrant Crisis Management

In 2015, the European Union adopted a series of measures for coping with the crisis. The European Commission had proposed a ten points plan with which Europol will cooperate with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Frontex (Европската гранична агенција) and Eurojust (Cooperation Agency for Legal and Criminal Affairs), teams are been deployed in Italy and Greece for joint processing of the asylum applications, and also designation of the cooperation in the combat against human trafficking and smuggling (The Guardian 2015).

The UN Convention on Refugees from 1951 and the Additional Protocol from 1967 are the most significant legal documents with which the responsibilities of the governments toward the refugees worldwide are designated. Beside these two most significant documents, there are few

18 Around 150 countries in the world are signatories of the UN Convention and the Protocol, although not in such number implement them in their national laws. These documents designate the definitions for the refugees and the asylum seekers which are not returning on a territory where their lives and freedoms are under threat. Also, the countries establish a formal cooperation with the procedures of the UNHCR. See more at: The UN Refugee Agency (2018) Partnership in Protection: http://www.unhcr.org/partnership-protection.html, accessed 3/4/2018.
important instruments (such as the EU Dublin Regulation and the EU Human Rights Convention) with which the responsibilities of the governments are contoured.

These adopted initiatives by the EU counterpoise a step forward toward the construction of a common European migration, asylum and border policy, but there are still a number of challenges which remain in the focus of attention. Specifically, these challenges refer to:

- Division of responsibilities and institutional coordination in the EU, the member states and the remaining involved parties;
- Guaranteeing a proper implementation and enforcing the current laws and standards of the EU by the member states on the basis of the principles for the rule of law in controlling the external borders and in the field of security/military operations;
- Implementing a common EU political agenda which will also include the sector with indirect involvement in the migrant crisis and which refer to the repercussions on security from an economic, trade, development and foreign policy aspect (Carrera 2015).

The largest portion of the migrant wave from the Syrian conflict had impact on the Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries from the neighborhood, such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, but the public attention from the entire world was mostly focused on the impact which this phenomena had on Europe.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), at this moment, there are 59.5 million people in the world which are displaced, from which 19.5 million are refugees. In 2015, on European soil by sea had arrived more than one million migrants and the subsequent years remain to be characteristic for the global migrant crisis (Tassinari, F., Nissen 2016).

The European Commission emphasized the importance of the stabilization of the Schengen system as a crucial mechanism for protection of the freedom of movement principle and to ensure that there will be no long term damages for the economy of the EU which would be a result of the re-establishment of border controls (Rojas and Ross 2016).

These efforts are most visible in the European Union, where the governments of the member states thrive to adapt national and European policies which settle migrant issues. It is important to note in this segment that the common policies for border management and cooperation in security operations is more reactive than proactive (EY 2016).

**Conclusion**

The platforms of the public-private partnerships in preserving the security in terms of migrant crisis as a need is most often identified in the sphere of integrated border management, the comprehensive approach in finding solutions for coordinated investigations and engagements, as well as defining new mechanisms for operationalization (Janevski 2017). The countries whose borders are under pressure by the migrant crisis have a real continuous need for several types of capacities for flexible systematic operational response in the intelligence and surveillance sphere, search and rescue, record, registration, identification and inspection and capacity building for migrant waves management. Also, it is important to note that beside the element of external
borders protection, on an internal plan as well, the migrant management and control by a private segment is equally effective as well (OECD 2017).

The public-private partnerships in this context contribute for procedure precision, as well as immediate access to data from the critical points. Additionally, the public-private partnerships are turning up as efficient in the combat against terrorism, respectfully platforms for information sharing and digital intelligence data are been created, in order to increase the efficiency for crime countering and terrorism elimination. This kind of partnerships counterpoise a basis for utilization of analytical methods and identification of fields for effective cooperation whereupon the national bureaucratic issues which take precious time are been avoided. Regarding the promotion of the public-private partnerships, there is a space for additional accent from the aspect of improving the informing of the citizens and the relevant actors for crisis situations and use of mass media for publishing action guidelines etc.

REFERENCES:


Abstract:

Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a post-war country in transition with close proximity to the European Union, complex political structure, underdeveloped economy, high number of refugees and internally displaced persons, young migration management structure, porous borders and limited resources, has been struggling with the phenomenon of human trafficking for almost two decades now. The migratory movements through Bosnia and Herzegovina occurs against a background of ongoing challenges related to countering trafficking in persons (TIP). Significant percentage of migrants and refugees transiting may be vulnerable to potential exploitation and abuse along the route. That being said, to date, only few victims have been identified among migrants and refugees in countries along the Western Balkan route. This paper is based on desk review of BH TIP capacities in available key documents and current researches and qualitative survey conducted through interviews using qualitative questionnaire developed by authors of this paper. An online search was performed for all available documents related to trafficking in people. Key informants were selected, according to the areas of their expertise. Those were experts from following agencies/organizations: National coordinator's office for the fight against trafficking in human beings, Prosecutors' office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Service for Foreigners, NGO IFS EMMAUS, and Immigration Centre. Key informants were asked to talk about their respective roles in counter TIP activities, about their perception of the established counter human trafficking system, indicators of human trafficking and link with mixed migration flows, to list examples of good practices and barriers for better identification of victims and potential victims of trafficking.

Key Words: Bosnia and Herzegovina, migrants, refugees, crisis, trafficking, capacities
1. Introduction

The research resulted in the paper that will be disseminated to stakeholders and raise awareness regarding recent changes in trafficking in person (TIP) trends since the closing of the border along the Western Balkan migration route and be able to develop their own interventions according to the new highlighted trends. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a post-war country in transition with close proximity to the European Union, complex political structure, underdeveloped economy, high number of refugees and internally displaced persons, young migration management structure, porous borders and limited resources, has been struggling with the phenomenon of human trafficking for almost two decades now. The migratory movements through Bosnia and Herzegovina occurs against a background of ongoing challenges related to countering trafficking in persons (TIP). Significant percentage of migrants and refugees transiting may be vulnerable to potential exploitation and abuse along the route.

