Call for papers vol 9, no. 1, 2018 is open until 30 March 2018


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Transnational linkages between criminals and terrorists have occurred on some level for centuries, but have evolved during the past several decades because of the increasing international law enforcement pressure. The worldwide anti-terror campaign and an extremely broad approach of repressing terrorist funding make cooperation become a rational choice for both organized criminal groups and terrorists. Moreover, the crime-terror nexus could also take advantage of the communication technology and advanced equipment to minimize their risk getting caught.
There is, however, growing recognition that the intersection between organized crime and terror organizations is deepening and becoming more complex. The intersection of crime and terrorism raises three important issues that have bearing on considerations of counterfeiting: First, to what extent do terrorist organizations have an “in-house” criminal capacity? In the words of one observer, “Some of the most serious terrorism cases detected have not involved organized crime groups at all—the terrorists have acted alone using methods of organized crime” (Williams, 2005).
Second, to what extent have criminal and terrorist organizations allied with each other in either parasitical or symbiotic ways? And third, to what extent have terrorists
benefited indirectly from the proceeds of organized criminal activity? A list of terrorist organizations with reputed in-house and/or sizable criminal operations or capabilities might include Hezbollah, FARC, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), the PKK, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Provisional IRA, and the LTTE. These organizations engage in criminal enterprises across international borders, within their home countries, within Diaspora communities (especially in North America), and in their areas of operation.
There is also growing evidence of cooperation between terrorist organizations and organized crime, which again is most notable for the insurgent groups—Peru’s Shining Path, FARC, M19 in Colombia, the LTTE, and the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) are reported to have provided security for narcotics cartels in their respective countries or regions (Gorka, 2000).
In the Balkans and Central Asia, as well as Colombia, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, markets dominated by organized crime require terrorist organizations desiring entry to
forge alliances. Moreover, terrorists and criminals both operate “outside the law,” and they often use the same methods, such as false identification and shipping documents and counter surveillance techniques (Sanderson, 2004).
Since the two groups are interested in two different objectives, it seems reasonable to assume that similar to any other normal activity they will be tempted to get involved

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