This paper is based on desk review of BH TIP capacities in available key documents and current researches and qualitative survey conducted through interviews using qualitative questionnaire developed by authors of this paper. An online search was performed for all available documents related to trafficking in people. Key informants were selected, according to the areas of their expertise. Those were experts from following agencies/organizations: National coordinator’s office for the fight against trafficking in human beings, Prosecutors’ office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Service for Foreigners, NGO IFS EMMAUS, and Migrant from Immigration Centre. Key informants were asked to talk about their respective roles in counter TIP activities, about their perception of the established counter human trafficking system, indicators of human trafficking and link with mixed migration flows, to list examples of good practices and barriers for better identification of victims and potential victims of trafficking.

2. Counter Trafficking in Potential Migrant Crisis in the Bosnia and Herzegovina

Counter TIP system

Bosnia and Herzegovina has invested significant efforts since 2001 to establish a comprehensive anti-trafficking mechanism in the country, the so-called National Referral Mechanism (NRM), including strategic planning of anti-trafficking actions, legislative amendments and harmonisation with international standards, training and capacity building of government institutions and non-state actors, and creation of efficient coordination mechanisms. (IOM - Trafficking in Persons Report, 2017)

The institutional anti-trafficking framework includes three main coordination mechanisms: State Coordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings and Illegal Migration in Bosnia and Herzegovina (CTHB). Responsible for leading and coordinating the country anti-trafficking efforts at the policy level, and chairing the inter-institutional team for monitoring the implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan. Furthermore, the SC Office in practice coordinates the work of the Regional Monitoring Teams (RMTs) and often convenes their meetings. At the operational level,
the SC Office occasionally facilitates ad hoc referral and cooperation among RMTs members, for example to facilitate victim’s access to services in concrete THB cases (Mujanović, et.al., 2010).

Strike Force for Fight against Trafficking in Human Beings and Organised Illegal Immigration: Mechanism for coordination of law enforcement agencies between State, Entity and Brčko District in fighting THB. It is established under the direct management of the B&H Chief Prosecutor with a specific and considerable budgetary allocation. It is responsible for ensuring operational cooperation and exchange of intelligence in relation to investigation of THB cases throughout the country. On invitation, an NGO representative participates in the work of the Strike Force, to discuss and arrange operational aspects of victim assistance when deemed necessary.

Regional Monitoring Teams (RMTs): Multidisciplinary teams involving public officials from multiple institutions: Ministry of Security (MoS), Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR), Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), Agency for Gender Equality, BiH Prosecutor’s Office, State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), Border Police, Service for Foreigner’s Affairs (SFA), police, prosecutor’s offices, social welfare centres, health care services, labour inspectorates, officials from the Ministries of Education, local NGOs and other public officials at Entity, cantonal and Brčko District level (Rizvo, et.al., 2010).

There are four operational RMTs in BiH: Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka and Tuzla. The RMTs are established on the basis of Article 22 of the Rules on the Protection of Victims and Victim Witnesses of Trafficking in Human Beings BiH Nationals. Their main mandate is to establish local referral mechanisms for victim identification and assistance. According to the Guidelines for RMTs for the Fight against Human Trafficking, they are also involved in prevention of THB, analysis of the phenomenon and capacity building. The RMTs are very large coordination mechanisms – involving around 60-70 participants in some locations (e.g. Sarajevo) and thus they provide mainly a forum for exchange of information and for establishment of contacts with counterparts in other public institutions and NGOs.

The infrastructure for the establishment of an NRM is complemented by two bylaws on protection of domestic and foreign victims. Here it is worth noting that none of the two documents mentions labour inspectorates, labour migration authorities and trade unions, although trafficking for labour exploitation has been on the rise in recent years, and these additional actors would need to be operationally involved in the NRM. (Mujanović, et.al 2010). With regard to establishing clear roles, mandates and tasks of each actor in the NRM process of identification and assistance, over recent years, numerous guidelines targeting specific professional groups have been developed. A number of NGO projects were also implemented in partnership with state institutions to build the capacity of various actors in the NRM. However, in practice it would seem that these efforts have not reached a critical mass, and hence the existing guidelines are not yet widely known, understood, shared and accepted by each professional group/actor involved in the process of victim identification, referral and assistance (Rizvo, et.al. 2010).
**Gaps in identification of potential VoTs within the mixed migration flows**

Trafficking has further developed in country, by altering its trends and patterns with respect to organisation of traffickers, forms of recruitment, purpose and type of exploitation, types of control imposed upon victim, routes of traffickers and victims as well as profile of persons involved in process. Such situation imposes new, complex and growing challenges to the authorities and society. It reiterates a requirement to raise awareness and knowledge on trafficking by both general public and professionals as well as to develop evidence based policy aimed at suppressing trafficking. (Muratbegović, et.al. 2010). The gaps in resources for the identification and referral of potential VoTs within the mixed migration flows in your country are:

- Lack of energetic, decisive research of cases involving trafficking for purpose of sexual and labour exploitation accompanied by less aggressive process of indicting and prosecuting traffickers representing the first and likely paramount deficiency within a counter trafficking system. (IOM - Trafficking in Persons Report, 2017)
- This attitude has corresponded with general perception of public that criminal judiciary response to criminal operations and penal policy associated with trafficking has been very mild. Major problems associated with efficient trafficking prosecution stem from drastic and various interpretations of criminal legal provisions on trafficking, which result with different law enforcement practices by prosecutors and police. (Rizvo, et.al., 2006)
- As a result, there has been a confusing court practice present to this end. At times, investigations are launched as cases of trafficking, but further continue as a case of instigating to prostitution or parent's neglecting of a child (Muratbegović, et.al., 2010), (IOM - Trafficking in Persons Report, 2017)
- Prosecutors do not apply same standards, and do not have same skills and experience in cases involving trafficking, which may cause certain level of victim's discrimination due to inappropriate level of protection and support. Police officers lack experience and training to recognise potential VoTs within the mixed migration flows, which occurs in many forms, including through labour exploitation primarily. Also, trafficking within the mixed migration flows cases have not been a familiar form of trafficking for judiciary (Strategy to counter trafficking in human beings in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013-2015., 2013)

A detailed analysis is required to determine gaps in criminal prosecution actions in order to overcome those deficiencies and ensure efficient investigations and prosecution of those crimes. That action would lead to imposing appropriate sanctions and deter potential traffickers from undertaking criminal operations. Special attention is to be paid to new forms of trafficking for purpose of labour exploitation and child trafficking, including the use of special surveillance means (Strategy in the area of migrations and asylum and action plan for the period 2016-2020., 2016).

The following deficiency is an absence of efficient mechanism to suppress corruption associated with trafficking. Trafficking and corruption have been closely and frequently associated activities. The process of overcoming this deficiency is dependent on actual method of treatment.
At first, it is necessary to acknowledge corruption and its impact to trafficking. Therefore it has been important to explore the role of corruption in trafficking and its impact on trafficking augmentation.

Secondly, it is necessary to investigate and prosecute acts of corruption decisively, including identification of the most present forms of corruption associated with trafficking. Such approach would lead to stop the practice of separate criminal prosecutions of trafficking and corruption cases related to individuals who allowed or tolerated trafficking. There are some typical forms of corruption associated with trafficking such as: use of forged travel documents to transport (transfer) victims of trafficking, issuance of visa or other travel documents (laissez passer) without meeting required conditions, etc. Aforesaid could be accomplished by improved legal framework governing these subjects and by harmonising practices and know-how of the institutions in charge of combating trafficking in order to build their capacity to recognise such criminal activities (Strategy to counter trafficking in human beings in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013-2015., 2013).

The third relevant deficiency is pro-active approach to field work aimed at identifying victims, in particular those forced to beg at public places and subjected to other forms of exploitation (primarily targeting children). Bosnia and Herzegovina must ensure that its law enforcement officers, labour inspectors, social workers and other officers apply pro-active approach and undertake intensified actions aimed at detecting and saving potential victims of trafficking, particularly of the most vulnerable ones – children subjected to exploitation by other adults. At the same time, further actions need to be undertaken in order to provide appropriate assistance and protection to victims. In addition, it is required to make efforts to facilitate victims’ reintegration to society, including having traffickers compensate damage to victims. Therefore any future training should be designed to improve knowledge and skills on providing appropriate assistance and protection to victims of trafficking (Rizvo et al, 2015).

The fourth deficiency has been associated with a low level of awareness on trafficking, in particular concerning new forms of labour exploitation and children exploitation at public places. Thus, it is required to conduct comprehensive public campaigns targeting general public and also specifically tailored campaigns targeting vulnerable groups. Those actions, serving as deterrents must coincide with implementation of other widespread actions aimed at improving general living conditions and standards of vulnerable groups including women, children, minorities, refugees and internally displaced persons (Rizvo et al, 2006).

The fifth deficiency is associated with absence of relevant research on trafficking in order to determine the scope and trends of trafficking, as well as factors favouring and facilitating trafficking in BiH. Additionally, the relevant research should contain recommendations for future counter – trafficking policy and actions taken by government and civil society. In this regard, this subject research tends to make available certain knowledge and propose some solutions which will facilitate counter trafficking efforts (IOM - Trafficking in Persons Report, 2017).

All individuals travelling in an irregular fashion are exposed to hardship and danger. However, some categories of individuals are of special concern as they are particularly vulnerable. This chapter speaks about some of different categories of vulnerable individuals in mixed migration
flows. Many of these categories are complex to identify and require specialised determination processes.

The key role of frontline officials is to provide immediate protection and assistance to migrants they think are in vulnerable situations, and refer them to appropriate authorities for further screening and support. (Strategy in the area of migrations and asylum and action plan for the period 2016-2020., 2016). The categories covered below include a wide range of vulnerable individuals within mixed migration flows. First line officials need to be aware they also may encounter vulnerable individuals who do not fall under those categories but who need assistance, including elderly migrants, migrants with disabilities or serious health conditions, pregnant women, migrants in need of family unification, and others (IOM & UNHCR, 2017).

People who migrate regularly, with valid travel documents, may also fall victim to traffickers, but the irregular situation of many migrants in irregular movements makes them particularly vulnerable. Unaccompanied children, stranded migrants, refugees and asylum seekers and stateless persons among mixed migration flows are particularly susceptible.

Many individuals who travel as part of mixed migration flows, may be unaware that they may become victims of trafficking, assuming that they are merely smuggled to another country. Smuggled migrants voluntarily enter into arrangements with migrant smugglers but may subsequently become victims of crimes, including kidnapping, extortion, rape, assault and trafficking in persons (Strategy in the area of migrations and asylum and action plan for the period 2016-2020., 2016).

Some smugglers may put migrants into exploitative situations on the basis of paying off their smuggling debts. Because of all of this, we have created a special set of feedback for the National TIP Coordinator in order to find out about the new forms of TIP within the migration crisis. We set the next question, What they think about cases in their Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Table 1)

- Migrants reported to have paid smugglers to be hidden from the public spaces, but they were then forced to remain in a closed space against their will.
- Migrants having worked or provided services for someone during their journey without receiving the expected or any remuneration in return.
- Migrants have been forced to work or perform activities against their will.
- Migrants reported having been approached with offers of an arranged marriage (for the respondent or for a close family member).
- Migrants REPORTED that they experienced physical violence.
- Migrants were offered money in exchange for blood, organs or body parts.
- Migrants FORCED to give blood, organs or body part.
- Migrants threatened with sexual violence.
Table 1: Forms of exploitations in the mixed migration flows in B&H (IOM - Flow Monitoring Surveys, 2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>… were held against their will</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… have worked without getting the expected payment</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… were forced to work</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… offers of an arranged marriage</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… experienced physical violence</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… cash in exchange for blood, organs or body parts</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… FORCED to give blood, organs or body part</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… threatened with sexual violence</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… no of cases within FMS2017 Survey</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Let's see, what National TIP Coordinator think about special mobile phone app, developed to provide smartphone accessible and useful information for migrant? Is it useful?

Table 2: Technical help for Migrants in B&H

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>… there is an SOS phone for migrants in your country</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… there is other technical help for migrants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the forthcoming phase we talked to 30 migrants (Camps in: BiH) about the same topic as with National TIP Coordinators. Their experience and bad experiences in migration were interesting to us.

What Migrants think about special mobile phone app, developed to provide smartphone accessible and useful information for migrant? Is it useful for them? The most frequent answers were:
• “Good idea. Is possible to set some kind of translator with legal terms, to better explain situation, something as Google translator. Advices, how to apply for asylum etc
• “That is very necessary. It is very dangerous to be bad or non-informed, or confused..-addresses of asylum centres (how to apply for asylum and security advices)”
• “Good idea.. Advices on help centres, legislation of various countries on various languages - addresses of help centres, advices on how and what to do etc”
• To be able to contact my parents and close family in the country of origin, from every country I am traveling through.
• Information regarding the safety of the road and the route that I am traveling through. Also information about the possibilities for asylum and employment in the countries I am traveling through.
• Information regarding the safety of the road and the route that I am traveling through. Also information about the possibilities for asylum and employment in the countries I am traveling through. This information would be useful for me because I have BA, and I would like to go to a country where I can use my knowledge.
• Information regarding locations of all migrants camps in the countries, borders of countries where I am traveling through, safe road for traveling, and maybe information about weather forecast
• It would be useful to have a phone number for hospitals and other institutions.
• Which is the nearest camp? Is this camp safe and could s/he be accepted/accommodated in it? What NGOs are present in the camp? Numbers of GOs such as police, hospital...?

**Forms of exploitation – migrants experience**

Migrants reported to have paid smugglers to be hidden from the public spaces, but they were then forced to remain in a closed space against their will in many cases. The most frequent answers were:

• “...just during travel, paid to smugglers 200 EUR”
• “... just during travel, paid to smugglers 1000 EUR”
• “... just during travel, paid to smugglers 500 EUR”
• “... paid 4500 EUR to smugglers, have been locked for 3 days at the forest house”
• “... have been closed for 2 days in the forest house in Croatia where I was settled by the smuggler, paid 4500 EUR “
• “.... 3 days in the house in the middle of the forest, paid 4200 EUR “
• “... have been closed for 4 days in the truck, paid 1500 EUR,”
• “... Paid 5500 EUR in total. I have been hidden in truck for 4 days, smuggled on route Greece heading to Croatia”
• “...Paid 6000 EUR in total. Have been hidden in truck for 3 days in Turkey and for 2 days on route Greece heading to Croatia”
Security dialogues

• “... I had to pay to a smuggler to hide me from public spaces, paid 1000 euros to get from Thessaloniki-Greece to Belgrade-Serbia”
• “... Yes, it happened in Turkey. I was imprisoned in an abandoned house, where I was hold for eight days. I escaped from the house while the smuggler was out“

Migrants REPORTED that they experienced different type of physical violence.

• “I have been beaten by the Romanian police, uniformed. In Serbia I have been beaten by ordinary citizens of Serbia”
• “I have been beaten by Croatian police. Hurt legs and hands. Not head nor torso, just hands and legs”
• “I have been beaten by Serbian smugglers, during the transport, when asked for sandwich but had no additional cash...”
• “I have been beaten by uniformed Croatian police. They took my mobile and never got it back”
• “I have been beaten in the truck, during the transport by smugglers, on route Greece-Croatia, after I asked for some food”
• “Algerian migrant attacked my by knife in Serbia. I have been wounded (visible scars on lower part of leg)”
• “I have been beaten several times while travelling across Iran. He thinks that he was beaten 5 or more times by Iranian smugglers and civilians. Reason was that he had no more cash to give them”

In a many cases, while the migrant was kept in the smuggler’s house in the village at the Macedonian – Serbian border, he experienced physical violence several times. They attacked them in order to pay just to continue to his final destination. The migrant was even left with no clothes and threatened that the smugglers would take his organs if he did not pay.

Migrants were beaten in Greece by Greek police officers. Since they did not have any documents with them, the police wanted to take them to police station. They refused, and afterwards they were beaten. Finally police took them to police station, where they were kept for one hour and then released.

Unaccompanied and separated children in migration

The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified a number of protection gaps in the treatment of such children, including that unaccompanied and separated children face greater risks of, inter alia, sexual exploitation and abuse, military recruitment, child labour (including for foster families) and detention. In many countries, unaccompanied and separated children are routinely denied entry to or detained by border or immigration officials. In other cases, they are admitted but are denied access to asylum procedures, or their asylum claims are not handled in an age and gender-sensitive manner. Some countries impede separated children who are recognised
as refugees from applying for family reunification. Many such children are granted only temporary status, which ends when they turn 18, and there are few effective return programmes (Termiz, et.al. 2010).

The vulnerable situation of migrant unaccompanied and separated minors worldwide, and the threats they face need to be addressed, particularly with the significant increase in their number in the current ‘refugee crises. The 2016 State of the Union speech called for a strong and immediate protection of unaccompanied and separated minors, in line with the EU’s historical values (Feltz, 2015).

In this paper we have created a special set of feedback for the BH National TIP Coordinators in order to find out about the new problems of unaccompanied and separated children in migration within the migration crisis (see Table 3).

Table 3: Unaccompanied and separated children in migration (UASC) - effective system in B&H

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does Your State take measures to have an effective system of guardianship which takes into account the specific needs and circumstances of unaccompanied and separated children in migration in order to protect and promote their rights and secure their best interests</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are separated children, present in their jurisdiction effectively provided with guardianship (alongside legal assistance) and representation, promptly after identification as an unaccompanied child</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation and guardianship - Is there a requirement to ensure that the child is represented throughout the entire process</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child is represented by Social Welfare Service?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any exceptions regarding children based on age</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is s/he always informed in a language s/he can understand?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An age assessment is a procedure organised by a public body to determine the chronological age of an individual lacking legal documents. Being considered an “undocumented migrant” by the administration and not an “unaccompanied child” may have serious consequences. If the age assessment concludes that the individual is 18 years of age or older, s/he will not benefit from the protective regime afforded to child asylum-seekers which includes lodging, access to healthcare and education and legal provisions limiting the recourse to detention. Incorrect age assessments often result in children being wrongfully detained or made homeless. Negotiating who should benefit from the rights afforded by childhood on the basis of arbitrary measurements is unacceptable (Feltz, 2015).

To ensure the highest degree of protection of the rights of the child during age assessment, it is necessary to approach every step from the perspective of the best interests of the child,
including his or her own particular circumstances. They must be a primary concern, even over the State’s political interests.

As we can see, in the region of WB there are no statutory procedures, protocols, guidance or recommendations issued on age assessment procedures by different authorities. In addition, the concern relates to the fact that domestic courts have not examined the application of age assessment procedures in individual cases (see Table 4).

Table 4: UASC - Age Assessment Procedures in B&H: Statutory procedure

| Is there any statutory procedure, protocol, guidance or recommendations issued on age assessment procedures by different authorities? | No |
| Have domestic courts examined the application of age assessment procedures in individual cases? | No |

Every country is free to choose the method used to scrutinise the age of an individual. The most common are wrist/carpal x-rays, followed by dental examinations and dental x-rays. To a lesser degree, collar bone and hip x-rays as well as physical development assessments are also used.

When it comes to the methods used to determine the age of unaccompanied children in migration in WB countries, we can see the prevailing “social oriented” methods: Documents submitted or obtained during the process, Estimation based on physical appearance, Age assessment interview, Social services assessment and Psychological evaluation. On the other hand, other methods are completely unknown to the countries o. (see Table 5).

Table 5: Unaccompanied and separated children in migration - age assessment procedures in B&H

| Documents submitted or obtained during the process | No |
| Estimation based on physical appearance | Yes² |
| Age assessment interview | Yes³ |
| Social services assessment | Yes⁴ |
| Psychological evaluation | Yes⁵ |
| Dental observation | No |
| Physical development observation | No |
| Carpal (hand/wrist) x-ray | No |
| Collar bone x-ray | No |
| Dental x-ray (wisdom/front teeth) | No |
| Sexual maturity observation | No |
The European Union has competence to deal with ‘legal migration’ (e.g. people coming to Europe on invitation of a specific employer, family reunification, etc.) and hence to lay down conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals. The EU is also competent to prevent and reduce ‘irregular migration’ according to article 78 and 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). This means that the EU is competent to legislate on common standards concerning age assessment. Article 25 of the Directive on common procedures for granting or withdrawing international protection (“Asylum Procedures Directives”) authorises the use of medical examination in order to determine the age of an unaccompanied minor in European Law. It does not specifically deal with the different existing methods, but lays down rights and safeguards for the child: to be provided with legal and procedural information free of charge, to have a representative appointed, personal interview(s) conducted by a qualified professional, a presumption of minority, the use the least invasive method, informed consent, the fact that no decision of non-minority can be based solely on a refusal to undergo medical examination, and finally the protection of the best interests of the child. Consequently, the Commission will be very interested to receive NGO observations that expose systematic violations of these safeguards.

An incorrect age assessment can have grave consequences by denying vulnerable UASC the services that they are entitled to and putting them at risk. For example, young girl, claimed asylum as a child in some countries. After an age assessment was requested, the Local Authority wrongly assessed her to be 23 when she was 15 years old and thus she was denied adequate protection which resulted in her being sexually abused. This theoretical case demonstrates the potential human cost of inadequate practice.

Therefore, it is very important for the procedures to proceed as soon as possible and to result in a formal decision. (see Table 6).

Table 6: Unaccompanied and separated children in migration - age assessment procedures in B&H

| Upon arrival/interception on the territory | No |
| Within a week                              | No |
| Within a month                             | Yes |
| Does age assessment result in a formal decision | No |

**Conclusion**

Trafficking should be treated in a more comprehensive fashion and thus expanded beyond sexual exploitation in order to encompass new forms namely criminal schemes of child begging and workers’ exploitation, whereas the latter are deceived by false promises and deprived of all human rights and decent treatment.

Bosnia and Herzegovina should take additional steps to improve the identification of victims of human trafficking, in particular by following:

- Ensure that all possible and formally identified victims of trafficking, irrespective of their
nationality and regardless of whether they cooperate with the investigating/prosecuting authorities and are accommodated in shelters, receive adequate assistance in accordance with their needs. This should include measures to:

- ensure adequate funding for NGO service providers to work with victims of THB;
- ensure access to health care to all victims of THB;
- develop capacities for assistance, including safe accommodation, adapted to the specific needs of male victims of THB;
- facilitate the reintegration of victims of trafficking into society by establishing long-term programmes and providing them with vocational training and assistance to find employment.
- make efforts to improve the identification of and assistance to child victims of trafficking, in particular by:
  - ensuring that relevant actors take a proactive approach and increase their outreach work to identify child victims of THB, including by continuing to pay attention to children in street situations;
  - providing further training to stakeholders (police, prosecutors, NGOs, centres for social welfare, child specialists) and guidance on the identification of child victims of THB, based on an agreed understanding of the concepts of trafficking for purpose of forced begging, forced criminality and early, child or forced marriages;
  - providing support and services which are adapted to the needs of child victims of trafficking, including appropriate accommodation, access to education and vocational training;
  - ensuring long-term monitoring of the reintegration of child victims of trafficking;
  - ensuring that proper risk assessment is conducted before returning children to their parents, taking into account the best interests of the child;
  - reviewing the criminal and civil procedures regarding compensation from perpetrators with a view to improving their effectiveness;
  - ensuring that victims of THB are systematically informed of their right to claim compensation and the procedures to be followed;
  - enabling victims of THB to exercise their right to compensation by guaranteeing them effective access to legal aid;
  - strengthening the capacity of law practitioners to help victims claim compensation and incorporating the issue of compensation in the training programmes for members of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary.
- there is no SOS phone for migrants.
- prosecutors do not apply same standards, and do not have same skills and experience in cases involving trafficking, which may cause certain level of victims discrimination due to inappropriate level of protection and support.
- police officers lack experience and training to recognise potential VOTS within the mixed migration flows, which occurs in many forms, including through labour exploitation primarily. Also, trafficking within the mixed migration flows cases have not been a familiar form of trafficking for judiciary
- very weak system for dealing with unaccompanied and separated children. Standard
operating procedures for dealing with unaccompanied and separated children, Standard Operative procedures for the treatment of vulnerable categories of foreign persons when introduced and implemented could have new potential for identification/referral.

- There has no statutory procedure, protocol, guidance or recommendations issued on age assessment procedures for unaccompanied and separated children in migration by different authorities.
- Domestic courts have no examined the application of age assessment for unaccompanied and separated children in migration procedures in individual cases.
- When it comes to the methods used to determine the age of unaccompanied children in migration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can see the prevailing “social oriented” methods: documents submitted or obtained during the process, estimation based on physical appearance, age assessment interview, social services assessment and psychological evaluation. On the other hand, other much more sophisticated methods are completely unknown to the Bosnia and Herzegovina but and other West Balkan Country.
- Age assessment of unaccompanied and separated children in migration does not result in a formal decision.

- inadequate cooperation between public and private sector in prevention of trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors through travel and tourism industry as well as with associations of employers is new potential for development of indicators for identification/referral.
- inadequate number of day centres for street children - Day centres for street children are recognised as an example of good practice and if accompanied with Psychosocial work on the street could be new potential for development of indicators for identification/referral.

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WHEN ASYLUM IS THE ONLY WAY OUT: MACEDONIA’S ASYLUM LEGISLATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE REFUGEE CRISIS

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Abstract:

Starting the refugee crisis and the influx of different categories of people moving to and through the territory of the Republic of Macedonia has shown how legal and practical weaknesses Macedonia and the other countries of the region have. Although, most of the migrants and refugees passing through the Macedonian territory, did not seek asylum here, but in the EU member countries, a necessity for changes in the provisions of the Asylum Law emerged. In the light of the above, using the normative and comparative method, the paper analyses the 2015/2016 refugees and migrant crisis situation in the Republic of Macedonia, the legal challenges, mostly the Asylum Law amendments and their compatibility with the EU’s Common European Asylum System.

Keywords: Asylum, European Union, migrant, refugee, the Republic of Macedonia

Introduction

The Republic of Macedonia was an inevitable crossing point during the influx of migrants from the Middle East who were seeking sanctuary in the EU member countries. The pick of the migration flow was in 2015/2016 where the number of refugees and migrants that where crossing the Macedonian borders got up to 750,000 (Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan For Europe Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Route, 2016), but Macedonia as a small country that was caught up in an ongoing political crises, did not have the capacity for a proper response without the help from the international community. The severity of this situation prompted a fast and appropriate legal improvement regarding the provisions on humanitarian
aid to refugee, the provisions on unaccompanied foreign minors, and the procedures for the vulnerable categories of migrants.

Around half of the refugees and migrants that entered into Macedonian territory in 2015 declared their intention to apply for asylum, and that was the reason why the necessary changes in the existing Asylum Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia 49/03, 66/07, 142/08, 146/09, 166/12, 27/13, 101/15, 152/15, 55/16, 71/16) were made in June 2015 when the National Assembly passed the Law of Amending and Addition of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, 101/15, 152/15, 55/16, 71/16).

This situation did not bring to light only the insufficient and inadequate legal solutions in the Macedonian legal system, but also the need of a comprehensive cooperation and collaboration with international and national agencies and institutions, NGO’s and other relevant subject regarding the improvement of services and interventions in attaining minimum humanitarian standards in the reception and assistance sites.

In the next chapters of this paper we will give a retrospective of the policies and actions undertaken by the government and state bodies and institutions regarding the refugees and migrant crisis in 2015/2016, the international documents containing provisions about refugees and migrants that Macedonia has signed and ratified and the national legal provisions regarding the Asylum procedure before and after the influx of large numbers of refugees and migrants.

**Macedonian Migration Policy**

With the large number of migrant crossing the Macedonia-Greece border and the estimated future arrivals, with the lack of a consistent cooperation with Greek authorities, prompt the following political and institutional solutions from Macedonia.

At first the policies and decisions were made on a daily bases trying to win over the international support and gain political points in the national political scene, with negative attitude towards migrants and refugees who were seen as people who were illegally crossing the border and not as possible asylum seekers. That eventually had a negative reflection on the actions regarding the fact that these people only wanted a safe passage through Macedonian territory. After that began the phase of proper registration and organized transport from the southern to the northern border and finally the phase of building metal fences and selective passage of refugees and migrants regarding their nationality, preceded with a nationalistic political atmosphere from the leading political parties (Spasov, 2016).

Regarding the institutional response to these crises we can say that it was consistent with the crisis management law. That meant that a risk assessment should be done to assess the situation and give a report with the identified security threats and risks from the Crisis Management Center. From this report a number of proposals were made to all relevant institutions, such as the president as commander in-chief of the armed forces, the government, and the ministries of defense, interior, labor, transport and health as well as the local authorities from the affected municipalities (Deliso, 2015).
A special Unit for Border Affairs and Migration was established in the Ministry of Interior and was responsible for security and safe management of Macedonian borders, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy was responsible for providing acceptable services and socioeconomic integration during the times of stay in Macedonia for refugees and migrants and also special protection for children without parents, asylum seekers and other vulnerable groups (Chudoska-Blazhevska and Juberias, 2016).

Two of the most relevant policy documents regarding migrants and refugees are both Strategies for integration of refugees and aliens for different time periods. The first one for the time period 2008-2015 was the first step towards a better social protection, accommodation and health care, and made crucial changes regarding the opportunities for future employment and education (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 2008). The second one for the time period 2017-2027 came in a different political climate when Macedonia was overwhelmed with a large number of refugees and migrants and was in need of improving the policies which were incorporated in the previous Strategy. The new Strategy addressed the different challenges that were not present when refugees from the region were in question, and those were the different cultural background and linguistic barriers set between Middle East refugees and migrants and Macedonian citizens. Also, this strategy incorporates solutions for each and every category of person who have rights under the Macedonian Asylum Law (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 2017).

**Macedonian first asylum law and its legal solutions**

Macedonia is a signature country of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees from 1951 and 1967 respectively, and also of the Convention relating to the status of stateless persons from 1994. That means that Macedonia guaranties the right to asylum to foreigners and stateless persons which are prosecuted because of their democratic and political views and activities.

The right to asylum is guaranteed in article 29 of the Macedonian Constitution, but also within this article is given the right to foreigners to enjoy all the freedoms and rights which are set forward in the Constitution.

The Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection was adopted in 2003 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia 49/03) and its provisions incorporated the fundamental rights given in the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the Convention against Torture and the European Convention for Human Rights. This Law regulates the conditions and procedure for granting of the right of asylum to an alien or a stateless person, who are seeking recognition of the right of asylum in the Republic of Macedonia, and also the right to a temporary protection, the procedure to grant this right and the rights and duties of persons from both of these categories.

Further in the legal provisions of this law are given the definitions of the persons who have the right of asylum (recognized refugee and a person under humanitarian protection), incorporating the principle of non-refoulement in article 7 (which stipulates that the persons who
have right of asylum cannot be expelled or returned if there is a treat to their life, freedoms or rights). Also, asylum seekers have the right to family reunification with members of their nuclear family.

The procedure for recognition of the right of asylum begins with an application from the asylum seeker when he enters the territory of the Republic of Macedonia and the request should be made to the border police or in the nearest police station. The application can be given in written form or orally in a language that the asylum seeker understands and uses. If the asylum seeker has residents in Macedonia the application should be submitted in the Sector for Asylum and even aliens that made illegal entrance or reside illegally in Macedonia have the right to apply for asylum, but under one condition, to submit the application immediately or if he reports himself to the nearest police station and give an explanation for his/her illegal entry. After the application had been submitted the asylum seeker is photographed and fingerprinted (Articles 15-18).

Asylum seekers need to present relevant documentation regarding their identity, visas, marital status, travel tickets etc. in original. They have the right to an interpreter and unaccompanied minors or mentally disabled persons shall be given a guardian in accordance to the legal provisions from the Family Law. During the procedure and the interviewing of the asylum seeker the public is excluded.

The final chapter of the procedure is the decision that can be positive, meaning the asylum application will be accepted or negative, the application will be rejected. The asylum seeker has the right to appeal the decision and during that procedure the decision cannot be executed.

In one of the chapters of the Asylum law are given the rights and duties of the asylum seekers. During the period of time when asylum seekers are awaiting for the final decision from the relevant authorities they have the right to residence, accommodation and care in the Reception Center, basic health services, work assignments inside of the Reception Center and communication with the High Commissioner for Refugees and NGO’s which provide legal assistance regarding the procedure of recognition of the right to asylum.

Since its adoption the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection has been amended several times. The first amendment in 2007 (Official Gazette 66/07) was made in direction of harmonizing the national law with the EU Directive on Asylum (Council of EU, 2005) and implementing the remarks in this area made in the Report from the Commission of the European Communities (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). The novelty in this amendment is adding a new article 4a which incorporates the definition of Person under subsidiary protection “A person under subsidiary protection is an alien, who is not qualified as recognized refugee, but to whom the Republic of Macedonia will recognize the right to asylum and will allow him to stay on her territory, because of the existing reasons for believing that if this person is returned in the state where he has citizenship, or if he is a stateless person, in the state where he had last residents, he will face a real risk of enduring serious injuries, such as death penalty or execution; torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or serious and individual treats to his life or person as a civilian”.

The following amendment was made in 2008 (Official Gazette, 142/08) in which the term ‘person under humanitarian protection’ was changed with ‘person under subsidiary protection’
and also changes were made regarding the right of the asylum seeker to an adequate legal remedy and the chance to start an administrative dispute against the decision made by the Sector for asylum before an appropriate court.

In 2009 (Official Gazette, 164/09) the amendments were made in the direction of incorporating the provisions from article 26.1 from the Asylum Procedures Directive regarding the first country of asylum “A country can be considered to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant for asylum if: s/he has been recognized in that country as a refugee and s/he can still avail him/herself of that protection; or s/he otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement” (Article 9a from the Law on Asylum). A new article 23a was added in which were defined the categories of Vulnerable people with disabilities and the permit of stay for persons under subsidiary protection has to last at least 1 year (Article 58).

Most of the changes to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection were made with the amendments from 2012 (Official Gazette, 166/12) when were incorporated new provisions regarding the definitions about asylum seekers and the request for asylum; actions that can lead to prosecution defined in article 1A from the Convention relating to the status of refugees from 1951, which institutions can lead the prosecutions about serious law violations, free legal help, further elaboration on which country is seen as safe and free third country, the assessment of facts and circumstances that are crucial for making the decision of granting of denying asylum, in which cases the application for asylum can be considered to be withdrawn, clarification of the duties that the asylum seeker have and also about the personal information that need to be contained in the integrated database for foreigners, including data for asylum, visa and migration.

Current legal solutions in the Republic of Macedonia regarding the Asylum Procedure (Amendments from 2015 and 2016)

The changes of the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection which were made with the amendments from 2015 (Official Gazette, 101/15 and 152/15) are the ones in the direction of making a distinction between the intent for asylum application and the formal aspect of such application (when a person actually applies for an asylum status in the country). Such amendments were a necessary step in the process of prevention of illegal migration, but on the other hand, those provisions would help the potential asylum applicants during their asylum application and during the process of decision. The process of changes in the Law on asylum and temporary protection, actually was a harmonization with EU regulation. Namely, with the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof; the Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (Qualification Directive); the Directive 2013/32/EU of the

Namely, the amendments of the Law on asylum and temporary protection gave the potential asylum applicants the possibility to move through the country legally by filling out a document stating their intention of applying for asylum status. The potential asylum applicant has 72 hours to either apply for asylum in the Department for asylum in the Reception Center for asylum applicants or to leave the country (art.16).

The last amendments of the Law on asylum and temporary protection were made in 2016 (Official Gazette, 55/16 and 71/16). These amendments included the principle of family reunification which can only be exercised after three years from the moment the asylum applicant was granted asylum (art.8, p.3), which later on is pointed out from the EU as a problem, because it is not in accordance to the Family Reunification Directive (Directive 2003/86/EU).

Also, these amendments included the term safe third country and its definition. Namely, the Geneva Conventions and the Asylum Procedures Directive consider a safe country, the country where there is a democratic system and where there is no general danger of persecution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, no threat of violence and no armed conflict. According to Macedonian Law on asylum and temporary protection, a safe third country, member country of the European Union, NATO member country or EFTA member country is every country that has ratified and applies the provisions from the Convention relating to the status of refugees from 1951 and the European Convention on Human Rights, including the standards for effective legal mean, and also has established an asylum application according to Law and in accordance to the Convention relating to the status of refugees from 1951 (art.10a).

Any asylum application coming from a person who wants to enter or has illegally entered the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, coming from a safe third country, EU, NATO or EFTA member state, will be taken as unfounded in accordance with article 35 of the Law on asylum and temporary protection, taking into account the principle of *non-refoulement* from article 7 of the Law on asylum and temporary protection. The 2016 Commission Report also addresses few concerns regarding these provisions of the Law on asylum and temporary protection, especially because applications made by asylum seekers from safe third countries are always considered unfounded (Stanojoska, 2018), which is contrary to the Asylum Procedures Directive.

**Strategy for integration of refugees and aliens in the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2017 - 2027**

In 2008, Macedonia had its first Strategy for Integration of Refugees for the time period of 2008 - 2015 and an Action Plan for its implementation. In this period the state, gradually started to take care of social protection, accommodation and health insurance. The existence of the Strategy besides helping each refugee to benefit from his/her rights of social protection,
accommodation and health insurance, was crucial for plans for individual or family integration. The Strategy 2008 - 2015 was positively used in direction towards integration and social inclusion of Kosovo refugees, which are now socially integrated into Macedonian society.

The 2017 – 2027 Strategy is a public policy document and is directed towards protection and integration of individuals which under the Law for asylum and temporary protection, are:

- individuals with recognized refugee status;
- individuals under subsidiary protection;
- asylum seekers;
- aliens that are legally staying in the Republic of Macedonia.

The newly established Center for refugees and aliens integration (body established with the Strategy) should help the Government in the integration process. Being a multidisciplinary, the Center has the possibilities to support the integration process by employment activities and professional training activities. Its long-term obligations are to become a consultative center, where refugees can get informed and use services such as housing, health and social protection, education, plans for individual or family integration. Also, it accents the need for better future social inclusion of refugees, mentioning the example with Roma people who originate from Kosovo and their decision to live among other Roma people in Shuto Orizari neighborhood. Actual social inclusion should help refugees to be accepted in other, mostly heterogenous neighborhoods, and will prevent their future marginalization.

**Conclusion**

The development of the Asylum Law in the Republic of Macedonia, even though it is relatively new, still in its short period of time from the first adopted law to the last amendments, has been improved so it can absorb and reflect the current migration problems and needs of the asylum seekers. Also, the legislators through the process of amending had in mind the need of harmonization of the Macedonian Asylum Law to the relevant European Union law from this area and their proper practical implementation.

Still Macedonian authorities are faced with problems when it comes to managing the different migration flows and a system of protection-sensitive screening of persons entering the country has not been implemented and that affects the effectiveness of the procedure for identification, profiling, referral and follow up on specific needs. Another problem is the lack of capacity of the border officials when it comes to recognizing the persons with international protection needs, including asylum seekers and the shortage of information about the right to seek asylum available at the borders.

In its observation UNHCR (UNHCR, 2015: 6-9) concluded that the police stations outside of Skopje do not prioritize asylum applicants and they direct them to the police stations in Skopje to pursue their application there. The registration forms are lacking very basic biographical data, because interpretation is not available at the police stations. A gender sensitive approach is almost nonexistent, and specific needs are not identified or taken into account at this initial stage
of the asylum procedure and these results in treatment that is not appropriately followed up with relation to their gender, age, or other specific needs.

When it comes to the Asylum procedure, the increase of asylum applications has given us a real picture about the shortcomings and to one of the main impediments to effective, efficient, and fair asylum procedure, which is the small administrative capacity when it comes to adequate equipment and proper budgetary support. An ongoing problem is the lack of interpretation that is provided to the asylum seeker and that reflects the outcome of the asylum procedure in a negative way. Also, the procedure at the first instance is really slow and with many delays, and when it comes to the decisions the Section for Asylum rarely made on the grounds of merits and they do not reflect the statement of the applicant as a whole, but only selective parts that suit them and without proper background checks about the facts and information’s regarding the country of origin and finally they are based upon inadequate legal reasoning’s.

This means that in the Republic of Macedonia we have made the needed and appropriate changes and amendments to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection, which means that the legal provisions can be implemented in an effective and efficient way if we have the much needed professionalism among the relevant authorities, institutions and administrative staff that make the first contact with the asylum seekers and should guide and advise them during the application procedure, the procedure in front of the first instance institutions and the procedures regarding the legal remedies.

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